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Recent Decisions
The Maryland Court of Appeals
I. ATToRNEY MALPRACTICE
A. Breathing New Life into the Strict Privity Rule in Attorney
Malpractice Actions
In Noble v. Bruce,' the Court of Appeals considered whether a tes-
tamentary beneficiary could maintain a cause of action for profes-
sional malpractice against the testator's attorney when there was no
privity of contract between the beneficiary and the attorney.2 In two
consolidated cases, one involving an allegation of negligent estate
planning advice,3 and the other a claim of negligent will drafting,4 the
court held that strict privity was a necessary element in establishing a
cause of action by the beneficiaries for attorney malpractice.5 While
the court may have decided the cases at bar correctly, the court's rea-
soning suggests a severe limitation of the recent trend in many other
jurisdictions, and to a limited degree in Maryland itself, to relax the
privity requirement in attorney malpractice suits brought by testamen-
tary beneficiaries.6 Unfortunately, this limitation precludes malprac-
tice suits when they are the sole means of compensating innocently
injured parties and holding attorneys responsible for their negligent
will drafting or estate planning advice.
1. The Case.-
a. Noble v. Bruce.-In 1991, Earl and Florence Long re-
tained Charles A. Bruce, Jr., an attorney practicing in Somerset
County, Maryland, to provide estate planning advice and prepare
their wills.7 Bruce prepared "mirror wills" for the Longs, which pro-
vided that if either spouse was the first to die, the surviving spouse
would inherit all of the decedent spouse's interest in theirjoint prop-
1. 349 Md. 730, 709 A.2d 1264 (1998).
2. Id. at 733, 709 A.2d at 1266.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 752-53, 709 A.2d at 1275.
6. See infra note 64 and accompanying text (citing cases from several jurisdictions in
which a third party beneficiary exception to the strict privity rule has been adopted in
attorney malpractice actions brought by testamentary beneficiaries).
7. Noble, 349 Md. at 733, 709 A.2d at 1266.
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erty.8 When the surviving spouse died, all property would then pass to
the Longs' children as specified in the will. 9 These wills were exe-
cuted on July 29, 1991.1' On August 28, 1991, Mr. Long died, and his
entire estate passed to Mrs. Long as specified in his will. t l Shortly
after his death, Mrs. Long transferred all of her real property to two of
the Longs' children, Lorraine Kulyncyz and Thomas F. Long.12 Mrs.
Long died on June 22, 1994.13 On August 25, 1994, six of the Longs'
eight children, who were beneficiaries of their parents' wills, filed a
tort suit alleging malpractice against Bruce in the Circuit Court for
Somerset County. 14 The plaintiffs alleged that Bruce was negligent in
failing to advise the Longs of an estate planning mechanism known as
a "bypass trust," which would have allowed both of the Longs to shel-
ter up to $600,000 in their estates from federal estate tax.15
Bruce responded with a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a
motion for summary judgment.16 In support of his motion, Bruce
filed an affidavit in which he asserted that he had advised the Longs
regarding the use of a bypass trust, but that they chose not to use the
tax sheltering mechanism because it would result in them losing con-
trol over their property during their lifetimes. 7 The Circuit Court for
Somerset County granted summary judgment in favor of Bruce on
July 26, 1995, after determining that the plaintiffs would be unable to
prove what the Longs' intentions were in creating the wills or to con-
tradict Bruce's assertion that he had advised the Longs regarding the
use of a bypass trust. 8 The court dismissed as "irrelevant" the issue
whether a third party beneficiary could maintain a cause of action for
professional malpractice against an attorney, with whom they have no
privity, for failure to draft a will that gives effect to a testator's inten-
tions regarding the disposition of his estate. 9
8. Id. at 733-34, 709 A.2d at 1266.
9. Id. at 734, 709 A.2d at 1266. The will specified that the family residence and curti-
lage on one of the farms would go to Lorraine Kulyncyz, one of the Longs' daughters. Id.
The Longs' partial interest in certain other real property was to pass to Mr. Long's sister.
Id. The remainder of the estate was to pass to the Longs' eight children as joint tenants,
subject to a life estate in Thomas A. Long, one of the Longs' sons. Id.
10. Id. at 733, 709 A.2d at 1266.
11. Id. at 734, 709 A.2d at 1266.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 733-34, 709 A.2d at 1266. The six plaintiffs included all of the Longs' chil-
dren except for Lorraine Kulyncyz and Thomas F. Long. Id
15. Id. at 734, 709 A.2d at 1266.
16. Id. at 735, 709 A.2d at 1266.
17. Id. at 734, 709 A.2d at 1266.




In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the grant of summary judgment, holding that the Long beneficiaries
did not have standing to sue Bruce under a third party beneficiary
theory.2 ° The Court of Special Appeals recognized that the plaintiffs'
complaint alleged that they were the intended beneficiaries of the
contract between Bruce and the Longs, but noted that in Maryland,
this alone was insufficient to maintain a cause of action for attorney
malpractice." Additionally, a testamentary beneficiary must allege
that either the will is invalid, the testamentary intent as expressed in
the will has not been carried out, or there is a concession of error on
the part of the drafting attorney.22 Because the Long beneficiaries
did not allege the existence of any of these three situations, they failed
to satisfy an element of the cause of action for professional malprac-
tice. 2' The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether
the beneficiaries had standing to sue Bruce for professional malprac-
tice as third party beneficiaries of the contract between him and the
Longs.
24
b. Fauntleroy v. Blizzard.-In 1983, Mrs. Sue Jackson re-
tained attorney T. Hughlett Henry, Jr., to assist her in planning her
estate and drafting her will. 25 In her will, executed on March 11,
1983, she bequeathed all of the shares of stock she owned in the Pitts-
burgh Des Moines Steel Company (PDM) to the children and
grandchildren of her brother-in-law, William R. Jackson. 26 The will
also directed that all of the estate taxes should be paid out of the
residuary estate.27 On January 10, 1994, Mrs. Jackson died.28 At the
20. Noble v. Bruce, No. 1867, slip op. at 1-2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 15, 1996) (per
curiam).
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. (citing Layman v. Layman, 84 Md. App. 183, 190, 578 A.2d 314, 317 (1990)(quoting Kirgan v. Parks, 60 Md. App. 1, 12-13, 478 A.2d 713, 719 (1984))).
23. Id. at 9. The court also ruled that summary judgment was properly granted by the
trial judge even though discovery had yet to be completed. Id.
24. Noble, 349 Md. at 733, 735, 709 A.2d at 1266, 1267.
25. Id. at 735, 709 A.2d at 1267.
26. Id. at 735-36, 709 A.2d at 1267.
27. Id. at 736, 709 A.2d at 1267. On March 29, 1983, Henry sent a letter to Mrs. Jack-
son estimating the federal taxes that would be imposed on her estate after her death. Id.
The letter also included a statement by Henry to the effect that he was pleased that the
decision had been made "to have the bulk of the PDM stock pay its own share of [the] tax."
Id. In 1988, Mrs. Jackson revoked this first will and executed a new one, which was also
prepared by Henry. Id. The new will was in most respects similar to the previous one and
also directed that any taxes should be paid out of the residuary estate. Id. In 1990, Mrs.
Jackson and PDM entered into a stock purchase agreement, which provided that PDM
would buy back all of Mrs. Jackson's PDM shares upon her death at the market price as of
the date of her death. Id. The agreement was never implemented because of the inability
606 [VOL. 58:604
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time of her death, Mrs. Jackson's estate consisted of a farm and 44,816
shares of PDM stock worth approximately $1.4 million.29 The Faunt-
leroy beneficiaries, as the sole residuary beneficiaries, bore the entire
burden of the estate and inheritance taxes, which totaled approxi-
mately $910,000.30
On January 8, 1997, the Fauntleroy beneficiaries filed a com-
plaint in the Circuit Court for Talbot County against Sara N. Blizzard
and W. Thomas Fountain, Personal Representatives of the Estate of
Henry and his law firm." The complaint alleged that Henry had com-
mitted malpractice by preparing a will that provided for estate taxes to
be paid out of the residuary estate, contrary to Mrs. Jackson's 
intent.32
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a mo-
tion for summary judgment.3 3 The circuit court granted the defen-
dants' motion to dismiss on April 4, 1997, ruling that the Fauntleroy
beneficiaries lacked standing to sue the defendants under the rule
announced in Kirgan v. Parks.34 The Fauntleroy beneficiaries ap-
pealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and also filed a petition for
writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals.3
5 Before proceedings be-
gan in the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals issued a writ
of certiorari to determine whether a will beneficiary has standing to
sue an attorney for professional malpractice in the absence of privity
between them.3 6 Because Fauntleroy raised substantially the same issue
presented by Noble, the Court of Appeals consolidated both cases into
one opinion.
37
to satisfy a condition that the purchase be treated as a sale or exchange, rather than a
dividend, for tax purposes. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 737, 709 A.2d at 1267.
31. Id., 709 A.2d at 1268.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. In Kirgan v. Parks, 60 Md. App. 1, 478 A-2d 713 (1984), the Court of Special
Appeals ruled that a testamentary beneficiary could not maintain a cause of action for
negligence against the testator's attorney when "the will is valid, the testamentary intent as
expressed in the will has been carried out, and there is no concession of error by the attor-
ney." Id. at 12, 478 A.2d at 718-19; see infra notes 121-130 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Kirgan).
35. Noble, 349 Md. at 737, 709 A.2d at 1268.
36. Id.




a. The Origin of Strict Privity.-The issue of whether a party
can maintain an action in negligence against an attorney with whom
they are not in privity was first addressed in this country in 1879 by the
United States Supreme Court in Savings Bank v. Ward.38 In that case,
the defendant attorney, Ward, conducted a title search on behalf of a
landowner who wanted to use a parcel of land as collateral for aloan. 9 Ward reported to his client that his title in the land was good,
but in actuality, a previously recorded and valid conveyance existed.4 °
On the basis of this erroneous report, the bank extended a loan to
Ward's client, who subsequently defaulted.41 When the bank at-
tempted to sell the land in satisfaction of the debt, it discovered that
the deed was worthless.42 The bank sued Ward for the amount of the
loan.43 In rejecting the bank's cause of action against the attorney,
the Court stated:
Beyond all doubt, the general rule is that the obligation of
the attorney is to his client and not to a third party, and un-
less there is something in the circumstances of this case to
take it out of that general rule, it seems clear that the propo-
sition of the defendant must be sustained. 44
The Court concluded that in order for a party to maintain an action
for negligence against an attorney, the party must establish privity of
contract between themself and a defendant attorney.45 Despite this
strong language by the Supreme Court, however, only four states
maintain a requirement of strict privity for all attorney malpractice
claims involving wills and estate planning.46
38. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
39. Id. at 197.
40. Id. at 197-98.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 198.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 200.
45. Id. at 202-03.
46. See Helen Bishop Jenkins, Privity-A Texas-Size Barrier to Third Parties for NegligentWill Drafting-An Assessment and Proposal 42 BAYLOR L. REv. 687, 697-98 (1990) (noting that
courts in Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Texas "still regard the privity barrier as
a bar to recovery by the third party will beneficiary" (citing Williams v. Bryan, Cave, Mc-Pheeters, McRoberts, 774 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Lilyhorn v. Dier, 335N.W.2d 554 (Neb. 1983); Viscardi v. Lerner, 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (App. Div. 1986)(mem.); Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987) (per curiam); Dickey v.Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App. 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.))). Although Jenkins cites Mis-
souri as one of the states continuing to apply the strict privity rule, it changed its positionin 1995 in Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson &Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 628-29 (Mo. 1995)
[VOL. 58:604
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b. The Decline of Strict Pivity-California's "Balancing" The-
ory.-For nearly 100 years after Ward, the "strict privity" requirement
in attorney malpractice actions reigned as the dominant rule in all
jurisdictions.4 7 Although courts began to relax the requirement of
contractual privity in other tort areas in the early 1900s,48 it was not
until 1961, in the California case of Lucas v. Hamm,4 9 that a party was
permitted to pursue a malpractice action against an attorney with
whom they were not in privity.5 ° In Lucas, the testator hired the de-
fendant attorney to prepare a will under which the plaintiffs were to
be made beneficiaries of a trust.5 ' The trust provision in the will vio-
lated the rule against perpetuities, and the will was held invalid when
submitted to probate.5 2 As a result, the plaintiffs were compelled to
enter into a settlement with the testator's blood relatives under which
they received $75,000 less than what they would have received had the
trust provision been valid.
The California Supreme Court held that the determination
whether a beneficiary could bring an action for negligent will drafting
against an attorney with whom they were not in privity was a question
of public policy involving the balancing of various factors.
5 4 These
factors include: "the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connec-
tion between the defendant's conduct and the injury, and the policy
of preventing future harm."5 5 The Lucas court noted that, in this case,
(en banc), to allow suits against attorneys by nonclients. See infra note 61 and accompany-
ing text.
47. See Douglas A. Cifu, Expanding Legal Malpractice to Nonclient Third Parties-At What
Cost?, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 8-9 (1989) (noting that in 1958, the California
Supreme Court "became the first court to depart from the strict privity rule" in allowing a
beneficiary to recover against a notary public who negligently prepared a will, and three
years later, applied this rule to allow a will beneficiary the right to recover against a draft-
ing attorney).
48. See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922) (holding that lack of
privity did not prevent a party from recovering against a public weigher); MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053-54 (N.Y. 1916) (discarding the privity of contract
requirement in product liability actions).
49. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) (in bank).
50. Id. at 688; see Martin D. Begleiter, Attorney Malpractice in Estate Planning-You've Got
To Know When To Hold Up, Know When To Fold Up, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 193, 195 (1990)
(stating that the rule requiring privity in attorney malpractice actions "changed abruptly in
1961 when the Supreme Court of California decided ... Lucas v. Hamm").
51. Lucas, 364 P.2d at 686.
52. Id. at 686-87.
53. Id. at 687.
54. Id. at 687-88.
55. Id. at 687 (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958)).
1999]
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one of the primary purposes of the transaction between the testator
and the defendant attorney was to provide for a transfer of property to
the plaintiffs.56 In the event that the intended bequest failed, the
damage to the plaintiffs was clearly foreseeable. 57 Additionally, the
court reasoned, if persons such as the plaintiffs were unable to recover
for this type of loss, which resulted from the negligence of the attor-
ney, no one would be able to, and the policy of preventing future
harm would be frustrated. 58 The court also considered whether impo-
sition of liability would place an undue burden on the legal profes-
sion.59 The court answered in the negative, deciding that the lack of
privity in this particular case did not preclude the plaintiff from main-
taining a tort action against the defendant.60
Several other jurisdictions have followed the California "balanc-
ing of factors" test in determining the liability of a defendant attorney
to will beneficiaries when there is no privity of contract between
them.61 This test has not gained widespread acceptance in mostjuris-




60. Id. Despite this holding, the court decided that due to the confusion and difficulty
associated with the rule against perpetuities, the defendant's error did not constitute a
breach of the applicable standard of care. Id. at 690. The court also held that beneficiaries
of a will who were damaged by a drafting error could maintain an action in contract
against the drafting attorney under a third party beneficiary theory. Id. at 688. However,
the court concluded that the appropriate standard of care was equally applicable regard-
less of whether such a claim sounded in tort or contract. Id. at 689. Therefore, even in a
contract action, a plaintiff would have to prove that the attorney did not "use such skill,prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and
exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake." Id. (citing In re Kruger's
Estate, 63 P. 31 (Cal. 1900); Moser v. Western Harness Racing Ass'n, 200 P.2d 7 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1948); Armstrong v. Adams, 283 P. 871 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929)). A later Califor-
nia case expressed a somewhat more limited view: "[The contractual] theory of recovery
... is conceptually superfluous since the crux of the action must lie in tort in any case;
there can be no recovery without negligence." Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 164 (Cal.
1969) (in bank).
61. See Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345, 1354 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
under a balancing test which utilized the same factors as the California Supreme Court, a
third party would be allowed to sue an attorney for negligence under certain circum-
stances); Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Mo. 1995)(en banc) (noting that with slight modification, the California balancing approach "is an
appropriate method for determining an attorney's duty to non-clients"); Jenkins v.Wheeler, 316 S.E.2d 354, 356-57 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that "North Carolina now
recognizes a cause of action in tort by non-client third parties for attorney malpractice"
and that it considers the factors enunciated by the California Supreme Court in Lucas v.
Hamm); Auric v. Continental Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1983) (holding that, on
examination of the factors set forth in Lucas v. Hamm, a lack of privity should not bar an
action against an attorney by a nonclient will beneficiary).
[VOL. 58:604
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dictions, however, and at least one commentator has suggested that,
even in California, this test is nothing more than "a disguised rule of
liability based upon third party beneficiary theory."62
c. The Evolution of the Third Party Beneficiary Exception to Strict
Privity.-Many jurisdictions were reluctant to adopt California's "bal-
ancing of factors" theory to deal with the question of privity in attor-
ney malpractice claims.63 However, it soon became apparent that
most jurisdictions were willing to move away from strict privity. In-
stead of adopting the balancing test as announced in Lucas v. Hamm,
many jurisdictions have found an exception to the strict privity rule
under a third party beneficiary theory, particularly in cases involving
will drafting and estate planning.
64
62. See Cifu, supra note 47, at 11. Cifu suggests that subsequent California cases ad-
dressing the issue of attorney liability to parties with whom they are not in privity have been
reluctant to hold such attorneys liable for negligent conduct outside of the context of will
drafting. Id. at 10 n.61 (citing Courtney v. Waring, 237 Cal. Rptr. 233, 238-39 (Ct. App.
1987)); see also infra Part 2.c (discussing recovery for attorney malpractice under a third
party beneficiary theory).
63. See Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 749-50 (Pa. 1983) (criticizing the California
balancing test as proving unworkable and "[leading] to ad hoc determinations and inconsis-
tent results").
64. See Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 84 (Conn. 1981) (recognizing that "a person
named in an invalid will could recover as an intended third party beneficiary of an attor-
ney-client agreement to prepare that will, if the attorney's error caused the loss" (citing
Lucas, 364 P.2d 685)); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983) ("We hold
that the better view is that which allows the intended beneficiary of a will a malpractice
cause of action against the drafting attorneys."); Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein &
Stauber, P.A., 467 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("In limited circumstances...
an intended beneficiary under a will may maintain a legal malpractice action against the
attorney who prepared the will, if through the attorney's negligence a devise to that benefi-
ciary fails." (citing DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); McAbee v.
Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976))); Jewish Hosp. v. Boatmen's Nat'l
Bank, 633 N.E.2d 1267, 1275 (Il. App. Ct. 1994) ("[U]nder limited circumstances, a non-
client may maintain.. . a third-party-beneficiary/breach-of-contract action against an attor-
ney." (citing Ogle v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224 (Ill. 1984); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d
96 (Ill. 1982))); Walker v. Lawson, 526 N.E.2d 968,968 (Ind. 1988) ("[An action will lie by
a beneficiary under a will against the attorney who drafted that will on the basis that the
beneficiary is a known third party."); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa
1987) ("[A] lawyer owes a duty of care to the direct, intended, and specifically identifiable
beneficiaries of the testator as expressed in the testator's testamentary instruments."); Pizel
v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 48 (Kan. 1990) ("The strict requirement of privity of contract...
has been eased when an attorney renders services that the attorney should have recognized
as involving a foreseeable injury to a third-party beneficiary of the contract."); Charia v.
Hulse, 619 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing the right of an "intended
legatee to bring [a] claim as a third-party beneficiary" of a contract between a drafting
attorney and a testator); Mieras v. DeBona, 550 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Mich. 1996) (agreeing
that the plaintiffs were intended beneficiaries of the testator's will, and that the absence of
privity between the plaintiffs and defendant attorney did not preclude them from main-
taining an action in either contract or tort against the attorney); Simpson v. Calivas, 650
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In Guy v. Liederbach,6 5 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pro-
vided a thorough analysis of the applicability of third party beneficiary
theory as an exception to the strict privity rule in the will drafting
context. In this case, the plaintiff was named as the sole residuary
beneficiary in a will prepared by the defendant attorney. 66 When the
will was submitted to probate in New Jersey, the court repealed the
plaintiffs legacy because she had acted as a witness to the will signing
in violation of New Jersey law.67 The plaintiff brought suit against the
drafting attorney under both tort and contract theories of recovery.6"
Addressing the tort claim first, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
dismissed the California balancing test as being "unworkable" andleading to "ad hoc determinations and inconsistent results."69 The
court concluded that to maintain a suit against an attorney that
sounded in tort, the element of privity would continue to be
required.70
A.2d 318, 322-23 (N.H. 1994) ("[Wlhere ... a client has contracted with an attorney todraft a will and the client has identified to whom he wishes his estate to pass, that identified
beneficiary may enforce the terms of the contract as a third-party beneficiary." (citingStowe, 441 A.2d at 84; Ogle, 466 N.E.2d at 227; Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or.
1987))); Albright v. Burns, 503 A.2d 386, 389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) ("[P]rivity
should not be required between the attorney and one harmed by his breach of duty where
the attorney had reason to foresee the specific harm which occurred." (citing Stewart v.
Sbarro, 362 A.2d 581 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976))); Hale, 744 P.2d at 1292 ("We agree
that the [will] beneficiary in these cases is not only a plausible but a classic 'intended'
third-party beneficiary of the lawyer's promise to his client.., and may enforce the duty so
created .... "); Guy, 459 A.2d at 751 (holding that named beneficiaries under a will wholose their intended legacy due to the failure of an attorney to draft properly the will may
recover in contract under a third party beneficiary theory); Persche v. Jones, 387 N.W.2d
32, 36 (S.D. 1986) ("One who negligently fails to [prepare] a will becomes liable in tort to
an intended beneficiary who suffered damage because of the invalidity of the testamentary
instrument."); Stangland v. Brock, 747 P.2d 464, 467-68 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (finding
that nonclient beneficiaries could establish a duty owed to them by a testator's attorney
under either the California balancing theory or the third party beneficiary theory, butdismissing the plaintiffs' case for failure to show a breach of the applicable duty of care on
the part of the defendant attorney); see also RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 4
LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 31.4 (4th ed. 1996). Although the third party beneficiary concept is
contractual in nature, many of these courts have used it to allow recovery under tort causes
of action. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. This has been done by expanding the
scope of duty concept in negligence to encompass those who would be considered thirdparty beneficiaries of the agreement to draft the testator's will. See infra notes 116-117 and
accompanying text.
65. 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983).
66. Id. at 747.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 749.
70. Id. at 750.
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Recognizing the need for a "properly restricted cause of action
for beneficiaries such as [the plaintiff],"71 the Guy court reasoned that
a contract action could be maintained under a third party beneficiary
theory,72 as enunciated by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302.
73
The court utilized the Restatement's two-part test to determine whether
a person could qualify as a third party beneficiary. 74 First, "the recog-
nition of the beneficiary's right must be 'appropriate to effectuate the
intention of the parties."'75 Second, "the performance must 'satisfy an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary' or 'the
circumstances [must] indicate that the promisee intends to give the
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. "'76 Applying
this test to beneficiaries of a will, the court noted that the first prong
of the test would be satisfied because "[t] he will, providing for one or
more named beneficiaries, clearly manifests the intent of the testator
to benefit the legatee."77 Moreover, because the estate would not or
could not bring suit against the attorney, recognizing this right would
be "appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties. "7 As to the
second prong, the testator's arrangements with the attorney and the
text of his will would be the "circumstances which clearly indicate the
testator's intent to benefit a named legatee."
79
Most jurisdictions followed Pennsylvania's lead in establishing a
third party beneficiary exception, ° however, unlike the Pennsylvania
court, many jurisdictions also permit recovery under a cause of action
71. Id. at 751.
72. Id. at 752. Despite the Guy court's focus on a contract cause of action, as opposed
to one based in tort, the court noted:
Although a plaintiff on a third party beneficiary theory in contract may in some
cases have to show a deviation from the standard of care, as in negligence, to
establish breach, the class of persons to whom the defendant may be liable is
restricted by principles of contract law, not negligence principles relating to fore-
seeability or scope of the risk.
Id.
73. Id. at 751.
74. Id,
75. Id (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Cor.rRACTS § 302 (1979)).
76. Id (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302).
77. Id
78. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 302(1)). The court explained that while named beneficiaries are clearly in-
tended, as opposed to incidental beneficiaries, the will could fail to name beneficiaries
who might be either intended or incidental beneficiaries. Id at n.8. The court stated that
it would be up to the trial court to determine whether "the circumstances indicate an
intent to benefit non-named beneficiaries." Id at 752 n.8.
79. Id. at 752.
80. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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sounding in tort." For example, in Stowe v. Smith,82 the Connecticut
Supreme Court noted that "[u] nless a particular conflict between the
rules of contract and tort requires otherwise, a plaintiff may choose to
proceed in contract, tort, or both. 83 In Jewish Hospital v. Boatmen's
National Bank,84  an Illinois appellate court explained that
"[r] egardless of which theory of recovery is pled, nonclient plaintiffs
'must demonstrate that they are in the nature of third-party intended
beneficiaries of the relationship between the attorney and client."'8 5
In Heyer v. Flaig,6 the California Supreme Court indicated even in a
case brought under a contract cause of action, "there can be no recov-
ery without [a showing of] negligence."87
d. The Strict Privity Rule in Maryland. -Recently, Maryland
courts have struggled to determine when the strict privity requirement
should be applied to attorney malpractice actions. Like otherjurisdic-
tions, Maryland originally adhered to the strict privity requirement,
which was enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Kendall v. Rogers.88
In Kendall, the defendant attorney erroneously informed the plaintiffs
that they had a legal responsibility to clear up a defective title to land
that they had recently conveyed to the defendant's clients under a
special warranty deed.8 9 The plaintiffs accepted this advice and dis-
charged the defendant's clients from a mortgage they had granted
plaintiffs, on which over $3000 was still due, for the purpose of cor-
recting the title.9 ° The plaintiffs later discovered that they were not
liable for the defective title because the defect did not come about
81. See, e.g.,Jewish Hosp. v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 633 N.E.2d 1267, 1275 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (noting that "a nonclient may maintain either a negligence action or a third-party-
beneficiary/breach-of-contract action against an attorney" (citing Ogle v. Fuiten, 466
N.E.2d 244 (Ill. 1984); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982))).
82. 441 A.2d 81 (Conn. 1981).
83. Id. at 84 (footnote omitted) (citing Watrous v. Sinoway, 65 A.2d 473 (Conn. 1949);
Dean v. Hershowitz, 177 A. 262 (Conn. 1935); Hickey v. Slattery, 131 A. 558 (Conn. 1926)).
84. 663 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
85. Id. at 1275 (quoting McLane v. Russel, 546 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ill. 1989)).
86. 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969) (in bank).
87. Id. at 164.
88. 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943). Although the Noblecourt cited Wioradek v. Thrift,178 Md. 453, 13 A.2d 774 (1940), as the first Maryland case to apply the strict privity rule to
attorney malpractice cases, in fact, W/oradek involved a breach of contract claim by several
land buyers against two attorneys for allegedly failing to conduct a proper title examina-
tion. Id. at 461, 13 A.2d at 778. Indeed, the W/oradek court noted that "[i]t seems generally
accepted that the liability of the defendants as attorneys to examine and pass upon a title
to land is founded in contract and not on tort, and, therefore, does not, as a general rule,
extend beyond the person by whom they were so employed." Id. at 468, 13 A.2d at 781.
89. Kendall, 181 Md. at 608, 31 A.2d at 313.
90. Id.
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through any act of their own, or through an act of anyone claiming
through them.9 In a subsequent lawsuit, the plaintiffs contended
that, although they were not represented by counsel, the circum-
stances of the situation led them to believe, and they had the right to
believe, that the defendant attorney was acting to protect their rights
as well as those of his clients.9 2 Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed
that they had relied on the defendant's statements regarding their
duty to correct the defective title and had discharged the defendant's
clients from the mortgage on the basis of these statements.
93 The
plaintiffs argued that because this advice amounted to negligence on
the part of the defendant, they were entitled to damages resulting
from their inability to collect on the mortgage.9 4 The Court of Ap-
peals held that in order for a plaintiff to maintain a suit against an
attorney for negligence, the plaintiff must prove three things: "(1)
The attorney's employment; (2) his neglect of a reasonable duty; and
(3) that such negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of
loss to the client."9 5 The court looked to the facts alleged in the com-
plaint and determined that the relationship between the plaintiffs and
the defendant did not rise to the level of employment, and, therefore,
the defendant attorney could not be held liable to the plaintiffs for
negligence. 96
The Maryland courts applied the rule of strict privity without ex-
ception for almost thirty years after Kendall. However, in the 1972
case of Prescott v. Coppage,9 7 the Court of Appeals demonstrated a will-
ingness to move beyond this requirement for the first time. In Prescott,
the plaintiff was the receiver for Security Financial Insurance Corpora-
tion (Security), a creditor of Maryland Thrift Savings and Loan Com-
pany (Maryland Thrift).98 The defendants were the receiver for
Maryland Thrift and Prescott, a court-appointed attorney charged
with assisting the receiver with "the performance of his duties."
99 The
plaintiff's complaint centered around a $40,000 debt owed to Security
by Maryland Thrift.1 ° ° The complaint alleged that the defendants had
91. Id. at 609, 31 A.2d at 314.
92. Id. at 608, 31 A.2d at 313.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 610, 31 A.2d at 314.
95. Id. at 611-12, 31 A.2d at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1916)).
96. Id. at 613, 31 A.2d at 315.
97. 266 Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972).
98. Id. at 565-66, 296 A.2d at 152.
99. Id. at 565, 574, 296 A.2d at 151, 156.
100. Id. at 565, 296 A.2d at 151.
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improperly distributed Maryland Thrift's assets to lower priority credi-
tors, instead of Security, who had a higher priority.1"1 Prescott argued
that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue him because there was
no privity of contract between them. 102 The Court of Appeals held
that all of the creditors of Maryland Thrift, including Security, were
third party beneficiaries,"' and that the court order appointing Pres-
cott "by necessary implication, bound him to those creditor benefi-
ciaries."104 Therefore, because Prescott had accepted the duties as
specified in the court order, along with the aforementioned condi-
tions, the plaintiff had standing to sue.'0 5
Thirteen years later, the Court of Appeals squarely confronted
the issue of privity in attorney malpractice claims in Flaherty v. Wein-
berg.1 6 In 1977, the plaintiffs, Robert and Sally Flaherty, purchased a
home that was financed by First Federal Savings and Loan (First Fed-
eral). 07 First Federal retained the services of the defendant attorney
and his law firm to represent the bank at settlement.'0 8 The Flahertys
were not represented by an attorney.' 0 9 At settlement, the bank's at-
torney assured the Flahertys that the property described in the sale
contract was the property they were purchasing and that the house
was located within the described boundary lines." 0 The attorney also
provided the Flahertys with a survey that supported his statements."'
In 1982, in preparation for the construction of improvements to the
property, the Flahertys obtained another survey of their land. That
survey revealed that the original survey obtained from the bank's at-
torney was erroneous, and that several prior improvements con-
structed on the property encroached upon their neighbor's land. 112
The Flahertys then filed suit against the attorney, alleging negligence
and breach of warranty, and in an amended declaration, added an
assertion that First Federal's hiring of the attorney was intended to
101. Id It is not clear whether this suit was brought in tort or contract.
102. Id. at 574, 296 A.2d at 156.
103. Id. The court noted that whether a class of persons met the definition of a creditor
beneficiary depended on the intention of the parties "as expressed in the language of the




106. 303 Md. 116, 492 A.2d 618 (1985).





112. Id, at 132-33, 492 A.2d at 626.
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benefit them.1 13 The trial court dismissed this suit, ruling that be-
cause there was no privity of contract between the attorney and the
Flahertys, the attorney owed them no duty.1 14
After examining national trends, as well as recent Maryland cases
addressing the subject, the Flaherty court decided that the third party
beneficiary theory operated as a limited exception to the general rule
requiring strict privity in attorney malpractice claims. 1 5 The court
reasoned that "the scope of duty concept in negligence actions may be
analogized to the third-party beneficiary concept in the context of at-
torney malpractice cases." '1 6 This analogy was necessary because the
third party beneficiary doctrine is a concept usually applied in con-
tract cases, while the Flaherty court was faced with a cause of action
brought under a negligence theory, in which the scope of the duty
owed is the relevant consideration. Thus, in order to establish a tort
duty owed by an attorney to a nonclient, the nonclient must establish
that the intent of the client to benefit the nonclient was "a direct pur-
pose of the transaction or relationship." 1 7 The court emphasized
that this exception, if properly applied, would not expose an attorney
to endless liability and would have limited application in adversarial
proceedings." 8
The court applied this rationale to the facts of the case and deter-
mined that the Flahertys' allegations that the hiring of the attorney
was intended to benefit both themselves and First Federal, and that
their interests were identical to those of First Federal, were tanta-
mount to alleging that they were intended to benefit directly from the
attorney's services."' Therefore, the court concluded, the Flahertys'
claim was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
120
The Maryland courts have had only a few occasions to consider
the issue of attorney malpractice in the context of will drafting and
estate planning, when beneficiaries of a will, or those claiming to be
beneficiaries, have brought a cause of action for professional malprac-
tice against the testator's attorney. Perhaps the most significant of
113. Id. at 133, 492 A.2d at 626-27.
114. Id., 492 A.2d at 627.
115. Id. at 129, 492 A.2d at 624.
116. Id at 130, 492 A.2d at 625.
117. Id. at 130-31, 492 A.2d at 625.
118. Id. at 131, 492 A.2d at 626. The court stressed that this exception could play only a
limited role in adversarial proceedings because under the Maryland Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client zealously and not to represent con-
flicting interests in a transaction. Id. (citing MD. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 5, 7 (1984)).
119. Id. at 138-39, 492 A.2d at 629.
120. Id. at 139, 492 A.2d at 630.
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these decisions is Kirgan v. Parks.1 21 In answering the broad question
of whether such a cause of action could ever be maintained, the Court
of Special Appeals in Kirgan responded with "a definite maybe."'122 In
Kirgan, the plaintiff alleged that she had referred the testator to her
attorney, the defendant, to effect a change in his will in the plaintiffs
favor.' 23 Upon the death of the testator, the plaintiff discovered that
she was left only "tangible personal property," valued at about
$7000.124 The bulk of the testator's estate, over $5,000,000, was left to
a charitable trust, of which the defendant and First National Bank of
Maryland were named co-trustees.1 25 The plaintiff filed suit in the Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging, inter alia, negligence on the
part of the defendant attorney for failing to prepare the testator's will
so as to reflect his intention to make "ample and adequate" provisions
for her.' 26 The plaintiffs complaint also included a contract action
based on the theory that she was a third party beneficiary of the con-
tract of employment between the defendant attorney and the testa-
tor.1 27 The court never answered the question whether a beneficiary
of a will could ever maintain a legal malpractice action against the
testator's attorney.' 28 Instead, it disposed of the case by holding that
such a cause of action could not be maintained when "the will is valid,
the testamentary intent as expressed in the will has been carried out, and
there is no concession of error by the attorney."' 29 Because the plain-
tiffs allegations regarding what her share of the estate should have
been were contrary to that which was expressed in the testator's will,
she had no cause of action against the attorney for negligent will
drafting. 1 30
121. 60 Md. App. 1, 478 A.2d 713 (1984).
122. Id. at 3, 478 A.2d at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 4, 478 A.2d at 714.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 5, 478 A.2d at 715.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 12, 478 A.2d at 718 ("We need not decide whether, in an appropriate case,
the beneficiary of a will can maintain a legal malpractice action in this state against the
testator's attorney for negligence in preparing the will . . . or whether an action of that
nature should be in contract or tort.").
129. Id., 478 A.2d at 719. The court noted that the will is a solemn document which,
under statute, must be in writing, signed by the testator, and attested to by two witnesses.
Id. at 12-13, 478 A.2d at 719 (citing MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-102 (1974)). When
the language of a will is plain and unambiguous, no extrinsic evidence is admissible to
show a contrary intent on the part of the testator, because "evidence intended to alter the
language of a will would violate [the] statute." Id. at 13, 478 A.2d at 719 (citing Jones v.
Holloway, 183 Md. 40, 46-47, 36 A.2d 551, 554 (1944)).
130. Id. at 13, 478 A.2d at 719.
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Several years later, in Layman v. Layman,1"1 the Court of Special
Appeals once again considered the question whether an attorney
drafting a will owes any duty to beneficiaries of the will.132 The court
ruled that the plaintiffs in the case had not satisfied the initial require-
ment of demonstrating that they were third party beneficiaries be-
cause they did not allege that the testator's intent to benefit them was
a direct purpose of the will transaction."13 Furthermore, the court
noted that under the Kirgan test, the plaintiffs could not maintain a
cause of action against the defendant attorney because there was no
suggestion that this particular will was not valid, the intent as ex-
pressed in the will had been carried out, and there was no concession
of error on the part of the defendant attorney.
1 34
Thus, after many years of insisting otherwise, the Maryland courts
finally recognized a third party beneficiary exception to the strict priv-
ity rule in attorney malpractice actions in Flaherty. 35 However, the
Court of Special Appeals, in Kirgan and Layman, required that a will
beneficiary attempting to use this exception also establish that either
the will is invalid, the testamentary intent as evidenced on the face of
the will was not carried out, or that the attorney drafting the will has
conceded error.136 It is against this backdrop that the Court of Ap-
peals considered Noble v. Bruce.
3. The Court's Reasoning.--In Noble v. Bruce, the Court of Appeals
held that the rule of strict privity applies in a malpractice action
against an attorney for negligent will drafting and estate planning.
1 37
The court came to this determination by declining to recognize the
Noble and Fauntleroy plaintiffs as third party beneficiaries of the will
drafting agreements with the testators' respective attorneys, and then
discussing the policy rationales for retaining a strict privity rule.'
33
The court concluded that neither set of beneficiaries could maintain a
cause of action for malpractice against either attorney because the
beneficiaries showed no employment relation between themselves
and the attorneys. 13 9 Judge Chasanow, writing for a unanimous court,
131. 84 Md. App. 183, 578 A.2d 314 (1990).
132. Id. at 184, 578 A.2d at 314.
133. Id. at 189, 578 A.2d at 317.
134. Id. at 190, 578 A.2d at 317.
135. See supra notes 106-120 and accompanying text (discussing Flaherty).
136. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text (discussing the Kirgan
requirements).
137. Noble, 344 Md. at 752-53, 709 A.2d at 1275.
138. Id. at 753, 709 A.2d at 1275-76.
139. Id. at 752-53, 709 A.2d at 1275.
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began the analysis with a survey of the three major approaches used in
various jurisdictions to determine when a plaintiff not in privity with
an attorney may maintain a cause of action against him or her for
professional malpractice." Next, the court considered which of
these theories should apply when a testamentary beneficiary sues the
testator's attorney for professional malpractice. 141
Although both beneficiaries suggested several alternative theories
of recovery,142 the court held that in these particular cases, the tradi-
tional rule of strict privity would apply.143 In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the court first decided that the third party beneficiary exception
to the strict privity requirement did not apply to the beneficiaries in
this case."'4 The court reasoned that Flaherty, a case in which non-
clients were permitted to maintain a cause of action against an attor-
ney for malpractice under a third party beneficiary theory, 1 45 was
140. Id. at 738-50, 709 A.2d at 1268-74.
141. Id. at 751, 709 A.2d at 1274.
142. Id. at 751-52, 709 A.2d at 1275. The beneficiaries suggested a rule of foreseeability
which would allow an attorney to predict the class of persons to whom he would be liable,
and the scope of such liability, at the time of employment. Brief of Appellants at 36-38,
Noble v. Bruce, 349 Md. 730, 709 A.2d 1264 (1998) (No. 7); see also Noble, 349 Md. at 751,
709 A.2d at 1275. The Fauntleroy beneficiaries offered several alternative theories. The
first test would require the nonclient plaintiff to establish that "1) the plaintiff was a mem-
ber of an identified class whose injury could be foreseen by a reasonable attorney exercis-
ing due care; 2) negligence was actually committed against the original client; and 3) there
is no conflict between the plaintiffs claim and any interest or potential interest of the
actual client." Id. at 751-52, 709 A.2d at 1275. The second alternative was derived from the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 73 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997), which
provides that an attorney's duty is owed to a nonclient when:
(a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary objectives of the
representation that the lawyer's services benefit the non-client; and
(b) such duty would not significantly impair the lawyer's performance of obliga-
tions to the client, and the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of
these obligations unlikely.
Noble, 349 Md. at 752, 709 A.2d at 1275 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw Gov-
ERNING LAwyERs § 73 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997)). The third alternative involved the
"relational" approach as enunciated in an article by ProfessorJay M. Feinman. Under this
approach, "the beneficiary of a will should be permitted to prove that the 'testator in-
tended to confer a benefit in the absence of proof in the will' and should not be precluded
from doing so by a blanket rule such as the strict privity rule." Id. (quoting Jay M.
Feinman, Attorney Liability to Nonclients, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 735, 756 (1996)). The fourth
alternative suggested the "agency" approach proposed by Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
under which "the attorney is liable 'to a third person, directly or by way of subrogation to
the right of the principal, for negligently or intentionally failing to carry out an undertak-
ing on behalf of the principal that was intended to benefit the third person."' Id. (quoting
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Privity Requirement Reconsidered, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 967, 993
(1996)).
143. Noble, 349 Md. at 752, 709 A.2d at 1275.
144. Id. at 753, 709 A.2d at 1275-76.
145. See supra notes 106-120 and accompanying text (discussing F/aherty).
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distinguishable from the present case because the beneficiaries in this
case never met or communicated with the defendant attorneys, nor
did they rely on representations made by the attorneys, as the plain-
tiffs had done in Flaherty.'4 6 Furthermore, the court disagreed with
the beneficiaries' assertion that the third party beneficiary exception
to the strict privity requirement was particularly suited to the area of
will drafting and estate planning. 47 The court noted that in order for
a nonclient to be considered a third party beneficiary of an attorney-
client transaction, the client's intent to benefit the nonclient must be
a direct purpose of the transaction, and stated that "[i] n cases involv-
ing wills, the beneficiary of a will is not necessarily the beneficiary of
the attorney-client relationship." 4 ' The court instead assumed that
the testator's primary intent is "to benefit themselves in planning their
estates and in creating and maintaining their wills."' 49
Next, the court briefly discussed the Kirgan case and its applica-
tion to the present sets of facts.'5 0 The court did not fully adopt the
reasoning of that case, but agreed with the pronouncement in Kirgan
that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show an intent on the part
of the testator different from that expressed in the will.' Although
the Noble beneficiaries argued that this rule would not apply because
they were not attacking the will, nor attempting to modify it, the court
dismissed this contention. 152  The court reasoned that, practically
speaking, if the beneficiaries' claims were successful, the wills would
be "rewritten" to exhibit an intent on the part of the testators in con-
formance with the beneficiaries wishes.'
146. Noble, 349 Md. at 753, 709 A.2d at 1276. The court also noted that "[a] close read-
ing of Flaherty also indicates the possibility that there was an assumption of duty by [the
defendant attorney]. Here, however, there is no evidence that either Bruce or Henry un-
dertook representation of the testators for estate planning on behalf of the beneficiaries."
Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 754, 709 A.2d at 1276.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 754-55, 709 A.2d at 1276-77.
151. Id. at 755, 709 A.2d at 1276. The court noted that "[i]f extrinsic evidence were
admitted, the potential for fraud and the risk of misinterpreting the testator's intent in-
crease dramatically." Id., 709 A.2d at 1277 (citing Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Ro-
sen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1379 (Fla. 1993)).
152. Id., 709 A.2d at 1277.
153. Id. The court also pointed out that the Fauntleroy case, if decided in favor of the
beneficiaries, would clearly result in the reformation of the will. Id The will would be
rewritten so that no taxes would be paid out of the residuary estate, contrary to the specifi-
cations of the will. Id. at 755-56, 709 A.2d at 1277.
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The court then explained the "compelling policy reasons"1 54 for
the application of the strict privity rule in these cases.1 55 First, the
court stated that the strict privity rule would "protect[ ] the integrity
and solemnity of the will" by preventing the defendant attorney from
being held liable for an additional bequest to the beneficiaries that
was not expressed in the will. 156 Next, the court noted that the strict
privity rule would protect the attorney-client relationship, reasoning
that subjecting attorneys to liability to will beneficiaries would inter-
fere with the "attorney's ability to fulfill his or her duty of loyalty to the
client and compromise[ ] the attorney's ability to represent the client
zealously."'1 7 Finally, the court asserted that the strict privity rule
would protect attorney-client confidentiality. 5 ' The court explained
that, although permitted under the Maryland Lawyer's Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, 1 9 an attorney "should not be placed in the posi-
tion where he or she would have to reveal a testator/client's
confidences in an attorney malpractice action asserted by a nonclient
beneficiary.' 60 For example, a testator may wish to tell a certain per-
son that he will be included in her will, while simultaneously in-
structing her attorney to exclude that person from her will.' 6 '
Therefore, the court found that permitting a cause of action by a non-
client beneficiary in these situations might require the testator's attor-
ney to reveal information that the client intended to keep
confidential.'62 The court concluded its opinion by briefly addressing
the problem of attorney accountability, suggesting that while the non-
client beneficiaries of a will would have no claim against the attorney
drafting the will or providing estate planning advice, the testator's es-
154. Id. at 756, 709 A.2d at 1277.
155. Id. at 756-58, 709 A.2d at 1277-78.
156. Id. at 756, 709 A.2d at 1277.
157. Id. The court found that in the case of the Noble beneficiaries, there could be a
potential conflict of interest between the testator and the beneficiaries because, although
the beneficiaries wished to minimize taxes on the estate, the testator had legitimate rea-
sons for not doing so. Id. at 756-57, 709 A.2d at 1277-78. Therefore, the attorney would be
torn between complying with the wishes of the client not to minimize the taxes, and maxi-
mizing the estate to avoid liability on the part of the beneficiaries. Id. at 757, 709 A.2d at
1278.
158. Id. at 758, 709 A.2d at 1278.
159. Under the Maryland Lawyer's Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b) (3), an attorney
may disclose confidential information concerning representation of a client "to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to respond to allegations in any proceedings
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client." MD. LAWYER'S RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (1988).
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tate may be able to meet the strict privity requirement and maintain
such a cause of action. 163 The court also left open the possibility that
a testator could maintain such a cause of action during his or her
lifetime.
164
4. Analysis.--Fourteen years after the Court of Special Appeals
answered with a "definite maybe" to the question whether a testamen-
tary beneficiary would ever maintain a cause of action against the tes-
tator's attorney for negligence, 16 the Court of Appeals in Noble v.
Bruce responded with a clear "no." At first glance, Noble v. Bruce may
very well evoke a sympathetic response. The allegations of both the
Noble and Faunderoy beneficiaries appear highly speculative and, as
the court pointed out, it is easy to recognize that the respective testa-
tors had very good reasons for structuring their wills in the way they
did, despite the large tax consequences that were imposed as a re-
sult. 16 6 Furthermore, as the court correctly pointed out, strong policy
reasons support limiting the liability of attorneys to nonclients.167
However, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that in disposing
of these cases in the manner that it did, the Noble court went a step too
far. By refusing to recognize the Noble and Fauntleroy beneficiaries
as third party beneficiaries of the will drafting agreement between the
defendant attorneys and the testators, the court took an excessively
harsh stance and failed to realize that the interests it sought to protect
can be adequately protected without adopting such an extreme
position.
a. The Denial of the Third Party Beneficiary Exception in Cases
Involving Wills in Maryland. -Most jurisdictions embrace the position
that specific, named beneficiaries of a will are third party beneficiaries
of the contract to draft the will and can therefore sue the attorney
who drafted it for professional malpractice.168 Yet, in Noble v. Bruce,
the Court of Appeals drew a clear line prohibiting will beneficiaries
from recovering against an attorney who engages in negligent will
drafting or estate planning. On the face of the opinion, it appears
163. Id. (citing Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d
1378, 1380 (Fla. 1993)).
164. Id. at 759, 709 A.2d at 1278. The court noted, however, that in such situations
damages "may be limited to the attorney's fee." Id.
165. Kirgan v. Parks, 60 Md. App. 1, 3, 478 A.2d 713, 714 (1984).
166. Noble, 349 Md. at 755-57, 709 A.2d at 1277-78.
167. Id. at 756-58, 709 A.2d at 1277-78.
168. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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that the court limited its holding to the particular cases at bar. 169 A
careful examination, however, reveals a much more dire prognosis.
Initially, it is important to recognize that the Noble court's decision was
based on the fact that both sets of plaintiff-beneficiaries were not third
party beneficiaries of the contractual relationship between the testator
and the drafting attorney. 7 Although the court phrased its reason-
ing in somewhat inconclusive terms, 17 1 it begs the question: If these
will beneficiaries are not third party beneficiaries of the contracts to
draft their respective wills, then who is? The obvious answer is effec-
tively "nobody." Both sets of beneficiaries were specifically included
in the relevant wills by name. 172 If specific, named beneficiaries can-
not establish their status as third party beneficiaries, then it appears
that no will beneficiary will be able to establish their status as such,
absent some extrinsic proof, such as a document in which the attorney
and testator expressly agree that the beneficiaries of the will are also
"third party beneficiaries" of the contract to draft the will. Thus, the
Noble court, although taking care not to specifically say so, created a de
facto rule that no beneficiary of a will can maintain a cause of action
against an attorney for malpractice under a third party beneficiary
theory.
1 73
b. Applicability of the Third Party Beneficiary Theory to Will Bene-
ficiaries.-The third party beneficiary theory, as it has developed as an
exception to the strict privity requirement in attorney malpractice
suits, seems particularly applicable to cases involving will beneficiaries.
The primary rule in most jurisdictions, including Maryland, is that the
client's intent to benefit the nonclient must be the direct purpose be-
hind the transaction in order for a nonclient to be considered a third
party beneficiary of the attorney-client transaction. 7 4 Several courts
169. See Noble, 349 Md. at 752, 709 A.2d at 1275 ("[W]e hold that the traditional rule of
strict privity applies in the instant cases, and thus neither [set of beneficiaries] may maintain a
malpractice action against the attorneys ... ." (emphasis added)).
170. Id. at 753-54, 709 A.2d at 1275-76 ("[Wie must first dispose of the beneficiaries'
assertion that they are third-party beneficiaries .... ").
171. Id. at 754, 709 A.2d at 1276. The court stated that "[i]n cases involving wills, the
beneficiary of a will is not necessarily the beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship." Id.
(emphasis added).
172. Id. at 734-36, 709 A.2d at 1266-67.
173. More evidence of the absolute position taken by the court is found in a statement
near the end of the opinion: "We agree... that 'the greater good is served by preserving a
bright-line rule which denies a cause of action to all beneficiaries whom the attorney did
not represent.'" Id. at 759, 709 A.2d at 1279 (quoting Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575, 578
(Tex. 1996)).
174. See, e.g., Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ill. 1982) ("We conclude that,
for a nonclient to succeed in a negligence action against an attorney, he must prove that
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recognize that the primary purpose behind a will is for the testator to
dispose of his assets in a way that benefits certain individuals or orga-
nizations.1 75 However, the Noble court reasoned that a testator's pri-
mary purpose in planning her estate and preparing a will is not
necessarily to benefit others, but to benefit herself in disposing of her
assets as she sees fit.176 Although it is undoubtedly true that a person
engages in estate planning to some extent for her own psychological
benefit, it is illogical to presume that a testator who names specific
beneficiaries in her will is not primarily motivated by an intent to ben-
efit those people or organizations.1 7 7 If there was no such purpose on
the part of the testator, it seems strange that she would have any com-
pulsion to prepare a will. 178 It is significant to note that in the cases
examined above that accept a third party beneficiary rationale 79 as an
exception to the privity requirement in attorney malpractice actions,
none of those courts held that a named beneficiary of a will did not
fall under this exception. This suggests the weakness in the Noble
court's reasoning.
c. Policy Rationales in Support of Allowing Will Beneficiaries to
Sue Attorneys in the Absence of Privity.-Looking beyond the technical
the primary purpose and intent of the attorney-client relationship itself was to benefit or
influence the third party."); Noble, 349 Md. at 753-54, 709 A.2d at 1276 (explaining that
"the client's intent to benefit the nonclient must be a direct purpose of the transaction or
relationship in order for the nonclient to be considered a third party beneficiary"); Fla-
herty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 130-31, 492 A.2d 618, 625 (1985) ("[T]o establish a duty
owed by the attorney to the nonclient the latter must allege and prove that the intent of
the client to benefit the nonclient was a direct purpose of the transaction or
relationship.").
175. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961) (in bank) ("Obviously the main
purpose of a contract for the drafting of a will is to accomplish the future transfer of the
estate of the testator to the beneficiaries named in the will, and therefore it seems im-
proper to hold ... that the testator intended only 'remotely' to benefit those persons.");
Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1063 (D.C. 1983) (recognizing as "obvious" that the
primary purpose of a contract for the drafting of a will is to effectuate a future transfer of
assets from the testator's estate to the named beneficiaries of the will); Guy v. Liederbach,
459 A.2d 744, 751 (Pa. 1983) (holding that a testamentary beneficiary could maintain a
cause of action for attorney malpractice only after determining that "[t]he will . . .
manifests the intent of the testator to benefit the legatee").
176. See Noble, 349 Md. at 754, 709 A.2d at 1276. The court noted that a testator's intent
in preparing a will may be to prevent certain individuals who would otherwise inherit
under their estate from doing so or to ensure that their assets did not pass intestate. Id.
177. SeeJenkins, supra note 46, at 700 ("It stretches simple reason to pretend that the
preparation of a will is not intended for the direct benefit of the named beneficiary.").
178. Cf Guy, 459 A.2d at 752 ("The circumstances which clearly indicate the testator's
intent to benefit a named legatee are his arrangements with the attorney and the text of
his will.").
179. See cases cited supra note 64.
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issue of whether a will beneficiary is also a third party beneficiary,
there are important policy considerations that bear on the issue of
attorney liability to will beneficiaries. The Noble court's bright-line
rule prohibiting nonclient will beneficiaries from recovering against
the testator's attorney for malpractice under a third party beneficiary
theory fails to withstand this policy-oriented scrutiny.180
A primary reason for allowing will beneficiaries to bring malprac-
tice claims against attorneys is that, absent such a right, an attorney
has a carte blanche to commit negligence without the fear of pen-
alty.' 81 It is critically important to impose liability on attorneys as a
consequence of their negligence to assure that they represent their
clients competently. If courts demand this degree of accountability
from attorneys, attorneys will exercise increased care in planning es-
tates and drafting wills.' 82 This focus on competence is particularly
important considering recent trends in this area of the law. Instead of
employing an attorney, many people with simple estate planning
needs are turning to other resources such as paralegals and do-it-your-
self materials. 83 Lawyers, therefore, are increasingly presented with
complex estate planning and drafting issues.184 This means that attor-
neys will be under more pressure to provide sound estate planning
advice and will drafting skills, which will demand a higher level of
competence. 185 Moreover, subjecting negligent attorneys to liability
to nonclient testamentary beneficiaries will result in increased special-
ization. 186 An attorney who wishes to avoid liability may decide that
180. It is important to note that the Noble court would have been aware of many of these
policy considerations, as they were set forth by the appellants in their brief to the court. See
Brief of Appellants at 26-36, Noble (No. 7).
181. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961) (en banc) (reasoning that if will
beneficiaries are unable to recover from a loss resulting from the negligent drafting of the
will, "no one would be able to do so, and the policy of preventing future harm would be
impaired"); Jenkins, supra note 46, at 687 (arguing that the application of the strict privity
rule to will beneficiaries has "suffered the creation of a legal right for which the law affords
no remedy"); see also Brief of Appellants at 27, Noble (No. 7).
182. See Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987) ("[T]he potential for
liability likely motivates the lawyer to draft and execute testamentary instruments with great
care." (citing Auric v. Continental Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1983))); see also
Brief of Appellants at 31-33, Noble (No. 7); Begleiter, supra note 50, at 274-76 (discussing
the positive impact that denying privity as a defense to legal malpractice actions has on
attorney accountability).
183. See Michael P. Morley, Note, Privity as a Bar to Recovery in Negligent Will-Preparation
Cases: A Rule Without Reason, 57 U. CIN. L. Rxv. 1123, 1139 (1989).
184. See id.
185. See id. ("The average will draftsman will need to be even more competent and care-
ful if the remaining clientele is to be properly served.").
186. See Begleiter, supra note 50, at 276 (noting that malpractice concerns on the part of
attorneys could lead to an increase in specialization).
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the risks are not worth the benefit, and therefore cease providing wills
and estates services to his or her clients. At the same time, the de-
mand for attorneys who specialize in the area of wills and estates will
rise. This move towards specialization will produce more competent
lawyers and reduce the number of errors, thereby benefitting the pub-
lic and improving the public image of lawyers.
187
To ensure accountability on the part of lawyers who negligently
draft wills or provide negligent estate planning advice, it is necessary
to allow suits by the beneficiaries who have been wronged by the negli-
gent conduct. In addressing this point, the Noble court stated that
although a will beneficiary could not file suit, the testator's estate may
have standing to sue the attorney who drafted the will.188 A number
of courts have stated, however, that the testator's estate would not
have standing to bring such a suit.189 Even if the estate did have
standing, it would have little incentive to bring suit because, as the
Noble court recognized, the measure of damages would probably be
limited to the fees paid to have the will drafted.19 °
In addition to jeopardizing attorney competence, the Noble deci-
sion, by prohibiting nonclient testamentary beneficiaries from bring-
ing attorney malpractice suits, precludes innocent parties from
seeking a remedy for harm suffered through the fault of another."9 '
187. See id. at 277 (discussing polls in several states that indicate that the vast majority of
those surveyed thought it "likely or very likely" that a specialist lawyer would be more effi-
cient and provide better advice in the wills and estates area than nonspecialists).
188. Noble, 349 Md. at 758-59, 709 A-2d at 1278.
189. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 165 (Cal. 1969) (in bank). The court stated:
Indeed, the executor of an estate has no standing to bring an action for the
amount of the bequest against an attorney who negligently prepared the estate
plan, since in the normal case the estate is not injured by such negligence except
to the extent of the fees paid; only the beneficiaries suffer the real loss.
Id.; see also Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 749 (Pa. 1983) ("In any cause of action for
malpractice, some harm must be shown to have occurred to the person bringing suit. In
the case of a failed legacy, the estate is not harmed in any way.").
190. See Noble, 349 Md. at 759, 709 A.2d at 1278 (admitting that if the testator's estate
had a cause of action against the attorney, damages "may be limited to the attorney's fee");
see also Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1987) (noting that the testator's
estate will have "little incentive" to bring suit against an attorney for possible negligence).
191. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961) (in bank) (concluding that im-
posing liability on attorneys on behalf of will beneficiaries did not place an undue burden
on the legal profession, "particularly when we take into consideration that a contrary con-
clusion would cause the innocent beneficiary to bear the loss"); Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d
28, 30 (Conn. C.P. 1966) ("Public policy would seem to favor the court's extending its
equitable arm to assist innocent parties seeking just damages resulting from an error com-
mitted by another and affecting their rights, which error those innocent parties were never
themselves able to correct."); Schreiner, 410 N.W.2d at 682 ("[I]f no cause of action could
be maintained, the very purpose for which the lawyer was retained... would be frustrated
without remedy." (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (in bank); Need-
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One of the major goals of tort law is to assign liability to those at fault
so that innocent parties will be compensated for harm they suffer. 192
In situations involving negligent will drafting or estate planning ad-
vice, the blame falls squarely on the negligent attorney. At the same
time, the beneficiaries of the will are the persons who suffer the direct
harm from the attorney's negligence. 193 Failure to provide a remedy
for the will beneficiaries against negligent attorneys thwarts these ba-
sic objectives of our tort system. Unfortunately, the Noble court appar-
ently neglected to substantially weigh these considerations, as it
imposed what amounts to an absolute barrier to suits by potentially
innocent, yet harmed, will beneficiaries against negligent attorneys. 194
Moreover, malpractice insurance serves to protect attorneys against
this type of risk, while the beneficiary harmed by the attorney's negli-
gence has no such recourse.19 5
d. Policy Arguments Favoring Retention of the Strict Privity
Rule.-Courts advance a number of policy reasons for retaining the
strict privity rule in cases involving will drafting and estate planning.
The Noble court specifically addressed three and implicated several
others. 9 6 However, none of these policy reasons are so compelling as
tojustify an absolute rule of strict privity in attorney malpractice cases
involving negligent will drafting or estate planning. Instead, if prop-
ham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983))); Guy, 459 A.2d at 752-53 ("Wle feel
persons who are named beneficiaries under a will and who lose their intended legacy due
to the failure of an attorney to properly draft the instrument should not be left without
recourse or remedy as they would if [lack of privity acted as a bar to these actions]."); see
also Jenkins, supra note 46, at 688 ("Clearly the intended beneficiary, who has no vested
right until the death of the client, cannot find redress for loss other than from the attorney
who caused the loss.").
192. See Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575, 580 (Tex. 1996) (Cornyn, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that the majority, in maintaining privity as a requirement to attorney malpractice
actions involving will beneficiaries, "gives no consideration to the fair adjustment of the
loss between the parties, one of the traditional objectives of tort law." (citing W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 24-25 (W. Page Keeton
ed., 5th ed. 1984); Robert E. Litan et al., The U.S. Liability System: Background and Trends, in
LIABILITY PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 1, 3 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988)).
193. SeeJohn H. Bauman, A Sense of Duty: Regulation of Lauyer Responsibility to Third Par-
ties by the Tort System, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 995, 1011 (1996) (arguing that extending liability to
attorneys in these cases is appropriate because the fault lies solely with the negligent attor-
ney, and, therefore, recognizing this duty "meets the goals of the tort system to deter
wrongful conduct in an understandable way").
194. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
195. See Bauman, supra note 193, at 1011 (noting that the drafting attorneys are parties
"well situated to insure against this risk").
196. See Noble, 349 Md. at 756-60, 709 A.2d at 1277-79 (noting that the strict privity rule
protects "the integrity and solemnity" of the will, the attorney-client relationship, and attor-
ney-client confidentiality).
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erly limited, a third party beneficiary exception to the strict privity
rule will ensure that the positive policy goals that mitigate in favor of
providing a cause of action to will beneficiaries against negligent attor-
neys are fulfilled, without substantial negative side-effects.
Often, the main concern expressed regarding the ability of non-
clients to bring malpractice suits against attorneys is the fear that an
attorney's liability will be extended to a large number of unknown
plaintiffs.' 97 However, the third party beneficiary exception, properly
applied, places clear and definite limits on the scope of an attorney's
liability because the class of potential plaintiffs, as well as the amount
of potential liability, is defined by the testator in advance.' 98 Most
jurisdictions applying the third party beneficiary exception in attorney
malpractice actions require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the attor-
ney and client intended to confer a direct benefit on him and state
that an incidental benefit will not suffice.' 99 In wills and estate cases,
some courts have simply refused to allow plaintiffs not specifically
197. See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 203 (1879) ("The only safe rule is to con-
fine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract; if we go one step beyond
that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty." (quoting Winterbottom v. Wright, 152
Eng. Rep. 109, 115 (Ex. 1842))); Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 21, 24-25 (Colo. Ct. App.
1994) ("We conclude ... that it is in the public's best interest to protect attorneys from
potentially unlimited liability to third parties .... Thus, in drafting testamentary instru-
ments at the behest of a client, an attorney should not be burdened with potential liability
to possible beneficiaries of such instruments." (citations omitted)); Dickey v. Jansen, 731
S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex. App. 1987, writ ref d n.r.e) ("It is obvious that opening attorney-
client contracts to third party scrutiny would entail a vast range of potential liability." (cit-
ing Jack W. Show,Jr., Annotation, Attorney's Liability, To One Other Than His Immediate Client,
For Consequences of Negligence in Carrying Out Legal Duties, 45 A.L.R.3D 1181, 1184-85
(1972))). Although the Noble court did not include this rationale in its primary discussion
on the reasons to maintain the rule of strict privity with respect to will beneficiaries, it did
mention it as one of the "public policy grounds" upon which courts often rely in applying
the strict privity requirement. Noble, 349 Md. at 742, 709 A.2d at 1270.
198. See Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 131, 492 A.2d 618, 626 (1985) ("Properly
applied, [the third party beneficiary] exception will not expose the attorney to endless
litigation brought by those who might conceivably derive some indirect benefit from the
contractual performance of the attorney and his client."); Bauman, supra note 193, at 1011
(explaining that "[t]he concerns of contract law are largely met because the risk here is
well defined and knowable in advance" and "[t]he duty is owed to a limited group of
known individuals"); see also supra Part 2.c (discussing the third party beneficiary exception
to the strict privity requirement).
199. See, e.g., Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (D.C. 1983) ("[Tlhis duty
[of care owed by a drafting attorney to a nonclient] does not extend to the general public
but only to a nonclient who was the direct and intended beneficiary of the attorney-client
relationship."); Copenhaver v. Rogers, 384 S.E.2d 593, 595-96 (Va. 1989) (noting that the
party claiming the benefit under the third party beneficiary theory must show that the
contract intended to confer the benefit on him).
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identified as beneficiaries in the will to bring a cause of action.2 °°
Even courts that allow claims by those not named in the will leave
open the question whether the plaintiff would actually be able to es-
tablish that they are a third party beneficiary.20 1 In Noble, the two sets
of beneficiaries were specifically identified in the respective wills. Al-
lowing such specifically identified beneficiaries to bring suit against an
attorney with whom they are not in privity would certainly not expose
that attorney to a large, unknown liability. 2
The first policy reason specifically addressed by the Noble court
was that the strict privity rule protects "the integrity and solemnity of
the will."20 3 The court viewed these two suits as collateral attacks on
the wills, essentially seeking their reformation. 20 4 However, most au-
thorities recognize that this analysis is not accurate because any suit
for negligence filed by the beneficiaries of a will against the drafting
attorney will not affect the scheme of distribution under the will.20 5
The will beneficiaries are simply claiming that if the attorney was not
negligent, they would have received more than they did. The two ac-
tions, probate of the will, and a claim of negligence against the attor-
200. See Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378,
1380 (Fla. 1993) ("[W]e adhere to the rule that standing in legal malpractice actions is
limited to those who can show that the testator's intent as expressed in the will is frustrated by
the negligence of the testator's attorney."); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 683
(Iowa 1987) (recognizing that the potential class of plaintiffs in will malpractice cases
would be confined to "the direct, intended, and identifiable beneficiaries of an individual's
testamentary instruments"); Kirgan v. Parks, 60 Md. App. 1, 12, 478 A.2d 713, 718-19
(1984) (noting that a cause of action against a testator's attorney for negligence in the
drafting of a will can be brought only by an intended beneficiary).
201. See, e.g., Teasdale v. Allen, 520 A.2d 295, 296 (D.C. 1987) (refusing to adopt a per
se rule that standing in attorney malpractice cases involving wills is limited to those whose
status as beneficiaries could be discerned from the text of the will, but not deciding
whether the particular plaintiffs would actually qualify as third party beneficiaries).
202. SeeJenkins, supra note 46, at 692 ("Clearly the aspect of limitation to a specifically
named legatee has appeal among those critics who would argue that the extension of third
party beneficiary recovery to the wills area will result in 'a vast range of potential liability.'"
(quoting Dickey, 731 S.W.2d at 583)).
203. Noble, 349 Md. at 756, 709 A.2d at 1277.
204. Id.
205. See Ogle v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ill. 1984) (finding that even if the will
beneficiary plaintiffs in this case were successful, "the orderly disposition of the testator's
property is not disrupted, and the provisions of the wills, and the probate administration,
remain unaffected"). One commentator has argued:
The negligence or breach of contract [action brought by the will beneficiary]
involves the contract between the attorney and the testator to draft a will contain-
ing certain provisions, not the will ultimately drafted. The action does not affect
the will as drafted and admitted to probate, nor does it remove property from the
estate or force beneficiaries under the will to give up their legacies or pay
damages.
Begleiter, supra note 50, at 204.
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ney who drafted the will, are conceptually separate. If the will
beneficiaries are successful in their malpractice claim, the damages
will not be paid out of the corpus of the will, but will be satisfied by
the attorney's malpractice insurance or from his or her own resources.
Although the "effect" may be the same-as if the will had read differ-
ently-the will is not, in fact, altered, and the bequests are carried out
as they are contained in the will. Moreover, as an added measure of
protection, some courts, including the Court of Special Appeals in
Kirgan,20 6 confine malpractice actions brought by will beneficiaries to
situations where the intent of the testator, as it appears on the face of
the will, was somehow frustrated by the defendant attorney's negli-
gence.20 7 If a will beneficiary's cause of action is subject to this restric-
tion, there can be no argument that the integrity of the will is being
sullied, because the will clearly states what the testator intended.
Although this restriction has been rejected by a number of courts and
commentators that accept a third party beneficiary exception to the
strict privity rule, 208 it is significant to note that the Noble court could
have satisfied its concern over the "solemnity of the will" 20 by simply
adopting the Kirgan reasoning. By applying the Kirgan rule, the Noble
court could have disposed of these cases by stating that the testamen-
tary intent on the face of the wills was valid, as opposed to erroneously
suggesting that in order to prevent an attack on the integrity of the
wills, it would be necessary to hold that no will beneficiaries could
maintain a cause of action against a drafting attorney. This would in-
volve recognizing the Noble and Fauntleroy beneficiaries as third
206. See supra notes 121-130 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, P.A., 467 So. 2d 315, 317-
18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("Under the limited exception to the privity requirement, this
court has held that an attorney's 'liability to the testamentary beneficiary can arise only if,
due to the attorney's professional negligence, the testamentary intent, as expressed in the
wil; is frustrated, and the beneficiary's legacy is lost or diminished.... .'" (quoting DeMaris
v. Asti, 426 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983))); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d
679, 683 (Iowa 1987) ("[W]e hold a cause of action ordinarily will arise only when as a
direct result of the lawyer's professional negligence the testator's intent as expressed in the
testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in part and the beneficiary's interest in
the estate is either lost, diminished, or unrealized." (citing Hiemstra v. Huston, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 269, 270-72 (Ct. App. 1970); DeMaris, 426 So. 2d at 1154; Kirgan v. Parks, 60 Md. App.
1, 12-13, 478 A.2d 713, 718-19 (1984))).
208. See, e.g., Creighton Univ. v. Kleinfeld, 919 F. Supp. 1421, 1426-27 (E.D. Cal. 1995)
(concluding that the California Supreme Court would allow a will beneficiary to introduce
extrinsic evidence to establish a testator's intent that is not apparent on the face of the
will); Begleiter, supra note 50, at 201 (arguing that the basis of a malpractice action
brought by a will beneficiary is the agreement to draft the will, and not the will itself, and
because the agreement is almost always oral, extrinsic evidence is necessary to prove the
terms of that agreement).
209. Noble, 349 Md. at 756, 709 A.2d at 1277.
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party beneficiaries,210 while ruling that they did not meet the neces-
sary elements for a cause of action for legal malpractice because they
did not allege the invalidity of the will, that the testamentary intent as
expressed on the face of the will was not carried out, or that there was
a concession of error on the part of the drafting attorney.2 11
A further policy concern advanced in support of the Noble court's
holding was that the strict privity rule would protect the attorney-cli-
ent relationship because subjecting attorneys to liability to will benefi-
ciaries would conflict with the attorney's duty to represent his or her
client loyally and zealously.212 This concern, however, makes little
sense in the context of will drafting and estate planning. One of the
primary reasons why courts downplay the conflict of interest concern
in cases involving will drafting and estate planning is the essentially
nonadversarial nature of these functions.213 Zealous advocacy is not
required in these situations because the interests of the testator and
the will beneficiary are essentially similar-the testator wishes to dis-
pose of his property in a way that names certain beneficiaries, and
those beneficiaries wish to receive what the testator leaves them.2 14
Moreover, the sole issue in an attorney malpractice suit is how well the
attorney carried out his or her responsibility to the client.215 If the
attorney represents his or her client in a manner which conforms with
the applicable standard of care, there is no basis for liability.21 6 In-
210. See supra Part 4.b.
211. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text (discussing the Kirgan
requirements).
212. Noble, 349 Md. at 756, 709 A.2d at 1277; see Brief of Appellee at 42-44, Noble v.
Bruce, 349 Md. 730, 709 A.2d 1264 (1998) (No. 7).
213. The court in Jewish Hospital v. Boatmen's National Bank, 633 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994) stated:
Our supreme court has strongly embraced the concept that third-party-benefici-
ary status should be easier to establish when the scope of the attorney's represen-
tation involves matters that are nonadversarial, such as in the drafting of a will,
rather than when the scope of the representation involves matters that are adver-
sarial ....
Id. at 1276 (citing Ogle v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ill. 1984); Pelham v. Griesheimer,
440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ill. 1982); York v. Stiefel, 458 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. 1983)).
214. See Morley, supra note 183, at 1136-37 ("In the will-preparation transaction, the
interests of the client-testator and the named beneficiary are essentially congruent ....
Both desire that the attorney draft an instrument which effectively transmits wealth from
the client-testator's estate to the beneficiary." (footnote omitted)).
215. See Bauman, supra note 193, at 1011 ("The only issue is whether the attorney's
representation met the standard of care of the profession in carrying out the client's
desires.").
216. See Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Or. 1987) ("Because negligence liability of
this kind arises only from the professional obligation to the client, it does not threaten to
divide a lawyer's loyalty between the client and a potentially injured third party. .. .");
Bauman, supra note 193, at 1011 ("[T]he will drafting situation is unique in eliminating
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deed, it should be expected that an attorney will not take into account
the interests of the beneficiaries separate from those of the client
testator.
The Noble court's real concern appears grounded in a fear that
attorneys will feel compelled to protect the interests of the will benefi-
ciaries, which may conflict with the interests of the client testator, so
as to not risk future liability in a suit that has no merit. However, if an
attorney is confronted with a situation where he foresees that the tes-
tator's decision may cause him to be liable to the beneficiaries in the
future, a simple solution is to record the client's wishes as evidence of
the client's intent. Again, if the Noble court had adopted the Kirgan
test,"' it could have satisfied this policy concern without any need to
apply the strict privity rule to all will beneficiary cases. If beneficiaries
are restricted to malpractice suits based on the text of the will, the
drafting attorney should have no reason to worry about a conflict of
interest of situation. This is because, under the Kirgan regime, an at-
torney cannot be held liable for any bequests other than those that
are actually incorporated into the will. 18 Therefore, an attorney need
not be concerned about the interest of nonclients, because once the
will is written and the testamentary intent as expressed on the face of
the will is carried out, the duty to the testator client is satisfied, and
the attorney is safe from liability.
Finally, the Noble court reasoned that applying the strict privity
rule to will beneficiary cases would protect attorney-client confidenti-
ality.219 The court's reasoning, that suits by will beneficiaries may re-
quire an attorney to reveal confidential client information to defend
themselves, appears sound. 220 However, as a matter of policy, it is not
sufficiently compelling to override the strong policy considerations
that favor allowing suits by will beneficiaries. 221 This argument is sup-
ported by the Maryland Lawyer's Rules of Professional Conduct,
which clearly allow an attorney in such a situation to reveal confiden-
tial client information if necessary to defend himself against allega-
concerns about conflicts of interest.... [a] claim by disappointed beneficiaries is nothing
more than a claim that the lawyer failed to make the client's wishes effective.").
217. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
219. Noble, 349 Md. at 758, 709 A.2d at 1278; Brief of Appellee at 45-46, Noble (No. 7); see
supra notes 158-162 and accompanying text.
220. Noble, 349 Md. at 758, 709 A.2d at 1278.
221. See supra Part 4.c (discussing the policy reasons for allowing will beneficiaries to
proceed in attorney malpractice suits on a third party beneficiary theory).
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tions of malpractice. 222 While it is regrettable to place an attorney in a
position in which he must reveal confidential information to defend
his own actions, it is a necessary evil in maintaining a system which
tries to best allocate blame and compensate for harm done.
5. Conclusion.--In Noble v. Bruce, the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that a testamentary beneficiary cannot maintain a cause of action
for professional malpractice against the testator's attorney under the
third party beneficiary exception to the strict privity rule.22 ' The ef-
fect of this holding is to categorically deny recovery for parties inno-
cently harmed by the negligence of others, while at the same time
allowing attorneys to act negligently without being held accountable.
By relying on comparatively weak policy grounds, the Noble court has
effectively thrown Maryland back into the dark age of strict privity with
little hope for relief in sight.
MICHAEL N. KUNSELMAN
222. See MD. LAWYER'S RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.6(b)(3) (1988) ("A law-
yer may reveal [information relating to representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary: to establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil claim, or
disciplinary complaint against the lawyer . . . ."). This exception to the attorney-client
privilege was recognized by the Noble court. See Noble, 349 Md. at 758, 709 A.2d at 1278.
223. Noble, 349 Md. at 752-53, 709 A.2d at 1275.
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II. CML PROCEDURE
A. Expanding Maryland Discovery and the Scope of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
In Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger,1 the Court of Appeals held that a
party should be permitted to obtain discovery of confidential settle-
ment agreements between plaintiffs and other settling joint
tortfeasors in order to determine their apportionment of damages
under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA).2
The court also held that an entry of default against a settling party
constitutes a finding of liability warranting classification of that party
as a joint tortfeasor under UCATA.3 Thus, other nonsettling joint-
tortfeasors are entitled to a reduction in contribution.
1. The Case.-The case involved two separate but related sets of
facts.4 The first set of facts arose from the bankruptcy litigation of the
Johns-Manville Corporation (Johns-Manville), which was later reorga-
nized into the Manville Personal Injury Trust (Trust).' The Trust was
established to compensate all parties who had claims against the
Trust.6 A national class action settlement was approved by the federal
bankruptcy courts and district courts in New York which dictated the
terms of the liability of the Trust for personal injury claims, including
co-defendant contribution liability and its correlate, judgment reduc-
tions or set-offs.7 The settlement specifically stated the federal courts
would determine the plaintiffs' set-offs. 8 However, the district and
bankruptcy courts excluded any claims arising in Maryland from the
set-off provisions,9 delegating the decision to the Maryland courts.10
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated that decision,
1. 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998).
2. Id. at 459, 713 A.2d at 965 (holding that the "trial court erred in refusing to allow
petitioners to inspect the amounts of the settlement agreements... and ... vacat[ing] the
trial court's judgment as to the apportionment of liability"). See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. §§ 3-1401 to -1405 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
3. See Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 455, 713 A.2d at 962 (holding that "the trial court and
Court of Special Appeals erred in not treating [the settling defendant] as a tort-feasor").
4. Id., 713 A.2d at 963.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Brief of Appellant Porter Hayden Company at 7, Porter Hayden Co. v. Bul-
linger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998) (No. 56).





and the lower courts were required to determine how Maryland would
rule on the reduction."'
In the meantime, several personal injury claimants sued Johns-
Manville and other defendants associated with Johns-Manville in Balti-
more City Circuit Court for damages resulting from asbestos-related
diseases.1 2 After a consolidated trial, ajury returned verdicts in favor
of four of the plaintiffs.13 In its calculation of damages, the state court
determined how set-offs should be applied.' 4 However, it made its
calculation of damages prior to the decision on remand by the New
York federal court.15 The co-defendants sought recalculation of the
verdicts in light of the federal court's treatment of the issue, but the
state court disregarded the federal court decision as to the appropri-
ate set-off. 6 Therefore, the instant case arose as to which set-off de-
termination should apply.
a. The Johns-Manville Federal Actions.-In 1982, the Johns-
Manville Corporation, the largest producer of asbestos and asbestos-
containing products in the United States, filed for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.17 The reorganization re-
sulted in the creation of the Trust, which assumed liability for all as-
bestos-related claims filed againstJohns-Manville."
In 1990, it became apparent that the trust was inadequately
funded to compensate all possible beneficiaries. 9 A national class ac-
tion was created for all of the trust beneficiaries, including the appel-
lees in the instant case, in order to supersede all state and federal
court litigation pending against the Trust.20 The plaintiff benefi-
ciaries were entitled to settle with the Trust for whatever terms the
Trust could provide. 2' Unabated liability for contribution to co-de-
IL. Id. at 457, 713 A.2d at 964.
12. See id. at 455-58, 713 A.2d at 963-65.
13. Brief of Amicus Curiae Manville Distributors Subclass at 10, Porter Hayden Co. v.
Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998) (No. 56).
14. Id. at 11.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 455-46, 713 A.2d at 963-64 (explaining that the over-
whelming number of persons claiming injury due to asbestos exposure forced the com-
pany into bankruptcy); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Manville Distributors Subclass at 2,Porter Hayden (No. 56). Porter Hayden Company was a Maryland distributor of Johns-
Manville products. Id. n.1.
18. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 455, 713 A.2d at 963.
19. Id. at 456, 713 A.2d at 963.
20. Id.
21. Brief of Appellant Porter Hayden Company at 6, Porter Hayden (No. 56).
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fendants, however, would result in an insolvent Trust.2 2 Thus, the
Trust was enjoined from fully funding the liability imposed by UCATA
to limit contribution liability and to ensure the Trust's solvency.23 A
settlement agreement was eventually reached by the trust benefi-
ciaries, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the
agreement.
24
Following remand, the trust beneficiaries reached a new settle-
ment agreement.25 The federal district courts for the Eastern and
Southern districts of New York approved the new settlement, under
which all claims against the Trust were to be removed from "the vari-
ous tort systems" and processed under a Trust Distribution Process
(TDP), which became the Trust's principal governing document. 26
The TDP categorized diseases resulting from exposure to asbestos and
assigned corresponding monetary compensation values.2v The TDP
also outlined methods by which a co-defendant's set-off would be cal-
culated in litigation involving trust beneficiaries. 28 However, the TDP
expressly excluded all claims arising in Maryland with respect to the
appropriate set-off provisions, providing for resolution of that issue by
"the Courts."
29
The Second Circuit vacated the lower court's approval of the set-
tlement with respect to the Maryland set-off issue and remanded the
case to the district court.3 0 On remand, the federal district court at-
tempted to predict how the Maryland Court of Appeals would resolve
the issue, holding that to determine the appropriate set-off, the courts
were to "exclude the Trust from calculations of other settling defen-
dants' pro rata shares, and ... credit amounts settled by the Trust to
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 456, 713 A.2d at 964.
25. Id. at 457, 713 A.2d at 964.
26. See id. at 456, 713 A.2d at 964; Brief of Amicus Curiae The Manville Personal Injury
Settlement Trust at 9, Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998)
(No. 56).
27. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 456, 713 A.2d at 964.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Stipulation of Settlement provided:
Section H.3 of the TDP, which deals with calculation of set-off, shall not apply by
operation of this Stipulation with respect to asbestos health claims arising under
Maryland law. The parties consent to trial by the Courts of the issue of appropri-
ate set-off rules that should be developed with respect to Manville or the Trust in
connection with claims arising under Maryland law.
Id. (quoting In rejoint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 578 (E.D.N.Y. &
S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Manville IV), affd in part, vacated in part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996)
(Manville V)).
30. See id. at 457, 713 A.2d at 964.
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joint tortfeasors who have not settled."31 The federal district court's
determination of the Maryland set-off was rendered on June 10, 1996,
after the Maryland trial court had rendered its decision on the issue.32
The issue on appeal is which set-off ruling should apply.
b. Personal Injury Actions in the State Courts.-In 1995, John
Grimshaw,33 Nick Zumas, Patrick McCaffery, Ethel Marie Granski,
Casimir Balonis, and Frank Krueger each filed suit in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City against numerous defendants, each alleging
that they contracted asbestos-related mesothelioma from either work-
place or household exposure to the defendants' products.34 The
court consolidated their suits for trial purposes.
Several of the defendants filed cross claims and impleaded third
parties for contribution.36 Porter Hayden, a defendant in this action,
filed a third party contribution claim against Babcock & Wilcox Com-
pany (B&W). At the same time, B&W entered into a settlement
agreement with Grimshaw."8 B&W, therefore, did not respond to
Porter Hayden's complaint or discovery requests.3 9 In response,
Porter Hayden filed a motion for entry of a default judgment against
B&W.40 The court granted Porter Hayden's motion and entered a
default judgment against B&W on August 30, 1995." 1
Porter Hayden also impleaded the Johns-Manville Trust "for the
sole purpose of obtaining a verdict reduction."42 On December 21,
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. John Grimshaw died in January 1995. Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md.
App. 134, 147, 692 A.2d. 5, 12 (1997), vacated sub nom. Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350
Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998). His daughter, Barbara Bullinger, is the "personal represen-
tative of the Grimshaw estate." Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 459, 713 A.2d at 965; Grimshaw,
115 Md. App. at 147, 692 A.2d at 12.
34. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 144, 692 A.2d at 10.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 144-45, 692 A.2d at 10-11.
37. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 457, 713 A.2d at 964.
38. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 183, 692 A.2d at 29. The settlement between B&W and
Grimshaw included a release agreement, which provided that "in order for Porter Hayden
to be entitled to a decrease or pro rata reduction of the damages claimed by Grimshaw, it
must be adjudicated that the releasees are joint tort-feasors." Id., 692 A.2d at 30. The
Grimshaw court referred to this release agreement as a "Swigert type release." Id., 692 A.2d
at 29; see infra notes 147-159 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of a Swigert
release).
39. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 457, 713 A.2d at 964.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Brief of Amicus Curiae Manville Distributors Subclass at 10, Porter Hayden (No. 56).
If Porter Hayden could obtain a judgment of liability against B&W, B&W would be classi-
[VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
1995, the jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs in the Zumas,
McCaffery, Grimshaw, and Granski cases.4"
In reducing the jury verdicts to judgment, the court made statu-
tory adjustments to the compensatory damages pursuant to the
UCATA to reflect the settlements with the Manville Trust and other
joint tortfeasors." The court made these adjustments after consider-
ing reports submitted by the parties that contained proposals for final
judgment.45 The court reviewed these documents in camera and then
sealed the reports. 46 The defendants moved to compel production of
this information, but neither the court nor the opposing parties al-
lowed the defendants to discover the settlement information.
47 On
March 13, 1996, the trial court rendered final judgments without af-
fording the defendants an opportunity to examine the settlement
information.48
The trial court's calculation of the final judgments was affected
by two factors. First, though the court rendered default judgment
against third party defendant and releasee B&W, it refused to classify
B&W as ajoint tortfeasor.49 Porter Hayden, therefore, did not obtain
a decrease or pro rata reduction of the damages entered in favor of
Grimshaw. ° Second, the circuit court rendered its decision before
the federal district court decided the set-off issue.51
Porter Hayden and co-defendant Owens Coming filed motions
pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-535 requesting recalculation of the final
judgments in light of the federal district court ruling on set-off.52 Ap-
plication of the federal rule would have resulted in an outcome more
favorable to Porter Hayden.5' The federal ruling held that the Trust
fled as joint tortfeasor. Thus, under the provisions of UCATA, Porter Hayden would be
entitled to a reduction in the verdict.
43. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 458, 713 A.2d at 964.
44. Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 167, 692 A.2d 5, 21-22 (1996),
vacated sub nom. Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998).
45. Id. at 167-68, 692 A.2d at 22 (explaining that such statutory adjustments were
aimed at preventing double recovery).
46. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 458, 713 A.2d at 964; Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 169, 692
A.2d at 22-23.
47. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 168-69, 692 A.2d at 22.
48. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 458, 713 A.2d at 965.
49. Id. (explaining that the trial court would not "'reduce Hayden's pro rata share of
the judgment because it was not established that B&W was a joint tort-feasor'" (quoting
Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 185, 692 A.2d at 30)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 457, 713 A.2d at 964.
52. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Manville Personal Injury Trust at 15, Porter Hayden.
(No. 56).
53. Brief of Appellant Porter Hayden Company at 13-14, Porter Hayden (No. 56).
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would not be counted as a joint tortfeasor when the amount of a pro
rata share was calculated, and that plaintiffs' judgments should be re-
duced dollar for dollar by the amount of the Trust settlement.54 Ap-
plication of this rule would not allow the plaintiffs' judgments to be
reduced by more than the amount of their Trust settlements, and thejudgment against defendants would not increase as a result of the set-
tlement between the plaintiff and the Trust. 55 Conversely, the Mary-
land ruling applied by the lower courts counted the Trust as a joint
tortfeasor and treated the release as a pro tanto reduction in the ver-
dict rather than a pro rata share.56 Thus, under the Maryland rule,
Porter Hayden would be forced to pay the Trust's portion that it was
enjoined from funding and pay more to the plaintiffs than if the Trust
had not been impleaded.5 7
Despite the differing outcomes resulting from application of the
different rules, the circuit court did not "exercise its revisionary pow-
ers."58 The nonsettling defendants argued that they were forced to
compensate the plaintiffs with a greater amount of damages than they
would have had to pay if the Trust had not been impleaded as a result
of the circuit court's resolution of the set-off issue.59
Porter Hayden and co-defendants Anchor Packing and Owens
Corning appealed the trial court's decision on several issues to the
Court of Special Appeals.6" The issues considered by the appellate
court included, but were not limited to, the discoverability of the con-
fidential settlement agreements, B&W's status as a joint tortfeasor,
and whether the circuit court should have applied the set-off rules as
determined by the federal court.61
The Court of Special Appeals held that the amounts of the settle-
ment agreements were properly withheld from Porter Hayden and the
other appellants.62 It rejected the appellants' arguments that access
to the agreements should be granted because the information was de-
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id. at 14.
56. Brief of Amicus Curiae Manville Distributors Subclass at 11, Porter Hayden (No. 56).
57. Id.
58. Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 172, 692 A.2d 5, 24 (1997),
vacated sub nom. Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998).
59. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Manville Distributors Subclass at 11, Porter Hayden (No.
56).
60. See Anchor Packing, 115 Md. App. at 145-47, 692 A.2d at 11-12.
61. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. at 146, 692 A.2d at 11; see supra notes 52-57 and accompa-
nying text (explaining the difference between the set-off rule adopted by the federal court
and that adopted by the Maryland circuit court).
62. Grimshaw, 115 Md. at 169, 692 A.2d at 22-23.
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livered ex parte and used to adjudicate the defendant's liability.63
The court first defined ex parte communication to mean "a communi-
cation about a case that an adversary makes to the decision maker
without notice to an affected party."64 It stated that ex parte commu-
nications occur when they are "taken or granted at the instance and
for the benefit of one party only and without notice to or contestation
by, any person adversely interested."6 The court in determining that
the settlement agreements were not delivered ex parte reasoned that
both parties were given the opportunity to submit information to the
court with regard to the settlement releases and proposed final judg-
ments.66 Thus, the appellants had notice that the materials were sub-
mitted to the court for review. 67 The court further concluded that the
circuit court's refusal to produce the information submitted by the
appellees did not prejudice the appellants because the latter already
possessed the information necessary to calculate reductions under
UCATA.6s Ultimately, the court stated that the lower court properly
reviewed the settlement agreements and properly applied the UCATA
provisions to determine the set-offs.6"
With respect to the default judgment entered against B&W, the
court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that B&W was not to
be considered a joint tortfeasor by reason of the default judgment
entered against it.7° The court rejected the appellants' argument
that B&W's default judgment could substitute for an adjudication on
the merits and render B&W a joint tortfeasor.71 The court inter-
preted UCATA Section 16(a), which defines joint tortfeasor, as
prohibiting entry of default judgment from establishing B&W as
jointly or severally liable in tort.72 It emphasized that only "a judicial
determination of liability or nonliability settles the question of
whether a cross-defendant is a joint tort-feasor under the UCATA."73
63. Id. at 168, 692 A.2d at 22 (stating that "appellees' submissions were not ex parte...
thus appellants' rights were not denied").
64. Id.
65. Id.




70. See id. at 184, 692 A.2d at 30 (finding that "the default judgment does not establish
that B&W is jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to [Grimshaw]" (alteration







With respect to the conflict between the federal and state court
decisions, the court noted that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
had "fundamental jurisdiction to adjust compensatory damages and
issue a final judgment. '7 4 The court recognized that while the circuit
court could refer to the federal court's conclusion, the ultimate deci-
sion rested with the circuit court.75 Therefore, the court affirmed the
circuit court's decision on the set-off issue.7 6
Dissatisfied with the results, Porter Hayden and Owens Corning
appealed, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine:
(1) whether the circuit court had the authority to determine the ap-
plication of co-defendant contribution claims when a federal court
was to address the application of Maryland set-off principles in a pend-
ing federal class action proceeding involving the parties to the instant
appeal; 77 (2) whether the trial court properly withheld from petition-
ers the amounts in the settlement agreements negotiated between the
plaintiffs and other joint tortfeasors; and (3) whether a default judg-
ment constitutes a finding of liability for purposes of application of
the UCATA.78
2. Legal Background.-
a. Discovery of Confidential Agreements in Maryland.-Mary-
land Rule 2-402 governs the scope of discovery in Maryland state
courts. 79 It permits discovery of any matter relevant and not privi-
74. Id. at 173, 692 A.2d at 24 (defining "fundamental jurisdiction" as "'the power resid-
ing in [a] court to determine judicially a given action, controversy, or question presented
to it for decision"' (alteration in original) (quoting Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406, 415, 412
A.2d 1244, 1249 (1980))).
75. See id. at 172, 692 A.2d at 25 (stating that "[t]he trial court's conclusion was not
dependent upon the conclusion reached in the federal court").
76. Id. at 175, 692 A.2d at 25.
77. The court in Porter Hayden ultimately vacated the trial court's apportionment of the
damages among the joint tortfeasors. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 459, 713 A.2d at 965. Be-
cause the court remanded the decision, the federal court's apportionment decision pre-
dated the trial court apportionment of damages. Id. Thus, the trial court was required to
apply the preclusive effect of the federal court action and the court did not need to answer
this issue. Id.
78. Id. at 458-59, 713 A.2d at 965. Zumas and McCafferey settled with Owens Corning
prior to oral arguments. Id, at 459, 713 A.2d at 965. Thus, Owens Corning appealed only
the verdicts rendered against it in the Granski and Grimshaw cases. Id. Porter Hayden
appealed only from the Grinshaw verdict. Id.
79. Maryland Rule 2-402 states, in relevant part:
A party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents
or other tangible things ... if the matter sought is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the action .... It is not ground for objection that the information
sought is already known to or otherwise obtainable by the party seeking discovery
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leged.' Many courts outside of Maryland, following a similar stan-
dard of discoverability, have determined that, in general, settlement
agreements deemed confidential by the negotiating parties are discov-
erable if relevant to the subject matter of the action."' They disagree,
however, on the showing necessary to obtain discovery of the docu-
ments. In Maryland, courts have not addressed the discoverability of
settlement agreements deemed confidential by the parties, but they
have considered the discoverability of agreements deemed confiden-
tial by statute.
82
(1) Other Jurisdictions. -Various jurisdictions have estab-
lished differing standards necessary to compel discovery of confiden-
tial settlement agreements. Some jurisdictions deem settlement
agreements discoverable to the extent they are relevant.8" Otherjuris-
dictions look for a "particularized showing of a likelihood that admis-
sible evidence will be generated by the dissemination of the terms of a
settlement agreement."84 For example, in Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co., 85 the defendant sought discovery of settlement agree-
ments between the plaintiff and settling defendant.86 The plaintiff, a
general contractor for a construction project, sued the defendant sub-
or that the information will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
MD. RULE 2-402.
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 72, 79 (S.D.W. Va.
1996) (mem.) (allowing discovery of relevant portions of confidential settlement agree-
ments); Collier Servs. Corp. v. Salinas, 812 S.W.2d 372, 376 (1991) (stating that "the terms
of a settlement agreement are properly discoverable under Tex. R. Civ. P.
166(b) (2) (f) (2)"); In re NewYork County Data Entry Worker Prod. Liab. Litig. v. A.B. Dick
Co., 616 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (stating that "discovery is permitted of evidence
which is material, necessary, and relevant, and facts which will sharpen the issues at trial").
82. See Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 467, 713 A.2d at 969 ("Although this court has not
examined the specific issue of whether a party may examine confidential settlement agree-
ments, we have discussed a party's ability to inspect other information deemed confidential
where the confidentiality is created by statute.").
83. Perez v. State Indus. Inc., 578 So. 2d 1018, 1020 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
information is admissible if it "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence [as] long as it is relevant to the subject matter"); Ford Motor Co. v.
Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1995) (stating that the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allow
discovery of settlement agreements to the extent they are relevant).
84. See, e.g., Botaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (mem.) (stat-
ing that the "strong public policy of favoring settlements ... require[s] some particular-
ized showing of a likelihood that admissible evidence will be generated by the
dissemination of the terms of a settlement agreement").
85. 122 F.R.D. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
86. Id. at 448.
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contractor to recover money paid in excess of the subcontract. 87 The
defendant counterclaimed for increased remuneration based on the
extra work he had performed and for damages incurred due to the
inability to accept other projects because of construction delays.88
The defendant asserted that discovery of the settlement documents
would lead to information concerning defendant's claims for in-
creased compensation.8 9 He proffered that the settlement documents
would "cite increases in construction costs, or indicate other sources
of such information" which would support his claim and even indi-
cated specific instances where specific materials would emphatically
show increase in construction costs.9 0 The court held that the particu-
larized showings of the appellant could reasonably lead to admissible
evidence on the issue of damages caused by the construction delays.9 a
Thus, it allowed the appellant to inspect the settlement agreements.
Other courts have established standards to allow discovery of con-
fidential settlement negotiations. The Second and Seventh Circuits
require a heightened showing for the discovery of such negotiations.
Their standard permits discovery of settlement negotiations during
ongoing litigation only when the movant "lays a foundation by adduc-
ing from other sources evidence indicating that the settlement may be
collusive."92
In Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
Co.,93 a class action co-defendant sought to discover settlement negoti-
ations between plaintiff and a settling co-defendant.94 The court
noted that discovery of another party's settlement negotiations in an
ongoing litigation is unusual because it allows one party to obtain in-
formation about an opponent's strategy.9" In negotiations, a plaintiff
might concede to certain weaknesses that a nonsettling co-defendant
might use to its advantage during litigation. 96 Thus, the court applied
a heightened discovery standard and ultimately found that the de-
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 451.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Thornton v. Syracuse Sav. Bank, 961 F.2d 1042, 1046 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting
Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 843 F.2d 677, 684 (7th Cir.
1987)).
93. 834 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1987).
94. Id. at 679.
95. Id. at 684.
96. Id.
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fendant failed to meet a showing of collusion during the negotiations,
and barred the co-defendant from discovery.
97
Likewise, in Thornton v. Syracuse Savings Bank,98 Syracuse, a co-
defendant in a class action, was prevented from discovering the writ-
ings and documents relating to a settlement agreement entered into
by a bank and investors.99 On appeal to the Second Circuit, the court,
citing Mars Steel, found that Syracuse did not show the "hanky panky"
necessary to show "evidence indicating that the settlement may be col-
lusive."1 °° It concluded that in light of the fact that Syracuse had not
met the heightened standard, the lower court did not abuse its discre-
tion to limit the scope of discovery.
As indicated by the holdings of the Second and Seventh Circuits,
courts will adhere to permitting discovery only when circumstances
clearly indicate evidence of fraud between the negotiating parties.
(2) The Maryland "Need to Inspect" Standard.-In Maryland,
courts have not addressed the discoverability of settlement agree-
ments deemed confidential by the parties, but they have considered
the discoverability of agreements deemed confidential by statute.
101
The Court of Appeals addressed the issue of documents made
confidential by statute in the criminal case of Zaal v. State.1"2 In Zaal,
the defendant was charged with sexual abuse of his twelve-year-old
granddaughter. 10 ' Because the two parties had opposing recollec-
tions of the events, the credibility of the witnesses played an important
role.104 In hopes of finding psychological disturbances on the part of
the child (for purposes of cross examination), the defendant subpoe-
naed the victim's educational records from the Montgomery County
Board of Education.105 The Board, in response, moved for a protec-
tive order.10 6 At the hearing on the motion for the protective order,
97. Id. (stating that "[s]uch discovery is only proper where the party seeking it lays a
foundation by adducing from other sources of evidence indicating that the settlement may
be collusive .... There is no indication of such hanky-panky here.").
98. 961 F.2d 1042 (2d Cir. 1992).
99. Id. at 1045. The settlement agreement stipulated that the investors agreed to pay
35% of the principal amount of the notes held by Syracuse and the investors' obligations to
repay the remaining 65%. Id. at 1044. Syracuse alleged that as a result of this settlement
with the investors, its claims became "subrogated to the investors' claims against another
co-defendant to the extent of the 65% discharged." Id.
100. Id.
101. See Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 467, 713 A.2d at 969.
102. 326 Md. 54, 602 A.2d 1247 (1992).
103. Id. at 61, 602 A.2d at 1250.
104. Id. at 62-63, 602 A.2d at 1251.




the court noted that Maryland regulates the disclosure of personally
identifiable information from a student's education records. 10 7 Also,
information may not be disclosed without consent of the parents.
Therefore, the lower court refused the defendant access to the
records and issued a protective order.'0 8
On appeal, Judge Bell, writing for the majority, held that the doc-
uments could be discovered if a "need to inspect" threshold had been
crossed.'0 9 In a decision that provided useful guidelines, Judge Bell
described the application of the claimant's "need to inspect."" 0 The
Zaal court defined the "need to inspect" as "a reasonable possibility
that review of the records would result in [the] discovery of usable
evidence.""' Thus, privacy interests could only be overcome by dis-
playing a relationship "between the charges, the information sought,
and the likelihood that relevant information [would] be obtained as a
result of reviewing the records."' 2 The Zaal court further indicated
that the individual circumstances dictate whether a sufficient relation-
ship exists. Thus, a proffer of relevance plays an important role."'
The more specific the proffer of relevance with respect to the infor-
mation sought, the less likely the necessity for direct access to the
records by the defendant or his representative.
The court provided examples to illustrate circumstances in which
an issue is relevant and demonstrative of a need to inspect. If the
issue in the case is one of identity, the educational files will not be
relevant." 4 But, if the evidence suggests that a stranger committed
the offense, a proffer that inspection of the records can reveal a con-
nection between the defendant and the victim will be relevant."15 The
107. Id.
108. Id. at 63, 602 A.2d at 1251.
109. See id. at 87, 602 A.2d at 1264.
110. Id. at 80, 602 A.2d at 1260 (stating that the threshold issues was.., whether [claim-
ant] established "the need to inspect").
111. Id. at 81, 602 A.2d at 1260.
112. Id. at 80-81, 602 A.2d at 1261. A "sufficient relationship" necessary to overcome
privacy interests depended, in part, upon the moving party's proffer of relevance. Id. In
Zaal, the court found that the defendant's "need to inspect" outweighed the privacy inter-
ests of the plaintiff. Id. at 82-84, 602 A.2d at 1261-62. The defendant proffered many
legitimate evidentiary possibilities for the information contained in the records, such as
demonstrating patterns of lying, acting out to gain attention, and bias. Id. at 83, 602 A.2d
at 1261. Finding that the issue, credibility of the witness, could not be established without
access to the records, the court allowed discovery of the documents. Id., 602 A.2d at 1261-
62.
113. Id. at 82, 602 A.2d at 1261 (stating that "whether a sufficient relationship exists is
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court further reiterated that the more specific the information sought
and existence easily determined, the less a need for direct access to
the entire file existed, and an in camera review will suffice.' 1 6
When the Zaal court applied these factors, it determined that the
issue was one of credibility. 17 The defendant sought records to cross-
examine the child's motivation, bias, and veracity.'11 Thus, the de-
fendant proffered the longstanding "antagonistic and hostile relation-
ship" that existed between the defendant and the victim's father.' 9
He also proffered the possibility that the records would reflect a pat-
tern of acting out to gain attention, or of lying, or other potentially
damaging characteristics.
120
The Zaal court then weighed this information against the victim's
privacy interest in her educational records to determine if the "need
to inspect" threshold had been crossed. 121 The court recognized that
disclosure of the contents and subsequent extensive questioning
about the records could compromise the victim's educational fu-
ture.1 22 The court saw two alternatives: in camera review by the court
alone or allowing unqualified access to the victim's records.
121
After consideration, the court stated that trial judges have the re-
sponsibility of fashioning remedies that account for both the rights of
the accused and the protection of the victim's records. 124 Thus, the
court held that in cases where the "need to inspect" threshold has
been crossed, the court may elect to review the records alone, conduct
the review in the presence of counsel, or review by counsel alone sub-
ject to certain restrictions required by the court to ensure confidenti-
ality of the records.
125
Later that same year, the court extended the "need to inspect"
standard in Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Stein.126 The
plaintiffs in Stein sued the owner of the home in which they resided.'
27
They alleged that the defendant's negligence proximately caused
116. Id.




121. Id., 602 A.2d at 1262 (stating that "juxtaposed against petitioner's proffer is the
victim's legitimate interest in the privacy of the contents of her educational records").
122. Id. at 83-84, 602 A.2d at 1262.
123. Id. at 84, 602 A.2d at 1262.
124. Id. at 86, 602 A.2d at 1263.
125. Id. at 87, 602 A.2d at 1264.
126. 328 Md. 1, 612 A.2d 880 (1992).
127. Id. at 3, 612 A.2d at 881.
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their child's lead paint poisoning. 2 8 In hopes of finding evidence of
behavioral problems on the part of the child prior to the alleged lead
poisoning, the defendant sought records from the Department of So-
cial Services to discover any information it had about the plaintiffs. 129
In response, the Department of Social Services filed a motion for pro-
tective order arguing that the records were statutorily confidential
and could only be released pursuant to court order.13 0 At the original
hearing on the motion, the court denied access to the records and
entered the protective order.13 1
The Court of Appeals framed the issue as "whether and to what
extent, a state's interest in the confidentiality of its social services
records must yield to a civil defendant's right to discover favorable
evidence bearing on his threatened loss of property."'13 2 In its analy-
sis, the court relied heavily on its decision in Zaal and utilized the
"need to inspect" standard.13 Though Zaal was a criminal case, the
court stressed that the plaintiffs in Stein sought to recover millions of
dollars.'34 The court found that the seriousness of this particular
cause of action paralleled that of a criminal case, thus the balancing of
Zaal's "need to inspect" standard against the privacy interest of the
plaintiff could be utilized. 135
The court reasoned that the issue of causation of the child's im-
pairments was similar to the credibility issue in Zaal.' 6 The only way
the plaintiff in Stein could rebut the proximate cause argument would
be to obtain information regarding past and present behavior of the
child.' 37 Access to the records would allow the trier of fact to assess
whether certain behavior directly resulted from the lead poisoning. 138
The court also recognized that because the defendant had never seen
the records and had no knowledge of their contents, the defendant's
proffer of relevance and need to inspect was not overly specific.' 39
Therefore, the court determined that the legitimate concerns gave
plausibility to the defendant's need to review the records for relevant
128. Id.
129. Id. at 3-4, 612 A.2d 881-82.
130. Id. at 5, 612 A.2d at 881-82.
131. Id. at 6-7, 612 A.2d at 882.
132. Id. at 24, 612 A.2d at 893.
133. Id. at 26, 612 A.2d at 892 (stating that "our recent opinion in Zaal v. State... albeit
a criminal case, is instructive").
134. Id. at 29-30, 612 A.2d at 894.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 30-31, 612 A.2d at 894-95.
137. Id. at 29-30, 612 A.2d at 894.
138. Id. at 30, 612 A.2d at 894.
139. Id.
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information thereby crossing the "need to inspect threshold."'4 ° The
court, balancing the privacy interests of the plaintiffs, allowed review
of the records to the extent that they revealed the child's behavior
during the relevant period in order to assist the trier of fact in deter-
mining the source of the child's irregular behavior.' 41
b. Classifying a Party as a "Tortfeasor" Under the Maryland Uni-
form Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.-At common law, if an injured
party released one of several joint tortfeasors from liability, the re-
maining joint tortfeasors were released from liability as well. 14 2 How-
ever, Maryland's adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act changed this. Under the UCATA, if a plaintiff enters
into a release with a joint tortfeasor, a nonsettling joint tortfeasor is
not automatically released, but may instead obtain a reduction in the
verdict. 1
4 3
Under the UCATA, there is a right of contribution among two or
more persons who are liable, jointly and severally, for the same tor-
tious injury to the plaintiff. A pro rata release enables a plaintiff to
settle with one or two (or more) defendants, and then proceed to trial
against a nonsettling defendant.' 44 The trial judge can then reduce
the amount of any verdict for damages against nonsettling defendants
140. Id. at 31, 612 A.2d at 894.
141. Id., 612 A.2d at 894-95.
142. Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613, 619, 133 A.2d 428, 431 (1957).
143. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-1404 (Supp. 1997). Section 3-1404 provides:
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or
after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so
provides; but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors, or in any amount or
proportion which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if
greater than the consideration paid.
It should be noted that the Maryland Uniform Contribution AmongJoint-Tortfeasors Act,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-20, was recodified as MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. §§ 3-
1401 to -1409 (1995 & Supp. 1997). Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 459, 713 A.2d at 962. Prior
case history in this section based its discussions on the prior Maryland Annotated Code.
For purposes of continuity in this Note, however, corresponding sections of CTS. & JUD.
PROC. will be cited.
Prior MD. ANN. CODE Current MD. CODE ANN.
Art. 50, § 16 = CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-1401
Art. 50, § 17 = CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-1402
Art. 50, § 18 = CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-1403
Art. 50, § 19 = CTS. &Jun. PROC. § 3-1404
Art. 50, § 20 = CTS. &Jun. PROC. § 3-1405
See Petitioners' Brief at 4, Porter Hayden Co. v. Barbara Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d
962 (1998) (No. 56).
144. See Peter B. Knapp, Keeping the Pierringer Promise: Fair Settlements and Fair Trials, 20
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1, 9 (1994).
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by the settling defendant's pro rata share. 4 5 Thus, if a settling de-
fendant's pro rata share is fifty percent and judgment is rendered
against nonsettling defendants for $100,000, the nonsettling defend-
ants would only have to pay $50,000.
In Swigert v. Welk,' 1 6 the Court of Appeals created guidelines for
classifying a party as a joint tortfeasor under section 3-1404 of the
UCATA so that a nonsettling party may receive a reduction in the ver-
dict. 4 7 In Swigert, the plaintiff, Evelyn Newport, a passenger in Harry
Swigert's car, sued Swigert for damages resulting from a two car colli-
sion. 148 Welk, a third party, operated the other car. 149 Swigert im-
pleaded Welk for contribution, but Welk obtained a release from
Newport. 15 °  The release denied liability and provided for a
mandatory pro rata reduction in total damages awarded to plaintiff.' 5'
Welk claimed that the release barred any suit against him and moved
for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in his favor and the de-
fendant appealed the court's decision.1 52
The court determined that Swigert had an extremely valuable
right in retaining Welk in the case.' 5 1 Since the UCATA does not in-
dicate how to determine liability, the court deemed it necessary to
determine Welk's negligence and contribution to the injuries "in one
manner or another."'t5" Even though the terms of the release dictated
that Welk had no obligations to contribute to further damages, a de-
termination of Welk's liability and subsequent classification as a joint
tortfeasor would reduce Swigert's liability to plaintiff Newport in
half.15
5
To determine Welk's liability, the court established guidelines,
which have subsequently been heavily relied upon. 156 It stated that
"[t] he act does not specify the test of liability. Clearly something short
145. Id.
146. 213 Md. 613, 133 A.2d 428 (1957).
147. Id. at 619-22, 133 A.2d at 431-33.
148. Id. at 614-15, 133 A.2d at 428.
149. Id. at 615, 133 A.2d at 429.
150. Id. at 615-16, 133 A.2d at 429.
151. Id. at 618, 133 A.2d at 431.
152. Id. at 617, 133 A.2d at 430.
153. Id. at 621, 133 A.2d at 432.
154. Id. at 619, 133 A.2d at 431.
155. Id. at 621, 133 A.2d at 433 (referring to an identical case in Pennsylvania where
"though [co-defendant] cannot recover contribution from the [settling] defendant, he
does have an extremely valuable right in retaining [settling defendant] in the case, be-
cause, if the jury should find [settling defendant] to be ajoint tortfeasor, [co-defendant's]
liability to plaintiffs would be cut in half").
156. Id. at 619, 133 A.2d at 431.
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of an actual judgment will suffice; we think it equally clear that a de-
nial of liability will not."1 57 It reasoned that while "something short of
an actual judgment" of liability does satisfy a party's classification as a
tortfeasor, a party must properly be cleared of any liability.1 5 Thus,
in circumstances, as in this case, where a party has been contractually
deemed "not liable" and "not a joint tortfeasor," the mere denial of
this liability does not obviate the need to actually determine the
party's liability.
For nearly two decades after the establishment of the Swigert
guidelines, classification of a settling defendant as a joint tortfeasor
through a trial on the merits and a subsequent determination by a fact
finder was the only method available in Maryland for a nonsettling
defendant to obtain a reduction in the verdict pursuant to section 3-
1404.19 In Jones v. Hurst,1 60 however, the Court of Special Appeals
held that a release could classify a settling defendant as a joint
tortfeasor which would operate to reduce the liability of the nonset-
ling tortfeasors under the UCATA.' 6 '
In Jones, an automobile owned and operated by Beverly Jones was
struck in the rear by an automobile operated by Zachary Hurst and
owned by Henry Hurst.'6 2 Jones sued the Hursts for personal inju-
ries.163 Zachary Hurst alleged that brake failure caused the accident
and filed a separate suit against General Motors Corporation.164 The
two cases were consolidated for trial.'65 Jones settled her case against
General Motors pursuant to a release which denied liability, but was
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 193, 218 A.2d 184, 188 (1966) (holding that
a joint release entitled a nonsettling defendant to a partial reduction in the verdict when
settling co-defendant was found liable for injury to plaintiff). It is important to note that
the federal courts had already determined that a release could identify a party as a joint
tortfeasor thereby eliminating the need for a determination of the settling defendant's
liability in order for nonsettling defendants to get reduction in verdict. See, e.g., Mazer v.
Security Ins. Group, 507 F.2d 1338, 1342 (3d Cir. 1975) ("[T]hejoint tortfeasor status of a
settling party could ... be established not only by ajudgment but also by a provision in the
joint tortfeasor release in which the injured party acknowledges that in any lawsuit the
verdict will be reduced to the extent agreed upon." (citing Griffin v. United States, 500
F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974))).
160. 54 Md. App. 607, 459 A.2d 219 (1983).
161. See id. at 612, 459 A.2d at 223 (holding that "a release agreement of the kind in-
volved here would bring a case within the provision of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tort-Feasors Act").
162. Id. at 609, 459 A.2d at 220.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id., 459 A.2d at 221.
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captioned 'JOINT TORT-FEASOR RELEASE."1 66 The release also
provided that "General Motors Corporation shall be considered as
joint tort-feasors." 1 67
The court applied the Swigert guidelines to allow for the settling
defendant's contractual classification as ajoint tortfeasor. In its appli-
cation of the Swigert guidelines, the court reasoned that the settling
defendant's denial of liability in its pre-negotiated joint tortfeasor re-
lease could not override its concession as a joint tortfeasor. 168 The
contract which classified the party as a joint tortfeasor qualified as
"something short of an actual judgment" sufficient to classify a party
as a joint tortfeasor.'6 9 Therefore, determination of the party as a
joint tortfeasor allowed for a reduction in the nonsettling defendant's
verdict pursuant to the UCATA. 170
Following the Jones decision, Maryland courts continued to ex-
pand and clarify the methods available to classify a settling party as a
joint tortfeasor. In Allgood v. Mueller,'17 the Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether to permit a nonsettling defendant to obtain a reduction
in the verdict despite the existence of a release obtained by the set-
tling parties which classified the parties as 'joint tortfeasors," but
stated that the release could not be construed as an admission of lia-
bility in tort unless the settling parties were judicially determined
liable. 172
In Allgood, plaintiff brought suit against a physical education class
teacher, the principal of the middle school, the Board of Education of
St. Mary's County, and Jayfro Corporation for injury to her child on
the school premises. 173 During the trial, the three parties affiliated
with the school settled for $75,000 and signed a release captioned
'JOINT TORT-FEASORS RELEASE AND INDEMNIFICATION
AGREEMENT.' 74 Despite the caption of 'joint tortfeasor," however,
a provision of the release stated that the release should not be consid-
166. Id.
167. Id. at 610, 459 A.2d at 221.
168. See id. at 611, 459 A.2d at 222 (stating that the release was sufficient for purposes of
satisfying the Swigert guidelines).
169. See id. (applying the rule in Swigert that "something short of an actual judgment will
suffice [to classify a party as ajoint tortfeasor]" and finding the "release sufficient for that
purpose").
170. Id. at 613, 459 A.2d at 223 (holding that "a release agreement of the kind involved
here would bring a case within the provision of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act").
171. 307 Md. 350, 513 A.2d 915 (1986).
172. Id. at 357-58, 513 A.2d at 919.
173. Id. at 353, 513 A.2d at 917.
174. Id.
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ered an admission of liability and that recovery of damages from
Jayfro could only be reduced if any of the settling defendants were
found jointly liable to the Plaintiff.175 The court proceeded with the
trial and the jury ultimately returned a verdict only against Jayfro. 176
Jayfro moved to reduce the verdict by the amount paid by the settling
defendants who had signed the joint tortfeasor release.1 77
The Allgood court recognized that the conditional terms of the
release distinguished the release used in Jones.178 The Ailgood release
only conditionally promised to reduce the judgment against Jayfro if
the settling parties were adjudicated as joint tortfeasors, whereas the
Jones release classified the settling party as a liable joint tortfeasor for
purposes of reduction under UCATA. 1 9 The Allgood court under-
scored that a release alone is not an absolute admission by any party
that a payer was negligent. 8 ' The court further emphasized that any
party to the suit has a right to submit the question of negligence and
liability.181 And in this case, where the settling parties were adjudi-
cated as nontortfeasors and held not liable, the conditional terms of
the release had not been met.182 Thus, the defendant could not re-
ceive a reduction in the verdict, and the plaintiff was entitled to both
the settlement amount and the amount of damages rendered against
Jayfro.1 83
As can be seen, in Maryland, the rights of a nonsettling party de-
pend upon the settling party's classification as ajoint tortfeasor under
the UCATA as well as the types of releases entered into by the settling
parties. Using the guidelines set out in Swigert,184 a released party who
denies liability as ajoint tortfeasor cannot obviate the need for ajudi-
cial determination as to its status as "non-liable." However, "some-
thing short of an actual judgment" can determine liability.1 85 Thus,
releases play an important role in the classification of a party as ajoint
tortfeasor. Settling parties who agree to classification as a joint
175. Id. at 354, 513 A.2d at 917.
176. Id. The court did not inform the jury about the settlement. Id. at 357, 513 A.2d at
919.
177. Id. Jayfro asserted that the defendants remained in the case solely for the purpose
of determining that amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff and not for determin-
ing the settling parties' liability in tort.





183. Id. (holding thatJayfro Corporation must pay the costs).
184. See supra notes 147-160 (discussing the Swigert guidelines and their application).
185. Allgvod, 307 Md. at 357, 513 A.2d at 919.
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tortfeasor in their release are considered liable, and the nonsettling
parties will be entitled to a reduction under UCATA.18 6 If the release
is conditional, then a nonsettling party must have the settling parties'
liability judicially determined.1 8 7
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, the
Court of Appeals addressed two issues."8 ' First, the court considered
whether the trial court improperly refused the appellants access to the
settlement agreements negotiated between the plaintiffs and the re-
leased defendants.' Second, the court considered whether a default
judgment constitutes a finding of liability for purposes of applying sec-
tion 3-1404 of the UCATA.190
With respect to the first issue, a unanimous court held that the
trial court erred in failing to require disclosure of the negotiated set-
tlement agreements.19' With respect to the second issue, the court
ruled that the default judgment entered against B&W on Porter Hay-
den's third party claim constituted a determination of liability, and
thus classified B&W as ajoint tortfeasor for purposes of section 3-1404
of the UCATA.' 92
a. Disclosure of Confidential Settlement Agreements.-In reach-
ing its decision, the Porter Hayden court first looked to the general pur-
pose and scope of discovery under the Maryland Rules. 9 ' Relying on
Maryland case law, the court noted that the purpose of the discovery
rules was to "require disclosure of facts by a party litigant to all of his
adversaries, and thereby to eliminate, as far as possible, the necessity
of any party to litigation going to trial in a confused or muddled state
of mind."19 4 The court stated that the discovery rules are broad in
scope and liberally construed to accomplish their purpose.'9 5
The court examined the evidentiary concept of privilege after
noting that "[u]nder the general discovery rule, a party may obtain
186. See supra notes 161-171 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
188. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 455, 713 A.2d at 963.
189. Id. at 459-69, 713 A.2d at 965-70.
190. Id. at 469-73, 713 A.2d at 970-72.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 472-73, 713 A.2d at 972. Judge Rodowsky filed a dissenting opinion on the
default issue. Id. at 474-84, 713 A.2d at 973-78.
193. Id. at 459-61, 713 A.2d at 965 (examining the "very broad" scope of discovery under
Maryland Rule 2-402(a)).
194. Id. at 460, 713 A.2d at 965-66 (quoting Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti, 227
Md. 8, 13, 174 A.2d 768, 771 (1961)).
195. Id., 713 A.2d at 966.
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discovery of information that is relevant and not privileged."196 Re-
flecting on the privileges accorded by the United States Constitution,
the Maryland Constitution, statutes, and common law, the court
found no privilege protecting the settlement agreements from disclo-
sure.1 97 The court then focused its attention on the relevance of the
information sought by petitioners.1 98 The court noted that at the pre-
trial stage, the amounts of the settlement agreements would have
been irrelevant. 99 Yet "once the verdicts were rendered against peti-
tioners, the amounts of the settlement agreements became relevant in
determining the apportionment of damages as to petitioners under
the [UCATA]."200 This ripened relevancy caused the settlement
agreements to become more vulnerable to discovery requests.2 °1
Finally, the Porter Hayden court analyzed whether settlement
agreements, deemed confidential by the parties that negotiated them,
"are discoverable."' 20 Recognizing this as an issue of first impression
in Maryland, the court first reviewed decisions of other jurisdic-
tions.2 °3 The court examined federal court opinions which found set-
tlement agreements discoverable if they were relevant.20 4 A review of
pertinent state court decisions from other jurisdictions also revealed
that settlement agreements, deemed confidential by the parties who
negotiated them, were discoverable.20 5 It also reviewed discovery of
confidential settlement negotiations which generally required a "more
particularized showing that evidence sought was relevant and calcu-
lated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence."20 6 The court then
reviewed prior case law in Maryland. It used the standard applied to
determine if parties could inspect other types of information deemed
confidential by statute to ultimately determine that inspection of the
relevant portions of the settlement agreement was permissible.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 460-61, 713 A.2d at 966 (stating that the "[r]espondents have asserted no
privilege pertaining to the amounts of the settlement agreements they negotiated with
other potentially responsible parties").
198. Id. at 461, 713 A.2d at 966.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 460, 713 A.2d at 966 (explaining that information must be relevant, as well as
unprivileged, in order to be discoverable).
202. Id. at 461, 713 A.2d at 966.
203. See id. (stating that "[c] ourts outside of Maryland have had the opportunity to ad-
dress the issue of whether settlement agreements, deemed confidential by the parties that
negotiated them, are discoverable").
204. Id. at 461-64, 713 A.2d at 966-68.
205. Id. at 464-65, 713 A.2d at 968-69.
206. Lesal Interiors v. Resolution Trust Corp., 153 F.R.D. 552, 562 (D.N.J. 1994).
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With no prior case law on point in Maryland, the court applied
the "need to inspect standard," utilized in Zaal and Stein, to determine
whether the confidential settlement agreements could be discov-
ered.2" 7 The court reasoned that though in those two cases, the docu-
ments in question were deemed confidential by statute, "[t]here
certainly would be no greater standard, and there may be significantly
less of a standard, where there is no statutory basis for the claims of
confidentiality, as in this case."2 °8 The court held that petitioners
crossed the threshold of "a reasonable possibility that review of the
[settlement agreements] would lead to discovery of usable evi-
dence."2 9  The court underscored the fact that the particular
amounts of the settlement agreements were utilized by the trial court
to determine finaljudgments against each petitioner.210 Thus, the pe-
titioners needed to inspect portions of the settlement agreement rele-
vant to determine whether, and how much, judgments might be
affected by (1) the settling defendant's classification as a tortfeasor or
nontortfeasor; (2) whether the release was pro tanto or pro rata; and
(3) the consideration paid for the release. 211 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the trial court acted improperly in withholding this
information.212 The court vacated the trial judge's apportionment of
damages and remanded the case for further proceedings. 213
b. Expanding the Definition of "Tortfeasor. "-Under the Mary-
land UCATA, a "release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor
... reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of
the consideration paid for the release or in any amount or proportion
by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if
greater than the consideration paid. ' 214 The lower court, however,
did not apply this provision of the UCATA and refused to reduce the
207. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 467-68, 713 A.2d at 969-70; see supra notes 102-141 and
accompanying text (discussing the "need to inspect" standard in Zaal and Stein).
208. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 468, 713 A.2d at 970.
209. Id. (quoting Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 81, 602 A.2d 1247, 1260 (1992)).
210. Id. at 469, 713 A.2d at 970.
211. Id. at 468-69, 713 A.2d at 970 (finding the petitioners demonstrated a "need to
inspect" the settlement agreement to determine "whether, and how much, the judgments
against them might be affected by (1) the way in which the agreement classified the set-
ling defendant, i.e., tortfeasor or nontort-feasor, (2) whether a pro tanto or pro rata re-
lease was intended, and (3) the amount paid for the release").
212. Id. The court emphasized that nondisclosure of the settlement agreements was
inappropriate, but it also cautioned against total disclosure, which might also be inappro-
priate, depending on the circumstances. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 470, 713 A.2d at 970 (omission in original) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 3-1404 (Supp. 1997)).
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judgment against Porter Hayden,215 failing to equate the defaultjudg-
ment entered against the impleaded third party, B&W, with a classifi-
cation of B&W as a joint tortfeasor for purposes of the UCATA.21 6
The Porter Hayden court recognized "that there ha[d] been no
determination by a fact finder as to B&W's liability. ' 217 The court also
acknowledged that the terms of the release did not classify B&W as a
joint tortfeasor for purposes of the UCATA. 21' Therefore, the court
was forced to decide whether the default judgment entered against
B&W on Porter Hayden's third-party claim constituted a determina-
tion of B&W's liability. 219 In addition, if the court found that B&W
was indeed liable, it needed to assess whether this liability established
B&W as a joint tortfeasor for purposes of reducing Porter Hayden's
verdict pursuant to section 3-1404 of the UCATA.
220
In resolving the first issue, the court focused on its decision Curry
v. Hillcrest Clinic, Inc.,221 in which it explained the effect of a default
judgment.222 The court noted that in Curry, it described a default
judgment as "more akin to an admission of liability. '223 The court
reviewed Maryland cases dating back to 1936 that were consistent with
the Curry court's reasoning that 'Judgment by default is as binding as
any other judgment and establishes the liability of the defendant to
the plaintiff."224 Therefore, the court concluded that the default
judgment entered against B&W should constitute an admission of lia-
bility by B&W.2 2
5
To determine if "this admission of liability [was] sufficient to es-
tablish B&W as a joint tort-feasor," the court applied the guidelines
created in Swigert and concluded that "[a] lthough no determination
as to B&W's liability was made by a judge or jury," B&W's admission of
liability was sufficient to establish B&W as a joint tortfeasor.226 The
court found further support for its conclusion in the fact that the un-
derlying goal of the Maryland Rules and the UCATA was "'to try in
215. Id. at 469, 713 A.2d at 970.
216. Id. at 469-70, 713 A.2d at 970.




221. 337 Md. 412, 653 A.2d 934 (1995).
222. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 472, 713 A.2d at 971.
223. Id. at 472, 713 A.2d at 971 (quoting Curry v. Hillcrest Clinic, Inc., 337 Md. 412, 434-
36, 653 A.2d 934, 945 (1995)).
224. Id., 713 A.2d at 972 (quoting Associated Transp. v. Bonoumo, 191 Md. 442, 445-46,
62 A.2d 281, 283 (1948)).




one action all phases of [the] litigation.""'22 If the court allowed the
trial court to enter a judgment against Porter Hayden without ac-
counting for the reduction in verdict due to B&W's contribution as a
tortfeasor, the trial court would have left open an unresolved issue
requiring further litigation.22 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held
that the lower court erred in not classifying B&W as a joint tortfeasor
and in not reducing the amount of damages pursuant to section 3-
1404 of the UCATA.229
4. Analysis.-The Porter Hayden court determined two issues
brought on appeal. First, the court established that parties can dis-
cover relevant portions of the settlement agreement despite party cre-
ated confidentiality. Though the court properly recognized the issue
and made the proper decision, it arrived at this decision through ex-
tension of a "need to inspect" standard used in prior case law. In so
doing, the court failed to create the minimum standard that will allow
courts to determine whether to allow discovery of confidential settle-
ment agreements. Second, the court determined that a default judg-
ment can substitute for adjudication as a tortfeasor for purposes of
reduction under the UCATA. This decision was proper because it is
consistent with the well established guidelines set forth in Swigert and
because it upheld the policy goals of the Maryland UCATA, to prevent
double recovery.
a. Discovery of Confidential Settlement Agreements. -In resolving
a notable issue of first impression,230 the Porter Hayden court extended
the use of the "need to inspect" standard to allow discovery of relevant
portions of settlement agreements deemed confidential by the par-
ties.23  This decision was proper in light of the existing body of case
law in other jurisdictions which allowed the discovery of relevant por-
227. Id. at 473, 713 A.2d at 972 (quoting Montgomery County v. Volk Mfg. Co., 317 Md.
185, 191, 562 A.2d 1246, 1249 (1989) (quoting Stem v. Nello L. Teer Co., 213 Md. 132,
133, 130 A.2d 769, 775 (1957))).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 473-74, 713 A.2d at 972.
230. See id. at 467, 713 A.2d at 969 ("[T]his Court has not examined the specific issue of
whether a party may examine confidential settlement accords.").
231. See id. at 468-69, 713 A.2d at 970 (concluding that "[p]etitioners had a 'need to
inspect' so much of the settlement agreement as was relevant"). The broad scope of dis-
covery under Maryland law, the relevance of the settlement agreements, and the fact that
they were nonprivileged supported the court's decision. Id. at 459-69, 713 A.2d at 965-70;
see also supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (explaining the scope of discovery under
the Maryland Rules). Moreover, the court was persuaded by the wealth of federal and state
court decisions outside of Maryland that permit the discovery of confidential settlement
agreements. PorterHayden, 350 Md. at 461-66, 713 A.2d at 966-69; see also supra note 81 and
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tions of settlement agreements deemed confidential by the parties
under certain circumstances.
The lower court decision initially identified this issue as whether
or not "appellees' submissions were [ ] ex parte."232 Its entire analysis
of the issue relied upon the definition of ex parte and whether the
submissions fit the definition of ex parte.233 The Court of Appeals
properly characterized the issue as one that required application of
the discovery rules.23 4 The court first looked to state and federal
courts that had already identified this as a discovery issue for gui-
dance.2 35 It then examined existing Maryland case law which permit-
ted discovery of other documents deemed confidential by statute.236
The Porter Hayden court then applied the "need to inspect" standard
established in those cases.2 37 A unanimous court approved the
straightforward application of the "need to inspect" standard to ulti-
mately allow discovery of relevant portions of settlement agreements
deemed confidential by the parties.23 8
b. A "Need to Inspect. "-To allow the use of the need to in-
spect standard, the court applied guidelines created in Zaal and Stein,
which pertain to a party's ability to inspect statutorily confidential in-
formation .2 39 Because confidentiality in Porter Hayden was not created
by statute, as in Zaal and Stein, but through an agreement between the
two parties, the court properly reasoned that a lower standard exists
for party-created confidentiality. 24 0 The facts of the instant case satis-
fied the "need-to-inspect" standard241 and the Porter Hayden court dis-
continued further analysis on this point. Thus, while the court will
accompanying text (examining the approach taken by other state and federal courts to-
ward the discovery of confidential settlement agreements).
232. Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 168, 692 A.2d 5, 22 (1997),
vacated sub nom. Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998).
233. Id
234. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 460, 713 A.2d at 965-66 (stating that "we have noted that
the purpose of the discovery rules is to require the disclosure of facts by a party litigant to
all of his adversaries").
235. Id. at 462-66, 713 A.2d at 966-69.
236. Id. at 466-69, 713 A.2d at 969-70.
237. Id. at 468, 713 A.2d at 970.
238. Id. at 469, 713 A.2d at 970 (stating that the "sums and certain of the conditions of
the settlements, however, are relevant and discoverable in the context of this proceeding").
239. Id. at 467, 713 A.2d at 969 (stating that in Zaa4 "we set forth the appropriate stan-
dards and procedures to be utilized when a... defendant attempts to obtain discovery of
confidential information").
240. See id. (suggesting that "there may be significantly less of a standard, where there is
no statutory basis for the claims of confidentiality").
241. See supra notes 207-213 and accompanying text (explaining the court's analysis and
application of the "need to inspect" standard).
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allow the inspection of relevant portions of settlement agreements
deemed confidential by the parties if the heightened "need to in-
spect" requirements have been met, the court has failed to establish
what standard will suffice to compel discovery in these circumstances.
The court should have adopted a standard which will provide future
guidance, namely a relevance standard.
There is a substantial amount of case law which uses a relevance
standard to allow discovery of settlement agreements. In Young v.
State Farm,2 42 the district court for the Southern District of West Vir-
ginia stated that certain portions of a confidential settlement agree-
ment were discoverable "because Plaintiffs have demonstrated their
relevance and probable admissibility." 4 ' Similarly, in Collier Services
Corp. v. Salinas,24 4 the Texas Supreme Court stated that "the terms of a
settlement agreement are properly discoverable... to the extent that
they are relevant."245 In In re New York County Data Entry Worker Product
Liability Litigation,246 the New York Court of Appeals noted that rele-
vancy dictates when discovery will be granted, but it went to great
lengths to highlight that the court must weigh the goals of encourag-
ing the settlement of disputes against those not entitled to examine
the settlement agreement. 247 It stressed that confidentiality in certain
circumstances is necessary in order to protect the litigants or en-
courage fair resolution of the matter in controversy. 248
In its decision, the Court of Appeals cited to the aforementioned
cases, conceding that relevant portions of settlement agreements are
discoverable 249 while discussing the importance of maintaining the
confidentiality of settlement negotiations and the overriding policy of
encouraging parties to settle.25 0 But, instead of utilizing the relevance
standard set out and relied upon in other jurisdictions, it looked to
242. 169 F.R.D. 72 (S.D.W. Va. 1996).
243. Id. at 79 (stating that "the confidential settlement agreement [is] discoverable be-
cause Plaintiffs have demonstrated their relevance and probable admissibility").
244. 812 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. 1991).
245. Id. at 377 (stating that "the terms of a settlement agreement are properly discovera-
ble under Tex. R. Civ. P. 166b(2) (f) (2)").
246. 616 N.Y.S.2d 424 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
247. Id. at 428 (concluding that when balance favors confidentiality, confidentiality
should be provided).
248. Id. (finding that "the strong public policy favoring settlement of disputed claims
dictates that confidentiality agreements regarding such settlements not be lightly
abrogated").
249. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 466, 713 A.2d at 969 (stating that "relevant portions of
such settlement agreements are discoverable" and recognizing "the importance of main-
taining the confidentially of settlement negotiations").
250. Id. (stating that the court "recognize[s] the importance of maintaining the confi-
dentiality of settlement negotiations").
[VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
other situations in Maryland where discovery of confidential informa-
tion was used and applied a "need to inspect standard."
While it was proper to allow discovery under this heightened stan-
dard, the court should have used a pure relevance standard. A rele-
vance standard balanced against the privacy interests of the plaintiffs
could accomplish the same result desired through application of the
"need to inspect" standards set out in Zaal and Stein.
In order to cross the Zaal "need to inspect" threshold, there must
be a strong showing of relevance to overcome the privacy interests of
the plaintiff.251 In Zaa, the court stated "some relationship must be
shown between the charges, the information sought, and the likeli-
hood that relevant information will be obtained as a result of review-
ing the records. [And] [w] hether a sufficient relationship exists is...
dependent upon the circumstances, including the proffer of rele-
vance."252 Thus, the "need to inspect" standard requires not only a
heightened showing of relevance, but consideration of other factors.
The courts in Zaal and Stein created and utilized the "need to inspect
standard" in light of the privacy and confidentiality of the parties at
stake. In Zaal, the records of a child were protected by COMAR.255 In
Stein, the records of the Department of Social Services were protected
in order to encourage openness and honest communication. 254 The
courts were in essence providing another layer of protection for inter-
ests the state had already deemed necessary to protect by statute. In
Porter Hayden, the confidentiality of the agreement in the instant case
was established to promote future settlements.255 Under these cir-
cumstances, the privacy interests were not as overriding as the privacy
interests in Zaal and Stein. Accordingly, the Porter Hayden court im-
plied that "significantly less of a standard" could be used.256 The rele-
vance standard, a significantly lower standard, is a plausible standard
251. Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 83, 602 A.2d 1247, 1262 (1992) ("J]uxtaposed against
petitioner's proffer [of relevance] is the victim's legitimate interest in the privacy of the
contents of her educational records.").
252. Id. at 81-82, 602 A.2d at 1261.
253. Id. at 60, 602 A.2d at 1251.
254. Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Stein, 328 Md. 1, 4-5, 612 A.2d 880, 881
(1992) (citing the portion of Maryland Code Article 88A which states "it shall be unlawful
for any person or persons to divulge or make known in any manner any information con-
cerning any applicant or recipient of social services").
255. See Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 168, 692 A.2d 5, 21 (1997)
(stating that "both parties have an interest in non-disclosure of settlement amounts be-
cause such information may affect future settlement negotiations in other cases. Such a
practice of confidentiality ... is customary in Baltimore"), vacated sub nom. Porter Hayden
Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998).
256. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 468, 713 A.2d at 468.
1999]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
used by courts in other jurisdictions to permit disclosure of confiden-
tial agreements. The court should have utilized this standard to pro-
vide guidance to courts in the future.
c. A Default Judgment is Equated with Tortfeasor Status Under the
Maryland UCATA.-The Court of Appeals, with only one dissenting
opinion,257 properly established that an entry of default judgment
constituted an adjudication as ajoint tortfeasor for purposes of verdict
reduction under section 3-1404 of the UCATA. 258 The court arrived
at this conclusion by equating a default judgment to an admission of
liability and then equating liability to the status of a joint tortfeasor.259
This decision is proper because, unlike the lower court's decision, it is
consistent with the standards set out in Swigert.260 Furthermore, by
creating this new class of joint tortfeasors, the court has maintained
the policy goals of both the Maryland UCATA and the Maryland Rules
to prevent double recovery by plaintiffs.
261
The Porter Hayden court properly applied the guidelines in Swigert,
which require a settling party holding a release to have its liability as a
joint tortfeasor judicially determined.262 The Swigert court noted that
"it would create a somewhat incongruous procedural situation to have
a [released] party [absent] from the case and leave the question of his
negligence yet to be determined."26 The court stated that though
the liability of the released party needed to be determined, the de-
fendant must individually determine whether to participate actively in
the trial.2" This implied that regardless of the released defendant's
decision, the question of his negligence would still need to be
determined.
257. Judge Rodowsky dissented from the majority on this issue. Id. at 474, 713 A.2d at
972 (Rodowsky, J., concurring and dissenting).
258. Porter Hayden, 350 Md. at 469-73, 713 A.2d at 970-72.
259. See also supra notes 221-229 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of a
default judgment).
260. See supra notes 143-158 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (noting that the goal underlying the
Maryland Rules and the Maryland UCATA was "to try in one action all phases of [the]
litigation").
262. Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613, 619, 133 A.2d 428, 431 (1957) (stating that "in order
for [a non-settling party] to be certain that he will obtain these reductions, it is necessary
that negligence on the part of the [released party] contributing to the injuries must be
shown. . . ."); see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROc. § 3-1304 (Supp. 1997) ("[A]
release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor . . . reduces the claim against the
other tort-feasors.").
263. Swigert, 213 Md. at 622, 133 A.2d at 433.
264. Id. ("[W]hether [settling defendant] wishes to participate actively in the trial is a
matter left for his selection.").
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Consistent with Swigert, B&W's default judgment could be classi-
fied as "non-active" participation. B&W's status should be determined
through default even though B&W chose not to take part in the pro-
ceedings. By not allowing the default judgment to constitute status as
ajoint tortfeasor, the question of B&W's liability remained open. This
would fundamentally contradict the holding of Swigert, which re-
quired the question of the released party's liability to be answered.2 6 5
Porter Hayden should not be penalized for the actions of B&W.
The Porter Hayden decision is also proper because upholding the
lower court's decision would have fundamentally contradicted the ef-
fect of a defaultjudgment. Forbidding the default judgment to substi-
tute for adjudication as a tortfeasor would mean that a default
judgment does not determine liability. This is contrary to the exten-
sive amount of case law that accepts and recognizes a default judg-
ment as an admission of liability.2 66 The very definition of judgment
is "the final decision of the court resolving the dispute and determin-
ing the rights and obligations of the parties. "267 In Porter Hayden,
B&W was impleaded in order to determine their liability.268 By not
answering the complaint, B&W essentially admitted liability. The en-
try of default judgment officially determined the rights and obliga-
tions of B&W.2 6 9  Thus, though the plaintiffs and nonsettling
defendants could not further recover damages from the settling de-
fendants, the nonsettling defendants were entitled to a reduction in
their verdict.2
70
Finally, the Porter Hayden court's decision to allow a default judg-
ment to substitute for adjudication as a tortfeasor was proper because
it upheld the policy goal of the UCATA: to prevent double recov-
ery.2 7 ' If a settling defendant is improperly prevented from being
classified as a tortfeasor, then a plaintiff is entitled to the amount of
damages rendered against the nonsettling tortfeasor, in addition to
the amount of consideration paid by the settling defendant, i.e., a
double recovery. Thus, in the instant case, if Porter Hayden failed to
classify B&W as ajoint tortfeasor, the nonsettling defendant would not
265. Id. at 619, 133 A.2d at 431 ("[N]egligence on the part of the [released defendant]
contributing to the injuries must be shown in one manner or another.").
266. See supra notes 223-225 and accompanying text.
267. BLACK'S LAw DiCTioNARY 842 (6th ed. 1990).
268. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 225-229 and accompanying text.
270. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-1402(c) (Supp. 1997).
271. Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 167, 690 A.2d 5, 22 (1997)
(quoting Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 126, 604 A.2d 47, 56 (1992)),
vacated sub nom. Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998).
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have obtained a reduction in the verdict and the plaintiff would have
recovered two times. This result would have been inconsistent with
the policy goals of the UCATA.
5. Conclusion.-In Porter Hayden, the Court of Appeals properly
arrived at two decisions. First, in an issue of first impression, it ex-
panded the scope of discovery in Maryland by extending the use of
the "need to inspect" standard to apply to the discovery of settlement
agreements deemed confidential by the parties. Though the decision
was consistent with pre-existing law, the court adopted a standard that
determined the upper threshold of admissibility. It failed to establish
a standard that would constitute a lower, but acceptable threshold. In
so doing, the court has left this decision to future courts. Second, the
court created a new classification of tortfeasor when it equated a de-
faultjudgment with a finding of liability for purposes of establishing a
party as a joint tortfeasor under the UCATA. In so doing, the court
has prevented the opportunity for litigation misconduct and upheld
the policy goal of preventing double recovery by plaintiffs.
APRIL M. MAYO
B. Redefining the Practice of Strict Compliance in Literal Terms
In Butler v. Tilghman,272 the Court of Appeals held that a valid lien
of attachment before judgment can only be created by strict adher-
ence to the procedures set forth in Maryland Rule 3-115.273 Specifi-
cally, after carefully reviewing the procedural requirements of Rule 3-
272. 350 Md. 259, 711 A.2d 859 (1998).
273. Id. at 270, 711 A.2d at 864. Rule 3-115 states, in pertinent part:
(a) Request for writ. At the time of filing a complaint commencing an action
or while the action is pending, a plaintiff entitled by statute to attachment before
judgment may file a request for an order directing the issuance of a writ of attach-
ment for levy or garnishment of property or credits of the defendant. The re-
quest may be made ex parte. The plaintiff shall file with the request an affidavit
verifying the facts set forth in the complaint and stating the grounds for entitle-
ment to the writ. ...
(c) Proceedings on request for writ. The court shall review the complaint, any
exhibits, and the supporting affidavit. The court may require the plaintiff to sup-
plement or explain any of the matters set forth in the documents or to provide
further information regarding the property to be attached. If the court deter-
mines that the plaintiff is entitled to the writ of attachment, it shall order issuance
of the writ conditioned on the filing of a bond by the plaintiff for the satisfaction
of all costs and damages that may be awarded the defendant or a claimant of the
property by reason of the attachment. The order shall prescribe the amount and
security of the bond.
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115, the Court of Appeals reinforced the necessity of filing a sheriff's
return 274 prior to the filing of a Notice of Lien in order to establish a
valid lien on the property.275 The court unanimously reached this
holding after deferring to legislative intent and reviewing both Mary-
land and out-of-state case law.276 In doing so, the court properly re-
fused to lessen the standard of strict compliance that creditors must
maintain in order to obtain a valid lien of attachment. As a result of
its decision, the court has eliminated the potential flood of lawsuits
that would result between creditors and good faith purchasers of debt-
ors' properties if the latter were no longer sheltered by Maryland's
race-notice recording statute.277
(d) Issuance of writ. Upon entry of the order and the filing of the bond, the
clerk shall issue one or more writs of attachment and shall attach to each writ a
copy of the supporting affidavit filed with the request....
(e) Notice of lien of attachment. When real property is attached, upon the filing
of the return by the sheriff the clerk shall file a Notice of Lien marked "Attach-
ment BeforeJudgment on Real Property." The notice shall contain (1) the name
of each plaintiff, (2) the name and address of each defendant, (3) the assigned
docket reference of the action, and (4) the name of the county in which the
action was commenced.
... When the real property is located outside of Baltimore City, the Notice of
Lien shall be filed with the clerk of the circuit court for the county in which the
property is located and shall constitute a lien on the property when entered by
the clerk of the circuit court.
If the attachment is dissolved, released, or otherwise modified, the clerk shall
transmit a certified notice of that action to each clerk with whom a Notice of Lien
was filed.
MD. RULE 3-115.
274. Delivering back to the court proof of service that the writ of execution was levied,
along "with a brief account of his doings under the mandate, [and] the time and mode of
...execution" constitutes a sheriff's "return." BLACK's LAw DIcrTIoNARY 1318 (6th ed.
1990).
275. Butler, 350 Md. at 270-72, 711 A.2d at 864-65.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 273, 711 A.2d at 866 (concluding that the petitioners, good faith purchasers
of the debtor's property, took title to the property "free and clear of respondent's claim of
a lien"). See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 3-203 (1957):
Every recorded deed or other instrument takes effect from its effective date as
against the grantee of any deed executed and delivered subsequent to the effec-
tive date, unless the grantee of the subsequent date has:
(1) Accepted delivery of the deed or other instrument
(i) In good faith,
(ii) Without constructive notice under § 3-202, and,
(iii) For a good and valuable consideration, and,
(2) Recorded the deed first.
See also infra text accompanying note 393 (discussing the implications of the fact that in
Maryland, the timing of the recordation by a good faith purchaser determines who holds
title in a property).
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1. The Case.-The confusion in the Butler case arose out of a
series of ill-timed events. On August 7, 1992, Johnnie R. Tilghman
filed suit in Charles County district court against Sandra and Wayne
Payne, alleging that the Paynes had "obtained [his] property with
worthless checks. '2 7' The Paynes had written Tilghman two checks,
totaling $18,100, as payment for the purchase of two automobiles. 279
The Paynes' bank returned the checks due to insufficient funds. 211
Tilghman sought judgment for the amount of the returned checks
and related bank fees.2 8 1
In addition to filing suit on August 7, 1992, Tilghman also filed a
"Request for an Order for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment Before
Judgment" with the district court.2 8 2 As authorized by Section 3-302
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Tilghman wanted to
levy on real property owned by the Paynes as a means of securing pay-
ment on the debt should a judgment be entered against them. On
August 26, 1992, the district court issued a Writ of Attachment Before
Judgment. 2
8 3
On September 25, the district court prematurely sent to the Cir-
cuit Court for Charles County a "Notice of Lien of Attachment Before
Judgment. ' 28 4 The district court's action was premature for two rea-
sons. First, the sheriff had not yet filed his return and proof of service
with the district court as required by the statute.28 5 Presumably to re-
flect the absence of the sheriff's return, the district court clerk modi-
fied the language of the Notice so that it stated an attachment had
278. Plaintiffs Request for an Order for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment Before
Judgment (3-115), Tilghman v. Payne, No. 42-2784-92 (Md. Dist. Ct. Aug. 7, 1992); see
Butler, 350 Md. at 260, 711 A.2d at 859.
279. Butler, 350 Md. at 260, 711 A.2d at 859. At this time, Tilghman was doing business





283. Id. at 260-61, 711 A.2d at 859.
284. Id. at 261, 711 A.2d at 859-60.
285. Id. at 261, 270, 711 A.2d at 859-60, 864; see MD. RULE 3-115(e) (requiring the sheriff
to file a return before the court files its Notice of Lien of Attachment Before Judgment).
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been "issued" as opposed to "levied."286 Second, Tilghman did not
request that the Notice of Lien be sent to the circuit court.
287
On September 28, 1992, the sheriff levied on the property.288 On
that same day, the circuit court clerk stamped the Notice of Lien of
Attachment Before Judgment as received.2 89 Although the circuit
court filed the Notice of Lien, it did not index it, which is to say it
failed to list the lien in the judgment index for Charles County.290
The sheriff did not file a return with the district court until October 1,
1992.291 The return certified that on September 28, 1992, the sheriff
had attached the property by affixing a copy of the writ and schedule
to the property, and mailing a copy of the writ, complaint, and attach-
ment before judgment to the Paynes' last known address.292 Because
the sheriff did not complete the levy prior to the district court for-
warding the Notice of Lien to the circuit court, the circuit court filed
a Notice of a Lien before an actual lien existed on the Paynes'
property.293
On October 29, 1992, George and Mary Butler entered into a
contract of sale with the Paynes for the purchase of the levied prop-
erty.294 Because the lien was not indexed, the Butlers' search of the
circuit court's judgment index did not reveal Tilghman's judgment
lien against the property. 295 The Paynes executed a deed transferring
the property to the Butlers on December 18, 1992.296 This deed was
recorded in the land records of the Circuit Court for Charles County
on December 23, 1992.297
286. Butler, 350 Md. at 261 n.1, 711 A.2d at 860 n.1. The district court clerk actually
"crossed out the word 'levied,'" which was printed on the Notice of Lien of Attachment
Before Judgment form and "replaced it with the word 'issued.'" Id, Interestingly, the dis-
trict court clerk ordered the sheriff to serve the attachment on September 25, 1992, Order
for Service, Tilghman v. Payne, No. 42-2784-92 (Md. Dist. Ct. Sept. 25, 1992), the same day
that he sent the circuit court the Notice of Lien of Attachment. Notice of Lien of Attach-
ment Before Judgment, Tilghman v. Payne, No. 42-2784-92 (Md. Dist. Ct. Sept. 25, 1992).
The same clerk's signature appeared on both the Notice of Lien of Attachment Before
Judgment sent to the circuit court and the Order for Service sent to the sheriff. Id.; see
Order for Service, Tilghman (No. 42-2784-92).
287. Intervening Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Decision of the District
Court at R. 60, Tilghman v. Payne, No. 42-2784-92 (Md. Dist. Ct. Aug. 7, 1992).












On January 6, 1993, a default judgment was entered in district
court against the Paynes in favor of Tilghman. 91 It was not untilJanu-
ary 21, 1993, however, that the circuit court finally indexed the lien in
the circuit court records. 299 Thus, the lien was indexed almost one
full month after the Butlers recorded their deed.3 °°
Approximately three years later, Tilghman's attorney notified the
Butlers of his client's intent to enforce the lien.30 ' On September 20,
1996, Tilghman requested the court to enforce the writ of execu-
tion. °2 In response, the Butlers moved to intervene and filed their
opposition to Tilghman's request.303 The district court granted Tilgh-
man's motion and permitted the sale of the property to satisfy the
judgment. 30 4 In reaching its decision, the district court found that
"while as a practical matter, [failing to index] makes it impossible for
a title searcher to obtain Ijudgment] information.. . the purchaser is
still charged with that knowledge."30 5 The district court reasoned that
the clerk's filing but not indexing the lien should have been enough
to put the Butlers on notice °.3 6 The Butlers appealed to the Circuit
Court for Charles County, which affirmed the district court's rul-
ing.307 The circuit court concluded that indexing is not essential to
the act of recordation; therefore the "attachment [before] judgment
had been effective prior to the entry of the Butler's deed."30 8 The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide "whether a valid lien was
created when the Notice of Lien of Attachment was filed prior to the
filing of the return of levy by the sheriff." °3 9
298. Id.
299. Id. at 261-62, 711 A.2d at 860.
300. Id. at 262, 711 A.2d at 860.
301. The letter is dated April 11, 1996. Record at 15.
302. Butler, 350 Md. at 262, 711 A.2d at 860.
303. Record at 5-6, 18-20.
304. Butler, 350 Md. at 262, 711 A.2d at 860.
305. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Butler v. Tilghman, 350 Md. 259, 711 A.2d 859
(1998) (No. 125) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the oral opinion of the
district court judge).
306. Petition at 37, Butler (No. 125). The district court disregarded the inescapable
quagmire in which such a holding would place good faith purchasers.
307. Butler, 350 Md. at 262-64, 711 A.2d at 861.
308. Id. at 263, 711 A.2d at 861 (alteration in original) (quoting the oral opinion of the
circuit court judge (citing Frank v. Storer, 308 Md. 194, 517 A.2d 1098 (1986))).
309. Id. at 260, 711 A.2d at 859. The second issue presented by the Petitioners was
"whether a lien entered pursuant to a writ of attachment on original process must be re-
corded and indexed in order for the lienholder to have priority over a subsequent good
faith purchaser." Id. The Court of Appeals did not reach this issue because it held that no
valid lien was created when the Notice of Lien was filed prior to the filing of the return by
the sheriff. Id.
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2. Legal Background. -
a. Maryland's Interpretation of Compliance Standards.-
(1) Maryland Rule 3-115.-Rule 3-115 establishes the proce-
dure that must be followed to create a valid lien in a proceeding to
attach property before judgment.3 10 The rule first requires a creditor
to request an order directing the issuance of a writ of attachment
before judgment by filing this request with a supporting affidavit."' 1
Upon receiving and reviewing the creditor's request, the district
court, if appropriate, issues a writ on the condition that the plaintiff
files a bond.312 Upon filing the bond, the district court issues a writ of
attachment directing the sheriff to levy on the property. 313 Issuance
of the writ, however, does not establish a lien on the property. 4
"When real property is attached, upon the filing of the return by the
sheriff the clerk shall file a Notice of Lien marked 'Attachment Before
Judgment on Real Property. "'315 Moreover, "the Notice of Lien shall
be filed with the clerk of the circuit court for the county in which the
property is located and shall constitute a lien on the property when
entered by the clerk of the circuit court.
3 16
In other words, the levy is complete when the sheriff files the re-
turn of service with the clerk of the district court, who in turn must
forward the notice of attachment to the clerk of the circuit court for
the county in which the property is located for proper indexing and
recording.317
The attachment procedure is "designed to accomplish the dual
purpose of compelling the defendant's appearance in court as well as
providing the plaintiff with security for the payment of his claim once
it is established as being due."3 1 8 The use of this procedure invokes
the doctrine of relation back. 19 Under this doctrine, "once [an at-
310. MD. RULE 3-115.
311. Id. 3-115(a).
312. Id. 3-115(c).
313. Id. 3-115(d); Butler, 350 Md. at 266-67, 711 A.2d at 862-63.
314. Butler, 350 Md. at 266, 711 A.2d at 862 (citing May v. Buckhannon River Lumber
Co., 70 Md. 448, 449-50, 17 A. 274, 275 (1889) (quoting Horwitz v. Ellinger, 31 Md. 492,
505 (1869))); see infra Part 2.a(3) (stressing that a valid lien is not created until the sheriff
attaches the property and returns the order of service to the court).
315. MD. RULE 3-115(e).
316. Id.
317. Id.; Butler, 350 Md. at 267, 711 A.2d at 863.
318. Butler, 350 Md. at 267, 711 A.2d at 863 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing State v. Friedman, 283 Md. 701, 706-07, 393 A.2d 1356, 1359-60 (1978) (citing Philbin
v. Thurn, 103 Md. 342, 351, 63 A. 571, 574 (1906))).
319. Id. (quoting Friedman, 283 Md. at 706-07, 393 A.2d at 1359-60).
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tachment] is properly and validly acquired, it is retained to await the
result of the action,"'3 20 and "claims or liens arising subsequent to the
date of the [attachment] are subordinate to the judgment rendered
in the attachment case."321
(2) Standards of Compliance: When "Strict" Really Means "Sub-
stantial, " not "Literal. "-Proceedings in attachment are a statutory cre-
ation and did not exist at common law.122 Consequently, Maryland
courts have long stressed that persons involved must strictly adhere to
statutory procedures such as the attachment process.3 23 The courts,
however, initially created some confusion by placing a liberal con-
struction on whether literal compliance or substantial compliance was
necessary to satisfy the strict compliance rule.
For example, in the 1870 case of Evesson v. Selby,121 the Court of
Appeals considered the language of an attachment statute requiring
that affidavits made out of state be accompanied by a certificate of the
clerk of the foreign court verifying that the court was "a court of rec-
ord. '3 25 The court reasoned that although the statute calls for strict
compliance, literal compliance is not necessary; rather, "substantial
compliance is all that is necessary." 26 The court found, however, that
the creditor's affidavit for attachment did not even meet the burden
320. Id. at 267-68, 711 A.2d at 863 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Friedman, 283 Md. at 706-07, 393 A.2d at 1359-60).
321. Id. at 268, 711 A.2d at 863 (quoting Friedman, 283 Md. at 706-07, 393 A.2d at 1359-
60).
322. Id. (quoting Gill v. Physicians' & Surgeons' Bldg., Inc., 153 Md. 394, 403-05, 138 A.
674, 677-78 (1927) and citing Turner v. Lytle, 59 Md. 199, 208 (1882); Evesson v. Selby, 32
Md. 340, 345 (1870)).
323. See Turner, 59 Md. at 208, ("It cannot be questioned that the law is derogatory of
the common law, and must be strictly construed.. . ."); Evesson, 32 Md. at 345 ("[T]he
proceedings in attachment being wholly statutory, and in contravention to the common
law, they must strictly follow the provisions of the statute under which they are
authorized.").
324. 32 Md. 340 (1870).
325. Id at 344.
326. Id. at 346. The court based this decision on earlier Maryland cases, most of which
accepted substantial compliance of strict compliance statutes as sufficient; in other words,
they did not require literal compliance with those standards. Id.; see Washington v. Hodg-
skin, 12 G. &J. 353 (1842) (holding that the certification of an affidavit by the Governor of
Mississippi sufficiently complied with the strict compliance requirements of the Act of
1795); Smith v. Greenleaf, 4 H. & McH. 189 (1799) (holding that although the Act of 1795
regulating attachment law required "stringent" compliance as to the judicial certification
of an affidavit of another state, certification by the Governor of Massachusetts would suf-
fice). But see Prentiss v. Gray, 4 H. &J. 193 (1816) (holding that because the court did not
have the authority to accept anything less than literal compliance with the Act, the clerk's
unauthorized administration of an oath by which a certificate was provided would not
suffice).
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of substantial compliance because it failed to produce any certifica-
tion proving the court was one "of record." 27
After the turn of the century, the Court of Appeals remained
steadfast in finding that strict compliance did not mean literal compli-
ance, but rather substantial compliance with strict statutory require-
ments. In Tonns v. Collins,3 28 the court acknowledged that the
attachment statute required strict compliance, but it chose not to
quash the creditor's attachment even though the clerk sent the sum-
mons to the wrong county.3 29 The court instead noted that "[i] t has
been held that a substantial compliance with the terms of the statute is
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction."330 The court added that "it
would seem unduly technical to quash the attachment simply on the
ground that the summons was not sent [by the clerk] to a different
county."
3 3 1
As noted in the 1918 case of Hedrick v. Markham,332 the Court of
Appeals continued to accept "substantial compliance" with strict com-
pliance statutes. In Hedrick, a creditor attached the bank account of a
nonresident debtor.33 The court considered whether to quash the
attachment, and thereby accept the debtor's argument that the credi-
tor had not satisfied the literal requirements of the controlling statute
which included producing bond or account evidence of the debt.33 4
The court refused to do so, stating that a creditor need only exert
"substantial compliance with the provisions and the requirements of
the statute under which it is authorized." 35 The court reasoned that
the filing of a specific cause of action was sufficient to satisfy the
statute.33 6
In Gill v. Physicians' & Surgeons' Building, Inc.,337 the Court of Ap
peals reviewed an attachment issued to secure payment from a nonres-
ident debtor for legal services rendered by the plaintiff in accordance
327. Evesson, 32 Md. at 346.
328. 116 Md. 52, 81 A. 219 (1911).
329. Id. at 53, 81 A. at 220-21.
330. Id, 81 A. at 220 (citing Gunby v. Porter, 80 Md. 402, 31 A. 324 (1895); Evesson, 32
Md. 346).
331. Id
332. 132 Md. 160, 103 A. 98 (1918).
333. Id at 161, 103 A. at 98.
334. Id at 162, 103 A. at 98. "[Slection 4 of article 9 of the Code . . . provided: 'No
attachment shall issue... unless.., the creditor shall produce the bond, account or other
evidence of debt. . . .'" Id.
335. Id. (citing 2 Poe's P1. & Pr. 502; Franklin v. Claflin, 49 Md. 24 (1878); Evesson, 32
Md. 340; Mears v. Adreon, 31 Md. 229 (1869); Tonns, 116 Md. 52, 81 A. 219).
336. Id
337. 153 Md. 394, 138 A. 674 (1927).
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with promises set forth in a contract between the parties. 3 s The de-
fendant argued that the court should not reverse the quashing of the
attachment because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of
the controlling statute, which included filing a sufficient affidavit,
bond, and declaration.339 Like courts before it, however, the Gill
court concluded that "the requirements of the statute [need only be]
substantially complied with" by the plaintiff in order for the attach-
ment to be valid.34 ° Because the plaintiff either complied with the
statute initially or tried to comply with it in an amended complaint
which the lower court refused to admit,3 41 the court reversed the
quashing of the amendment.342 It is interesting to note, however, that
the Gill court thought the amended bond would have cured any de-
fects because it reportedly would have "strictly and literally [com-
plied] with the terms of the statute."343
(3) The Critical Role of the Sheriff in Fulfilling Any Compliance
Standard.-As a matter of conveying jurisdiction, Maryland courts
have recognized the critical role the sheriff plays in both establishing
the court's jurisdiction 44 and the validity and priority of the lien. 45
The Court of Appeals has repeatedly reinforced the notion that it is
the sheriff who creates the inchoate lien by attaching the property and
filing his return with the court.3 46 Maryland courts are not alone in
stressing the importance of this step in the attachment process. It is
338. Id. at 395-96, 138 A. at 675.
339. Id. at 398, 138 A. at 676. "[S]ection 44, article 9, Bagby's Code .. . provides that:
Attachments may also be issued against non-resident ... debtors in cases arising ex con-
tractu ... [but only if] a declaration ... [an] affidavit of the plaintiff.., and a bond [have
been] filed . . . ." Id., 138 A. at 675.
340. Id at 405, 138 A. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coward v.
Dillinger, 56 Md. 59, 60 (1881)).
341. Id. at 402, 138 A. at 677. The lower court did not allow the plaintiff to amend the
bond in question despite the language of "[slection 28, art. 9, Bagby's Code [which stated
that] all other papers in attachment proceedings may be amended." Id. at 400, 138 A. at
676.
342. Id at 407, 138 A. at 679.
343. Id at 402, 138 A. at 677.
344. See Petition at 11, Buter (No. 125) ("[T]he return of the sheriff levying the attach-
ment is an [sic] necessary part of the attachment proceeding. Only through the return is
the court advised of the levy and its sufficiency, [by which] jurisdiction is acquired .
(citation omitted)).
345. See infra notes 340-360.
346. See May v. Buckhannon River Lumber Co., 79 Md. 448, 448, 17 A. 274, 275 (1889)(determining that "merely issuing a writ of attachment, and placing it in the hands of a
sheriff" does not create a lien); Main v. Lynch, 54 Md. 658, 668-69 (1880) (finding that the
return of the sheriff is "a necessary part of the [attachment] proceeding," but to allow him
to amend it after all other evidence had been submitted would have been improper and
unfair to the parties involved).
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generally recognized that "[t] he return is a necessary part of the pro-
ceeding ... without which the court cannot proceed to final adjudica-
tion of the cause."347 Thus, the sheriff must properly comply with an
order and file the return before a creditor is able to obtain security
against a debt.
348
One of the first cases in which the Court of Appeals recognized
the critical role played by the sheriff in the process of creating a lien
was Main v. Lynch.349 After making his case, the creditor in Main
asked that the sheriff, who forgot to attach a copy of the short note
when serving the writ and thus failed to properly attach the property,
be allowed to amend his return °.35  The court declined, determining
that it would be unreasonable to permit a sheriff to amend a return of
writ after all other evidence had been submitted and when such an
amendment would affect the rights of third parties. 35 1 The court
noted that "[t]he return of the sheriff is . . . a necessary part of the
proceeding, without which the attachment would, upon motion, be
quashed. '352 Because of the interest in the attachment held by the
third party, the delinquent timing of the motion to amend was the
creditor's Achilles' heel.
353
In May v. Buckhannon River Lumber Co., 54 the sheriff was given
two writs, Buckhannon's being the first, to levy against the debtor's
property. 355 The sheriff, however, executed the writs in the reverse
order and served Buckhannon's writ second. 6 Buckhannon argued
that it held the priority lien as against the debtor because its writ of
attachment was issued, albeit not levied, before the other creditor's
lien.317 The court determined, however, that "merely issuing a writ of
attachment, and placing it in the hands of a sheriff' does not create a
347. 7 C.J.S. Attachment & Garnishment § 194 (1980) (citing Bolling v. Pikesville Nat'l
Bank, 280 S.W. 1090, 1092 (Ky. 1926)); see also 6 AM. JuR. 2D Attachment & Garnishment
§ 316 (1964) ("The return of a writ of attachment, being required by statute, is necessary to
create a lien on the property attached, and the failure of the levying officer to file a return
may be fatally defective . . . ." (citing Bass v. Dumas, 95 A. 286 (Me. 1915); Mitchell v.
Pierce, 86 A. 748 (Vt. 1913); Albright-Pryor Co. v. Pacific Selling Co., 55 S.E. 251 (Ga.
1906); Peterson v. Wiesner, 146 P.2d 789 (Nev. 1944); Dickinson v. First Nat'l Bank, 252
N.W. 54 (N.D. 1933))).
348. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Attachment & Garnishment § 316.
349. 54 Md. 658 (1880).
350. Id. at 668.
351. Id. at 668-69.
352. Id. at 670.
353. Id. at 669-70.
354. 79 Md. 448, 17 A. 274 (1889).
355. Id. at 448, 17 A. at 274.
356. Id., 17 A. at 275.
357. Id., 17 A. at 274-75.
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lien.158 Because the property attached by Buckhannon and the other
creditor was not the same, the court also found that "the only lien
created by levying an attachment is on the [specific] property actually
taken by the sheriff." 59 Because of this, a judgment cannot be en-
tered unless the adjudicating court has jurisdiction, which is achieved
through proper adherence to legislative requirements. 6 °
b. Other Jurisdictions Interpretation of Strict Compliance.-Un-
like Maryland, other jurisdictions require the practice of literal strict
compliance to statutory procedure. In Bass v. Dumas,361 for example,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine determined that in accordance
with the statutory procedure for creating a lien of attachment, an of-
ficer must either "retain possession [of the attached property] or
within five days file such an attested copy of his [signed] return as the
statute prescribes. '3 62 In Bass, the lien of attachment was invalid be-
cause the sheriff did not sign the return of service himself before fil-
ing it with the court.363 Because the sheriff allowed someone else to
sign the return, thereby violating the mandate of the governing stat-
ute, the creditor in Bass lost his lien to secure payment of the property
delivered to the debtor.3 6 4 While the sheriffs conduct may have sub-
stantially complied with the statute, it did not literally comply with
it.365 Thus, the Maine court concluded that only literal and strict ad-
herence to the requirements set forth in the statute could create a
valid lien. 6 6
The Superior Court of Connecticut in Jepsen v. Toni Co.167 came
to a similar conclusion when it noted that the time limits involved in
creating a writ of attachment were specifically drafted by the Connect-
icut legislature 6 8 and must be strictly and literally met.3 69 In Jepsen,
the sheriff abided by an attachment order's instructions requiring him
358. Id, 17 A. at 275 ("[N]o man can, by merely applying for and obtaining a writ of
attachment, create a lien on .. . the property of another person.").
359. Id.
360. See Gill v. Physicians' & Surgeons' Bldg., Inc., 153 Md. 394, 405, 138 A. 674, 678
(1927) (providing that "the principle has become firmly established in this state... [that]
attachment statutes will be strictly construed in determining what steps must be taken to
confer jurisdiction on the court issuing the attachment").
361. 95 A. 286 (Me. 1915).
362. Id. at 288.
363. Id. at 287.
364. Id at 288.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. 133 A.2d 150 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1957).
368. Id at 154. The Jepsen court referred to section 7767 of the General Statutes, which
"expressly provides that process in civil actions returnable to the Superior Court 'shall be
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to file his return "'on or before the first Tuesday of February A.D.
1957. ' ',37' The defendant argued that these instructions violated the
regulating statute, which required at least six days to pass before the
sheriff was permitted to file his return with the court. 71
Although the sheriff was merely obeying the attachment order,
the court found his actions violated a "mandatory" statute that must
be adhered to literally in order to avoid being "fatally defective. "372
3. The Court's Reasoning.--In Butler v. Tilghman, the Court of Ap-
peals held that a valid lien was not created when Tilghman's notice of
lien was filed with the courts and that, because the lien in question
was not corrected nor a new lien filed, Tilghman's lien did not be-
come valid until after the Butlers had purchased and recorded their
interest in the property.3 73 The court reached this holding by examin-
ing the procedural steps required by Rule 3-115 to obtain a valid lien
and by recognizing that "strict compliance with the steps of the statute
is required. '3 74 Quoting each critical step in the attachment proce-
dure, the court painstakingly reviewed the rule's requirements regard-
ing how a creditor requests a writ, how the court proceeds with the
creditor's request, and how the writ is issued.37 5 The court particu-
larly relied on the explicit language of the rule requiring that the no-
tice of lien should be filed by the clerk of court only "upon the filing
of the return by the sheriff."376 Because the property in dispute was
not levied prior to the filing of the notice and because the eventual
filing of the return by the sheriff did not retroactively cure the defec-
tive lien, the court held that Tilghman's lien did not exist.
3 7 7
The court then explained that one purpose of the attachment
process is to "provid[e] the plaintiff with security for the payment of
his claim once it is established as being due. ' 37 ' The court noted that
the levy of property by a sheriff "creates an inchoate lien" that binds
returned ... to the clerk of such court at least six days before the return day.'" Id. (omis-
sion in original).
369. Id.
370. Id. at 153 (quoting the order for further attachment).
371. Id. at 154. See supra note 368 for the exact statutory language.
372. Jepsen, 133 A.2d at 154.
373. Butler, 350 Md. at 272, 711 A.2d at 865.
374. Id. at 265-68, 711 A.2d at 862-63; see also supra note 273 (quoting the relevant provi-
sions of Rule 3-115).
375. Butler, 350 Md. at 265-66, 711 A.2d at 862.
376. Id at 266, 711 A.2d at 862.
377. Id. at 272, 711 A.2d at 865.
378. Id. at 267, 711 A.2d at 863 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Friedman, 283 Md. 701, 706-07, 393 A.2d 1356, 1359-60 (1978)).
19991
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the property attached until judgment is entered 79 and that any
"claims or liens arising subsequent to the date of the levy are
subordinate to the judgment rendered in the attachment case" under
the doctrine of relation back.3"' The court concluded, however, that
Tilghman did not acquire the inchoate lien that normally attaches
when the sheriff levies against property; therefore the judgment lien
obtained by Tilghman in the attachment case did not relate back to
the time of the levy and was subordinate to the Butlers' claim of
title.3""
Upon analyzing both the purpose and the steps of the attach-
ment process, the court turned its attention to the public policy and
legislative intent implicated in its holding. The court recognized that
if Tilghman's lien was considered valid despite its flawed creation, the
court "would encourage plaintiffs seeking to utilize the attachment
before judgment procedures to disregard the clear language of Mary-
land Rule 3-115. "382 The court reasoned that if the legislature had
wanted a lien to be created "upon the mere issuance of a writ of at-
tachment, the inclusion of the provisions dealing with the levy and the
filing of the sheriffs return would have been unnecessary."38 3 More-
over, the court indicated that had Tilghman amended his lien or even
filed a new one after the levy was returned by the sheriff, he might
have been able to cure the original lien's defect.3 8 4 However, because
the Butlers' deed was recorded prior to the entry of the default judg-
ment against the Paynes, the Butlers took the property free and clear
of Tilghman's claim of lien. 5
4. Analysis.-In Butler v. Tilghman, the Court of Appeals deter-
mined that under Maryland Rule 3-115, a valid lien is not created
when a Notice of Lien of Attachment is filed prior to the filing of the
return of levy by the sheriff.386 By requiring creditors to adhere ex-
actly to the specific chronology mandated by the General Assembly
for the creation of a valid lien, the court seemed to shift away from its
prior "substantial compliance" approach to the strict compliance stan-
379. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Friedman, 283 Md. at 706-07, 393
A.2d at 1359-60).
380. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Friedman, 283 Md. at 706-07, 393
A.2d at 1359-60).
381. Id. at 272-73, 711 A.2d at 865-66.




386. Id. at 270, 711 A.2d at 864.
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dard and toward one of "literal compliance" as found in other juris-
dictions.387 Because its jurisdiction over attachment proceedings
derives from statute, 88 the Court of Appeals appropriately required
that creditors literally adhere to the statute's mandates in order to
obtain a valid lien of attachment.
389
This decision goes beyond mere adherence to Maryland prece-
dent on liens of attachment. While the court in Evesson, Tonns, and
Gill noted that the strict process by which a lien is created must be
substantially followed for the lien to be valid before judgment,3 90 the
Butler court required literal compliance with the statute. This literal
approach more closely follows the statute's intent.
a. Protecting Good Faith Purchasers. -By requiring literal com-
pliance with Maryland's attachment rule, the Butler court protected
good faith purchasers from bearing the burden of an improperly laid
lien. Although the historical function of the attachment procedure
may have been to secure payment and to compel an answer to the
plaintiff's demand,3 9' the Butler court hinted that the need to obtain a
valid lien is important in ajurisdiction, such as Maryland, 2 where the
timing of recordation determines who holds title to a property. 93 If a
lien that was improperly obtained and recorded was deemed valid,
both debtors and good faith purchasers would like a standard to
gauge whether they held good title. Perhaps considering this poten-
tial, the Butler court cautioned that if it were to rule otherwise, it
387. See supra Part 2.a(1) (discussing Maryland's "substantial compliance" approach to
the strict compliance standard; see also supra Part 2.b (examining jurisdictions' "literal com-
pliance" requirements of strict statutory mandates).
388. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
389. Butler, 350 Md. at 270-72, 711 A.2d at 864-65. For an extremely old and seemingly
almost forgotten instance when the court required literal compliance with strict statutory
standards, see Prentiss v. Gray, 4 H. &J. 193 (1816), which held that because the court did
not have the authority to accept anything less than literal compliance with the Act, the
clerk's unauthorized administration of an oath by which a certificate was provided would
not suffice.
390. See supra notes 322-327, 337-343 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and
holdings of these cases).
391. See Philbin v. Thurn, 103 Md. 342, 351, 63 A. 571, 574 (1906) ("The proceeding by
attachment ... is designed to accomplish the two-fold purpose of compelling the appear-
ance of the defendant to answer the plaintiffs demand, and also of giving the plaintiff a
security for the payment of his claim").
392. Butler, 350 Md. at 273, 711 A.2d at 866.
393. Id. (noting that "the deed to the Butlers had been recorded and thus was not sub-
ject to the later-filed lien"). Generally speaking, the two other most common types of
recording acts are classified as "notice" acts (where a subsequent good faith purchaser
prevails over a prior title holder who failed to record) and "race" acts (where whoever
records first wins). SeeJEssE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 711 (3d ed. 1993).
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"would encourage plaintiffs seeking to utilize the attachment before
judgment procedures to disregard the clear language of Maryland
Rule 3-115." 3 9 4
If the court had held that Tilghman's lien against the Butlers'
property was valid despite the filing of the notice prior to the sheriff's
return, it would have effectively eliminated the need for formal attach-
ment procedures. 95 Such a decision would have breathed life into
the notion that a valid lien is created the moment the writ of attach-
ment is placed in the sheriffs hands. This decision would be contrary
to the court's holding in May v. Buckhannon River Lumber Co. that an
enforceable writ is not created by merely issuing a writ of attachment
to a sheriff.396 Declining to overturn May, the Butler court noted:
Had the rule intended that a Notice of Lien of Attachment
be filed in the District and circuit courts upon the mere issu-
ance of the writ of attachment, the inclusion of the provi-
sions dealing with the levy and the filing of the sheriffs
return would have been unnecessary. It is clear those provi-
sions were inserted to ensure that the sheriff levied on the
property prior to the filing of the Notice of Lien of
Attachment. 397
If courts began enforcing liens that were not obtained according
to the provisions of Rule 3-115, good faith purchasers who recorded
their deeds first would be unfairly harmed by their subjection to the
later-filed lien. In a time where low interests rates spur an active real
estate market,398 if courts validated liens obtained outside the estab-
lished procedure, numerous claims between eager creditors and dis-
gruntled good faith purchasers would arise.
b. Literal Construction, Strict Compliance.-In Maryland, a
court's jurisdiction is dependent upon a creditor's strict compliance
with the statutory attachment procedures.39 9 Similarly, other jurisdic-
tions have strictly construed attachment statutes and wisely applied a
standard of literal compliance before determining that a creditor's
394. Butler, 350 Md. at 272, 711 A.2d at 865.
395. See infra text accompanying note 397.
396. May v. Buckhannon River Lumber Co., 70 Md. 448, 448, 17 A. 274, 274-75 (1889).
397. Butler, 350 Md. at 272, 711 A.2d at 865.
398. Housing Starts in July at Fastest Pace Since '87; But the Boom is Expected to Slow Soon;
'Nearly Pefect Conditions,' B.iur. SUN, Aug. 20, 1998, at Cl, availabe in 1998 WL 4981097;
(noting that relatively low interest rates were in part responsible for "nearly perfect condi-
tions [in] the residential real estate market").
399. Evesson v. Selby, 32 Md. 340, 345 (1870) ("[T]he proceedings in attachment being
wholly statutory, and in contravention to the common law, they must strictly follow the
provisions of the statute under which they are authorized.").
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lien is valid.4"' As the Butler court recognized, both the Jepsen court in
Connecticut and the Bass court in Maine acknowledged that the statu-
tory procedures for attachment must be followed in order to create a
valid lien.40 1 By requiring creditors to adhere strictly to the attach-
ment process, the Butler court narrowed its definition of strict compli-
ance from one where substantial compliance would suffice to one
where only literal compliance will do.
By choosing to interpret Gill, Tonns, and Evesson as stalwarts of
"literal" creditor compliance with statutory mandates, the court
reinvented a century of case law which found that "substantial" credi-
tor compliance with those requirements would suffice. In so doing,
the Court of Appeals heightened the level of compliance that a credi-
tor must meet in order for the creditor's lien to be valid.
Additionally, it is possible to interpret the court's literal adher-
ence standard as necessary not only for jurisdictional reasons but for
reasons of fairness as well. Given the existence of Maryland's race-
notice statute, it would be unfair for a creditor whose lien is undiscov-
erable by a title search to take title over a good faith purchaser whose
claim is valid on its face. Even if Tilghman's lien was indexed and the
Butlers did know about it, the lien would still have been invalid ac-
cording to the court.4" 2 The requirement of strict compliance by
creditors seeking to attach property protects both a subsequent pur-
chaser's title in the property as well as the creditor's interests in secur-
ing his or her payment. The practice of strict compliance should,
therefore, be adopted by all creditors to protect themselves in the
event a debtor deeds his or her property to an unknowing purchaser
for value before judgment is granted on a creditor's lien.
5. Conclusion.-The Butler court confirmed the necessity of
strictly complying with the attachment procedures set forth by the
Maryland legislature in Rule 3-115. In so holding, the Court of Ap-
peals followed precedent established in Maryland and other jurisdic-
tions that requires the practice of strict compliance for creditors
seeking to attach property as security for payment of debts. Although
the court did not address the issue, its ruling protects the integrity of
Maryland's race-notice statute by guarding the rights of good faith
purchasers from creditors' liens which are not attached, recorded, or
indexed properly. While the court's ruling provides important pro-
400. See supra Part 2.b (discussing cases from other jurisdictions demanding strict com-
pliance with attachment statutes).
401. See Butler, 350 Md. at 270-72, 711 A.2d at 864-65.
402. Id. at 272, 711 A.2d at 865.
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tection to good faith purchasers, it also retains safeguards for credi-
tors who await judgment on liens acquired by following the proper
attachment procedures.
FRANCIE COHEN SPAHN
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
III. CONTRACTS
A. The Meaning of "Arising Out of" in Indemnification Clauses
In Mass Transit Administration v. CSX Transportation, Inc.,' the
Court of Appeals held that an indemnification clause in a procure-
ment contract between a railroad and a state transit authority provid-
ing for indemnification from liability "arising out of' work under the
contract was to be interpreted under a "physical causation or causa-
tion in fact" standard.2 Proof of proximate cause, while a requisite for
tort liability, is unnecessary to satisfy this contract law standard.' "But
for" causation is all that is required. In other words, the Court of Ap-
peals will not accept an intermediate standard of causation to narrow
the definition of "arising out of." For the time being, practitioners
should be wary of the potentially broad applications of "arising out of'
language in indemnification agreements and perhaps think more
carefully about expressly carving out tightly worded exceptions.
1. The Case.--On October 1, 1990, the Mass Transit Administra-
tion (MTA) executed a Commuter Rail Passenger Service Agreement
(Contract) with CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), the successor to
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.4 The Contract provided for CSXT to
run and maintain MARC commuter train service, along with its man-
aging, operating, and supporting staff and facilities, between Balti-
more and Washington and between Martinsburg, West Virginia and
Washington. Under the Contract, MTA agreed to "indemnify, save
harmless, and defend CSXT from any and all casualty losses, claims,
1. 349 Md. 299, 708 A.2d 298 (1998).
2. Id. at 321, 708 A.2d at 309.
3. Id. The Court of Appeals has previously described this requirement:
The words "arising out of" must be afforded their common understanding,
namely, to mean originating from, growing out of, flowing from, or the like.
While these words plainly import a causal relation of some kind, read in context,
they do not require that the unloading of the truck be the sole "arising out of'
cause of the injury; they require only that the injury arise out of the . . . em-
ployee's unloading of the truck .... This is so regardless of whether the injury
may also be said to have arisen out of other causes further back in the sequence
of events .... The exclusion also applies irrespective of the theory of liability by
which [claimant] seeks redress for his injury, as the policy exclusion is not con-
cerned with theories of liability.
Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 230-31, 533 A.2d 682,
688-89 (1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
4. CSX 349 Md. at 300-01, 708 A.2d at 299. CSXT's primary obligations under the
Contract included providing "regularly scheduled daily commuter rail service on weekdays
.... This train operation, plus the maintenance of equipment, access of and use of facili-
ties... and other activities required to support the operation of the train service.., shall
be called the 'Contract Service.'" Id. at 301, 708 A.2d at 299.
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suits, damages or liability of every kind arising out of the Contract Ser-
vice."5 In turn, CSXT agreed to submit to MTA for approval "[a]lny
proposed settlement or payment in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars."6
MTA also agreed to self-insure for $5 million per casualty incident, as
well as obtain an excess liability policy of $145 million, with CSXT as
an additional insured for CSXT's operations under the Contract. 7
On November 4, 1992, CSXT hired a contractor, Melvin Benhoff
Sons, Inc. (Benhoff), to pave four public road crossings over CSXT's
tracks.8 Less than two months later, a MARC train operated by CSXT
hit and destroyed a Benhoff backhoe left on one of the tracks that
Benhoff was repaving.9 The dispatcher had not received advance no-
tice of the repaving work on the tracks in order to warn the MARC
train operators. 10 Benhoff sued CSXT in the Circuit Court for How-
ard County for the value of the backhoe, $40,420.25, and finally set-
tled for $23,230.11 CSXT agreed to the settlement with MTA's
knowledge and without admitting its negligence.1 2
While CSXT litigated Benhoffs claim, it filed a third-party indem-
nity claim against MTA in the Circuit Court for Howard County1 3 on
two grounds: (1) that the work CSXT contracted Benhoff to perform
was necessary to CSXT's performance under the Contract, and (2)
that the MARC train that struck the Benhoff's backhoe was perform-
ing work under the Contract.14 The Circuit Court for Howard County
held the third-party claim in abeyance, agreeing with MTA's position
that the indemnity case properly belonged before the Maryland State
Board of Contract Appeals (BCA).15 CSXT filed its claim for reim-
5. Id. at 301, 708 A.2d at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the con-
tract between MTA and CSXT).
6. Id. at 300, 708 A.2d at 300.
7. Id. at 302, 708 A.2d at 300.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 303, 708 A.2d at 300-01; see In re CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1771, slip op. at 1-2(Md. Bd. Contract App. Jan. 3, 1995) (explaining that "MARC" is an acronym for the Mary-
land Rail Commuter, and that under the contract, CSXT operated the MARC on runs
"between Baltimore and Washington, D.C., and between Washington, D.C. and Martins-
burg, West Virginia, on tracks and using station facilities owned by CSXT, CSXT and Mass
Transit Administration rolling stock, CSXT employees, and CSXT maintenance facilities").
10. The BCA and Court of Special Appeals determined that the MARC train was not
operated negligently. CSX, 349 Md. at 303, 305, 708 A.2d at 301-302.
11. Id. at 304, 708 A.2d at 301 (noting that the MTA agreed the settlement amount was
"reasonable").
12. Joint Record Extract at 2, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Mass Transit Admin., 111 Md. App.
634, 683 A.2d 1127 (1996) (No. 1779).
13. Id. at 6-7.
14. CSX 349 Md. at 304, 708 A.2d at 301.
15. Joint Record Extract at 7, CSX (No. 1779).
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bursement of the Benhoff settlement amount, as well as attorney and
interest fees, with an MTA Procurement Officer, who rejected the
claim. 6 The Procurement Officer denied CSXT's claim under the
indemnity clause of the Contract for two reasons: (1) he determined
that the indemnity clause did not cover liabilities caused by CSXT's
sole negligence, and (2) the "track maintenance activities" at issue
during the Benhoff construction were not "Contract Service" but
"general business activity" of CSXT. While this activity may have been
necessary as a prerequisite to CSXT's ability to perform its obligations
under the contract, i.e., to make its rail facilities "available," it primar-
ily supported CSXT's responsibilities in its other lines of work, for ex-
ample, freight movement. 7 CSXT then appealed to the BCA, which
affirmed the Procurement Officer's decision.' 8
The BCA agreed with the Procurement Officer that "[t] he mere
fact that a MARC train was innocently and fortuitously involved in the
incident does not bring the incident within the ambit of the definition
of 'contract service' under the Contract ... the construction work was
not sufficiently significant to the performance of the provision of the
Contract Service to require indemnification. Contract Service is not
defined specifically . .. [and] the Contract is silent on track mainte-
nance and upgrades."'" As to the issue of sole negligence coverage,
the BCA stated that " [w] e understand that by entering into this Con-
tract the State has agreed to indemnify a private party for its own neg-
ligence with taxpayer dollars."20
The Circuit Court for Howard County affirmed the BCA's deci-
sion, and CSXT appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which re-
versed the Circuit Court's decision.2 The Court of Special Appeals
agreed with CSXT's argument that, "the December 18, 1992 collision
arose out of 'Contract Service' because the collision involved a MARC
train and 'Contract Service' specifically includes 'train operations. '22
Furthermore, the Court of Special Appeals held that the indemnifica-
tion agreement was not related to or "collateral to" a construction
contract, and, therefore was not barred by section 5-305 of the Courts
16. Id.
17. Id. at Exh. I, p.6.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. The BCA decision noted that "counsel for CSXT stated his belief that approxi-
mately 15-20% of the traffic over CSXT rail lines in the Baltimore/Washington/Frederick
corridors involved the MARC commuter service." Id.
20. Id.
21. CSX 349 Md. at 305, 708 A.2d at 301-02.
22. Id., 708 A.2d at 302 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Mass Transit Admin., 111 Md.
App. 634, 640, 683 A.2d 1127, 1129 (1996)).
19991
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
and Judicial Proceedings Article.2" MTA petitioned for certiorari to
the Court of Appeals to review the question whether CSXT's liability
to Benhoff "arose out of" its service under the Contract, thus requir-
ing MTA to indemnify CSXT for the loss incurred, and whether sec-
tion 5-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article barred
CSXT's indemnity claim.24
2. Legal Background. -
a. Construing the "Arising Out Of' Language in Insurance Poli-
cies.-Since 1964, the Court of Appeals has interpreted the phrase
"arising out of," or similar language, in a number of insurance cases,
particularly those involving automobile policies. In National Indemnity
Co. v. Ewing,25 a driver with a passenger in his car had an accident on a
snow-covered road.26 After parking the car on the side of the road,
the driver went to help his passenger, who was thrown from the car
during the accident.27 While leading his passenger down the road,
another car hit the two men and their parked car.28 The ensuing law-
suit turned on whether the first driver's automobile insurance policy
for "bodily injury... caused by accident and arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance, or use of the automobile"29 covered the passen-
ger's injuries from the second accident, when the passenger was not
injured during the first accident.3 ° The Court of Appeals held that a
"sufficient nexus was shown" that the "ejection of [the passenger] ...
did not break the chain of use" of the automobile negligently driven
by the first driver.3' The Court of Appeals looked to workmen's com-
23. Id. Section 5-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article voids and prohibits
enforcement of indemnification clauses in contracts "relating to the construction, altera-
tion, repair, or maintenance of a building, structure, appurtenance or appliance, including
moving, demolition and excavating .... " MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 5-305
(1995).
24. CSX, 349 Md. at 306, 708 A.2d at 302.
25. 235 Md. 145, 149, 200 A.2d 680, 682 (1964) (stating that the interpretation of the
"arising out of' language in an automobile insurance policy was a case of first impression).
26. Id. at 147, 200 A.2d at 681.
27. Id. at 147-48, 200 A.2d at 681 (stating that the injured passenger was "incoherent"
but not injured after the accident).
28. Id. at 148, 200 A.2d at 681 (noting that the driver of the second car had been
drinking).
29. Id. at 147, 200 A.2d at 680.
30. Id. at 149, 200 A.2d at 682. Ajury found that "Ewing was negligent in the operation
of his car in running off the road, but Bridge was not injured in the first accident;... that
Ewing was guilty of concurrent negligence in the second accident; and that Bridge was not
negligent." Id. at 148, 200 A.2d at 681. Bridge was Ewing's passenger. Id. at 147, 200 A.2d
at 681.
31. Id. at 150, 200 A.2d at 682-83.
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pensation cases, in which the words arising out of have been "given a
broad construction."32 In automobile cases, "the words import and
require a showing of causal relationship," and "recovery is not limited
by the strict rules developed in relation to direct and proximate
cause." 3 Looking to cases from other states, the Court of Appeals
noted that:
the chain of responsibility must be deemed to possess the
requisite articulation with the use or operation until broken
by the intervention of some event which has no direct or sub-
stantial relation to the use or operation, ... and until an
event of [this] nature transpires the liability under this policy
exists.
34
The court then stated that the only question under consideration was
one of "cause and effect," suggesting that "but for" causation was all
that was required for liability to be considered as having "arisen out
of' an event.
3 5
In Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim &Judgment Fund Board,36 a mother
and child were injured after an unknown driver in another car threw a
firecracker into their car.37 The mother was "[d] istracted by the ex-
plosion and by [the child's] cries, [and the mother] lost control of
her car and hit a tree."3" After unsuccessfully attempting to ascertain
the identity of the other driver, the mother sued the Unsatisfied Claim
and Judgment Fund Board (the Board) to cover the accident.39 The
statutory provision for an action to be brought against the Board re-
quired that "the death of, or personal injury to, any person arises out
of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this
State."4 The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County determined "as
a matter of law, that the injuries sustained did not arise out of the
ownership, maintenance and use of the unidentified car."41 On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals "conclude [d] that for purposes of deter-
mining whether leave to sue the Board should have been granted, the
injuries under the facts of this case did arise out of the ownership,
32. Id. at 149, 200 A.2d at 682.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 149-50, 200 A.2d at 682 (quoting Merchants Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co., 188 So. 571, 572 (Miss. 1939).
35. Id. at 150, 200 A.2d at 683.
36. 262 Md. 115, 277 A.2d 57 (1971).
37. Id. at 116, 277 A.2d at 58.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 116-17, 277 A.2d at 58.




operation or use of an unidentified motor vehicle"42 and therefore
held that the mother could sue the Board." The Court of Appeals's
decision "turn[ed] on the question whether the use of an automobile
is directly or merely incidentally causally connected with the injury,
even though the automobile itself may not have proximately caused
the injury."44
In Aragona v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,45 judgment
creditors brought suit against an attorney's malpractice insurer to
cover losses resulting from the misappropriation of funds by the attor-
ney's partner.46 The insurance policy covered liabilities "arising out
of the performance of professional services for others," but excluded
coverage of any "dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or
omission of the Insured, any partner or employee. '47 The Court of
Appeals held that the exclusion applied to the case, reasoning that the
attorney's partner was the "direct and precipitating cause of the
loss;.., the negligence of [the attorney] may have.., been a contrib-
uting cause of the loss [but] ... it was indirect and remote at best."48
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals stated that the fact the attorney
"may have been liable for his negligence to the Aragonas does not
determine whether his liability is within the coverage of the policy."4
Both statements suggest that "arising out of" requires a direct causa-
tion standard, not a proximate cause one.
Northern Assurance Company of America v. EDP Floors, Inc.,5° a more
recent case, involved an employer's commercial general liability policy
with an exclusionary clause against "bodily injury or property damage
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use loading or
unloading of ... any automobile."5 In EDP Floors, an employee un-
loading a truck was injured by floor tiles that fell off a hydraulic lift at
the rear of the truck. Another employee, who was allegedly intoxi-
42. Id. at 119, 277 A.2d at 59.
43. Id. at 120, 277 A.2d at 60.
44. Id. at 118, 277 A.2d at 59.
45. 281 Md. 371, 378 A.2d 1346 (1977).
46. Id. at 372-73, 378 A.2d at 1347. The Aragonas, the judgment creditors, were benefi-
ciaries of a partnership escrow account from which the partner misappropriated funds. Id.
47. Id. at 372, 378 A.2d at 1347.
48. Id. at 379, 378 A.2d at 1351 (stating that "the [insurance company and attorney]
intended . . . that any loss which resulted from any dishonest or criminal act of the in-
sured's partner was excluded from coverage, and that the exclusionary clause . . . was all-
encompassing in this respect").
49. Id.
50. 311 Md. 217, 533 A.2d 682 (1987).
51. Id. at 224-25, 533 A.2d at 686.
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cated, was operating the lift at the time of the accident.12 The injured
employee sued the employer." The employer notified both its gen-
eral liability insurance carrier and its automobile insurance carrier for
coverage of the accident, which both insurers denied.54 The em-
ployer sought a declaratory judgment, claiming that its general insur-
ance carrier owed it a legal defense in the injured employee's suit
against the employer, as well as payment of any judgment against the
employer.
55
The Court of Appeals held that the exclusionary clause applied to
the facts of the case. 5 6 The court stated that "[t] he words 'arising out
of must be afforded their common understanding, namely, to mean
originating from, growing out of, flowing from, or the like."'57 There-
fore, "although these words plainly import a causal relation of some
kind," the insurance policy did not "require that the unloading of the
truck be the sole 'arising out of cause of the injury; [the policy] re-
quire [s] only that the injury arise out of the unloading of the vehicle"
as a minimum threshold question.58 So that there was no mistake as
to how the Court of Appeals interpreted "arising out of," it reiterated
its position that tort causation analysis was inapplicable to an interpre-
tation of the insurance policy exclusionary clause. The court stated
that the exclusionary clause applied to this case "regardless of whether
the injury may also be said to have arisen out of other causes further
back in the sequence of events" and "irrespective of the theory of lia-
bility . . . as the [insurance] policy exclusion is not concerned with
theories of liability."'59 Again, the Court of Appeals seemed to suggest
that it was unwilling to apply a tort causation analysis to an insurance
contract. If anything, it was only willing to apply a physical or direct-
causation analysis. As the Court of Appeals succinctly put it, "[a] s we
see it, the language ... clearly focuses the 'arising out of' inquiry on
the instrumentality of the injury."6"
b. Construing "Arising Out Of" in Other States.--The Court of
Appeals's decision in CSXlooked to cases interpreting the words "aris-
ing out of' that were decided in otherjurisdictions. Two examples are
52. Id. at 220, 533 A.2d at 684.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 221, 533 A.2d at 684.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 231, 533 A.2d at 689.






Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Allegheny Construction Co. 6 1 and
O'Connor v. Serge Elevator Co.62 In C&P Telephone, the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, applying Pennsylvania law,
held that an agreement for a construction subcontractor to indemnify
C&P Telephone for "all liability 'arising from said work, or from any
act or negligence of' [the subcontractor]" did not include coverage of
liabilities incurred as a result of C&P Telephone's sole negligence."
The liability incurred by C&P Telephone involved a construction
worker who was injured when a rotted telephone pole fell on top of
him.6 4 C&P Telephone was potentially solely negligent because it
knew or should have known that the telephone pole that collapsed
was in a deteriorated condition for a year prior to the accident.6"
Whether C&P Telephone was entitled to indemnity under the indem-
nification clause focused on the issues of sole negligence coverage
and "whether the injuries alleged by [the construction worker] are
injuries 'arising out of' the operations."66 Only one prior Penn-
sylvania case interpreted "arising out of," explaining that it "means
causally connected with, not proximately caused by. 'But for' causa-
tion, i.e., a cause and result relationship is enough to satisfy this provi-
sion of the policy. . . . But for the fact of its being so used on this
occasion, [the other driver's] automobile would not have collided
with it."67 Therefore, the injured construction worker claimed that he
would not have been injured "but for" the fact that he had to perform
work on the telephone pole.6 8 However, in C&P Telephone, the court
also applied Pennsylvania law whereby "words of general import do
not constitute an assumption by the indemnitor of liability for the in-
demnitee's own negligence."69 Therefore, the court concluded that
because the contract did not expressly include coverage of liabilities
"arising out of' the contractor C&P's sole negligence,7 ° contractor
61. 340 F. Supp. 734 (D. Md. 1972) (applying Pennsylvania law).
62. 444 N.E.2d 982 (N.Y. 1982).
63. C&P Telephone, 340 F. Supp. at 737.
64. Id. at 738.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 741.
67. Id. (quoting Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 170 A.2d 571
(Pa. 1961) (emphasis added)); see also Township of Springfield v. Ersek, 660 A.2d 672, 676
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) ("'Arising out of' has been defined as causally connected with, not
proximately caused by.").
68. C&P Telephone, 340 F. Supp. at 742.
69. Id. at 744 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 743-44 ("The indemnification provision in the ... agreement does not affirm-
atively and specifically provide that Allegheny will hold C&P harmless for C&P's own negli-
gence. Nor does the agreement contain any 'clearly expressed or unequivocal' language to
that effect." (footnote omitted)).
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C&P was not entitled to an indemnity from the subcontractor in this
instance even though the court agreed that the injury "arose out of"
work done under the contract.71 In other words, the court deter-
mined the injury itself "arose out of" contract work under a "but for"
standard, but the court implied an exclusion for sole negligence of
C&P by virtue of the fact that it was not expressly included in the
contract. In dicta, the court stated that, even if Maryland law applied,
it believed the outcome of the case would be the same. 2
In Serge Elevator Co., a drywall subcontractor's employee was struck
by an elevator on his way out of the construction project site for a
lunch break.73 The injured employee brought suit against the general
contractor, which then sought indemnification from the drywall sub-
contractor under the indemnity clause contained in their contract.
74
Specifically, the indemnification clause "included personal injuries
'arising out of the work which is the subject of this contract.""'' The
New York Court of Appeals determined that the subcontractor's in-
demnification clause applied, holding that "[t] he contract could not
be performed . . .unless A&M's employees could reach and leave
their workplaces on the job site. The instant injuries, occurring dur-
ing such a movement, must be deemed as a matter of law to have
arisen out of the work."' 76 Under New York law, the causation stan-
dard seemed to be met unquestionably by the mere fact that the dry-
wall subcontractor's employee was struck by the elevator, suggesting
that a physical causation standard was at work, which would also be
met with a "but for" causation analysis.
Overall, it is generally agreed that "[t] he words 'arising out of ...
are not words of narrow and specific limitation, but are broad, gen-
eral, and comprehensive terms effecting broad coverage. 7 In order
to satisfy "arising out of,"
courts have only required that some form of causal relation-
ship exist between the insured vehicle and the accident.
However, liability does not extend to results distinctly re-
mote, though within the line of causation.
The words "arising out of" when used in such a provi-
sion are of broader significance than the words "caused by,"
71. Id. at 742.
72. Id. at 740; see also supra note 67.
73. O'Conner v. Serge Elevator Co., 444 N.E.2d 982, 983 (N.Y. 1982).
74. Id. The general contractor sued the elevator subcontractor under the indemnifica-
tion clause contained in their contract, but that suit was dismissed. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 7 Am. JUR. 21 Automobile Insurance § 161 (1997).
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and are ordinarily understood to mean originating from, in-
cident to, or having connection with ... .78
Other states seem to have adopted a "but for" causation analysis.
In Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Koontz-Wagner Electric
Co.,79 an action was brought by the insurer as subrogee of a contractor
employed by a company to remove electric light fixtures.80 An em-
ployee of the contractor was injured while erecting scaffolding on the
company worksite when a company employee drove a truck against
the scaffolding. 8' The contract between the company and the con-
tractor included a clause whereby the contractor agreed to "indemnify
and protect the Buyer against the.., demands for injuries or damages
to any person ... growing out of the performance of this order.... 82
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision that the employee's "injuries grew out of the perform-
ance of [the contractor's] contract with [the company]."83 In reach-
ing its decision, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the phrase
"growing out of' is "equivalent to the words 'resulting from or arising
in connection with."' 84 In the absence of Indiana case law on point,
the court looked to Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota case law to sup-
port this interpretation.85
In Myers v. Burger King Corp., 6 Burger King contracted with a con-
struction company to renovate one of its stores.8 7 An employee of the
contractor was injured by a menu board while working on the store
renovations.8 8 The employee sued Burger King, and Burger King
filed third party claims against the contractor and the contractor's in-
surance company.89 Under the terms of the contract between the
contractor and Burger King, the contractor was to have insured Bur-
ger King against any "claims which arise from the Contractor's opera-
78. 6BJOHN ALAN APPLEMAN &JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4317, at
360-63 (Richard B. Buckley ed., 1979) (citations omitted); see also 8 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS
F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 119:33 (3d ed. 1997) ("It has been stated in a few cases
that the words 'arising out of' ... generally mean 'originating from,' 'growing out of,' or
'flowing from.'").
79. 233 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1956).
80. Id. at 381.
81. Id. at 382.
82. Id. at 381-82.
83. Id. at 383.
84. Id. (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 383-84 (citations omitted).
86. 618 So. 2d 1123 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
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tions, whether such operations be by... anyone directly or indirectly
employed [by the contractor or subcontractor]."" The contractor ar-
gued that the employee's injury did not "arise from" the contractor's
operations, but from Burger King's negligent hanging of the menu
board."1 The Court of Appeals of Louisiana disagreed with the con-
tractor and held that "[t] he 'arising out of language in the contract is
sufficiently broad enough to cover this situation" because the contrac-
tor admitted in his deposition that "[the contractor] was working on
the menu board when it fell on Myers."
'9 2
In Faber v. Roelofs,9" an automobile insurance policy case, a private
elementary school pupil "ran out into the street alongside his school
bus, slipped, and fell under the wheels."94 The bus was hired by the
independent school district,95 which was named as an additional in-
sured under the bus owner's automobile policy.9 6 The insurance pol-
icy covered "bodily injury . . . sustained by any person, caused by
accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the
automobile."97 The Supreme Court of Minnesota determined that
the pupil "was run over by the insured vehicle. The causal relation is
present [the automobile insurance] policy affords coverage."9" In
reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court of Minnesota quoted
Long's The Law of Liability Insurance99
The phrase "arising out of' is not to be construed to mean
"proximately caused by." The thought expressed by the
words "arising out of the use of an automobile" is compre-
hensive and broad in service. The phrase itself is much
broader than a phrase such as "proximately caused by the
use of the automobile." The words "arising out of' mean
causally connected with, not "proximately caused by" use.
"But for" causation, i.e., a cause and result relationship is
enough to satisfy the provision of the policy.10
90. Id. at 1124-25.
91. Id. at 1128.
92. Id.
93. 250 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1977).




98. Id. at 823.





Schmidt v. Utilities Insurance Co., 1' upon which the Ewing court
relied, concerned the applicability of automobile insurance policy cov-
erage when a pedestrian fell over triangular wooden blocks left by a
company truck.10 2 The blocks were used as a ramp to back the truck
up onto the sidewalk for unloading purposes. The company's auto-
mobile insurance policy covered bodily injury "caused by accident and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the automo-
bile."1 3 The Supreme Court of Missouri held that "[a]lthough the
negligent disposition of the blocks could be viewed as the proximate
cause of the claimant's injuries, 'the acts of disposition grew out of or
arose from the use of the trucks, as trucks."'" °4 The Supreme Court of
Missouri reasoned that "[t]he words 'arising out of,' ... are ordinarily
understood to mean 'originating from' or 'having its origin in,' 'grow-
ing out of' or 'flowing from."'10 5 The Supreme Court of Missouri ex-
plained that "lIt] he injury, of course, did not arise out of the use of the
trucks if it was directly caused by some independent act, or interven-
ing cause wholly disassociated from, independent of and remote from
the use of the trucks.... In this case.., it may not be said as a matter
of law that the negligent acts of the truck drivers . . .were entirely
disconnected from and disassociated with the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of the trucks.' 0 6
A more recent Missouri case, American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co.,' involved a homeowner's insurance
policy versus automobile insurance policy coverage interpretation.
The case centered around a dispute over which insurance policy was
to provide coverage of an accident on a residential property that in-
volved a truck. The injured party was helping carry a transmission
from a truck down a driveway to a body shop when he fell and crushed
his hand, severing his pinky from his hand. The body shop was lo-
cated on the premises of a residence. The homeowner's insurance
"policy excluded coverage for bodily injury 'arising out of the owner-
ship, entrustment, maintenance, operation, use, loading of ... any
type of motor vehicle."' 8 The Missouri Court of Appeals held that
the accident was covered under the automobile insurance policy and
101. 182 S.W.2d 181 (Mo. 1914).
102. See infra notes 104-114 for a discussion of Ewing.
103. Schmidt, 182 S.W.2d at 182.
104. CSX, 349 Md. at 314, 708 A.2d at 306 (quoting Schmidt, 182 S.W.2d at 181-82); see
also infra note 110 and accompanying text.
105. Schmidt, 182 S.W.2d at 184.
106. Id.
107. 747 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
108. Id. at 175.
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excluded from coverage under the homeowner's insurance policy.1"9
The Missouri Court of Appeals followed Schmidt in reaching its deci-
sion "that the injuries were incident to and a consequence of the un-
loading of the . . .pickup truck."11 The Missouri Court of Appeals
explained that not only was the truck used to deliver the transmission,
"[t]he use of the truck was necessary to deliver the transmission, and
without the use of the truck, the transmission would not have been
located on the premises."11'
In a New Hampshire case, Union Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v.
King,1 12 the central issue for the court was whether a slip and fall acci-
dent that occurred on a driveway "arose out of the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of the automobile," and thus was covered under the
insured party's automobile insurance policy and not their home-
owner's insurance policy which excluded "loss arising out of the own-
ership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of ... any
automobile ... at the premises.""' 3 The injured party was sent to the
house of the insured party in order to start a car in the garage that
had a dead battery." 4 The injured party attempted to push the car
out of the garage and up the driveway when he slipped on ice and was
injured." 5 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the auto-
mobile insurance policy was to provide coverage of the accident
because
The [automobile insurance] policy provided coverage for ac-
cidents arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
the [insured party's] automobile. Such a clause has been in-
terpreted by this court to mean accidents originating from,
or growing out of, or flowing from the use or maintenance of
the insured vehicle.... A finding that the injury was directly
and proximately caused by its use or maintenance is not re-
quired .... All that is necessary is that the accident was caus-
ally connected with the use or maintenance of the insured
vehicle." 6
109. Id. at 178.
110. Id. at 177 (quoting Schmidt, 182 S.W.2d at 184, and stating that "although proxi-
mate causation in the strict legal sense is not required, there must be some causal connec-
tion between an injury and the 'use' of a vehicle in order for there to be coverage").
111. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
112. 300 A.2d 335 (N.H. 1973).
113. Id. at 335-36.
114. Id. at 336.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citations omitted).
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New Jersey follows a similar line of reasoning. In Scarfi v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.,1 17 which cited the Maryland Court of Appeals
decision in EDPFloors favorably," 8 the Superior Court of New Jersey
examined an exclusionary clause in an insurance policy. The clause
excluded coverage for bodily injury or property damage "arising out
of ownership, operation, or use, loading or unloading" of an automo-
bile. 19 Aetna, the insurer in the case, refused to defend or indemnify
the insured company which owned a dump truck that struck a school
van.'2 ° The injured party sued for personal injuries caused by the "al-
legedly negligent operation of the truck."' 2 ' Subsequently, the direc-
tors of the insured company brought suit against Aetna for its failure
to indemnify or defend the company in the tort action brought by the
injured party.' 22 The Superior Court of New Jersey held that the in-
sured was barred from coverage under the exclusionary clause be-
cause under New Jersey law, the insurance policy "clearly did not
provide coverage for injuries and damage arising out of the hiring
and training of employees in connection with the ownership, opera-
tion, use, repair or maintenance of automobiles. . . . The policy
clearly was designed to exclude coverage for personal injuries and
property damage arising out of automobile accidents."' 23 In describ-
ing an interpretation that gave the policy "its ordinary and usual
meaning,"124 the New Jersey court stated that "the underlying action
for negligent hiring or training was triggered only when [the injured
party] was injured as a result of the accident." 25 In support of its
decision, the New Jersey court cited to commercial insurance policy
case law in eighteen states and the territory of Puerto Rico. 1 26
Similarly, courts in other states, such as Oklahoma, 127 Penn-
sylvania,' 28 South Carolina, 1 29 and Utah, 3 ° have interpreted "arising
117. 559 A.2d 459 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
118. Id. at 463.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 460.
121. Id. at 460-61.
122. Id. at 461.
123. Id. at 462.
124. Id. at 461.
125. Id. at 462-63.
126. Id. at 462-64. The eighteen states were New Jersey, Maryland, New York, Indiana,
Alaska, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, Texas and Washington, and the territory of Puerto
Rico. Id.
127. Wallace v. Sherwood Constr. Co., Inc. 877 P.2d 632, 634 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
128. Township of Springfield v. Ersek, 660 A.2d 672, 676 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (re-
versing and remanding on the issue of coverage because "'[a]rising out of' has been de-
fined as causally connected with, not proximately caused by").
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out of' as something akin to a "but for" causal relationship rather than
one of proximate cause. None of these states have chosen to equate
"arising out of' with "but for" causation in all cases. However, most
courts agree that "arising out of' is something less than proximate
cause in a tort case. Consequently, what is left is a motley group of
terms that casts as wide a net as "but for" causation.13 1 Maryland takes
a somewhat firmer stance by determining that a discussion of tort cau-
sation in what should be a pure contract law case essentially muddies
the analysis, but nonetheless comes to a similarly broad conclusion.
1 32
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In CSX, the Court of Appeals held
that an indemnification clause in a procurement contract between a
railroad and a state transit authority providing for indemnification
from liability "arising out of' work under the contract was to be inter-
preted under a "physical causation or causation in fact" standard.
133
As applied in CSX, "arising out of' has "a broader concept" than proxi-
mate cause, which the Court of Appeals held to be "an incorrect legal
standard."134
The Court of Appeals first analyzed whether the indemnification
clause in the Contract excluded MTA's indemnification of CSXT for
liabilities caused by CSXT's sole negligence. 135  On this issue, the
Court of Appeals decided that " [i] n 'unequivocal terms,' the indemni-
fication ... includes the liability of CSXT for its own acts or omis-
sions."1 36  No tort causation analysis was necessary because the
indemnity was enforceable regardless of whether the accident was due
to CSXT's negligence.
13 7
129. McPherson v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 426 S.E.2d 770, 771 (S.C. 1993).
130. Taylor v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 925 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
131. See supra notes 57, 67, 83, 104, 116, 125 and accompanying text (discussing the
various but similar interpretations of "arising out of" in Maryland and other states).
132. See infra notes 100 and 142 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland's process
of defining "arising out of' language).
133. CSX, 349 Md. at 321, 708 A.2d at 309.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 306, 708 A.2d at 302.
136. Id. at 310, 708 A.2d at 304.
137. MTA also argued that indemnification of CSXT under the Contract for its sole
negligence was unenforceable as applied to the facts of this case because Benhofis con-
tract with CSXT involved construction work, i.e., the repaving of train tracks. Id. There-
fore, section 5-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article rendered the
indemnification agreement void and unenforceable. Id.; see also supra note 3 and accompa-
nying text. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the Benhoff contract was a side
agreement, and that the contract, which neither was nor became a construction contract as
a result of the side agreement with Benhoff, controlled. CSX 349 Md. at 319-20, 708 A.2d
at 308-09. The Court of Appeals concluded that the indemnification clause in this matter
1999]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Court of Appeals next focused on the issue of how to inter-
pret the words "arising out of' used in the indemnification clause.
The analysis of "arising out of' contained two components: (1) the
general meaning or standard ascribed to the words "arising out of,"
and (2) the application of "arising out of' to the Contract, i.e. did the
liability incurred by CSXT "arise out of' CSXT's Contract Service? In
the process, the Court of Appeals devoted a substantial portion of its
opinion on deriving its broad definition, while underlining the point
that no tort or proximate cause analysis would be used to test whether
this requirement was met. 1
38
To decipher the general meaning of "arising out of," the Court of
Appeals analogized to insurance policies, looking to insurance law
treatises and to prior case law both in Maryland and in other states.13 9
In general, the "words 'arising out of mean 'originating from, grow-
ing out of, flowing from, or the like.""' 4 Although the language
mimics descriptions used in causation or tort analysis, insurance law
interpretation focuses on the scope of the causal relation, and not the
legal cause of injury. The insurance law interpretation of the words
"arising out of' can have a broader scope than "caused by."' 41 In that
sense, if we were to place "arising out of' on a tort causation scale in
order to ascertain the landscape, the application of the words "arising
out of' would be satisfied by a "but for" causation analysis rather than
a proximate cause analysis. 142
MTA advocated for the use of an "intermediate" causation stan-
dard, lying somewhere between actual causation and proximate
cause.' 4 3 In rejecting MTA's argument, the Court of Appeals stated
that MTA never explained "[w] hat that extra quantum must be ...
other than that it is more than 'but for' causation and that it need not
reach the level of proximate causation.' 1 44 The court also stated that
was legally enforceable and that section 5-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Arti-
cle was irrelevant. Id. at 320, 708 A.2d at 309.
138. CSX 349 Md. at 311-18, 708 A.2d at 304-08 (analogizing to public liability insurance
policies and indemnification contracts, which are similarly interpreted).
139. Id. at 310-11, 708 A.2d at 304 ("Inasmuch as the indemnification was intended, at a
minimum, to serve as liability insurance for CSXT for the first $5 million of CSXT's liabil-
ity, it is appropriate to interpret and apply the indemnification in the same manner as
liability insurance policies are interpreted and applied.")
140. Id. at 311-19, 708 A.2d at 304-08 (quoting Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP
Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 230-31, 533 A.2d 682, 688-89 (1987)).
141. Id. at 315, 708 A.2d at 307 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 323, 708 A.2d at 310 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Eldridge
stated that "[t]he majority bases its decision on its conclusion that the phrase 'arising out
of' means nothing more than simple 'but for' causation." Id.
143. CSX, 349 Md. at 316, 708 A.2d at 307.
144. Id. at 306, 708 A.2d at 302.
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contract law, not tort law, applied to the indemnification clause, so
that only direct causation could satisfy its terms.' 45
The dissent disagreed with the majority that "arising out of' was
satisfied by "the use of a simple 'but for' analysis in this case." '4 6 The
dissent opined that the Court of Appeals had earlier adopted an "in-
separable association" test, which it believed was "far from adopting a
'but for' approach." '47
In the end, the Court of Appeals agreed with CSXT's argument,
interpreting the words "arising out of' as "a physical causation or cau-
sation in fact" '1 48 standard, and declining to accept the MTA's argu-
ment for an intermediate causation standard, 4 ' or the dissent's call
for an "inseparable association" test.150
The second component of the "arising out of' issue concerned
whether the liability incurred by CSXT "arose out of' the Contract,
and therefore entitled CSXT to indemnification by MTA. Although
the BCA decided that the Benhoff work was outside of the Con-
tract,15 1 the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the MARC train
operation was work conducted within the scope of the Contract.
1 52
Because the issue was not disputed at the Court of Appeals level, the
Court of Appeals applied the Court of Special Appeals's finding that
"Contract Service" was satisfied. 151 In any event, the Court of Appeals
agreed with the Court of Special Appeals's finding because "so long as
the liability of CSXT arises out of the Contract [ ], it matters not that
MTA [i.e. the MARC train] is not at fault."' 5 4 Therefore, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the accident occurred when the MARC train
struck the Benhoffs backhoe; the MARC train was operated by CSXT,
i.e. MTA's agent; thus MTA was, at the moment of impact, liable for
the damage to Benhoffs backhoe so that CSXT is entitled to indemni-
fication by MTA.
145. Id at 321, 708 A.2d at 309.
146. Id. at 324, 708 A.2d at 311 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 327, 708 A.2d at 312 (citing Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors,
Inc., 311 Md. 217, 231, 533 A.2d 682, 689 (1987)).
148. CSX, 349 A.2d at 307, 708 A.2d at 302. CSXT's argument was that in contract in-
demnity claims the language 'arising out of' triggers a 'causation in fact' analysis. Id.
149. Id. at 306, 708 A.2d at 302.
150. Id. at 327, 708 A.2d at 312 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
151. CSX, 349 A.2d at 305, 708 A.2d at 301.
152. Id. ("The [Court of Special Appeals] agreed with CSXT's contention that, notwith-
standing the absence of negligence in the operation of the MARC train, 'the . .. collision
... involved a MARC train and 'Contract Service' specifically includes 'train operations.'").
153. Id. at 305-06, 708 A.2d at 302 (citation omitted).




The dissent disagreed, arguing that under a contract law analysis,
"[n] o reasonable person would have thought that MTA had agreed to
indemnify CSXT" for CSXT's sole negligence in this matter.155 The
dissent took this position because of the fact that "[t]he tracks were
used primarily for trains other than MARC trains. 156
4. Analysis.-In CSX, the Court of Appeals held that an indem-
nification clause in a procurement contract between a railroad and a
state transit authority providing indemnity for liability "arising out of'
work under the contract was to be interpreted under to a "physical
causation or causation in fact" standard. 157 As applied in CSX, "arising
out of' has "a broader concept" than proximate cause, a tort law con-
cept, which the Court of Appeals deemed to be "an incorrect legal
standard. 1
58
The Court of Appeals viewed MTA and CSXT as two experienced
parties that have the freedom to negotiate the inclusion or exclusion
of any express terms of the indemnification clause in their contract.1 59
The Court of Appeals therefore inferred from the express language of
the contract that MTA and CSXT intended the agreement to cover
train collisions, 160 and that the Benhoff accident was covered under
the indemnification clause because the accident occurred when the
MARC train operated under the Contract Service collided with the
Benhoff backhoe. 6' The Court of Appeals's determination that liabil-
ities incurred through the sole negligence of CSXT were not excluded
from the indemnification agreement enabled the Court of Appeals to
conclude that the alleged omissions of CSXT "do not diminish the
fact that the damage to the backhoe arose out of the collision with the
MARC train."162 The Court of Appeals found evidence of MTA's in-
tent to provide a broad indemnity to CSXT in MTA's contractual
agreement to include CSXT's Contract work as an additional insured
155. Id. at 323, 708 A.2d at 310 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. CSX, 349 Md. at 321, 708 A.2d at 309.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 320, 708 A.2d at 309. Discussing the applicability of MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 5-305 to the MTA and CSXT contract, the Court of Appeals stated that "[a]
decent respect for the freedom of sophisticated parties contractually to establish the rules
governing their business relationship compels the conclusion that the General Assembly
intended contracting parties to be able to determine, when they contract, whether CJ § 5-
305 applies to their agreement." CSX, 349 Md. at 320, 708 A.2d at 309.
160. CSX 349 Md. at 310, 708 A.2d at 304.
161. Id. at 312, 708 A.2d at 305. The MTA admitted that "the only Contract Service
involved in the collision was the operation of the MARC train," but argued that the cause
of the collision was not the operation of the train. Id. at 306, 708 A.2d at 302.
162. Id. at 312, 708 A.2d at 305 (emphasis added).
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under its $150 million public liability insurance policy.163 In other
words, the Court of Appeals applied contract law, not tort law princi-
ples, to conclude that the business expectations of the parties at the
time the contract was entered into was to allocate losses to MTA, so
that MTA's role was that of an insurer to CSXT.
1 6 4
It is only because of this perceived role of MTA as CSXT's insurer
that the Court of Appeals examined insurance liability case law and
insurance law treatises to determined whether the indemnification
clause applied in the instant case, focusing much of its opinion on
interpreting the words "arising out of."1 6 5 Nonetheless, the court's
lengthy discussion of the "arising out of" language serves not only to
distinguish between contract and tort law analysis of "cause," but also
to dispel the notion that, under contract law, the Court of Appeals will
not consider anything more than a straightforward cause and effect
analysis of the liability at the time of its occurrence.
166
MTA's argument for a more restrictive standard than a basic,
physical, "but for" analysis of the accident was not fully supported by
the court's analysis in Ewing and Frazier.'67 In Ewing, an automobile
insurance liability case, the Court of Appeals held that the passenger's
injuries in a second accident "arose out of" the driver's negligent use
of the automobile in the first accident.168 There, the Court of Appeals
was "bound by the jury's finding 'that the injuries to the claimant in
the second accident were proximately caused by concurrent negli-
gence on the part of the host driver and the third motorist."" 69 The
Court of Appeals accepted the jury's finding because "a sufficient
163. Id. at 310, 708 A.2d at 304 ("In addition to the very words used in expressing the
indemnification, the fact that it extends to $150 million clearly indicates that the parties
were contemplating a possible disaster, such as a wreck of a train filled with commuters,
due to CSXT's negligence.").
164. Id. at 310-11, 708 A.2d at 304.
165. Id. (citing Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 533
A.2d 682 (1987)). For a discussion of EDP Floors, see supra notes 50-60 and accompanying
text.
166. CSX 349 Md. at 311-12, 708 A.2d at 305 ("[T]he language in the exclusionary
clause clearly focuses the 'arising out of' inquiry on the instrumentality of the injury."
(quoting EDP Floors, 311 Md. at 230-31, 533 A.2d at 689)). The Court of Appeals in EDP
Foors held that the injury was excluded from insurance coverage "regardless of whether the
injury may also be said to have arisen out of other causes further back in the sequence of
events .... The exclusion also applies irrespective of the theory of liability by which [the
claimant] seeks redress for his injury, as the policy exclusion is not concerned with theories
of liability." Id.
167. Id. at 316, 708 A.2d at 307 (citing National Indem. Co. v. Ewing, 235 Md. 145, 200
A.2d 680 (1964) and Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim &Judgment Fund Bd., 262 Md. 115, 277
A.2d 57 (1971), as two "illustrations of 'intermediate causation'").
168. Ewing, 235 Md. at 150-51, 200 A.2d at 682-83.
169. CSX 349 Md. at 314, 708 A.2d at 306.
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nexus of cause and effect" between the first and second accidents,
without any intervening event to "break[ ] the chain," which resulted
in the passenger being injured during the second accident.17 °
The court's holding in Ewing therefore did not support the appli-
cation of a proximate cause standard for "arising out of" language in
indemnity clauses, but merely stood for the proposition that, in some
situations, the finding of proximate cause is sufficient. Thus, the ma-
jority in CSX elaborated that in Ewing "we concluded that 'it has gen-
erally been held that, while the words import and require a showing of
causal relationship, recovery is not limited by the strict rules devel-
oped in relation to direct and proximate cause."'"7 " The majority con-
cluded that Ewing stands for "simply reject[ing] proximate cause as a
predicate for 'arising out of coverage, without mentioning any need
for some lesser fault."' 7 2 The dissent in CSX, citing the same passage,
stated that in Ewing, as in EDP Floors, "the Court rejected placing reli-
ance on any form of strict causation analysis. 1 73
Nonetheless, MTA presented a second case, Frazier, in support of
its argument for a more restrictive standard than "but for" causation.
In Frazier, a mother sued for recovery under the Unsatisfied Claim and
Judgment Fund law, which provides for the recovery of "personal in-
jury that 'arises out of the use of an unidentified motor vehicle.' 74
In Frazier, the Court of Appeals held that the mother and child's inju-
ries arose out of the "ownership, operation or use of an unidentified
motor vehicle" not because of the negligent operation of the automo-
bile, but because the firecracker was thrown from an automobile. 175
The CSX majority stated that Frazier did not support MTA's argu-
ment because the court's decision in Frazier, which "dr[ew] on auto-
mobile liability coverage cases, held that the Fund was answerable
because 'the injuries under the facts of this case did arise out of the
... use of an unidentified motor vehicle.'1 76 Similar to the instant
case, in Frazier there was no fault in the operation of the unidentified
car, but in what the unidentified driver was doing at the time he or
170. Ewing, 235 Md. at 149-50, 200 A.2d at 682.
171. CSA 349 Md. at 313-14, 708 A.2d at 306 (quoting Ewing, 235 Md. at 149, 200 A.2d
at 682).
172. Id. at 316, 708 A.2d at 307.
173. Id. at 328-29, 708 A.2d at 313 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (citing Ewing, 235 Md. at
149, 200 A.2d at 682).
174. CSX, 349 Md. at 316, 708 A.2d at 307 (citing Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim &Judg-
ment Fund Bd., 262 Md. 115, 117, 277 A.2d 57, 58 (1971)).
175. Frazier, 262 Md. at 119, 277 A.2d at 59.
176. CS, 349 Md. at 316-17, 708 A.2d at 307 (quoting Frazier, 262 Md. at 119, 277 A.2d
at 59).
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she drove the car.' 77 The dissent's response was to throw Frazier out of
the line of relevant cases, further weakening MTA's argument for a
more restrictive standard than "but for" causation. The dissent in CSX
argued that the Frazier court's holding that the accident claim could
be brought before the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund was
based "on the remedial nature of the Fund and the interest of protect-
ing innocent victims" and did not "draw[ ] on automobile liability cov-
erage cases."'1
78
MTA's argument for a new, brighfline standard of causation to
apply to the contract interpretation of "arising out of' was rejected by
the Court of Appeals. Instead of impinging on the parties' freedom to
contract, under Maryland law, the courts will "apply the terms of the
contract as written," without going "contrary to the intention of the
parties.' 79 In both Ewing and Frazier, the Court of Appeals looked at
the express language of the insurance agreement and considered the
intent of the agreement in order to determine whether it would inter-
pret the language of the agreement and its corresponding scope of
coverage broadly or narrowly. Similarly, in CSX the Court of Appeals
decided to apply the express, yet broad, language of the indemnity
clause to allow coverage of the liability in question because of what it
determined to be the intent of a contract between two experienced
parties.' 80
EDP Floors was the most recent Maryland case prior to CSX that
looked at an indemnification clause using the "arising out of' lan-
guage, and the CSX majority supports the proposition that "' [t]he
words 'arising out of must be afforded their common understanding,
namely, to mean originating from, growing out of, flowing from, or
the like .... This is so regardless of whether the injury may also be
said to have arisen out of other causes further back in the sequence of
177. Id; see also id. at 330, 708 A.2d at 314 (Eldridge,J., dissenting) (stating, referring to
Frazier, that "this Court's holding in that limited context should not influence our decision
in the case sub judice").
178. Id. at 330, 708 A.2d at 314 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority in CS,
349 Md. at 316-17, 708 A.2d at 307).
179. CS, 349 Md. at 312, 708 A.2d at 305 (quoting Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v.
EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 231, 533 A.2d 682, 689 (1987)). The Court of Appeals
discussed its decision in EDP F/oors, where it stated that:
When, as here, there is no ambiguity in the policy exclusion, the first principle of
construction of insurance policies in Maryland requires that we apply the terms of
the contract as written. To apply either a proximate or concurrent cause analysis
in the interpretation of the policy exclusion .. .would severely strain its plain
import and would result in coverage being provided, contrary to the intention of
the parties.
EDP F/oors, 311 Md. at 231, 533 A.2d at 689.
180. CSX 349 Md. at 320, 708 A.2d at 309.
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events ... ."'181 The interpretation of "arise out of' therefore pre-
cludes application of "either a proximate or concurrent cause analy-
sis" '182 that would go "further back in the chain of causation. "183
Instead, the focus of the "inquiry [is] on the instrumentality of the
i* ",184injury.
In agreement with the CSX majority, the dissent in CSX pointed
out that in EDP Floors, the Court of Appeals stated that it would "re-
ject[ ] relying on a causation based analysis which would defeat the
intent of the parties." '85 Nonetheless, the dissent asserted that an "in-
separable association" test was formulated to take the place of a causa-
tion-based analysis.186 However, if the dissent had continued its
examination of the EDP Floors decision, it would have noted that the
test was described as an "inseparable associat[ion] with the operation,
use or unloading of the truck" because it flowed from what was
deemed the intent of the parties at the time of contract. 187 Thus, the
Court of Appeals's interpretation of "arising out of' in EDP Floors was
not intended to be a brightline rule for interpreting the words; rather,
it was a descriptive interpretation of "arising out of' in line with that
particular contract's intent. 188
In the end, it was the structure and provisions of the MTA-CSXT
contract itself that led the Court of Appeals to apply a broad interpre-
tation of "arising out of'18 9 consistent with contract law principles of
interpretation. Rather than creating a new precedent in case law, the
majority applied and reconfirmed existing principles. The dissent
opined that the majority's interpretation was unreasonably broad,
even with the case's special circumstances.190 The dissent argued that
the majority opinion rendered meaningless the numerous other fac-
tors that were far more significant in causing the accident, such as
CSXT's hiring practices, negligent train operation, or "profit motiva-
tions."191 In a worst-case scenario, the dissent argued, the majority
opinion would hold CSXT harmless even if CSXT had hired unquali-
181. Id. at 311-12, 708 A.2d at 305 (quoting EDP Floors, 311 Md. at 230-31, 533 A.2d at
688-89).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 312, 708 A.2d at 305.
184. Id.; EDP Floors, 311 Md. at 230-31, 533 A.2d at 688-89.
185. CSX 349 Md. at 327, 708 A.2d at 312 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. EDP Floors, 311 Md. at 231, 533 A.2d at 689.
188. CSX, 349 Md. at 325-26, 708 A.2d at 312 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 323, 708 A.2d at 310.
190. Id. ("Such a sweeping interpretation of the phrase 'arise out of,' as applied to the
facts of this case, is unreasonable.").
191. Id. at 324, 708 A.2d at 311.
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fled engineers to run its trains under the contract. 19 2 But such a sce-
nario was not presented here, nor would any party reasonably intend
to contract with a party engaging in such blatantly bad business prac-
tices. Presumably, a public authority such as MTA would take reason-
able precautionary inquiries to ensure that it does not contract an
operator that would hire unlicensed drivers. And perhaps, as a matter
of public policy, incentives should exist to encourage the MTA to take
such measures, particularly when it chooses to bind itself contractually
to an indemnification clause so broadly expressed. The majority's re-
sponse was that this case involved two experienced parties free to ne-
gotiate the express terms of the indemnification agreement.1 9 3 They
were thus held to the express terms of the contract.
5. Conclusion.-In CSX the Court of Appeals held that BCA ap-
plied the wrong legal standard to the case by "appl [ying] the indemni-
fication provision based on the proximate cause of the collision of the
backhoe, without recognizing that the 'arising out of' promise in the
contract's indemnification of CSXT was a broader concept.""' Not to
be confused with a causation analysis to determine negligence, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals's interpretation of "arising out of' is, in
tort-speak, close to a "but for" analysis because it relies on a direct or
physical link to the accident. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the Court of Appeals will not look to a more narrow standard
such as proximate or intermediate causation, or even "inseparable as-
sociation." To the Court of Appeals, the default rule is to apply a
simple direct cause and effect analysis because a higher standard of
analysis not called for by the plain language of the contract is contrary
to contract interpretation principles.
Here, insurance contract case law was implicated because the
Court of Appeals reasoned that MTA intended to act like an insurer of
CSXT and therefore insurance contract case law was analogous.' 95
The Court of Appeals construed the scope of "arising out of" in this
case in its broadest sense, namely, "physical causation or causation in
192. Id. at 323-24, 708 A.2d at 310-11. The dissent warned:
There should be more of a nexus between contract services and CSXT liability
than simple 'but for' causation before the indemnity provision is triggered. If
not, then MTA could be required to indemnify CSXT for a myriad of liabilities in
no way closely related to the provision of commuter rail service by CSXT for
MTA.
Id. at 323, 708 A.2d at 310.
193. CSX, 349 Md. at 309-10, 317, 319-20, 708 A.2d at 303-04, 307-09.
194. Id. at 321, 708 A.2d at 310.
195. Id. at 310-11, 708 A.2d at 304.
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fact"19 6 as a result of its reasoning that these two experienced parties
intended to be held to the express language of the contact.197 The
Court of Appeals then looked at the facts of how the liability was in-
curred in order to conclude that it fell within the terms of the
agreement.
Experienced parties should be wary of how they craft the lan-
guage in an indemnification clause, particularly if the parties belong
to an industry known to negotiate indemnification clauses in the ordi-
nary course of business. Great care should be taken to state with spec-
ificity which liabilities are included or, perhaps more importantly,
excluded from the scope of coverage.19
DEBRA S.P. CHENG
196. Id. at 321, 708 A.2d at 309.
197. Id. at 310, 708 A.2d at 304.
198. Id. at 312, 708 A.2d at 305 (explaining that "the language ... focuses the inquiry on
the instrumentality of the injury," so that application of a proximate or concurrent cause
analysis was contrary to the intent of the parties (quoting Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v.
EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 231, 533 A.2d 682, 689 (1987))).
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IV. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Formally Adopting the Single Larceny Doctrine in Maryland
In State v. White,1 the Court of Appeals examined whether the
single larceny doctrine is still recognized in Maryland after the pas-
sage of the state's Consolidated Theft Statute.2 According to this doc-
trine, "'the taking of property belonging to different owners at the
same time and place constitutes but one larceny."' 3 The court held
that this doctrine is part of the Maryland common law of theft; it sur-
vived the passage of the Consolidated Theft Statute, and the Court of
Special Appeals correctly applied it in this case.4 Thus, stealing sev-
eral articles of property at one time, whether belonging to one owner
or several owners, constitutes one offense; it does not constitute as
many separate offenses as there are different owners of the property
stolen.5 The court's ruling clarifies Maryland theft law and is consis-
tent with both precedent and the Maryland Consolidated Theft Stat-
ute. Also, the ruling is consistent with the majority of jurisdictions in
the United States. The opinion's only shortcoming is its failure to
fully discuss the equitable and constitutional reasons for formally
adopting the single larceny doctrine.
1. The Case.--Carla Price and Patricia McNabb were high school
physical education teachers who shared office space with two other
teachers at Western Vocational Technical High School in Baltimore
County, Maryland.6 On August 17, 1995, two items were stolen from
their office: a small TV/radio belonging to Carla Price, and a canvas
bag decorated with a Baltimore County Teachers Logo belonging to
Patricia McNabb.7
Around noon on the same day, Detective Edmond Bradley no-
ticed Richard Albert White standing on a street corner about four
blocks from the school.8 White had a canvas bag between his feet and
was closely examining a small TV/radio.9 As Detective Bradley ap-
1. 348 Md. 179, 702 A.2d 1263 (1997).
2. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 340-345 (1996). The Consolidated Theft Statute was
passed in 1978.
3. See White, 348 Md. at 183, 702 A.2d at 1264 (quoting Daniel H. White, Annotation,
Single or Separate Larceny Predicated upon Stealing Property from Different Owners at the Same
Time, 37 A.L.R. 3d 1407, 1409 (1971)).
4. Id. at 195-96, 702 A.2d at 1271.
5. Id. at 193-94, 702 A.2d at 1270.






proached, White placed the TV/radio in the bag.1" Detective Bradley
identified himself and asked White for identification; White gave his
name but did not provide identification."1
Noting the distinctive Baltimore County Teachers Logo on the
bag,12 Detective Bradley radioed for assistance and dispatched an of-
ficer to Western Vocational Technical High School to see if anything
was reported missing.' 3 Upon learning from a second officer that a
TV/radio and a canvas bag were missing from the school, Detective
Bradley arrested White for theft. 4
In the District Court for Baltimore County, White was charged
with three separate counts: stealing a canvas bag having a value of
$300 or less from Patricia McNabb, stealing a TV/radio set having a
value of $300 or less from Carla Price, and trespassing on posted
school property.' 5 The case was transferred to the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County after White requested a jury trial.' 6 The jury re-
turned a guilty verdict on all three counts.17 The trial court sentenced
White to consecutive eighteen-month sentences for each theft count
and a concurrent sixty-day sentence for the trespassing count.18
White appealed the decision, asserting that the trial court erred in
failing to merge his two theft convictions.' 9
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment,
but merged the theft convictions and sentences.2" In doing so, the
court agreed with White's contention that the stealing of two pieces of
property was "one transaction, and therefore constituted but one of-
fense."'" Noting that a majority of courts2 2 have adopted this princi-
ple, known as the single larceny doctrine, the court explained that,
although the Maryland Court of Appeals had not expressly adopted
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. At the sentencing proceeding, it was revealed that Detective Bradley knew White
and was aware of prior incidents involving White. See id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 181-82, 702 A.2d at 1264.




19. See White v. State, No. 540, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Jan. 8, 1997) (per
curiam). White also argued that the trial court erred "in refusing to hear his belated mo-
tion to suppress evidence." Id.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id.
22. See infra note 72 and accompanying text for examples of other courts following the
single larceny doctrine.
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this doctrine, the Court of Special Appeals had.23 Citing Govostis v.
State,2 4 the Court of Special Appeals held that the single larceny doc-
trine applies in Maryland.2 5
The State appealed the decision, arguing that the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals erred in applying the single larceny doctrine and in
merging the two convictions. 26 On appeal, the Court of Appeals con-
sidered two questions. First, the court addressed whether "the steal-
ing of several articles of property at the same time, belonging to
several owners, constitute [s] one offense, or as many separate offenses
as there are different owners of the property stolen?"27 Second, the
court considered whether the single larceny doctrine had been abro-
gated by the enactment of the Maryland Consolidated Theft Statute.28
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Crime of Larceny.-At common law, larceny consisted
of "the wrongful taking and carrying away [of] the chattels of another
with a felonious intent to convert them to the taker's own use." 29 The
requisite elements of larceny, in addition to intent, were "a physical
23. See White, No. 540, slip op. at 4 (deciding that "the stealing of several articles at one
time, irrespective of whether they belonged to one person or many, constitutes one
offense").
24. See Govostis v. State, 74 Md. App. 457, 471, 538 A-2d 338, 345 (1988) (holding that
stealing a person's personal effects as well as his car was a single theft because "there was
but one criminal scheme and one criminal intent").
25. White, No. 540, slip op. at 4.
26. See White, 348 Md. at 182, 702 A.2d at 1264.
27. Id. at 180-81, 702 A.2d at 1263 (citing State v. Warren, 77 Md. 121, 122, 26 A. 500,
500 (1893)).
28. See id. at 180, 702 A.2d at 1263 (asking "whether the 'single larceny doctrine' is alive
and well in Maryland under the Consolidated Theft Statute"). For the Maryland Consoli-
dated Theft Statute, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 340-345 (1996).
29. Worthington v. State, 58 Md. 403, 409 (1882); see Murray v. State, 214 Md. 383, 386,
135 A.2d 314, 315 (1957) (quoting Worthington for the common law definition of larceny);
Canton Nat'l Bank v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 111 Md. 41, 44-45, 73 A. 684, 685
(1909) (stating and comparing the varying definitions of larceny employed by seventeenth
and eighteenth century English treatises).
A number of more recent cases define larceny as the "fraudulent taking and carrying
away of a thing without claim of right with the intention of converting it to a use other than
that of the owner without his consent." See, e.g., State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 606, 298 A.2d
378, 381 (1973) (emphasis omitted); Brown v. State, 236 Md. 505, 513, 204 A.2d 532, 536
(1964); Putinski v. State, 223 Md. 1, 3, 161 A.2d 117, 119 (1960).
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taking and asportation"3 ° of goods from the actual or constructive
possession of the owner. 1
English law classified larceny as either grand or petit; both were
felonies, but the latter carried a less severe penalty.3 2 While no Mary-
land statute distinguishes between grand and petit larceny, the Mary-
land Consolidated Theft Statute distinguishes between felonious and
nonfelonious larceny. 3   According to Section 342(f) of Article 27,
stealing property or services that have a value of $300 or more consti-
tutes a felony, and stealing property or services that have a value of
less than $300 constitutes a misdemeanor.3 4 The punishment im-
posed-the length of incarceration and/or the amount of the fine-is
affected by the classification of the crime as either a felony or a
misdemeanor.35
b. The History of the Single Larceny Doctrine.-
(1) At English Common Law.-The single larceny doctrine-
the principle that the taking of several articles of property belonging
30. Brown, 236 Md. at 513, 204 A.2d at 536; accord Loker v. State, 250 Md. 677, 686-87,
245 A.2d 814, 819 (1968) (agreeing that taking and asportation are two elements necessary
to constitute a larceny); cf Wiggins v. State, 8 Md. App. 598, 603, 261 A.2d 503, 506 (1970)
("The slightest asportation is sufficient. The trespasser must acquire complete control over
the property, but the slightest entire removal of it from the place it occupies, and a tempo-
rary control of it, even for a moment is enough." (quotation omitted)).
31. See Farlow v. State, 9 Md. App. 515, 517, 265 A.2d 578, 580 (1970) ("The 'taking'
refers to the taking of possession from possession of one entitled thereto.").
32. See Melia v. State, 5 Md. App. 354, 360 n.5, 247 A.2d 554, 558 n.5 (1968) ("[At
common law,] the punishment for grand larceny was death and forfeiture of goods, subject
to benefit of clergy. The punishment for petit larceny was forfeiture of goods and whip-
ping, or some corporal punishment less than death.").
33. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(f) (1996).
34. Id
35. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(f) Penalty
(1) A person convicted of theft where the property or services that was the subject
of the theft has a value of $300 or greater is guilty of a felony and shall restore the
property taken to the owner or pay him the value of the property or services, and
be fined not more than $1,000, or be imprisoned for not more than 15 years, or
be both fined and imprisoned in the discretion of the court.
(2)A person convicted of theft where the property or services that was the subject
of the theft has a value of less than $300 is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
restore the property taken to the owner or pay him the value of the property or
services, and be fined not more than $500, or be imprisoned for not more than
18 months, or be both fined and imprisoned in the discretion of the court; how-
ever, all actions or prosecutions for theft where the property or services that was
the subject of the theft has a value of less than $300 shall be commenced within 2
years after the commission of the offense.
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to different individuals at the same time constitutes one crime-has
existed for a long time. In a classic English case, Regina v. Giddins,3 6 a
prisoner was charged with assaulting two individuals at the same time
and then stealing from them.37 The prisoner stole two shillings from
one individual, one shilling and a hat from the other.38 The court
held: "It is all one act and one entire transaction: [both individuals]
were assaulted and robbed at one and the same time; and there was
no interval of time between the assaulting and robbing of the one and
the assaulting and robbing of the other." 9
Seventeenth and eighteenth century English writers also consid-
ered the single larceny doctrine in the context of aggregating several
petty larcenies into a single grand larceny.4 ° Sir Matthew Hale distin-
guished between the defendant who steals a total of twenty pence
from three separate owners at different times, and the defendant who
steals a total of eighteen pence from three separate owners at the
same time.41 Whereas the first defendant engaged in several petit lar-
cenies, the second defendant engaged in one grand larceny because
"it was one entire felony done at the same time."42
(2) Case Law in Mayland.-The Court of Appeals first ad-
dressed the single larceny doctrine in the 1893 case, State v. Warren.
43
In Warren, the defendant was charged with stealing several sums of
money belonging to different owners at the same time;44 the defen-
dant's indictment contained two counts. The trial court dismissed the
counts as duplicative. 45 On appeal, the court considered the follow-
36. Regina v. Giddins, 174 Eng. Rep. 667 (Worcester Assizes (Crown Side) 1842) (hold-
ing that the stealing of several objects from different people at the same time and same




40. See 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 531 (1st Amer.
Ed. 1847) (distinguishing between stealing several goods from several people at different
times and stealing several goods from several people at the same time); 2 EDWARD HYDE
EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 740-41 (Professional Books Ltd. 1987)
(1806) ("[1]f the property of several persons, lying together in one bundle or chest, or
even in one house, be stolen together at one time... the value of all may be put together
so as to make it grand larceny . . . for it is one felony.").
41. See I HALE, supra note 40, at 531. Petty larceny was defined as the theft of articles
valued at less than 12 pence. See also Melia v. State, 5 Md. App. 354, 361 n.5, 247 A.2d 554,
558 n.5 (1968) (noting that theft of property having a value greater than 12 pence was
classified as grand larceny).
42. 1 HALE, supra note 40, at 531.
43. 77 Md. 121, 26 A. 500 (1893).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 122, 26 A. at 500.
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ing question: "Does the stealing of several articles of property at the
same time, belonging to several owners, constitute one offense, or as
many separate offenses as these different owners of the property
stolen?"46
The Warren court concluded that the stealing of several articles at
the same time, belonging either to one or to several persons, is one
offense because "the act is one continuous act-the same transac-
tion."" The court reasoned that the essence of the offense is the felo-
nious taking of the property, not the fact that property is stolen from
several different individuals.4" The court explained that the purpose
of identifying property ownership is merely to inform a defendant
about the precise nature of the charges against him.49 Furthermore,
the court stated that because larceny is "an offense against the pub-
lic,"5° it is prosecuted "in the name of the state," in order to protect
the public, and not on behalf of the victimized property owners.5'
Since Warren, the Court of Appeals has not addressed whether
taking property from different owners at the same time is one crime
or several crimes. It has, however, reviewed related issues. In Horsey v.
State,52 the Court of Appeals considered a larceny conviction for a de-
fendant who stole several boxes of merchandise from the same store
owner on two separate occasions, approximately two months apart.53
The defendant argued that the State should not be able to aggregate
the value of merchandise taken on the two separate occasions because
each constituted a separate crime.54 Rejecting this argument, the
court held that the thefts constituted a single crime because "the sepa-
rate takings were pursuant to a common scheme or intent."55 The
court explained that "the fact that the takings occur[red] on different







52. 225 Md. 80, 169 A.2d 457 (1961) (per curiam).
53. Id. at 82, 169 A.2d at 459. See generally Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Series of Tak-
ings Over a Period of Time as Involving Single or Separate Larcenies, 53 A.L.R. 3d 398, 400 (1974)
(discussing "whether a series of takings from the same owner over a period of time consti-
tutes a single larceny or a number of separate larcenies").
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The Court of Appeals considered another related issue in Bane v.
State." In Bane, the court reviewed a conviction where the defendant
was charged, among other things, with two separate counts of store-
house breaking from a single building." The premises were occupied
by two different businesses, separated only by a hallway; there were no
signs, either inside or outside, that indicated that the offices were sep-
arate. 9 The Bane court concluded that the separate counts could not
stand and that there could be only one conviction because there was
only one objectively identifiable storehouse.60
Although the Court of Appeals has not formally addressed the
single larceny doctrine since Warren, the Court of Special Appeals has
done so. In Govostis v. State,61 the Court of Special Appeals merged
the defendant's two theft convictions for taking two different articles
of property from the same person at the same time.6 2 After commit-
ting a murder, the defendant and his accomplice stole the victim's car
and the victim's other belongings.6" The defendant later argued that
the convictions had to be merged because the takings were part of a
"single, continuous course of conduct."64 Citing the "one transaction"
language of Warren, and the "common scheme or intent" language of
Horsey, the court found that there was but one theft.6 5 The court ex-
plained that "[s] tealing the victim's personal effects as well as his car
were not separately conceived crimes; there was but one criminal
scheme and one criminal intent, thus one theft."66 The court merged
the theft sentences.67
(3) Case Law In OtherJurisdictions. -Despite the relative scar-
city of case law in Maryland, there is extensive case law on the single
larceny doctrine in other jurisdictions." At one time, several jurisdic-
57. 327 Md. 305, 609 A.2d 313 (1992).
58. Id. at 307, 609 A.2d at 314.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 317, 609 A.2d at 318-19. The Bane court also noted that, although the Court
of Appeals had not directly adopted the single larceny doctrine, the Court of Special Ap-
peals had. Id. at 311 n.4, 609 A.2d at 316 n.4. While recognizing that the majority of
jurisdictions had adopted the single larceny doctrine, the court did not address the doc-
trine because it did not affect the outcome in this case. Id
61. 74 Md. App. 457, 538 A.2d 338 (1988).
62. Id. at 470-71, 538 A.2d at 344-45.
63. Id. at 461, 470, 538 A.2d at 340, 344.
64. Id. at 471, 538 A.2d at 344.
65. Id., 538 A.2d at 345.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See White, supra note 3, at 1407 (discussing the history and application of the single
larceny doctrine and comparing the approaches of different jurisdictions to this doctrine).
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tions followed the separate larceny doctrine "under which there was a
distinct larceny as to the property of each person."6 Other jurisdic-
tions took the position that the state could elect to prosecute such
situations as either one offense or several distinct offenses. 7 Only onejurisdiction still takes this position. 71 Today, the overwhelming major-
ity of jurisdictions follow the single larceny doctrine.72
69. Id. at 1410; see United States v. Beerman, 24 F. Cas. 1065, 1075 (C.C.D.D.C. 1838)(No. 14,560) (asserting that "the stealing of the goods of divers persons at the same time,
constitutes as many distinct felonies"); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 121 Mass. 369, 370(1876) (stating that an acquittal for the breaking and entering of "a dwelling-house and
stealing therein the property of [owner 1], was no bar to this complaint for stealing in the
same dwelling-house at the same time the property of [owner 2]"); Phillips v. State, 3 S.W.
434, 435 (Tenn. 1887) (upholding the trial judge's instruction that if mother and daughter
"were the owners of different lots of goods in the same room, and they were feloniously
taken and carried away, although it was done on the same evening, and during one contin-
uing trespass, it would be two separate and distinct larcenies"); Morton v. State, 69 Tenn.
498, 499 (1878) (stating that an indictment alleging the theft of items belonging to two
different owners "avers two separate and distinct offenses").
70. See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 104 Mass. 552, 553 (1870) ("The stealing at the
same time and by one taking of several articles belonging to different persons is larceny of
the whole and of each article; and may be indicted either in one aspect or the other-as
one entire crime, or as several distinct offences."); State v. Lambert, 9 Nev. 321, 324 (1874)("[Tihe stealing of the property of different persons at the same time and place and by the
same act may be prosecuted at the pleasure of the government as one offense or as several
distinct offenses."); Long v. State, 43 Tex. 467, 470-71 (1875) ("[T]he State is not bound to
divide the single act [of driving several cattle belonging to different owners from a range]
into all the separate charges which might be formed out of it, but may charge the taking
• . .as one offense."); Haywood v. Territory, 2 P. 189, 190 (Wash. 1883) (explaining that
"while it is true that the taking of two horses, the property of different persons, might
constitute two separate offenses .... if they were taken at the same time, the prosecutor
could elect to treat it as one transaction, and charge it as a single offense"). See generally
White, supra note 3, at 1410 n.l (stating that jurisdictions which permitted such an elec-
tion included the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Nevada, Texas, and Washington).
71. Nevada is the one jurisdiction that maintains this position. See State v. Douglas, 65
P. 802 (Nev. 1901); Lambert, 9 Nev. at 324; White, supra note 3, at 1410 n.1l.
72. See State v. Stoops, 603 P.2d 221, 226 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) ("Out of the thirty-five
states that have considered the question [as of 1979], thirty-four appear to have adopted
the single larceny theory."); Todd R. Smyth, Articles Belonging to Different Owners, 50 AM.JUR.
2D Larceny § 7 (1995) (listing cases from various jurisdictions that follow the single larcenydoctrine); White, supra note 3, at 1410-14 (providing a thorough compilation ofjurisdic-
tions that have adopted the single larceny doctrine).
Many jurisdictions formally adopted the single larceny doctrine in the late 1800s and
early 1900s. See, e.g., Sweek v. People, 277 P. 1, 3 (Colo. 1929); Lowe v. State, 57 Ga. 171,172 (1876); Furnace v. State, 54 N.E. 441, 442 (Ind. 1899); State v. Sampson, 138 N.W. 473,
475 (Iowa 1912); Bushman v. Commonwealth, 138 Mass. 507, 508 (1885); Ward v. State, 43
So. 466, 467 (Miss. 1907); State v. Toombs, 34 S.W.2d 61, 66 (Mo. 1930); State v. Mjelde, 75
P. 87, 88 (Mont. 1904); State v. Merrill, 44 N.H. 624, 625 (1863); State v. Klasner, 145 P.
679, 680 (N.M. 1914); State v. Douglas, 65 P. 802, 803 (Nev. 1901); State v. Hennessey, 23
Ohio St. 339, 345 (1872); Woolbright v. State, 288 P. 499, 500 (Okla. Crim. App. 1930);
Fulmer v. Commonwealth, 97 Pa. 503, 507 (1881); State v. Kieffer, 95 N.W. 289, 290-91(S.D. 1903); Ratcliffv. State, 38 S.W.2d 326, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1931); State v. McKee, 53
P. 733, 734 (Utah 1898); State v. Newton, 42 Vt. 537, 537 (1870); Alexander v. Common-
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In the federal arena, several circuits have also considered and ap-
proved the single larceny doctrine.73 The Eleventh Circuit decision in
United States v. Perez74 is characteristic of that approval. In Perez, the
defendants stole several items from the Miccosukee Tribal Cultural
Center gift shop, including jewelry and a money bag from the shop,
and the purse of the gift shop manager.75 A grand jury indicted the
defendants on three counts, and ajury found the defendants guilty on
the first two counts. 76 On appeal, the defendants argued that the dis-
trict lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the second count of the
indictment, which charged the defendants with theft under Florida
law and the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) of the items stolen from
the Cultural Center and the shop manager. 77 The defendants con-
tended that they could have been indicted under the federal Embez-
zlement and Theft from Indian Tribal Organization Statute;
78 this
would have precluded application of Florida law via the ACA. How-
ever, because the theft from the store manager did not fall within that
federal statute, 79 Florida law was applied through the ACA. In re-
wealth, 20 S.E. 782, 783 (Va. 1894); State v. Makovsky, 120 P. 513, 514 (Wash. 1912); Acker-
man v. State, 54 P. 228, 230 (Wyo. 1898).
Several jurisdictions have formally adopted the single larceny doctrine more recently.
See, e.g., People v. Bauer, 461 P.2d 637, 643 (Cal. 1969) (in bank); People v. Fuentes, 527
N.E.2d 152, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Fair v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 864, 866-67 (Ky.
1983); State v. Myers, 407 A.2d 307, 309 (Me. 1979); People v. Williams, 296 N.W.2d 293,
295 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Caron, 121 N.Y.S.2d 404, 409 (Crim. Ct. 1953); State
v.Jager, 85 N.W.2d 240, 243 (N.D. 1957); State v. McDonald, 365 P.2d 494, 497 (Or. 1961)
(in banc); Seamster v. State, 283 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955).
73. The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have addressed the single larceny doctrine,
by applying it both to larceny and to other theft crimes. See Mansfield v. Champion, 992
F.2d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 1993) ("We see no logical reason why the single larceny rule is
not applicable to the larceny element of robbery, as other courts have held."); United
States v. Billingslea, 603 F.2d 515, 520 n.6 (5th Cir. 1979) ("We note with approval the
position adopted by a number of state courts that a series of larcenies may be properly
charged in a single larceny where there was a continuing impulse, intent, plan, or scheme
actuating the several takings." (internal quotation marks omitted)); infra note 74.
74. 956 F.2d 1098 (1lth Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
75. Id. at 1100. The Center "is located on the Miccosukee Indian Reservation [in Flor-
ida] and belongs to the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians." Id. at 1099.
76. Id. at 1100.
77. Id. The Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1969 & Supp. 1998), states
that:
Whoever within [a special territorial jurisdiction of the United States] is guilty of
any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of
Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of
the State .. .in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the
time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like
punishment.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1163 (1984 & Supp. 1998).
79. Perez, 956 F.2d at 1102.
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sponse to the defendants' argument that the theft from the gift shop
and the theft from the shop manager should not have been combined
into one count,80 the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[t]his circuit has
approved the 'single larceny doctrine."'' s The court concluded that
"[b]ecause the thefts from the tribe and [the shop manager] were
clearly part of a single scheme, they were properly combined in count
II."82
The Seventh Circuit represents a different position, "a decidedly
minority view." 3 Without specifically addressing the single larceny
doctrine, the Seventh Circuit seemed to disapprove of the principle.
United States v. Marzano8 4 involved the "theft of more than three mil-
lion dollars from the vaults of Purolator Security, Inc." 5 Among
other things, the defendant was charged with six counts of stealing
money, belonging to several different banks, from the possession of
Purolator. 6 The Seventh Circuit considered whether, in light of the
fact that all the money was stolen from Purolator, the trial court erred
in charging multiple counts. This determination turned on whether
Congress intended the unit of prosecution 7 to be the victim or the




83. White, 348 Md. at 192, 702 A.2d at 1269.
84. 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976). In response to the State's citation of Marzano in its
Brief, the Court of Appeals discussed the case in White, 348 Md. at 191-92, 702 A.2d at 1269.
The State used Marzano to argue that the single larceny doctrine "'is most applicable where
the property taken is fungible and commingled such that it is not possible to determine
ownership."' Brief of Petitioner at 8, State v. White, 348 Md. 179, 702 A.2d 1263 (1997)
(No. 13). The court rejected the State's argument. White, 348 Md. at 191-92, 702 A.2d at
1269; see infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text (discussing the court's conclusion that
Manzano is not applicable to White's case).
85. Manzano, 537 F.2d at 261. Purolator was responsible for transporting cash between
banks and business establishments.
86. Id. Marzano was charged with violating the Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes
Statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1984 & Supp. 1998). "A separate count was charged for each
bank whose money was taken." Marzano, 537 F.2d at 272.
87. The 'unit of prosecution' refers to the behavior that is criminalized. See Brown v.
State, 311 Md. 426, 434, 535 A.2d 485, 489 (1988) ("The unit of prosecution of a statutory
offense is generally a question of what the legislature intended to be the act or course of
conduct prohibited by the statute for purposes of a single conviction and sentence."); Bur-
roughs v. State, 88 Md. App. 229, 246, 594 A.2d 625, 633 (1991) ("In homicide cases, the
units of prosecution are dead bodies. . . ."); Cunningham v. State, 78 Md. App. 254, 263,
552 A.2d 1335, 1340 (1989) (holding that the unit of prosecution for the charge of "posses-
sion of a controlled dangerous substance" is the type of substance possessed, not the act of
possessing).
88. See Maizano, 537 F.2d at 272-73.
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multiple offenses if Congress so intends." 9 The court concluded that
a separate crime could be charged for each bank; the fact that the
money was taken only from the single source of Purolator was irrele-
vant.9° Because the money was kept in separate containers, and was
not commingled, it was clear that the money belonged to different
owners.
9 1
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In State v. White,92 the Court of Ap-
peals held that the single larceny doctrine exists in Maryland law, that
it remains after the passage of the Consolidated Theft Statute, and
that it applied in White.9" Thus, the stealing of several articles of prop-
erty, whether belonging to one owner or several owners, constitutes
one offense.94
After briefly recognizing the rationales underlying the single lar-
ceny doctrine,95 the court examined case law relating to the single
larceny doctrine.96 Tracing the doctrine back to common law, the
court cited English scholars.97 The court then discussed the few rele-
vant Maryland cases and provided an overview of the doctrine's treat-
ment in other jurisdictions.98
Following its survey of case law, the court explained its reasons
for adopting the single larceny doctrine. First, the court stated, con-
trary to the State's assertion, that the single larceny doctrine was appli-
cable to White's situation. Citing an Oregon case, State v. Gilbert,99 the
State had contended that the individual crime victim should be the
determining factor in imposing punishments; in other words, the
owner should be used as the unit of prosecution.100 Under the State's
reasoning, White would have been found guilty of two separate counts
of theft. While recognizing the similarities between Oregon and
Maryland theft law, 101 the court explained that the Oregon decision
89. Id. at 272 (citing Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915); Barringer v. United
States, 399 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
90. Id. at 273.
91. Id.
92. 348 Md. 179, 702 A.2d 1263 (1997).
93. Id at 196, 702 A.2d at 1271.
94. Id. at 181, 702 A.2d at 1263-64.
95. Id. at 183, 702 A.2d at 1265.
96. Id. at 184-90, 702 A.2d at 1265-68.
97. Id. at 183-84, 702 A.2d at 1265; see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
98. White, 348 Md. at 184-90, 702 A.2d at 1265-68; see supra notes 43-66 and accompany-
ing text.
99. 574 P.2d 313 (Or. 1978) (in banc).
100. White, 348 Md. at 190, 702 A.2d at 1268; see also supra note 87 and accompanying
text (discussing the "unit of prosecution" concept).
101. White, 348 Md. at 190, 702 A.2d at 1268.
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was based on that state's FormerJeopardy statute. 10 2 That statute pro-
vides that, when the same criminal conduct violates only one statutory
provision, but results in loss to two or more victims, "there are as many
offenses as there are victims." ' Thus, in Gilbert, because the defen-
dant's receipt of stolen guns "result[ed] in a loss to six different per-
sons,"1 0 4 the Oregon court found that there were six separate
offenses.10 5 Because "there is no counterpart in Maryland" to the Or-
egon statute, the White court declined to apply Gilbert's reasoning to
the case before it. 10
6
Second, the White court, again rejecting one of the State's conten-
tions, concluded that the single larceny doctrine did not have limited
applicability.'0 7 In its brief, the State had relied upon United States V.
Marzano,t'0 which upheld a defendant's multicount conviction for
stealing money belonging to several banks from a single location at
the same time, 10 9 to argue that the single larceny doctrine "'is most
applicable where the property taken is fungible and commingled such
that it is not possible to determine ownership."" '1 0 The court rejected
this argument because it disagreed with the State's reading of Mar-
zano."' The court noted that the Marzano court's only explanation
for considering the thefts as a multicount offense was that the money
was stored in separate containers. Presumably the separate containers
put the Marzano defendant on notice that he was stealing from sepa-
rate owners. However, the White court concluded that the above ex-
planation was inadequate; there was "nothing in the [Marzano]
opinion to suggest that the court viewed the single larceny doctrine as
limited to cases of commingled or fungible property." ' 2
Third, rejecting the State's contention to the contrary, the court
held that the Maryland theft statute did not preclude application of
102. See OR. REV. STAT. § 131.505(3) (1973 & Supp. 1998) ("When the same conduct or
criminal episode, though violating only one statutory provision, results in death, injury,
loss or other consequences of two or more victims, and the result is an element of the
offense defined, there are as many offenses as there are victims.").
103. Id.
104. Gilbert, 574 P.2d at 317.
105. Id. at 318.
106. White, 348 Md. at 190, 702 A.2d at 1268.
107. Id.
108. 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976); see also supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
109. Mavzano, 537 F.2d at 272-73, 276.
110. White, 348 Md. at 191, 702 A.2d at 1268-69 (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 8, White
(No. 13)).
111. Id., 702 A.2d at 1269.
112. Id The White court also noted that, to the extent that Marzano does reject the
single larceny doctrine, it "also represents a decidedly minority view." Id.
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the single larceny doctrine." 3 The State used two text-based argu-
ments to explain why the Maryland Consolidated Theft Statute abro-
gated the single larceny doctrine. The State first argued that, by using
the singular form of "owner" in Article 27, section 342(a)," 4 "the Leg-
islature intended for there to be 'no impediment to separately charg-
ing, proving, and punishing thefts of items belonging to different
owners."" 15 Second, the State argued that by including a provision
1 6
which permits aggregation of the value of stolen items when there is
"one scheme or continuing course of conduct,"'1 17 the legislature in-
tended that the single larceny doctrine be applicable in this specific
context.' 8 By inference, then, the single larceny doctrine would not
be applicable in all other contexts. Thus, in all situations where the
aggregation provision does not apply (such as White's case), "each
taking would be subject to separate prosecution and punishment."1 '
Rejecting the first argument, the court explained that the term
"owner" in the statute was used to indicate property ownership and
"not [used] to define the unit of prosecution. '1 20 With respect to the
second argument, the court decided that the aggregation provision
was inserted for a purpose other than that suggested by the State. Us-
ing the legislative history of the statute, the court concluded that the
legislature inserted the provision to convey the notion "that a person
who steals property at different times from several persons and places as
part of a continuing scheme has engaged in activity which is just as
reprehensible as a person who steals an equal amount from a single
person and place at one time." 121 Thus the aggregation provision was
113. Id. at 192, 702 A.2d at 1269.
114. This section provides: "Obtaining or exerting unauthorized control.-A person commits
the offense of theft when he willfully or knowingly obtains control which is unauthorized
or exerts control which is unauthorized over property of the owner .. " MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 342(a) (1996) (second emphasis added).
115. White, 348 Md. at 193, 702 A.2d at 1270 (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 9, White (No.
13)).
116. In a section defining the value of stolen goods, the theft statute provides:
When theft is committed in violation of this subheading pursuant to one
scheme or continuing course of conduct, whether from the same or several
sources, the conduct may be considered as one offense and the value of the prop-
erty or services aggregated in determining whether the theft is a felony or a
misdemeanor.
Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 340(n) (5) (1996).




120. Id. at 193, 702 A.2d at 1270 (citingJoiNT COMMITrEE ON THEFT RELATED OFFENSES,
REVISION OF MARYLAND THEFT LAWS AND BAD CHECK LAWS 19 (1978)).
121. Id. at 195, 702 A.2d at 1271.
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not meant to deal with situations where several articles of property
were taken from several people at the same time.12 2 Instead, this pro-
vision was meant to deal with situations where, as part of a continuing
scheme, "property is taken at different times from several persons and
places."1
23
Fourth, the court examined the legislative history, particularly the
purpose of the enactment of the Consolidated Theft Statute, and con-
cluded that there was "nothing in the legislative history" to suggest
that the General Assembly intended "to abrogate the single larceny
doctrine."' 24 The court noted that the Consolidated Theft Statute was
intended "'to eliminate the[ ] technical and absurd distinctions that
have plagued the larceny related offenses and produced a plethora of
special provisions in the criminal law.' 1 25 The court further ex-
plained that the Consolidated Theft Statute was intended to consoli-
date disparate common law rules, not to effect a "tacit change in the
substance of the law."1 26
4. Analysis.-In State v. White, the Court of Appeals held that the
stealing of several articles of property, whether belonging to one
owner or several owners, constitutes one offense and not separate of-
fenses. 127 In so doing, the court affirmed the Court of Special Ap-
peals, which had overruled the trial court's decision that the
defendant should be convicted and sentenced separately for stealing,
122. Id. at 194-95, 702 A.2d at 1270-71 (citingJoiNr COMMITTEE ON THEFT RELATED OF-
FENSES, supra note 120, at 27). Concerning the purpose of section 340(n) (5), this report
states:
Paragraph (5) of this subsection allows aggregation of the value of stolen
property or services in order to determine whether theft is a felony or a misde-
meanor. In this manner, the total value of the property or services which are
stolen in any one scheme or continuing course of conduct may be considered to
decide if the cumulative amount taken warrants a misdemeanor or felony penalty.
Although the value of the property may be aggregated for the purpose of deter-
mining the potential penalty, the prosecution must still allege and prove each
separate incident that is part of the aggregated offense.
The paragraph on aggregation was inserted on the basis that a person who
steals property at different times from several persons and places as part of a contin-
uing scheme has engaged in activity which is just as reprehensible as a person who
steals an equal amount from a single person and place at one time.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THEFT RELATED OFFENSES, supra note 120, at 27 (emphasis added).
123. White, 348 Md. at 195, 702 A.2d at 1271.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 196, 702 A.2d at 1271 (quoting JOINT COMMITTEE ON THEFT RELATED OF-
FENSES, supra note 120, at 2).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 180-81, 702 A.2d at 1263-64.
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at the same time, items belonging to two different owners.1 28 As a
result, the defendant in White could only be convicted of one theft
crime.
The court's decision formally to adopt the single larceny doctrine
is wise for several reasons. First, the decision clarifies Maryland law on
this matter. Second, it is consistent with past case law and the Consoli-
dated Theft Statute. The court followed the 104-year-old precedent
established in State v. Warren, and engaged in a proper reading of the
Consolidated Theft Statute. Third, the decision is consistent with the
trend of most jurisdictions in the United States.1 29
a. The Court's Decision Clarifies Maryland Law.-Prior to
White, only the Court of Special Appeals, and not the Court of Ap-
peals, had formally adopted the single larceny doctrine. In Govostis v.
State,1 30 the Court of Special Appeals held that the stealing of several
articles at one time, belonging to either one owner or many owners,
constitutes one offense."' Thus, with the formal adoption of the sin-
gle larceny doctrine by the Court of Appeals, the law of the state has
been firmly established. As such, Maryland theft law has been
clarified.
b. The Court's Decision is Consistent With Precedent.-In addi-
tion to clarifying Maryland theft law, the court's decision in White is
consistent with precedent. While Maryland case law on the single lar-
ceny doctrine is scarce, State v. Warren"3 2 did address the principles
that underlie this doctrine. 33 The Warren court provided the oft-
quoted reasoning that the taking of several items from multiple own-
ers at the same time is "one continuous act" and the "same transac-
tion." 4 Furthermore, the Warren court concluded that "it seems
clear to us, on principle, that the taking of several articles of property
under such circumstances constitutes but one felony."' 3 5 Based not
only on the reasoning provided by the Warren court, but also on the
White court's conclusion stated above, it seems clear that, in White, the
Court of Appeals was "set[ting] forth the generally accepted theoreti-
128. Id. at 182, 702 A.2d at 1264.
129. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
130. 74 Md. App. 457, 538 A.2d 338 (1988).
131. Id. at 471, 538 A.2d at 344-45.
132. 77 Md. 121, 26 A. 500 (1893).
133. See id. at 122-23, 26 A. at 500 (noting that, because the purpose of theft law is to
protect the public rather than vindicate individual victims, the taking of several items from
multiple owners at the same time constitutes a continuous act that is but one offense).
134. Id. at 122, 26 A. at 500.
135. Id. at 122-23, 26 A. at 500.
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cal basis of the single larceny doctrine that the taking is but one of-
fense because the act is one continuous act." 136
The Warren court not only laid the groundwork for adopting the
single larceny doctrine, but also made explicit the unit of prosecution
in common law larceny. The Warren court stated that "the gist of the
offense [is] the felonious taking,"1 7 and that "[the court does] not
see how the legal quality of the act is in any manner affected by the
fact that the property stolen . . . is the several property of different
persons. 1 38 From this analysis, it follows that the unit of prosecution
for common law larceny was the "felonious taking," i.e., the act of
stealing. 1
39
Subsequent Maryland cases upheld this conclusion. In Horsey, the
Court of Appeals held that "the fact that the takings occur[red] on
different occasions does not establish that they are separate
crimes,"' 40 because they were part of a "common scheme or in-
tent."'' In Govostis, the Court of Special Appeals merged theft con-
victions because, under Horsey, the actions were part of "a common
scheme or a 'single criminal impulse."" 42 In both cases, the notion of
a common scheme implicitly presupposes that the object of prosecu-
tion is the act of the taking, not the number of items stolen or the
number of property owners. In Bane,'4 3 although the single larceny
doctrine was not considered at the appellate level,' 44 the court still
acknowledged the doctrine in a footnote and cited Warren and
Govostis. '4 5
The White decision accords with the above discussed line of cases.
The court in White upheld the underlying logic of the Warren decision.
The court also properly recognized that subsequent case law has im-
plicitly supported the principles underlying the single larceny doc-
136. See White, supra note 3, at 1413.
137. Warren, 77 Md. at 122, 26 A. at 500.
138. Id.
139. See Respondent's Brief at 6, State v. White, 348 Md. 179, 702 A.2d 1263 (1997) (No.
13) ("Hence, under Warren, the unit of prosecution for common law larceny in Maryland
was the act of stealing.").
140. Horsey v. State, 225 Md. 80, 83, 169 A.2d 457, 459 (1961) (per curiam).
141. Id.
142. Govostis v. State, 74 Md. App. 457, 471, 538 A.2d 338, 345 (1988) (quoting 52A
C.J.S. Larceny § 53 (1968)).
143. Bane v. State, 327 Md. 305, 307-08, 609 A.2d 313, 314 (1992).
144. Bane was convicted of various counts of theft and store breaking. Id. at 307, 609
A.2d at 314. The theft convictions were merged into the storehouse breaking convictions.
Id. at 308, 609 A.2d at 314. With the theft convictions removed, the court had no need to
discuss the unit of prosecution for common law larceny.
145. Id. at 312 n.4, 609 A.2d at 316 n.4.
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trine. Thus, a decision that affirms the single larceny doctrine in
Maryland is a decision consistent with the precedent of the state.
c. The Court Adopts a Proper Reading of the Maryland Consoli-
dated Theft Statute.-The Maryland General Assembly adopted the
Consolidated Theft Statute in 1978.146 While the single larceny doc-
trine was part of pre-19 7 8 Maryland common law, the applicability of
the doctrine was not entirely clear after the introduction of the statute
in 1978.117 The question of whether the Consolidated Theft Statute
incorporated the single larceny doctrine remained unanswered until
White.
Because of the potential impact of the Consolidated Theft Statute
on the single larceny doctrine, much of the dispute in White centered
on interpreting this statute.14 8 The White court, in rejecting the
State's arguments, accepted White's interpretation of the statute.' 4 9
The court was correct to do so because White's arguments were more
plausible than the State's.
The State made two arguments, based on the text in the Consoli-
dated Theft Statute, for the preclusion of the single larceny doc-
trine. 15 ° The State's "owner" argument' is based on the singular-
146. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 340-345 (1996).
147. See supra notes 113-126 and accompanying text (discussing the White court's treat-
ment of this statute and its legislative history).
148. The portion of the Consolidated Theft Statute under which White was convicted
provides that:
(a) Obtaining or exerting unauthorized control - A person commits the offense of
theft when he willfully or knowingly obtains control which is unauthorized or
exerts control which is unauthorized over property of the owner, and:
(1) Has the purpose of depriving the owner of the property; or
(2) Willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in such
manner as to deprive the owner of the property; or
(3) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, concealment,
or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the property.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(a) (1996). For conflicting interpretations of the statute, see
Brief of Petitioner at 8-11, White (No. 13) (arguing that a proper interpretation of the
Maryland theft statute indicates that "there are as many thefts as there are victims" and
thus the single larceny doctrine is abrogated); Respondent's Brief at 8-12, White (No. 13)
(arguing that "[s]ince the gravamen of a sub-§(a) theft is obtaining or exerting control
over another's property with larcenous intent, that act committed with that intent is the
unit of prosecution" and providing reasons why the legislature selected "the number of
criminal transactions as a basis for multiplying a theft's punishment").
149. White, 348 Md. at 193-94, 702 A.2d at 1270.
150. See supra notes 113-126 and accompanying text.
151. See Brief of Petitioner at 9, White (No. 13) (stating that because the statute refers to
the "'property of the owner' in the singular . . . there is no impediment to separately
charging, proving, and punishing thefts of items belonging to different owners").
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plural status of the word. The State's "value" argument'5 2 is based on
an inference as to why the state included this provision. The court
was correct to find both of the State's arguments untenable in light of
the legislative history of the Consolidated Theft Statute.
The legislative intent is indicated by the report of the joint sub-
committee; 5 3 this report notes that, over the centuries, an "unwieldy
and in some cases unintelligible body of statutory and case law" had
developed. 154  Beginning in 1979, "the Legislature combined a
number of separate offenses, each involving some type of deprivation
of one's property, into one statute." '155 The purpose of enacting the
statute was "to eliminate [the] technical and absurd distinctions that
have plagued the larceny related offenses and produced a plethora of
special provisions in the criminal law."1 56 In light of these factors, the
White court was correct to conclude as follows: "The fact is that there
is nothing in the legislative history of the Consolidated Theft Statute
even to suggest, much less to document, an intent by the General As-
sembly to abrogate the single larceny doctrine. 1 57
d. The Court Fails to Discuss the Public Policy Reasons for Adopt-
ing the Single Larceny Doctrine. -There are additional reasons, related
to the protection of constitutional rights and to basic notions of fair-
ness, that favor adoption of the single larceny doctrine. While the
152. See id. at 9-10 (arguing that section 340(n)(5), providing for aggregation of the
value of stolen items, was included solely because, while the thefts of items from different
owners "stand separately," the General Assembly intended aggregation as a means to per-
mit prosecution of separate crimes together as felonies).
153. SeeJoiNT COMMrYrEE ON THEF-T RELATED OFFENSES, supra note 120.
154. Id. at 1.
155. Craddock v. State, 64 Md. App. 269, 277, 494 A.2d 971, 975 (1985).
156. JoINT COMMITr-EE ON THEFT RELATED OFFENSES, supra note 120, at 2; see Jones v.
State, 303 Md. 323, 328-29, 493 A.2d 1062, 1064-65 (1985) (discussing the statute's purpose
as stated in the Joint Subcommittee Report). See generally Farlow v. State, 9 Md. App. 515,
516, 265 A.2d 578, 580 (1970) (explaining that due to the lack of an inclusive crime stat-
ute, convictions for people who "unlawfully appropriate the personal property of another"
are not straight-forward or clear-cut, but instead depend on alleging subtle factual
distinctions).
157. White, 348 Md. at 195, 702 A.2d at 1271. In his Brief, White provided a comprehen-
sive sampling of courts that "have held that the jurisdiction's consolidated theft statute
incorporated the single larceny rule." Respondent's Brief at 9 n.5, White (No. 13); see Mar-
tin v. State, 797 P.2d 1209, 1218 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); State v. Fillmore, 927 P.2d 1303,
1308-09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Bauer, 461 P.2d 637, 642-43 (Cal. 1969) (in bank);
Reader v. State, 349 A.2d 745, 747-48 (Del. 1975); Johnson v. State, 490 So. 2d 182, 184
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Fuentes, 527 N.E.2d 152, 154-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988);
State v. Myers, 407 A.2d 307, 309 (Me. 1979); Commonwealth v. Donovan, 478 N.E.2d 727,
734-35 (Mass. 1985); Horsey v. State, 747 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (en banc);
State v. Brown, 830 P.2d 183, 184-86 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hall, 298 S.E.2d 246,
255-56 (W. Va. 1982).
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court alludes to these reasons in its opinion,158 it fails to discuss them
fully. The court's argument would have been strengthened by a dis-
cussion of the two additional reasons for adopting the single larceny
doctrine: avoiding unfair and unreasonable punishments, and pro-
tecting individuals from double jeopardy. 159
Regarding the first reason, if the court were to interpret the stat-
ute to mean that the property owner was the unit of prosecution, so
that the single larceny doctrine did not apply, the resulting punish-
ments could be unusually harsh. 6 ° If "each owner's property were of
sufficient value for grand larceny... a holding that there is a distinct
larceny as to each owner could result in extremely severe punish-
ment." '61 Likewise, the punishment could be severe where each arti-
cle of property stolen was owned jointly.162 Furthermore, imposing a
punishment for each and every taking when the takings occurred
from several different people at the same time would be particularly
excessive when compared to the punishment for takings totaling the
same amount but from only one person. 6
158. As other rationales for the doctrine, the court mentions "'the harshness of the
punishment which might result from a contrary holding'" and "'the unconstitutionality of
[ I double jeopardy.'" White, 348 Md. at 183, 702 A.2d at 1265 (quoting White, supra note
3, at 1409-10).
159. Id
160. See Respondent's Brief at 17, White (No. 13) (explaining that "by stealing a $50 TV
from the teachers' office, [White's] prison exposure would be 18 months, but, by stealing a
$3 pen from the desk of each of the four teachers who shared the office, his exposure
would be 6 years"); see also People v. Bauer, 461 P.2d 637, 643 (Cal. 1969) (in bank). In
Bauer, the court stated that a defendant can only be punished once when he engages in
several property crimes against several people in the same transaction. Id. If the rule were
otherwise, a defendant who burglarized a house and stole items belonging to different
family members could receive consecutive sentences for as many items as there were family
members. Id. See generally Sweek v. People, 227 P. 1, 3 (Colo. 1929) (stating that the single
larceny doctrine is a "humane rule").
161. See White, supra note 3, at 1409; see also Sweek, 227 P. at 3 ("If each article stolen
were of a value sufficient to make the crime a felony, and a separate charge could be filed
as to each, a defendant, if convicted, might be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of
his life.").
162. See Respondent's Brief at 17-18, White (No. 13) ("ff 20 office workers jointly possess
20 pens and keep them together in one receptacle, theft of the 20 pens could bring 20
convictions and 30 years of incarceration. Theft of a $300 office refrigerator jointly and
severally owned by the 20 office workers could result in 20 convictions and 300 years of
incarceration.").
163. See State v. Egglesht, 41 Iowa 574, 579 (1875) (noting the inconsistency between a
defendant who hands a merchant one counterfeit bill equaling $20 and is sent to the
penitentiary for ten years for one crime, and the defendant who hands a merchant four
counterfeit bills, each equaling $5, and is sent to the penitentiary for forty years for four
crimes); see also State v. Sampson, 138 N.W. 473, 474-75 (Iowa 1912) (restating the logic
and examples provided in Egglesht).
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The single larceny doctrine also protects an individual from
double jeopardy. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment states that "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."'16 4 Double jeopardy issues
arise where the "prosecution for stealing the property of one person is
a bar to a prosecution for the larceny of the property of the other
owners. " 165 Although there are varying opinions, "the most common
conclusion is that once the defendant has been tried, and either con-
victed or acquitted, or at least placed in jeopardy, for the larceny of
the property of one owner, the state is barred from any further prose-
cutions for the larceny of the balance of the property."1 66 Adoption of
the single larceny doctrine avoids this danger. If all offenses are
merged into one, regardless of the number of owners, then the possi-
bility that the defendant is placed twice in jeopardy for the same of-
fense will not arise.
5. Conclusion.-In State v. White, the Court of Appeals formally
adopted the single larceny doctrine. 6 ' This decision clarifies Mary-
land theft law by strengthening the Court of Special Appeals's deci-
sion that previously recognized the single larceny doctrine. 6 ' White is
164. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion of double jeopardy, see Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding "that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth
Amendment... should apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment"); Block-
burger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (providing a test to be used for determining
whether two offenses should be considered the same for double jeopardy purposes: "[t] he
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied . . . is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact which the other does not"); Gianiny v. State, 320 Md. 337, 347-48, 577 A.2d
795, 800 (1990) (holding that where defendant was "convicted of and punished (fined) for
the lesser included offense of negligent driving, no matter how that conviction came
about, he cannot be prosecuted for the greater offense of vehicular manslaughter"); Mid-
dleton v. State, 318 Md. 749, 756, 569 A.2d 1276, 1279 (1990) (recognizing that Maryland
common law principles also protect individuals from being put in jeopardy for the same
offense).
165. White, supra note 3, at 1409; see Hoiles v. United States, 10 D.C. (3 MacArth.) 370,
373 (1879) ("To divide one larceny into several because there were several owners of the
property, is contrary to the constitutional guaranty and the spirit of the common law....");
Nelson v. State, 628 P.2d 884, 897 (Alaska 1981) ("[T]he single larceny rule is implicit in
the spirit of our state constitutional protection against double jeopardy and should there-
fore be adopted in Alaska."); Hearn v. State, 55 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 1951) (en banc)
("[T]o permit the dividing into several larcenies of objects which are the subject of larceny,
although belonging to separate owners, when stolen at the same time ... would be viola-
tive of the . . . [principle that] a man should not be put in jeopardy twice for the same
offense.").
166. White, supra note 3, at 1409.
167. White, 348 Md. at 196, 702 A.2d at 1271.
168. See Govostis v. State, 74 Md. App. 457, 471, 538 A.2d 338, 345 (1988).
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consistent with Maryland law and with the Maryland Consolidated
Theft Statute. Furthermore, the court's decision is consistent with the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the United States. 169
The court's only shortcoming was its failure to fully consider the
constitutional and fairness reasons for adopting the single larceny
doctrine. These additional reasons are very convincing; they show the
effect that the doctrine, or lack thereof, can have on the functioning
of our criminal justice system and the working of justice more gener-
ally. Nonetheless, the court's failure to discuss these arguments is not
fatal to its argument.
At this juncture, one critical question remains: How will the sin-
gle larceny doctrine be applied in Maryland? The single larceny doc-
trine applies to thefts that occur in the same time and place, or as
parts of a single transaction. Commentators recognize that "there is
some diversity in the construction of these requirements and in the
manner in which they have been applied to various fact situations.
' 170
While the court's decision to adopt the doctrine is commendable, it is
but one step in a series of steps that still need to be taken. Knowing
when to apply the single larceny doctrine to a particular set of facts
remains unclear. In order to clarify the law, the Court of Appeals will
have to formulate more specific guidelines for the doctrine's
application.
CHRISTINA E. MCDONALD
B. Maryland Courts Accomplish Policy Goal of Preserving Pleas
In Yoswick v. State,171 the Court of Appeals considered whether a
trial court must advise a defendant of the parole consequences of a
sentence when he or she pleads guilty in order for the plea to comply
with the requirement that a plea be "knowing" and "voluntary."
'
"72
The court resolved the issue by characterizing parole eligibility as a
collateral consequence, which may be omitted from the court's expla-
nation, rather than a direct consequence of a plea, which must be
communicated.173 The court further rejected Yoswick's argument
that his sentence effectively constituted a mandatory minimum sen-
169. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
170. See White, supra note 3, at 1410.
171. 347 Md. 228, 700 A.2d 251 (1997).
172. Id. at 239, 700 A.2d at 256; see also infra note 194 (explaining the statutory condi-
tions precedent to a court's acceptance of a defendant's guilty plea).
173. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 240, 700 A.2d at 256-57.
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tence, which would have to have been disclosed prior to the plea. 174
The court also contemplated whether incorrect advice, arguably re-
ceived from defendant's counsel violated the Sixth Amendment 175
right to effective assistance of counsel, and was therefore grounds for
vacating a guilty plea.1 76 The court held that the defendant must
demonstrate that counsel's error prejudiced the plea, and specifically,
in the present case, that there was not a sufficient showing of preju-
dice.17 7 By preserving the plea, the court conformed to the general
policy, advanced by the United States Supreme Court, of discouraging
the formation of new avenues to overturn pleas.178
1. The Case.--On February 25, 1992, David Teddy Yoswick ab-
ducted an acquaintance, Frank Storch, and detained him by handcuff-
ing him and locking him in the bathroom of a Howard County motel
room. 17 ' The next day, Yoswick drove Storch to Carroll County where
he stabbed Storch in the stomach and attempted to drown him in a
creek.' Although Storch was still alive, Yoswick thought he was dead
and fled the scene." 1 Two days later, Yoswick disposed of the physical
evidence of his crimes in a Baltimore City landfill.81 2 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Yoswick was indicted in Carroll County on twenty counts of crimi-
nal activity. 8 3 At that time, charges were pending against Yoswick in
Howard and Anne Arundel Counties as well.18 4
174. Id. at 243, 700 A.2d at 258.
175. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has held that this provision carries no weight
unless it also includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (declaring that "the right to counsel is the right to
the effective assistance of counsel"); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)
(same).
176. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 231, 700 A.2d at 252.
177. Id. at 244-46, 700 A.2d at 259. According to the court, the Petitioner was unable to
show that "but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial." Id. at 245, 700 A.2d at 259 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59 (1985)).
178. See infra notes 301-302 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Timmreck,
411 U.S. 780 (1979), which stands for the proposition that pleas should be difficult to
overturn).
179. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 232, 700 A.2d at 253.
180. Id. at 232-33, 700 A.2d at 253.
181. Id. at 233, 700 A.2d at 253.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 231, 700 A.2d at 252.
184. Id. at 246-47, 700 A.2d. at 260.
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On August 31, 1992, Yoswick pled guilty to attempted first degree
murder and kidnapping. 185 Pursuant to a plea agreement arranged
between Yoswick's attorney and the State's Attorney's Office, Yoswick
was sentenced to life for the charge of attempted first degree murder,
with all but forty years suspended. 186 Additionally, he was sentenced
to life with all but thirty years suspended on the kidnapping charge.
187
The two sentences were to be served concurrently.1 88 As part of the
agreement, the State's Attorney entered a nolle prosequi1 89 to the re-
maining eighteen charges and recommended that charges pending in
Howard and Anne Arundel Counties be dropped.190 Prior to the plea
agreement, and if convicted of all potential charges in Carroll County,
Yoswick faced a prison sentence of life imprisonment plus seventy
years.1 91 The charges in other jurisdictions could have amounted to
one hundred years in prison.
1 92
On April 14, 1994, Yoswick filed a Petition for Post Conviction
Relief, and on August 15, 1994, he filed an amended petition. 9 The
petition contended that Yoswick's plea was neither knowing nor vol-
untary, as required by Maryland Rule 4-242(c), 194 because the trial
court failed to disclose the number of years Yoswick must serve prior
to becoming eligible for parole. 95 He supported his position by argu-
ing that his plea in effect triggered a mandatory minimum sentence
that he must serve before he would be eligible for parole,' 9 6 as the
185. Id. at 231-32, 700 A.2d at 253.
186. Id., 700 A.2d at 252-53.
187. Id. at 231, 700 A.2d at 253.
188. Id.
189. A nolle prosequi is a "declaration of record from the legal representative of the
government, that he will no further prosecute the particular indictment or some desig-
nated part thereof." Ward v. State, 290 Md. 76, 83, 427 A.2d 1008, 1012 (1981) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 JOEL PRNTISS BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 1387, at 1194 (2d ed. 1913)).




194. Id. at 235, 700 A.2d at 254. Maryland Rule 4-242(c) provides:
The court may accept a plea of guilty only after it determines, upon an examina-
tion of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the
State's Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that
(1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with the understanding of the nature of
the charge and the consequences of the plea; and (2) there is a factual basis for
the plea.
MD. RULE 4-242(c).
195. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 238-39, 700 A.2d at 256.
196. Id. at 242, 700 A.2d at 258 (noting Yoswick's contention that "the trial court in
essence imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years").
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statute required those sentenced to a life term to serve fifteen years
before being eligible for parole.'9 7 Yoswick argued that a mandatory
sentence is a direct consequence of a plea.1"8 Because he was una-
ware of the statutory sentencing requirement at the time he rendered
the plea, he contended that he did not plead "with understanding of
the .. .consequences."' Yoswick also claimed that he was unaware
that his parole eligibility was contingent upon approval from the Gov-
ernor. zoo Yoswick stated that, had he known of the restrictions on his
parole eligibility, he would not have pled guilty.2 1
Yoswick argued in the alternative that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because the information his attorney gave him
regarding the parole consequences of his plea was erroneous, and
therefore, his plea should be vacated. 20 2 In August 1992, Yoswick
spoke to his counsel, Linda Ostovitz, about the parole consequences
of his plea.203 Ostovitz had previously telephoned the Parole Commis-
sion to inquire about the parole eligibility that accompanies a forty-
year sentence. 204 According to Ostovitz, she was told that a prisoner
must serve approximately one quarter of his sentence before becom-
ing eligible for parole.205 Based on this information and the belief
that Yoswick would be serving a forty-year sentence, Ostovitz told Yos-
wick that he would have to serve a minimum of ten years before be-
coming eligible for parole. 20 6 The court subsequently sentenced him
197. The law that pertained to sentencing at the time Yoswick pled guilty read:
Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection, a person who has
been sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole consideration until
the person has served 15 years or the equal of 15 years when considering the
allowances for diminution of period of confinement provided for in Article 27,
§ 700 and Article 27, § 638C of the Code.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-516(b) (1) (1990). Section 4-516(b) was subsequently amended
to become section 4-516(d), but the legislature made no changes to the text of the statute.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-516(d) (1997).
198. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 242, 700 A.2d at 258.
199. Id. at 238, 700 A.2d at 256. See supra note 194 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the statutory requirements a court must satisfy before accepting a guilty plea.
200. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 238-39, 700 A.2d at 256. The statute required a prisoner serving
a life sentence to obtain approval of the Governor in order to be paroled. See MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, § 4-516(b) (4) ("If eligible for parole under this subsection, an inmate serving
a term of life imprisonment and a person serving a term of life imprisonment who is con-
fined at Patuxent Institution as an eligible person shall only be paroled with the approval
of the Governor.").
201. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 238-39, 700 A.2d at 256.
202. Id. at 236, 700 A.2d at 254.
203. Id.
204. Id., 700 A.2d at 255.
205. Id.
206. Id., 700 A.2d at 254.
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to life in prison with all but forty years suspended.2"7 This alteration
in sentencing increased the number of years that he must serve before
he will become eligible for parole to fifteen years.20 8 At the post-con-
viction hearing, Ostovitz testified that she did not remember if she
informed Yoswick of this change.20 9 Yoswick argued that the incorrect
information he received about his parole eligibility directly prejudiced
his defense, and therefore, deprived him of his Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel.2 0 In support of this contention, he cited
extensive case law which states that if a defense is prejudiced by defi-
cient performance of counsel, the resulting plea should be vacated. 11
A post-conviction hearing was held in the Circuit Court for Car-
roll County; that court rejected Yoswick's claims and upheld his
plea. 212 The circuit court held that a defendant must be informed
only of the direct consequences of his plea, and that parole eligibility
is not a direct consequence.2 1 3 The court further held that, assuming
counsel had misinformed Yoswick as he contended, the error did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because Yoswick was unable
to support his claim that the misinformation prejudiced his plea.2 1 4
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court, holding that
the parole consequences of a plea are collateral to the plea, and there-
fore need not be communicated to a defendant before he pleads
guilty.215 The Court of Special Appeals further concluded that, even
assuming he had been misinformed, Yoswick did not suffer from inef-
fective assistance of counsel because he was unable to establish that
his plea had been prejudiced by the communicated misinforma-
tion. 2 16 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider an issue
207. Id., 700 A.2d at 255.
208. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (increasing the minimum time served to
15 years).
209. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 236, 700 A.2d at 255.
210. Id. at 244, 700 A.2d at 259.
211. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying the Strickland two-prong test
to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel); Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984) (requiring petitioner to prove that counsel's per-
formance was not reasonably effective, and that there was a reasonable probability that
counsel's errors prejudiced the judgment, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel);
Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 373-75, 605 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1992) (applying the Strickland
test to assess effectiveness of counsel); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 426-27, 578 A.2d 734,
739 (1990) (applying the Strickland test and clarifying the "reasonable probability" prong of
that analysis).
212. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 232, 700 A.2d at 253.
213. Id. at 237, 700 A.2d at 255.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 238, 700 A.2d at 256.
216. Id. at 237, 700 A.2d at 255.
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of first impression, whether parole consequences are direct or collat-
eral consequences of a guilty plea.217
2. Legal Background.-In Yoswick, the Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether parole eligibility is a collateral consequence of a guilty
plea, and therefore, does not require the trial court judge to commu-
nicate those consequences before a plea may be accepted. 21' The
court also examined the lower courts' determination that Yoswick's
defense was not prejudiced by incorrect information received from
counsel regarding parole consequences of his plea.219
a. Maryland Rule 4-242(c).-In Maryland, a guilty plea may
be accepted by the court only after the court determines that the plea
was given "voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea," and that there is a factual basis for
the plea.220 Maryland Rule 4-242(c) ensures the voluntary and know-
ing character of a plea by requiring either the judge or one of the
attorneys to examine the defendant on the record and in open
court.2 2 1 The examination includes asking the defendant if he under-
stands that he is waiving a right to a jury trial, that the State would be
required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he is
waiving both the right to testify on his own behalf and the right to
confront his accusers.22 2 After considering these factors, the trial
judge will accept a plea if he is convinced that the defendant under-
stands the plea and is rendering it voluntarily. 223
b. Direct or Collateral Consequences. -In Yoswick, the Court of
Appeals's decision turned on whether parole consequences constitute
direct or collateral consequences of a plea.224 This determination is
essential because a direct consequence of a plea that is undisclosed to
a defendant renders the plea "unknowing" and "involuntary. "225
The purpose of the distinction is to ensure that defendants are
aware of the important factors that will result from waiving the right to
217. Id. at 241, 700 A.2d at 257.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 244, 700 A.2d at 259.
220. See MD. RULE 4-242(c). See also supra note 194 for the text of the rule.
221. See MD. RULE 4-242(c).
222. Id.; see also English v. State, 16 Md. App. 439, 441, 298 A.2d 464, 466 (1973) (restat-
ing the "standard applicable to waiver of constitutional rights" when accepting a guilty
plea).
223. MD. RULE 4-242(c).
224. See Yoswick, 347 Md. at 238, 700 A.2d at 256.
225. See id. at 231, 700 A.2d at 252.
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trial while recognizing that it would be impossible to communicate
every possible result stemming from a guilty plea.226 While the dis-
tinction originated in federal courts,"' it has also been adopted by
many states. 228 For example, the Supreme Court of Indiana deemed
information regarding the impact a defendant's parole status would
have on his sentencing to be collateral, and therefore, not necessary
for the trial court to communicate prior to accepting a guilty plea.
229
Additionally, several state courts have labeled deportation possibilities
that stem from guilty pleas to be collateral consequences.23 0 On the
other hand, state courts usually deem a mandatory sentence to be a
direct consequence that must be communicated to a defendant for his
plea to be knowing and voluntary.
231
Maryland courts have required that the trial court must only in-
form defendants of the direct consequences of a plea. For example,
in Daley v. State,232 the Court of Special Appeals construed the phrase
"consequences of the plea" to mean that the trial judge has the duty to
inform defendants of "direct consequences of pleading guilty, such as
the maximum potential sentence. '232 The court attempted to illumi-
nate the definition of "direct" by stating that "a consequence was con-
sidered to be direct only if 'the result represents a definite, immediate
and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punish-
ment.' ' 234 In Moore v. State,235 the Court of Special Appeals construed
Maryland Rule 4-242's requirement that a defendant's plea must be
226. See Cuthrell v. Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1972) (recognizing
the impracticality of informing every defendant of every ancillary result of a guilty plea).
227. See United States v. Ready, 460 F.2d 1238, 1239 (4th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (dis-
tinguishing between direct consequences and ancillary or consequential results of a plea);
Johnson v. United States 460 F.2d 1203, 1204 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (same); United
States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (same).
228. See, e.g., Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 251 (Alaska 1972) (distinguishing between
direct and collateral consequences of a plea); State v. Coban, 520 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 1988)
(same); Daley v. State, 61 Md. App. 486, 488, 487 A.2d 320, 321 (1984) (same); State v.
Bailey, 545 A.2d 206, 209-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1988) (same).
229. Morlan v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ind. 1986) (holding the parole board's
action to be a collateral consequence of the defendant's plea).
230. See, e.g., Tafoya, 500 P.2d at 251 (holding that deportation consequences were col-
lateral to guilty pleas); Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44, 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (same).
231. See, e.g., Coban, 520 So. 2d at 42 (holding that an automatic minimum sentence of
25 years must be communicated before a plea will be accepted as knowledgeable); see also
supra notes 251-258 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which mandatory mini-
mum sentences were deemed to be direct consequences of the pleas).
232. 61 Md. App. 486, 487 A.2d 320 (1985).
233. Id. at 488, 487 A.2d at 321.
234. Id. at 489, 487 A.2d at 322 (quoting Cuthrell v. Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366
(4th Cir. 1973)).
235. 72 Md. App. 524, 531 A.2d 1026 (1987).
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"with understanding of the consequences" to refer only to direct con-
sequences, not collateral ones. 23 '6 The Moore court found that in dis-
tinguishing direct from collateral consequences, "[c]ourts generally
hold that for the plea to be accepted, the defendant must be made
aware of the former, but not the latter."23 7 Prior to Yoswick, the Court
of Appeals had not considered whether parole eligibility fell within
the category of "direct consequences."2 8 Therefore, an examination
of other state and federal approaches is informative.
In the federal context, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires a defendant to be advised of the "mandatory mini-
mum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible pen-
alty provided by law."239 In Hunter v. Fogg,24 0 the defendant argued
that because he was either not told or misinformed about the mini-
mum period of imprisonment that might be set by the parole board,
his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered, and therefore violated Rule
11.2 1' The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
jected the defendant's argument; the court held that the Advisory
Committee's notes accompanying Rule 11 clearly indicated that the
drafters did not intend to include possible parole consequences as in-
formation that must be communicated to the defendant prior to a
plea.242 The United States Supreme Court went further in United
States v. Timmreck243 by holding that a violation of Rule 11 does not by
itself justify collateral relief from a plea.2 " The Court stressed that
such a violation is not constitutional in magnitude and may not be
grounds for vacating a plea unless the error results in a "'complete
miscarriage ofjustice' "245 or the proceeding is "'inconsistent with the
236. Id. at 526, 531 A.2d at 1027.
237. Id.
238. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 241, 700 A.2d at 257 (noting that the question of parole eligibil-
ity as a direct or collateral consequence of a guilty plea "is an issue of first impression for
this Court").
239. FED. R. CiM. P. 11.
240. 616 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1980).
241. Id. at 58.
242. Id. at 60; see also FED. R. CiuM. P. 11 advisory committee's note. In discussing
whether to require trial courts to inform defendants of parole eligibility that results from
pleas, the advisory committee concluded that such information is not required. The com-
mittee contemplated instances where parole eligibility "may be so complicated that it is not
feasible to expect a judge to clearly advise the defendant." Id.
243. 441 U.S. 780 (1978).
244. Id. at 783-84.
245. Id. (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1961)).
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rudimentary demands of fair procedure."' 246 The Court expressed its
desire to avoid creating judicial avenues by which to overturn pleas.247
State courts considering the consequence of parole eligibility
generally hold that it is a collateral consequence of a plea and there-
fore not necessary to disclose to the defendant. 248 However, courts
often consider parole consequences to be a direct consequence of the
plea that must be communicated to the defendant if the plea results
in the requirement that the defendant serve a minimum statutory sen-
tence before becoming eligible for parole.249 In those cases, if the
defendant is not informed of the parole consequences of the
mandatory minimum sentence, the plea will be vacated. 250 For exam-
ple, in Washington v. State,25 a the defendant was misinformed about a
statutory mandatory sentence during his sentencing hearing; the
judge and his attorney failed to tell the defendant that under the stat-
ute he would not be eligible for parole for ten years.252 The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court held that a defendant was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether his plea was voluntary.
253
In Robinson v. State,25 4 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
considered a defendant's argument that his guilty plea should be va-
cated because he was not informed that his particular charge would
make him ineligible for parole. 255 The court denied relief because
the defendant made no showing that the plea resulted in parole ineli-
gibility, but stated that where a "statutory mandate" has "a definite
practical consequence," it must be disclosed to the defendant. 256 Fur-
thermore, the Robinson court characterized the diminution of the pa-
246. Id.
247. Id. at 784 (citing United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528-29 (1971) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
248. See, e.g., State v. Coban, 520 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1988) (suggesting that parole eligi-
bility is usually a collateral consequence of a guilty plea); Smith v. State, 329 S.E.2d 507,
508-09 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence of a
plea and that the trial court may assume a defendant has apprised himself of such
consequences).
249. See Coban, 520 So. 2d at 42 (concluding that a mandatory sentence was a direct
consequence of the guilty plea when the sentence was "triggered" by the plea, and the
court had no discretion on whether to impose the sentence).
250. See id (observing that, because a mandatory minimum sentence requirement im-
pacts a defendant's opportunity for parole, failure to advise the defendant of such a sen-
tence renders a guilty plea involuntary).
251. 620 So. 2d 966 (Miss. 1993).
252. Id. at 968-70.
253. Id. at 970.
254. 806 P.2d 1128 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
255. Id. at 1130-31.
256. Id. at 1131.
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role period as being within the control of the Department of
Corrections, an area outside the control of the judiciary.2 57 Conse-
quently, "a sentencing judge has no enforceable expectations with re-
spect to the actual release of a sentenced defendant short of his
statutory term."258
In State v. Coban,25 9 the Supreme Court of Florida declared that
only parole consequences that arise from mandatory minimum
sentences may be labeled direct consequences of a plea.2 60 The court
held that under "the narrow circumstances" of that case-when a
"mandatory sentence is triggered by the plea and the court has no
discretion on whether to impose [the] automatic sentence"-the sen-
tence is a direct consequence of the plea.261 Furthermore, the court
emphasized that "parole eligibility is normally a collateral conse-
quence of a guilty plea."262
c. Prejudice.-Most courts that characterize statutory limita-
tions on parole eligibility as direct consequences of pleas further re-
quire the defendant to demonstrate that he or she was prejudiced by
the deficiency in order for the plea to be vacated.263
In State v. Bailey,2 64 the Superior Court of New Jersey held that a
statutorily imposed parole ineligibility period constituted a direct con-
sequence of a plea, and therefore was required to be disclosed to the
defendant prior to his plea. 265 Additionally, however, prior to vacat-
ing a guilty plea, the defendant was required to show that the failure
to inform him of the parole ineligibility "would have made a differ-
ence in his decision to plead."266
Similarly, in In re Moser, the California Supreme Court divided the
inquiry of whether parole consequences must be communicated
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. 520 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1988).
260. Id. at 42.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 41-42.
263. See, e.g., In re Moser, 862 P.2d 723, 729 (Cal. 1993) (in bank) (explaining that a
defendant must show that he or she was prejudiced by a trial court's misadvisement to be
entitled to relief); State v. Bailey, 545 A.2d 206, 211 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1988) ("Whether
a defendant should be permitted to vacate his plea 'ought to be decided on a case-by-case
basis, depending on whether the accused can be said to have been prejudiced by the omis-
sion.'" (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Taylor, 403 A.2d 889, 895 (N.J. 1988))).
264. 545 A.2d 206 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
265. Id. at 210.
266. Id. at 211 (citing State v. Howard, 539 A.2d 1203, 1203 (N.J. 1988)). The Bailey
court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing on these issues.
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before accepting a guilty plea into two parts.2 6 7 First, the court held
that "a mandatory term of parole is a 'direct consequence' of a plea
and thus a matter of which a trial court is obligated to advise a defen-
dant." '268 Second, the court imposed a prejudice requirement on the
defendant, holding that relief from the plea was available "only if the
defendant establishes that he or she was prejudiced by the misadvise-
ment, i.e., that the defendant would not have entered the plea of
guilty had the trial court given the proper advisement. "269
d. Ineffective Counsel.-Defendants seeking to have their
guilty pleas vacated often argue that their pleas resulted from denial
of effective assistance of counsel. 270 Such claims are governed by a
two-prong test first set forth in Strickland v. Washington.271 That case,
which involved a sentencing hearing, required a defendant to first
prove that his counsel's performance was deficient. The second
prong of the test-prejudice-required a showing that, but for the
attorney's errors, the defendant's proceeding would have ended dif-
ferently.272 Two terms later, in Hill v. Lockhart,273 the court held that
the two-prong Strickland analysis applied to a claim of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel "arising out of the plea process. "274 Explaining that
the first prong of the test remains identical, the Court clarified the
second prong with respect to pleas: "[Iln order to satisfy the 'preju-
dice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
275
Prior to Yoswick, Maryland had not had the opportunity to ad-
dress an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the context of a
guilty plea. Maryland courts had, however, adopted the Strickland test
to determine whether an error by counsel violated the defendant's
267. 862 P.2d 723, 729 (Cal. 1993) (in bank).
268. Id.
269. Id. The Mosercourt also remanded the case for a hearing as to whether the defend-
ant was prejudiced by the misinformation.
270. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (establishing the test to
be used in assessing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
271. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
272. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (requiring a "reasonable probability" that the result of
the defendant's trial would have been different in order to find that the defendant was
prejudiced).
273. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
274. Id. at 57.




Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. 76 In Bowers v. State,277
the Court of Appeals clarified the standard used to measure the sec-
ond prong of the test, prejudice. After much discussion, the court
announced that a defendant must prove that had his counsel's errors
not occurred, there was a "substantial possibility" that the outcome
would have been different. 278
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Yoswick v. State, the Court of Ap-
peals held that parole eligibility is not a direct consequence of a guilty
plea, and therefore, the trial court was not required to inform Yoswick
of his parole eligibility before accepting his plea.2 79 Further, the court
held that the defendant's ineffective counsel claim was without merit;
no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. 280
The Court of Appeals determined that 'the guilty plea entered by
Yoswick was made voluntarily and with an understanding of the nature
of the consequences of the plea.28' The court first reaffirmed that it is
"well settled that the Constitution does not require that a defendant
be provided with information concerning parole eligibility."2 82 The
court then considered Yoswick's argument that the fifteen year period
of parole ineligibility that resulted from his plea in effect constituted a
mandatory minimum sentence. The court rejected this argument,
stating that the language of Article 41, section 4-516(b) of the Mary-
land Code, under which Yoswick was sentenced, did not constitute a
mandatory sentence 28-one in which "the court has no discretion on
whether to impose a particular or automatic sentence. 28 4 Rather, the
court held that the trial court "exercise [d] its discretion and imposed
a sentence of life with all but forty years suspended."28 5 In no way did
this sentence "change the nature of parole eligibility to make it an
automatic, definite, and immediate consequence of pleading
276. See Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425, 578 A-2d 734, 738 (1990) ("As we summa-
rized in Harris, a defendant who hopes to show that counsel was ineffective in that sense
has the burden of persuading a court that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and
(2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." (citing Harris v. State, 303 Md.
685, 696, 496 A.2d 1074, 1079 (1985))).
277. 320 Md. 416, 578 A.2d 734 (1990).
278. Id. at 426, 578 A.2d at 739.
279. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 231, 700 A.2d at 252.
280. Id.
281. Id.; see supra note 194 (discussing Maryland Rule 4-242(c)).
282. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 241, 700 A.2d at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1153 (3d Cir. 1996)).
283. Id. at 24243, 700 A.2d at 258.
284. Id. at 242, 700 A.2d at 258 (citing State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 518-
19, 325 A.2d 573, 582 (1974); State v. Coban, 520 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1988)).
285. Id. at 243, 700 A.2d at 258.
[VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
guilty."2" 6 Therefore, the court rejected Yoswick's argument that his
plea was involuntary.
After holding that failure to advise Yoswick of his parole eligibility
did not render his plea involuntary, the court considered Yoswick's
claim that his counsel's misadvisement about his parole ineligibility
rendered this counsel ineffective.2"7 When Yoswick offered his plea,
he was informed by his counsel that he would be eligible for parole in
ten years; it was not until later that Yoswick learned he would be re-
quired to serve at least fifteen years prior to parole and must gain the
Governor's approval to obtain parole.2"8 In addressing Yoswick's con-
tention, the court used the two-part Strickland/Hill test to determine if
such misinformation had resulted in ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. 28" Assuming, without deciding, that Yoswick's counsel had mis-
informed him, the court declined to decide the first prong of the
test-whether the misinformation constituted deficient misrepresen-
tation.290  Rather, the court grounded its decision in the second
prong of the test-prejudice. Under Strickland and Bowers v. State,29 1 a
defendant must show "that there is a 'substantial possibility' that but
for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. '2 2 The court concluded that Yoswick did
not satisfy the "substantial probability" standard.2 ' The only evidence
that Yoswick produced to show that the misinformation had
prejudiced his plea was his own statement that, had he known of the
286. Id. At a later point in its decision, the court also noted that Yoswick may not even
have to serve fifteen years, as Article 41, section 4-516(b) permits diminution of the sen-
tence for good time credits, as well as education, industrial, or special project credits. Id. at
248-49, 700 A.2d at 261; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-516(b) (1) (1990) (current
version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-516(d) (1997)).
287. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 244-46, 700 A.2d at 259.
288. Id. at 244, 700 A.2d at 259; see supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing
the parole eligibility requirements of MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-516(b)(1)). Yoswick also
raised the argument that his counsel's failure to inform him of the correct parole eligibility
consequences rendered his plea involuntary. The court rejected this argument as well,
holding that the case relied upon by Yoswick to support his claim, Margles v. State, 325 Md.
330, 600 A.2d 851 (1992), was inapplicable to the present situation, since the trial court in
Yoswick did not make an error. See Yoswick, 347 Md. at 243-44, 700 A.2d at 258.
289. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 245, 700 A.2d at 259.
290. Id. The court quoted Strickland in support of its decision not to answer the defi-
ciency question. "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack
of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
697 (1984)).
291. 320 Md. 416, 578 A.2d 734 (1989).
292. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 246, 700 A.2d at 259 (citing Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 426,




parole consequences, he would not have pled guilty.2 9 4 The trial
court determined that this statement was merely self-serving.29 The
Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's assessment of Yoswick's
credibility.29 6 In determining that the trial court's decision was not
clearly erroneous, the Court of Appeals said that it did not believe that
"a reasonable defendant in Yoswick's shoes would have insisted on go-
ing to trial even with the benefit of parole eligibility information. 29 v
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted the numerous other
charges pending against the defendant; if he had been convicted on
all of these crimes, he would have faced a substantially longer prison
term. 298 Furthermore, the court stressed the strength of the State's
case, which it deemed "relevant in determining whether a defendant
would have insisted on going to trial."299 The prosecution had over-
whelming evidence against Yoswick; therefore, the Court of Appeals
concluded that despite his claim to the contrary, it was unlikely that
Yoswick would have preferred to go to trial.300
4. Analysis.-The limitation that most courts place on the rele-
vance of collateral consequences of a plea stems from pragmatic con-
siderations that originated in the United States Supreme Court.301
The Court was concerned about reducing the opportunities for over-
turning guilty pleas. °2 By classifying parole eligibility as a collateral
consequence, the Court of Appeals in Yoswick eliminated one poten-
tial avenue for vacating pleas.303 Yet the court did recognize an excep-
tion to this roadblock in cases where the plea triggers a mandatory
294. Id., 700 A.2d at 259-60.
295. Id., 700 A.2d at 260.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 246-47, 700 A.2d at 260 (noting that Yoswick faced the possibility of a life
sentence plus seventy years, in addition to "additional sentences of approximately one hun-
dred years in Howard and Anne Arundel Counties").
299. Id. at 247, 700 A.2d at 260 (citing Ostrander v. Green, 46 F.2d 347, 356 (4th Cir.
1995)).
300. Id.
301. See United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (recognizing that the limi-
tation on collateral attacks "has special force with respect to conviction based on guilty
pleas").
302. See id. at 784-85 ("Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in
the integrity of our procedures .... The impact is greatest when new grounds for setting
aside guilty pleas are approved because the vast majority of criminal convictions result
from such pleas." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 440
F.2d 521, 528-29 (7th Cir. 1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
303. Yoswick, 347 at 241, 700 A.2d at 257 (noting that the Constitution does not require
defendants to be informed of collateral consequences prior to their pleas).
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minimum sentence.3 °4 Several states fashion this exception by requir-
ing the defendant to show prejudice caused by ignorance of the
mandatory sentencing requirements.3" 5 The Yoswick court did not
hold that it was necessary to show prejudice in cases where a sentence
was mandatory, but saved the prejudice requirement for the ineffec-
tive counsel analysis.30 6 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals provided
numerous safeguards to ensure that a plea will not be easily vacated.
a. Policy Goals.-In Timmreck, the Supreme Court advanced
the general policy goal of insuring that pleas will not be vacated on
technicalities.30 7 Expressing concern with the practical ramifications
of a permissive approach, the Court reasoned that, since a "vast major-
ity of criminal convictions result from such pleas," providing methods
to overturn them would "undermine confidence in the integrity of
[their] procedures."30 8 The Court was further concerned that al-
lowing inroads on the concept of finality would increase "the volume
of judicial work, [cause] inevitable delays, and impair the orderly ad-
ministration ofjustice."3 °9 Such concerns are justified when one con-
siders that a court does not have the resources to try every case, and
therefore relies on a certain percentage to be disposed of through
plea agreements.3 "0
Although the Yoswick court did not discuss the concerns raised in
Timmreck,"t it is likely that the Court of Appeals of Maryland was simi-
larly interested in limiting the avenues by which defendants may va-
cate guilty pleas. Had the Yoswick court deemed parole consequences
to be direct consequences of pleas, the resulting additional load
would inevitably have burdened an already overtaxed state court sys-
tem. The court did not entirely foreclose on defendants' ability to
304. Id. at 242, 700 A.2d at 258 ("A mandatory minimum sentence is a direct conse-
quence of a guilty plea, and a defendant must therefore be advised of a mandatory mini-
mum sentence in order for the plea to be valid.").
305. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (noting that courts in California and
New Jersey have imposed a prejudice requirement in cases of defendants who seek to have
their guilty pleas vacated).
306. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 244-45, 700 A.2d at 259.
307. Timmreck, 441 U.S. at 783-85 (indicating heightened concern for protecting the
finality of pleas from collateral attacks).
308. Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528-29 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens
J., dissenting)).
309. Id.
310. A further concern was aptly expressed by the Superior Court of New Jersey when
that court stated, "it is especially obvious that it is literally impossible for a trial judge to
convey to an accused the panoply of disabling consequences emanating from a convic-
tion." State v. Bailey, 545 A.2d 206, 209 (N.J. Super. App. Ct. 1988).
311. See supra notes 308-309 and accompanying text.
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vacate pleas, but allowed flexibility when required in the interests of
fairness;"1 2 thus the court fulfilled the Timmreck policy goals without
establishing a rigid rule that may have limited legitimate grievances
from being addressed by the courts.
b. Means of Safeguarding Pleas.--In Yoswick, the Court of Ap-
peals deemed mandatory sentencing requirements to be direct conse-
quences of pleas.3" 3 In so doing, the court allowed for the possibility
of overturning pleas in situations where the court determines the sen-
tence to be "one where the court has no discretion on whether to
impose a particular or automatic sentence." ' 4 The court further
stated that a mandatory sentence must contain the necessary qualities
of a direct consequence: It must have definite, immediate, and largely
automatic consequences.3" 5 The court did not raise the issue of
whether an additional showing of prejudice would be necessary if the
sentence was defined as mandatory, 316 and therefore, this issue will
need to be addressed in future cases. The practical result of a preju-
dice requirement would be to further insulate pleas from being va-
cated. However, the policy goal in this instance would overwhelm the
original purpose of Maryland Rule 4-242-that the plea be voluntary
and knowing. To place the extra burden on defendants would pre-
vent a defendant, who truly would not have pleaded guilty had he
known of the mandatory nature of his sentence, from vacating his
plea unless he had empirical evidence beyond his own subjective in-
tent. Adding the prejudice requirement would, in effect, swallow rule
4-242 since demonstrating that the plea was either unknowing or in-
voluntary would, alone, not be sufficient.317
312. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 246-48, 700 A.2d at 260 (examining all of the relevant factors of
Yoswick's case to determine if he was prejudiced by ineffective counsel).
313. See id. at 242, 700 A.2d at 258 ("A mandatory minimum sentence is a direct conse-
quence of a guilty plea .
314. Id.
315. See id. at 243, 700 A.2d at 258 (refusing to recognize the 15-year restriction on
defendant's parole eligibility as a mandatory sentence because it did not change the nature
of parole eligibility to make it an "automatic, definite, and immediate consequence of
pleading guilty").
316. Other cases have required such an additional showing of prejudice when the sen-
tence is deemed mandatory in order to vacate a plea. See supra notes 263-269 and accom-
panying text.
317. See infra notes 320-325 accompanying text (discussing the differences between re-
quiring a showing of prejudice in the Strickland test for ineffective counsel and in the in-
stance where mandatory sentencing is not communicated and is a direct consequence of
the plea).
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c. Ineffective CounseL.-Yet another level of plea security was
introduced in the court's ineffective counsel analysis. Proof that
counsel gave erroneous advice was insufficient to vacate a plea.318 In-
stead, the defendant was required to provide additional evidence indi-
cating that the misinformation prejudiced his plea.319 Unlike when
the prejudice requirement is applied to knowledge of mandatory sen-
tencing,3 20 the application of the prejudice requirement to the inef-
fective counsel analysis does not run afoul of the underlying policy
goal of providing defendants with effective counsel. When a trial
judge examines the defendant to ensure that a plea is being given
knowingly and voluntarily, constitutional rights are attached, such as
the right to trial by jury32' and the right to confront one's accuser.322
Rule 2-424 encapsulates the process by which proper waiver of such
rights may be accomplished. 323 Because questioning of the defendant
by the trial judge is the forum where inquiry into waiver of constitu-
tional rights occurs, violation of the rule alone, without extrinsic evi-
dence to prove prejudice, should be grounds for overturning pleas.324
Conversely, the right to effective counsel is not a simple procedural
formula by which to ensure that the defendant understands his option
to plead or stand trial. This right, encompassed in the Sixth Amend-
ment,325 involves inspection of the myriad of decisions and communi-
cations that occur between a defendant and his counsel.
Furthermore, there is no formula by which to measure effective coun-
sel. It would be impractical to examine each move a counsel makes in
his or her defense plan, as the context of each decision is of vital im-
portance as well. Omission of seemingly relevant advice may make
perfect sense in the context of a particular case. For these reasons, it
is logical to require a showing of prejudice in determining if counsel's
errors were truly harmful to the defense.
318. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 246, 700 A.2d at 259 (assuming arguendo thatYoswick's counsel
provided him erroneous advice, but refusing to address the question of whether this consti-
tuted deficient performance because of Yoswick's failure to show he was prejudiced by the
misinformation).
319. Id. at 244, 700 A.2d at 259 ("Petitioner ... must prove . .. the deficient perform-
ance prejudiced the defense.").
320. See text accompanying supra notes 316-317 (noting the inconsistency of the policy
goals of Maryland Rule 4-242 with requiring prejudice to overturn unknowing and involun-
tary pleas).
321. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
322. Id. amend. VII.
323. See MD. RULE 2-424(c).
324. This assumes that the violation involves the omission of direct consequences. See
supra notes 235-237 (discussing the exclusion of collateral consequences from meeting the
"unknowing" and "involuntary" standard necessary to overturn pleas).
325. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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The argument that Yoswick's counsel was ineffective because she
had not informed him of the parole consequences of his plea was cor-
rectly analyzed under the Strickland test.32 6 Yoswick was unable to
demonstrate that there was a "substantial possibility" that but for his
counsel's error, he would not have plead guilty.327 The test developed
by the Maryland courts is an attempt to create an equitable test that
weighs plea stability against fair sentencing. In determining if the sen-
tence was fair, the court may examine the strength of the State's case
against the defendant.3 28 In doing so, the court will have the opportu-
nity to distinguish frivolous petitions for post-conviction relief from
instances in which a Petitioner has been truly prejudiced by ineffective
counsel. Thus, the prejudice prong of the Strickland test poses an-
other obstacle for a defendant who attempts to get a plea vacated, but
grants the court the ability to examine all the evidence in order to
assess whether that defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were
violated.
5. Conclusion.-The policy goals enumerated in Timmreck are
pervasive concerns that reach both state and federal courts. These
policy goals justify construction of certain barriers to ensure that valid,
informed pleas remain intact. These barriers are countered, however,
by concern for defendants' constitutional rights to informed pleas
and effective counsel. Both the ineffective counsel test and the collat-
eral versus direct consequences test attempt to balance the tension
that sometimes exists between the effective administration of criminal
justice on the one hand, and safeguarding the rights of defendants on
the other.
The Strickland test for determining if an error by a lawyer consti-
tutes ineffective counsel has been well settled since the Supreme
Court's analysis in Strickland. The test is a substantial obstacle for the
defendant to overcome since one must prove both that an error by
counsel occurred and that the error prejudiced the defense. How-
ever, the test allows the court to assess the fairness of the circum-
stances surrounding the petitioner's plea. Such an assessment
326. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring a defendant to
prove that counsel's performance was deficient, and that deficiency was prejudicial to the
defense).
327. See Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990) (requiring a defendant
to demonstrate a "substantial possibility" that a different outcome would have occurred in
order to prove prejudice).
328. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 247, 700 A.2d at 260 ("The potential strength of the State's case
is also relevant in determining whether a defendant would have insisted on going to trial."
(citing Ostrander v. Green, 46 F.3d 347, 356 (4th Cir. 1995))).
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preserves knowledgeable pleas, but leaves ample opportunity to over-
turn a plea if there has truly been a Sixth Amendment violation.
The direct/collateral consequences distinction, which dictates
the scope of the advice required to be given a defendant by the trial
court, is also well settled at both the state and federal level. It is a
practical outgrowth of the realization that every conceivable conse-
quence of a plea cannot be communicated to each and every defend-
ant. The requirement is logical but becomes strained in the cases
where an additional level of prejudice is required to vacate unknowing
and involuntary pleas when mandatory sentences are not communi-
cated. The Court of Appeals was not required to decide on whether
such a prejudice requirement would be necessary, as the sentence in
Yoswick was not mandatory. When the issue does arise, the balancing
of policy goals would best be reflected by an exclusion of the preju-
dice requirement from the analysis of whether to vacate a plea where





A. In Anticipation of Anticipatory Warrants: Maryland's Statutory
Barrier and the Meaning of the Court's Restraint
In Kostelec v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that Maryland's
search warrant statute, Article 27, section 551 (a),2 does not authorize
anticipatory search warrants that are conditioned upon future events.'
Both of Maryland's appellate courts agreed that section 551 (a) ante-
dates the modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that supports
the validity of anticipatory warrants.4 The Court of Special Appeals,
however, saw Kostelec v. State as an opportunity for Maryland to ap-
prove anticipatory warrants. 5 Accordingly, it read the statute in pari
materia with the Fourth Amendment, finding that section 551 (a) does
not prohibit anticipatory warrants. 6 The Court of Appeals, on the
other hand, reversed on the grounds that the statute's plain meaning
does not authorize anticipatory warrants. 7 In so doing, the Court of
Appeals exercised judicial restraint that implied the necessity of apply-
ing the existing statute, even though this statute does not address
modern search and seizure problems. By deciding only the legal is-
sue, the court tacitly, but clearly, referred the question of Maryland's
approval of anticipatory warrants to the legislature. Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals discussed, but declined to decide, whether evidence
wrongly seized under section 551 (a) can be suppressed.8 The court's
reasoning about the reach of section 551 (a) and its remedy suggests
that the law should be reconciled with modern jurisprudence.
1. The Case.--On April 5, 1995, Howard County police inter-
cepted a Federal Express package, searched it under warrant, and dis-
covered a large amount of liquid phencyclidine (PCP).' Upon
delivering the package, they arrested the person who accepted the
1. 348 Md. 230, 703 A.2d 160 (1997).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551(a) (1996).
3. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 231, 703 A.2d at 161.
4. Id. at 237, 703 A.2d at 163; Kostelec v. State, 112 Md. App. 656, 669-70, 685 A.2d
1222, 1229 (1996) (citing cases that compare the early jurisprudence upon which section
551(a) is based with modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence), revd, 348 Md. 230, 703
A.2d 160 (1997).
5. See Kostelec, 112 Md. App. at 662, 685 A.2d at 1225.
6. Id. at 668, 685 A.2d at 1228. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause . . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
7. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 237, 703 A.2d at 163.
8. Id. at 240-41, 703 A.2d at 165.
9. Kostelec, 112 Md. App. at 661, 685 A.2d at 1225.
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package, Randal Lucabaugh.1° Lucabaugh informed police that some
of the PCP was intended for a third party, Roarke Boulton." Lu-
cabaugh helped police contact Boulton and arrange delivery.12 When
undercover police officers telephoned Boulton, Boulton instructed
them to deliver the entire package.' 3 The delivery location's tele-
phone number and address were listed in the name of the petitioner,
Joseph Kostelec."4
A detective sought an anticipatory search warrant for Kostelec's
address and the persons inside. 5 The warrant application set forth
the following conditions:
Your affiant will only execute said warrant if the following
actions are observed at 5967 Rowanberry Drive [Kostelec's
address], within the next fifteen (15) days:
1. A member of the Howard County Police Department will
visit the residence at 5967 Rowanberry Drive and present the
package containing the [PCP] for delivery.
2. An individual within the residence accepts the package
containing the [PCP].
3. This individual is observed to carry the package contain-
ing the [PCP] into said residence after the delivery; and
4. Law enforcement officials conduct a constant surveillance
of the residence from the time of delivery until the time the
warrant is served.1
6
The search warrant was expressly conditioned upon future events.'
7
On the evening of April 5, 1995, police delivered the package and
Kostelec accepted it.'8 Within minutes, an electronic device alerted
police that the package had been opened. 9 They immediately made
a no-knock entry into Kostelec's residence and found both Kostelec
and Boulton with the package. One bottle of PCP had been re-
moved.2" In addition to the PCP, police seized paraphernalia
throughout the house including an aluminum can fashioned into a
10. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 233, 703 A.2d at 161. The package was addressed to Joey
Labaugh. Id. at 232, 703 A.2d at 161.





16. Id., 703 A.2d at 161-62 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original).
17. See id.
18. Id. at 234, 703 A.2d at 162.
19. Id. The police had placed an electronic device in the package to alert them when
the package was opened. Id.
20. Id. The package originally contained two large bottles of PCP. Id.
1999]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:604
pipe that contained traces of cocaine; another pipe containing traces
of cocaine; a pipe containing marijuana residue; and three large bot-
tes of parsley flakes, customarily used as a medium for smoking liquid
pCp. 21
Kostelec was convicted for drug offenses in the Circuit Court for
Howard County. 22 He immediately appealed, arguing, inter alia, that
the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
seized under the anticipatory search warrant. 23 The Court of Special
Appeals noted that the primary issue raised by this appeal-
"[w]hether Maryland will or should approve the issuance and use of
anticipatory search warrants"-had been anticipated for some time. 24
The court held, in accord with a great majority of courts from other
jurisdictions,2 5 that "anticipatory search warrants do not, as a matter
21. Id.
22. Kostelec v. State, 112 Md. App. 656, 659, 685 A.2d 1222, 1224 (1996), rev'd, 348 Md.
230, 703 A.2d 160 (1997). Kostelec was sentenced to "five years without parole, to certain
concurrent sentences, and to payment of a fine." Kostelec, 348 Md. at 235, 703 A.2d at 162.
23. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 231, 703 A.2d at 160-61. Kostelec also argued that the court
made several other errors: the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; the
court excluded an out-of-court statement made by an alleged accomplice as a statement
against penal interest; the court refused to permit evidence that he had never used PCP or
cocaine; and the court refused to ask a proposed voir dire question. Kostelec, 112 Md. App.
at 660, 685 A.2d at 1224.
24. Kostelec, 112 Md. App. at 662, 685 A.2d at 1225 (quoting State v. Lee, 93 Md. App.
408, 420, 613 A.2d 395, 401 (1992), afffd, 330 Md. 320, 624 A.2d 492 (1993)).
25. See id. at 664-65, 685 A.2d at 1226-27 (listing cases from otherjurisdictions that have
held that anticipatory search warrants "do not per se offend the Fourth Amendment"); see
also, e.g., United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that "the
simple fact that a warrant is 'anticipatory' . . . does not invalidate a warrant or make it
somehow suspect or legally disfavored"); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir.
1989) (stating that when there is evidence which tends to show "that delivery of contra-
band will, or is likely to, occur... there is sufficient probable cause to uphold the anticipa-
tory [search] warrant"); United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1197-98 (4th Cir. 1988)
(upholding the validity of an anticipatory search warrant on the grounds that contraband
was on a sure course to its destination); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1468 (9th Cir.
1986) (noting that an anticipatory search warrant is permissible when evidence is "on a
sure course to its destination"); State v. Cox, 522 P.2d 29, 34 (Ariz. 1974) (finding that "it is
reasonable to issue a warrant to be served at some time not unreasonably distant for a
crime, as here, that is in progress or it is reasonable to assume will be committed in the
near future"); People v. Sousa, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 270 (Ct. App. 1993) (justifying antici-
patory warrants as necessary for effective enforcement of narcotics laws, preferable to war-
rantless searches, and in accord with the aims of the exclusionary evidence rule); People v.
Favela, 681 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (explaining that "[b]y adopting much of
the language of Federal Rule 41(b), the legislature obviously intended to conform this
State's law to the federal law and permit the issuance of anticipatory search warrants");
Commonwealth v. Soares, 424 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Mass. 1981) (holding that "[n]either logic
nor the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement support a gen-
eral prohibition against the use of anticipatory warrants"); State v. Doyle, 336 N.W.2d 247,
252 (Minn. 1983) (suggesting that "conditional warrants are permissible upon a showing of
746
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of law, offend the Fourth Amendment."2 6 Furthermore, the court
held that such warrants do not violate Article 26 of Maryland's Decla-
ration of Rights, in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment.
27
The court then discussed Maryland's warrant statute,28 section
551 (a), which provides in pertinent part:
Whenever it be made to appear to any judge.., by written
application signed and sworn to by the applicant, accompa-
nied by an affidavit ... containing facts within the personal
knowledge of the affiant... that there is probable cause, the
basis of which shall be set forth in said affidavit... to believe
that any misdemeanor or felony is being committed by any
individual or in any building... or that any property subject
to seizure under the criminal laws of the State is situated or
located on the person of any such individual or in or on any
such building, . . . then the judge may forthwith issue a
search warrant .... 29
Kostelec contended that the statute required any evidence sought "be
situated in the place to be searched at the time the warrant is is-
sued."3 ° The court, however, rejected Kostelec's reading of the statute
as too narrow.3 1 According to the court, the statute's language was "at
best, ambiguous"3 2 because it "could also be read merely to require
probable cause"); State v. Stott, 503 N.W.2d 822, 829 (Neb. 1993) (holding that "search
warrants are not invalid merely because they are anticipatory in nature"); State v. Parent,
867 P.2d 1143, 1145 (Nev. 1994) (per curiam) (finding that "[a] nticipatory search warrants
are not unreasonable and are therefore permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution"); State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1101-02 (N.H. 1995) (endors-
ing the First Circuit's logic that anticipatory warrants do not per se violate the Fourth
Amendment); People v. Glen, 282 N.E.2d 614, 615 (N.Y. 1972) (ruling that "[n]either the
Constitution nor relevant sections of the former Code of Criminal Procedure forbid issu-
ance of a search warrant in advance of the imminent or scheduled receipt of seizable prop-
erty by the person or at the premises designated in the warrant"); Commonwealth v.
DiGiovanni, 630 A.2d 42, 45-46 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (following "the lead of the great
majority of federal and state cases and approv[ing] the efficacy of anticipatory warrants");
State v. Sachs, 216 S.E.2d 501, 514 n.12 (S.C. 1975) (discussing in dicta that federal case
law does not support the contention that "probable cause cannot exist when delivery is to
be in futuro"); State v. Engel, 465 N.W.2d 787, 789 (S.D. 1991) (concluding on the clear
weight of authority that "an anticipatory search warrant based on a controlled delivery of
contraband to occur in the near future is not unconstitutional per se"); State v. Coker, 746
S.W.2d 167, 172 (Tenn. 1987) (observing that "[t] here is respectable authority that antici-
patory search warrants do not violate the Fourth Amendment").
26. Kostelec, 112 Md. App. at 668, 685 A.2d at 1228.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551(a) (1996).
30. Kostelec, 112 Md. App. at 664, 685 A.2d at 1226.
31. Id. at 669, 685 A.2d at 1229.
32. Id.
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that probable cause be present at the time the warrant is executed.""3
Instead of a literal reading of the words, the court considered their
"meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose
of the enactment.31 4 The court found "[n]othing in the legislative
history of § 551(a) [to] support [Kostelec's] narrow reading of the
statute."" Accordingly, the court construed section 551(a) in pari
materia with the Fourth Amendment to hold that anticipatory search
warrants do not violate Maryland's search warrant statute.36
In reaching this decision, the Court of Special Appeals focused
on the legislative intent of section 551(a)." The court cited one au-
thority showing that section 551 (a) is in par materia with the Fourth
Amendment on the question of probable cause," but quoted a differ-
ent case, In re Special Investigation No. 228,"9 which stated that the stat-
ute and the Federal Constitution "are totally divergent remedies in
that they serve different purposes ... overlap [ping] minimally as they
touch probable cause."4" Furthermore, the court, in a parenthetical,
noted another Maryland case for the proposition that "§ 551 (a) is not
an exclusionary rule, [and] in many ways § 551 (a) is not inpari materia
with the Fourth Amendment."41 In sum, the court reasoned that sec-
tion 551 (a) differs from the Fourth Amendment in intention and ef-
fect, but not on the question of probable cause.4 2
The Court of Special Appeals then ruled that the other issues
raised by the petitioner's appeal did not constitute error:43 the affida-
vit supplied probable cause for the warrant;44 the evidence was suffi-
cient;45 there was no statement against penal interest;46 lack of prior
33. Id.
34. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672,
659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 669-70, 685 A.2d at 1229.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Andresen v. State, 24 Md. App. 128, 169, 331 A.2d 78, 104, cert. granted in
part by 423 U.S. 822 (1975), affd, 427 U.S. 463 (1976)).
39. 54 Md. App. 149, 458 A.2d 820 (1983).
40. Id. at 176-77, 458 A.2d at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted in Kostelec,
112 Md. App. at 670, 685 A.2d at 1229.
41. Kostelec, 112 Md. App. at 670, 685 A.2d at 1229 (discussing the implications of Anne
Arundel County v. Chu, 69 Md. App. 523, 528, 518 A.2d 733, 735 (1987) (distinguishing the
statutory property right and its remedy of return of evidence wrongly taken from the con-
stitutional right and remedy of exclusion of improper evidence from trial), af'd, 311 Md.
673, 680-81, 537 A.2d 250, 253-54 (1988)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 671-78, 685 A.2d at 1230-33.
44. Id. at 673, 685 A.2d at 1231.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 675, 685 A.2d at 1232.
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involvement with drugs was not relevant; 47 and a requested voir dire
question was properly omitted.48 Therefore, the court affirmed the
petitioner's conviction.49
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review only the follow-
ing issue: "Whether an anticipatory search warrant, issued on the ba-
sis of an affidavit which lacked probable cause that a crime was being
committed at the time of issuance. .. is constitutional and in compli-
ance with Article 27, Section 551(a)."5 °
2. Legal Background.-In the sixty years since Maryland enacted
section 551(a), 5 the law governing search and seizure has changed
fundamentally. Section 551(a) emerged from early jurisprudence
that protected citizen's property rights by restricting the scope of goods
that the police could take as evidence.52 In contrast, modern Fourth
Amendmentjurisprudence guarantees privacy rights by prohibiting un-
constitutional search and seizure.53 Because the principles underlying
early and modern jurisprudence are distinctly different, they author-
ize search and seizure of different scope, provide for different reme-
dies, and, in particular, diverge on the question whether a recent law
enforcement tool-the anticipatory warrant-is valid.54
a. Early Search and Seizure Jurisprudence and Property Rights.-
Maryland's warrant statute belongs to a long historical tradition in ju-
risprudence.55 The statute's roots in early search and seizure jurispru-
47. Id. at 676, 685 A.2d at 1232.
48. Id. at 677, 685 A.2d at 1233.
49. Id. at 660, 685 A.2d at 1225.
50. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 235, 703 A.2d at 163.
51. Id. at 237, 703 A.2d at 163 (stating that the relevant language of section 551(a)
dates back to Chapter 749 of the Acts of 1939).
52. See id. (stating that section 551 (a)'s enactment antedates Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 310 (1967), which abolished the "mere evidence rule" according to which the
State could only seize fruits and instrumentalities of crime and contraband); see infta Part
2.a and accompanying text (discussing early search and seizure jurisprudence in the con-
text of property rights).
53. See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning behind re-
cent developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
54. See infra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
55. In a Court of Special Appeals opinion, In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md.
App. 149, 458 A.2d 820 (1983), Judge Moylan presented a valuable and insightful history
and analysis of search and seizure jurisprudence, distinguishing section 551 (a) from
Fourth Amendment law. Id. at 156-65, 458 A.2d 820, 824-28. Other Maryland decisions
have also contributed to the understanding of this statute in historical context. See Chu v.
Anne Arundel County, 311 Md. 673, 676, 573 A.2d 250, 251 (1996) (reviewing "the history
of exclusionary rules at the federal level and in Maryland"); Howell v. State, 60 Md. App.
463, 465, 483 A.2d 780, 780 (1984) (distinguishing section 551 (a) from the exclusionary
rule); see also supra note 41 (discussing the distinction between the exclusionary rule rem-
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dence trace back to the theoretical grounds of liberal democracy in
the political philosophy of John Locke (1632-1704).56 Locke pro-
posed that the end of government was to secure the property of the
citizens: "The great and chief end.., of Mens uniting into Common-
wealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation
of their Property."'57 Following Locke, the American founders made the
preservation of property a central purpose of the new republic. 58 In
the Federalist Papers, Madison writes, "[g] overnment is instituted no
less for protection of the property than of the persons of individu-
als."59 In accordance with this tenet, the common law not only of Eng-
land, but also of Maryland, restricted the state's right to take as
evidence only those things in which it showed a superior property
right.6
0
This property principle informed the "mere evidence rule,'
which restricted the state's power of search and seizure to fruits of
crime, instrumentalities of crime, and contraband, and denied the
state any right to "mere evidence" of crime.62 The state had a supe-
rior property right in the former, but not in the latter.6" This theory
shaped early search and seizure jurisprudence including section
551 (a).64 The "mere evidence rule" was clearly articulated in Gouled v.
United States,65 which held that warrants:
may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search
and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or
the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in
the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of
the police power renders possession of the property by the
accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken.6 6
edy to Fourth Amendment violations and the return of property remedy under common
law).
56. See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 124 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press (1960) (1689)).
57. Id.
58. See THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 339 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge 1961).
59. Id.
60. In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. at 170, 458 A.2d at 831 (noting the
consequences of "the common law of England and of Maryland recogniz[ing] the search
warrant for stolen goods, but no other search warrant").
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. Id. (citations omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 172, 458 A.2d at 832.
65. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
66. Id. at 309 (citation omitted).
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The Supreme Court abolished the "mere evidence rule" as constitu-
tionally required in 1967 in Warden v. Hayden.67 The Hayden Court
analyzed the source of the old rule in repudiating it:
historically the right to search for and seize property de-
pended upon the assertion by the Government of a valid
claim of superior interest, and.., it was not enough that the
purpose of the search and seizure was to obtain evidence to
use in apprehending and convicting criminals. The com-
mon law of search and seizure after Entick v. Carrington, 19
How. St. Tr. 1029, reflected Lord Camden's view, derived no
doubt from the political thought of his time, that the 'great
end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property.'68
The Hayden Court, with recourse to the principles of the Fourth
Amendment, extended the state's right to the search and seizure of
evidence.6" The Court reasoned that "if [the mere evidence rule's]
rejection does enlarge the area of permissible searches, the intrusions
are nevertheless made after fulfilling the . . . requirements of the
Fourth Amendment and after the intervention of a 'neutral and de-
tached magistrate. "'70
b. Modern Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: Balancing Privacy
Rights and Law Enforcement's Needs. -Modern Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence has expanded citizens' rights against government intrusion
not by securing private property, as Maryland's warrant statute did,
but primarily by protecting privacy.71 The Supreme Court's decision
in Hayden based modern search and seizure law on privacy rights.
7 2
With the development of citizens' rights, the state also gained a new
power to seize evidence in order to prosecute and convict criminals.
7 3
In sum, "Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has sought to balance in-
dividual privacy interests against law enforcement interests.
67. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
68. Id. at 303.
69. Id. at 304 ("We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amend-
ment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded
fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts.").
70. Id. at 309 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
71. See id. at 304 (reasoning that "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the
protection of privacy rather than property.").
72. Id. at 310.
73. Id. at 306. The Court observed that "it is reasonable, within the terms of the Fourth
Amendment, to conduct otherwise permissible searches for the purpose of obtaining evi-
dence which would aid in apprehending and convicting criminals." Id.
74. David P. Mitchell, Anticipatory Search Warrants: The Supreme Court's Opportunity to
Reexamine the Framework of the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1387, 1389 (1991) (sug-
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In addition to mere property rights, the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects the liberty of citizens from undue interference by the state. v5
This formed the rationale for the Court's warrant requirement for
searches and seizures established in Johnson v. United States.76 The
Court added further protection by making the constitutional exclu-
sionary rule applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,77 and by ruling
warrantless searches per se unreasonable in Katz v. United States.78
While creating these constitutional safeguards, courts have also
recognized the legitimate needs of law enforcement to conduct
searches in circumstances that make it difficult to comply with the
warrant rule.79 They have established numerous exceptions to the
warrant requirement and to the exclusionary rule.8" One such excep-
tion is the anticipatory warrant, which the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit ruled served the interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment.
8 1
Many modern courts have ruled that anticipatory warrants com-
ply with the Fourth Amendment on the grounds they do not offend
the Reasonableness Clause and they satisfy the Warrant Clause.82
Modern courts have recognized that anticipatory warrants meet con-
gesting that an equilibrium between privacy rights and law enforcement needs should be
sought).
75. SeeJohnson, 333 U.S. at 14 ("The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is
also a grave concern . . . to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and
freedom from surveillance.").
76. 330 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The Court announced the newly established warrant rule:
"When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id.
77. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
78. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (establishing that "searches conducted outside the judi-
cial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions" (citations omitted)).
79. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (observ-
ing that "[e]ven before today's decision, the 'warrant requirement' had become so riddled
with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable" and noting that law enforcement does
not have to comply with the warrant requirement in "'searches incident to arrest.., auto-
mobile searches ... border searches... administrative searches of regulated businesses...
exigent circumstances... search [es] incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to
arrest.., boat boarding for document checks... welfare searches... inventory searches
... airport searches ... school search [es]'" (quoting Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the
Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1473-74 (1985))).
80. Id. (remarking on the more than twenty exceptions to the warrant requirement).
81. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir. 1989). The court found that
"the purposes of the fourth amendment are best served by permitting government agents
to obtain warrants in advance if they can show probable cause to believe that the contra-
band will be located on the premises at the time that search takes place." Id.
82. See supra note 25 (listing federal and state court opinions upholding the validity of
anticipatory warrants).
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temporary law enforcement needs; in particular, they address current
problems such as narcotics and child pornography.s3 As the answer to
the problems of the day, anticipatory warrants represent an innova-
tion too recent to have been considered by early judicial opinions.
Nevertheless, State v. Guthrie, a case decided in 1897,84 provides a rare
example of an early opinion that illustrates how "mere evidence"juris-
prudence might reason about prospective warrants. In a case about
the need to execute warrants promptly, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine in Guthrie commented upon prospective warrants:
[i] t is suggested that the prosecution often needs to obtain
search warrants in advance, in order to have them in readi-
ness to seize the liquors at the moment of deposit before
they can be concealed; that such a procedure is very effica-
cious, and even essential, to circumvent the cunning of li-
quor sellers; and that the rule here evolved will nullify it. If
such a practice obtains, it should be nullified. 5
The Guthrie court justified this position on the grounds that "[n] o
prosecution can be lawfully begun, no criminal process lawfully is-
sued, before the offense is committed." 6 While suggesting the kind
of due process concerns that came to prevail after incorporation, in
fact this rationale exemplifies the early understanding that the issu-
ance of a search warrant marks the instigation of prosecution or
"criminal process."8" By contrast, in the modem view, search warrants
are an investigative tool: modem courts regard search warrants as a
governmental intrusion into citizens' privacy that may be reasonable
when used to meet contemporary law enforcement needs.88
Early jurisprudence's view of prospective warrants must be ex-
plained not only by the notion that warrants initiate prosecution, but
also by the restricted scope of search and seizure within the theoreti-
cal framework of the "mere evidence" rule. By restricting the state's
power of seizure to only the fruits of crime, instrumentalities of crime,
and contraband, the "mere evidence" rule rendered investigative
83. See People v. Sousa, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 270 (Ct. App. 1993) ("Such warrants
recognize that police often must move quickly, 'especially when dealing with the furtive
and transitory activities of persons who traffic in narcotics. .. .'" (citation omitted)); in the
context of child pornography distribution, see also United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8,
10 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing that "[a]nticipatory search warrants are peculiar to property
in transit").
84. 38 A. 368 (Me. 1897).
85. Id. at 369-70.
86. Id. at 370.
87. Id.
88. See supra Part 2.b text (discussing modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as the
balancing of privacy rights and law enforcement needs).
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searches unsupportable. In practice, most searches are now investiga-
tive, involving forensic evidence such as fingerprints, DNA, ballistics,
gunshot primer residue, blood spatter analysis, and controlled dan-
gerous substances, whereas early search and seizure law targeted pri-
marily stolen property.89  Modern search warrants facilitate
investigative searches without reference to the legal status of the ob-
jects of the warrant."0
c. Maryland's Section 551(a): Scope and Sanctions.-Mary-
land's search and seizure statute, now designated section 551 (a), was
originally adopted in 1939.1 It provides in pertinent part:
Whenever it may be made to appear to any judge ...by
written application signed and sworn to by the applicant, ac-
companied by an affidavit... containing facts within the per-
sonal knowledge of the affiant . . . that there is probable
cause, the basis of which shall be set forth in said affidavit...
to believe that any misdemeanor or felony is being commit-
ted by any individual or in any building, apartment, prem-
ises, place or thing within the territorial jurisdiction of such
judge, or that any property subject to seizure under the crim-
inal laws of the State is situated or located on the person of
any such individual or in or on any such building, apart-
ment, premises, place or thing, then the judge may forthwith
issue a search warrant directed to any duly constituted po-
liceman . . .authorizing him to search such suspected indi-
vidual, building, apartment, premises, place or thing, and to
seize any property found liable to seizure under the criminal
laws of this State, provided that any such search warrant shall
name or describe, with reasonable particularity, the individ-
ual, building, apartment, premises, place or thing to be
searched, the grounds for such search and the name of the
applicant on whose written application as aforesaid the war-
rant was issued ..... 9
89. See In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. 149, 170, 548 A.2d 820, 831
(1983) (explaining that "the common law of England and of Maryland recognized the
search warrant for stolen goods, but no other search warrant").
90. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (declaring that "[n]othing in the
language of the Fourth Amendment supports the distinction between 'mere evidence' and
instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or contraband").
91. In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. at 159, 159 n.3, 458 A.2d at 825, 825
n.3. The original statute, Chapter 749 of the Acts of 1939, was later designated as Article
27, section 259A. Id.
92. Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551(a) (1996).
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The present statute provides sanctions for violations of its terms.93 If
the property taken is not that described in the warrant, if there is no
probable cause for believing the grounds on which the warrant was
issued, or if more than fifteen calendar days pass between the issuance
of the warrant and the seizure of the property, "the judge must cause
it to be restored to the person from whom it was taken."94 The sole
sanction, the return of wrongly taken property, is meant not to protect
constitutional rights, but to preempt an action in replevin.
95
Section 551(a) has never authorized the exclusion of evidence
seized in violation of its provisions.96 In fact, Maryland has never had
an exclusionary rule for serious or violent crimes. 7 A limited exclu-
sionary rule enacted in 1929, the Bouse Act, applied only to certain
misdemeanors, primarily bootlegging and gambling.9" The Bouse Act
was repealed in 1973." 9 In 1958, legislators proposed a statutory
amendment providing for the exclusion of evidence obtained in
searches violating either section 551 (a) or the Fourth Amendment.100
This exclusionary rule-proposed even before the Supreme Court
made the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule binding on the states
in Mapp v. Ohiol'l-never passed. 10 2 Even if the sanction of section
551 (a) were imposed, "the quashing of the warrant did not operate to
exclude the evidence, if the State had had the prescience to make
copies or photographs of it or had sufficient recollection to testify
about it from memory."108
d. Anticipatory Search Warrants in Light of the Fourth Amend-
ment.-Three states have held anticipatory search warrants are barred
by the plain language of their statute. Neither of the three courts
93. Id.
94. Id. The legislature added the third provision, requiring that the warrant be exe-
cuted within fifteen days of issue, in Chapter 81 of the Acts of 1950. In re Special Investiga-
tion No. 228, 54 Md. App. at 162, 458 A.2d at 827.
95. In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. at 164, 458 A.2d at 827-28.
96. Id. at 160, 164, 458 A.2d at 825, 828; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551(a).
97. In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. at 159-60, 458 A.2d at 825.
98. Id. at 160, 458 A.2d at 825.
99. Id., 458 A.2d at 826. At the time that section 551 (a) was enacted, the lack of an
exclusionary rule effectively made warrants unnecessary for the investigation of serious
crimes. Id., 458 A.2d at 825-26.
100. Id. at 163, 458 A.2d at 827.
101. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
102. In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. at 163, 458 A.2d at 827; see also Howell
v. State, 60 Md. App. 463, 469, 483 A.2d 780, 782 (1984) (observing that "[t]he sanction of
exclusion for a violation of § 551 has, therefore, not only never been adopted; it has been
affirmatively rejected").
103. In re Special Investigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. at 161, 458 A.2d at 826.
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ruled formally on the constitutionality of anticipatory warrants under
the Fourth Amendment. Rather, their decisions were strictly confined
to the reading of their statutes.
In State v. Gillespie,1"4 the Iowa Supreme Court construed the
search warrant statute, Iowa Code, section 808.3.105 The court held
that, because probable cause for the search warrant rested on three
conditions that "were not established facts at the time the search war-
rant was issued ... the search warrant was invalid. '1 0 6 While the lower
court, reversed by Gillespie, remarked that the statute's language did
not contemplate that the conditions constituting probable cause
might be met in the future, it construed the statute on the grounds
that its language was ambiguous on this point.1" 7 Accordingly, the
lower court read the statute in conformity with the common law and
ruled that the anticipatory warrant was valid.1"8 The Iowa Supreme
Court stated that the statute was not ambiguous; that ambiguities, if
they did exist, should be resolved in favor of the defendant; and that
no right to issue search warrants existed at common law.1 09 The Gilles-
pie court, therefore, concluded that "the plain meaning of these stat-
utes is that probable cause must exist at the time the warrant is issued
and not at some future time when the warrant is executed."'11
In People v. Poirez,"' the Supreme Court of Colorado heard an
interlocutory appeal by the prosecution." 2  The trial court had
granted a motion to suppress evidence upon a finding that "an antici-
patory warrant is not valid in Colorado."11 The higher court affirmed
that motion for suppression, but held only that "the language of sec-
tion 16-3-303, 8A C.R.S. (1986), creates a barrier to the issuance of
anticipatory warrants by judicial officers."' 14 The statute contained a
requirement that the object of the search warrant had to be present at
104. 530 N.W.2d 446 (Iowa 1995).
105. Id. at 448.
106. Id. at 449.
107. Id. at 448-49.
108. Id. at 449.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 448.
111. 904 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1995) (en banc).
112. Id. at 880.
113. Id. at 881.
114. Id. at 883. The Iowa Statute reads in pertinent part:
(1) A search warrant shall issue only on ... facts sufficient to: (c) [e]stablish the
grounds for issuance of the warrant or probable cause to believe that such
grounds exist; and ... (d) [e]stablish probable cause to believe that the property
to be searched for, seized, or inspected is located at, in, or upon the premises,
person, place, or thing to be searched....
IOWA CODE § 16-3-303(1) (b),(d) (1992).
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the designated location at the time of issue.1 15 In Ex parte Oswalt,1 16
the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals's
broad ruling that "anticipatory search warrants are valid in Ala-
bama."1 17 In dicta, the court broached Fourth Amendment questions
in a preface, proclaiming that "we recognize, along with an over-
whelming number ofjurisdictions, that an anticipatory search warrant
is not per se unconstitutional.""' The court's holding, however, was
quite narrow: "The specific anticipatory search warrant at issue in this
case was not authorized by existing Alabama law.""' 9 The court noted
the State's arguments that anticipatory warrants are permitted be-
cause not expressly prohibited by Alabama law,12 ° and that the court
should follow the trend of federal courts that permit such warrants
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.121 The court, however,
confined its decision to the plain language of Rule 3.8 of the Alabama
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 122 and section 15-5-2 of the Alabama
Code,' 23 which required that the objects to be seized under a search
warrant be evidence of a crime that had already occurred.1 24 Rather
than bend the rule, the court read it as it was written.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Kostelec, the Court of Appeals held
that section 551 (a) does not authorize search warrants when the sup-
porting affidavit shows that the evidence to be seized is not currently
115. Poirez, 904 P.2d at 883.
116. 686 So. 2d 368 (Ala. 1996) (per curiam).
117. Id. at 372. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that "anticipatory search
warrants do not violate the protections against unreasonable searches and seizures con-
tained in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Alabama Con-
stitution of 1901, Art. I, § 5 . . . [and] such warrants are valid under Alabama law
controlling the issuance of search warrants." Id. at 369.
118. Id. at 369-70 (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 370.
120. Id. at 372.
121. Id.
122. Rule 3.8(3) reads in pertinent part:
A search warrant authorized by this rule may be issued if there is probable cause
to believe that the property sought .. . (3) [i]s in the possession of any person
with intent to use it as a means of committing a criminal offense, or is in the
possession of another to whom he may have delivered it for the purpose of con-
cealing it or preventing its discovery.
ALA. R. CRiM. P. 3.8(3) (1996).
123. Section 15-5-2(3) reads in pertinent part:
A search warrant may be issued on any one of the following grounds: . . . (3)
[w] here it is in the possession of any person with the intent to use it as a means of
committing a public offense or in the possession of another to whom he may have
delivered it for the purpose of concealing it or preventing its discovery.
ALA. CODE § 15-5-2(3) (1996).
124. Oswalt, 686 So. 2d at 373.
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on the premises to be searched.125 Though it granted certiorari to
consider whether anticipatory search warrants are "constitutional and
in compliance with Article 27, Section 551(a),"" 2 6 the court based its
decision on the construction of section 551 (a) alone, explaining that
it would not decide any constitutional question unless the record com-
pelled it to do so. 1 2 7 In the first part of the decision, the court con-
strued the language of section 551 (a), explained its legislative intent,
and concluded that it does not authorize anticipatory search war-
rants. 121 Second, the court explained that it would not decide the
issue of the proper remedy for a violation of section 551 (a) since that
issue was not raised in a timely way.' 29
The court's analysis focused on the use of the present tense in the
sentence of section 551 (a) that describes the requirement to show
probable cause to obtain a warrant. 30 It construed the statute's lan-
guage to mean that, at the time the judge is asked to rule, the crime
"is being committed" and that the property "is situated or located" on
the described premises.131 In so doing, the court reversed the Court
of Special Appeals's holding that section 551 (a) requires only that
probable cause be present at the time the warrant is issued, but that
the evidence of crime may not be present until the time the warrant is
executed.1
2
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals adopted the premise of the
Court of Special Appeals-that the legislative intent in framing sec-
tion 551 (a) was never to address the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.1 33 Moreover, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the
125. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 236, 240, 703 A.2d at 163, 165.
126. Id. at 235, 703 A.2d at 163 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Court
of Appeals's order granting certiorari).
127. Id. at 236, 703 A.2d at 163.
128. Id. at 236-40, 703 A.2d at 163-65.
129. Id. at 240-43, 703 A.2d at 165-66. The court noted that the parties had neither
argued the suppression issue to the courts below, nor raised it in a cross-petition for certio-
rari. Id. at 231-32, 703 A.2d at 161. Consequently, the court allowed that, in Kostelec's
case, the motion to suppress should be granted. Id. at 232, 703 A.2d at 161; see also id. at
242-43, 703 A.2d at 166 (concluding that "[i]nasmuch as § 551(a) was violated and there
has been no previous challenge . .. to suppression as the remedy.., the motion to sup-
press should be granted under the unique procedural history of this case").
130. Id. at 236, 703 A.2d at 163. The court stated that "[t]he time to which the present
tense of these verbs in § 551 (a) refers is the time when the warrant is sought." Id.
131. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551 (a)
(1996).
132. Id. at 235-36, 703 A.2d at 162-63.
133. Id. at 241-42, 703 A.2d at 165-66. Both courts look to In re Special Investigation No.
228, 54 Md. App. 149, 176-77, 685 A.2d 820, 834-35 (1983), which stated that "the federal
Exclusionary Rule and the Maryland statute .. .are totally divergent remedies ......
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language of section 551 (a) was written in 1939, concluding that the
"incompatibility" of this statute's language with anticipatory warrants
is explained by the simple fact that it was written "long before antici-
patory warrants came into use."13 4 Instead, the language of section
551 (a) belongs to the era of the "mere evidence rule," which was abol-
ished by the Supreme Court in Hayden in 1967."5
For an explanation of how section 551 (a) could function in the
face of the new jurisprudence announced in Hayden, the court refers
to a decision of the Court of Special Appeals, Salmon v. State.136 In
Salmon, ChiefJudge Murphy wrote that section 551 (a) "authorizes...
a search of persons, places or things, as reasonably particularized in the
warrant, for specifically designated property, unlawfully obtained or
held, or of evidence of the commission of the crime, now including
items relating thereto which are purely evidentiary in nature. 13 v
Thus, whereas the state had been prohibited from seizing things in
which the state could not show a superior property right prior to
Salmon, the law now recognizes the public interest in permitting the
seizure of material having evidentiary value in criminal
prosecution. 138
Because the court was not reviewing the constitutionality of antic-
ipatory search warrants, it disregarded the State's long list of federal
circuit and state cases upholding such warrants on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds. 139 The court turned instead to three cases included as
exceptions.140 Decisions in Alabama, Colorado, and Iowa all con-
strued the plain meaning of warrant statutes analogous to Maryland's
section 551 (a) as requiring that the evidence be presently in the pos-
session of the person whose premises are to be searched. 41 Following
134. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 237, 703 A.2d at 163.
135. Id.; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967).
136. 2 Md. App. 513, 235 A.2d 758 (1967).
137. Id. at 519, 235 A.2d at 761.
138. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of an exclusionary
remedy in the language of section 551(a)).
139. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 238, 703 A.2d at 164.
140. Id. The court found these cases to be more closely related to the issue under re-
view. Id.
141. Id. at 238-40, 164-65; seeEx Parte Oswalt, 686 So. 2d 368, 370, 373 (Ala. 1996) (per
curiam) (construing an Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure authorizing search warrants
as requiring the evidence to be " 'presently in the possession'" of the person whose prem-
ises are to be searched); People v. Poirez, 904 P.2d 880, 883 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (hold-
ing that the state's statutory language precluded authorization of anticipatory search
warrants); State v. Gillespie, 530 N.W.2d 446, 448-49 (Iowa 1995) (holding that "probable
cause must exist at the time the warrant is issued" and therefore barring search warrants).
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the reasoning in those decisions, the court held that section 551(a)
did not authorize the disputed search warrant. 142
Next, the court explained its reason for declining to decide
whether the proper remedy for a violation of section 551 (a) was sup-
pression of the evidence. 14 3 The State argued that section 551(a)
does not include an exclusionary rule so that a violation of the statute
that does not violate the Fourth Amendment should not result in evi-
dence suppression. 14 4 However, the court ruled that the suppression
issue had been introduced too late to receive consideration, as it had
neither been argued in the lower courts nor raised in a cross-petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 14
5
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals commented that the lower
court distinguished section 551 (a) from the Fourth Amendment and
provided authority to show that section 551 (a) is not an exclusionary
rule. 14 6 The court, however, pointed out the "unique procedural his-
tory" of the instant case: 147 Both the petitioner and the State had as-
sumed that, if the warrant were found to violate section 551 (a), the
remedy would be suppression. 148 For this reason, in this instance, the
court granted Kostelec's motion for suppression, while declining to
rule on the proper remedy for violation of the statute generally.1 4
4. Analysis.-
a. Judicial Restraint and the Problem of Maryland's Statutory Bar-
rier to Anticipatory Search Warrants.--The Kostelec opinion, a model of
judicial restraint, sends a clear message: state legislators-not
courts-must decide the permissibility of anticipatory search warrants
in Maryland. The terse ruling of the Court of Appeals says only "that
142. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 240, 703 A.2d at 165.
143. Id. at 24041, 703 A.2d at 165.
144. Id. The State relied on In re SpecialInvestigation No. 228, 54 Md. App. 149, 163, 458
A.2d 820, 827 (1983), which stated that the exclusionary rule would not apply to a violation
of section 551 (a). Id.; see also Howell v. State, 60 Md. App. 463, 469, 483 A.2d 780, 782
(1984) (rejecting an exclusionary remedy for violations of section 551 (a)).
145. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 231-32, 703 A.2d at 161. The State's only argument in the cir-
cuit court was that the warrant was issued in good faith and, therefore, suppression should
not be permitted under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). Kostelec, 348 Md. at
241, 703 A.2d at 165.
146. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 24142, 703 A.2d at 165-66 (citing Anne Arundel County v. Chu,
69 Md. App. 523, 528, 518 A.2d 733, 735 (1987)).
147. Id. at 243, 703 A.2d at 166.
148. Id.
149. Id. The court ordered that the conviction be vacated and the case be remanded for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
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§ 551 (a) does not authorize anticipatory search warrants. '' 15 0 In re-
versing the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals displayed
judicial restraint in a manner which the lower court had not.
The Kostelec case raised a basic question: Are anticipatory war-
rants permissible in Maryland?' 5 ' The Court of Special Appeals ex-
plicitly addressed this question.152 In contrast, the Court of Appeals
declined to answer this fundamental question, but instead confined
itself solely to the question whether an anticipatory search warrant is
"in compliance with Article 27, Section 551 (a).""' The Court of Ap-
peals does not deny the lower court's observation that the case raised
a fundamental question, but the court's reserve implies that this is not
a question for courts to answer. It is properly a question for the
legislature.
While the two courts reached opposite results, they shared the
same premise. The lower court held that "search warrants, merely be-
cause they are anticipatory, do not violate § 551 (a) as a matter of
law."' 154 In contrast, the higher court held "that § 551 (a) does not
authorize anticipatory search warrants."'11 5 Yet both courts recognized
that the statute neither prohibits nor authorizes these warrants for the
same reason-it predates modern Fourth Amendment law and, there-
fore, simply does not address the issue of anticipatory warrants.
56
Given this premise, the Court of Special Appeals found the statute
ambiguous and open to interpretation in light of legislative intent
before reading it in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment. 157 The
Court of Appeals, on the other hand, observed judicial restraint in
reading the plain meaning of the statute. 158
The Court of Appeals also demonstrated judicial restraint in its
refusal to rule on the issue of exclusion. While it emphatically de-
clined to decide the issue because it has not been timely raised,' 59 the
court did devote half the opinion to explaining the issues surrounding
the question of remedy.' 6 ' The Court of Appeals identified the
150. Id. at 231, 703 A.2d at 161.
151. See id. at 235, 703 A.2d at 163; Kostelec, 112 Md. App. at 662, 685 A.2d at 1225.
152. See Kostelec, 112 Md. App. at 662, 685 A.2d at 1225.
153. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 235, 703 A.2d at 163. The Court formally posed the question of
whether anticipatory warrants are constitutional, but declined to take it up because the
record did not compel it. I& at 236, 703 A.2d at 163.
154. Kostelec, 112 Md. App. at 670, 685 A.2d at 1229.
155. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 231, 703 A.2d at 161.
156. Id. at 237, 703 A.2d at 163; see supra note 133 and accompanying text.
157. Kostelec, 112 Md. App. at 669, 685 A.2d at 1229.
158. See Kostelec, 348 Md. at 236, 703 A.2d at 163.




strongest authorities for the position that exclusion is unavailable
under section 551(a) .161 However, because the State had not raised
this issue, the court did not decide it. 162 The Court of Appeals consist-
ently exhibited judicial restraint by refusing to do the work of the leg-
islature. Likewise, the court declined to do the work of the
prosecutor, granting Kostelec's motion for suppression in the absence
of timely opposition: "[i]nasmuch as § 551 (a) was violated and there
has been no previous challenge to Kostelec's assertion of a right to
suppression as the remedy for that violation, the motion to suppress
should be granted under the unique procedural history of this
case."
' 163
b. Judicial Restraint as a Call for Legislative Action. -In exercis-
ing judicial restraint, the Court of Appeals focused solely on how sec-
tion 551 (a) should be read.' 64 Thus, it did not consider the long line
of federal circuit court and state cases holding that anticipatory war-
rants do not violate the Fourth Amendment.1 65 Instead, the court
turned immediately to the decisions of three states in which statutes
analogous to section 551 (a) have been construed to reach the same
result. 166 It is illuminative to ask how and why these three states ruled
as they did in order to interpret the similar decision in Kostelec. The
comparison with Kostelec provides support for the view that courts
faced with outdated search and seizure statutes should observe judi-
cial restraint in applying the statutes, with the expectation that the
permissibility of anticipatory warrants will be determined by their state
legislatures through deliberate revision of the law.
161. See id. at 240, 703 A.2d at 165. The State took the position that "§ 551(a) does not
embody an exclusionary rule." Id.; see supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing
authorities that have held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to a violation of section
551(a)).
162. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 24243, 703 A.2d at 166.
163. Id. at 243, 703 A.2d at 166 (citation omitted).
164. See id. at 236-37, 703 A.2d at 163.
165. Id. at 238, 703 A.2d at 164 (referring to, but neither citing nor discussing, cases
from "ten federal circuit courts of appeal and from numerous state courts" cited by the
State that conclude that anticipatory search warrants are constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment); see supra note 25 (providing federal and state court decisions upholding
anticipatory warrants).
166. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 238-40, 703 A.2d at 164-65; see Ex parte Oswalt, 686 So. 2d 368,
370 (Ala. 1996) (per curiam) ("[T]he specific anticipatory search warrant at issue in this
case was not authorized by existing Alabama law."); People v. Poirez, 904 P.2d 880, 883
(Colo. 1995) (en banc) ("[T]he language of section 16-3-303, 8A C.R.S. (1986), creates a
barrier to the issuance of anticipatory warrants by judicial officers."); State v. Gillespie, 530
N.W.2d 446, 449 (Iowa 1995) (holding that because the disputed warrant's conditions
"were not established facts at the time the search warrant was issued ... [it] was invalid").
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These Alabama, Colorado, and Iowa cases can be compared to
the Kostelec decision on three main points: first, all three courts exer-
cised judicial restraint, as Maryland did, to apply the statutes liter-
ally;' 67 second, Colorado and Alabama acted, as Maryland did, on the
express premise that their warrant statutes predate Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence; 6 ' and third, none of the three states heard the
argument that suppression is unavailable to remedy statutory viola-
tions, and, in contrast to the Maryland opinion, none identified sup-
pression as an issue. 6 '
c. Interpreting Statutes That Antedate Modern Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence.--Colorado and Alabama acknowledged that their war-
rant statutes antedated the modern Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence to which anticipatory warrants belongl70 a premise
subsequently accepted in Maryland. 17 1 The Colorado court based its
reading of its warrant statute on the fact that the statute had been
bypassed by modern Fourth Amendment law through adoption of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.172 The court looked to Rule
41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17  which was
amended in 1990 to permit anticipatory search warrants.' 74 The 1990
advisory committee note explained the revision:
167. See Oswalt, 686 So. 2d at 373 (reasoning on the basis of plain language interpreta-
tion of legislative intent); Gillespie, 530 N.W.2d at 448-49 (same); Poirez, 904 P.2d at 882-83
(same).
168. See Poirez, 904 P.2d at 882-83 (comparing the language of Colorado's warrant stat-
ute to similar language that was deleted from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (a) in
order "to make way for anticipatory warrants"); Oswalt, 686 So. 2d at 373-74 (recom-
mending that Alabama's Rules Advisory Committee "redraft Rule 3.8 to permit the broader
issuance of anticipatory search warrants than the [r]ule currently allows").
169. See Oswalt, 686 So. 2d at 368; Poirez, 904 P.2d at 880; Gillespie, 530 N.W.2d at 446.
170. See Oswalt, 686 So. 2d at 373-74 (pointing out that "although anticipatory search
warrants may be constitutional," the original intent of Alabama's warrant statute did not
recognize their permissibility); Poirez, 904 P.2d at 883 (observing that Colorado's statute
contains language identical to FED. R. CpiM. P. 41(a) before that rule was modernized).
171. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 237, 703 A.2d at 163 (recognizing that "[t]he incompatibility of
the language of § 551(a) with anticipatory warrants is explained by the fact that the lan-
guage under consideration formed part of the statute's original enactment... long before
anticipatory warrants came into use").
172. Poirez, 904 P.2d at 882-83.
173. See FED. R. C~iM. P. 41(a) (1998). The rule provides:
Upon the request of a federal law enforcement officer . . . , a search warrant
authorized by this rule may be issued ... for a search of property or for a person
within the district and.., for a search of property or for a person either within or
outside the district if the property or person is within the district when the war-
rant is sought but might move outside the district before the warrant is executed.
Id.
174. Poirez, 904 P.2d at 883.
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"Rule 41 (a) (1) permits anticipatory warrants by omitting the
words 'is located,' which in the past required that in all in-
stances the object of the search had to be located within the
district at the time the warrant was issued. Now a search for
property or a person within the district, or expected to be
within the district, is valid if it otherwise complies with the
rule."1
7 5
The Colorado court noted that its own statute retained the outdated
language barring the authorization of anticipatory search warrants. 176
The court's own explanation strongly suggests that Colorado's statute
should be revised in the same way that the federal rules have been:
We cannot overlook the direction charted by the amendment to Fed.
R. Crim. P. 41. Language identical in pertinent part to our
statute was deleted so as to make way for anticipatory war-
rants because such language was viewed as requiring prob-
able cause to believe the object of the search was located at
the place to be searched contemporaneous with issuance. 177
Moreover, by supporting its holding with an analysis of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court implied that the state rules
should be made to conform to the modern jurisprudence accepting
anticipatory warrants.17 1
The Alabama Supreme Court asserted even more clearly that the
old rules and statutes that impede modern search and seizure juris-
prudence should be revised to permit anticipatory warrants. 179 The
Alabama court found "no indication of an intent when Rule 3.8 was
adopted to expand the grounds for granting a search warrant beyond
those that were provided for in § 15-5-2 and its ancient predeces-
sors." ' Hence, the court observed restraint by applying an outdated
law instead of making it comply with the times. According to the
court:
although anticipatory search warrants may be constitutional,
those which fail to comply with the requirements adopted by
this Court in Rule 3.8 are currently impermissible in Ala-
bama. However, because we believe it would be in the best interest of
the citizens of this State, we recommend that the Criminal Rules Ad-
175. Id. (quoting FED. R. CiuM. P. 41(a) Advisory Committee's Note (1990)).
176. Id.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Id.
179. Ex parte Oswalt, 686 So. 2d 368, 374 (Ala. 1996) (per curiam).
180. Id. at 373.
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visory Committee redraft Rule 3.8 to permit the broader issuance of
anticipatory search warrants than the Rule currently allows.
181
The Alabama court's restraint represented a call to the legislature's
rules committee to take action.'82 The court analyzed Rule 41(a) in
order to support its reading of the present tense language of the
state's rule and statute.1
83
d. Anticipating Statutory Reform of Search and Seizure Law.-
The clear message of the Kostelec decision was recognized by Maryland
State Delegates Rosenberg and Genn who, in February 1998, intro-
duced Maryland House Bill 706, which proposed the repeal and reen-
actment with amendments of Article 27, section 551.184 While the bill
failed in the judiciary committee, the failure does not represent a con-
clusive judgment on anticipatory warrants because the proposed bill
also included a provision for oral warrants. 185 The proposal for antici-
patory warrants will likely find greater success if reviewed on its own
merits.
The Maryland initiative on anticipatory warrants accorded with
the intention of Kostelec, and followed the direction of the Colorado
and Alabama decisions. Alabama has already changed its rules to per-
mit anticipatory warrants and the legislature is reading a bill to revise
the relevant statute.' 86 Other states in which statutory change author-
181. Id. at 374.
182. See id. This call echoed the Illinois Supreme Court's suggestion to the legislature in
People v. Ross, 659 N.E.2d 1319, 1321-22 (Ill. 1995). In Ross, the court invited the legislature
to rewrite the existing statute to recognize anticipatory search warrants. Ross, 659 N.E.2d at
1321-22; see also People v. Ross, 642 N.E.2d 914, 917-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that
anticipatory warrants are impermissible under Illinois's statute, but that "[i]f Illinois wishes
to overcome this limitation and join those jurisdictions presently benefitting from the use
of anticipatory search warrants, the remedy must come from legislative modification of the
existing statutory scheme[; w]e strongly suggest that the legislature review section 108.3 to
determine if amendment is appropriate").
183. See Oswal 686 So. 2d at 374.
184. Md. H.B. 706, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1998). The bill proposed to add the following fu-
ture-tense language to the warrant requirement of probable cause: "there is probable
cause ... to believe that any misdemeanor or felony is being committed or will be committed
... or that any property subject to seizure under the criminal laws of the State is situated or
located or will be situated or located." Id.
185. Id.
186. See ALA. R. CRiM. P. 3.8 (1998) (amended 1997). Amendments to the Alabama
Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.8 permitting anticipatory search warrants were adopted by
the Alabama Legislature and became effective December 1, 1997. Id. Subsequently, 1998
Alabama Senate Bill No. 150 was introduced to revise the corresponding statute. S.B. 150,
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998).
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izing anticipatory warrants has been proposed in the past year include
Hawaii187 and Rhode Island.18 8
Anticipatory warrants have met the needs of law enforcement pri-
marily in the effort to control problems posed by the trade in drugs
and in child pornography. 189 Increasingly, circumstances occur in
which anticipatory warrants prove indispensable. For example, for po-
lice stings in which undercover agents are sent into drug trafficking
operations in anticipation of making arrests, anticipatory warrants are
the most effective law enforcement tool.1 9° Furthermore, anticipatory
warrants allow police to preserve easily destroyed evidence by entering
the suspect's premises without seeking consent.1 91 Narcotics can be
disposed of by being flushed down the toilet or poured down the
drain; likewise, child pornography on computers or disks can be
erased by the push of a button or the brush of a magnet. Finally, the
only way to curtail child pornography that is sent and received over
the Internet instead of being delivered to the home by mail or courier
may be an anticipatory warrant.
Legal scholars have pointed out that anticipatory warrants ensure
greater protection of privacy by providing judicial oversight of police
searches.19 2 Without anticipatory warrants police will have to conduct
warrantless searches, rely on exceptions to the warrant requirement,
187. See S.B. 2710, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997) (amended 1998). 1997 Hawaii
Senate Bill No. 2710 reads in pertinent part:
The legislature recognizes the tremendous importance and utility of anticipatory
search warrants in drug investigations .... The legislature finds that the Hawaii
supreme court has held that anticipatory search warrants are impermissible under
section 803-31, Hawaii Revised Statutes .... The legislature further finds that the
court stated that it was "incumbent upon the legislature to amend HRS Section
803-31 to provide a legal basis" for anticipatory search warrants.
Accordingly, the purpose of this Act is statutorily to authorize the issuance of
anticipatory search warrants.
Id.
188. See S.B. 2844, 1997-98 Leg. Sess. (R.I. 1998). 1997 Rhode Island Senate Bill No.
2844 proposed revision of the existing warrant statute to provide for anticipatory warrants
and telephonic application for search warrants and anticipatory warrants. Id.
189. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing decisions involving drug traf-
ficking and child pornography in which anticipatory warrants have been upheld).
190. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (repudiating the "murder scene
exception" for warrantless search in the absence of exigency when police searched the
suspects' premises after an undercover police agent was killed in a shootout with drug
traffickers).
191. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-72 (1966) (upholding the exception
to the warrant rule for searches necessary and reasonable to preserve evidence under the
totality of the circumstances).
192. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
362 (3d ed. 1996).
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and risk exclusion of the evidence at trial. 193 In so doing, law enforce-
ment bears the burden of showing that the warrantless search was ne-
cessitated by exigency and justified by the totality of the
circumstances.1 94 For the police officers on the streets, therefore, the
court's view of a particular search remains unpredictable. Moreover,
as Judge Kearse has argued convincingly, even if a warrantless search
meets muster as exigent, the expedient of exigent circumstances re-
mains constitutionally problematic.195 According to Kearse, the Mac-
Donald court's decision to permit warrantless searches for exigency on
the totality of the circumstances defeats the Fourth Amendment in
two ways. 196 It both renders probable cause tantamount to exigency
and encourages police to contrive exigency in order to circumvent the
Fourth Amendment.
9 7
Vice's infinite variety makes it difficult to generalize about how
law enforcement should proceed while anticipatory warrants remain
unavailable. In the Kostelec case, however, it is clear that a warrantless
search could not have been justified as exigent.1 98 In contrast to the
police drug raid in MacDonald, in Kostelec, police did not peaceably
announce themselves before entering the Kostelec residence. 9 9
Under the facts of Kostelec, police without an anticipatory warrant
would have been forced to follow a circuitous path and to invoke yet
another warrant clause exception. Instead of seeking to charge sus-
pects with distribution or possession of narcotics, police could have
pursued conspiracy charges. 20 ' To seize evidence, police would have
had to rely not on search warrants, but on arrest warrants, and expect
193. SeeJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (establishing the per se warrant
rule for searches).
194. See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (1970) (en banc) (establishing
six factors relevant to determining the existence of an exigency); see also United States v.
MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769-70 (2d Cir. 1990) (adopting and applying the Dorman fac-
tors to a warrantless search). The Dorman factors include the gravity of the offense, a rea-
sonable belief that the suspect is armed, a clear showing of probable cause, a strong reason
to believe that the suspect is present on the premises, likelihood of escape, and peaceful
circumstances of entry. Dorman, 435 F.2d at 392-93.
195. MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 777 (Kearse, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[a]fter this deci-
sion there appears to be little left of the warrant requirement in narcotics cases").
196. Id. at 776-77.
197. Id. For example, police may do this by the pretext of identifying and announcing
themselves before breaking in. Id.
198. See Kostelec, 348 Md. at 232-34, 703 A.2d at 161-62.
199. Id. at 234, 703 A.2d at 162; MacDonald, 916 F.2d at 768.
200. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 286 (1996). Conspiracy carries the same maximum
penalties as the actual crime. For narcotics offenses, the same sentencing guidelines apply
to conspiracy crimes as well. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 38 (1996).
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to search incident to arrest.20 1 An arrest on conspiracy charges could
then lead to further charges of possession and intent to distribute.
This course recalls the old Polonius who would "[b]y indirections find
directions out.
202
e. Judicial Acceptance of the Constitutionality of Anticipatory War-
rants.-The question of the constitutionality of anticipatory warrants,
easily decided by the Court of Special Appeals, 20 3 was not reached by
the Court of Appeals in Kostelec.2°4 The strongest indication that an-
ticipatory warrants are constitutionally valid comes from the Supreme
Court itself. Although the Court has not formally ruled on anticipa-
tory warrants in any opinion, Congress has revised Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41 (a) to permit anticipatory warrants.20 5 More-
over, a growing number of federal and state courts have decided that
anticipatory search warrants are valid.20 6
Congress's revision of Rule 41 (a) strongly suggests that anticipa-
tory warrants are constitutionally valid. Prior to the change, the rule
stated that a search warrant may be issued by a judicial officer "within
the district wherein the property or person sought is located."20 7 The
revised Rule 41 (a) omits the words "is located," to permit anticipatory
search warrants that otherwise comply with the rule.208
Numerous federal and state courts have justified anticipatory war-
rants on the grounds that anticipatory search warrants comply with
the Fourth Amendment as reasonable or that they are preferable to
warranless searches.20 9 In United States v. Gendron,21° Chief Judge
Breyer, formerly of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
201. See Draper v. U.S., 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (concluding that a search made inci-
dent to a lawful arrest was valid).
202. WILLIAM SHAKEsPEARE, HAMLET, act 2, sc. 1.
203. Kostelec, 112 Md. App. at 668, 685 A.2d at 1228.
204. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 236, 703 A.2d at 163.
205. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text (quoting the notes of the 1990
Rules Advisory Committee explaining the change in Rule 41 (a) and the effect of permit-
ting anticipatory search warrants).
206. See supra note 25 (cataloging federal and state court decisions upholding the consti-
tutionality of anticipatory search warrants).
207. See People v. Poirez, 904 P.2d 880, 882 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (quoting FED. R.
CruM P. 41(a) (1976)).
208. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 41 (a).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) ("There is noth-
ing unreasonable about authorizing a search for tomorrow, not today.... ."); United States
v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he purposes of the fourth amendment are
best served by permitting government agents to obtain warrants in advance . ).
210. 18 F.3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994).
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Circuit, defined the basic reason for the constitutional validity of an-
ticipatory search warrants:
[i] n principle, the use of a "triggering event" can help assure
that the search takes place only when justified by "probable
cause"; and anticipatory warrants may thereby offer greater,
not lesser, protection against unreasonable invasion of a citi-
211zen's privacy.
Chief Judge Breyer explained that anticipatory warrants satisfy
the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment:
[w]arrants often do specify that they will take effect upon
issuance. But the Constitution imposes no such require-
ment. Rather, it says that a search must not be "unreasona-
ble," and that warrants must be supported by "probable
cause." U.S. Const. amend. IV. There is nothing unreasona-
ble about authorizing a search for tomorrow, not today,
when reliable information indicates that, say, the marijuana
will reach the house, not now, but then. Nor does it seem
automatically unreasonable to tie the warrant's search au-
thority to the future event that brings with it the probable
cause .... 212
The court in United States v. Garcia213 defended the constitutional-
ity of anticipatory warrants on the grounds that they are preferable to
warrantless searches:
[t]he question . . . is whether the objective of the fourth
amendment is better served by allowing an agent to obtain a
warrant in advance of delivery, or whether it is better served
by forcing him to go to the scene without a warrant, and, if
necessary, proceed under the constraints of the "exigent cir-
cumstances" exception, subject always to the risk of "being
second-guessed" by judicial authorities at a later date as to
whether the known facts legally justified the search.21 4
Furthermore, the Garcia court argued that anticipatory searches pro-
tect Fourth Amendment rights: "[a]nticipatory warrants are not un-
constitutional per se, and in the proper circumstances, may be an
effective tool, both to fight criminal activity, and to protect individual
fourth amendment rights."21 5 Courts, therefore, have upheld antici-
211. Id. at 965.
212. Id.
213. 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1989).




patory warrants under the Fourth Amendment both as reasonable and
as offering the supervision of a judicial officer.
5. Conclusion.-The Kostelec decision places Maryland in antici-
pation of anticipatory warrants. Maryland's statutory barrier to antici-
patory warrants remains until the legislature-not the court-
removes it. The court held that section 551 (a) does not authorize
such warrants. 216 In so doing, the court recognized that in fifty years
since the statute's enactment, modem search and seizure jurispru-
dence has recast search and seizure law. Nevertheless, the court duly
applied the statute in a tacit call for the legislature to consider
whether Maryland will approve anticipatory warrants.117  Further-
more, the court declined to decide whether suppression is a remedy
for a violation of this statute. 21 8 The Kostelec court's judicial restraint
in applying section 551 (a) suggests that it has not reserved judgment
on the appropriateness of revising Maryland law to permit anticipa-
tory warrants.
M. AHMAD A. BAIG*
B. Prosecutorial Discretion and Mandatory Minimum Sentences
In Beverly v. State,219 the Court of Appeals correctly held that a
trial court is not compelled to invoke a mandatory minimum sentence
pursuant to a subsequent offender statute221 where the defendant is a
subsequent offender, but the State had agreed in a plea-bargain not to
treat the crime as a subsequent offense. 22 ' The court reached this
216. Kostelec, 348 Md. at 231, 703 A.2d at 161.
217. See id. at 236-37, 703 A.2d at 163.
218. Id. at 240-41, 703 A.2d at 165.
* The author wishes to acknowledge suggestions and contributions of Professors
Richard Boldt, Alan Hornstein, and Jerome Deise. In addition, Alan Woods, Chief of the
Research and Development Division of the State's Attorney's Office for Baltimore City,
gave the benefit of his experience and insight.
219. 349 Md. 106, 707 A.2d 91 (1998).
220. The criminal statute at issue in this case provided in pertinent part:
A person who is convicted under subsection (b) (1) or subsection (b) (2) of this
section [concerning distribution and possession of controlled substances], or of
conspiracy to violate subsection (b) (1) or (b) (2) of this section shall be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for not less than 10 years if the person previously has
been convicted: (i) Under subsection (b) (1) or subsection (b) (2) of this section;
(ii) Of conspiracy to violate subsection (b) (1) or subsection (b) (2) of this section;
or (iii) Of an offense under the laws of another state, the District of Columbia, or
the United States that would be a violation of subsection (b) (1) or subsection
(b) (2) of this section if committed in this State.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(c)(1) (1996).
221. Beverly, 349 Md. at 126-27, 707 A.2d at 101.
(VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
holding by deferring to a prosecutor's discretion under Maryland
Rule 4-245(c),222 which, on the court's reading, allows the prosecutor
not to treat the defendant's crime as a subsequent offense either by
not giving the defendant notice of the State's intent to use his prior
convictions to invoke the mandatory minimum sentence, or by with-
drawing this notice after it has been given. 221 In so doing, the court
followed well-established case law, which supports broad discretion for
the State's Attorney to decide which cases to prosecute.224 The court
also considered the withdrawal of notice as a special form of plea bar-
gaining known as charge bargaining, which the trial judge has no au-
thority to reject.225 The dissent argued that such a practice
"thwart[s]" the legislature's intent to punish repeat drug offenders
more severely.226 If the General Assembly wanted to prevent the prac-
tice of plea bargaining "around" mandatory minimum penalties, how-
ever, it could pass a statute limiting prosecutorial discretion; indeed, a
model for such a statute already exists in Kansas, which has limited the
ability of prosecutors to plea-bargain in repeat offender drunk-driving
cases.227 Thus, because the practice of plea bargaining "around"
mandatory minimum sentences need not undermine the legislature's
intent to punish repeat drug offenders more seriously than first time
offenders, the court correctly decided that the prosecutor has the dis-
cretion to decide which cases to prosecute.
1. The Case.-Victor Tyrone Beverly was charged under Article
27, section 286, with twelve counts of drug-related offenses, including
possession of dangerous controlled substances with intent to dis-
tribute.228 Beverly had previously violated and been convicted under
the same criminal statutory provisions.229 Subsection (c) of section
286 provides that, "A person who is convicted under subsection (b) (1)
or subsection (b) (2) of this section... shall be sentenced to imprison-
ment for not less than 10 years if the person previously has been con-
victed: (i) Under subsection (b) (1) or subsection (b) (2) of this
222. MD. RULE 4-245(c). For the text of this Rule, see infra note 13.
223. Beverly, 349 Md. at 126-27, 707 A.2d at 101.
224. Id. at 121, 707 A.2d at 98 (citing Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 296, 114 A.2d 66, 71
(1955); Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 90, 40 A.2d 319, 321 (1944)).
225. Id. at 127, 707 A.2d at 101.
226. Id. at 130, 707 A.2d at 102-03 (WilnerJ., dissenting).
227. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1567(n) (1991) (prohibiting plea bargaining in repeat of-
fender drunk-driving cases); State v. Compton, 664 P.2d 1370, 1376-79 (Kan. 1983) (up-
holding, under a separation of powers challenge, the constitutionality of this statute).




section .... "230 Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-245, which sets forth the
procedural requirements for invoking enhanced penalties, the State
notified Beverly of its decision to invoke the mandatory penalty au-
thorized by section 286(c). 23 1
Before trial, the State and the defendant reached a plea agree-
ment in which the State offered a sentencing cap of ten years with the
possibility of parole.23 2 That is, the State was offering to withdraw its
subsequent offender notice in exchange for Beverly's guilty plea.233
As a result of this plea agreement, both the State's Attorney and Bev-
erly expected his sentence to be less than the mandatory minimum
sentence that the State originally sought under section 286(c).2 3 4
Before accepting this agreement, the trial court judge looked to
the language of section 286(c) to determine if she had the authority
to sentence the defendant to less than the mandatory minimum.2 3 5
The trial judge found no language in the statute that referred to plea
bargaining or that permitted a sentence of less than ten years without
parole under the circumstances of this case.2 36 The trial judge con-
cluded that section 286(c) required that a ten-year sentence be im-
posed and that she had no authority to sentence the defendant to a
lesser punishment than what the statute required.23 7
230. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(c) (1996). Subsection (c) also imposes a ten-year
mandatory minimum penalty for those who are convicted of conspiracy to violate subsec-
tion (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2). Id
231. Beverly, 349 Md. at 111, 707 A.2d at 93. Maryland Rule 4-245 states in pertinent
part:
(c) Required notice of mandatory penalties. When the law prescribes a mandatory
sentence because of a specified previous conviction, the State's attorney shall
serve a notice of the alleged prior conviction on the defendant or counsel at least
15 days before sentencing in circuit court or five days before sentencing in Dis-
trict Court. If the State's Attorney fails to give timely notice, the court shall post-
pone sentencing at least 15 days unless the defendant waives the notice
requirement.
MD. RULE 4-245(c).
232. Beverly, 349 Md. at 111, 707 A.2d at 93.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 111-12, 707 A.2d 93-94.
236. Id. Section 286(c) (2) provides a limited exception to the mandatory ten-year pen-
alty by stating that "the person may be paroled during [the ten year] period only in accord-
ance with Article 31B, § 11 of the Code." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(c) (2) (1996). This
limited exception applies to inmates who are serving their sentence at the Patuxent Institu-
tion, which houses inmates with an "intellectual impairment or emotional unbalance." See
MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 11 (1997) (discussing conditions of release from the Patuxent
Institution). Subsection 286(c)(2) also states that "[t]he prison sentence of... a second
offender may not be suspended to less than 10 years." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(c) (2).
237. Beverly, 349 Md. at 112-14, 707 A.2d at 93-95.
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The prosecution then directed the judge's attention to Maryland
Rule 4-245, hoping that it would provide some guidance. 238 The
judge read Maryland Rule 4-245 in the context of the mandatory pen-
alties required in section 286(c) and concluded that the Rule requires
a postponement of the sentencing hearing for fifteen days if the de-
fendant has not been notified of his status as a repeat offender.239
Finding no authority in Maryland Rule 4-245 to sentence the defend-
ant to less than the mandatory sentence prescribed by section 286(c),
the trial judge became convinced that the statute commanded her to
hand down the prescribed sentence.24 °
After failing to persuade the trial judge through examination of
the statute and the rule that the State could waive the mandatory min-
imum sentence, the State's Attorney pointed out that withdrawing the
notice of mandatory penalties was a common practice. 241 The court
rejected this argument, stating that the legislature's intent in enacting
section 286(c) was "to facilitate the imposition of mandatory
sentences." 242 Furthermore, the statute and the rule offered no sug-
gestion that the court had the discretion to decide whether or not to
impose the mandatory sentence.243 As a result, the trial judge re-
jected the plea agreement.244
Because the plea agreement was not approved, the defendant de-
cided to plead not guilty and proceeded to trial.2 45 The jury returned
a guilty verdict on all counts, and the State invoked the ten-year
mandatory penalty prescribed by section 286(c). The court subse-
quently sentenced Beverly to fifteen years in prison, ten of those years
to be served without parole. Although Beverly renewed his objection
at the sentencing hearing to the trial court's refusal to allow the prose-
cutor to withdraw the subsequent offender notice, the trial court reaf-
firmed its position that it was required to impose the mandatory
246sentence.
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, all parties agreed that
they had indeed reached a pretrial plea-bargain in which the State
agreed to withdraw its notice to seek mandatory penalties. 247 Before
238. Id. at 112, 707 A.2d at 94.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 112-14, 707 A.2d at 94-95.
241. Id. at 113, 707 A.2d at 94.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 114, 707 A.2d at 94.
244. Id., 707 A.2d at 95.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 116, 707 A.2d at 96.
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this court heard the appeal, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari
on its own motion to hear the case.248
2. Legal Background.-
a. History of Prosecutorial Discretion in Maryland.-In Mary-
land, the decision whether a prosecutor will pursue a plea agreement
with a defendant has been largely a matter of prosecutorial discre-
tion. 24 9 The Court of Appeals recognized this discretionary function
of the prosecutor in Brack v. Wells. 25 ° In this case, the appellant,
Brack, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. 2 1 Brack claimed that a
party who previously brought a lawsuit against him held a signed as-
surance that, if the case were not successful, then that party would not
be required to pay any legal fees.25 2 In addition, Brack asserted that
this lawsuit was instituted in an attempt to defraud him of money and
property.253 He claimed that these practices violated a statute prohib-
iting barratry. 5 4 The petitioner repeatedly had presented his allega-
tions to the State's Attorney for Baltimore City, who refused to
institute criminal charges against the party who had sued Brack. 255
Arguing that this refusal to prosecute violated the prosecutor's oath of
office and his duty to uphold justice in the State, Brack sought a writ
of mandamus to compel the State's Attorney to enforce the statute. 256
248. Id.
249. Maryland is not alone in its support for prosecutorial discretion. The District of
Columbia has followed similar reasoning in addressing the prosecutor's discretion to insti-
tute a criminal action and the limited authority given to courts to check that discretionary
function. See United States v. White, 689 A.2d 535, 538 (D.C. 1997) (pointing out that
normally "the judiciary is without authority to question and review the Executive Branch in
the exercise of its discretion in deciding whether or not to prosecute a particular case");
Wood v. United States, 622 A.2d 67, 70 (D.C. 1993) (suggesting that the judiciary is ill-
suited to question the broad discretion possessed by the prosecutor to bring a criminal
action because factors such as "the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deter-
rence value, the [g]overnment's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the
[g]overnment's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis
the courts are competent to undertake" (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in
original) (quoting Fedorov v. United States, 600 A.2d 370, 376 (D.C. 1991) (en banc))).
250. 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944).
251. Id. at 88, 40 A.2d at 320. Brack sought the writ of mandamus to order the State's
Attorney to present evidence of barratry in a previous case in which he had been a litigant
to the grand jury of Baltimore City. Id at 89, 40 A.2d at 320.
252. Id. at 88-89, 40 A.2d at 320.
253. Id. at 89, 40 A.2d at 320.
254. Id at 88-89, 40 A.2d at 320 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 14, 15 (1939)). Sec-
tion 14 defined barratry as the situation in which someone "having no existing relationship
or interest in the issue ... solicits another to sue."
255. Brack, 184 Md. at 89, 40 A.2d at 320.
256. Id. at 88-89, 40 A.2d at 320.
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The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, finding that, as a gen-
eral rule, the prosecutor's decision whether to pursue a particular
case "is a matter which rests in [the State's Attorney's] discretion."257
The court stated that a writ of mandamus will not be granted unless
the prosecutor grossly abuses his discretion, or a statute imposes a
duty to prosecute. 2 " The court based this rule on the duty imposed
on the State's Attorney by the Constitution of Maryland, which pro-
vided that "the State's Attorney shall perform such duties as may by
law be prescribed."259 The court also examined a statutory provision
requiring the prosecutor to "prosecute and defend, on the part of the
State, all cases in which the State may be interested." 26 ° In light of
these provisions, the court concluded that a prosecutor "must be
trusted with broad official discretion to institute and prosecute crimi-
nal causes.
261
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland fol-
lowed Brack in interpreting Maryland state law in Sellner v. Panagou-
lis.2 6 2 Sellner was a retired police officer who conducted a freelance
investigation of an unsolved murder in the county where he served on
the police force.2 63 During the course of his investigation, Sellner be-
came convinced that he had identified the prime suspect in connec-
tion with the murder.264 The petitioner presented his findings to the
State's Attorney, but claimed that the prosecutor chose not to prose-
cute the case because the prosecutor was part of a wider conspiracy to
cover up the murder.2 65 Sellner claimed that the State's Attorney's
decision not to pursue the case was a denial of his right to the
courts. 2 "6 Following Brack, the district court held that in Maryland
there is "no such duty [to aid a grand jury in its consideration of evi-
dence presented by an individual] in cases in which the State's Attor-
257. Id. at 90, 40 A.2d at 321.
258. Id.
259. Id For the current version of the constitutional provision at issue in Brack, see MD.
CONST. art. V, § 9.
260. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 33 (1939)).
The section referred to by the court in Brack is now located in a different part of the Code.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 34 (1998).
261. Brack, 184 Md. at 90, 40 A.2d at 321.
262. 565 F. Supp. 238 (D. Md. 1982), affd, 796 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1986) (mem.).
263. Id. at 241.
264. Id.
265. Id. Sellner alleged that the murderer was the son of the former police chief for the
county in which he served on the police force; that the police chief removed his son from
the state prior to the filing of charges; and that several key investigators took part in the
cover up, including the State's Attorney to whom Sellner presented his evidence. Id.
266. Id. at 249. Sellner claimed that this denial violated his federally protected rights by
an official acting under color of law. Id. at 249-51 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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ney has determined, in the exercise of his prosecutorial discretion,
not to pursue allegations of criminal wrongdoing." '267 The decision
not to prosecute the case, or assist Sellner in presenting evidence to a
grand jury, did not violate his constitutional right of access to the
courts because this decision was within the State's Attorney's
discretion. 2 68
Maryland courts also have recognized the breadth of
prosecutorial discretion in a line of cases in which alleged discrimina-
tory prosecution resulted in harsher penalties for some criminal of-
fenders than others committing the substantially same act. For
example, in Purohit v. State,269 the owner of an adult video store was
charged with violating state obscenity laws after an undercover police
officer purchased a video from the defendant's store. Prior to trial,
the State filed a motion in limine to determine the validity of the de-
fendant's discriminatory prosecution defense. 271 At the pretrial hear-
ing on this motion, the defendant offered evidence that other adult
video stores were distributing the same type of material, but were not
prosecuted.272 On appeal, the issue was whether or not discrimina-
tory prosecution was a defense for the jury to consider.273 The court
again recognized that the State's Attorney's decision to proceed with a
criminal prosecution is "replete with broad discretion. '274 In deciding
that discriminatory prosecution is a matter for the trial judge to con-
sider, the court noted that the exercise of some selectivity in prosecu-
tion does not violate the right of equal protection unless the selectivity
is both deliberate and based on a prohibited classification, such as
race.275 Because the court found that the decision to prosecute in this
267. See id. at 251 (noting further that Maryland State's Attorneys are vested "with broad
official discretion to institute and prosecute criminal causes" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 90, 40 A.2d 319, 321 (1944))).
268. Id.
269. 99 Md. App. 566, 638 A.2d 1206 (1994).
270. Id, at 569-70, 638 A.2d at 1207-08.
271. Id. at 570, 638 A.2d at 1208. The trial court recognized the defense of discrimina-
tory prosecution as an allegation of a "defect in the institution of the prosecution," which,
under Rule 4-252, must be made in a mandatory pretrial motion. Id. at 570, 638 A.2d at
1208; see also MD. RULE 4-252(a) (1), (b) (noting that such a motion must be raised within
30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defend-
ant before the court, or else the motion is waived absent a showing of good cause).
Although the defendant failed to file a timely motion to dismiss, the trial court entertained
the motion on a "good cause" basis. See Purohit, 99 Md. App. at 570, 638 A.2d at 1208.
272. Purohit, 99 Md. App. at 570-71, 638 A.2d at 1208.
273. Id at 577, 638 A.2d at 1211.
274. Id (citing Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975)).
275. Id. at 578, 638 A.2d at 1212 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
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case was not based on any "arbitrary or invidious criteria," it rejected
the defendant's allegation of discriminatory prosecution.
2 76
b. Advantages of Plea Agreements.-In general, plea bargain-
ing has been accepted as an effective way of accomplishing the goals
of this country's criminal justice system.2 77 The Supreme Court has
even gone so far as to say that plea bargaining is an "essential compo-
nent of the administration ofjustice. '278 Because an estimated ninety
percent of felony convictions are the result of guilty pleas, plea bar-
gaining significantly helps courts administer their caseloads. 279
Plea bargaining not only aids with the administration of justice,
but also benefits the parties involved in the case. Plea bargaining re-
lieves a criminal defendant who has little hope of gaining an acquittal
from the burden of enduring a trial on the merits. 28 ° In addition,
plea bargaining allows the defendant to begin serving his sentence
immediately, and his cooperation with prosecutors helps reduce the
defendant's possibility of receiving a longer sentence.
28 1
Plea bargaining serves to implement a number of the purposes of
criminal punishment.28 2 First, plea bargaining serves the rehabilita-
tive aspect of criminal punishment.283 Because plea agreements re-
quire the defendant to plead guilty, guilty defendants are forced to
recognize that their conduct was wrong and to accept responsibil-
ity.284 This act of repentance is a vital step to beginning the rehabilita-
tive process, because the defendant is expected to recognize the error
276. Id. at 579, 638 A.2d at 1212.
277. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970) (noting several factors that
illustrate the benefits of plea bargaining and its role as an essential component of the
criminal justice system, including a lesser penalty for the defendant and more efficient
administration of justice for the state).
278. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (noting further the impor-
tance of plea bargaining in alleviating the pressures of overcrowded criminal dockets).
279. SeeJames A. Cramer et al., The Judicial Role in Plea-Bargaining, in PLEA-BARGAINING
139, 139 (William F. McDonald &James A. Cramer eds., 1980).
280. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.
281. Id.
282. Four basic theories behind society's decision to punish those who are found guilty
of criminal activity include the following: (1) retribution through fine or imprisonment;
(2) rehabilitation, so that the criminal can return to society as a productive member; (3)
deterrence; (4) incapacitation, i.e., removal of the criminal from society so that, during
incarceration, he cannot continue to do harm. See 1 HELEN SILVING, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1,
18-19, 48, 53 (1971).
283. See STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUiTy 41 (Approved Draft, 1968) (noting
that a guilty plea defendant "has acknowledged his guilt and shown a willingness to assume
responsibility for his conduct").
284. Id. at 42-43.
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of his ways.28 5 Second, plea agreements serve the deterrent aspect of
criminal punishment. 286 A plea on the part of a guilty defendant in-
creases the probability of a penalty by eliminating the uncertainties of
a criminal trial.287 At trial, key witnesses may refuse to cooperate or
the jury may respond unexpectedly to the emotions of the proceed-
ing.2 8 8 Plea bargaining eliminates these possibilities and imposes pen-
alties where they might otherwise be difficult to obtain.289 The fact
that more criminals receive penalties serves to deter those who other-
wise would commit crimes. 29 ° Finally, plea bargaining serves the func-
tion of incapacitation. 91 Confinement of the criminal defendant
protects the public from those defendants awaiting trial who may com-
mit additional crimes if released on bail. 292 Because criminal defen-
dants who accept plea agreements begin serving their prison sentence
immediately, the practice of plea-bargaining decreases their opportu-
nities to harm society. 293
For the State, the benefits of plea bargaining consist of enabling
the State to direct its limited resources to cases in which guilt is more
difficult to prove.294 The State can also offer a criminal defendant a
more lenient sentence in exchange for information that will aid in the
prosecution of other crimes. 295 In addition, some believe that without
plea bargaining, the criminal justice systems in a vast majority ofjuris-
dictions "would grind to a halt"296 because the need for additional
judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and courtrooms would
explode.
285. Id. at 41-42, 42 n.12 (citing a questionnaire of 140 federal district judges). But see
id. at 44 (observing that some criminals plead guilty in order to mitigate their sentence and
not because they have remorse for their conduct (citing Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 210
(1956))).
286. Id. at 40.
287. Id. at 40-41.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 41.
290. Id. at 40.
291. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (noting that disposition of
charges after plea "protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to con-
tinue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release").
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693, 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976) (explaining that
plea agreements, by "eliminat[ing] many of the risks, uncertainties and practical burdens
of trial, permit the judiciary and prosecution to concentrate their resources on those cases
in which they are most needed").
295. Id.
296. See STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GuILTY, supra note 283, at 50 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (citing Harris B. Steinberg & Monrad G. Paulsen, A Conversation with
Defense Counsel on Problems of a Criminal Defense, 7 PRAc. LAw. 25, 31 (1961)).
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c. Legislative Intent of Maryland Drug Laws.-The General As-
sembly enacted Maryland's drug laws to combat the rising problem of
illegal use of controlled substances. In a section of the Maryland
Code expressing its legislative findings and purpose, the General As-
sembly has stated that its intent in passing laws against possession and
distribution of dangerous controlled substances is to protect the
health and welfare of the residents of Maryland.297 The General As-
sembly sought to ensure that these controlled substances were avail-
able only for legitimate scientific research and to prevent the "serious
danger" of their abuse.298 In addition to recognizing the threat
presented by these substances, the General Assembly has recognized
that people who distribute these drugs are a special threat to Mary-
land residents.299 Section 286(c) of the drug offender laws imposes a
ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for anyone convicted of re-
peatedly violating the law against unlawful manufacture and distribu-
tion of dangerous narcotic drugs. 30 ' This provision illustrates the
heightened interest that Maryland has in deterring the abuse of drugs
by punishing more severely those who repeatedly violate its drug laws.
While considering the implementation of mandatory minimum
sentences, the General Assembly relied on findings contained in a
study of heroin addicts and their propensity to commit crime while
addicted.3 0 1 This study showed that criminal activity among heroin
addicts was six times greater when those people were using heroin as
opposed to when they were off the drug.30 2 The fact that the General
Assembly considered such a study when it enacted the mandatory min-
imum penalties shows its concern about the crime perpetrated by re-
peat drug users. By targeting this segment of the population that is a
high-crime risk to the residents of Maryland, the General Assembly
was attempting to reduce the harm that repeat offenders cause.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Beverly, the Court of Appeals held
that under Maryland Rule 4-245, a prosecutor may refrain from giving
a criminal defendant notice that the State will seek mandatory penal-
ties, or may decide to withdraw notice to seek mandatory penalties
297. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 276(a) (1996).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. MD. ANN CODE art. 27, § 286(c) (1996).
301. JOHN C. BALL ET AL., THE CRIMINALITY OF HEROIN ADDICTS WHEN ADDICTED AND
WHEN OFF OPIATES (1980). This study is included with the legislative history of the
mandatory minimum sentence law. See S. 447.
302. BALL ET AL., supra note 301, at 1.
7791999]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
after it has been given.3" 3 The court reasoned that, by enacting Rule
4-245, the legislature did not intend to remove the prosecutor's discre-
tion to "plea bargain away a mandatory minimum subsequent of-
fender sentence."3 ° 4 Instead, this rule was intended "to prevent an
inadvertent waiver from preventing the imposition of a mandatory pen-
alty for a subsequent offender."3" 5 The court also relied on the strong
history of prosecutorial discretion in Maryland to arrive at its deci-
sion.30 6 The court did, however, limit its holding to cases in which the
mandatory penalty must be invoked by supplying notice and proof of
the defendant's subsequent offender status.3 0 7 The court's decision
does not extend to enhanced sentences that must be imposed because
of the nature of the circumstances of the crime.308
In writing for the majority, Judge Chasanow first addressed the
State's preliminary arguments challenging Beverly's standing to ap-
peal the trial judge's decision. 30 9 The State argued that the defendant
acquiesced in the trial court's erroneous ruling and therefore aban-
doned his right to appeal this issue.3 10 The State based this argument
on a limited portion of the trial record in which the defense counsel
agreed with the trial court's interpretation of Rule 4-245.311 Upon
further examination of the trial court record, however, the majority
determined that Beverly's counsel litigated this issue vigorously and
that the defense counsel, seeing that the trial judge would not com-
promise, "politely continued on with the matter of the day. '3 12 The
303. Beverly, 349 Md. at 126-27, 707 A.2d at 101. The court believed that the decision
not to give notice pursuant to Rule 4-245 or the withdrawal of such notice is a form of
charge bargaining, within the "absolute discretion" of the prosecutor, as distinct from sen-
tence bargaining, which a judge is free to accept or reject. See id. at 127-28, 707 A.2d at
101; infra text accompanying notes 145-146.
304. See Beverly, 349 Md. at 125-26, 707 A.2d at 100 (noting further that Rule 4-245 "does
not attempt to correct any State's Attorney's abuses which may exist in this area [of plea-
bargaining]" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Memorandum from Robert J.
Ryan, Chairman of the Criminal Rules Subcommittee to Members of the Rules Committee
(June 2, 1982))).
305. Id. at 125, 707 A.2d at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ryan, supra
note 304).
306. Id. at 121-22, 707 A.2d at 98-99; see supra notes 250-276 and accompanying text
(discussing the history of prosecutorial discretion in Maryland).
307. Beverly, 349 Md. at 127, 707 A.2d at 101.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 117, 707 A.2d at 96.
310. Id.
311. See id. (quoting defense counsel's remark at trial that the trial judge's interpreta-
tion of the issue "sound [sic] right to me, Your Honor, and I have no argument as to
that").
312. Id. at 118, 707 A.2d at 97. The portion of the trial court record reproduced in the
majority opinion contains a lengthy discussion between the judge and the State's Attorney
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court, noting that it would ignore the everyday functioning of the trial
court to characterize this remark as acquiescence, dismissed this argu-
ment by the State.313
The State also argued that Beverly never accepted the plea agree-
ment, and consequently that he failed to preserve the issue for ap-
peal.314 Distinguishing this case from Luce v. United States,3" and
Jordan v. State, 16 in both of which a defendant was required to testify
in order to preserve for review the trial court's pretrial evidentiary
rulings, the Beverly court reasoned that the harm at issue was not de-
pendent on what a defendant would have testified to at trial-and
thus remote and speculative; instead, the harm was concrete because
it consisted of the difference between the sentence Beverly actually
received and the sentence he would have received under the plea
agreement that the judge refused to accept solely due to a "mistake of
law."317 Moreover, unlike a defendant's decision not to testify on ac-
count of a pretrial ruling, Beverly's decision to plead not guilty and go
to trial was based solely on the trial judge's mistaken legal determina-
tion. 18 For these reasons, Beverly's decision not to proceed with a
guilty plea did not constitute a waiver of the issue.319
After disposing of these preliminary issues, the court considered
whether the prosecution, in order to implement a plea-bargain, could
withdraw its intent to seek a mandatory sentence after the defendant
had received notice of that intent pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-245.32 °
as well. Id. at 111-14, 707 A-2d at 93-95. This record indicates that the prosecutor also
argued this point to the trial judge. See id. at 112, 707 A.2d at 93 (quoting the remark of
the State's Attorney that "if the State does not invoke the mandatory [sentence], then the
court is free to give whatever sentence the court deems appropriate in the case"). The fact
that both sides were trying to convince the judge to allow the prosecutor to withdraw the
notice makes it clear that this point was argued thoroughly.
313. Id. at 118, 707 A.2d at 97.
314. Id. at 119, 707 A.2d at 97.
315. See 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984) (holding that "to raise and preserve for review the claim
of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify").
316. See 323 Md. 151, 155-59, 591 A.2d 875, 877-79 (1991) (holding that the issue of the
voluntariness of an incriminatory statement is not preserved for appeal when a defendant
fails to testify on his own behalf and merely proffers to the court that, but for its ruling, he
would testify).
317. See Beverly, 349 Md. at 120-21, 707 A.2d at 98 (noting that the plea agreement con-
templated a ten-year sentencing cap, whereas Beverly was sentenced to fifteen years, ten of
which without parole).
318. Id. at 121, 707 A.2d at 98.
319. Id. at 118, 707 A.2d at 97.
320. Id. at 121, 707 A.2d at 98. Because the State agreed with the defendant that the
plea-bargain should have been accepted by the trial judge, it did not argue that the trial
court's substantive decision was correct regarding its inability to accept such an agreement
after the State has withdrawn notice to the defendant. Id. at 128, 707 A.2d at 102. Instead,
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The court began this discussion by looking at the history of
prosecutorial discretion in Maryland.32' The court relied on statutory
authority, 22 as well as its decision in Brack v. Wells, 2' in which it de-
cided that the State's Attorney has wide discretion to decide which
cases to prosecute.32 4 Thus, the Beverly court reaffirmed that in Mary-
land the State's Attorney has broad discretion to decide which cases
shall command the resources of the State.325 This discretion allows
the State's Attorney to decide whether or not to invoke the mandatory
penalty. 3
26
Next, the court discussed the benefits of plea bargaining and its
role in the efficient administration ofjustice. 327 The court recognized
that, most importantly, plea bargaining reduces the heavy caseload
that would otherwise overwhelm courts. 28 In addition, the court
noted several benefits of plea bargaining that the Supreme Court had
identified in Santobello v. New York:329
[Plea bargaining] leads to prompt and largely final disposi-
tion of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive
impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement for
those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the
public from those accused persons who are prone to con-
tinue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and,
by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it
enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the
guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.
The Court of Appeals added that plea bargaining allows the State to
focus its limited resources on cases in which the most work is
needed.331
the State argued that Beverly had failed to preserve the issue for appeal. See supra notes
314-319 and accompanying text.
321. Beverly, 349 Md. at 121-22, 707 A.2d at 98.
322. See id. at 121, 707 A.2d at 98 (noting that the State's Attorney is directed to "prose-
cute and defend, on the part of the State, all cases in which the State may be interested"
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 10,
§ 34 (1998))).
323. See supra notes 250-261 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
324. Beverly, 349 Md. at 121-22, 707 A.2d at 98.
325. Id. at 122, 707 A.2d at 98.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id., 707 A.2d at 98-99.
329. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
330. Beverly, 349 Md. at 122-23, 707 A.2d at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261).
331. Id. at 123, 707 A.2d at 99 (citing State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693, 357 A.2d
376, 381 (1976)).
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Having observed the history and benefits of plea bargaining, the
court turned to the specific circumstances of the case in order to de-
termine whether they constituted a "proper condition" for plea bar-
gaining."3 2 The Maryland Rules expressly provide for plea bargaining
under Rule 4-243, which states that "[t]he defendant may enter into
an agreement with the State's Attorney for a plea of guilty or nolo
contende on any proper condition .... " The Court of Appeals
considered this language in the context of determining whether plea
bargaining "around" a mandatory sentence was an acceptable condi-
tion.3 34 The court noted that the subsequent offender statute at issue
in this case calls for a mandatory sentence of ten years without parole
if the defendant was convicted under the statute on a prior occa-
sion.335 The court further noted that under Maryland Rule 4-245(c),
the State's Attorney is required to provide notice of the intention to
seek a mandatory penalty and, at sentencing, to prove the prior con-
victions beyond a reasonable doubt.3 6 Once the State has satisfied its
burden, the trial judge must impose a minimum sentence of ten years
without parole. 337 The court observed, however, that if the State's
burden is not satisfied, the trial judge is not permitted to impose the
mandatory penalty.3 3 8 Thus, the purpose of Rule 4-245 is to afford the
defendant the opportunity to challenge the State's assertion that he is
a repeat offender, not to remove the discretion vested in the prosecu-
tor to plea-bargain. 339 The court noted that the legislative history of
the Rule supported the interpretation that it was not intended to re-
move the prosecutor's ability to plea-bargain "around" a mandatory
sentence; instead, the rule was intended to prevent an inadvertent
waiver from preventing the imposition of a mandatory penalty.
3 40
Thus the court concluded that a prosecutor could withdraw notice of
mandatory penalties as part of a plea agreement reached with a
defendant.3 41
332. Id. (quoting MD. RULE 4-243).
333. MD. RULE 4-243(a).
334. Beverly, 349 Md. at 123, 707 A.2d at 99.
335. See id. at 123-24, 707 A.2d at 99 (discussing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286).
336. Id. at 124, 707 A.2d at 99-100 (citing MD. RULE 4-245(c)).
337. Id. at 124, 707 A.2d at 100 (citing State v. Montgomery, 334 Md. 20, 21 n.1, 637
A.2d 1193, 1193 n.1 (1994)).
338. Id. at 125, 707 A.2d at 100.
339. Id.
340. Id. (noting that "[t]his rule does not attempt to correct any State's Attorney's
abuses which may exist in this area [of plea bargaining]" (quoting Ryan, supra note 304)).
341. See id. at 126, 707 A.2d at 101 (noting that the decision to pursue a mandatory
sentence "is part of the prosecutorial function, rather than a [trial judge's] sentencing
function" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Middleton v. State, 67 Md. App.
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The court also addressed the role of the trial judge in the plea
bargaining process.3 42 Although recognizing that a trial judge may
reject a plea agreement about a sentence, the court explained that a
trial judge has no authority to reject a charge agreement where the
State agrees to withdraw or reduce the charges against a defendant.3 43
The court characterized an agreement by the State to withdraw a no-
tice of mandatory sentence as a form of charge bargaining that cannot
be rejected by the trial judge.344
For these reasons, the trial judge's decision to reject Beverly's
plea agreement did not constitute a permissible exercise of discretion,
but a failure to recognize that she had the discretion to sentence in
accord with the plea agreement; as a result, the Court of Appeals af-
firmed Beverly's convictions, but remanded the case for a new sen-
tencing hearing to allow Beverly to establish the existence and
conditions of the plea agreement struck with the State.345
Writing in dissent, Judge Wilner claimed that the decision by the
Court of Appeals allows the prosecution to "thwart" the will of the
General Assembly and could compel the court to impose an "illegal
sentence."3 46 The dissent began by arguing that no plea agreement
with the defendant was ever submitted to the trial court for approval
and that there was nothing more than a hypothetical discussion about
the possibility of a plea-bargain.3 47 As a result, the dissent believed
that the defendant waived his right to dispute the trial judge's inter-
pretation of Rule 4-243 and her duties under the mandatory mini-
mum sentence provision.348
The dissent also addressed what it perceived to be the prosecu-
tor's ability to "thwart" the legislature's will. 349 The dissent first recog-
nized that, indeed, the prosecutor has broad discretion in
determining which cases to pursue, and that plea bargaining is an ac-
cepted and necessary part of our criminal justice system. 311 However,
the dissent argued that the prosecutorial discretion embodied in Rule
159, 169, 506 A.2d 1191, 1196 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Fairbanks v. State, 331
Md. 482, 629 A.2d 63 (1993))). The Beverly court noted that, in Middleton, the Court of
Special Appeals "held that a prosecutor may withdraw a notice of mandatory penalties." Id.
at 126, 707 A.2d at 100.
342. Id. at 126-27, 707 A.2d at 101.
343. Id. at 127, 707 A.2d at 101.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 127-29, 707 A.2d at 101-02.
346. Id. at 130, 707 A.2d at 103 (Wilner,J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 135-36, 707 A.2d at 105.
348. Id. at 137, 707 A.2d at 106.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 137-38, 707 A.2d at 106.
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4-243 does not allow for the imposition of an illegal sentence. 351 Ac-
cording to the dissent, the majority's position enabled a prosecutor to
frustrate the mandatory minimum sentence provision by "refusing to
produce relevant evidence [of prior convictions] that is in his or her
possession or by deliberately refusing to perform the ministerial act
required by Rule 4-245 of sending a notice."352 The dissent felt this
behavior to be akin to misconduct in office.353 In essence, the dissent
believed that the majority had allowed the prosecutor to overstep his
bounds and infringe on the General Assembly's law-making power.
54
4. Analysis.-In deciding whether to allow the prosecutor to
withdraw her notice of mandatory penalties, the Beverly court had to
weigh what seem to be two competing interests: (1) the long standing
practice in Maryland of allowing broad prosecutorial discretion and
(2) the duty imposed upon the State's Attorney by the people of Mary-
land to "prosecute and defend, on the part of the State, all cases in
which the State may be interested.
3 55
The majority in Beverly, emphasizing the first interest, held that a
prosecutor may withdraw her notice of intent to seek mandatory pen-
alties, even if the defendant has received notice of his status as a re-
peat offender.356 In doing so, the court ruled that the withdrawal of
notice was a form of charge bargaining rather than sentence bargain-
ing. 57 This distinction is important, because the prosecutor, and not
the trial judge, has the sole discretion to decide what charges to file
against a defendant.358 Thus, the court found that in Beverly the trial
judge erred by rejecting the charge bargain because she did not have
the authority to do so.a
59
351. Id. at 138, 707 A.2d at 106.
352. Id. at 139, 707 A.2d at 107.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 141, 707 A.2d at 108.
355. MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 34 (1998).
356. Beverly, 349 Md. at 126-27, 707 A.2d at 101.
357. Id. at 127, 707 A. 2d at 101.
358. Id Sentence bargaining is a plea agreement in which the prosecutor agrees to
recommend a lighter sentence to the trial judge in exchange for the defendant's plea of
guilty. The judge is not bound to follow this recommendation and has the discretion to
impose any sentence mandated by the law. Charge bargaining, on the other hand, is an
agreement in which the prosecutor agrees to reduce or dismiss some or all of the charges
against the defendant. This type of agreement does not afford the trial judge as much
discretion in sentencing because the judge is limited in the sentence that he or she can
impose by the sentences called for under the amended charges. In deciding which of-
fenses to charge a particular defendant with, the prosecutor has sole discretion. The trial
judge has no authority to invade this area of the prosecutor's duty. Id.
359. Id. at 127-28, 707 A.2d at 101.
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The Court of Appeals reached the correct result, even though it
can be argued that its distinction between charge bargaining and sen-
tence bargaining allows the prosecutor to undermine the legislative
intent behind section 286(c), which was to sentence repeat drug deal-
ers to a minimum sentence of ten years.3 60 This practice appears to
undermine the law-making function of the General Assembly, a prac-
tice the dissent suggests that the court should not approve.36 How-
ever, flexibility of charge bargaining allows the prosecutor to focus
prosecutorial resources on those offenders who pose the greatest
threat to citizens of Maryland.36 2 The State's Attorney is in a better
position than the General Assembly to determine whether or not a
repeat offender poses a serious threat to the community because she
has the individual facts in front of her to make an accurate assess-
ment. The dissent points out that courts of other states have not en-
dorsed such a practice, and asserts that language from prior decisions
of the Court of Appeals are inconsistent with the ruling in Beverly.363
Prior to Beverly, the Court of Appeals ruled that where the trial court
fails to sentence within the mandates of the statute, the State shall
have the right to appeal.364 Beverly did not overrule these previous
cases, but instead allowed the prosecutor the discretion "not to meet
the statutory conditions [under which a trial judge is required to im-
pose a minimum sentence] by not giving notice [of intent to seek a
mandatory penalty] and by not presenting evidence sufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has a prior
conviction. "365
360. For this argument, made by the dissent, see supra notes 346-354 and accompanying
text.
361. Beverly, 349 Md. at 138, 707 A.2d at 106-07 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
362. See supra Part 2.b (discussing the advantages of plea bargaining, which include flexi-
ble and efficient prosecution of cases).
363. Beverly, 349 Md. at 138, 707 A.2d at 106-07 (Wilner, J., dissenting); see Shilling v.
State, 320 Md. 288, 293, 577 A.2d 83, 85-86 (1990) (stating that the trial judge failed to
follow the legislature's intent when he sentenced a repeat drunk driver to probation in-
stead of a mandatory sentence); State v. Hannah, 307 Md. 390, 403, 514 A.2d 16, 22 (1986)
(holding that the State was permitted to appeal a trial judge's imposition of probation
before judgment for a weapons violation in light of the minimum sentence explicitly man-
dated by the legislature); State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 504, 325 A.2d 573,
574-75 (1974) (holding the trial judge had no authority to suspend the defendant's sen-
tence when the statute called for a five year minimum sentence).
364. Shilling, 320 Md. at 294, 577 A.2d at 86.
365. Beverly, 349 Md. at 126, 707 A.2d at 100. Moreover, the court limited its holding to
"circumstances in which the mandatory penalty is under a subsequent offender statute
where the state has the obligation to supply notice and proof of subsequent offender status
and is not necessarily applicable where the enhanced sentence is due to the nature of the
circumstances of the offense itself." Id. at 127, 707 A.2d at 101.
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In light of the strong prosecutorial discretion in Maryland, 366 and
the many benefits that are achieved by plea agreements, 367 the court
was correct to allow the State's Attorney's office the power to allocate
its resources as efficiently as possible and not to be forced to prose-
cute cases merely because a mandatory minimum sentence could ap-
ply to them. Absent a clear intent on the part of the General
Assembly, the State's Attorney should have the power to determine
which cases to prosecute even if that means indirectly determining
when legislatively mandated penalties should be imposed.
The State of Kansas has eliminated this perceived dilemma by
statutorily limiting the right of prosecutors to plea-bargain "around" a
mandatory sentence.3 68 The validity of such a statutory limitation was
tested in State v. Compton,369 in which the Supreme Court of Kansas
reviewed this provision. In Compton, the State appealed a decision by
the lower court, which held that the provision of the drunk driving
statute in question was unconstitutional.370  The defendants were
charged with violating the drunk driving laws of Kansas and were
found to be repeat offenders under the statute.3 7' The issue before
the court was whether the statute's prohibition of plea bargaining was
an encroachment by the legislature on the powers of the executive
branch.3 7 2 Kansas, like Maryland, grants the prosecutor wide discre-
tion in determining what charges to file; this discretion, however, is
not completely without limits. 37 3 In finding that this provision was
constitutional, the court looked to the objectives sought by the legisla-
ture in passing this provision of the drunk driving statute.3 74 The
court found that the objectives of the legislature were to deter the
serious problem of drunk driving by making penalties certain and se-
366. See supra Part 2.a (discussing the history of prosecutorial discretion in Maryland).
367. See supra Part 2.b (discussing the advantages of plea bargaining in the criminal
justice system).
368. The relevant portion of Kansas's drunk driving statute provides:
No plea bargaining agreement shall be entered into nor shall any judge approve a
plea bargaining agreement entered into for the purpose of permitting a person
charged with a violation of this section, or a violation of any ordinance of a city or
resolution of any county in this state which prohibits the acts prohibited by this
section, to avoid the mandatory penalties established by this section or by the
ordinance.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1567(n) (1991).
369. 664 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (Kan. 1983).
370. Id. at 1372-73.
371. Id. at 1373.
372. Id. at 1376-79.
373. Id. at 1377.
374. Id. at 1378.
1999]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
vere, objectives that were consistent with those of the executive and
judicial branch.375
Similarly, if the Maryland General Assembly desires to ensure that
mandatory penalties are imposed on repeat drug offenders, it should
enact a provision similar to that in Kansas's drunk driving statute.
Such a provision would limit the powers of the prosecutor to plea-
bargain "around" mandatory minimum sentences. If the legislature
believes that charge bargaining undermines the intent of its
mandatory sentence for repeat drug offenders, then the legislature
itself-and not the Court of Appeals-should be the one to remedy
this problem.
5. Conclusion.-In Beverly v. State, the Court of Appeals held that
a prosecutor can plea-bargain "around" a mandatory minimum sen-
tence by withholding the required notice of intent to seek the sen-
tence, or by withdrawing that notice after it has been given.376 This
decision follows the longstanding history of prosecutorial discretion in
the State of Maryland.37 This ruling strengthens the prosecutor's
ability to circumvent harsh penalties if they seem unwarranted in a
given case, and provides prosecutors with the flexibility they need to
control their caseloads. The General Assembly enacted these penal-
ties because of the threat that repeat drug offenders pose to the wel-
fare of the residents of Maryland.37 ' The Court of Appeals properly
recognized that prosecutors are granted broad discretion to decide
which cases are worth pursuing. If the General Assembly believes that
repeat drug offenders are so dangerous that a prosecutor's discretion
should be limited, then the General Assembly should make this ex-
plicit in a provision similar to the one contained in Kansas's drunk
driving statute.
CHRIS B. EDWARDS
C. The Fourth Amendment Nexus Requirement: Homes and Cars
In State v. Ward,37 9 the Court of Appeals ruled on a narrow issue
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The court considered whether
the facts in an affidavit provided the required nexus between the evi-
dence sought and the two places searched, the defendant's home and
375. Id.
376. Beverly, 349 at 1126-27, 707 A.2d at 101.
377. See supra Part 2.a (discussing the history of prosecutorial discretion in Maryland).
378. See supra Part 2.c.
379. 350 Md. 372, 712 A.2d 534 (1998).
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the defendant's car. 8° In particular, the court contemplated whether
the anonymity of witnesses, defendant's prior arrests for handgun vio-
lations, the fact that no weapon had been found, and the fact that the
defendant had been picked up near his vehicle two days after the mur-
der gave the magistrate enough evidence to conclude that probable
cause existed to search the defendant's house and car. 3 11 The four-
three majority found an adequate nexus for both locations searched,
and thus reversed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals and
reinstated the defendant's conviction.382 In so doing, the court used
the same facts and logic that permitted the search of the house to
validate the search of the car.183 The result is muddled law that has
the potential to permit the issuance of search warrants for
automobiles when the supporting affidavit contains absolutely no facts
connecting the evidence sought to the car to be searched.
1. The Case.-On the night of September 30, 1992, Alfred Stew-
art was shot several times and killed on a public street in Baltimore
City.384 Over the next two days, the police received several anony-
mous tips that Gary Ward had committed the murder.38 5 Ward was
brought to police headquarters for questioning and his automobile
was towed to the police station.386 Ward was not charged at the time
and was released, but the police retained possession of Ward's auto-
mobile because his license plates had expired.38 7 Three days after
Stewart was murdered, the police secured an eyewitness who identi-
fied Ward as Stewart's killer.388 Accordingly, the police obtained a
warrant to search Ward's residence and his automobile for
"'[h]andguns, [a]mmunition [and] [p]ersonal papers showing own-
ership/possession of a firearm.' 3 89
The sworn affidavit filed in support of the warrant included infor-
mation about the anonymous tips and the eyewitness identification.39 °
In addition, the affidavit listed Ward's address, the fact that Ward had
an automobile registered to that address, and Ward's prior arrest rec-
380. Id. at 375-78, 712 A.2d at 535-36.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 378, 389, 712 A.2d at 536, 542.
383. Id. at 386, 712 A.2d at 540-41.





389. Id. at 391 n.2, 712 A.2d at 543 n.2 (Bell, CJ., dissenting) (quoting the warrant
application).
390. Ward, 350 Md. at 375 n.2, 712 A.2d at 535 n.2.
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ord for committing handgun violations.3 9' Pursuant to this warrant,
the police searched Ward's home and automobile and recovered
three .357 "MAG" hollow-point cartridges from the automobile. 92
The State entered these cartridges into evidence at Ward's trial on the
charges of first degree murder and of using a handgun in the commis-
sion of a crime of violence. 9 3 Ward was convicted on both counts and
sentenced to life imprisonment.
39 4
The search warrant issued for Ward's residence and automobile
gave rise to voluminous appellate litigation. After his conviction,
Ward appealed the trial court's decision not to hold a suppression
hearing.3 9 5 In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals
remanded the case for the sole purpose of conducting a suppression
hearing.3 96 On remand, the trial court held a suppression hearing
but denied Ward's motion to suppress.3 9 7 Accordingly, Ward ap-
pealed once again.3 98 Ward won in his second entreaty to the Court
of Special Appeals, which, in another unreported opinion, reversed
the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and vacated Ward's
conviction. 39 9 The Court of Special Appeals found that the affidavit
did not supply an adequate nexus "'between the item sought and the
place to be searched,"'4 ° ° and held that:
[t] here was insufficient information to connect the evidence
sought, firearms and ammunition, to the place searched, ap-
pellant's car. There was no information that appellant kept
handguns or ammunition in his car, nor was there any infor-
mation that the car was involved in any way with the shooting
death of the victim. In analogous cases involving residential
searches, a review of Maryland case law reveals that generally
391. Id.
392. Id. at 374, 712 A.2d at 535.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. The trial court denied Ward's request for a suppression hearing because the
evidence seized that was offered in the murder trial had already been the subject of a
suppression hearing in a criminal case against Ward involving a shooting on September 17,
1992. Id. at n.1. The motion to suppress in that case had been denied, thus the trial court
concluded that a second suppression hearing was not needed in Ward's murder trial. Id.
396. Id. at 374, 712 A.2d at 535.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 374-75, 712 A.2d at 535.
400. Id. at 375, 712 A.2d at 535 (quoting the Court of Special Appeals's decision in
Ward).
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something more than was shown here is required to justify a
search.401
Following this decision, the State moved unsuccessfully for reconsider-
ation. 40 2 The Court of Appeals subsequently granted the State's peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari. 40 3 The court addressed the sole issue of
whether the underlying affidavit had supplied a sufficient nexus be-
tween the places searched, the crime committed, and the items
sought. 404
2. Legal Background.-
a. Guidelines for Appellate Review.-In Illinois v. Gates,4°5 the
Supreme Court ruled that a reviewing court should defer greatly to
the probable cause determination made by the magistrate who issues
a warrant.40 6 The Supreme Court, in defining the duties of a review-
ing court, concluded that it should examine the magistrate's decision
only to ensure that the underlying affidavit contains a "'substantial
[factual] basis for . . .conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed."40 v
Specifically, the Gates majority held that a warrant based on an anony-
mous tip provided probable cause to search the home and car of a
married couple suspected of running a drug smuggling operation.40 8
The Supreme Court declared that the review of such probable cause
determinations should be "'practical [and] nontechnical' 40 9 in na-
ture, and the affidavits should be examined using a "totality-of-the-
circumstances" approach.410 As a result, magistrates and judges mak-
ing probable cause determinations enjoy a standard of review more
deferential than the clearly erroneous standard afforded to fact-find-
401. Id. at 410, 712 A.2d 552-53 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Court of Special Appeals decision in Ward).
402. Ward, 350 Md. at 375, 712 A.2d at 535.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
406. Id. at 236-39 (stressing that rigorous scrutiny of a magistrate's determination of
probable cause conflicts with the preference afforded to searches carried out in accord-
ance with a warrant (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969))); see also
infra notes 414-416 and accompanying text (describing the preference given to searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant).
407. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (second alteration in original) (omission in original)
(quotingJones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
408. See id. at 225, 246.
409. Id. at 231 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
410. Id. at 230. The court reasoned that, in making probable cause determinations " 'ev-
idence . . . must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement."' Id. at 232 (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
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ingjudges orjuries.4 11 The issue on appeal is not whether the under-
lying affidavit supplied probable cause, but rather, considering only
the facts as set out in the officer's warrant,4" 2 whether "such an infer-
ence would be permitted.
4 13
A second factor further insulates a magistrate's probable cause
finding from appellate scrutiny. The Supreme Court has articulated a
presumption in favor of searches made pursuant to a warrant, as op-
posed to warrantless searches.41 4 The Court has stood firmly behind
the notion that "doubtful or marginal cases . . .should be largely de-
termined by the preference to be accorded to warrants."4 '5 This pref-
erential treatment encourages "police officers [to] submit[ ] their
evidence to a judicial officer before acting." '416 As a result of this pre-
sumption and the high standard of review described above, the deci-
sion of a warrant-issuing magistrate enjoys a large degree of deference
when challenged in an appellate court.
b. The Nexus Requirement.--The Fourth Amendment pro-
vides that:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall is-
sue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
411. State v. Amerman, 84 Md. App. 461, 471-73, 581 A.2d 19, 24-25 (1990) (interpret-
ing the "substantial basis" standard governing the probable cause determination to be a
more deferential standard than the "clearly erroneous" standard that applies to fact-find-
ing in a trial setting).
412. See State v. Lee, 330 Md. 320, 326, 624 A.2d 492, 495 (1993) ("In determining
whether probable cause exists, the issuing judge or a magistrate is confined to the aver-
ments contained within the four corners of the search warrant application." (citing
Birchead v. State, 317 Md. 691, 700, 566 A.2d 488 (1989); Valdez v. State, 300 Md. 160, 168,
476 A.2d 1162 (1984))).
413. Amerman, 84 Md. App. at 463 n.1, 581 A.2d at 20 n.1 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Danz v. Schafer, 47 Md. App. 51, 57-58, 422 A.2d 1 (1980)). In Amer-
man, the Court of Special Appeals described the subjective process of a probable cause
determination as being "as much an art form as a mechanical exercise [that] relies neces-
sarily upon the eye of the beholder." Id. at 463, 581 A.2d at 20. Accordingly, the court
concluded that in making such determinations, "one judge may choose to draw a reason-
able inference; another may as readily decline the inference; each will be correct and each
is entitled, therefore, to the endorsement of a reviewing colleague." Id.
414. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) ("[T]his Court, strongly sup-
porting the preference to be accorded searches under a warrant, [has] indicated that in a
doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one
it would fall." (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960))).
415. Id. at 109 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. at 270).
416. Id. at 108.
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tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.417
Courts interpreting the Fourth Amendment have produced a broadly-
formulated requirement that an underlying affidavit establish an ade-
quate connection or nexus between the criminal activity, the place or
person to be searched, and the items sought.41 Such a connection is
a necessary antecedent to any valid probable cause determination.41
In addition, if a warrant authorizes a search for more than one place,
or one place and one vehicle, the underlying affidavit must provide a
factual basis connecting the crime, the items sought, and each place
searched.42 °
Many complications can arise due to the various methods of de-
termining if an affidavit provides a sufficient nexus between the place
searched and items sought.4 21 Direct observation of that connection
renders the decision far easier, but such evidence is not always avail-
able.422 As a result, magistrates must rely on reasonable inferences
drawn from the facts contained in the affidavit.423
(1) Residences and the Nexus Requirement.-When the place to
be searched is a residence, most reviewing courts operate under the
417. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
418. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TRATtsE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 3.7(d), at 372 (3d ed. 1996) (identifying the problems that occur regarding the nexus
between place, items sought, and criminal activity).
419. United States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding that a
warrant was invalid because the affidavit failed to supply a sufficient nexus between the
firearm and [the] defendant's premises"); 2 LAFAvE, supra note 418, § 3.7(d), at 372 ("[lit
is [ ]necessary that there be established a sufficient nexus between (1) criminal activity,
and (2) the things to be seized, and (3) the place to be searched.").
420. See Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1964) (stating that, upon a
showing of probable cause for all places to be searched, "the fact that a suspect has two
automobiles, or two residences, does not mean that neither one of them can be searched,
because the suspect may have concealed the wanted evidence in the other one"); People v.
Easley, 671 P.2d 813, 820 (Cal. 1983) (explaining that a search warrant designating more
than one person or place to be searched must contain sufficient probable cause to justify
its issuance as to each person or place named therein); Andresen v. State, 24 Md. App. 128,
174, 331 A.2d 78, 106 (1975) (validating a single warrant that allowed an officer to search
two places because "there was probable cause to believe that some of the evidence sought
was in each of the two locations").
421. See 2 LAFAvE, supra note 418, § 3.7(d), at 372-93.
422. See United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1970) (stating that in the
.normal search-and-seizure case" the nexus between the items to be seized and the place to
be searched are based on direct observation).
423. State v. Edwards, 266 Md. 515, 517-19, 295 A.2d 465, 466-67 (1972) (asserting that a
"judicial officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts contained in the
affidavit based on his experience in such matters" when making a probable cause determi-
nation (citing Irby v. United States, 314 F.2d 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1963))).
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assumption that the home is a reasonable repository for incriminating
evidence and therefore often conclude that sufficient nexus exists to
search a home when an affidavit supplies enough facts to conclude
that the defendant may be in possession of incriminative evidence. In
United States v. Lucarz,424 the Ninth Circuit addressed the permissible
range of such inferences. Lucarz involved a search of a home for
money allegedly stolen from the United States Postal Service. 425 The
Lucar7z court pointed specifically to several facts in the warrant: that
the accused had "ample opportunity to make a trip home to hide the
envelopes"; that the value and bulk of the things stolen lend them-
selves to concealment in the home; that the defendant had custody of
the stolen mail; and that his explanation of the events in question was
internally inconsistent and differed from those given by other wit-
nesses. 426  The court validated the inference that the defendant's
home was a reasonable place to hide the stolen items.427 The court
provided a list of bases for this inference including, but not limited to:
"the type of crime, the nature of the missing items, the extent of the
suspect's opportunity for concealment, and normal inferences as to
where a criminal would be likely to hide stolen property. "428 A string
of cases from various federal circuits and state courts concur with the
Lucarz court and have allowed magistrates to infer that a suspect who
believes his identity to be unknown can reasonably be expected to
hide a weapon or contraband in his residence.
4 29
424. 430 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1970).
425. Id. at 1052. The defendant was a postal employee accused of embezzling the pro-
ceeds of stamp sales. Id.
426. Id. at 1055.
427. See id.
428. Id. (citing United States v. Teller, 412 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1969); Aron v. United
States, 382 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1967); Anderson v. United States, 344 F.2d 792 (10th Cir.
1965); Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1964)).
429. See United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[C]lothing and
firearms[ ]are .. .the types of evidence likely to be kept in a suspect's residence." (citing
United States v. Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam))); United States v.
Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988) (observing that the home is a place where a
suspect would keep a gun he was trying to sell and listing cases that assert the reasonable-
ness of the assumption that people keep guns in their homes); State v. Couture, 482 A.2d
300, 308-09 (Conn. 1984) (finding that "the magistrate could reasonably infer that the
defendant believed his identity was unknown and that his house was at least temporarily a
secure place in which to store the [stolen] money"); Bollinger v. State, 556 P.2d 1035, 1039
(Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (concluding that "[t]he trial court did not err in finding that
probable cause existed to believe that" the clothing and weapon used in the crime were
hidden in the defendant's home); see 2 LAFAvE, supra note 418, § 3.7(d), at 384 n.157
(citing authorities relying upon the inference that when the suspect believes his identity is
unknown his residence is a logical place to search for instrumentalities of the crime or
clothing worn during the commission of the crime).
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Many decisions have explored the factors that aid reviewing
courts in their determination of whether an affidavit adequately con-
nected the items sought to the place searched. Courts often look to
the proximity of the crime scene to the defendant's residence to aid
them in determining if the affidavit properly connected the items
sought to the suspect's home.43° The nature of the offense is another
factor. For example, arson, robbery, and drug trafficking violations
tend to involve tangible goods that a suspected perpetrator would
likely keep at a residence.431 In United States v. Anderson,4" 2 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that a weapon the defendant offered
to sell could reasonably be expected to lie hidden in his residence.4"3
In United States v. Jones,434 the Third Circuit examined the validity of a
warrant to search the residences of a group of robbery suspects who
had recently spent large amounts of cash.4 5 The court operated
under the assumption that the suspects would have likely kept the sto-
len cash in their homes.43 6 In so doing, the Jones court raised, but did
not reach, the question "whether in every case the fact that a suspect
committed a crime involving cash and/or a gun automatically pro-
vides a magistrate with enough information to approve a search of a
430. Blount v. State, 511 A.2d 1030, 1033 (Del. 1986) (sustaining a search warrant for a
murder suspect's residence because "a reasonable magistrate could have concluded that
the proximity of the defendant's residence to the crime scene could have rendered imme-
diate disposition of the weapon more imprudent than retaining it").
431. See United States v. Rambis, 686 F.2d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The crime involved
here, intended arson, required that a detonating device be assembled. A reasonable infer-
ence is that assembly of this device would require simple tools and materials commonly
found in a home."); Commonwealth v. Gannon, 454 A.2d 561, 564 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(affirming magistrate's conclusion that probable cause existed to search a residence for
bank records and canceled checks providing evidence of theft of funds, as "it is only a
matter of common sense to assume that the most likely place to find the bank records
would be in [the suspect's] residence"); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 418, § 3.7(d), at 379 & n.145
(citing cases supporting the proposition that the absence of specific facts supporting the
inference that a drug dealer keeps evidence of the crime in his home can be replaced by
police "experience that drug dealers ordinarily keep their supply, records and monetary
profits at home"); id. at 382 n.153 (citing cases supporting the inference that stolen prop-
erty is likely to be found in the suspect's residence).
432. 851 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1988).
433. Id. at 729 ("It was reasonable for the magistrate to believe that the defendant's gun
and the silencer would be found in his residence ... even though the affidavit contained
no facts that the weapons were located in [the] defendant's trailer ... .
434. 994 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1993).
435. Id. at 1055-58.
436. Id. at 1055-56 (noting that "cash is the type of loot that criminals seek to hide in
secure places like their homes" (citing United States v. Hendrix, 752 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir.
1985); United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1970))).
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suspect's home."43 7 Additional facts in the affidavit spared the court
from having to make such a broad ruling.4 3 8
Maryland case law contains examples of judicial officers using in-
ferences instead of direct evidence to conclude that the requisite
place-item nexus for a search warrant existed.4 39 Most influential
among such inferences is the notion that suspects are likely to hide
weapons or contraband in their homes. In Mills v. State,44 ° a rape
case, the Court of Appeals based its approval of a magistrate's determi-
nation of probable cause on an affidavit with very few facts connecting
the items sought to the suspect's residence. 441 The court affirmed the
validity of the warrant based on an identification of the perpetrator, a
detailed description of both the weapon used and the suspect's resi-
dence, and the fact that the suspect did not have the weapon on his
person when he was apprehended. 4 2  The chief inference relied
upon in Mills was that the "'assailant's house was a place where implements
such as knives would ordinarily be kept.' ' 443
The First Circuit has rejected the proposition that a residence is a
reasonable place to hide one type of incriminating evidence.4 4 4 In
437. Id. at 1056.
438. Id. (explaining that the presence of three newly-purchased motorcycles parked in
front of one suspect's residence was an additional factor allowing the magistrate to con-
clude that evidence of wrongdoing could be found inside).
439. See Grimm v. State, 6 Md. App. 321, 328, 251 A.2d 230, 235 (1969) (upholding a
search warrant for a trailer belonging to one of the two men suspected of killing a cab
driver based on the inferences that "the guns had been carried away from the scene of the
crime by the perpetrators," and that the men had carried the guns to the trailer where one
of them resided).
It is worth noting that federal cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment are often
cited by the Maryland appellate courts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has emphasized
that "in considering [Maryland State's] constitution and statutes relating to the subject of
unlawful searches and the admissibility of evidence thereby obtained, 'decisions of the
Supreme Court on the kindred 4th Amendment are entitled to great respect."' Givner v.
State, 210 Md. 484, 498, 124 A.2d 764, 771 (1956) (discussing the effect of Supreme Court
decisions on state search and seizure law (quoting Lambert v. State, 196 Md. 57, 62, 75
A.2d 327, 329 (1950))).
440. 278 Md. 262, 363 A.2d 491 (1976).
441. See id. at 276-80, 363 A.2d at 499-501 (quoting from the affidavit submitted to ob-
tain a search warrant for the defendant's residence).
442. Id. at 276, 363 A.2d at 499. In a subsequent case, Mills was parenthetically de-
scribed by the Court of Appeals as "upholding [a] warrant based on police allegation of a
crime, knowledge of the suspect's address, [a] detailed description of the weapon and
[the] absence of [the] weapon on suspect at time of arrest." Malcolm v. State, 314 Md.
221, 233, 550 A.2d 670, 676 (1988).
443. Mills, 278 Md. at 278, 363 A.2d at 500 (quoting Vessels v. Estelle, 376 F. Supp. 1303,
1309 (S.D. Tex. 1973), affd, 494 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1974)).
444. See United States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015, 1017 (1st Cir. 1979) ("Common sense
tells us that it is unlikely that a murderer would hide in his own home a gun used to shoot
someone.").
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United States v. Charest,44 the court instead assumed that the defen-
dant would more likely take measures to dispose of the weapon."4 6
The court further observed that the gun "could easily have been dis-
posed of within a short time after the crime." Since the affidavit con-
tained no other facts linking the defendant's home directly to the
weapon, the court found the search invalid and suppressed the seized
evidence.4
47
(2) Automobiles and the Nexus Requirement.--The decisions in-
volving the sufficiency of a warrant allowing the search of a vehicle are
relatively few in number.4 4 This number becomes even smaller when
narrowed solely to include the issue of sufficient nexus. When a war-
rant permits the search of an automobile, a magistrate may be com-
pelled to rely on a different set of inferences in order to conclude that
there is a sufficient nexus between the items sought and the automo-
bile in question.4 49 The cases examined above predominantly base
their nexus determinations on the suspect's tendency to hide incrimi-
nating evidence in his or her residence.4 50 The logical implication is
that a home offers a secure place where one can expect a high degree
of privacy from intrusion.4 5 It is well established that a person enjoys
a lower expectation of privacy in an automobile, as compared with a
residence. 452 As such, it would be far less likely for a suspect to hide
potentially incriminating evidence in a car, as opposed to a home,
445. 602 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir. 1979).
446. Id. at 1017.
447. Id.
448. See 2 LAFAvE, supra note 418, § 2.5(d), at 538 (noting that "because it is ordinarily
permissible to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile," few appellate decisions deal
with warrants to search an automobile).
449. See id., § 3.7(d), at 384 n.157 ("If the place to be searched is a vehicle rather than a
residence, additional difficulties [in providing nexus] may be encountered." (citing Com-
monwealth v. Moon, 405 N.E.2d 947 (Mass. 1980))).
450. See supra notes 424-443 and accompanying text (discussing the common judicial
assumption that the home is a reasonable repository for incriminating evidence).
451. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1979) ("The Fourth Amendment pro-
tects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings[, yet] [i]n none is the zone of privacy
more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual's home.").
452. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976) (discussing the tradi-
tional distinction drawn between automobiles and residences in relation to the Fourth
Amendment and asserting that "warrantless examinations of automobiles have been up-
held in circumstances in which a search of a home or office would not" (citing Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 43940 (1973); Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970))).
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since the latter is more protected from intrusion.453 Maryland courts
have specifically recognized that a lesser expectation of privacy at-
taches to a vehicle, as opposed to a residence.45 4 In the name of logi-
cal consistency, that reduced expectation of privacy should cause a
criminal to be reluctant to store incriminating evidence in his vehi-
cle.4 5 As a result, it is not reasonable to place automobiles on a par
with residences as places where a suspect would hide incriminating
evidence.456
Accordingly, courts rely on other factors to conclude that a suffi-
cient nexus exists between an automobile and an item sought to per-
mit a search of the car. One such factor is the possibility that the car
was somehow used in the commission of the crime in question.
Courts allow the search of an automobile if the affidavit shows that it
was the only means of transporting the contraband. In United States v.
Christenson,457 the Eighth Circuit upheld a search of a Ford Falcon
allegedly used for the commission of three burglaries all within a few
hours of each other.4 8 The court held it reasonable to infer that the
stolen items could be found in the "only apparent means of transpor-
tation available to [the defendant]"4 59 and therefore concluded that
the required connection between the contraband sought and the
place searched existed.46 ° Courts will point to a variety of factors
which can link an automobile to evidence of wrongdoing.461
453. See State v. Metzner, 338 N.W.2d 799, 805 (N.D. 1983) ("[A] convicted felon would
more logically secrete a rifle in his house than in his car which carries a considerably
diminished expectation of privacy.").
454. See Dyson v. State, 122 Md. App. 413, 423-24, 712 A.2d 573, 578 (1998) (noting that
warrantless searches of automobiles are allowable in large part because of "the ready mobil-
ity of the automobile" and "the risk of imminent disappearance of the automobile" and its
"probable evidentiary contents" if an officer is forced to leave the automobile to obtain a
warrant), cert. denied, 351 Md. 287, 718 A.2d 235 (1998);Jones v. State, 111 Md. App. 456,
467-68, 681 A.2d 1190, 1196 (1996) (-[T]he expectation of privacy associated with a car is
less than that associated with a home or office." (citing Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S.
132 (1925))).
455. See Metzner, 338 N.W.2d at 805 (acknowledging that a convicted felon would be
less likely to hide a gun in his automobile than in his house due to the lesser expectation of
privacy that attaches to the former).
456. See id.
457. 549 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1977).
458. Id. at 56.
459. Id. at 57.
460. See id. ("[T] here existed a justifiable nexus between the burglaries and the Ford
Falcon.").
461. See United States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 1981) (approving the issu-
ance of a warrant to search a car based partially on eyewitness testimony in the affidavit
labelling defendant's vehicle as the "getaway car"); State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 28 (N.D.
1971) (counting the fact "that [the defendant] drove a cab and would on occasion give
[the murder victim] a ride to work" among the factors allowing the issuance of a warrant
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Some courts will make more subtle nexus inferences. For exam-
ple, the California Supreme Court approved the search of two cars
when one had been recently purchased, and the suspect was an out-of-
county resident whose fingerprints placed him at the crime scene.4 6 2
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In State v. Ward, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the affidavit supporting the search warrant provided the
magistrate with a sufficient factual basis to connect the evidence
sought to Ward's home and automobile, and as a result, probable
cause existed to search both.4 6 3 After detailing the procedural his-
tory,464 the court discussed the standard of review applicable to a mag-
istrate's determination of probable cause.46 5 The court stressed that
the Supreme Court has directed appellate courts to review affidavits in
a "'commonsense and realistic fashion"' because "'[t]hey are nor-
mally drafted by non-lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal
investigation. "'466
The court then turned its attention to the underlying affidavit 46 7
and the inferences a magistrate could have drawn based on the facts
detailed in that affidavit. 468 The majority first found that the murder
victim was "gunned down on [a] public street."469 Second, the ano-
nymity of the tips accusing Ward, combined with Ward's arrest record,
permitted the magistrate to infer that the informants feared Ward and
for the defendant's vehicle in the absence of direct evidence that incriminating evidence
was located in the vehicle); State v. Higginbotham, 471 N.W.2d 24, 31-32 (Wis. 1991) (al-
lowing the search of an accused arsonist's automobile in part because the victim saw a car
driving slowly in front of the crime scene after the arson was discovered).
462. See People v. Easley, 671 P.2d 813, 819-20 (Cal. 1983) (naming the recent purchase
of an automobile, following a suspected contract killing, as one of the facts allowing the
issuance of a search warrant for that car).
463. Ward, 350 Md. at 374, 712 A.2d at 534.
464. See supra notes 392-403 and accompanying text (describing the procedural history
of Ward).
465. See Ward, 350 Md. at 376, 712 A.2d at 536.
466. Id. (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).
467. See id. at 376-77, 712 A.2d at 536 (examining the affidavit and discussing the facts
giving rise to permissible inferences).
468. See id. The following is a list of facts discussed by the majority opinion in develop-
ing the chain of inferences. First, Stewart's body was found in the street at the 1400 block
of Cliftview Avenue in Baltimore City. Id. Second, the tips which led to Ward's custodial
interrogation were anonymous. Id. at 377, 712 A.2d at 536. Third, Ward had a history of
prior arrests for handgun violations. Id. Fourth, the murder weapon was not found at the
crime scene. Id. Fifth, an eyewitness identified Ward as Stewart's killer. Id. at 374, 712
A.2d at 535. Sixth, Ward had been stopped by the police while in or about his vehicle. Id.
at 377, 712 A.2d at 536. Lastly, Ward's address was also given in the affidavit. Id. at 375,
712 A.2d at 535.
469. Id. at 376-77, 712 A.2d at 536.
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that this fear rendered them unwilling to identify themselves.47
Third, the court noted that the manner in which the "affidavit de-
scribed Ward" as a man with a history of handgun arrests and the
ability to create fear-inspired anonymity, revealed that he is the type of
person to whom a gun was "of utility and value."'471 Therefore, the
court inferred that Ward had not, and would not, discard the murder
weapon or "the weapon's less incriminating bullets. '472 Fourth, the
fact that the gun was not recovered allowed the inference that it was
neither on Ward's person when he was apprehended, nor was it in
plain view in his vehicle. 47' Finally, the magistrate could infer that
Ward had used his automobile within two days of the commission of
the murder by the fact that the police towed the automobile to police
headquarters474 when they brought Ward into custody for question-
ing.475 Based on this chain of inferences, the majority concluded that
"the magistrate had probable cause to believe that the murder weapon
and associated evidence . . . could be found in Ward's home and/or
in his automobile, but out of view." 4 76
a. Nexus Between the Items Sought and Ward's Residence.-The
court devoted the remainder of the opinion to an examination of the
case law governing the nexus requirement.477 The court began by an-
alyzing the nexus requirement needed to support the search of
Ward's residence,4 78 and found its previous decision in Mills v. State479
supportive of its conclusion that the magistrate had probable cause to
issue a warrant to search Ward's residence. 480 According to the Ward
court, there was "no substantial difference between" the circum-
stances of the instant case and Mills.48' In Mills, the Court of Appeals
upheld a warrant to search a suspect's residence based upon an affida-
vit "describ[ing] in detail the offense, the arrest of [the suspect], the






476. Id. at 377-78, 712 A.2d at 536.
477. Id. at 378-89, 712 A.2d at 536-42.
478. Id. at 377, 712 A.2d at 536.
479. 278 Md. 262, 363 A.2d 491 (1976) (finding probable cause to search a suspect's
residence for a hunting knife and sheath used in the commission of a kidnapping, robbery
and rape although the affidavit contained no direct evidence establishing a nexus); see also
supra notes 440-443 (discussing the probable cause determination made in Mills v. State).
480. Ward, 350 Md. at 378-79, 712 A.2d at 536.
481. Id. at 379, 712 A.2d at 537.
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[weapon], and the place to be searched."4"2 As in Ward, the only evi-
dence linking the weapon sought in Mills to the suspect's residence
was the fact that the suspect, when arrested, did not physically possess
a weapon similar to the one used in the crime.4"' The majority fur-
ther examined the reasoning in several other cases that drew infer-
ences similar to those drawn in Mills.48 4
The court continued its nexus analysis of the warrant, in relation
to the search of Ward's residence, by explaining that "geographical"
inferences may be drawn to illustrate that a suspect would likely re-
turn to his or her residence following the commission of a crime.485
The court noted that Baltimore street maps indicate that Ward's resi-
dence was located only one block from the crime scene. 486 From the
proximity of Ward's residence to the scene of the murder, the major-
ity reasoned that a magistrate could have concluded that Ward had
taken the weapon home, rather than disposing of it.
48 7
The court ended its discussion of Ward's residence by recogniz-
ing precedent contrary to the above discussion.488 The court focused
on United States v. Charest,489 a First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion
which relied on the inference that a residence is an unlikely place for
482. Id.; see also Mills, 278 Md. at 276, 363 A.2d at 499.
483. Ward, 350 Md. at 379, 712 A.2d at 537 (citing Mills, 278 Md. at 276, 363 A.2d at
499).
484. Among the authorities cited by the court were State v. Couture, 482 A.2d 300, 309
(Conn. 1984) (finding probable cause to issue a search warrant for a murder weapon
where "the magistrate could reasonably infer that the defendant believed his identity was
unknown and that his house was at least temporarily a secure place" to store the money
and hide the weapon), Blount v. State, 511 A.2d 1030, 1033 (Del. 1986) (sustaining a search
warrant for a murder suspect's residence because his "residence would be a logical place to
search for the weapon and clothing used in the crime" (quoting Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d
189, 203 (Del. 1980))), and Bollingerv. State, 556 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976)
("[T]he logical inference is that a criminal [accused of assault and battery with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill], who believes his identity has been concealed, would return his
clothing and property to his home.").
485. See Ward, 350 Md. at 383, 712 A.2d at 539.
486. Id. ("Standard Baltimore City street maps reflect that Darley Avenue, where Ward
resided at No. 1634, is parallel to, and one block away from, Cliftview Avenue, on which the
murder occurred in the 1400 block.").
487. Id. In Blount v. State, 511 A.2d 1030 (Del. 1986), the Delaware Supreme Court
utilized this approach as well, finding that a reasonable magistrate could conclude that the
proximity of a defendant's residence to the crime scene may render immediate disposition
of the weapon more imprudent than retaining it. Id. at 1033; see also supra note 430.
488. Ward, 350 Md. at 384-85, 712 A.2d at 540.
489. 602 F.2d 1015, 1017 (1st Cir. 1979) (refusing to find probable cause to search a
defendant's home for the murder weapon because "[ilt is not reasonable to infer that
[the] defendant drove [home from the crime scene] and then casually placed a weapon
which had fired more than one bullet into a man on the shelf in his bedroom closet").
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
a suspect to hide a gun.4 90 The court concluded, however, that Charest
is overshadowed by more persuasive precedent in the Fourth Circuit
recognizing the validity of the criminal's tendency to hide contraband
in his or her home.491
b. Probable Cause to Search Ward's Vehicle.-The majority then
turned its attention to the probable cause determination linking
Ward's automobile to the weapon and ammunition used in the mur-
der of Alfred Stewart.492 The court began its analysis with a proclama-
tion that the search of the vehicle was upheld by "[t] he same probable
cause that supported issuance of the search warrant" for Ward's resi-
dence.493 In order to buttress this position, the court argued that a
single affidavit may provide probable cause to search more than one
place.494 The court listed several cases that stand for this proposi-
tion.49 5 In each case, Judge Rodowsky explained that the affidavit pro-
vided the requisite nexus between the items sought and the vehicles
searched. 496 The court finished its discussion of the applicable law by
citing several cases involving warrants for both a residence and a vehi-
cle in which the vehicle was used in leaving the scene of the acci-
dent.497 The court then concluded that the fact that Ward had
operated his car two days after the crime and that weapons and am-
munition were items of "continuing utility and value" enabled the
magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed to search his
vehicle.498
490. Id. ("Common sense tells us that it is unlikely that a murderer would hide in his
own home a gun used to shoot someone.").
491. Id. at 385-86, 712 A.2d at 540 (citing United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729
(4th Cir. 1988)).
492. Id. at 386, 712 A.2d at 540-41.
493. Id., 712 A.2d at 540.
494. Id., 712 A.2d at 541 (explaining that "'[i]t is permissible to have a single warrant
authorize search of a . . . described place and a described automobile...'" (quoting 2
LAFAvE, supra note 418, § 4.5(c), at 535)).
495. Id. at 385-89, 712 A.2d at 541-42. In support of the rule allowing a single affidavit to
authorize the search of multiple places, the court cited Vessels v. Estelle, 376 F. Supp. 1303,
1309 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (upholding a warrant that authorized the search of both the sus-
pect's residence and automobile), affd, 494 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1974), People v. Easley, 671
P.2d 813, 820 (Cal. 1983) (rejecting the defendant's theory that a "warrant which autho-
rizes the search of more than one location for the same property is per se invalid"), and
Williams v. State, 240 P.2d 1132, 1135, 1137-39 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952) (sustaining the
search of four places under a single warrant).
496. See Ward, 350 Md. at 386-89, 712 A.2d at 541-42.
497. Id at 388-89, 712 A.2d at 542 (pointing out that the fact that the vehicle was seen
leaving the scene was not the "threshold of validity").
498. Id. at 389, 712 A.2d at 542.
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c. The Dissent.-Chief Judge Bell wrote a visceral dissent
joined by Judges Eldridge and Wilner. The dissent begins with an ex-
planation of the facts,4 99 followed by a criticism of the inferences the
majority drew from those facts, which Judge Bell described as unsub-
stantiated "bald assumptions.""' The dissent explains the historical
derivations of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, including in that history a careful explanation of probable
cause, the standard of review, and the nexus requirement.51 The dis-
sent then turns its attention to the particular analysis employed by the
majority and, one-by-one, distinguishes or criticizes the decisions
upon which Judge Rodowsky bases his opinion .5 2 The dissent fo-
cused its ire on the fact that the majority failed to cite murder cases in
support of its conclusion.5 0 3 The dissent argued that cases involving
other types of criminal activity are far more likely to produce contra-
band which would be stored in the perpetrator's home.50 4 In a rob-
bery case, for example, the dissent explained that "one may
legitimately infer that he or she will keep the proceeds; that after all is
the only point of the endeavor."50 5 The dissent pointed out that the
crime of murder does not lend itself to such inferences. 50 6 The dis-
sent's most vehement protest is its conclusion that the nexus require-
ment has been abandoned.5 7 The dissent complained that even the
cases the majority relied upon had at least applied the correct test for
determining if a warrant supplies adequate nexus.50 8 The dissent con-
cludes that, as a result of its errors in choosing and applying the law of
the Fourth Amendment nexus requirement, the majority has
determined:
probable cause automatically will exist sufficient for the issu-
ance of a search warrant for both the residence and vehicle
of a suspect in a criminal investigation, whenever the instru-
499. Id. at 391-94, 712 A.2d 543-45 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
500. Id. at 392, 712 A.2d at 544.
501. Id. at 394-401, 712 A.2d 545-48.
502. See id. at 401-05, 712 A.2d 548-50 (focusing its disagreement on the majority's use of
Mills v. State, 278 Md. 262, 363 A.2d 491 (1976), and other cases not involving the crime of
murder).
503. Id. at 404, 712 A.2d at 549.
504. Id, 712 A.2d at 550.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 390, 712 A.2d at 543 (arguing that the majority opinion "abrogates the re-
quirement that... the affiant establish a reasonable nexus between the items sought by the
warrant and the premises or places to be searched").
508. Id. at 403, 712 A.2d at 549 ("Mills may actually have applied, albeit incorrectly, in
my view, the proper nexus standard[.]").
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mentality of the crime or key evidence relating to it is not
found on that suspect when he or she is questioned or
arrested.509
4. Analysis.-
a. The Court Accurately Affirmed That Probable Cause Existed to
Search Ward's Residence.-The majority's conclusion that the affidavit
supplied the magistrate with a sufficient nexus between the items
sought and Ward's home 10 is a solid, albeit unremarkable, example
of decision-making. It falls in line with the nexus principles of Mary-
land, most federal circuits, and many states.5"' As reasoned in the
opinions cited by the majority, the nexus between the items sought
and Ward's residence can be provided in large part by the fact that his
home was a reasonable place to hide such evidence.5" 2 Alone, the
inference that a home is a reasonable place to hide a weapon would
not have been enough. The majority makes this clear by not endors-
ing the bright line rule suggested in United States v. Jones.513 Instead,
the majority correctly points to other factors linking Ward's home
with the crime and holds that those factors serve to complete the ne-
cessary connection between the place searched and the evidence
sought.514 As a result, the Ward decision does not navigate Maryland
into unchartered Fourth Amendment waters with respect to probable
cause determinations for residences.
The majority stayed within the boundaries established by case law
which hold that one's residence is a normal place to hide a weapon,
509. Id. at 391, 712 A.2d at 543.
510. Ward, 350 Md. at 378-79, 712 A.2d at 536-37.
511. Id. at 379-86, 712 A.2d at 537-40; see also supra notes 424-443 and accompanying text
(discussing case law from Maryland and other state and federal jurisdictions that have con-
sidered the nexus requirement in relation to the search of residences).
512. Ward, 350 Md. at 379-80, 712 A.2d at 537-40; see also supra notes 479-485 and accom-
panying text (discussing case law cited by the Ward court in support of its holding that
there was a sufficient nexus between the items sought and the residence searched in the
instant case).
513. 994 F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (declining to decide the validity of a per se rule
in which the required nexus between the item sought and the defendant's residence would
always be established when a suspect commits a crime involving cash or a firearm).
514. Ward, 350 Md. at 376-77, 383-84, 712 A.2d at 536, 539. Those factors included the
proximity of Ward's house to the crime scene, the fact that the gun was an item of continu-
ing utility and value, and the fact that Ward could have believed that there were no wit-
nesses to the shooting who would report or identify him. Id.
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especially when the suspect operates under the belief that she was not
observed while executing the crime.515
In fact, the majority in Ward had more facts tying the weapon to
the place searched than it did in Mills v. State.516 In Mills, the court
did not rely on the inferences that the suspect believed his identity to
be a secret or that his prior arrest record showed any particular reason
for him to maintain possession of the knife after the crime.517 In-
deed, the affidavit in Mills contained nothing connecting the knife to
the defendant's home except for the facts that he lived in close prox-
imity to the area where the victims were kidnapped, he had been iden-
tified by the victims, and that he was arrested without the knife on his
person a short time after the crime was committed.518 Nevertheless,
the Mills court-without detailing the extent of the permitted infer-
ences-held that the underlying affidavit supplied enough informa-
tion to find a nexus.5 1 1 If anything, it was Mills, not Ward, that-as the
dissent complains-had:
[t]he natural and certain consequence . . . that probable
cause automatically will exist sufficient for the issuance of a
search warrant for the residence . . . of a suspect in a crimi-
nal investigation whenever the instrumentality of the crime
or key evidence relating to it is not found on [the] suspect
when he or she is questioned or arrested.52 °
The Ward majority based its assumptions on additional facts that were
not present in the Mills affidavit. 521 Thus, the majority steered its
holding well within the course charted by previous decisions discuss-
ing the nexus issues.
515. See supra notes 439-443 and accompanying text (examining the notion that suspects
are likely to hide weapons or contraband in their homes).
516. 278 Md. 262, 363 A.2d 491 (1976). For a general discussion of Mills, see supra
notes 440-443 and accompanying text. For a comparison of Mills and Ward, see supra notes
479484 and accompanying text.
517. Mills, 278 Md. at 276, 363 A.2d at 499. Quite to the contrary, the suspect in Mills
showed the victims off to several of his friends before releasing them. Mills v. State, 28 Md.
App. 300, 301, 345 A.2d 127, 128 (1975), affd, 278 Md. 262, 363 A.2d 491 (1976).
518. See Mills, 278 Md. at 276, 363 A.2d at 499 (offering a description of the facts as laid
out in the affidavit).
519. See id. at 280, 363 A.2d 501 (concluding that "Mills' home was a probable place for
secreting objects such as a hunting knife and a sheath").
520. Ward, 350 Md. at 390, 712 A.2d at 543 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). This, of course, is the
bright line rule raised in United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1993), which would
hold that a sufficient nexus will automatically exist between a suspect's home and the items
sought whenever the crime involves stolen goods and/or a weapon. Id. at 1056.
521. See supra notes 467-476 and accompanying text (outlining the factual basis upon
which the majority could begin to outline permissible inferences).
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b. The Majority Needed More Evidence to Affirm the Search of
Ward's Automobile.-The majority does, however, drift off course in its
analysis, reasoning, and conclusion regarding the validity of the
search warrant for Ward's car. The court concluded that "the same
probable cause that supported" the search warrant of Ward's house,
supported the search warrant for his car.5 22 The majority based its
nexus determination for Ward's house primarily on the inference,
supported by ample case law, that a suspect will likely hide a weapon
in his home.5 2 Yet, this body of law does not support the same infer-
ence for hiding a weapon or ammunition in a car. On the contrary,
the notion that a suspect would hide a weapon at home militates
sharply against the idea that a car is also a safe hiding place. Homes
are places to which the law grants protection;5 2 4 cars are not.525 As
such, it would not have been reasonable or likely for Ward to have
hidden such evidence in his car. Simply put, the same factors making
it likely that Ward hid his gun in his home render it unlikely that he
hid the gun in his car.
Unlike the support it drew from Mills for the search of Ward's
house, the majority cannot point to a single decision that provides a
basis for searching a car with so little factual grounding. Nor does
such a precedent exist. The majority authorized a search of the car
based on the fact that Ward's car was towed to the station two days
after the murder occurred. 526 No other facts in the affidavit implicate
the car.
The other factors the majority used to uphold the search of
Ward's house similarly do not apply to the vehicle. In fact, those de-
tails further indicate that Ward would not have used his car in the
commission of the crime in question.5 27 For example, in the section
522. Ward, 350 Md. at 386, 712 A.2d at 540.
523. See id. at 378-86, 712 A.2d at 537-40.
524. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (explaining that "'[a]t the very
core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion"' (alterations in original)
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))).
525. See supra notes 452-454 and accompanying text (pointing out the decreased privacy
interest an individual has in an automobile).
526. See Ward, 350 Md. at 389, 712 A.2d at 542 (stating that "we are informed by the
affidavit that Ward was operating his car within forty-eight hours after the murder"). Yet,
the affidavit does not explicitly say that Ward was "operating" his car. Id. at 375 n.2, 712
A.2d at 535 n.2 (providing the text of the relevant portions of the affidavit). Rather, the
document merely states that the car was brought to the station with Ward and that it had
expired tags. Id. It seems that the majority inferred that Ward was operating the car,
without labeling its conclusion as an inference.
527. Compare United States v. Christenson, 549 F.2d 53, 56 (8th Cir. 1977) (approving
the inference that evidence would be found in the car of defendant who had allegedly
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of the opinion devoted to discussing the search of Ward's residence,
the majority gave heed to the fact that Ward's home was located
within a few blocks of the scene of the crime. 28 Yet this same proxim-
ity illustrates that it is unlikely that Ward would have traveled to the
murder scene by car. As such, this case is distinguishable from cases
in which the use of a car in the commission of the crime supplied the
required nexus between the car and the item sought. 529 The use of a
car is unlikely when the defendant lives but a few blocks from the
crime scene.
A close examination of the court's reasoning reveals the origin of
its error. The court skipped a critical step in finding legal support for
its conclusion. The majority focused its defense of the automobile
search by listing a series of cases that allow the search of multiple
places.53 ° After detailing the fact patterns found in those decisions,
the majority concluded that the affidavit in Ward also validly allowed a
multi-place search 1.5 " The courtjumped inappropriately from the dis-
cussion of multiple-place affidavits to the final nexus determination
made on the Ward affidavit by the magistrate 2.5 " Thus, the court
failed to cite a single analogous precedent that buttressed its analysis
regarding the search of Ward's automobile. The majority reached its
decision without any sign that it considered whether the magistrate's
determination in Ward was analogous to similar determinations made
by other courts.
Furthermore, the cases cited by the majority differ demonstrably
with respect to the facts that would enable a magistrate to conclude
that a sufficient nexus exists to issue a warrant. The court did cite
three cases where the "affidavit ha[d] indicated that the vehicle may
committed three robberies within a few hours of each other and hence would have needed
the car to travel among the crime scenes).
528. See Ward, 350 Md. at 383, 712 A.2d at 539 (discussing cases where geographical
proximity played a role in the magistrate's determination of probable cause). A "standard
street map" of the neighborhood in question reveals that Clifton Avenue and Darley Ave-
nue run parallel to each other, one block apart. Id. The affidavit revealed that Ward lived
at 1634 Darley Avenue and that the murder had occurred at 1400 Clifton Avenue. Id. The
distance between the two locations could not have been more than three blocks.
529. See supra note 470 and accompanying text and notes 457461 and accompanying
text.
530. See Ward, 350 Md. at 386-89, 712 A.2d at 540-42; see also supra notes 494-496 and
accompanying text (citing various cases for the proposition that a single affidavit can pro-
vide probable cause for the search of multiple places).




have been used in leaving the scene of the crime." '533 Although that
detail was not dispositive by itself, it was a factor that those courts con-
sidered in finding that the car was sufficiently linked to the crime for
probable cause purposes.3 4 The majority in Ward invoked no similar
detail tending to show that the car may have been used. In spite of
the lack of analogous precedent, the majority still concluded that the
affidavit in question provided probable cause to search Ward's
Oldsmobile. 35
Still other facts in the affidavit render it even less likely that Ward
would have hidden incriminating evidence in his Oldsmobile. The
affidavit notes that the police detained Ward's automobile because it
had expired tags;53 6 as a result, it was "subject to towing under statu-
tory law." '537 It is clear enough that a car is a less reliable hiding place
than a house; a car with expired tags is a virtual invitation of police
scrutiny. Such a fact renders it even less likely that Ward would have
hidden a weapon in his car, and therefore-following the majority's
reasoning 5 38-- it should be less likely that the affidavit detailed a con-
nection between the items sought and the automobile.
While, as the dissent mistakenly laments, the majority has not
produced the end of the nexus requirement, it has broken new
ground with respect to establishing probable cause to search a car. As
noted previously, the majority's ruling with respect to the finding that
the affidavit sufficiently connected the items sought to Ward's home
fell within the scope of previous decisions.539 As such, the dissent is
533. Id. at 389, 712 A.2d at 542 (citing United States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.
1981); State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d I (N.D. 1971); State v. Higginbotham, 471 N.W.2d 24
(Wis. 1991)).
534. Id.
535. Id. One must be careful to distinguish between the possibility that an affidavit can
lay out the basis for a search of two different places and the question whether the affidavit
did in fact do so. If the majority allows a magistrate to draw a geographical inference from
the fact that the suspect's residence is a few blocks from the murder scene, it cannot rely
on precedent that allowed the search of a car based in part on the opposite geographical
inference. This is logically inconsistent. It does not dispute the premise that an affidavit
could provide probable cause to search more than one place.
536. Id. at 375 n.2, 712 A.2d at 535 n.2.
537. Brief of Respondent at 9, State v. Ward, 350 Md. 372, 712 A.2d 534 (1998) (No.
35).
538. Once again, this sentence refers to the majority's reliance on the notion that a
suspect's home is a reasonable place to hide contraband. See Ward, 350 Md. at 378-86, 712
A.2d at 536-40; see also supra notes 476-490 and accompanying text.
539. See supra notes 510-521 and accompanying text (explaining that the Ward court's
finding of a sufficient nexus between Ward's residence and the evidence sought fell within
the boundaries of Maryland precedent).
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misguided in its conclusion that Ward abrogates the nexus
requirement. 54
0
While the nexus requirement remains for residences, it is now
likely that anytime an officer can provide the required nexus to link
an item to a residence, probable cause will also exist to search the
suspect's car. The court has erased the difference between the charac-
ter of a home and that of car with respect to a suspect's propensity to
regard a car as a less reliable repository. Under this construction, all
of the precedent cited by the majority in support of a defendant's
tendency to hide items in his or her house also extends to any car
used within two days of the offense.541
5. Conclusion.-The Ward decision opens the door to searches
of many automobiles that, barring the fact that their owners have a
residence subject to search, should not be searched at all. By approv-
ing an affidavit which literally offered no evidence linking the car in
question with the instrumentalities of the crime, the majority felt
obliged to lump the car and house together and drew inferences
about automobiles that run contrary to well-established Fourth
Amendment analysis.
DENIS C. MITCHELL
D. Police Searches of Children's Belongings Conducted Pursuant to
Parental Consent
In In re Tariq A-R-Y,54 2 the Court of Appeals addressed the validity
of a police search of a minor child's jacket left in the family dining
room, conducted pursuant to parental consent, over the objection of
the child.543 The court held the search valid, reasoning that the child,
by leaving his vest in a common area of the house, assumed the risk
that his mother would consent to the search.544 In reaching its hold-
ing, the court relied on two factors. First, the mother's superior au-
thority over the premises gave her the authority to consent to a search
540. Ward, 350 Md. at 390, 712 A.2d at 543 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
541. In addition, the majority's reasoning could allow a crafty defense attorney to argue
that an automobile is now on the same plane as a residence for all Fourth Amendment
analysis. That is, a person now enjoys the same expectation of privacy in both her car and
home. As a result, the State needs the same showing of probable cause to conduct a search
of either repository.
542. 347 Md. 484, 701 A.2d 691 (1997), cert. denied, TariqY v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1105
(1998).
543. See id. at 487, 701 A.2d at 692.
544. See id. at 495-96, 701 A.2d at 696 (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.10(d), at 350 (2d ed. 1992)).
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of the dining room and the vest over the objection of her child. 45
Second, the court viewed the search of the room and the search of the
vest as a single search, rather than two distinct searches.546 Therefore,
the mother's valid consent to search the room authorized the officers
to search the child's jacket that was left on a table in the room.547
The Court of Appeals opinion is rather narrow, specifically apply-
ing to the case of clothing left in a common area of a home. Though
the opinion may provide some guidance, the validity of such searches
conducted in other areas of the home, and of personal effects other
than clothing, remains unanswered. The basis of the court's holding,
however, may be used to provide some insight into how Maryland
courts might decide other parental consent cases. For example, how
might a court treat a search of a child's clothing left in the child's
room? Though the answer to such questions is certainly not clear, the
validity of a search of a child's personal effects depends on both the
area in which the effects are located and the type of effects searched.
A change in both or either of these factors may alter the validity of a
search.
1. The Case.--On May 16, 1995, two Frederick County police of-
ficers responded to a "911 hang-up call."' 54 8 Petitioner, a sixteen-year-
old minor, met the officers at the front door of his mother's house.549
At the same time, the police observed a female walking away from the
house. 50 Both Petitioner and the female denied any knowledge of
the 911 call.551 While questioning Petitioner, the officers noticed an
odor of alcohol on his breath and marijuana in the air. 2 Items were
upset throughout the house and on the floor lay the butt of a cigar55
and an empty bottle of liquor.5 54
The officers brought their observations to the attention of Peti-
tioner's mother when she arrived shortly thereafter. 5 Consequently,
545. See text accompanying notes 681, 684-686.
546. See infra note 682 and accompanying text.
547. Tariq, 347 Md. at 496, 701 A.2d at 696; see also infra note 688.
548. Brief of Petitioner at 2, In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 701 A.2d 691 (1997) (No.
100) (internal quotation marks omitted).
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Tariq, 347 Md. at 487, 701 A.2d at 692.
552. Id. at 487-88, 701 A.2d at 692.
553. At trial, one of the officers testified that "the use of cigar wrappers is a common
method of smoking marijuana." Id. at 488 n.1, 701 A.2d at 692 n.1.
554. Id. at 487-88, 701 A.2d at 692.
555. Id. at 488, 701 A.2d at 692.
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she "consented to a search of the house 'and anything in it."'"56 Pur-
suant to the mother's consent,557 the officers made their way to the
dining room and picked up a vest from the dining room table.558 Pe-
titioner, who was sitting down next to the officers, stood and stated,
"That's my vest."'559 One of the officers told Petitioner to sit down and
the officer proceeded to search the vest pockets. 560 In one of the
pockets, the officer found a bag of marijuana.56' As the officers at-
tempted to arrest Petitioner, he struggled, punching and kicking both
of them. 562 Ultimately, Petitioner was charged with possession of mar-
ijuana, resisting arrest, and possession of paraphernalia.563
At his delinquency hearing, Petitioner moved to suppress the ma-
rijuana, arguing that the search of his vest violated his Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.564
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, noting that "it would
not seem to [the court] that there would be any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in this vest that was laying in open view on the dining
room table."56 5 Furthermore, "the owner of the premises gave con-
sent to search the premises and its contents. "566 Accordingly, Peti-
tioner was found "involved" in the possession of marijuana and
resisting arrest, but "not involved" in the possession of
paraphernalia.567
Thereafter, Petitioner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,
arguing that the search of his vest was an illegal search under the
Fourth Amendment and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying
556. Id.
557. The Court of Appeals deferred to the trial court's holding and determined that the
trial court "did not err in finding as a fact that the consent given by Tariq's mother encom-
passed the entire house and its contents." Id. at 489, 701 A.2d at 693 (citing Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1991) (upholding the search of a paper bag located in de-
fendant's car when defendant gave the officer permission to search for drugs in the car);
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982) (noting "[a] lawful search of fixed prem-
ises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found
and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required
to complete the search")). This does not mean that the consent necessarily validated the
search but merely that the scope of the consent included all the contents in the house.
The validity of the consent is a separate issue and is the focus of this note.
558. Id. at 488, 701 A.2d at 692.
559. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Tariq (No. 100); Tariq, 347 Md. at 488, 701 A.2d at 692.




564. Id. at 488, 489-91, 701 A.2d at 692, 693-94.
565. Id. at 489, 701 A.2d at 693 (internal quotation marks omitted).
566. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
567. Id. at 488, 701 A.2d at 692.
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the motion to suppress. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
lower court's ruling.5 6' The Court of Appeals then granted certiorari
to determine "whether the parent of an unemancipated minor child
can consent to a search of the child's personal belongings left in the
common area of the home, over the child's objection."569
2. Legal Background.-The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution protects persons from "unreasonable searches and
seizures."57 ° In determining what constitutes a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreason-
able, unless they fall within one of a number of recognized
exceptions.5 1 One of those recognized exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement is a search conducted pursuant to consent.572 Although
consent is often obtained from the party against whom the search is
targeted, this is not a requirement for a valid search. Courts acknowl-
edge that it is not necessary that consent is obtained from the party
against whom the search is directed, but merely that consent is ob-
tained from a party who has authority to consent to the search.573
568. Id,
569. Id. at 487, 701 A.2d at 692.
570. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads, in pertinent part, that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated." Id.
571. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (excluding evidence obtained from
FBI surveillance of a phone booth when agents failed to obtain a warrant); see also Ricks v.
State, 322 Md. 183, 188, 195, 586 A.2d 740, 743, 746 (Md. 1991) (upholding a search of the
defendant's luggage as a search incident to arrest). Many scholars argue, however, that
there are so many exceptions to the warrant requirement that it is misleading to say that a
search without a warrant is per se unreasonable. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (positing that the warrant requirement has "become so rid-
dled with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable"); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG &
DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 68 (5th ed. 1996) (noting that "the so
called per se rule can be restated as follows: A search and seizure in some circumstances is
presumed to be unconstitutional if no prior warrant is obtained, but in other circum-
stances the prior warrant is unnecessary to justify a search and seizure"); Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 801 (1994) (arguing that the rea-
sonableness clause, not the warrant clause, is "[t]he core of the Fourth Amendment").
572. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("It is ... well settled that
one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." (citing Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946))).
573. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72 (1974) (holding that search was
constitutional where the wife consented to a search of a shared closet that uncovered
money from a bank robbery in which her husband was a suspect); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S.
731, 740 (1969) (holding search valid in which a homeowner consented to a search of his
friend's duffel bag where homeowner had access to the bag); McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9,
812
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The United States Supreme Court recognized this aspect of con-
sent searches in Frazier v. Cupp.574 The Court was confronted with the
validity of a police search of a duffel bag conducted pursuant to the
consent of Petitioner's cousin.575 The search took place in the home
of Petitioner's cousin and, at the time of the search, Petitioner was not
present.57 6 Petitioner, however, had given his cousin permission to
use one compartment of the bag.577 The court found that because
the cousin had the authority to access the bag, Petitioner, by leaving
the bag with the co-user, "assumed the risk" that his cousin would al-
low someone else access to the bag.578 Where multiple persons share
the authority to use a container, one who leaves the container with a
co-user assumes the risk that the co-user will consent to a search of the
container. 579 Therefore, the search of a container pursuant to a co-
user's consent is valid against absent users of the container.58 °
Of some noteworthy significance, the Court rejected Petitioner's
argument that his cousin did not have access to the entire bag.581 Pe-
titioner argued that because he gave his cousin permission to use only
14, 202 A.2d 320, 322-23 (1964) (holding that a search was not unlawful when a father
consented to a search of the sun parlor in his house where his son sometimes slept);Jones
v. State, 13 Md. App. 309, 313-15, 283 A.2d 184, 187-88 (1971) (holding that a search of a
child's room conducted pursuant to the mother's consent was not unreasonable).
574. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). The ability of a third party to consent to a search of an area,
thereby binding the defendant, stems from the Fourth Amendment's requirement that
searches be reasonable. When officers obtain valid consent to search an item or area, from
one who has the authority to grant such consent, the search is inherently reasonable.
Therefore, even if the consenting party is not the target of the search, the government
action is still reasonable and the defendant may not claim a Fourth Amendment violation.
See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170 (noting that "the consent of one who possesses common au-
thority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with
whom that authority is shared").
575. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740. Petitioner and his cousin were indicted jointly for second-
degree murder. Petitioner was convicted by an Oregon state court, whereas his cousin
pled guilty to the offense. Id. at 732-33.
576. See id. at 732-33.
577. Id.
578. Id. Clothing obtained during the search of the bag was introduced by the State at
Petitioner's trial. Id.
579. See id.; see also Clarke v. Neil, 427 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (6th Cir. 1970) (citing Frazier as
support for its conclusion that a store owner could consent to a search of an item left in its
care by a defendant-in this case, a suit left at a dry cleaners).
580. See Frazier, 394 U.S. at 732-33; United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498 (1st Cir.
1994) (concluding that a friend of the defendant "had sufficient authority over [defend-
ant's] briefcase to consent to its search" where the friend had access to the contents of the
briefcase and the briefcase contained property belonging to both the defendant and his
friend); United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding a search of a foot-
locker containing effects of the defendant where the owner of the footlocker consented to
the search).
581. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 732-33.
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one compartment of the bag, his cousin's authority to consent to a
search was only valid for that one compartment. 582 However, the
Court rejected Petitioner's argument and noted that it would not "en-
gage in such metaphysical subtleties in judging the efficacy of [the co-
user's] consent. 581
The Supreme Court was again confronted with the validity of a
search conducted pursuant to the consent of a third party in United
States v. Matlock.5" 4 The Court held that a wife's consent to a search of
a closet, to which both the wife and her husband had access, would be
valid against her absent husband if the wife had common authority
over the area searched.585 The Court noted that:
when the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by
proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that con-
sent was given by the defendant, but may show that permis-
sion to search was obtained from a third party who possessed
common authority over or other sufficient relationship to
the premises or effects sought to be inspected.58 6
The Court cautioned, however, that:
[c] ommon authority is, of course, not to be implied from the
mere property interest a third party has in the property. The
authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest
upon the law of property.... but rests rather on mutual use
of the property by persons generally having joint access or
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recog-
nize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed
the risk that one of their number might permit the common
area to be searched.58 7
582. Id.
583. Id.; see also 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 544, § 3.10(d) (5), at 24041 (noting that
Matlock is ambiguous as to whether a third party's ability to consent to a search of a room
and everything in it is "affected by the fact that the defendant maintained exclusive control
as to certain areas or effects").
584. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
585. Id. at 169-71, 177.
586. Id. at 171.
587. Id. n.7 (citations omitted). In support of the contention that the authority to con-
sent to a search is not derived from the law of property, the Court noted two earlier cases.
In Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), the Supreme Court invalidated a search of
a tenant's home where police obtained consent from his landlord. Similarly, a hotel clerk
was deemed unable to consent to a search of defendant's hotel room in Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964).
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The Matlock Court recognized that a search, conducted pursuant to
consent by a third party who has common authority over the area or
the personal effects searched, is valid against an absent defendant. 588
Maryland courts have also addressed the issue of third-party con-
sent and specifically searches of a child's belongings conducted pursu-
ant to parental consent.589 In 1964, prior to the Supreme Court cases
of Frazier and Matlock, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in McCray v.
State,59° held valid a father's consent to a police search of a room in
his home where his son sometimes slept.5 91 The son, who had been
arrested and detained by police prior to the search in connection with
a burglary, was not present.592 The court explained that the father,
"[a] s an owner and co-occupant of the house," had the authority to
consent to a search of the room and "to bind his son in so doing.
5 3
The ruling, which relied on the father's authority over the prem-
ises, 59 4 is consistent with the later Supreme Court cases. 595 The Court
588. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169-71. The Supreme Court expanded the doctrine of
third-party consent when, in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), the Court adopted
the doctrine of apparent authority. The Rodriguez Court held that, when it is reasonable
for police to believe that the party consenting to the search has the authority to consent,
the search is valid regardless of the consenter's actual authority to consent to the search.
See id. at 186. After complaining to police that she had been beaten by Rodriguez, Ms.
Fisher accompanied officers to Rodriguez's apartment. During her conversation with the
officers, Fisher referred to the apartment as "our" apartment and said that she had clothes
and furniture there. She also told the officers that Rodriguez was sleeping in the apart-
ment but she would let them in with her key. Upon entering the apartment, the officers
observed, in plain view, drug paraphernalia and containers of cocaine. Id. at 180. The
officers arrested Rodriguez and seized the cocaine and drug paraphernalia. Id. Because
Fisher had vacated the premises several weeks earlier, paid no rent, and did not have her
name on the lease, the trial court held that Fisher lacked the authority to consent to the
police entry of the apartment. Id. The Supreme Court, however, remanded the case to the
appellate court of Illinois to "determine whether the officers reasonably believed that
Fisher had the authority to consent." Id. at 189. But see State v. Diaz, 925 P.2d 4, 8 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting the apparent authority doctrine on state constitutional grounds
and holding that a third party must have actual authority to consent to a search).
589. See McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 14, 202 A.2d 320, 322-23 (1964) (validating a police
search of a room in the parents' home where the defendant minor child sometimes slept);
Waddell v. State, 65 Md. App. 606, 616-17, 501 A.2d 865, 870-71 (1985) (upholding a po-
lice search conducted pursuant to a parent's consent where the child defendant paid rent
but the mother had access to the child's room); Tate v. State, 32 Md. App. 613, 618-21, 363
A.2d 622, 626-27 (1976) (finding the mother's consent to search the minor defendant's
room valid over the objection of the defendant);Jones v. State, 13 Md. App. 309, 315, 283
A.2d 184, 188 (1971) (upholding a police search of a child's room conducted pursuant to
the consent of the child's mother).
590. 236 Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320 (1964).
591. Id. at 14, 202 A.2d at 322-23.
592. See id. at 12, 202 A.2d at 321.




of Appeals recognized that a party who has authority to consent to a
search of an area, even though the party is not a target of the search,
may validly consent to a search.
Seven years later, in Jones v. State,596 the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland validated a search of a child's room based on parental
consent.597 The child against whom the search was aimed was a mi-
nor, paid no rent, and was present at the time of the search but did
not object to the search. 5 "9 Though the mother sometimes entered
the room to wake up the defendant, she did not regularly enter the
room for purposes of cleaning the room. 99 In determining the ca-
pacity of a parent to consent to a search of his or her child's room, the
court noted that a parent has a "superior right to exclude others, in-
cluding the [child], from her home, and also from the very bedroom
that the [child] used."600 Consequently, the court held that a parent
may consent to a search of a child's room even though the child is
present.601 Notwithstanding its approval of the search, the Court of
Special Appeals noted that because the child did not object to the
search, the question remained whether a parent could consent to the
search of a child's room in the face of a child's objection.60 2
The effect of a child's objection to a search was addressed by the
Court of Special Appeals in Tate v. State.6" 3 The court concluded that
a parent's consent to a search of a child's room makes the search valid
over the objection of the child.60 4 The defendant, a seventeen-year-
old minor, did not pay rent for the use of the room in his mother's
house and had begun using the room only a few weeks prior to the
search.60 5 Although the mother testified that the child had sole use of
the room, the court reasoned that the mother not only had common
authority over the area searched but had superior authority because
she "had the sole control, power and superior right to exclude others,
595. See United States v. Maflock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (noting that the ability of
a third party to validly consent to a search of an area rests on "mutual use" of or 'Joint
access" to the property).
596. 13 Md. App. 309, 283 A.2d 184 (1971).
597. Id. at 315, 283 A.2d at 188.
598. Id, at 310-11, 283 A.2d at 185.
599. Id. at 310, 283 A.2d at 185.
600. Id. at 315, 283 A.2d at 187-88.
601. See id., 283 A.2d at 188; see also George L. Blum, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence,
55 A.L.R. 5th 125, § 4 (1998) (listing cases in which state courts upheld searches con-
ducted pursuant to the consent of a parent even though the child was present at the time
of the search).
602. See Jones, 13 Md. App. at 315, 283 A.2d at 188.
603. 32 Md. App. 613, 363 A.2d 622 (1976).
604. Id. at 619-21, 363 A.2d at 626-27.
605. Id. at 619, 363 A.2d at 626.
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including the appellant," from the room.60 6 Furthermore, in an ap-
parent attempt to place some limit on the effects of the holding, the
court noted that the facts in Tate did not involve the search of per-
sonal effects but only the room of the child.60 7 Though the Court of
Special Appeals recognized that a parent's superior authority over the
premises enables the parent to consent to searches of areas of the
house over the objection of the child, its own limitation to the specific
facts of the case implied that similar reasoning does not necessarily
expand to encompass searches of personal effects within the area.
The Court of Special Appeals confronted another parental con-
sent case in Waddell v. State.608 The defendant lived in a room of his
parents' house for which he paid twenty dollars a week in rent.60 9 His
mother had access to the room "at all times" because she used the
closet in the room.610 Furthermore, the defendant was not present at
the time of the search. 61 ' The Court concluded that under Matlock,
the search was valid because the mother had access to the room and
therefore common authority over the area searched.612 By allowing
his mother unrestricted access to his bedroom, the court held that the
defendant assumed the risk that his mother would consent to a search
of this room.613
Although Maryland courts have long recognized that parties who
share common authority over an area can consent to a search of that
606. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones, 13 Md. App. 309, 283 A.2d
187). Many jurisdictions have followed similar reasoning, namely, that a parent is able to
validate a search in the face of an objecting child because the parent has not just common
authority over the area or effects to be searched but has superior authority over the area or
effects. See 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 544, § 3.10(e), at 242. Thus, the reasoning is still
consistent with Matlock, where the court merely held that consent by a third party with
common authority was valid against an absent defendant. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 169-71 (1974). Although, Matlock does not answer the question whether a third party
can consent to a search aimed at a co-user of the property when that co-user is present and
objecting, the superior authority of the consenting party over the area or effects to be
searched can overcome any objection of the co-user. See Tate, 32 Md. App. at 619, 363 A.2d
at 626 (mother consenting to a search of her son's bedroom); see also Blum, supra note 601,
at 195-98 (noting cases where "a parent may consent to the warrantless search of his or her
home for evidence against his child even though the child has refused to consent to such a
search"). But see id. at 199-200 (summarizing cases in which "courts held that a parent may
not consent to a warrantless search of a home or, at least, of areas under joint control with
a child, where the child has refused to consent to such a search").
607. Tate, 32 Md. App. at 620, 363 A.2d at 627.
608. 65 Md. App. 606, 501 A.2d 865 (1985). The opinion was written by Judge Karwacki,
the author of the Tariq majority opinion.
609. Id. at 615-16, 501 A.2d at 870.
610. Id. at 616, 501 A.2d at 870.
611. Id. at 615-16, 501 A-2d at 870.
612. Id. at 617, 501 A.2d at 871.
613. Id.
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area, they have also recognized that such common authority over an
area does not necessarily validate searches of items in that area.614
The Court of Appeals examined this limit on the effective scope of
third-party consent in Owens v. State.615 The defendant left a closed
luggage bag in the apartment of a friend where he previously stayed as
an overnight guest.616 The defendant, who planned to return for his
bag, did not give his friend permission to open the bag.617 The court
found the friend in whose home the bag was located incapable of val-
idly consenting to a search of the bag.618 It reasoned that the defen-
dant's friend "did not possess common authority over [the
defendant's] bag and had no other sufficient relationship to its con-
tents to validate any consent by her to search the bag. '6 19 Although
the friend had authority to consent to a search of her apartment, she
did not have the authority to consent to a search of a luggage bag left
in her apartment when she had no access to that item. 620 Thus, when
a party leaves a closed suitcase in the home of another, asks him or
her to hold the suitcase for him, and gives no permission to open the
suitcase, that party does not assume the risk that the homeowner will
consent to a search of the suitcase.6 21
Other courts have made this same distinction between authority
over the room and authority over personal effects within the room.6 2 2
614. See Owens v. State 322 Md. 616, 633, 589 A.2d 59, 67 (1991) (holding that the
owner of the premises could not validly consent to a search of the defendant's bag left in
his home when the homeowner had no right to access the bag). Justice O'Connor, in a
concurring opinion in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) noted that "[a] privacy interest in a home itself need not be coextensive with a
privacy interest in the contents or movements of everything situated inside the home." Id.
at 725. She went on to explain that, therefore, in the context of a third party's consent to a
search, "[a] homeowner's consent to a search of the home may not be effective consent to
a search of a closed object inside the home." Id.
615. 322 Md. 616, 589 A.2d 59 (1991).
616. Id. at 619, 589 A.2d at 60. The bag found its way to the apartment when the de-
fendant's friend, as a favor to the defendant, retrieved the bag from a third party. Id. After
staying at the apartment for a night, the defendant left the bag at the apartment. Id.
617. Id.
618. Id. at 633, 589 A.2d at 67.
619. Id.
620. See id. at 630-33, 589 A.2d at 66-67.
621. See id. at 630. The court likened the circumstances in this case to a gratuitous
bailment: "There is an expectation of privacy because the bailor has sought to maintain
the security and privacy of his effects in a place he regarded as a safe place for storage." Id.
622. See, e.g., United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 865 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting
that "ownership and control of property does not automatically confer authority over con-
tainers within it" (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725-26 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring))). But cf I LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 544, § 3.10(d) (5), at 240 ("[W]hile it
has sometimes been suggested that under Matlock police are obligated to ascertain the
possibly unique pattern of living arrangements between defendant and the third party so
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Even more noteworthy is that many jurisdictions have made this dis-
tinction in the context of parental searches.623 For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in United States
v. Block,6 24 concluded that, although a mother had the authority to
consent to a search of her twenty-three-year-old son's room in her
house, that authority did not extend to a locked footlocker located in
that room to which the mother had no access.6 25 The court reasoned
that " [w] hile authority to consent to [a] search of a general area must
obviously extend to most objects in plain view within the area, it can-
not be thought automatically to extend to the interiors of every dis-
crete enclosed space capable of search within the area. 626
Furthermore, the court noted that, under Matlock, there can only be
an assumption of risk when one shares common authority over the
area or effects to be searched.627
Thus, there is no assumption of risk if one leaves a container in
the home of another where the homeowner is prohibited from enter-
ing the container.628 But when a container is left with a third person
who shares common access to the container, the absent party "retains
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the place or object,"629 and
as to determine the extent of the 'common authority,' courts generally are not inclined to
be that demanding.").
623. See United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Why a lack of
privacy in the room implies a lack of privacy interest in the contents of the containers
remains a mystery."); United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 540-41 (4th Cir. 1978) (invali-
dating a search, based on the consent of defendant's mother to search the defendant's
bedroom, of a footlocker located in the room); United States v. Robinson, 999 F. Supp.
155, 163 (D. Mass. 1998) (concluding that a mother's authority to consent to a search of
her son's room did not extend to the pockets of a pair of pants on the floor of the room);
United States v. Whitfield, 747 F. Supp. 807, 811-12 (D.D.C. 1990) (finding the mother
lacked actual authority to consent to a search of her son's jackets hanging in his closet),
rev'd on other grounds, 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991); In re Scott K., 595 P.2d 105, 110-11
(Cal. 1979) (stressing that "[c]ommon authority over personal property may not be im-
plied from the father's proprietary interest in the premises" nor "may it be premised on
the nature of the parent-child relation"); State v. Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d 405, 407-08
(N.D. 1980) ("The authority of a third party to consent extends only to those areas and
objects over which that person has common authority. Such authority does not extend to
those areas or effects which are exclusively those of the subject of the search." (citing Block,
590 F.2d 535; Scott, 595 P.2d 105)).
624. 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978).
625. Id. at 541.
626. Id.
627. Id. at 539-40.
628. See Owens v. State, 322 Md. 616, 633, 589 A.2d 59, 67 (1991) (holding that the
owner of an apartment did not have the authority to consent to a search of defendant's bag
left behind in the apartment).
629. Block, 590 F.2d at 539 n.5.
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therefore assumes the risk that the co-user will consent to a search of
630the container.
Although courts have recognized that the party giving consent to
a search of personal effects must have common authority in regard to
those personal effects, regardless of any common authority over the
general area,63 ' not all personal effects are regularly afforded such
protection. In particular, some courts have refused to apply this dis-
tinction to searches of clothes pockets. In United States v. Buckles,6 32
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an owner can
consent to a search of his home, including the search of an absent
party's jacket.633 The defendant in Buckles and two companions were
overnight guests in a home owned by a husband and wife.6 3 4 Police
went to the house with traffic warrants for the husband.63 5 Although
the husband was out of town, the wife consented to a search of the
house.63 6 The police, after taking the defendant and his two compan-
ions into custody, seized defendant's jacket and searched the pockets,
finding two money orders that were reported missing.6 7 The court
held that the wife, who possessed the authority to consent to a search
of the premises, accordingly had the authority to consent to the police
seizure and search of the jacket.6 8
Similarly, in State v. Fountain,639 the Supreme Court of South Da-
kota held that a party that left a jacket in the home of another failed
to "protect its privacy" and "left the jacket behind .. .subject to the
risk that [the owner] might permit its inspection. '64 0 Defendant was
staying as a guest in an apartment when police went to the apartment
with outstanding warrants for his arrest.6 4 ' The tenant allowed the
630. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (holding that co-user had authority to
consent to a search of a bag when defendant left the bag in the co-user's home).
631. See supra notes 615-627 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts
invalidated searches of closed containers when the parties that granted consent, though
able to validly consent to a search of the room in which the containers were located, did
not possess a common authority over the containers).
632. 495 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1974).
633. Id. at 1381-82.
634. Id. at 1381.
635. Id.
636. Id.
637. Id. The defendant came into possession of several blank money orders that were
shipped by the American Express Company to an agent in Kansas City, but never received
by the agent. Id. at 1378. The defendant then forged and negotiated some of the money
orders. Id. at 1378-79.
638. Id. at 1381-82.
639. 534 N.W.2d 859 (S.D. 1995).
640. Id. at 864-65.
641. Id. at 861-62.
820 [VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
police to enter and place defendant under arrest.642 After police es-
corted defendant off the premises, they asked permission to search
the apartment.643 Pursuant to the tenant's consent, officers searched
the apartment.644 When the tenant's child notified the officers that a
jacket belonged to the defendant, officers searched the pockets and
found LSD.64 5 The Supreme Court of South Dakota concluded that
the tenant had the authority to consent to a search.64 6 It reasoned
that the defendant assumed the risk that the tenant might permit in-
spection of the jacket when "he chose not to exercise and maintain
control over the jacket when he left it behind." '647
Other courts, however, have recognized a distinction between the
search of a room and the search of pockets of clothing. The United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, in United States v.
Robinson,648 examined the validity of a search of various containers in
a child's bedroom conducted pursuant to parental consent.6 49
Among the items searched were a plastic videocassette container and
the pockets of a pair of pants.650 The Court concluded that, although
the mother could consent to a search of the room, she could not val-
idly consent to a search of the pants pockets.65 ' The child maintained
an expectation of privacy in the pants pockets that protected the con-
tents from a search conducted pursuant to his mother's consent. 652
The Court noted that, unlike the pants, a plastic videocassette box
does not afford the user a high expectation of privacy.653 Accordingly,
the Court found the search of the videocassette box valid.654
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, in United States v. Witfield,655 noted that a mother's consent to
642. Id.
643. Id. at 862.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. Id. at 864-65.
647. Id. at 865.
648. 999 F. Supp. 155 (D. Mass. 1998).
649. See id. at 160-63.
650. Id.
651. Id. at 160, 162-63.
652. See id. at 163 (noting that pockets "historically have a high expectation of privacy").
653. Id. at 162.
654. Id. In the alternative, the Court based the validation of the search of the video-
cassette box on the doctrine of apparent authority. Id. It noted that, considering the sur-
rounding circumstances and the absence of any evidence that the mother "made her lack
of authority to consent to a search of the movie box known to the searching officers[,] ...
the officers had a reasonable basis for relying on [the mother's] consent to search the
movie box." Id.
655. 747 F. Supp. 807 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd, 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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search her child's room did not extend to pockets of clothing hanging
in the closet.6 56 Although the court held the search of the pockets
valid under the doctrine of apparent authority,657 and accordingly de-
nied the motion to suppress the evidence retrieved from the clothing
pockets, it stated that " [t] he government.., failed to carry its burden
of establishing as a matter of fact and law that any access retained by
defendant's mother.. . extended to the pockets of defendant's jackets
in his closet."65" The cases indicate that it is this critical determina-
tion of the privacy interest protected by a container that is often deter-
minative of searches of personal effects conducted pursuant to
parental consent.
The ability of a homeowner to consent to a search of a common
area of his or her house has clearly been recognized in Supreme
Court and Maryland case law. Furthermore, Maryland courts have
recognized that such authority extends, at least under some circum-
stances, to a child's room in the house. Where the child objects to the
search of his or her room, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
has held that the parent's superior authority over the premises, none-
theless, enables the parent to validly consent to a search. Such supe-
rior authority enables the parent to override the child's objection.
Prior to Tariq, however, no Maryland court had addressed the particu-
lar issue raised by that case: whether a parent can, over the objection
of the child, validly consent to a search of the child's clothing left in a
common area of the house. Although the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held that a luggage bag, left in the home of another, preserves an
expectation of privacy in its contents so that a third party may not
validly consent to a search of the bag, the question of whether cloth-
ing similarly preserves an expectation of privacy remained unan-
swered. Under some situations, courts outside Maryland have held
that the owner of clothing maintains an expectation of privacy in the
clothing. At the same time, however, some courts have concluded
that clothing does not effectively preserve one's privacy.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Maryland Court of Appeals, in a
5-2 decision,659 held that Petitioner's mother had the authority to val-
656. Id. at 811-12.
657. The Court held that the agent conducting the search "reasonably believed that
defendant's mother had authority to consent to the entire search of defendant's room and
all of its contents." Id. at 812.
658. Id.
659. The dissenting opinion written by Judge Eldridge, and joined by Chief Judge Bell,
argued that, in light of Petitioner's objection, the scope of the mother's consent was am-
biguous and, therefore, the search of the vest pockets was unreasonable. Tariq, 347 Md. at
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idly consent to a police search of Petitioner's vest over the objection of
Petitioner.66 ° The court noted three grounds on which searches au-
thorized by a parent have been upheld. First, that "the parent is the
head of the household or owner of the property. 6 61 Second, that
"the parent is exercising his or her parental authority and control over
the unemancipated minor child."6 6 2 Third, that "the parent is a co-
tenant or common resident of jointly occupied property. "663
Although both parties argued the issue of whether a parent, through
the exercise of parental authority, can limit a child's protection under
the Fourth Amendment,664 the court did not decide this issue.665
Rather, the court reached its holding by relying on the mother's status
as "head of the household" and "common resident ofjointly occupied
property. '666  The Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the
496-97, 701 A.2d at 697 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The dissent's reasoning relied on a state-
ment by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that "[i] t is the government's burden to
establish that a third party had authority to consent to a search ... [and that] burden
cannot be met if the agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed with-
out making further inquiry." Id. at 500-01, 701 A.2d at 699 (second alteration in original)
(omission in original) (quoting United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.
1991)).
660. Tariq, 347 Md. at 496, 701 A.2d at 696-97.
661. Id. at 493, 701 A.2d at 695.
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. See Brief of Petitioner at 16-20, Tariq (No. 100) (arguing that parents cannot waive
a minor's rights under the Fourth Amendment). Brief of Respondent at 13-19, In re Tariq
A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 701 A.2d 691 (1997) (No. 100) (noting that "any privacy interest that
Tariq had in his vest or in the controlled dangerous substance was subordinate to the right
of his parent to ascertain whether he possessed marijuana"). The California Supreme
Court addressed the issue of a parent's ability to waive their child's Fourth Amendment
rights in In re Scott K, 595 P.2d 105 (Cal. 1979). Although the consenting father lacked
access to his minor son's toolbox, the state argued that a parent's interest in the child's
"health and welfare" gives rise to a parent's ability to consent to a police search. Id. at 107.
The Court, however, invalidated the search, concluding that a minor is afforded the full
protection of Article 1, Section 13 of the California constitution. Id. at 109.
665. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 493, 701 A.2d at 695.
666. Id. Because the court did not address the issue of a parent's exercise of parental
authority over a minor child in the context of consent searches, the court did not deter-
mine whether a parent can limit a child's protection under the Fourth Amendment. The
opinion, however, is misleading in that it refers to the act of consent by a third party as a
"waiver" of the Fourth Amendment rights of an individual. Id. at 493, 701 A.2d at 695.
Such language might seem to imply that a third party, in this particular case a parent, can
limit the protection that the Fourth Amendment provides to another. The United States
Supreme Court has likewise referred to third party consent as a waiver of Fourth Amend-
ment rights. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 171 (1974) (discussing whether "a wife's
permission to search the residence in which she lived with her husband could 'waive his
constitutional rights'"). A more accurate description of third party consent is not a waiver
of a right but rather an action that makes the search inherently reasonable. The issue is
not "whether the fight to be free of searches has been waived, but whether the right to be
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Court of Special Appeals in Jones667 and Waddel3 68 for the proposition
that a parent possesses superior authority over the premises.669 Thus,
"[t]he consent of a parent to search his or her residence will act to
bind a child ... because ordinarily that parent has shared, if not supe-
rior, access to or authority over the area and/or items to be
searched."67 ° The court also noted Tate for the proposition that, even
where the child pays rent, a parent may validly consent to a search of a
room under the theory of common authority where the parent had
shared access to the room. Recognizing that Petitioner's mother had
the authority to consent to the search of a common area of the house,
the court concluded that Petitioner's mother, therefore, could validly
consent to a search of a vest left in a common area.67' The court
noted that petitioner was living in his mother's home, paid no rent,
was a minor, and that the vest was left in a common area of the
house.6 7 2 The court reasoned that, under these circumstances, Peti-
tioner "assumed the risk that his mother, who had authority in her
own right to consent to a search of the vest left in a common area of
the house, would herself look into his vest pockets, or expose his vest
to a search by others. ' 67' The court, therefore, upheld the trial
court's denial of the motion to suppress.
4. Analysis.-In a somewhat conclusory opinion,6 74 the court
upheld the search because the mother could consent, in her own
right, to a search of Petitioner's vest left in a common area675 and,
therefore, the child assumed the risk that the mother would consent
to a search of the vest.6 76 The concept of assumption of risk is depen-
free of unreasonable searches has been violated." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 187
(1990).
667. 13 Md. App. 309, 283 A.2d 184 (1971); see also supra note 600 and accompanying
text.
668. 65 Md. App. 606, 501 A.2d 865 (1985).
669. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 494, 701 A.2d at 696.
670. Id., 701 A.2d at 695-96 (citing Waddel4 65 Md. App. 606, 501 A.2d 865; Tate v. State,
32 Md. App. 613, 363 A.2d 622 (1976);Jones, 13 Md. App. 309, 283 A.2d 184).
671. Id. at 496, 701 A.2d at 696-97.
672. Id.
673. Id.
674. In his brief, Petitioner argued that he maintained a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his vest pocket so that his mother could not validly consent to a search of the
pocket. Brief of Petitioner at 9-14, Tariq (No. 100). Although the court disagreed with
such an argument, they did not explain the basis for their disagreement. Rather, they
summarily dismissed all of Petitioner's arguments by replying that "[t]he short answer...
is that petitioner left his vest in the common area within the family home, i.e., the dining
room." Tariq, 347 Md. at 495-96, 701 A.2d at 696.
675. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 492, 701 A.2d at 695.
676. Id.
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dant on the ability of a third party to consent to the search of the
particular area or item. In the case of parental consent searches, a
child's assumption of risk inherently depends on the parent's ability
to consent to the search in his or her own right.677 Where the parent
has the authority to consent to a search of the item in his or her own
right, the child has assumed the risk that the parent might consent.678
Where the parent has no such authority, however, the child has not
assumed the risk that the parent might consent to a search.679 The
concept of assumption of risk relies on a third party's common au-
thority over the particular area or item searched.68 °
Although the court's opinion did not clearly identify the basis of
the mother's ability to consent to the search of the vest in her own
677. See United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 539-40 (4th Cir. 1978). The Block court
noted:
it is well settled that [the third party's authority] may be based simply upon the
fact that the third person shares with the absent target of the search a common
authority over, general access to, or mutual use of the place or object sought to be
inspected under circumstances that make it reasonable to believe that the third
person has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the absent
target has assumed the risk that the third person may grant this permission to
others.
Id. (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (noting that common
authority is based, not on the law of property, but on mutual access or joint control of the
property); United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1975) (upholding a
search of defendant's bedroom, conducted pursuant to the consent of defendant's
mother, where the mother "had access to and complete control of the entire premises,
including the bedroom"); United States v. Gradowski, 502 F.2d 563, 564 (2d Cir. 1974)
(per curiam) (upholding a search of defendant's automobile trunk where the people with
whom defendant left his car, and to whom defendant gave his keys, consented to the
search); see also supra notes 587, 613, 639-647 and accompanying text (citing cases that
relied, in part, on the assumption of risk doctrine).
678. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (holding that a third party could
validly consent to a search of defendant's luggage bag because defendant assumed the risk
that a co-user of the bag might consent to a search in her own right).
679. See Block, 590 F.2d at 540-41 (finding no assumption of risk when defendant's
mother had access to the room but not the footlocker inside the room); United States v.
Robinson, 999 F. Supp. 155, 162-63 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that the mother's authority to
consent to a search of defendant's room did not extend to the pockets of his pants on the
floor of the room); United States v. Whitfield, 747 F. Supp. 807, 812 (D.D.C. 1990) (validat-
ing the search of defendant's jacket under the doctrine of apparent authority but noting
that the mother lacked any actual authority to consent to a search of the jacket even
though she could consent to a search of the room), rev'd, 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
680. To say that one assumed the risk that a third party might consent to a search be-
cause he or she left personal effects in a particular area is merely a conclusory statement,
and yet this is exactly what the Maryland Court of Appeals said in Tariq. The opinion
stated that the mother had superior authority over the room and that, therefore, the child
assumed the risk of a potential search. Tariq, 347 Md. at 496, 701 A.2d at 696. But the
court never addressed the essential intermediate step; why the mother's authority over the
room extended to the vest.
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right, the conclusion appeared to rely on two factors. First, the court
noted that the mother had common and superior authority over the
room. 68 1 Second, the court did not recognize a significant distinction
between a search of the room and a search of the pockets of a vest
located in the room.68 2 The Tariq court appeared to follow those ju-
risdictions that hold that one who has the authority to consent to a
search of a common area of a house also has the authority to consent
to a search of pockets of clothing in the common area, regardless of
his or her authority over the clothing alone.68 3
Considering these factors one at a time, the court's reasoning
progressed in the following manner. First, the mother's superior au-
thority over the room enabled her to validly consent to a search of the
room.6 8 4 As the Court of Special Appeals recognized in Tate v.
State,68 and the Court of Appeals agreed, a parent's superior author-
ity may override the objection of the child.686 Second, the lack of
distinction between a search of the room and a search of the vest
pockets expanded the valid search to include the pockets. 687 In the
court's view, because the search of the room and the search of the vest
pockets were one and the same, the mother's superior authority en-
compassed the vest pockets.688 Therefore, the mother could validly
consent to a search of the vest pockets over Petitioner's objection.689
By ignoring any distinction between the room and the vest pockets,
the court was able to hold the search valid while respecting the hold-
ing in Owens,690 that a third party must have common authority over
681. Id.
682. Rather than treat the search of the dining room and the search of Petitioner's vest
as separate searches, the court viewed the police action as one search. See id. at 495-96, 701
A.2d at 696.
683. See United States v. Buckles, 495 F.2d 1377, 1381-82 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding that a
homeowner's authority to consent to a search of her home authorized the homeowner to
consent to a search of defendant's jacket); State v. Fountain, 534 N.W.2d 859, 864-65 (S.D.
1995) (same).
684. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 496, 701 A.2d at 696.
685. 32 Md. App. 613, 363 A.2d 622 (1976); see also supra notes 604-607.
686. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 496, 701 A.2d at 696-97.
687. See supra note 682.
688. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 496, 701 A.2d at 696-97.
689. See id.
690. 322 Md. 616, 589 A.2d 59 (1991). Though the Tariq court did not address the
Owens opinion, the court effectively distinguished the two cases by concluding that cloth-
ing, when left in the common area of a house, does not afford the same protection of one's
privacy as does a luggage bag. Compare Tariq, 347 Md. at 496, 701 A.2d at 696 (upholding
the search of a vest left in a common area of a house where the defendant's mother con-
sented to a search of the house) with Owens, 322 Md. at 632, 589 A.2d at 66 (holding
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a luggage bag left in the living room
of a friend's apartment). Just as a parent recognizes superior authority over the premises,
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the container to validly consent to a search of the container.69 1 Be-
cause there was no evidence that the mother possessed common au-
thority over the vest pockets, 692 the court could not view the searches
of the dining room and vest as two distinct searches, while maintain-
ing that the search of the vest was valid.69 3 Certainly it would appear
that, if the court were to recognize a separate privacy interest in the
container, the parent must establish common authority over the
container to consent to a search.6 94 But as the Tariq court has recog-
nized, articles of clothing left in a common area do not preserve a
distinct area of privacy that is separate from the common area.6 95 The
relative to his or her child, it follows that a homeowner or tenant exerts "superior authority
.... including the right to exclude him from the premises," Tariq, 347 Md. at 494, 701
A.2d at 696 (omission in original) (quoting Tate v. State, 32 Md. App. 613, 619-20, 363
A.2d 622, 626 (1976)), relative to houseguests. Thus, after Tariq, although a houseguest
maintains an expectation of privacy in a luggage bag, see Owens, 322 Md. at 630, 589 A.2d at
65-66, that guest would not maintain an expectation of privacy in clothes pockets, see Tariq,
347 Md. at 496, 701 A.2d at 696 (failing to find a distinction between the search of a room
and the search of jackets in the room).
691. See Owens, 322 Md. at 633, 589 A.2d at 67 (holding that a friend of the defendant, at
whose apartment the defendant left a luggage bag, did not have the authority to consent to
a search of the bag); supra notes 624-630 and accompanying text (explaining the distinc-
tion between authority to consent to a search of a room and authority to consent to a
search of personal effects in the room).
692. There was no evidence as to whether Tariq's mother had access to the vest and,
therefore, possessed the resulting common authority to consent to a search of the pockets
of the vest based on access to the property. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 487, 701 A.2d at 692
(describing vest as petitioner's "personal belonging[ ]"); id. at 489, 701 A.2d at 693
(describing vest as petitioner's "personal effect[ ]"). Furthermore, the objection by Peti-
tioner favors just the opposite conclusion; that Petitioner had sole access to thejacket. See
id. at 488, 701 A.2d at 692 (noting that petitioner "stood and indicated that the vest be-
longed to him"). Therefore, it was necessary for the court to find some other basis upon
which consent could be validated. Although it is possible that the mother purchased Peti-
tioner's vest, considering his age of sixteen, common authority is not to be determined by
mere property interest. SeeUnited States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (explain-
ing that "[t]he authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law
of property ... but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having
joint access or control"). Even when a party owns the item or area to be searched, their
complete lack of access to the item or area would equate to a lack of common authority to
consent to a search. See id. (citing cases in which a nonpossessory interest in the subject
property was held insufficient to authorize consent).
693. See United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding invalid the search
of a footlocker when the party giving consent had authority to consent to a search of the
room but no such authority over the footlocker); Owens, 322 Md. at 633, 589 A.2d at 67
(concluding that tenant did not have actual authority to consent to a luggage bag left in
her apartment by the defendant).
694. See, e.g., Owens, 322 Md. at 630, 589 A.2d at 65 (refusing to uphold the search of a
luggage bag because the party that granted consent did not possess common authority over
the bag and the defendant maintained "an expectation of privacy in the bag").
695. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 696, 701 A.2d at 495-96 (failing to distinguish between the
search of a room and the search of a vest located in the room).
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holding of the court in this case is relatively narrow. The area of the
house and the particular effects searched were significant factors in
the court's conclusion that Petitioner assumed the risk that his
mother would consent to a search of his vest. The opinion, therefore,
is limited to searches of clothing, or similar objects, in a common area
of the home. Consequently, Tariq leaves unanswered a parent's au-
thority to consent to searches of a child's personal effects under other
circumstances. Although the court believed that, generally, a parent
will possess the authority to offer a valid consent of his or her child's
room and personal effects,69 6 the court noted that "[t]here may also
be cases, however, in which a parent's consent to search would not be
valid in the face of the child's objection."697 Tariq and other cases,
however, do provide some insight into how Maryland courts might
rule under other circumstances.
In order to provide such insight, the following discussion sets out
a hypothetical model that can be used to determine the probable va-
lidity of parental consent searches conducted under a variety of cir-
cumstances. In this hypothetical model, police search a child's
personal effects pursuant to a parent's consent but over the objection
of the child. The personal effects are located in the parent's home
but the parent never looks within the personal effects nor has the per-
mission to look in them.698 While the above factors are held constant
throughout all variations of the model, the model also consists of two
variable factors.
The first variable is the area in which the personal effects are lo-
cated. This includes not only the particular room but the circum-
stances surrounding both the parent's and child's access to the room.
The second variable is the type of container or personal effect
searched. In order to separately understand the impact of each of
these variables, initially one variable will be fixed while the other is
modified and vice versa. Finally, both variables will be altered
concurrently.
By altering the circumstances surrounding the parent's access to
the room, the parent's superior authority over the room is affected.
As parental access decreases, the concept of superior parental author-
696. See id. at 494, 701 A.2d at 695-96 (citing Tate, 32 Md. App. at 619-20, 363 A.2d at
626, for the proposition that a parent's superior authority over the premises will generally
allow a parent to consent to searches of his or her child's personal effects). But see Tate, 32
Md. App. at 620, 363 A.2d at 627 (declining to answer the question of whether the search
would have been valid if it involved the child's personal effects).
697. Tariq, 347 Md. at 495, 701 A.2d at 696.
698. These facts are modeled after the fact pattern in Tariq.
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ity diminishes. Likewise, the parent's degree of access may play a role
in determining whether the particular personal effect searched pro-
vides the child with distinct privacy rights separate from the privacy
provided by the room. Similarly, an alteration of the personal effect
or container searched influences whether a court will find a distinc-
tion between a search of the room and a search of personal effects
within the room.699
a. Variation of the Room.-In the first set of examples, the
type of container is held static while the area of the house is modified.
For comparison purposes, the container is the same as that in Tariq, a
vest pocket. 700 With the type of container static, there is a continuum
of possible scenarios. At one extreme the parent has no right of ac-
cess to the room. This could be represented by a situation in which a
child pays rent for use of the room, the door is kept locked, the par-
ent is unable to unlock the door, and the parent never enters the
room.7 1' This situation comes closest to reflecting a landlord-tenant
relationship. At this point, the concept of superior parental authority
is at its weakest. It seems likely that, under these circumstances, a par-
ent could not even authorize a search of the room let alone a search
of a child's personal effects in the room.70 2
At the opposite extreme, the parent has unqualified access to the
room, whereas the child has limited or no access. This could be rep-
resented by the parents' bedroom where the child has been told he is
699. Compare United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (1978) (viewing the search of a
room and a search of a footlocker in the room as two distinct searches), and Owens, 322
Md. at 631, 589 A.2d at 66 (concluding that a tenant had the authority to consent to a
search of her apartment but lacked the authority to consent to a search of defendant's bag
in the apartment), with Tariq, 347 Md. at 495-96, 701 A.2d at 696 (viewing the search of a
room and the search of a vest in the room as one search).
700. Tariq, 347 Md. at 488, 701 A.2d at 692.
701. Though there are apparently no Maryland cases that address similar facts, other
courts have found that a child living in his parents' home can effectively negate his par-
ents' authority to consent to a search of his room. See, e.g., State v. Carsey, 664 P.2d 1085,
1089, 1094 (Or. 1983) (recognizing that the child's grandparents-whom the Court
viewed as parents-lacked the authority to consent to a search of the child's bedroom in
their home because the child paid rent and the grandparents essentially "never went into
his room"). The question whether Maryland courts will ever find that a child can take
steps to negate his parents' authority over his room is unclear.
702. Though the parent may own the home, a property interest alone does not establish
the authority to consent to a police search. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171
n.7 (noting that "[c]ommon authority is . .. not to be implied from the mere property
interest a third party has in the property"). Where the parent lacks any right to enter the
room and his or her only right over the room lies in his or her property interest in the




not permitted to enter.7 °3 At this point, the parent's authority is at its
most superior. Under the court's reasoning in Tariq, the parent has
superior authority over the area "'including the right to exclude [the
child] from the premises.' 7 0 4 Because the Tariq court makes no dis-
tinction between a search of the room and a search of the vest pock-
ets, in the case of a common area the child assumed the risk that the
parent might consent to a search of the premises and the vest.70 5
As a starting point, consider the actual scenario in Tariq, where
the parent and child share common access to the room of the house
in which the container is located.7 6 This lies somewhere in the mid-
dle of the two extremes. As the court indicated, a search of the vest
under these conditions would be valid when the parent consented to
the search because the parent has superior authority over the
room.
70 7 Because the parent's authority to consent to a search of the
room encompasses the vest, the child assumed the risk that a parent
would allow both the area and vest to be searched.708
Moving along the continuum in the direction of lesser parental
authority, consider the situation in which the vest is left in the child's
room. 70 9 Assume, also, that the child pays no rent and the parent has
access to the room. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held,
in Tate v. State,7 10 that a parent may validly consent to a search of a
child's room, over the objection of the child, where the parent has
703. For the sake of argument we will ignore the question of how the child left his vest
in an area that he is unable to enter.
704. Tariq, 347 Md. at 494, 701 A.2d at 696 (quoting Tate v. State, 32 Md. App. 613, 619-
20, 363 A.2d 622, 626 (1976)). In fact, there is no common authority over the room
shared by the parent and child in this situation because the child is completely lacking
authority. The child has no expectation of privacy in the room and, therefore, has no
standing to challenge a search of the room. If, however, the court viewed the search of the
vest and the search of the room as two separate searches, the child could challenge a
search of the vest though he would lack the standing to challenge a search of the room. See
Owens, 322 Md. at 626-30, 589 A.2d at 64-66 (concluding that the defendant did not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in a third party's apartment but that he maintained a
legitimate expectation of privacy in a closed luggage bag that he left in the apartment); see
also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
that "the movement of a guest's closed container into another's home involves overlapping
privacy interests").
705. See supra notes 682-683, 688-691 and accompanying text.
706. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 495-96, 701 A.2d at 696.
707. See supra notes 666-670 and accompanying text.
708. See supra note 678 and accompanying text.
709. For cases with similar fact patterns, see United States v. Robinson, 999 F. Supp. 155
(D. Mass. 1998) (search of pants pockets in child's room) and United States v. Whitfield, 747
F. Supp. 807 (D.D.C. 1990) (search ofjacket in child's room), rev'd, 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
710. 32 Md. App. 613, 363 A.2d 622 (1976).
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access to the room.711 This holding rests on the concepts of joint ac-
cess to the room and the superior authority of the parent over the
712premises. Because a parent under this scenario can validly consent
to a search of the room, the determinative issue concerning the
search of the child's personal effects is whether the court distin-
guishes between the search of the room and the search of the per-
sonal effects. This, in turn, depends on whether clothing left in a
bedroom under such circumstances provides a greater protection of
privacy than when such clothing is left in a common area. If a court
determines, as did the Tariq court, that the search of the room in-
cludes the search of the vest, the parent's authority to consent to a
search of the room will include a search of the vest pockets.713
Although there is no joint access to the vest, the child still assumed
the risk that the parent might consent to a search because the parent
exercised common, and superior, authority over the room. 1
There is, however, a substantial argument that under these cir-
cumstances, a court should view the search of the room and the vest as
two distinct searches. The underlying principle of the court's holding
in Tariq was that the child assumed the risk that the mother might
consent to a search of a vest left in a common area of the house. A
child, however, arguably does not assume such a risk when he or she
leaves the clothing in his or her own room, rather than in a common
area of the house.715 Unlike clothing left in a common area of a
house, clothing left in a child's bedroom may maintain an expectation
711. Id. at 620, 363 A.2d at 627 (declining to decide whether, under such circumstances,
the parent's authority to consent to a search would extend to personal effects located in
the child's room); see supra notes 604-606 and accompanying text (discussing the Tate
holding).
712. See Tate, 32 Md. App. at 619-20, 363 A.2d at 626 (stating "[w]hat is crucial and
dispositive . . . is that [defendant's mother] possessed not only common authority with
[defendant] over the searched premises, but in fact possessed superior authority under
these circumstances, including the right to exclude [defendant] from the premises").
713. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 495-96, 701 A.2d at 696 (upholding a search of the pockets of
a child's vest, located in the dining room of the family house, where the child's mother
consented to the search).
714. See id. (noting that defendant "assumed the risk that his mother, who had authority
in her own right to consent to a search of the vest left in a common area of the house,
would herself look into his vest pockets, or expose his vest to a search by others").
715. To hold that the child assumed the risk would effectively mean that a child's pro-
tection under the Fourth Amendment is subject to the control of his or her parent while
the child is living in the parent's home. Additionally, if a child is held to assume the risk of
a police search when he or she leaves clothing in his or her own room, there would seem
to be no area in which a child can be free from such a risk short of placing the clothing in
a separate container. See Owens v. State, 322 Md. 616, 589 A.2d 59 (1991) (holding that a
person may not validly consent to a search of luggage left in his home by a houseguest if he
or she lacks any authority over the luggage); United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 542
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of privacy that is otherwise lost when such clothing is left in a common
area. 71 6 Because the child maintains a distinct expectation of privacy
in the contents of the clothing, he or she has not assumed the risk
that his or her parent might consent to a search of the clothing.
Therefore, this greater protection would require that the courts view
the search of the room and the search of the clothing as two separate
searches. Where there is no evidence that the parent has the right or
permission to access the contents of the clothing, the parent cannot
validly consent to a search of the clothing.
Despite this plausible argument, it is not unlikely that Maryland
courts will follow the analysis in Tariq, and the example set by the
Supreme Court in Frazier v. Cupp,7 17 and refuse to "engage in such
metaphysical subtleties" '718 required to find the search of the jacket to
be separate from the search of the room. 719 The Court of Appeals's
doctrine of superior authority, combined with the lack of distinction
between the room and the vest pockets, leads to the possible conclu-
sion that the child assumed the risk that his mother might consent to
a search of his vest left in his or her own room. But it is important to
note that the answer to this question was not provided by Tariq and
remains open. The court specifically noted that there may be some
cases "in which a parent's consent to search would not be valid in the
face of the child's objection."720
Now consider the outcome as one continues to move along the
continuum in the direction of no parental authority over the room.
As one moves farther away from the starting point, the concept of
superior parental authority over the room grows weaker. Suppose the
(1978) (concluding that defendant's mother lacked the authority to consent to a search of
a locked footlocker in defendant's room).
716. Compare United States v. Robinson, 999 F. Supp. 155 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that
the mother could not validly consent to a search of pants in her child's room), and United
States v. Whitfield, 747 F. Supp. 807 (D.D.C. 1990) (concluding that a mother did not have
the authority to consent to a search of pockets of clothing in her son's closet), rev'd, 939
F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991), with United States v. Buckles, 495 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1974)
(upholding a search of defendant's jacket where the defendant left the jacket in his home
and his wife consented to the search), and State v. Fountain, 534 N.W.2d 859, 864 (S.D.
1995) (stating that where the defendant left his jacket in another's home, he failed to
"protect its privacy").
717. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
718. Id. at 740 (referring to the Court's refusal to decide if a person's authority to use
one pouch in a bag authorizes him to consent to a search of the entire bag).
719. See supra notes 682-683 and accompanying text (noting that the Tariq court refused
to view the search of the room and the search of the vest as separate searches).
720. Tariq, 347 Md. at 495, 701 A.2d at 696.
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child pays rent but the parent has some access to the room."'
Clearly, under Matlock, the parent can consent to the search of the
room if the child is absent and not objecting.722 However, whether a
parent, under these circumstances, can consent to a search of the
room over the objection of the child, and whether that consent ex-
tends to a search of clothing pockets, is less clear. First, the superior
authority of the parent over the premises may be somewhat dimin-
ished by the payment of rent by the child.72 Second, there does not
appear to be the degree of assumption of risk as existed in Tariq."'
Where the occupant of the room is a minor child, however, a court is
unlikely to conclude that a parent relinquishes their superior author-
ity even if certain steps are taken to make the room the child's own,
including the payment of rent.725 Therefore, it may be that the par-
ent loses their superior authority and, accordingly, their ability to con-
sent to a search of the room over the child's objection only in the
most extreme case of a minor child exercising complete control of the
room. Although a parent may be capable of validly consenting to a
search of his or her minor child's room even if the child pays rent,
such authority will not necessarily validate a search of clothing located
in the room. The Tariq court relied on the fact that the clothing was
left in a common area of the house.72 6 Where the clothing is left in
the child's room and the child has minimized the parent's authority
721. For a case with similar facts, see Waddell v. State, 65 Md. App. 606, 501 A.2d 865
(1985), where a child paid his parents twenty dollars per week in rent but the mother had
authority to consent to a search of the room because she sometimes used the closet in the
room and had access to the room at all times. Id. at 615-17, 501 A.2d at 870-71.
722. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (holding that a person with
common authority over an area may consent to a search of that area); see also McCray v.
State, 236 Md. 9, 14, 202 A.2d 320, 322-23 (1964) (holding that a father could consent to a
search of a sunroom where his son sometimes slept); Jones v. State, 13 Md. App. 309, 315,
283 A.2d 184, 188 (1971) (holding that a parent could consent to the search of a bedroom
used by her son who did not object to the search).
723. The general rule is that a parent may validly consent to a search of their child's
room over the child's objection because the parent exercises superior authority over the
premises. Tate v. State, 32 Md. App. 613, 619-20, 363 A.2d 622, 626-27 (1976). The supe-
rior authority, however, might be effectively limited, or negated, under certain circum-
stances. See State v. Carsey, 664 P.2d 1085, 1089, 1094 (Or. 1983) (holding that the
payment of rent by the child and the fact that his grandparents never entered the room,
negated the grandparents' ability to consent to a search of the child's room).
724. In this hypothetical, the child has left the vest in his room. However, in Tariq the
Petitioner left his vest in a common area of the house. Tariq, 347 Md. at 495-96, 701 A.2d
at 696.
725. See Waddell, 65 Md. App. at 615-17, 501 A.2d at 870 (finding a search valid where
the child paid rent but was not present at the time of the search).
726. Tariq, 347 Md. at 496, 701 A.2d at 696.
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over the room, that child probably has not assumed the risk that a
parent might consent to a search of clothing located in the room.
In a more extreme case, where the facts of the situation indicate
that the parent lacks any access to the room, the validity of a search of
the room and a search of the vest pursuant to parental consent be-
comes even less clear. To say that a child assumed the risk that a par-
ent would consent to a search of his vest when the vest was left in his
room is more tenuous when the child has taken steps to limit parental
access to the room.72 7 As the child takes further steps to protect his or
her privacy, the risk of parental consent diminishes. However, as long
as there exists some authority by which the parent may consent to a
search of the room, there exists a possibility that the parent may also
validly consent to a search of the vest located in the room. And as
long as a court also determines that a parent has superior authority
over the room, the parent's consent will override any objection by the
child to the search of a container located in that room.7 2 8 Where,
however, the parental authority over the room is diminished, as in the
previous examples, the objection of the child may play an important
role in determining the validity of the search.729
b. Variation of the Container.-In the second set of examples,
the area of the room, and all surrounding circumstances related to
the room, are held constant while the type of personal effect is modi-
fied. As discussed above, a change in the characteristics of the
container affects the likelihood that the court will conclude that there
is no distinction between a search of the room and a search of the
container. 7 0 For the purpose of these examples, it is assumed that
the child's personal effects are located in the family dining room, ac-
cessible by all members of the family.7 1' As was the case when the
circumstances surrounding the room were altered, the variation of the
727. In Tariq, the vest was left in the dining room. Tariq, 347 Md. at 495-96, 701 A.2d at
696. The court noted that the vest was left in a common area of the house and, therefore,
Petitioner "assumed the risk" that his mother might consent to a search. Id. at 496, 701
A.2d at 696.
728. See id. at 496, 701 A.2d at 696 (holding that the child assumed the risk where his
mother had authority to consent to a search of the room).
729. As an initial matter, the child's objection to the search of clothing located in the
child's room raises a legitimate question as to the parent's authority to consent to such a
search. As Judge Eldridge noted in his dissenting opinion, "[i]t is the government's bur-
den to establish that a third party had authority to consent to a search . . . [and that]
burden cannot be met if the agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless pro-
ceed without making further inquiry." Tariq, 347 Md. at 500-01, 701 A.2d at 699 (Eldridge,
J., dissenting).
730. See supra note 699.
731. This is the same as the scenario in Tariq. Tariq, 347 Md. at 495-96, 701 A.2d at 696.
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type of container allows for unlimited factual variations along a con-
tinuum. Furthermore, as in all of the hypotheticals, it is presumed
that the parent has no right to access the container.
At one extreme, the child's personal effect is a container that has
an interior space considered distinct from the room in which it is situ-
ated; for example, a locked footlocker.732 Courts regard such contain-
ers as furnishing the user a privacy interest separate from any privacy
interest in the room. 733 At this extreme, a court will likely distinguish
between a search of the room and a search of the container. 3
Though the parent may have the authority to consent to a search of
the room, that authority does not extend to the contents of the child's
locked container when the parent lacks any right to access the
container. 73' Although the parent will generally exercise superior au-
thority over the room, which validates the search of the room over the
objection of the child, the complete lack of access to the container
results in the parent's inability to consent to a search of the
container .7 36 Because the search of the locked box is a search sepa-
rate from a search of the room, the parent must have authority to
search the box independent of any authority over the room.73 7
Furthermore, because the search of the container is separate
from a search of the room, and the parent has no authority over the
container, the rational conclusion is that the child has not assumed
the risk that the parent might consent to a search. 73" Assumption of
risk arises in the case of shared authority over an area or container; it
can be established when the defendant is absent and relinquishes any
732. For an example of a court's treatment of such a container, see United States v. Block,
590 F.2d 535, 540 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that authority to search a room does not auto-
matically extend "to the interior of the footlocker in the room").
733. See id. at 541 (noting that "the law's 'enclosed spaces'-mankind's valises, suitcases,
footlockers, strong boxes, etc.-are frequently the objects of his highest privacy expecta-
tions, and that the expectations may well be at their most intense when such effects are
deposited temporarily or kept semi-permanently in public places").
734. See Owens v. State, 322 Md. 616, 630-33, 589 A.2d 59, 66-67 (1991) (distinguishing
between a search of the room and a search of a luggage bag in the room); see also Block, 590
F.2d at 540 (distinguishing the search of a footlocker from the search of a room); In re
Scott K., 595 P.2d 105, 107-09 (Cal. 1979) (distinguishing the search of a toolbox from the
search of a room).
735. See Block, 590 F.2d at 539-42 (holding that mother's authority to consent to a search
of her 23-year-old son's room did not extend to a search of the locked footlocker in the
room).
736. Id.
737. See Owens, 322 Md. at 633, 589 A.2d at 67 (holding invalid a search of a luggage bag
because the party giving consent lacked any authority over the bag).
738. See supra notes 687-691 and accompanying text (noting that, in Tariq, the mother
was able to consent to a search of her son's jacket only because the court did not distin-
guish between a search of the room and a search of the jacket).
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expectation of privacy, 39 or when the defendant shares the area or
container with one who has superior authority over the area or
container.140 Where a child leaves a locked container in the dining
room, though the parent exercises superior authority over the room,
the child has effectively negated any assumption of risk that a parent
might consent to a search because the parent is not capable of gaining
access to the container.
At the opposite extreme, the container is one which historically is
given no protection. The clearest example is a plastic baggie or other
clear container. Because a search of the room would naturally dis-
close the contents of any transparent containers, it would be illogical
to conclude that a search would not include the contents of such a
container. 4 1 Where the parent has the authority to consent to a
search of the room, and a search of the room includes a transparent
container, the parent's authority logically extends to the contents of
the container.
In between these two extremes is a search of the pockets of arti-
cles of clothing. Although some courts recognize a distinction be-
tween a search of the room and a search of the pockets,742 the Court
of Appeals has afforded clothing no such protection when left in a
common area.7 43 The court has concluded that when clothing is left
in a common area, the owner of the clothing has assumed the risk that
a third party will consent to a search of the room and clothing.144
739. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72 (1974) (holding that a wife could
consent to a search of shared living quarters when her husband was absent); Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (holding that a co-user of bag could consent to search of
bag when defendant was absent).
740. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 495-96, 701 A.2d at 696 (holding that a mother was capable of
consenting to a search of her child's vest, although the child was present and objecting,
because the mother possessed superior authority over the property); Tate v. State, 32 Md.
App. 613, 618-19, 363 A.2d 622, 626 (1976) (upholding a search of a child's room pursuant
to mother's consent in spite of the child's presence and objection to the search); Jones v.
State, 13 Md. App. 309, 315, 283 A.2d 184, 187-88 (1971) (holding that a mother could
consent to a search of her son's room because she possessed superior authority over the
room).
741. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 999 F. Supp. 155, 161 (D. Mass. 1998) (treating
the search of a plastic bag as included in the scope of the search of the room).
742. See id. at 163 (holding that a party that had authority to consent to a search of the
room did not have authority to consent to a search of pockets of another's clothing in that
room); United States v. Whitfield, 747 F. Supp. 807, 811-12 (D.C. 1990) (same), rev'd, 939
F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
743. See supra notes 682-689 and accompanying text (discussing the Tariq court's treat-
ment of the searches of the room and the vest as one search).
744. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 495-96, 701 A.2d at 696.
836 [VOL. 58:604
1999] MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
Therefore, any consent that validates the search of a common area
also validates the search of pockets of clothing in the area.7 45
The determinative point on the continuum lies where a court dis-
tinguishes between the container and the room in which it is located.
However, where this point lies is not clear.74 6 Suppose the container
is a zippered backpack.747 Maryland courts will probably recognize a
search of the backpack as a search separate from a search of the
room.74 8 Therefore, the parent's consent is insufficient to validate a
search of the backpack. 749 Such a container is one that, historically,
affords the user a certain degree of privacy.750 Even though the
backpack is in the dining room, a common area of the house, the
child exerts an expectation of privacy over the contents of the
backpack by closing it and keeping its contents away from the view of
co-occupants of the house.7 5 Where the container or personal effect
is one that affords the child an expectation of privacy, separate from
any privacy rights in the room, a search of the container is a search
beyond the scope of the room. 7 52 Regardless of its location in the
745. See id.
746. Even where this distinction can be made, the court, in considering parental con-
sent to search a minor's personal effects, may likely determine that the parent exercises
superior authority over the effects distinct from any authority over the room. In such a
case, the type of container is irrelevant. The parent can consent to a search of the
container, over the objection of the child, based on their superior authority. Furthermore,
the privacy that a particular container affords its user may sometimes depend on the loca-
tion of the container.
747. This item was chosen because it is likely to be a common item searched in a case
concerning a parent-child relationship and because it closely resembles the characteristics
of the luggage bag in Owens. See Owens v. State, 322 Md. 616, 631, 689 A.2d 59, 66 (1991)
(involving the search of a luggage bag that "was zippered closed, and its contents were not
exposed to public view").
748. See id. (holding that a tenant's consent to a search of her apartment authorized
police to obtain a zippered luggage bag, but that such consent did not authorize a search
of the contents of the bag). It is important to remember that, in these hypotheticals, it is
assumed that the parent has no right of access of his or her own to the item being
searched. When the parent has an individual right of access to the container, that right of
access establishes the common authority over the container and validates a search of its
contents. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (requiring a "mutual
use" of the particular property searched). Often a parent's right to access the container
will provide the requisite authority to consent to a search. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S.
731, 740 (1969) (holding that a person's authority to use part of a bag authorizes him to
consent to a search of the entire bag).
749. See Owens, 322 Md. at 630-31, 589 A.2d at 65-66 (concluding that a third party must
have some authority over a luggage bag that was "zippered closed" to validly consent to a
search of its contents).
750. See id. (noting that defendant "had an expectation of privacy in the bag which soci-




house, if the container is one that maintains the child's expectation of
privacy in the contents of the container, a parent cannot validly con-
sent to a search of the container.7 53 Therefore, the parent's authority
to consent to a search of the room will not extend to the contents of
the container or personal effect when the container affords the child
an expectation of privacy beyond the child's privacy interest in the
room.
c. Variation of the Room and Container Simultaneously. -Now
suppose that both variables are allowed to change simultaneously. As
just explained, if the container is of a type that protects the contents
from others, the parent cannot validly consent to a search of the
container."' Therefore, in any search of a child's personal effects, if
the personal effect is a container that sufficiently protects the privacy
interests of the child, that protection becomes the determinative fac-
tor. The parent's consent is invalid because the parent maintains no
authority over the particular effect. In the case of items such as cloth-
ing, however, it is possible that the level of privacy is affected by the
room in which the item is located.
In analyzing any search of a child's personal effects conducted
pursuant to parental consent, when the child is present and objects to
the search, and the parent has no common authority over the per-
sonal effects, there are two factors to analyze. First, a court must con-
sider whether the parent has the authority to consent to a search of
the room.755 Second, a court must determine if the personal effect
should be considered distinct from the room.15 6 For example, sup-
pose the search is of a child's backpack found on the floor of the
child's room, the child is a minor, and the parent has the right to
enter the room. Also, as in all of the hypotheticals above, the parent
has no right of access to the backpack.7 57 Although the parent has the
753. See id. (holding that although the homeowner had the authority to consent to the
search of the home, she lacked similar authority over the luggage bag left in her home).
754. See supra notes 735-740 and accompanying text.
755. Alternatively, the search of the room could be upheld under the doctrine of appar-
ent authority. See supra note 588 (noting that, pursuant to the doctrine of apparent author-
ity, a search is valid, regardless of an individual's actual authority to consent, if police
reasonably believed that the individual had such authority).
756. See supra notes 684-689 and accompanying text (describing the Tariq court's failure
to distinguish between the search of the room and the search of the vest).
757. When a parent is given access to the bag, the parent is a co-user of the bag and has
common authority to consent to searches. One question which might arise in this scena-
rio, assuming the child objects to the search of the bag, is whether the parent's superior
authority in some way includes the bag so that the parent, on similar reasoning as used in
searches of bedrooms, can override the objection of the child. Often the facts of a particu-
lar case will lead a court to conclude that the parent can, in their own right, consent to a
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authority to consent to a search of the room, that authority does not
appear to extend to the contents of the backpack. 5
Instead, suppose that the search is of a plastic videocassette
container located in the child's room. 59 Also, assume the child pays
rent for the use of the room in his parent's house and the mother
enters once a week to do the child's laundry. First, the parent must
possess the superior authority over the child's room to consent to a
search of the area.760 As discussed earlier, when the parent has access
to the child's room, the parent has authority to consent to a search of
the room.7 1' Furthermore, even though the child pays rent, a court is
likely to determine that the parent exercises superior authority over
the room, enabling the parent to consent to a search over the objec-
tion of a child.7 62 Second, the container searched is not of a type that
a court is likely to conclude protects the child's expectation of pri-
vacy.763 Therefore, like the search in Tariq, a search of the room in
this hypothetical would include the videocassette container. 764 Be-
cause the search of the room is valid, the subsequent search of the
videocassette container is also valid. In addition, the examples dis-
cussed above, though encompassing a very narrow set of fact patterns,
may be helpful in predicting a court's treatment of a variety of third-
party consent cases. While the aforementioned examples involved
search of the contents of the bag. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (upholding
the search of a bag because the party that gave consent had permission to use a compart-
ment of the bag). When a parent commonly cleans out or uses the child's bag, as may
often be the case, the parent has common authority over the bag. See United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (noting that common authority is based on "mutual
use of the property by persons generally havingjoint access or control for most purposes").
The court may determine that the parent's control over the bag determines their authority
to consent. See Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740 (concluding that the joint use of a bag established
the authority to consent to a search of the bag).
758. See Owens, 322 Md. at 630-31, 589 A.2d at 65-66 (holding that authority to consent
to a search of the premises does not automatically equate to an authority to consent to a
search of a zippered luggage bag located on the premises); see also supra notes 747-757 and
accompanying text.
759. For an example of a court's treatment of such a container, see United States v. Robin-
son, 999 F. Supp. 155, 162 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting that "[a] plastic movie box is not the
type of container that has historically been regarded as having a high expectation of
privacy").
760. See supra note 684 and accompanying text (discussing the mother's superior au-
thority in Tariq).
761. See supra notes 608-613 and accompanying text (discussing a case in which the
court held that a mother's access to her child's room authorized her to consent to a search
of the room).
762. See supra notes 723-725 and accompanying text.
763. See supra note 759 (discussing Robinson, 999 F. Supp. at 162).
764. See Robinson, 999 F. Supp. at 162 (declining to distinguish between the search of a
room and the search of a videocassette container in the room).
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searches conducted over the objection of the child, they nonetheless
provide insight into a court's likely treatment of searches where the
child does not object. In addition, the hypotheticals provide a frame-
work on which to build arguments for all parental consent cases, as
well as many third party consent cases not involving parent and child.
5. Conclusion.-Tariq establishes a parent's ability to grant valid
consent for a police search of a child's belongings over the objection
of the child.76 5 However, that ability is not as substantial as the Tariq
holding might suggest. Although a parent will generally maintain su-
perior authority over all of the rooms in his or her home, that supe-
rior authority, alone, will not always validate a search of a child's
personal effects.7 66 This conclusion rests primarily on the determina-
tion that the court treated the search of the vest as inclusive in the
search of the room. 76 7 Not all personal effects, however, are afforded
such treatment. 768 As the analysis suggests, the characteristics of the
personal effects will most often be the determinative factor in any
search under these circumstances.769 Such characteristics, and the
corresponding protection that the personal effect provides may, how-
ever, be affected by the location of the item.77° One must keep in
mind that children are protected under the Fourth Amendment and
the Court of Appeals has given no indication that one's status as a
minor in any way affects the scope of such protection.77' Instead, the
court bases the parent's ability to override a child's objection on the
doctrine of superior authority.772
DAVID W. STAMPER
765. See supra notes 659-660 and accompanying text (discussing the Tariq holding).
766. See Tariq, 347 Md. at 495, 701 A.2d at 696 ("There may also be cases, however, in
which a parent's consent to search would not be valid in the face of the child's
objection.").
767. See supra notes 682-683 and accompanying text.
768. See supra notes 614-621 and accompanying text (discussing the court's different
treatment of a luggage bag in Owens v. State, 322 Md. 616, 589 A.2d 59 (1991)).
769. See supra note 750 and accompanying text (noting that an important consideration
is whether the container is one for which society is prepared to recognize an expectation of
privacy).
770. See supra notes 700-729 and accompanying text (examining the possible effect that
the location of a child's vest has on a parent's authority to consent to a search of the vest).
771. Though the court does not explicitly limit a minor's rights under the Fourth
Amendment, the superior authority and assumption of risk doctrines may, practically
speaking, have just such an effect. See supra note 728 and accompanying text (noting that
the court's reliance on the mother's superior authority to justify a search effectively leaves
the child no place where his privacy is protected by the Fourth Amendment).
772. See supra notes 675-682 and accompanying text.
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VI. ESTATES AND TRUSTS
A. Declining to Apply the Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
In Kroll v. Nehmer,1 the Court of Appeals refused to apply the doc-
trine of dependent relative revocation 2 and allow probate of a will that
a testator3 had revoked under the mistaken belief that her later will
was valid.4 The court held that application of the doctrine was not
proper in this case because the "dispositive schemes" between the re-
voked will and the invalid will were vastly different.5 In reaching this
conclusion the court was careful not to dismiss the possibility that de-
pendent relative revocation might be applicable in the future under
proper circumstances.6 However, the decision implies that any use of
the doctrine in Maryland would likely occur under a traditionally rigid
application of testamentary formalities. 7 This ruling, while proper
within the framework of Maryland precedent, begs the question
whether judicial or legislative action is appropriate to better fulfill the
desires of some testators in the future.
1. The Case.--On July 24, 1980, Margaret Binco (Binco) exe-
cuted the first of four wills (the 1980 will).8 Approximately five years
later, on April 12, 1985, she visited an attorney and executed a second
1. 348 Md. 616, 705 A.2d 716 (1998).
2. Dependent relative revocation is a doctrine under which a court can invalidate a
testator's valid will revocation in certain circumstances. See 2 WILLIAMJ. BowE & DOUGLAS
H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAw OF WILLS § 21.57, at 446 (rev. ed. 1960). Generally, there are
two fact patterns where the doctrine may be appropriately applied: (1) Conditional revoca-
tion, where the testator intends his revocation to be final only upon the happening of a
condition that never takes place, seejoseph Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HARv.
L. REv. 337, 338 (1920); and (2) Revocation by act to the document under a mistake, where a
testator "cancels his will by act under the impression that he has made another valid testa-
mentary disposition" (when in fact he has not), see id. at 342. Kroll follows the latter fact
pattern.
3. Hereafter, the term "testator" shall be used to refer to either a testator or a
testatrix.
4. Kroll, 348 Md. at 618, 705 A.2d at 717.
5. Id. at 631-32, 705 A.2d at 723.
6. Id. (noting that "[w]e need not decide in this case whether the doctrine of depen-
dent relative revocation, as articulated [in this case], is part of Maryland law and, if it is, the
circumstances under which it may properly be applied," since "it cannot be applied under
the circumstances of this case").
7. See id. at 628, 705 A.2d at 722 ("This case presents for the first time a situation in
which the doctrine might be applied and in which other courts have applied it. It is not a
situation, however, in which we believe it appropriate to apply the doctrine.").
8. Id. at 617, 705 A.2d at 716. The court noted that "the 1980 will is not in the record
before us, but, from a comment made during the hearing in the circuit court, it appears
that [appellant HenryJ. Kroll] was left a car in that will." Id. at 621, 705 A.2d at 718.
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will (the 1985 will).' The 1985 will divided Binco's estate among six
beneficiaries and three charitable organizations," ° and named one of
the beneficiaries as her personal representative. 1
Binco again revised the testamentary disposition of her estate in
1990.12 This will (the 1990 will) lacked witness signatures and a resid-
uary bequest, and was handwritten with numerous margin notes. 3
Binco did not include any of the individual legatees named in the
1985 will in the 1990 will.1 4 She also named new executors.1 5 Upon
creating the 1990 will, Binco wrote "VOID-NEW WILL DRAWN UP
6-28-90" on the back of the 1985 will.16 However, she did not mention
any of the earlier wills in the 1990 will. 7
Binco's fourth and final will was dated October 27, 1994 (the
1994 will).' 8 Like the 1990 will, the 1994 will lacked witness signa-
tures, lacked a residuary bequest, lacked any mention of previous
wills, and was handwritten. 9 In this final will, Binco listed as benefi-
ciaries many of the same individuals and charitable organizations
named in the 1990 will.20 One of the two executors named in the
1994 will had also been named an executor in the 1990 will.2 1
9. Id. at 617, 621, 705 A.2d at 716, 718; seeJoint Record Extract at 6, Kroll v. Nehmer,
348 Md. 616, 705 A.2d 716 (1998) (No. 53).
10. Kroll, 348 Md. at 621-22, 705 A.2d at 718-19. In the 1985 will, Binco left much of
her personal property to Charmaine Kilmartin, Esther Strebech, Betty Ball, Joan Roma-
nowski, Phyllis Butler and Frances Hogarth. Id. at 621, 705 A.2d at 718. She left some
stocks to the First Church of God, Lutheran Social Services of Maryland, and Spay and
Neuter All Pets, Inc. Id. at 622, 705 A.2d at 718. Her estate's residuary was to benefit
equally St. John's Lutheran Church, the First Church of God, and Spay and Neuter All
Pets, Inc. Id., 705 A.2d at 718-19.
11. Id. at 622, 705 A.2d at 719. In the 1985 will, Binco named Joan Romanowski as her
personal representative. Id.
12. Id. at 617, 705 A.2d at 716.
13. Id. at 622, 705 A.2d at 719.
14. Id. In the 1990 will, Ms. Binco made a variety of bequests to "Richard," "Sharyn,"
"Chris," "Bea," and "Pat." Id. The court had evidence that "Richard" was Richard Kroll;
"Sharyn" was Sharyn L. Trent; "Pat" was Pat Sonneborn; and "Bea" was Bea Reynolds. Id.
15. Id. In the 1990 will, Binco named Pat Sonneborn, Bea Reynolds, and "Hank,"
whom the court thought might be the appellant, Henry Kroll, as her executors. Id.
16. Id. at 618, 705 A.2d at 716.
17. Id. at 623, 705 A.2d at 719.
18. Id. at 617, 705 A.2d at 716.
19. Id. at 622-23, 705 A.2d at 719.
20. See id., 705 A.2d at 718-19 (noting that in the 1994 will, Ms. Binco devised her
property to Pat Sonneborn, Bea Reynolds, Richard Kroll, the First Church of God, and
Friends of Animals).
21. See id. at 623, 705 A.2d at 719. In the 1994 will, Ms. Binco named Pat Sonneborn
and Richard Kroll as executors. Id.
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Binco died on December 19, 1994.22 Subsequently, Richard Kroll
(Binco's nephew) submitted the 1990 will for probate.23 The appel-
lee2 4 then submitted the 1980 will to the court for probate. 2' During
the March 14, 1995 probate hearing, the appellant, Henry Kroll
(Kroll), Binco's brother and closest surviving relative, produced the
1985 will, which was admitted to probate. 26 The appellee was ap-
pointed as personal representative. 27 Kroll filed a caveat to the 1985
will,28 claiming testamentary incapacity, fraud, and undue influence
regarding the 1985 will and contending that Binco had revoked the
1985 will; 29 the orphans' court dismissed Kroll's claims "without as-
signing any reasons." 0 The circuit court affirmed the orphans'
court's admission of the 1985 will, holding that "the revocation of the
April 12, 1985 Will was so related to the making of the June 28, 1990
Will as to be dependent on it"; therefore, because the 1990 will was
invalid the 1985 will should be given effect."'
Kroll appealed, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari sua
sponte prior to any proceeding in the Court of Special Appeals to
consider whether the doctrine of dependent relative revocation had
been properly applied by the lower court.
2
22. Id. at 617, 705 A.2d at 716.
23. Id. at 623, 705 A.2d at 719.
24. The appellee was the pastor of St. John's Lutheran Church, one of the benefi-
ciaries under Binco's 1985 will. Id.
25. KroU, 348 Md. at 623, 705 A.2d at 719.
26. Id. (stating that the orphans' court "apparently appl[ied] the doctrine of depen-
dent relative revocation" in admitting the 1985 will to probate). The orphans' court re-
jected Binco's 1990 will for probate, holding that "it does not satisfy the statutory
requirement of a valid will and is not in good form." Id. at 623-24, 705 A.2d at 719. Addi-
tionally, the 1990 and 1994 wills were ineffective "because they lack[ed] the signatures of
attesting witnesses, as required by Maryland Code, Estates and Trusts Article, § 4-102." Id.
at 618, 705 A.2d at 716-17; see also MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-102 (1991) (setting
forth the requirements for a valid will in Maryland).
27. Kroll 348 Md. at 623, 705 A.2d at 719.
28. A caveat is "A formal notice or warning given by a party interested to a court...
against the performance of certain acts within [its] power and jurisdiction." BLACK'S LAW
DIcrIoNARY 222 (6th ed. 1990). It is used in estate matters "to prevent.., the proving of a
will." Id.
29. Kroll, 348 Md. at 623, 705 A.2d at 719.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 624, 705 A.2d at 720 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the opin-
ion of the circuit court).
32. Id. at 618, 705 A.2d at 717.
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2. Legal Background.-
a. Introduction.--The role of the court in a probate case is to
ascertain and carry out the will of the testator.33 The court is at the
same time guided and constrained by the formalities of probate stat-
utes, as well as by a lack of empowerment either "to write a will for
[the testator or] structure a will that differs from any will which [the
testator] ever executed."34 Sometimes, a testator's clear preference
cannot be probated owing to the testator's failure to fulfill these for-
malities. In these situations, the doctrine of dependent relative revo-
cation 5 helps courts to nevertheless give effect to the intent of a
testator.3 6
The court in Semmes v. Semmes 7 illustrated one fact pattern that
would trigger application of the doctrine:
[W]here a man having duly executed one will, afterwards
causes another to be prepared, and supposing the second to
be duly executed, under that impression alone cancels the
first. In such case it has been held, that on the second turn-
ing out not to have been duly executed, the canceling the
first, being done by mistake and misapprehension, would not
operate as a revocation.38
It is in this way that a testator's revocation of an old will is nullified.
In applying dependent relative revocation, the court presumes
that the testator would not have wanted her old will to be revoked if
she had known that the new will would not be allowed probate.3 9 But
this presumption sets up a fiction.4" The court acts as if the testator
33. See Warren, supra note 2, at 351 (noting that in order to allow the probate court to
determine the intent of the testator "we must be willing to accept an occasional instance of
injustice for the sake of a sound result in a majority of the cases").
34. Arrowsmith v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit, 313 Md. 334, 350, 545 A.2d 674, 682
(1988).
35. See supra note 2 (describing the doctrine of dependent relative revocation and its
application).
36. 2 BowE & DOUGLAS, supra note 2, § 21.57, at 450 (noting that the decision to apply
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation to preserve an earlier, revoked will should be
based on how a "testator's final intention can best be given effect").
37. 7 H. &J. 388 (Md. 1826).
38. Id. at 390-91.
39. See Warren, supra note 2, at 347 (noting in a hypothetical involving a testator who
has revoked an old will under the impression that he has created a new, valid will that
"[t]he testator does not say to himself, 'This is a revocation if the second disposition is
valid,' for he assumes that it is").
40. See id. at 342 (noting that in a situation involving a revocation made with the as-
sumption that the new instrument will be valid, the revocation is not truly conditioned or
dependent upon the validity of the new will).
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conditioned the revocation of her old will on her new will being
found suitable for probate.4" In reality, the testator probably in-
tended to revoke her old will unconditionally, believing erroneously
that her new will would pass probate.4 2 As one prominent treatise
states:
A mistaken frame of mind is really quite different from a
conditional frame of mind, and it involves a needless and
highly fictional process to pretend that an act uncondition-
ally done by a person who never doubts the truth of the erro-
neous beliefs which motivate him is in reality done
conditionally.4"
This "conditional intent analysis" was developed by the courts "as
a means of giving relief against a [testator's] revocation induced by
mistake."44 But given the potential havoc such an equitable principle
could wreak upon established law were it given broad application,45
and given the possibility that "policies that underlie the refusal of such
relief would be wholly undercut,"46 courts have almost universally re-
fused to apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation "where
the revocation was not connected with some alternative plan for suc-
cession to the decedent's estate or part of it, and the plan failed to
take effect."4 7 This limitation by the courts serves as the outer bound-
ary of the doctrine, beyond which it will not be applied.4"
Within that outer boundary, the creation of this conditional in-
tent in a testator's decision causes a court to focus much of its analysis
on the state of mind of the testator, and whether she really would have
wanted her old, revoked will to be revived had she known that her
new will would fail probate.49 Courts look at "all of the relevant cir-
cumstances surrounding the revocation," such as how completely the
41. See 2 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 2, § 21.57, at 446 (stating that courts often apply
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation to situations such as these where "the revoca-
tion is carried out because of a purely mistaken frame of mind rather than a conditional
frame of mind; but the courts still persist in [treating it as] a conditional revocation").
42. See id. ("[H]ere there is no question but that the testator intends to revoke his will.
He is, however, induced to do so by a misapprehension of law or of fact.").
43. Id.
44. George E. Palmer, Dependent Relative Revocation and Its Relation to Relief for Mistake,
69 MICH. L. REv. 989, 990 (1971).
45. See id. (noting that "if [the principle] were to be applied to every case of mistake,
the dangers would be the same as though the court gave relief through the traditional
method of setting aside a transaction because of mistake").
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. ("This provides an almost completely settled outer limit for the doctrine.").
49. See Warren, supra note 2, at 345 ("The inquiry should always be: What would the
testator have desired had he been informed of the true situation?").
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act of cancellation was carried out by the testator, the manner that the
testator chose to revoke the will, the unity between revocation and the
creation of a new will, the similarities and differences between the two
wills, and any parol evidence that sheds light on the testator's true
intentions.5 °
The breadth of this analysis by a court applying dependent rela-
tive revocation may prompt questions about a court's justification for
so testing the bounds of the statutory probate formality constraints.51
Answers to these questions can only be developed after an analysis of
the purposes behind statutory will formalities.
b. Purpose of Statutory Will Formalities. -Will formalities can
be justified as serving four social policies: (1) cautionary, (2) eviden-
tiary, (3) protective, and (4) channeling. 52 The cautionary, or ritual,
function ensures that the testator is aware of the significance of her
testamentary transfer.5' This awareness on the part of the testator is
essential to guarantee that "dispositive effect" is only given to words
that the testator intended to attach such importance.54 It is thought
that the formality required in testamentary dispositions has this im-
pact on a testator,55 thus assuring the court in a probate situation that
50. Kroll, 348 Md. at 629, 705 A.2d at 722.
51. See infra note 69 (listing the pertinent Maryland provisions governing the creation
and validity of testamentary instruments).
52. SeeJESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 206-07
(5th ed. 1995) (outlining the four public policy reasons that will formalities support, and
noting that all states have some variation of either the English Statute of Frauds of 1677 or
the English Wills Act of 1837 governing testamentary transfers); John H. Langbein, Excus-
ing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in
Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors]
(noting the "evidentiary, cautionary, and protective policies" served by will formalities); see
also Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE
L.J. 1, 5-10 (1941) (outlining the ritual [cautionary], evidentiary and protective functions
served by wills formalities); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88
HARv. L. REv. 489, 494 (1975) [hereinafter Langbein, Substantial Compliance] (describing a
fourth policy served by wills formalities, the channeling function).
53. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 52, at 206 ("The formalities of transfer
therefore generally require the performance of some ceremonial for the purpose of im-
pressing the transferor with the significance of his statements ...."); Gulliver & Tilson,
supra note 52, at 5 (noting that the "ceremonial precludes the possibility that the testator
was acting in a casual or haphazard fashion").
54. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 52, at 3-4 (suggesting that these ceremonial re-
quirements guard against attaching a "dispositive effect" to casual language not meant to
have legal effect).
55. See id. at 4 (noting that the formalities of transfer also have the purpose of "im-
pressing the testator with the significance of his statements").
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"the statements of the transferor were deliberately intended to effectu-
ate a transfer."5 6
Will formalities also serve an evidentiary function.5 7 By comply-
ing with these formalities, the testator "may increase the reliability of
the proof presented to the court" in establishing the desire of the tes-
tator.58 Thus, the court will be more likely to have legitimate evidence
of the true desire of the testator at its disposal in making a probate
decision.5 9
The third social policy that will formalities serve is protection of
the testator's wishes by lessening the chance that the testator made
her last will and testament under subversion or improper duress.6 °
Society seeks to prevent a testator from being "coerced into doing that
which he or she does not desire to do."6 ' Finally, will formalities serve
a channeling purpose by providing assurances to the testator that her
intentions will be fulfilled.6 2 The formalities provide uniformity, al-
lowing courts to consistently probate wills in a predictable manner.6 3
This consistency in turn allows a testator planning her estate to have
confidence that what she has planned for her property will come to
pass.64
Questions have arisen as to whether the public good is best served
by rigid adherence to will formalities. For example, courts are often
in the position of being "perfectly satisfied that [a] document was in-
tended by the deceased to be executed as his will and that its contents
represent testamentary intentions," but still ruling against the under-
stood intentions of the deceased. 6 While disregarding the known in-
tention of a testator would at first blush seem to violate public policy,
56. See id. at 3.
57. See id. at 6.
58. See id. at 4. While recognizing that "[t]he extent to which the quantity and effect of
available evidence should be restricted . . . is . . . a controversial matter," Gulliver and
Tilson nonetheless argue that whatever decision is made with regard to allowable evidence,
"the existing requirements of transfer emphasize the purpose of supplying satisfactory evi-
dence to the court." Id,
59. See id. at 6-7 (noting that will formalities such as requiring the will to be in writing
and signed by the testator help to demonstrate the intent of the testator while preventing
"unauthenticated or fraudulent additions" to the will).
60. See id. at 9 ("Some of the requirements of the statutes of wills have the objective...
of protecting the testator against imposition at the time of execution.").
61. See Wingrove v. Wingrove, 11 P.D. 81, 83 (P. Div'l Ct. 1885).
62. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 52, at 494 (suggesting that will for-
malities absolve the testator of worry as to whether the mode of communicating his testa-
mentary wishes will be effective).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See In re Groffman, 1 W.L.R. 733, 735, 739 (1969).
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upon closer examination, this apparent disregard for a testator's in-
tentions is caused by rigid application of will statutes and may be justi-
fiable if such application provides a greater benefit to society at large
than the wrong dealt to testators who fail to clear the formalities
hurdle.66
c. Statutory Framework Around the Doctrine.-The public poli-
cies discussed above are evident in the three Maryland statutes that
most directly limit the doctrine of dependent relative revocation: sec-
tion 4-102, Writing; signature; attestation,67 section 4-105, Revocation
of a will,68 and section 4-106, Revival of a will.69
d. The History of the Doctrine.-One of the earliest and most
defining cases applying the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
was the English case of Onions v. Tyrer. ° Tyrer made a properly exe-
cuted will detailing the testamentary disposition of his realty. 71 He
later made a second will that revoked the first and effected minor
changes as to the disposition of his real estate.72 However, as Tyrer
was bedridden when he drafted his second will and there was no place
in his room for the three witnesses to sign, they signed out of sight of
the testator. The failure to sign in the testator's presence invalidated
the will.7 3 Tyrer then had his wife destroy the first will.74 The court
66. See supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text (outlining the societal benefits of ad-
hering to will formalities).
67. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-102 (1991). This section requires that:
Except as provided in §§ 4-103 [holographic will] and 4-104 [will made outside
Maryland], every will shall be (1) in writing, (2) signed by the testator, or by some
other person for him, in his presence and by his express direction, and (3) at-
tested and signed by two or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator.
Id.
68. Id. § 4-105. This section states:
A will, or any part of it, may not be revoked in a manner other than as provided in
this section .... (2) Destruction.-By burning, canceling, tearing, or obliterating
the same, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence and by
his express direction and consent.
Id.
69. Id. § 4-106. This section states:
If a testator makes a subsequent will intended to revoke a prior will, the destruc-
tion or other revocation of the subsequent will does not revive the prior will un-
less the will is still in existence and is republished with the same formalities as are
required for the execution of a will in this subtitle.
Id.
70. 2 Vern. 741 (1716).
71. Id. at 741. The will was properly attested by three witnesses. Id.
72. Id. at 741-42.
73. Id. at 742.
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held that since Tyrer's second will was invalid, the revocation clause
therein was also invalid.7" The court also held that owing to the simi-
larity between Tyrer's two wills, Tyrer most likely would have preferred
his first will to intestacy.76 In reaching this conclusion, the Tyrer court
found it clear that Tyrer revoked his first will "only upon a supposition
that he had made a latter will at the same time, and both wills, as to
the main, were much to the same effect."77 As such, the court set
aside Tyrer's revocation of the first will and allowed it to stand.7"
The English courts later applied Onions in Tupper v. Tupper.
79
The testator had devised gifts to certain charities in his 1851 will.80
Later, in an 1853 codicil, he explicitly revoked these gifts and instead
made a gift to another charity.81 The codicil, having been found to
violate the law, was held to be void.82 The question before the court
was whether to uphold the testator's revocation of his earlier will.8"
The Tupper court began by looking at Onions, where the court
had found revocation of the old will bound to the attempted creation
of a new will.84 The Tupper court concluded that it could not find a
similar bond. Although both the 1851 and 1853 gifts benefitted chari-
table parties, they were different charitable benefactors.8 5 Without
such a bond, the court found no indication of an intention by the
testator that "the legatees whose legacies he revoke [d] should remain
recipients of his bounty."86 Accordingly, the court upheld the testa-




76. Id. at 742-43. The court also raised minor doubt as to Tyrer's revocation. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 743.
79. 1 K. &J. 665 (1855).
80. Id. at 666 (noting that the testator had made various charitable bequests totaling
£850 to the treasurers for the time being of the Missionary College of Saint Augustine at
Canterbury, the Society for Promoting the Employment of Additional Curates in Populous
Places, and the Tithe Redemption Trust).
81. Id. at 666-67 (noting that in his codicil, the testator explicitly revoked the charitable
bequests from his earlier will totaling £850; "in lieu thereof," testator bequeathed £1000 to
the treasurer for the time being of the House of Charity in Rose Street, Soho).
82. Id. at 670 (noting that "[t]he law prevents the particular object which [the testator]
has designated [in his codicil] from taking anything").
83. Id. at 667-68 (giving arguments by executors and the codicil charity beneficiary as
to why the testator's revocation should be upheld or stricken).
84. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text (describing Onions v. Tyrer).
85. Tupper, 1 K. &J. at 666-67 (listing beneficiaries under the 1851 will and the 1853
codicil).




In Quinn v. Butler,"8 a testator had written a will exercising his
power of appointment in favor of his son and three daughters. He
later wrote a codicil revoking this bequest and bequeathing the legacy
entirely to his son."9 When the bequest in this codicil was found to be
unenforceable,"° the court was asked whether the revocation in the
codicil was unenforceable as well. 1 The court began by looking at the
connection between the testator's revocation and his new distribu-
tion. 2 Relying on Onions v. Tyrer,9" the court held that the testator's
intention was to first revoke his prior will, and then make a codicil gift
to his son; the revocation was not conditioned on the validity of the
testator's bequest under his codicil.9 4 Thus, the court was unwilling to
apply dependent relative revocation to cancel the revocation. The
portion of the codicil revoking the 1856 will bequest was upheld,
while the portion of the codicil creating an alternative bequest was
held to be void.95
Onions and its progeny establish that the English equity courts
were willing to consider the intent of the testator in the process of
interpreting will revocations and subsequent gifts. If the courts deter-
mined that the testator had intended for her revocation and subse-
quent gift to be part of one continuous act, and the gift failed, then
the revocation was found to have failed as well. But if the revocation
and subsequent gift were found to be independent actions, then the
valid revocation was upheld, and the invalid gift was found void.
e. The Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation in Maryland.-
Maryland courts have never applied the doctrine of dependent rela-
tive revocation, 6 but they have considered it on three occasions prior
to Kroll.9 7 The issue of when, if ever, the doctrine should be applied
in Maryland first arose in Semmes v. Semmes.9" In Semmes, the deceased
made a will devising his entire estate in trust to his wife until his son
88. L.R. 6 Eq. 225 (1868).
89. Id. at 225-26.
90. Id. at 228.
91. Id. at 226-27.
92. Id. at 227-28.
93. Id. at 227 ("If a will is simply revoked in order to make a gift in favor of another
person, and you can see that there is no intention to revoke unless for that purpose, then
the doctrine of Onions v. Tyrer applies. The case has generally arisen when there has been
a defective execution of the second instrument.").
94. Id.
95. Id. at 228.
96. Kroll, 348 Md. at 619, 705 A.2d at 717.
97. Id. at 625, 705 A.2d at 720.
98. 7 H. &J. 388 (Md. 1826).
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reached twenty-one, at which point half of his estate would go to his
son and half to his wife.99 When his wife predeceased him, he wrote
on his will "[i]n consequence of the death of my wife, it is [sic] be-
come necessary to make another will," and signed it.10 He then
crossed out his and all the witnesses' signatures.'l t He failed to make
another will before his death, and when he died his original will was
presented for probate.'0 2
The court was faced with deciding whether Semmes' deliberate,
intentional revocation of his will was valid. 1'3 After reviewing Onions
v. Tyrer, the court concluded that for dependent relative revocation to
apply, a testator must have revoked his will upon the mistaken belief
that a later created will was legitimate.'0 4 Because Semmes had not
created a later will, the doctrine was inapplicable."0 5 Thus, the court
upheld the testator's revocation of his will.'0 6
The Court of Appeals next considered the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Thorn.'°7 Anne Lowe
Rieman died on March 3, 1911, leaving two daughters and three
sons.'0 8 Rieman's will directed that each of her surviving children was
to receive $10,000 outright.'09 The will devised the majority of
Rieman's residuary estate to a trust, with each of Rieman's children
receiving one-fifth of the income from the trust quarterly." 0 If one of
the children died, the trust was to be divided, with each of the five
children, or his or her living issue, receiving a one-fifth share per
capita."'
Rieman later changed her mind and decided to give each child
their one-fifth share outright, thus abolishing the trust and bequest
arrangement." 2 On June 28, 1910, Rieman notified her attorney of
the change, and told her attorney that because her children would get
their shares of her estate absolutely under the new will, Rieman had
99. Id. at 391.
100. Id. at 389.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 391.
103. Id. (commenting upon Semmes' actions that "[if that was not a revocation, it
would be found difficult to revoke a will by canceling").
104. Id. at 390-91.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 391.
107. 117 Md. 154, 83 A. 45 (1912).
108. Id. at 155, 83 A. at 45.
109. Id. at 157, 83 A. at 46.
110. Id. at 158, 83 A. at 46.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 160, 83 A. at 47.
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erased the provisions of her will detailing the $10,000 bequests. 1
Her attorney responded that Rieman should not attempt to change
her will in this manner, and offered to draft a new will for Rieman as
soon as she sent him a list of revisions.' 14 Apparently taking his ad-
vice, Rieman retraced in pencil some of the words that she had
rubbed out.
1 15
Mrs. Rieman died before she sent her attorney the list of revi-
sions.' 1 6 Consequently, he had not prepared a new will for her.117
Rieman's estate was left with her old will, complete with its rub-outs
and re-tracings, to bring to probate.'
The Thorn court considered whether Rieman's erasure and retrac-
ing of items in her will operated to revoke the items in particular and
the will in general." 9 The court held that the erasure did not consti-
tute revocation,' 20 reasoning that in order for a cancellation to consti-
tute revocation of the will, the cancellation must "clearly indicate an
intention to revoke." 21 Rather than view Mrs. Rieman's acts as an
intent to clearly revoke, the court viewed her erasing and re-lining as
an incomplete revocation. 122 Since there was no revocation, there was
no opportunity to consider applying the doctrine of dependent rela-
tive revocation. The court simply allowed probate of Rieman's old
will.
1 2 3
In 1988, the issue of whether the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation should be applied in Maryland resurfaced in Arrowsmith v.
Mercantile-Safe Deposit.124 In Arrowsmith, the testator, Frances Arrow-
113. Id. at 161, 83 A. at 47. During that conversation, Rieman also told Willis that in
addition to changing the bequests to her children, she had some specific money legacies
that she wanted to incorporate into the revised will. Id. at 160, 83 A. at 47. Willis re-
sponded that he would prepare a revised will as soon as Rieman sent him a list of the
additional legacies. Id.
114. Id. at 160, 83 A. at 47.
115. Id. at 159-60, 83 A. at 47.
116. Id. at 160-61, 83 A. at 47.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 156, 83 A. at 46.
120. Id. at 166, 83 A. at 49.
121. Id. at 163, 83 A. at 48.
122. Id. ("Such an act is clearly too indefinite, too incomplete to form the foundation of
a presumption that the testatrix intended thereby to revoke an instrument which she had
executed with so much formality.")
123. Id. at 169, 83 A. at 50.
124. 313 Md. 334, 545 A.2d 674 (1988). The Court of Appeals considered three issues
in this case: (1) whether the rule against perpetuities had been properly applied; (2)
whether the doctrine of dependent relative revocation had been properly dismissed as a
remedy to cure the perpetuities violation in a testator's will that did not share a perpetu-
ities violation; and (3) whether a charitable contribution in the testator's will should be
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smith, drafted an irrevocable deed of trust giving her son power of
appointment over approximately $7 million worth of assets.' 2 5 He
proceeded to exercise this power in his wills dated 1966, 1976, and
1982.126 Each will contained a clause revoking the previous will. 12 7 In
1983, the son died, and his 1982 will was probated. 128 Upon examin-
ing this 1982 will, the circuit court held that a trust provision within
the will, which operated under the testator's power of appointment
granted him by his mother's 1953 trust, violated the rule against per-
petuities. 129 Consequently, the court ordered that a default provision
under Ms. Arrowsmith's 1953 deed of trust, which called for dividing
the trust equally among her son's children, be put into effect.'3 °
The circuit court's ruling was appealed by takers under the 1982
will on three separate grounds, 13 1 one of which was based on the doc-
trine of dependent relative revocation. The Unknowns, an appellant
group made up of all possible unknown people with an interest in the
son's will, argued that the court should apply the doctrine of depen-
dent relative revocation to vitiate the rule against perpetuities viola-
tion presented by execution of the son's power of appointment in the
1982 will. 13
2
In the 1966 will, the son had established a trust for the benefit of
his children similar to the trust in his 1982 will. 1 3 However, the 1966
will limited the duration of the trust to the lifetime of eleven lives in
being at the creation of the trust,'3 4 thereby eliminating the perpetu-
ities violation under the 1982 trust.135 Citing the doctrine of depen-
dent relative revocation, the Unknowns petitioned the Court of
Appeals to make the 1982 will suitable for probate by bringing this
provision forward and attaching it to the 1982 will.
136
void as a contract for lack of consideration or estoppel. Id at 341, 351-52, 545 A.2d at 677-
78, 682-83. Only the second issue is relevant here.




129. Id. at 339, 545 A.2d at 676.
130. Id. at 340, 545 A.2d at 677.
131. Id. at 340-41, 545 A.2d at 677.
132. Id. Since the son's children were all childless, all possible unknown people (the
Unknowns) who may have had an interest in his estate were represented by counsel. Id. at
339, 545 A.2d at 677.
133. Id. at 340, 545 A.2d at 677.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 340-41, 545 A.2d at 677.
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The court began its analysis by reviewing the traditional purpose
of the doctrine. 137 The court noted that dependent relative revoca-
tion was based on the idea that a court may correct a conditional revo-
cation made by a testator.' This foundation limits the doctrine's
breadth to situations where a court believes that a testator would have
preferred a prior will to intestacy brought on by the failing of a later
will.139 The Arrowsmith court found no support for the Unknowns'
proposition that the court could parse a will into individual bequests
and compare each bequest with a similar bequest in a prior revoked
will;140 in the court's opinion, this would violate the purpose of the
doctrine.1 ' Thus, the Arrowsmith court held that if dependent relative
revocation were to apply at all, it would have the effect of using an
earlier revoked will to usurp the 1982 will in its entirety.
14 2
Following this conclusion, the court outlined the logical progres-
sion that, given the facts in Arrowsmith, the court would need to follow
in order to apply the doctrine.' 4 First, the court would have to hold
that the son preferred his 1976 will to his 1982 will.' 4 4 Even if the
court arrived at this conclusion, applying the doctrine would not help,
because the 1976 will violated the rule against perpetuities for the
same reason as his 1982 will. 145 Thus, the Unknowns would next have
to show that the son would have preferred his 1966 will to his partially
invalid 1976 will. 1 46 Only then would dependent relative revocation
apply.'4 7 In applying the doctrine, the 1966 will would have to be
admitted to probate in its entirety, completely replacing the 1982
will.t 48
In addition to this rather tortured path of "un-revocations" that
the court would need to accept, the court stated another reason for
finding dependent relative revocation unsuitable in this case: there
were "substantial differences" between some of the bequests made in
the 1966 and 1982 wills which made the application of dependent rel-
137. Id. at 343-48, 545 A.2d at 679-81.
138. Id. at 348, 545 A.2d at 681.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 345, 350, 545 A.2d at 680, 682.
141. Id. ("Plucking the perpetuities savings clause from the 1966 will and inserting it in
the 1982 is inconsistent with the theoretical justification for the doctrine [of dependent
relative revocation].').
142. Id. at 349, 545 A.2d at 682.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 349-50, 545 A.2d at 682.
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ative revocation inappropriate. 49 For example, the son made sixteen
bequests in his 1966 will to individuals that he omitted entirely from
his 1982 will.150 Also, only two of the sixteen charitable legatees in his
1982 will were also included in his 1966 will.151 The court noted that
these and other substantial differences made it unlikely that the son
"would have preferred the prior [1966] will to the result under the
later [1982] will."' 15 2 Thus, the Arrowsmith court refused to apply the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation."5 '
f The Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation in OtherJurisdic-
tions.-Most states have had occasion to consider judicial application
of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.154 In McIntyre v. Mc-
Intyre,155 the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether a duly
executed will in which the testator had crossed out portions of the will
in pencil and pasted pieces of paper over other portions of the will,
sometimes with notations on the paper, was suitable for probate.156
149. Id.
150. Id, at 350-51, 545 A.2d at 682.
151. Id. at 351, 545 A.2d at 682.
152. Id. at 348, 545 A.2d at 681.
153. Id. at 351, 545 A.2d at 683.
154. See Franklin v. Bogue, 17 So. 2d 405, 409 (Ala. 1944); Larrick v. Larrick, 607 S.W.2d
92, 95 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); In re Kaufman's Estate, 155 P.2d 831, 834 (Cal. 1945); Church-
ill v. Allessio, 719 A.2d 913, 915 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998); Bailey v. Kennedy, 425 P.2d 304,
307 (Colo. 1967); Ruth v. Ruth, 123 A.2d 132, 134 (Del. Ch. 1956); In reJones, 352 So. 2d
1182, 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 47 S.E. 501, 503 (Ga. 1904); In
re Heazle's Estate, 240 P.2d 821, 823 (Idaho 1953); In re Estate of Davies (Joranson v. Ja-
cobs), 282 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Roberts v. Fisher, 105 N.E.2d 595, 599-600
(Ind. 1952); Blackford v. Anderson, 286 N.W. 735, 746-47 (Iowa 1939); In re Kemper's
Estate, 145 P.2d 103, 112 (Kan. 1944); Wallingford's Ex'r v. Wallingford's Adm'r, 99
S.W.2d 729, 731 (Ky. 1936); Smith v. Shaw, 60 So. 2d 865, 866 (La. 1952); In re Thompson,
102 A. 303, 306 (Me. 1917); Schneider v. Harrington, 71 N.E.2d 242, 243 (Mass. 1947); In
re McKay's Estate, 79 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Mich. 1956); In re Estate of Anthony, 121 N.W.2d
772, 779 (Minn. 1963); Estate of Lyles, 615 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Miss. 1993); Watson v.
Landvatter, 517 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Mo. 1974); In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of
Estate of Tennant, 714 P.2d 122, 129-30 (Mont. 1986); In re Ladman's Estate, 259 N.W. 50,
53 (Neb. 1935); In re Estate of Laura, 690 A.2d 1011, 1014 (N.H. 1997); In re Smalley's
Estate, 24 A.2d 515, 517 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1942); In re Roeder's Estate, 106 P.2d 847, 851-52
(N.M. 1940); In re Macomber's Will, 87 N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (App. Div. 1949); Shriners' Hosp.
for Crippled Children v. Hester, 492 N.E.2d 153, 157 (Ohio 1986); In re Estate of Ausley,
818 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Okla. 1991); Flanders v. White, 18 P.2d 823, 828 (Or. 1933); In re
Crook's Estate, 130 A.2d 185, 188 (Pa. 1957); Charleston Library Soc'y v. Citizens & South-
ern Nat'l Bank, 20 S.E.2d 623, 627 (S.C. 1942); Briscoe v. Allison, 290 S.W.2d 864, 866
(Tenn. 1956); Chambers v. Chambers, 542 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976, no writ);
Bell v. Timmins, 58 S.E.2d 55, 61-62 (Va. 1950); In re Estate of Hall, 499 P.2d 912, 914
(Wash. App. 1972); In re Estate of Siler, 187 S.E.2d 606, 615 (W. Va. 1972); In re Rauchfuss'
Estate, 287 N.W. 173, 177 (Wis. 1939).
155. 47 S.E. 501 (Ga. 1904).
156. Id. at 502-03.
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The court began its analysis by noting the express statutory provi-
sion in Georgia that when a will is obliterated in material part, a rebut-
table presumption arises that the testator intended to revoke the
will. 157 It then outlined the two elements that must be present for a
testator to revoke a will: act and intention. 158 The court went on to
note that when a testator revokes his old will, the fact that the testator
meant to create a new will and did not, or created one that failed,
does not alone justify the application of dependent relative revoca-
tion.159 The revocation of the old will and creation of the new one
must be "part of one scheme," and entirely dependent upon one an-
other.160 In McIntyre, the court did not find this union, a finding nec-
essary to clearly rebut the presumption of intention to revoke that
arises when material portions of a will have been crossed out."'6 Thus,
the court remanded the case for trial before ajury consistent with the
court's opinion. 162
South Carolina applied the doctrine of dependent relative revo-
cation in Charleston Library Society v. Citizens & Southern National
Bank. '6 In that case, the testator bequeathed most of her estate to
various charities through a will and a series of codicils.' 64 Her will and
first codicil bequeathed certain property in trust to the Charleston
Library Society (CLS), with instructions to set up a memorial for her
two brothers. 65 A later codicil revoked this legacy and bequeathed
the property instead to a trust, the purpose of which was to set up a
museum (the Ross Memorial) as a memorial to her two brothers.' 66
The museum was ruled not to be a charity, and thus this legacy of the
codicil violated the rule against perpetuities and could not be effectu-
ated. 167 Confronted with the revocation of the library legacy, the
court could either apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
to revive the library bequest, or allow the revocation to stand and roll
the bequest into the residual estate. 168 The South Carolina court
chose the former. 169




161. Id. at 504.
162. Id.
163. 20 S.E.2d 623 (S.C. 1942).
164. Id. at 624.
165. Id. at 624-25.
166. Id. at 625.
167. Id. at 626.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 628.
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The court looked at the will and codicils, and concluded that the
overall intention of the testator was to give approximately three
fourths of her estate to various hospitals and about one fourth to a
cultural interest in memory of her deceased brothers.1 7 1 Since her
hospital legatees were the beneficiaries of her residual estate, rolling
the legacy into the residual would have the effect of giving most of the
estate to the hospitals, thereby upsetting this balance. 17 1 The South
Carolina Supreme Court held that this result would frustrate the testa-
tor's eleemosynary intent.172 To avoid this outcome, the court ap-
plied dependent relative revocation.' 7  Accordingly, when the
museum provisions failed due to a mistake of fact, "the Library provi-
sions [were] automatically reinstated to prevent the frustration of the
intent of the testatrix."
174
California applied the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
in In re Kaufman's Estate.175 The case involved a testator who executed
a California will identical to a will he had earlier executed in New
York, except for a change in executor.' 76 When his California will was
not accepted for probate,1 77 Justice Traynor applied the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation to probate the testator's New York
will. 178 Justice Traynor first noted that "[t]he doctrine [of dependent
relative revocation] is designed to carry out the probable intention of
the testator when there is no reason to suppose that he intended to
revoke his earlier will if the later will became inoperative.'1 79 After
examining the facts of the case with respect to the doctrine, Justice
Traynor held that "[s] ince the second will was virtually identical with
the first in the disposition of the testator's estate, it is clear that the
first will was revoked only because the second duplicated its purpose
and that the testator would have preferred the first will to intestacy
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. The court reached this conclusion even though the beneficiaries in the con-
flicting documents were completely different. Id. at 624-25.
173. Id. at 628.
174. Id. The court went on to say that "even if the mistake be considered one of law this
would have no effect on the rule." Id.
175. 155 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1945).
176. Id. at 832 (noting that "[b]oth wills named identical persons for identical cash be-
quests and the Second Church of Christ, Scientist, of New York City, as residuary legatee").
Kaufman changed executors because the executor on his New York will, Mr. Franklin, was
"a busy man" who "would not want to come" to California to take care of Kaufman's estate.
Id.
177. Because Kaufman died within 30 days of executing his California will, the new will
was ineffective under California statutory law. Id. at 833.
178. Id. at 834.
179. Id. at 833.
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.... "180 Thus, revocation of the old will was found to be inseparably
related to the effectiveness of the new will."' As such,Justice Traynor
held that revocation of the old will did not occur and ordered that the
old will be admitted to probate.1 8 2
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Kroll v. Nehmer, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the doctrine of dependent relative revocation was erro-
neously applied by the lower courts, and that such application was
inconsistent with the testator's intentions. 8 3 In reaching this holding,
the court began its analysis by noting that the doctrine can be applied
in two cases: where the testator's mistake of fact causes her to revoke
her will,18 4 and where the testator's mistake of law impresses a false
belief that the subsequently executed will is valid.'8 5 Kroll represents a
mistake of law situation, 186 since the orphans' court found that Binco
intentionally revoked her will under the mistaken assumption that her
later will would be valid. 187
The Court of Appeals perceived the dispositive question as what
the testator would have preferred had she known her new will was
invalid.' 8 ' To answer this question, the court noted some of the fac-
tors generally considered in deciding whether to apply dependent rel-
ative revocation: any parol evidence that casts light on the intent of
the testator, how the testator revoked the existing will, whether a new
will was written, the temporal connection between the old and new
will, and any similarities and differences between the old and any new
wills."8 9 Often, because much of the above evidence simply does not
exist or is not helpful, "courts ... refuse [ I] to apply the doctrine un-
less the [old and new wills] reflect a common dispositive scheme." 9 °
180. Id. at 834.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Kro, 348 Md. at 631-32, 705 A.2d at 723.
184. Id. at 619, 705 A.2d at 717. Such a mistake in fact occurs when a testator mistakenly
destroys his will without realizing that it was, in fact, his will he was destroying. Warren,
supra note 2, at 338; see also 2 BowE & DOUGLAS, supra note 2, § 21.57, at 446.
185. Kro, 348 Md. at 619-20, 705 A.2d at 717-18. Mistake-of-law situations arise "where
the mistake is not in the revocation itself but in the inducement for the act, arising from
facts or circumstances extrinsic to the instrument revoked." Id., 705 A.2d at 717; see also 2
BowE & DOUGLAS, supra note 2, § 21.57, at 446.
186. Kroll, 348 Md. at 624, 705 A.2d at 720.
187. Id. at 618, 705 A.2d at 717.
188. Id. at 629, 705 A.2d at 722 ("The real question is what Ms. Binco would have wanted
to do if she had been told that she was unable to make a new will .
189. Id. at 629-30, 705 A.2d at 722.
190. Id. at 630, 705 A.2d at 722-23.
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Turning to the facts in Kroll, the Court of Appeals first looked for
evidence that Binco intended her revocation of the 1985 will to be
conditional on the validity of the 1990 will.191 They found that
Binco's unambiguous language written on the 1985 will,' 92 in combi-
nation with her new handwritten will created at the time of revocation
of the 1985 will, "indicat[ed] with some clarity that her act of revoca-
tion was based on her mistaken belief that the new will was valid and
would replace the old one." '193 However, the court noted that this
mistake regarding the new will "does not alone justify application of
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.1194
Rather, the court had to locate "that fictional presumed intent of
what [Binco] would have done had she been informed that she could
not make a new will."' 95 The evidence regarding the relationship be-
tween the appellant and the testator was conflicting and of little assist-
ance to the court. 196 However, a comparison of the legatees listed for
the 1985 and 1990 wills did aid the court in its analysis, as the two wills
listed almost completely different beneficiaries.197 In fact, with one
possible exception, "none of the beneficiaries under the 1985 will
were named in the 1990 will."198 Therefore, "the effect of applying
the doctrine [of dependent relative revocation] and disregarding
[Binco's] revocation . . . is precisely to do what she clearly did not
want done-to leave her estate to people she had intended to disin-
herit."' 99 Accordingly, the court held that it could not apply the doc-
trine of relative revocation, and instead remanded the case to the
lower court to proceed with intestacy."' The court did clarify, how-
ever, that its holding applied to the facts of Kroll, and that no broader
191. Id. at 631, 705 A.2d at 723.
192. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining that upon Binco's drafting
the 1990 will, she hand wrote "VOID-NEW WILL DRAWN UP 6-28-90" on the back of the
1985 will).
193. Kroll, 348 Md. at 631, 705 A.2d at 723.
194. Id.
195. Id.; see also supra notes 40-43 (discussing why presumed intent under dependent
relative revocation has been dubbed a "fiction").
196. Kroll, 348 Md. at 631, 705 A.2d at 723. The court noted that while some evidence
indicated that Binco did not have a good relationship with her brother (Henry Kroll) and
would not have desired that he take any part of her estate, other testimony contradicted
this evidence, suggesting that Binco and Kroll did have a cordial relationship. Id
197. Id
198. Id. ("The 1990 will replaced them all, indicating that Ms. Binco did not wish any of
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lesson about the state of the doctrine in Maryland should be gleaned
from the case. 20 1
4. Analysis.-In Kroll v. Nehmer, the Court of Appeals refused to
apply the doctrine of relative revocation in a case in which the differ-
ences in dispositive schemes between the testator's wills clearly indi-
cated her intent.20 2 In so ruling, the court followed both Maryland
precedent 2 3 and a general trend among states in refusing to apply
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation in a situation where it is
not clear that the testator would have preferred the dispositive scheme
of a prior will to intestacy.20 4
a. The Kroll Decision.-The Kroll decision was consistent
with the public policy underlying both Maryland statutory law requir-
ing certain will formalities and prior case law holding that courts
201. See id. ("We need not decide in this case whether the doctrine of dependent rela-
tive revocation ... is part of Maryland law ....
202. Id. at 631-32, 705 A.2d at 723.
203. See id, at 630, 705 A.2d at 722-23 ("In many cases, because the other evidence is
either inconclusive or nonexistent, the principal focus is on the differences and similarities
between the two instruments. In that regard, courts have generally refused to apply the
doctrine unless the two instruments reflect a common dispositive scheme." (citations
omitted)).
204. See In re Kaufman's Estate, 155 P.2d 831, 834 (Cal. 1945) ("Since the second will was
virtually identical with the first in the disposition of the testator's estate, it is clear that the
first will was revoked only because the second duplicated its purpose and that the testator
would have preferred the first will to intestacy as to a substantial part of his estate.");
Churchill v. Allessio, 719 A.2d 913, 918 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (noting that under depen-
dent relative revocation, "[t] he revival of the old will is the result of the legal presumption
that a testator would prefer an old, previously revoked will to intestacy"); In re Nutting's
Estate, 82 F. Supp. 689, 690 (D.D.C. 1949) (noting, in applying the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation, that "[c]ertainly [the testator] preferred the [earlier] will to intestacy
as to a substantial part of her estate"); In reJones, 352 So. 2d 1182, 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (finding dependent relative revocation applicable in part because it was clear that
the testator "did not intend to die intestate"); In re McKay's Estate, 79 N.W.2d 597, 600
(Mich. 1956) (noting that the testator's "intention implements the presumption against
intestacy which is the foundation of the rule of dependent relative revocation"); Estate of
Lyles, 615 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Miss. 1993) (noting that "the heart of the doctrine... is the
idea that, given the option, the testator . .. would prefer the will as executed over intes-
tacy"). See generally 2 BowE & PARKER, supra note 2, § 21.57, at 449-50 (noting that the
larger the difference between the valid but revoked will and the most recent but invalid
will, the less a court should be willing to apply the doctrine of doctrine of dependent
relative revocation); Palmer, supra note 44, at 998 ("If the testamentary disposition is closer
[to the testator's intent, then] dependent relative revocation should be applied and the
will held unrevoked, but if intestacy is closer the doctrine should be held inapplicable.");
Warren, supra note 2, at 350 (advising a probate judge, faced with a testator's revocation
based on a mistake in fact, to "[d]ecline to tamper with [a testator's] revocation at all, if
you please; but if you do tamper with it, set it aside only if that would meet the probable
intention of the testator were it possible to call the error to his notice").
860
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should not supersede a testator's intention. Courts, including those
in Maryland, agree that in cases where the old, valid (but revoked) will
is very similar in disposition to the new, invalid (but unrevoked) will,
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation may be allowed to resus-
citate the old will.2" 5 Application of the doctrine often turns on
whether the revocation and the making of a new will were part of one
scheme.20 6 However, courts often interpret a complete change in
one's testamentary dispositions as an indication that the testator
meant her revocation to be permanent, regardless of whether the
later will stands.20 7
Similarly, courts refuse to presume a testator's intentions by creat-
ing a will in situations where a testator canceled a will saying she
would write a new one, but never did so.20 8 The Kroll decision was
205. See Kroll, 348 Md. at 630, 705 A.2d at 722-23; see also Kaufman, 155 P.2d at 834
(holding that the similarity between Kaufman's old, revoked will and his new, invalid will
made dependent relative revocation appropriate); Arrowsmith v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit,
313 Md. 334, 351, 545 A.2d 674, 683 (1988) (noting the importance of similarity in disposi-
tion between an old revoked and a new invalid will when deciding whether to apply depen-
dent relative revocation).
206. See Kaufman, 155 P.2d at 834 ("When a testator repeats the same dispositive plan in
a new will, revocation of the old one by the new is deemed inseparably related to and
dependent upon the legal effectiveness of the new."); see also McIntyre v. McIntyre, 47 S.E.
501, 503 (Ga. 1904) (noting the importance of similarity between new and old testamen-
tary disposition); Arrowsmith, 313 Md. at 347, 545 A.2d at 680-81 (noting that identical
dispositive plans between new and old wills are evidence that the two were part of one
scheme). As the Court of Appeals stated in 1912:
If it is clear that the cancellation and the making of a new will were parts of one
scheme, and the revocation of the old will was so related to the making of the new
as to be dependent upon it, then if the new will be not made, or if made, is
invalid, the old will, though cancelled, should be given effect, if its contents can
be ascertained in any legal way.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Thom, 117 Md. 154, 168, 83 A. 45, 50 (1912).
207. See Krol4 348 Md. at 631, 705 A.2d at 723; see alsoWallingford's Ex'r v. Wallingford's
Adm'r, 99 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Ky. 1936) (finding the doctrine not applicable, and noting
that "[n]ot only does the new will in express terms indicate a positive intention to revoke
the old one, but, in making an entirely different disposition of the testator's estate, no
room is left for the presumption or inference that the revocation was intended to depend
upon whether the later will or any provisions thereof would be efficacious"); Watson v.
Landvatter, 517 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Mo. 1974) (refusing to apply the doctrine, and noting
that "the doctrine has been held inapplicable in a case in which the new will was materially
different from the old one"); In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Estate of Tennant,
714 P.2d 122, 129-30 (Mont. 1986) (noting that "an essential element of [dependent rela-
tive revocation] is that the new will and the old will of the testator must reflect essentially
the same dispositive plan"); Chambers v. Chambers, 542 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976, no writ) (concluding that "the doctrine does not apply" owing to the "extremely
different manner" in which the two instruments in question indicated the testator's intent
to dispose of his property).
208. See Arrowsmith, 313 Md. at 350, 545 A.2d at 682 (declaring that "this Court is neither
empowered to write a will for [the deceased testator] nor structure a will that differs from
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consistent with prior Maryland case law and statute by refusing to ap-
ply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation to Binco's 1990 will.
The court's choice was between intestacy, benefitting heirs not men-
tioned in any will, and a will with legatees to whom it knew the testator
did not want to bequeath. 20 9 Because the legislature established the
intestacy statutes as a "best guess" of how a typical intestate citizen
would want her estate to be dispersed, the court was correct to choose
the will beneficiary from this "best guess" over beneficiaries that the
testator clearly rejected.
One consequence of the Kroll court's properly narrow holding is
that it fails to offer guidance to future courts regarding when to apply
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. As noted above, courts
tend to apply the doctrine when the wills are almost identical, 210 and
decline to apply the doctrine when the testator's intentions are clearly
contradictory to the earlier will. 211 Yet no court, including Kroll, has
answered the question of how to handle cases in the middle; how simi-
lar must a revoked will be to a later flawed will before the court will
allow dependent relative revocation to operate.
For example, suppose Ts valid will, VW, was written in 1990 and
has as beneficiaries P, Q and RL Ts invalid will, IW, was written in
1995 and has as beneficiaries P, Yand Z. Her intestacy beneficiaries
are A, B and C. Clearly, T wanted P to benefit under both wills. It is
equally clear that she did not want A, B, and C to benefit under either
of her testate plans. Following the Kroll court's logic, a court would
focus principally on the "differences and similarities" between wills
VW and IW. 21 2 A court in this situation would likely apply dependent
relative revocation if Ts bequest to P in both wills was 99% of her
estate. But what if the bequests under both wills were one-third of her
estate equally to each beneficiary? The greater the difference be-
tween wills VW and IW, the more difficult the decision whether to
apply dependent relative revocation. This is because as the differ-
ences increase between wills VW and IW, it becomes more difficult for
any will which [the deceased testator] ever executed"); Semmes v. Semmes, 7 H. &J. 388,
391 (Md. 1826) (noting that although the testator "did not intend to die intestate.... we
cannot make a will for him").
209. Kroll 348 Md. at 621-22, 705 A.2d at 718-19 (referring to Ms. Binco's 1985 will). If
Binco had wanted the legatees named in the 1985 will to still benefit, presumably she
would have provided for them in her subsequent wills. See id. at 631, 705 A.2d at 723
(referring to the beneficiaries not included in the 1990 and 1994 wills as those Ms. Binco
"intended to disinherit").
210. See supra notes 205-206.
211. See supra notes 207-208.
212. See Krol4 348 Md. at 630, 705 A.2d at 722 (noting that "in many cases . . . the
principal focus is on the differences and similarities between the two instruments").
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the court to answer "the real question" of what T "would have wanted
to do if she had been told [before she died] that she was unable to
make a new will: would she have preferred her estate to pass under
[the VW will] to persons she had decided to remove as beneficiaries,
or would she have preferred that her estate pass intestate"?213 While
the Kroll court hinted that a court should consider "all of the relevant
circumstances surrounding the revocation,"214 it did not take the op-
portunity to say how it would weigh the different evidence, or how
much proof would be required for the doctrine to apply.
215
b. An Alternative to Dependent Relative Revocation.-Although
the Kroll decision followed prior Maryland court rulings on the doc-
trine of dependent relative revocation, its discussion of this doctrine
exposed a conflict in testamentary law: the struggle between main-
taining will formalities and carrying out the desire of the testator.
There is an answer to this dilemma that would allow both sides of this
conflict to win: a harmless error rule.
The thrust behind the adoption of a harmless error rule would be
an understanding "that the law could avoid so much of the hardship
associated with the rule of strict compliance if the presumption of in-
validity now applied to defectively executed wills were reduced from a
conclusive to a rebuttable one."2 1 6 This rule could be applied either
judicially, through a substantial compliance doctrine, or legislatively,
through a statutory dispensing power.
217
(1) Substantial Compliance.-Under a substantial compliance
doctrine, the court would allow slightly defectiveS
2 1
'-and therefore
technically invalid-wills to pass through probate, so long as it satis-
fied the purposes behind statutory will formalities.
219 Such an ap-
213. Id. at 629, 705 A.2d at 722.
214. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 189 (describing the types of factors at which
the court would look).
215. Krol 348 Md. at 629-30, 705 A.2d at 722-23.
216. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 52, at 4.
217. Id. at 6.
218. Consider, for example, In re Kaufman's Estate, 155 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1945), involving
old and new wills that were virtually identical. Id. at 832. Despite this, the court still had to
work through "the highly fictional process to pretend" that the testator's unconditional act
based on the mistaken belief that his later will would be valid was really an unconditional
act. Id. at 833-34; see also 2 BowE & PARKER, supra note 2, § 21.57, at 446. This is how the
court was able to probate Kaufman's old will. Kaufman, 155 P.2d at 834. Under a substan-
tial compliance doctrine, the court would have arrived at approximately the same out-
come; it just would have arrived there by finding that the testator's new will substantially
complied with the statute, and allowed that will to go to probate.
219. See supra Part 2.b (discussing the purposes of will formalities).
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proach would be similar to that found in dependent relative
revocation cases. When a court applies dependent relative revocation,
it seems to really be saying "it is not equitable to allow this person's
estate to pass through intestacy, given what we know of her true inten-
tions from her invalid will."220 By following a doctrine of substantial
compliance, the court would be doing what it really wanted to do-
allow the defective will to be probated, without having to create the
fiction of a "conditional revocation" as required under the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation.2 21
Substantial compliance would allow a court to avoid the cumber-
some artificially-produced "conditional revocation" in dependent rela-
tive revocation 222 while giving greater effect to the testator's true
desires. The substantial compliance doctrine does this by framing the
situation as it really is: a testator who meant to create a will, but failed
to meet a minor statutory requirement, is deemed to have crafted a
probate-worthy will because her document substantially complied with
the statutory requirements. Substantial compliance serves the same
purpose as dependent relative revocation, and achieves the result
most consistent with the testator's wishes, but without the doctrinal
mess.
With dependent relative revocation's conditional revocation, on
the other hand, a court frames the testator's revocation as having
been conditioned on facts that the testator believed to be true at the
time (the mistaken belief that the later will would pass probate), when
in reality, the testator made an unconditional revocation coupled with
a mistake of law.22' The artificiality, or fiction, is that a court trans-
forms a testator's unconditional action into a conditional one.
Despite the potential of the substantial compliance doctrine as a
tool for Maryland courts to better effectuate a testator's intent, the
prior examples using Kaufman and Kroll expose a problem with this
proposed doctrine: overcoming explicit statutory language. For exam-
ple, section 4-102 of the Maryland Estates & Trust Code establishes
specific requirements regarding the signing and attestation of a
220. See Kaufman, 155 P.2d at 834 (noting that "[s]ince [Kaufman's] second will was
virtually identical with the first in the disposition of the testator's estate, it is clear that the
first will was revoked only because the second duplicated its purpose and that the testator
would have preferred the first will to intestacy as to a substantial part of his estate").
221. See 2 BowE & PARKER, supra note 2, § 21.57, at 446 (describing the artificial condi-
tion set up by courts in dependent relative revocation cases).
222. See supra note 221.
223. See Warren, supra note 2, at 342 (noting that in these situations, "there is no ques-
tion that the testator intends to revoke his will.... [h]e is, however, induced to do so by a
misapprehension of law or of fact").
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will. 2 2 4 Great judicial activism would be required to probate a will
that, while clearly failing to meet these statutory requirements, ful-
filled the legislature's intent. Further, the Maryland courts would
have to overrule longstanding precedent. 225 For these reasons, the
legislature seems a more likely source of a harmless error rule.
(2) Statutory Dispensing Power.--The Wills Act, obviously, was
enacted by the legislature; creation of a statutory dispensing power
could occur by a legislative act.
In South Australia, the state parliament adopted just such a stat-
ute. It reads:
A document purporting to embody the testamentary inten-
tions of a deceased person shall, notwithstanding that it has
not been executed with the formalities required by this Act,
be deemed to be a will of the deceased person if the [pro-
bate court], upon application for admission of the document
to probate as the last will of the deceased, is satisfied that
there can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased in-
tended the document to constitute his will.
2 2 6
By adopting a similar statute, the Maryland legislature would resolve
the conflict experienced by Maryland courts, and allow them to fully
implement the intent of testators. At the same time, such a statute
would render unnecessary the doctrine of dependent relative revoca-
tion and its fictitious artificial conditional revocation.
5. Conclusion.-The Kroll court's holding-that the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation is inapplicable when there is a great
difference in dispositive schemes between an old valid will and the
new will that revoked it-is consistent with previous analysis of the
doctrine in Maryland. It also follows the tendency of many states to
only use this doctrine to correct minor testamentary errors. Although
the court did not elaborate on the circumstances under which the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation might be applied in Mary-
land, its holding implies a willingness by the court to continue inter-
preting the testamentary statutes strictly.
The court's ruling highlights an ongoing conflict within testa-
mentary law between adherence to will formalities and fulfilling the
224. See supra note 67 (stating the text of this statute).
225. See supra Part 2.e (discussing the history of the doctrine of dependent relative revo-
cation in Maryland).
226. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 52, at 9 (citing the Wills Act Amend-
ment Act (No. 2) of 1975, § 9).
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intent of a testator. It should prompt examination of how testamen-
tary statutes are currently applied, and analysis of whether this applica-
tion is really in the best interest of society.
JONATHAN M. HOLDA
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
VII. EVIDENCE
A. The Tacit Admission Rule Misapplied
In Key-El v. State,' the Court of Appeals considered whether an
accused's silence in the face of an accusation made against him in the
presence of a police officer could constitute a tacit admission.2 The
court held that admission of the accused's pre-arrest silence as sub-
stantive evidence against him was valid on both evidentiary and consti-
tutional grounds.' The court rejected the notion that such pre-arrest
silence is inadmissible because it is ambiguous in light of the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent,4 and reasoned that the circum-
stances surrounding pre-arrest silence should be examined by the trial
court on a case by case basis before determining the question of ad-
missibility.5 The court also concluded that the admission of pre-arrest
silence in the presence of a police officer did not automatically bur-
den the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.6 In validating the prosecution's use of Key-El's pre-arrest silence,
the court correctly identified the threshold requirements established
by Maryland case law for determining the admissibility of tacit admis-
sions.7 However, in deciding that such admissions by silence may be
1. 349 Md. 811, 709 A.2d 1305, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 267 (1998).
2. Id. at 813, 709 A.2d at 1305. The tacit admission exception to the hearsay rule is
codified in the Maryland Rules of Evidence. See MD. RULE 5-803(a) (2) (specifying that "[a]
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth" is not ex-
cluded by the hearsay rule). The tacit admission exception had long been recognized as
part of Maryland's common law, and the rule is a codification of that common law. Key-E4
349 Md. at 816, 709 A.2d at 1307. The Court of Appeals has explained that "[a] tacit
admission occurs when one remains silent in the face of accusations that, if untrue, would
naturally rouse the accused to speak in his or her defense." Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204,
241, 596 A.2d 1024, 1043 (1991) (quoting Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133, 137-38, 586
A.2d 15, 17 (1991)). The Henry court noted several prerequisites to classifying silence as a
tacit admission:
In order for the other's statement to be considered the party's tacit admission,
the following prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the party heard and understood
the other person's statement; (2) at the time, the party had an opportunity to
respond; (3) under the circumstances, a reasonable person in the party's posi-
tion, who disagreed with the statement, would have voiced that disagreement.
The party must have had first-hand knowledge of the matter addressed in the
statement.
Id. at 241-42, 596 A.2d at 1043 (quoting 6 LYNN McLAN, MARYLAND PRACTICE: MARYLAND
EVIDENCE STATE AND FEDERAL § 801(4).3, at 312-13 (1987)); see also infra notes 116-117 and
accompanying text.
3. Key-E; 349 Md. at 820, 824, 709 A.2d at 1309, 1311.
4. The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall.., be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. Key-El, 349 Md. at 818-19, 709 A.2d at 1308.
6. Id. at 824, 709 A.2d at 1311.
7. See supra note 2.
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used as substantive evidence of guilt rather than as impeachment evi-
dence only, the court failed to recognize that the Fifth Amendment is
necessarily implicated in pre-arrest situations, and therefore did not
adequately safeguard the defendant's constitutional rights under the
Fifth Amendment.
1. The Case.--On the night of August 19, 1994, Baltimore
County Police Officer John Johnson arrived at the home of Philip Key-
El and his wife, Pamela to investigate a 911 call recently placed from
the home.8 When Mr. Key-El answered Officer Johnson's knock at the
door, Officer Johnson asked him whether anyone had placed a 911
call, and whether there was any trouble.9 Mr. Key-El responded "no,"
but his wife, who was in the next room, responded "yes," at which
point OfficerJohnson entered the house."0 With Mr. Key-El standing
nearby, OfficerJohnson asked Mrs. Key-El what happened."l Officer
Johnson testified that Mr. Key-El was three or four feet away when his
wife made the accusation. 2 Mrs. Key-El responded that she had got-
ten into an argument with her husband and that he pulled her hair
and punched her in the face."3 Mr. Key-El made no response to his
wife's accusation.14 Officer Johnson later placed Mr. Key-El under
arrest.15
At Mr. Key-El's battery trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County, Mrs. Key-El denied her previous allegations and testified in
her husband's defense, claiming that it was actually another woman
who struck her.' 6 Mrs. Key-El testified that when she came home the
night of August 19, 1994, she found her husband with another wo-
man." She claimed that she and the other woman argued and ex-
changed blows before Mr. Key-El was able to get the woman out of the
house.'8 Mrs. Key-El testified further that she and her husband con-
tinued to argue, and that she called the police and accused Mr. Key-El
of battering her after he refused to identify the other woman and ex-
plain what she was doing in their home.' Mrs. Key-El testified that
8. Key-E4 349 Md. at 813, 709 A.2d at 1305.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id., 709 A.2d at 1305-06.
12. Id. at 815, 709 A.2d at 1306.
13. Id.
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she falsely accused her husband because she wanted to hurt him "the
way that he hurt me."2 On cross-examination, however, Mrs. Key-El
testified that she had sent a letter to the State's Attorney's office re-
peating the battery accusation against her husband in response to a
request that she complete a victim impact statement.21 Mrs. Key-El
testified that when her husband saw the letter from the State's Attor-
ney's Office requesting that his wife complete the victim statement, he
became angry and threw it away.22
Officer Johnson was recalled by the State as a rebuttal witness,
and he testified that Mr. Key-El remained silent in the face of his
wife's accusation on the night of August 19, 1994.23 Officer Johnson's
testimony was admitted in evidence over the objections of the de-
fense. 24 The jury found Mr. Key-El guilty of battery and sentenced
him to five years imprisonment.
25
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals considered, inter alia,
whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Mr. Key-El's
pre-arrest silence when Mrs. Key-El's accusations were made in the
presence of a police officer. 26 The court acknowledged that other ju-
risdictions have rejected the tacit admission rule when the accusation
occurs in the presence of a police officer on the rationale that silence
in such a situation "is so ambiguous as to be of little probative
[value]."27 However, the court stated that the admission by silence
exception to the hearsay rule has been recognized by Maryland law,
28
and observed that "[n] o Maryland Court has held that the mere pres-
ence of the police is sufficient to preclude testimony of an accused's
silence under circumstances where a response might reasonably be
expected."29 In determining that Mr. Key-El's silence was probative of
the truth of Mrs. Key-El's trial testimony, the court stated that "[i]f




23. Id. at 814-15, 709 A.2d at 1306. OfficerJohnson testified that when Mrs. Key-El told
him that her husband had struck her, Mr. Key-El was standing in the dining room, approxi-
mately four feet away from him. Officer Johnson also testified that Mrs. Key-El spoke
loudly enough for Mr. Key-El to hear, and that when she stated that her husband hit her,
Mr. Key-El said nothing. Id.
24. Id. at 815, 709 A.2d at 1306.
25. Id.
26. Key-El v. State, No. 65, slip op. at 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 22, 1996), afrd, 349
Md. 811, 709 A.2d 1305, cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 267 (1998).
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. (citing Ewell v. State, 228 Md. 615, 618-19, 180 A.2d 857, 859-60 (1962); Duncan
v. State, 64 Md. App. 45, 50-51, 494 A.2d 235, 237 (1985)).
29. Id. at 6.
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being falsely accused of a crime, it was when [Mrs. Key-El] accused
appellant of an assault that, if she is to be believed, was committed by
appellant's female guest."' The court held that the trial court did
not err in admitting Mr. Key-El's silence as a tacit admission, and up-
held Mr. Key-El's conviction.31 The Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari to consider whether the trial court properly admitted rebuttal
evidence regarding Mr. Key-El's pre-arrest admission by silence when
his wife, in the presence of a police officer, accused him of battering
her. 2
2. Legal Background.-The tacit admission rule is codified at
Maryland Rule 5-803 (a) (2), which states, "a statement of which the
party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth" is not excluded
by the hearsay rule.33 Prior to its codification, the tacit admission rule
was long a part of Maryland common law.34 While recognizing the
30. Id.
31. Id. Judge Wilner concurred in the result, noting that the Court of Special Appeals
was bound by the Court of Appeals's decision in Barber v. State, 191 Md. 555, 62 A.2d 616
(1948), in which an accusation made in the presence of law enforcement officers was ad-
missible as a tacit admission. Key-El v. State, No. 65, concurring slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. Nov. 22, 1996) (WilnerJ., concurring). Judge Wilner stated that if it were not for the
Barber decision, he would have dissented because the widespread popular knowledge of an
accused's right to remain silent renders all pre-arrest silence in the presence of a law en-
forcement officer ambiguous. Id. Judge Wilner expressed hope that the Court of Appeals
would take the opportunity to reconsider Barber. Id. at 2.
32. Key-El, 349 Md. at 813, 709 A.2d 1305.
33. MD. RULE 5-803(a) (2). The rule has been applied when an accused fails to respond
in the face of an accusatory statement, as in Key-EL See Ewell, 228 Md. at 617, 180 A.2d at
859; Duncan, 64 Md. App. at 49, 494 A.2d at 237. However, when analyzing the admissibil-
ity of an accused's silence in various pre- and post-arrest situations, Maryland courts have
borrowed reasoning from Supreme Court cases in which defendants fail to proffer alibis in
situations where they might reasonably be expected, rather than from cases in which de-
fendants remain silent in response to accusatory statements. See Key-El, 349 Md. at 821-23,
709 A.2d at 1309-10 (discussing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and Jenkins v. Anderson,
447 U.S. 231 (1980)); Wills v. State, 82 Md. App. 669, 672-73, 573 A.2d 80, 82 (1990)
(same). From an analytical perspective, therefore, Maryland courts have not distinguished
silence maintained in response to a statement from silence maintained in a situation where
an alibi or explanation would be expected.
34. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 151 Md. 87, 96-97, 133 A. 899, 902-03 (1926) (holding acqui-
escence by a young man in the presence of actions implicating him as the father of an
illegitimate child was admissible as a "vicarious admission by him of the truth of the
charge"). In Zink v. Zink, 215 Md. 197, 137 A.2d 139 (1957), the Court of Appeals ex-
plained the basis for the rule as follows:
Where a party to an action adopts a statement uttered by another, it becomes his
own admission. In some situations standing mute may constitute the adoption of
the statement of another person. This can be only when no other explanation is
equally consistent with silence-i.e., if the situation and circumstances are such
that a dissent in ordinary experience would have been expressed if the statement
or communication had not been correct.
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validity of tacit admissions, the Maryland courts were circumspect with
regard to the evidentiary value of such admissions. Therefore, at com-
mon law, tacit admissions were admissible only as circumstantial evi-
dence of the truth of an accusatory statement.
35
a. Admissibility of Silence Maintained in the Presence of Police Of-
ficers Before Miranda.-Silence maintained in the presence of law en-
forcement officers has been subject to greater judicial scrutiny than
silence maintained when an officer is not present. In Barber v. State,3 6
the Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant's refusal to
speak post-arrest in response to an accusatory statement made by a co-
defendant while in the presence of law enforcement officers could
constitute a tacit admission.
Barber and a co-defendant, Holmes, were arrested in connection
with a robbery.3" Holmes made a statement to the police implicating
Barber in the crime, and then lead the police to a creek where the
clothes worn by the men during the robbery were hidden.39 The po-
lice later brought both Barber and Holmes back to the creek, where
they asked Barber if a pair of trousers in the pile of clothes belonged
to him.4° Barber responded, "I have nothing to say."'" The police
then asked Holmes whose trousers they were, and he replied
"Barber's."42
While recognizing that silence maintained by a suspect in re-
sponse to an accusatory statement is inadmissible in some states when
the suspect is under arrest,43 the court chose to follow other states and
view the arrest as merely one of the circumstances to be considered in
Id. at 202, 137 A.2d at 142 (citing 4JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRILS AT COMMON
LAW §§ 1069, 1071 (3d ed.)).
35. See Ewell, 228 Md. at 619, 180 A.2d at 860 (noting that if testimony of a tacit admis-
sion is allowed into evidence, the trial judge should inform the jury that "such evidence is
to be received with caution, that it is not substantive evidence of the fact asserted and does
not of itself show guilt and that it is but a circumstance which permits the drawing of an
inference of guilt"); Ellison v. State, 56 Md. App. 567, 582, 468 A.2d 413, 420 (1983) ("The
error found ... involved a failure to instruct the jury that a failure to deny [an accusatory
statement] only gives rise to an inference and is not direct evidence.").
36. 191 Md. 555, 62 A.2d 616 (1948).
37. Id. at 564-65, 62 A.2d at 620.
38. Id. at 560-61, 62 A.2d at 618.




43. Id. at 565, 62 A.2d at 620 (citing People v. Rutilgiano, 184 N.E. 689 (N.Y. 1933);
People v. Mleczko, 81 N.E. 65 (N.Y. 1948); State v. Battle, 212 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1948)).
1999]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
determining admissibility. 4 Adopting the latter approach, the court
observed that "'the better rule is to allow some flexibility according to
circumstances.' 4
5
Having adopted a case by case approach to determining the ad-
missibility of post-arrest silence in the presence of law enforcement
officers, the court determined that the trial court erred in admitting
the officer's testimony concerning Barber's silence.46 The court
stated:
[E]ven in States where the fact of arrest is not controlling, if
it appears that the failure to deny is attributable to fear, the
advice of counsel, or the desire to exercise an assumed or
asserted right against self-incrimination, it has been held that
no inference of guilt can properly be drawn.47
The court concluded that Barber's silence "would not support an in-
ference of admission of guilt under the circumstances" because he was
told by the police and his lawyer that he had a right to decline to
make a statement.48 While the court refused to hold all post-arrest
silence in the face of accusatory statements inadmissible as a tacit ad-
mission, it did recognize that an accused's assertion of his right
against self-incrimination would render the silence devoid of eviden-
tiary value, and therefore inadmissible.4"
As the United States Supreme Court undertook to safeguard the
defendant's right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment in Miranda v. Arizona5" and its progeny, this affected the Mary-
land courts' views on the admissibility of an accused's silence in the
presence of law enforcement officers.5 ' In Miranda, the Supreme
Court established procedural safeguards that must be followed by law
enforcement officers whenever an accused is subjected to "custodial
interrogation, 52 which the Court defined as "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."'53
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 565-66, 62 A.2d at 620-21.
47. Id. at 565, 62 A.2d at 620 (citing People v. Simmons, 172 P.2d 18 (Cal. 1946)).
48. Id. at 566, 62 A.2d at 621.
49. Id. at 565, 62 A.2d at 620; accord Miller v. State, 231 Md. 215, 217-19, 189 A.2d 635,
635-37 (1963) (holding that a defendant's silence in response to an accusatory statement
when he is in police custody is inadmissible because of the defendant's right to remain
silent).
50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51. See infra notes 57-97.
52. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
53. Id.
[VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
The Court imposed an affirmative duty on law enforcement officers to
notify an individual subject to custodial interrogation of his right
against self-incrimination.54 The Court believed that police interroga-
tion was inherently coercive55 and required the warnings as a prophy-
lactic means of insuring against the abuse of an accused's Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent.56
b. Admissibility of Silence Maintained in the Presence of Police Of
ficers After Miranda.-The Miranda decision raised new questions con-
cerning the admissibility of silence maintained by accuseds while in
the presence of police officers. The validity of the tacit admission rule
as applied in pre- and post-arrest situations was thrown into question,
and the Supreme Court and the Maryland courts undertook to recon-
cile Miranda and the tacit admission rule.
(1) Admissibility of Post-Arrest, Post-Miranda Warning Silence.-
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first considered the effect of Mi-
randa on the admissibility of post-arrest, post-Miranda warning silence
in Younie v. State." That case involved the appeal of a conviction for
first degree murder and armed robbery.5" After Younie was arrested,
he was informed of his constitutional rights under Miranda.5" He
waived his rights, and the police subjected him to extensive question-
ing concerning the robbery.60 Younie answered some of the ques-
tions, but he remained silent in response to others.61
54. Id. The Court required the following warnings to be given to individuals subject to
custodial interrogation prior to questioning:
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
55. Id. at 461 ("An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody,
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion [em-
ployed by police] cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak.").
56. Id. at 458 ("Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compul-
sion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can
truly be the product of his free choice.").
57. 272 Md. 233, 322 A.2d 211 (1974).
58. Id. at 235, 322 A.2d at 212.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 235-38, 322 A.2d at 212-14.
61. Id. at 236-37, 322 A.2d at 213.
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At trial, the court allowed the transcript of the custodial interro-
gation to be entered in evidence as substantive evidence of guilt,62
and the jury found Younie guilty.6" On appeal, Younie argued that his
silence in response to some of the questions asked by the police "was a
permissible exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination and,
since the only purpose the objected to evidence served was to create
the highly prejudicial inference that his failure to respond was moti-
vated by guilt, its inclusion was reversible error."64 The Maryland
Court of Appeals agreed and overturned the conviction.65
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied heavily
on the Miranda Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment:
Concerned with both the inherent unreliability which may
infest a coerced confession, and the unhealthy tendency
which its use creates in making police and prosecutors alike
less zealous in the search for independent, objective evi-
dence, the Court in Miranda addressed itself specifically to
the voluntariness requirement of the fifth amendment. Of
particular concern to that Court was its view that custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive.66
Therefore, "'the prosecution may not use statements ... stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination."'67
Rebutting the state's attempts tojustify the use of Younie's silence
based on the tacit admission rule,6" the court pointed out that the
assumption underlying the rule-that an innocent person would
promptly deny false statements made in his presence-is generally in-
valid in custodial interrogation because the Constitution "permits the
innocent and guilty alike to remain mute and not have this made
known to the trier of facts."69 The court held that absent clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the courts must presume that an
accused's silence in response to questions or accusations made during
62. Id. at 238, 322 A.2d at 214. Younie's refusal to answer some of the officer's ques-
tions was also used by the prosecution in its closing argument, and Younie's statement was
given by the trial judge to the jury for use in its deliberations. Id.
63. Id. at 235, 322 A.2d at 212.
64. Id. at 238, 322 A.2d at 214.
65. Id. at 249, 322 A.2d at 219.
66. Id. at 240, 322 A.2d at 215 (footnote omitted).
67. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
68. Id. at 244, 322 A.2d at 217.
69. Id.
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custodial interrogation is an "exercise of the privilege against self-in-
crimination from which no legal penalty can flow."
7 °
The Supreme Court addressed a similar scenario in Doyle v.
Ohio.71 While in Younie, the Court of Appeals relied on the Fifth
Amendment in determining that post-arrest, post-Miranda warning si-
lence was inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt,72 the Supreme
Court found such silence inadmissible for impeachment purposes on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds.73
In Doyle, the defendant was arrested and charged with selling
drugs.74 At trial, Doyle took the stand and accused the government
informant of framing him.75 On cross-examination, the prosecution
asked why he had not told this story when he was initially questioned
by the police after his arrest.76 Doyle explained that he did not main-
tain his innocence at that time because he did not know that the in-
formant was trying to frame him.77
The Court held that although Miranda warnings contain no ex-
press assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is
implicit.78 Therefore, the Court concluded, use of post-arrest, post-
Miranda warning silence for impeachment purposes violated the due
process protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
79
(2) Admissibility of Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Warning Silence.-
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals addressed whether post-arrest,
pre-Miranda warning silence can be used for impeachment purposes
70. Id.
71. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
72. See supra notes 64-70.
73. DoyLe, 426 U.S. at 619.
74. Id. at 611.
75. Id. at 613-14. Doyle alleged that it was actually the informant who was selling the
drugs, and that the deal had been disrupted when Doyle told the informant that he only
wanted "one or two pounds [of marihuana] instead of the agreed-upon 10 pounds." Id. at
613.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 614 n.5 (quoting Transcript).
78. Id. at 618.
79. Id. at 619. The Court stated:
"An accused having the assurance of the court that his claim of privilege would be
granted might well be entrapped if his assertion of the privilege could then be
used against him. His real choice might then be quite different from his appar-
ent one .... Elementary fairness requires that an accused should not be misled
on that score."
Id. at 618 n.9 (omission in original) (quotingJohnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 197
(1943)); see also Burko v. State, 19 Md. App. 645, 652, 313 A.2d 864, 868 (1974) (noting
that allowing testimony on a defendant's choice to exercise his right to remain silent would
.cloak[ ] the precepts of Miranda in an armor of gauze"), vacated, 422 U.S. 1003 (1975).
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in Wills v. State.80 Joseph Wills was convicted of selling cocaine to an
undercover police officer. 1 Wills appealed his conviction on the
grounds that the cross-examination questions concerning his silence
regarding his alibi violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that the evidence was inadmissible under Maryland
law.82 In addressing the constitutional question, the Court of Special
Appeals relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Fletcher v. Weir,8"
which held that the use of a defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda warn-
ing silence to impeach his credibility does not violate due process. In
Fletcher, the Court noted that the states were entitled to determine ac-
cording to their own rules of evidence whether post-arrest, pre-Mi-
randa warning silence may be used against a criminal defendant.84
Reading Fletcher to mean that the use of Wills's post-arrest silence
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court of Special Ap-
peals examined whether Maryland evidentiary law precluded the use
of Wills's silence by the prosecution.8 5 The court noted that even
before Miranda warnings have been administered, an accused might
decide to remain silent simply because he is aware of his Fifth Amend-
ment rights.8 6 The court held that "evidence of an accused's post-
arrest, pre-Miranda warning, silence for impeachment is inadmissible
because the probative value, if any, of such evidence, is clearly out-
weighed by its potential for unfair prejudice."8 7
(3) Admissibility of Pre-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Warning Silence.-
Williams v. State8' is the only Maryland case to address whether an ac-
cused's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda warning silence may be used as sub-
stantive evidence of his guilt. In Williams, a police officer questioned
the defendant and a woman, both of whom were stopped on the
80. 82 Md. App. 669, 677, 573 A.2d 80, 84 (1990).
81. Id. at 670, 573 A.2d at 81.
82. Id. at 672, 573 A.2d at 82. The record indicated that when Wills was brought into
custody, he was not read his Miranda rights. Id.
83. 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 607.
85. Wills, 82 Md. App. at 677, 573 A.2d at 84.
86. Id. at 675-76, 573 A.2d at 84. Applying the test of admissibility for tacit admissions,
the court noted that such an admission may be received into evidence only when "'the
statement and the failure to rebut it occurred in an environment and in the presence of
actors such that a reply might naturally have been expected.'" Id. at 677, 573 A.2d at 84
(quoting Ewell v. State, 228 Md. 615, 619, 180 A.2d 857, 860 (1962)). The court opined
that such an environment does not exist when a person is arrested for crime. Id., 573 A.2d
at 84-85.
87. Id. at 677, 573 A.2d at 84.
88. 4 Md. App. 342, 242 A.2d 813 (1968).
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street.8 9 The defendant had a bag full of clothes, and the woman was
holding a skirt that had come from the bag.90 The woman told the
police officer that she was going to buy the skirt, and Williams said
nothing.91 Williams was arrested for peddling without a license 92 and
was subsequently found guilty of breaking into a warehouse to steal
the goods he was selling on the street.9 3
At his trial, the defendant's silence in the face of the woman's
statement that she was going to buy the skirt was held to be a tacit
admission, admissible as substantive evidence of his guilt.9 4 Williams
argued that no inferences could be drawn from his silence because he
was under no obligation to say anything when the woman made her
statement.9 5 Citing the tacit admission rule, and pointing out that
Williams was not in custody when the statement was made, 96 the Court
of Special Appeals upheld the conviction.9"
While Williams allowed the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda warning
silence as substantive evidence of guilt, in Jenkins v. Anderson,9" the
Supreme Court held that use of an accused's pre-arrest silence to im-
peach his exculpatory testimony did not violate the Fifth or Four-
teenth Amendments. 9
In Jenkins, the defendant stabbed and killed a man, then avoided
capture by the police for two weeks before finally turning himself
in.1"0 At trial, Jenkins took the stand and testified that he killed the
man in self defense.'0 1 In an attempt to impeach his credibility, the
prosecution questioned Jenkins as to why he never explained this
story to the police before his arrest.
1 0 2




93. Id. at 344, 142 A.2d at 814.
94. Id. at 348 n.6, 142 A.2d at 817 n.6.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 348 & n.6, 142 A.2d at 817 & n.6. The court offered no further explanation
of its decision to admit Williams' silence as a tacit admission. However, the fact that the
court noted that Williams was not in custody when the woman's accusatory statement was
made suggests that the court believed the situation to be outside the purview of Barber and
Miranda.
98. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
99. Id. at 238-40.
100. Id. at 232.
101. Id. at 232-33.
102. Id. at 233.
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The Court concluded that by taking the stand in his own defense,
the accused "cast[ ] aside his cloak of silence"'l 3 and forfeited his
Fifth Amendment right.10 4 Moreover, there was no violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment because "no governmental action induced
[Jenkins] to remain silent before arrest [and] [t]he failure to speak
occurred before [he] was taken into custody and given Miranda warn-
ings."' 5 While holding that use of pre-arrest silence for impeach-
ment purposes did not violate the Constitution, the Court noted that
the states were "free to formulate evidentiary rules defining the situa-
tions in which silence is viewed as more probative than prejudicial."'0 6
The Supreme Court cases following Miranda, as well as the Mary-
land cases of Younie and Wills, restricted the use of an accused's si-
lence when in police custody or under arrest. Left unaddressed by
both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Maryland, how-
ever, was the question of whether an individual's silence in the pres-
ence of a police officer prior to arrest or custody could be used as
substantive evidence of guilt. The stage was thus set for the Maryland
Court of Appeals to address the issue.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Key-El v. State, the Court of Appeals
held that Key-El's pre-arrest silence, when confronted with his wife's
accusation in the presence of a police officer, was admissible as a tacit
admission, and that use of the tacit admission as substantive evidence
of guilt did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights.' Writing for the
majority, Judge Karwacki, with whom Judges Rodowsky, Chasanow,
and Smith joined, began his analysis by acknowledging that Maryland
has long recognized the tacit admission rule as an exception to the
hearsay rule under common law.' 08
The court explained the elements of the tacit admission rule'09
and then addressed the contentions of the petitioner. First, the court
addressed Key-El's argument that whenever a police officer is present
there should be a per se prohibition on the use of the pre-arrest si-
lence of a person confronted with an accusation as tacit admission,
103. Id. at 238.
104. Id. The Court reasoned that once a defendant chooses to testify, regard for the
truth finding function of the trial limits the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. (citing
Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958)).
105. Id. at 240.
106. Id.
107. Key-El, 349 Md. at 816, 709 A.2d at 1307.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 817, 709 A.2d at 1307 (quoting Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 241-42, 596 A.2d
1024, 1043 (1991) (quoting 6 McLAIN, supra note 2, § 801 (4).3, at 312-13)); see supra note
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regardless of the circumstances."' Key-El contended that pre-arrest
silence maintained in the presence of a police officer is ambiguous at
best, because of the widespread knowledge of the Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent.1
The Court of Appeals recognized that the Maryland courts, as
well as the United States Supreme Court, have distinguished between
pre-arrest and post-arrest silence.112 While recognizing the restric-
tions on the use of the defendant's silence as a tacit admission after he
has been arrested and read his rights, the court cited a number of
cases in which tacit admissions were allowed into evidence when a law
enforcement agent was present and either no arrest had been made,
or an arrest had been made, but the defendant had not yet been in-
formed of his Miranda rights.11 The court specifically addressed Wil-
liams, in which the Court of Special Appeals held that pre-arrest
silence in the face of an accusation of a third party occurring in the
presence of a police officer could be admitted as a tacit admission. 14
Based on this precedent, the court determined that there was no bar
to the use of tacit admissions when made in the presence of a law
enforcement officer before an arrest.
1 5
The court next stated the importance of determining the admissi-
bility of tacit admissions on a case by case basis and defined the re-
spective roles of the trial court and the jury in making this
determination:
This is a text-book example of the wisdom of judging the
effect of pre-arrest silence on a case by case basis. As a
threshold question for the trial court, the admissibility of
such silence should depend on an evaluation of the required
prerequisites for the use of the tacit admission that have
been established over the years by this Court, i.e., did the
defendant hear and understand the other party's statement,
110. Brief of Petitioner at 22-23, Key-El v. State, 349 Md. 811, 709 A.2d 1305 (1998) (No.
5).
111. Id. at 12-13.
112. Key-El, 349 Md. at 817-18, 709 A.2d at 1307-08 (citingJenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231, 240-41 (1980); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609, 615 (1965); Williams v. State, 4 Md. App. 342, 348 n.6, 242 A.2d 813, 817 n.6 (1968);
Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 244-45, 322 A.2d 211, 217-18 (1974); Zemo v. State, 101 Md.
App. 303, 316, 646 A.2d 1050, 1056-57 (1994); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37
(1966); Wills v. State, 82 Md. App. 669, 677, 573 A.2d 80 (1990)).
113. Id. at 818, 709 A.2d at 1307-08 (citing Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240-41; Williams, 4 Md.
App. at 348 n.6, 242 A.2d at 817 n.6).
114. Id. at 819, 709 A.2d at 1308 (citing Williams, 4 Md. App. at 348 n.6, 242 A.2d at 817
n.6).
115. Id. at 819-20, 709 A.2d at 1308-09.
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did the defendant have the opportunity to respond; and
under the circumstances would a reasonable person in the
defendant's position, who disagreed with the statement, have
voiced that disagreement. These same factors would then be
evaluated by the jury and the tacit admission given the
weight that the jury believes it to be worth."16
If the threshold factors were applied, the court believed, there would
be no risk of pre-arrest silence being admitted when its potential prej-
udicial effect outweighed its probative value."1 7 On this reasoning,
the court refused to adopt a per se rule prohibiting the use of pre-
arrest silence in the presence of a police officer as substantive evi-
dence of guilt under the tacit admission rule." 8
The majority also rejected Key-El's alternative argument that
under Maryland evidence law, the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting Key-El's pre-arrest silence into evidence as a tacit admis-
sion."' Applying the steps detailed above, the majority determined
that circumstances surrounding Key-El's silence did not warrant pre-
clusion of the tacit admission exception.' 20 The court noted that Key-
El was in his own home,121 that he was not being interrogated, that he
had not been arrested and informed of his right to remain silent, and
that he had every opportunity to respond to his wife's accusation.122
The court reasoned that under the circumstances, the trial court
could have reasonably concluded that Key-El would have denied his
wife's accusation if he believed it to be false.'12  Moreover, the court
observed that Key-El's silence would help the jury determine whether
Mrs. Key-El's trial testimony was credible. 24 In light of these factors,
the majority concluded that "[t]he trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in allowing the jury to determine the weight to be accorded the
tacit admission." 125
116. Id. at 818-19, 709 A.2d at 1308.
117. Id. at 819, 709 A.2d at 1308 (stating that when an evaluation of the threshold fac-
tors by the court "discloses that the police officer's presence together with the other cir-
cumstances demonstrate that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not
be expected to deny or explain the accusation, then the defendant's silence would be
excluded from evidence").
118. Id. at 819-20, 709 A.2d at 1308-09.
119. Id. at 820, 709 A.2d at 1309.
120. Id. The court determined that after examining the circumstances in the light of
the threshold factors, "the only factor contested was whether [Key-El] would have been
expected to deny his wife's accusation made in the presence of a police officer." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 818, 709 A.2d at 1308.
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Having addressed the evidentiary question, the court turned to
the question of whether the introduction of Key-El's tacit admission
into evidence violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth
Amendment.1"6 Relying heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in
Jenkins, and on Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in that case, the
court determined that the use of pre-arrest silence in the presence of
a police officer as substantive evidence of guilt was constitutionally
permissible if the silence was not compelled by the officer.127
Finding no contrary consensus in the federal circuit courts on the
issue of whether pre-arrest silence can be admitted as substantive evi-
dence of guilt, the court stated that "[w] hen silence of a defendant in
response to an incriminatory accusation is used by the prosecution as
the basis for an inference of a tacit admission, the defendant can not
validly assert that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination has
been violated."' 28 The court noted that Key-El was not in custody and
was not being interrogated when he remained silent in the face of his
wife's accusation, and that he was under "no official compulsion to
speak or remain silent" even though a police officer was present.
1 29
Concluding that the use of Key-El's pre-arrest silence as a tacit admis-
sion did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights, the court affirmed
the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 130
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Raker, with whom Judges Bell
and Eldridge joined, argued that tacit admissions made in the pres-
ence of police officers are too ambiguous to have any probative value
and ordinarily should not be admissible as substantive evidence of
guilt.13' The premise underlying the tacit admission exception, the
126. Id. The court noted that Key-El did not make an argument that the issue should be
resolved any differently under Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which also
protects against compelled self-incrimination and has been held to be "in pari materia with
the Fifth Amendment." Id, at 820 n.2, 709 A.2d at 1309 n.2 (citing Hof v. State, 337 Md.
581, 586 n.3, 655 A.2d 370, 373 n.3 (1995)).
127. Id. at 822-24, 709 A.2d at 1310-11.
128. Id. at 824, 709 A.2d at 1311.
129. Id. at 824-25, 709 A.2d at 1311.
130. Id at 825, 709 A.2d at 1311.
131. Id. (Raker, J., dissenting). Judge Raker noted that the issue presented in the case
involved evidence of pre-arrest silence when used to imply that the defendant was guilty,
rather than if it were used to impeach that defendant's testimony. Id. at 825 n.1, 709 A.2d
at 1311 ni. Judge Raker stated that although the majority allowed Key-El's tacit admission
to be admitted to impeach Mrs. Key-El's testimony, it was actually used as substantive evi-
dence of Key-El's guilt because in his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the
defendant remained silent in response to his wife's accusation because he did, in fact,
strike her. For this reason, the dissent argued, the majority should have been concerned
with whether Key-El's silence was probative of his guilt, rather than with whether it im-
peached his wife's testimony. Id.
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dissent observed, is that silence in the face of an accusation is proba-
tive of guilt, since an innocent person falsely accused would deny the
accusation.1 3 2 The dissent argued that this premise is invalid when
the tacit admission is made in the presence of law enforcement of-
ficers because in such a case, the silence is ambiguous at best, due in
large part to the well-publicized right to remain silent.' 33
The dissent examined cases from other jurisdictions in which pre-
arrest tacit admissions in the presence of police officers were excluded
from evidence on both evidentiary'14 and constitutional1 35 grounds,
and concluded that "[s] ince an individual who is accused of a criminal
act in front of a police officer may choose to remain silent based on a
general awareness of the popularized right to remain silent, or even
out of suspicion or mistrust of the police, silence in the presence of
law enforcement officers is ambiguous. '' 136 This ambiguity made the
probative value of pre-arrest silence minimal.1 37 Therefore, the dis-
sent concluded that "Ib]ased on Maryland evidentiary grounds, the
tacit admission rule should be inapplicable in the context of accusa-
tions made in the presence of law enforcement officers. 138
4. Analysis.-As evidenced by the case law, the tacit admission
exception is firmly established in Maryland law.1 39 However, case law
also illustrates that silence maintained in the presence of a law en-
forcement officer stands on different footing than other tacit admis-
sions because such a situation implicates the Fifth Amendment right
132. Id. at 827, 709 A.2d at 1312.
133. Id. at 833, 709 A.2d at 1315.
134. Id. at 828-29, 709 A.2d at 1313 (citing State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Iowa
1972); Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 227 A.2d 904, 906-09 (Pa. 1967); State v. Daniels, 556
A.2d 1040, 1046 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989)).
135. Id. at 829, 709 A.2d at 1313 (citing United States ex rel Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d
1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1987); Commonwealth v. Cull, 656 A.2d 476, 481 n.5 (Pa. 1995);
State v. Villarreal, 617 P.2d 541, 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)).
136. Id. at 833, 709 A.2d at 1315. The dissent further stated, "[a]s the Supreme Court
recently noted, [a]nd as for the possibility that the person under investigation may be
unaware of his right to remain silent: In the modern age of frequently dramatized 'Mi-
randa' warnings, that is implausible." Id. at 832, 709 A.2d at 1315 (second alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct.
805, 810 (1998)).
137. Id. at 832, 709 A.2d at 1315.
138. Id. at 833, 709 A.2d at 1315. The dissent did not directly address the constitutional
issues, reasoning that "courts should not decide constitutional issues unnecessarily." Id. at
833 n.4, 709 A.2d at 1314 n.4 (citing Professional Nurses v. Dimensions Health Corp., 346
Md. 132, 139, 695 A.2d 158, 161 (1997); Middleman v. Maryland, 232 Md. 285, 289, 192
A.2d 782, 782 (1963)).
139. See supra notes 33-34.
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against self-incrimination.1"' The Key-El court essentially restated and
affirmed the validity of tacit admissions in particular circumstances
and recognized that pre-arrest silence maintained in response to accu-
satory statements in the presence of a police officer can be used as
substantive evidence of guilt.141 The court applied the proper tests to
determine whether silence constitutes a tacit admission. However, by
allowing pre-arrest silence to be used as direct evidence of guilt rather
than limiting its holding to admitting such silence only to impeach a
defendant when he takes the stand in his own defense, the court
failed to account properly for the existence of the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, and the possibility that an accused in
Key-El's situation might have been asserting that right. The court
could have better safeguarded the accused's Fifth Amendment right
by holding that pre-arrest silence could not be admitted as substantive
evidence of the defendant's guilt.
a. Use of Pre-Arrest Silence as Substantive Evidence of Guilt Vio-
lates the Fifth Amendment.-The court's conclusion that pre-arrest si-
lence maintained in the presence of police officers may be used as
substantive evidence of guilt raises serious constitutional concerns.
The majority argued that the presence of the police officer did not, in
itself, trigger Key-El's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.142 In
drawing this conclusion, the court relied on Justice Stevens's concur-
ring opinion in Jenkins v. Anderson, in which Justice Stevens main-
tained that for the Fifth Amendment to be implicated, an accused
must assert his right against self-incrimination in response to govern-
ment coercion. 14 3 Because Key-El was not in custody and was not be-
ing interrogated when he remained silent in the face of his wife's
140. See Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 244, 322 A.2d 211, 217 (1974) (holding that si-
lence maintained by an accused during a custodial interrogation is assumed to be an exer-
cise of his privilege against self-incrimination); Wills v. State, 82 Md. App. 669, 677, 573
A.2d 80, 84 (1990) (holding that post-arrest, pre-Miranda warning silence is inadmissible
because the probative value is outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice).
141. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text (noting that circumstances and con-
duct of police officer bear on the admissibility of silence in the face of an accusation).
142. Key-El, 349 Md. at 825, 709 A.2d at 1311.
143. SeeJenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 243-44 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Stevens argued:
When a citizen is under no official compulsion whatever, either to speak or to
remain silent, I see no reason why his voluntary decision to do one or the other
should raise any issue under the Fifth Amendment. For in determining whether
the privilege is applicable, the question is whether petitioner was in a position to





accusation, the court concluded that there was no government coer-
cion, and therefore, the use of Key-El's silence as evidence did not
violate his Fifth Amendment right. 14 1 In holding that Key-El's pre-
arrest silence could be used as substantive evidence of guilt, the court
improperly elevated the importance of Justice Stevens's concurrence
above that of the actual holding in Jenkins,'4 5 as well as the Supreme
Court's prior Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
Miranda v. Arizona established procedural safeguards to insure
that an accused is aware of his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination in the course of a "custodial interrogation."' 4 6 The Mi-
randa Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."' 147 While it is clear that this statement applies to situations where
an accused has been taken into police custody and subjected to ques-
tioning, the inclusion of the phrase "otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way" implies that the Fifth
Amendment privilege can be triggered in situations outside of formal
police interrogations.' 4 8
Key-El was not under formal interrogation or in police custody
when his wife made her accusatory statement.'4 9 However, he could
reasonably have believed that his freedom of action was curtailed in a
significant way by Officer Johnson's presence. When the officer came
to the door and asked if there was a problem, Key-El responded
144. Key-E4 349 Md. at 824-25, 709 A.2d at 1311.
145. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240 (holding that the use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a
defendant's credibility does not violate the Constitution). While the court justified its use
of Key-El's silence as substantive evidence of guilt based in part on the holding in Jenkins, it
failed to recognize that the reasoning employed by the majority in Jenkins addressed only
impeachment situations. See infta Section 4(c). Rather, the majority in Key-El focused on
Justice Stevens's concurrence, which provided stronger support for the proposition that
pre-arrest silence could be used as substantive evidence of guilt without violating the Fifth
Amendment. Key-El, 349 Md. at 824, 709 A.2d at 1311 (citingJenkins, 447 U.S. at 243-44
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
146. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see also supra notes 52-56 and accom-
panying text (noting that police officers must apprise an accused of his right to remain
silent before a custodial interrogation begins).
147. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
148. See id. at 467 (stating that the Fifth Amendment "serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being
compelled to incriminate themselves"); see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301
(1980) (noting that "the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police... that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."
(footnote omitted)).
149. Key-El, 349 Md. at 824, 709 A.2d at 1311.
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"no."'1 50 In response to the indication by Mrs. Key-El that there was a
problem, Officer Johnson entered the house. t5 1 Whether guilty or
innocent, Key-El likely believed that he could not simply leave the
house or even the room while Officer Johnson was speaking to Mrs.
Key-El. It is unrealistic, therefore, to maintain that Key-El's freedom
of action was not impacted by the presence of the police.
To understand the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination as a right that is triggered only at the point where the
accused is taken into custody and read his Miranda warning is to im-
properly limit the protection of the Fifth Amendment.1 5 2 The Key-El
court concluded that "[a]lthough a police officer was present, [Key-
El] was under no official compulsion to speak or remain silent."153
However, if Key-El remained silent after having been read his Miranda
rights, the government would not be allowed to comment on that si-
lence, even if Key-El was under no official compulsion to speak or
remain silent. Nevertheless, the court maintained that since Key-El
was neither in custody nor under interrogation, "[h]is silence gave
rise to a permissible inference" and "[t] he use of it in evidence did
not burden his Fifth Amendment privilege." '5 4
Drawing such a bright line between the pre-arrest context, where
the silence of the accused is admissible, and the post-arrest context,
where the silence of the accused suddenly and automatically becomes
inadmissible, leads to the untenable conclusion that an individual can
safely assert his Fifth Amendment rights only after he has been placed
under arrest and read his Miranda rights. In holding that comment by
the government about an accused's post-arrest silence is inadmissible,
the Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio155 stated that "[s]ilence in the
wake of [Miranda] warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's
exercise of these Miranda rights," thereby making all post-arrest si-
lence "insolubly ambiguous."156 The Court recognized that although
the accused might not be relying on his Fifth Amendment rights in
150. Id. at 813, 709 A.2d at 1305.
151. Id.
152. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (recognizing that the privi-
lege against self incrimination can be asserted in any investigatory or adjudicatory proceed-
ing); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955) (invocation of Fifth Amendment
rights "does not require any special combination of words"); see also United States ex rel.
Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The right to remain silent, unlike the
right to counsel, attaches before the institution of formal adversary proceedings.").
153. Key-El, 349 Md. at 825, 709 A.2d at 1311.
154. Id.
155. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
156. Id. at 617.
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maintaining his silence, State comment on that silence would not be
allowed in order to safeguard the accused's Fifth Amendment rights.
The Key-El court should have taken the same precaution by hold-
ing that Key-El's pre-arrest silence could not be entered into evidence
as substantive evidence of his guilt. While Key-El's silence was ambigu-
ous, it is at least possible that he was relying on his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination when he remained silent in the face of
his wife's accusation.157 The only way to insure that an individual in a
pre-arrest situation will receive the full measure of protection guaran-
teed by the Fifth Amendment, therefore, is to maintain that the right
against self-incrimination is triggered from the initial encounter of
the accused with the law enforcement officer and to bar the govern-
ment from using any silence maintained by the accused in the pres-
ence of a law enforcement officer as substantive evidence of guilt. 158
b. The Probative Value of Key-El's Silence was Diminished Due to
the Presence of the Police Officer.--The existence of the Fifth Amendment
right, even if not technically triggered in a pre-arrest situation such as
the one in Key-El, makes the silence so ambiguous as to be of little
probative value. Consequently, on evidentiary grounds, pre-arrest si-
lence maintained in the presence of a police officer should be inad-
missible as substantive evidence of guilt in most cases.
Although Jenkins concluded that the admissibility of pre-arrest si-
lence for impeachment purposes is a question of state evidentiary
law, 159 the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Hale16 ° illus-
157. The Maryland Court of Appeals used similar reasoning in determining that post-
arrest, pre-Miranda warning silence was inadmissible in Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 322
A.2d 211 (1974). The Younie court noted:
Since a waiver of [the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent] to be effective
must be clearly and intentionally made, and since silence, even in the face of
incriminating accusations, statements, or questions, is inaction and therefore dif-
ficult to draw an inference from, in a situation such as this where it is uncertain as
to what occurred, we must assume that the petitioner's failure to answer was an
invocation of his fifth amendment privilege.
Id. at 245, 322 A.2d at 217.
158. See Aaron R. Pettit, Comment, Should the Prosecution be Allowed to Comment on a De-
fendant's Pre-Arrest Silence in its Case-in-Chief?, 29 Loy. U. CHI. Lj. 181 (1997). The author
expressed the following opinion:
The Fifth Amendment does not provide that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself unless he has not been read his Miranda
rights. No evidence exists that the drafters of the Constitution intended to limit
the full protections of the Fifth Amendment to persons in custody or persons
informed of their rights.
Id. at 215-16 (footnote omitted).
159. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980).
160. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
886 [VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
trates the proper way in which a state court should evaluate such a
question. In Hale, the Court ruled that post-arrest silence could not
be used to impeach a defendant's credibility because "[i]n most cir-
cumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative
force." '6 ' The minimal probative value of such silence weighed
against the "significant potential for prejudice"' 62 toward the defen-
dant led the Court to conclude that such evidence should be
excluded.
1 63
In Wills, the Court of Special Appeals applied this reasoning in
determining that post-arrest, pre-Miranda warning silence could not
be used to impeach the testimony of a defendant.164 The court rea-
soned that the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice toward the defendant because at the
time of arrest, there are a number of reasons, other than acquiescence
in the truth of the accusation, why an innocent individual would re-
main mute in the face of an accusation. 165 The court explained:
In these often emotional and confusing circumstances, a sus-
pect ... may have felt there was no need to reply. He may
have maintained silence out of fear or unwillingness to in-
criminate another. Or the arrestee may simply react with si-
lence in response to the hostile and perhaps unfamiliar
atmosphere surrounding his detention.166
Although the Supreme Court and other courts have taken a more
moderate stance on the use of pre-arrest silence for impeachment,
67
the reasoning in Hale and Wills is persuasive when the issue is whether
to allow pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt. 168 More-
over, Maryland case law recognizes that if there is another reasonable
161. Id. at 176. The majority did not address the Fifth Amendment issue. However, in
his concurrence, Justice White foresaw Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) when he com-
mented that the Court's decision should have rested on a constitutional basis. Id. at 182-83
(White, J., concurring); see also supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
162. Hale, 422 U.S. at 180.
163. Id.
164. Wills v. State, 82 Md. App. 669, 677, 573 A.2d 80, 84 (1990).
165. Id. at 677-78, 573 A.2d at 85.
166. Id. at 678, 573 A.2d at 85 (omission in original) (quoting Hale, 422 U.S. at 177)).
167. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (noting the reasons why courts have al-
lowed the use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a defendant).
168. Although Hale did not comment on the probative value of silence occurring before
arrest, several jurisdictions have weighed the probative value of an accused's silence against
the potential prejudicial effect of silence in determining that pre-arrest silence may not be
used as substantive evidence of an accused's guilt. See State v. Daniels, 556 A.2d 1040, 1046-
47 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (recognizing that the emotional state of the accuser and the
presence of a police officer rendered silence of the accused void of probative value); Com-
monwealth v. Dravcecz, 227 A.2d 904, 906 (Pa. 1967) (attacking the premise that when a
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explanation for why an accused would remain silent in the face of an
accusation, other than acquiescence in the truth of the accusation,
then the accused's silence is too ambiguous to be entered in evidence
as a tacit admission.' 69 If the Key-El court had applied the reasoning
of Hale, Wills, and the other Maryland cases limiting the use of ambig-
uous silence as tacit admissions, it would have determined that Key-
El's pre-arrest silence was inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt
on evidentiary grounds.
As Judge Wilner of the Court of Special Appeals noted, the Mi-
randa warnings have received so much public exposure through televi-
sion and popular culture that an accused such as Key-El might have
reasonably believed that he should remain silent in the face of a false
accusation while a police officer was present. v The presence of the
police officer, the likelihood that Key-El was aware of the right against
self-incrimination, as well as the emotionally charged atmosphere in
the Key-El home prior to the arrest, leads to the conclusion that there
might have been other plausible explanations why Key-El would re-
main silent in the face of his wife's accusation, even if the accusation
was false. 17' Because Key-El's silence is open to several interpreta-
tions, his silence was of little or no probative value, and it should not
have been admitted as substantive evidence of his guilt.
c. The Court Failed to Recognize the Distinction Between Using Pre-
Arrest Silence as Substantive Evidence of Guilt and Using Such Silence for
Impeachment Purposes.-While few courts permit the use of pre-arrest
silence as substantive evidence of guilt, many who have considered the
question allow the use of such silence for impeachment purposes if
person remains silent in response to an incriminating statement, he is admitting the truth
of that statement).
169. See Ewell v. State, 228 Md. 615, 619, 180 A.2d 857, 860 (1962) (requiring a tacit
admission to be made "in an environment and in the presence of actors such that a reply
might naturally have been expected"); Zink v. Zink, 215 Md. 197, 202, 137 A. 2d 139, 142
(1957) (deciding that silence in the face of a statement may constitute an adoption of that
statement only when "no other explanation is equally consistent with silence"); Barber v.
State, 191 Md. 555, 565, 62 A.2d 616, 620 (1948) ("[I]fit appears that the failure to deny is
attributable to fear, the advice of counsel, or the desire to exercise an assumed or asserted
right against self-incrimination, it has been held that no inference of guilt can properly be
drawn." (citing People v. Simmons, 172 P.2d 18 (Cal. 1946) (in bank))).
170. Key-El v. State, No. 65, concurring slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 22, 1996)
(Wilner, J., concurring) ("Although the Supreme Court has required that the police give
such a warning directly when engaging in custodial interrogations, the public at large, I
expect, assumes that incriminating statements made at any time may come to haunt the
accused.").
171. See Daniels, 556 A.2d at 1046 (determining that the emotional state of the victim
and the presence of a police officer rendered the defendant's silence void of probative
value).
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the defendant takes the stand to testify.172 In Jenkins, the Supreme
Court held that the use of pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes
did not violate the Fifth Amendment, but it made no comment on the
constitutionality of such silence as direct evidence of guilt.173 Several
courts have recognized that the impeachment/substantive evidence
distinction is crucial when deciding whether to allow a defendant's
pre-arrest silence into evidence.1
74
In Key-El, the majority never clearly addressed the impeachment/
substantive evidence distinction. The majority seemed to couch its de-
cision to allow Key-El's pre-arrest silence into evidence in terms of im-
peachment, noting that his silence would be highly probative when
the jury was determining whether Mrs. Key-El's trial testimony was
credible. 175 However, the majority also noted that the federal circuit
courts were split on the issue of whether pre-arrest silence can be used
as substantive evidence of guilt when the defendant does not testify1
76
and stated that "[t] he Supreme Court of the United States has never
decided the question presented to us in the instant case. "177
In her dissent, Judge Raker noted that Key-El's silence was used as
substantive evidence of his guilt because in its closing argument, the
prosecution stated that "[a] person in the position of the defendant,
truly innocent, who did not do these things would have been expected
to protest .... The defendant does not do that. He doesn't do that
172. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Supreme Court stated:
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to
do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit
perury .... Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obliga-
tion to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more
than utilize the traditional truth-telling devices of the adversary process.
Id. at 225; see also United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1987)
(noting that impeachment is employed by the state to detect perjury, and that a defendant
does not have a constitutional right to perjure himself).
173. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) ("[I]mpeachment follows the de-
fendant's own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding
function of the criminal trial").
174. See Lane, 832 F.2d at 1017-18 (distinguishing between the use of pre-arrest silence
as substantive evidence of guilt and as impeachment evidence); People v. Cetlinski, 460
N.W.2d 534, 542-44 (Mich. 1990) (noting that use of pre-arrest silence for impeachment
does not violate the Fifth Amendment, but that use of such silence to infer guilt would
violate the Fifth Amendment).
175. See Key-E4 349 Md. at 820, 709 A.2d at 1309. This impeachment justification is
suspect. Courts have allowed the use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence for impeachment
purposes when that defendant himself takes the stand. However, research has not uncov-
ered any cases where a court has allowed the use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence to
impeach a defense witness when the defendant decides not to testify. In such a situation,
Fifth Amendment problems would remain.
176. Id. at 823, 709 A.2d at 1310.
177. Id. at 820-21, 709 A.2d at 1309.
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because he was, in fact, the person who struck her." '17 8 As the dissent
makes clear, the issue before the court was whether a defendant's pre-
arrest silence could be used as substantive evidence of guilt when the
defendant does not take the stand in his own defense. 179
Use of pre-arrest silence to confront a defendant who takes the
stand to testify in his own defense serves an important truth-finding
purpose. As the Supreme Court noted in Jenkins, when a defendant
chooses to testify at trial, the state should be allowed to raise the issue
of the defendant's pre-arrest silence when such silence would shed
light on the truth or falsity of the defendant's testimony.18 ' By taking
the stand, the defendant forfeits his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination because he opens the door to cross-examination by
the prosecution.181
Using the pre-arrest silence of a defendant such as Key-El who
chooses not to testify as substantive evidence of his guilt, however, of-
fends both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. Key-El never
opened the door to comment by the state concerning his pre-arrest
silence. Therefore, his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination should remain intact.
While use of pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes passes
Fifth Amendment scrutiny, the evidentiary problems discussed in sec-
tion 4(b) remain. This is why Jenkins left it up to the states to decide
whether to allow use of such testimony under their own rules of evi-
dence.182 The threshold tests employed by the majority in Key-El, how-
ever, would serve to exclude silence that is likely the result of some
factor other than the accused's knowledge of his own guilt.18 In cases
where it is uncertain whether the pre-arrest silence has any probative
value even after the application of threshold tests, a court might be
justified in allowing the silence in evidence simply because the de-
fendant, unlike a defendant who chooses not to take the stand, would
have an opportunity to explain his silence.
The Key-El court, therefore, applied the correct test in the wrong
context. If Key-El had taken the stand in his own defense, the trial
court would have been correct in applying threshold tests to deter-
mine whether his pre-arrest silence had any value as impeachment
178. Id. at 825 n.1, 709 A.2d at 1311 n.1 (Raker, J., dissenting) (quoting Transcript).
179. Id.
180. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 237-38 (1980).
181. Id. at 238.
182. Id. at 240.
183. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (noting the threshold test employed by
the court in Key-El).
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evidence. Because Key-El did not take the stand, however, use of his
pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt should not have
been permitted.
5. Conclusion.--Maryland courts have long recognized tacit ad-
missions as valid evidence in certain situations. Silence, like a state-
ment or a gesture, can have meaning and can give the court and the
jury insight into the guilt or innocence of a defendant. However, the
Maryland courts have also recognized that silence can be ambiguous.
To insure that the probative value of an accused's silence outweighs
the possible prejudicial effect, a number of threshold tests must be
applied to insure that in a given situation, the accused would have no
other reason for remaining silent in the face of an accusation aside
from acquiescence in the truth of the accusation.
Pre-arrest silence maintained in the presence of a police officer,
however, should be inadmissible as substantive evidence of the de-
fendant's guilt for two reasons. First, use of such silence violates the
accused's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Because
the pre-arrest situation might be perceived as coercive by the accused,
the court should make the assumption that the accused was relying on
his right against self incrimination when remaining silent. This is the
assumption Maryland courts are required to make after an accused
has been given Miranda warnings, 184 and when an accused is in police
custody before Miranda warnings have been given.185 To insure that
Fifth Amendment rights are protected consistently, this same assump-
tion should be made in pre-arrest situations such as the one in Key-EL
Second, even if the court does not acknowledge that pre-arrest
silence violates the Fifth Amendment, the mere possibility that the
defendant is asserting a perceived right to remain silent renders the
silence too ambiguous to be of probative value as substantive evidence
of guilt. Under the threshold tests established by the Maryland courts,
such silence should be inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt.
Although use of pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt
should be prohibited, courts have held that use of pre-arrest silence to
impeach the credibility of a defendant who takes the stand to testify in
his own defense does not violate the Fifth Amendment. In such a
situation, a court should apply a test such as the one applied by the
Key-El court to determine whether the defendant's pre-arrest silence
has any probative value. If the facts of this case were different, and
184. See Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 245, 322 A.2d 211, 217 (1974).
185. See Wills v. State, 82 Md. App. 669, 677, 573 A.2d 80, 84 (1990).
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Key-El himself took the stand to testify about what happened in his
home on the night of August 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals's analysis
would have been correct. By failing to recognize the critical distinc-
tion between use of pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt
and as impeachment evidence, however, the Court of Appeals im-
properly applied the tacit admission rule at the expense of the individ-
ual's right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment.
MICHAEL K. LAVANGA
B. Judicial Discretion and Problems of Perception
In Gunning v. State,186 the Court of Appeals held that the decision
of whether to give a jury instruction on the reliability of eyewitness
testimony should be left to a trial judge's sound discretion. 87 The
court decided this case in conjunction with Harris v. State because
both cases presented the same issue and were heard at trial before the
same judge. 8 ' In both cases, the Court of Appeals decided that the
trial judge abused his discretion in failing to give the required jury
instructions.' 89 The court's determination that the decision to give or
withhold this jury instruction lies within the trial judge's discretion is
consistent with its emphasis in previous cases on ensuring that jury
instructions be appropriately tailored to the case.'9 ° In refusing
either to adopt a mandatory instruction or to bar such instructions
completely, the court implied that eyewitness identifications should
be considered under the same standards as other types of evidence.''
The court's decision, however, overlooked the problems peculiar to
eyewitness testimony. In comparison to other evidence, eyewitness
identifications of strangers are scientifically unreliable, yet unusually
convincing.192 Therefore, requiring ajury instruction when particular
186. 347 Md. 332, 701 A.2d 374 (1997).
187. Id. at 345, 701 A.2d at 380.
188. Id. at 335, 701 A.2d at 375.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 248-49, 596 A.2d 1024, 1046 (1991) ("In decid-
ing whether the trial court was required to give such an instruction, we must determine...
whether it is applicable under the facts and circumstances of this case .... " (quoting Hunt
v. State, 321 Md. 387, 442-43, 583 A.2d 218, 245 (1990))). See generally MD. RULE 4-325(c)
(permitting the court upon its own initiative, and requiring it at the request of any party, to
instruct the jury as to the "applicable law").
191. See Gunning, 347 Md. at 347, 701 A.2d at 381 (noting that "[t]he inclusion of [an]
evidentiary instruction did not remove the.., instruction from the category of 'applicable
law,' and the same is true for the identification instruction").
192. See infra notes 369-370 and accompanying text (discussing the persuasive nature of
eyewitness identifications); infra notes 406-410 and accompanying text (discussing the
great deference juries tend to give eyewitness identifications).
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circumstances are present in a case would decrease the risk of unjust
convictions based on misidentification. Such circumstances could in-
clude those suggested by the Fourth Circuit: a strong possibility of
misidentification, unusual witness uncertainty in the identification, or
other particular difficulties with the identification.
1 93
1. The Case.-
a. Gunning.-On February 4, 1994, Marie Hoopes was at-
tacked near her home in Baltimore as she and her husband were get-
ting into their car. 11 4 A man grabbed her, held a knife to her throat,
and snatched her purse.'9 ' Although Mrs. Hoopes was unable to see
the man's face, her husband, William Hoopes, who was seated in the
driver's seat of the vehicle, later testified that from his position he was
able to see the attacker. 196 Mr. Hoopes stated that he was approxi-
mately two feet from the assailant, described the man's clothes, esti-
mated his height, and said that he had a mustache.' 97 The robbery
lasted "'a couple of seconds."" 98
Mark D. Gunning, Sr. was charged with robbery with a deadly
weapon and related offenses arising out of the attack on Mrs.
Hoopes. 19 9 Through a pretrial photo array and an in-court statement,
Mr. Hoopes identified Gunning as the assailant.2"' At trial in the Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore City, Gunning presented evidence in support
of an alibi defense that he was watching a video at the time of the
robbery with his father, his sister, and a friend.2' Mr. Hoopes's testi-
mony was the only evidence admitted against the defendant.20 2
193. United States v. Brooks, 928 F.2d 1403, 1409 (4th Cir. 1991). Brooks, however, did
not adopt a rule requiring an eyewitness instruction, but a "flexible approach" whereby a
trial court may give the instruction when such circumstances are present. Id. at 1408.
194. Gunning, 347 Md. at 335, 701 A.2d at 375.
195. Id. at 336, 701 A.2d at 375.
196. Id.
197. Id., 701 A.2d at 375-76.
198. Id. at 360, 701 A.2d at 388 (Raker, J., and Wilner,J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (quoting the victim's testimony).
199. Gunning, 347 Md. at 335, 701 A.2d at 375.
200. Id. at 336, 701 A.2d at 376.
201. Id. at 360-61, 701 A.2d at 388 (Raker, J., and Wilner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Gunning's alibi defense included testimony from his sister and father
as to the length of the movie and the times at which Gunning was home watching it. Id
Gunning also presented the testimony of his friend, who stated that, when he loaned out
movies, he always recorded the loan in a journal. Id. The journal, which was produced at
trial, showed that Gunning's father borrowed Scaiface on the date of the attack. Id.
202. Gunning, 347 Md. at 335, 701 A.2d at 375.
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At the close of evidence, Gunning's counsel provided the court
with two proposed jury instructions. One was an identification in-
struction, MICPEL pattern instruction MPCJI-Cr 3:30;203 counsel also
requested that the judge read a mistaken identity instruction that sub-
stantially followed Maryland Criminal Jury Instructions, section 5.10.204
The trial judge refused to give either instruction, stating that
"'[i]dentification is a[n] issue of fact, not of law,"' 205 and that
"'[t]here is no issue of law that requires instruction to the jury on
203. Id. at 336, 701 A.2d at 376. The proposed instruction stated in pertinent part:
[Y] ou should consider the witness' [s] opportunity to observe the criminal act and
the person committing it, including the length of time the witness had to observe
the person committing the crime, the witness' [s] state of mind and any other
circumstance surrounding the event. You should also consider the witness' cer-
tainty or lack of certainty, the accuracy of any prior description and the wit-
ness' [s] credibility or lack of credibility, as well as any other factor surrounding
the identification. [You have heard evidence that prior to this trial, a witness
identified the defendant by .] It is for you to determine the reliability of any
identification and to give it the weight you believe it deserves.
The identification of the defendant by a single eyewitness, as the person who
committed the crime, if believed beyond a reasonable doubt, can be enough evi-
dence to convict the defendant. However, you must examine the identification of
the defendant with great care.
Id. at 336-37, 701 A-2d at 376 (alterations in original) (quoting MICPEL, MARYLAND CRIMI
NAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS MPCJI-Cr 3:30 (1995)).
204. Id. at 337, 701 A.2d at 376. The proposed instruction stated:
Evidence has been introduced that William Hoopes is mistaken in identifying
the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Whether or not a witness has adequately identified the defendant as the per-
petrator of the crime is a question solely for you to decide. In other words, the
credibility of the witness is a matter for your consideration and determination. In
reaching your determination, you may consider such factors as any mistake, hesi-
tancy or inconsistency on the part of the identifying witness.
Specifically, you may consider the opportunity of the witness to view the per-
son committing the criminal acts at the time of the crime, including: (1) how
long the encounter lasted; (2) the distance between the various persons; (3) the
lighting conditions at the time; (4) the witness' [s] state of mind at the time of the
offense; and (5) the witness'[s] degree of attention to the offender during the
commission of the offense.
Also, you may consider the accuracy of the witness' [s] prior description of
the criminal, if any; the certainty or lack of certainly expressed by the witness; the
demeanor and conduct of the witness making the identification; and any other
direct or circumstantial evidence which may identify the person who committed
the offense charged or which corroborates-that is, strengthens-or negates the
identification of the defendant by the witness.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting DAVID E. AARONSON, MARYLAND CRIMINAL JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS AND COMMENTARY § 5.10 (2d ed. 1988)).
205. Id. at 338, 701 A.2d at 376-77 (second alteration in original).
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identification.' 20 6 The jury convicted Gunning of all charges, and
the trial judge sentenced him to ten years imprisonment.
20 7
Gunning appealed to the Court of Special Appeals on the
grounds that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the photo-
graphic identification and in failing to give the eyewitness identifica-
tion instruction.218 On the first issue, Gunning argued that the photo
array shown to Mr. Hoopes was impermissibly suggestive.20 9 Second,
Gunning contended that the proposed instructions described the law
applicable to the case and should have been given.21 0 The Court of
Special Appeals affirmed the convictions. 211 The court held that the
evidence offered by Gunning did not suggest that the array shown to
Mr. Hoopes was so unfair as to infringe on Mr. Gunning's right to due
process of law.212 Furthermore, the court found that Gunning's ob-
jection to the jury instructions had not been properly preserved for
review.213
b. Harris.-On June 11, 1995, as Mildred Dennis walked
down a street in Baltimore City, her purse was snatched. 4 Robin
Carponetto witnessed the attack from the window of her place of em-
ployment across the street.215 While Dennis never saw the face of the
man who attacked her,216 Carponetto gave the police a description of
the attacker, including details about the attacker's complexion, cloth-
ing, and distinctive keloid scars.2 7 Carponetto subsequently identi-
fied Gary L. Harris from a photographic array. 1
Harris was charged with battery and theft.219 At his trial in Balti-
more City Circuit Court, Carponetto was the only witness who saw the
206. Id. (emphasis omitted).
207. Id., 701 A.2d at 377.
208. Gunning v. State, No. 2031, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Aug. 8, 1995)
(per curiam).
209. Id. at 2.
210. Id. at 1.
211. Id. at 8.
212. See id. at 3-5 (identifying appellant's burden and explaining why he failed to meet
it).
213. Id. at 6.
214. Gunning, 347 Md. at 358, 701 A.2d at 387 (Raker, J., and Wilner, J., concurring in








attack, and Harris presented no evidence on his own behalf.22 ° De-
fense counsel requested MICPEL pattern instruction MPCJI-Cr
3:30,221 the same instruction that Gunning requested at his trial.222
The trial judge refused, as he had in response to Gunning's request,
stating that he "never [gave] that instruction" and reiterating his be-
lief that identification was a pure issue of fact and thus inappropriate
for jury instruction.223 Harris was convicted on both counts, and the
trial judge imposed concurrent sentences of five years imprisonment
for the battery conviction and eighteen months imprisonment for the
theft conviction.2 24 Harris appealed, claiming that the trial court
erred in declining to give the eyewitness identification instruction.225
Before the intermediate appellate court could review Harris's case,
the Maryland Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari sua sponte to
determine whether the trial judge erred in refusing to give the re-
quested instruction.226 It also granted certiorari in Gunning's case,
and ordered the two to be argued on the same day, 2 27 in order to
consider the propriety of the trial judge's prohibition against giving a
jury instruction on eyewitness identification.228
2. Legal Background.-By the time of Gunning v. State, the Court
of Appeals had firmly established the importance ofjudicial discretion
over jury instructions. 229 In Gunning, the court considered the appro-
priate judicial response to a request for an instruction specifically cov-
ering eyewitness identification. 230
a. The Application of Judicial Discretion. -Jury instructions
have long been the province of judicial discretion. 21  By definition,
discretion must be exercised whenever there is no rule to guide a
220. Id. at 359, 701 A.2d at 387 (Raker,J., and WilnerJ., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
221. See supra note 203 (setting forth the pertinent text of the instruction).
222. Gunning, 347 Md. at 338-39, 701 A.2d at 377.
223. Id. at 339, 701 A.2d at 377.
224. Id.
225. See Appellant Harris's Brief at 3, Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 701 A.2d 374
(1997) (No. 132).
226. Brief of Appellee at 1-2, Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 701 A.2d 374 (1997) (No.
132) (noting that the Court of Appeals "on its own motion issued a writ of certiorari to
review this case prior to decision by the Court of Special Appeals").
227. Id. at 2 n.1.
228. Gunning, 347 Md. at 339, 701 A.2d at 377.
229. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 315 Md. 309, 318-19, 554 A.2d 395, 399 (1989) (stating
that the decision to grant or refuse a missing witness ajury instruction is "within the discre-
tion of the trial judge").
230. Gunning, 347 Md. at 339-41, 701 A.2d at 377-78.
231. See supra note 229.
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judge.2" 2 In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has defined judicial dis-
cretion as "sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right
under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capri-
ciously."2 3 Thus, judicial discretion includes subjective and objective
components: while judges must tailor a decision left to their discre-
tion to the specific facts of the case, they must also draw conclusions
by applying certain constant factors that serve to guide their discre-
tion.23 4 Moreover, while the sound exercise of judicial discretion re-
quires judges to weigh the specific evidence in a case in order to reach
decisions, judges may not reach conclusions that lie within the prov-
ince of the jury.23 5 Maryland courts consider the jury to be the "exclu-
sive judge"23 6 of matters of fact. In matters of law, however, "the jury's
role... is limited to resolving conflicting interpretations of the legal
effect of the evidence and disputes concerning the substantive law of
the crime for which there is a sound basis."2 7 Maryland courts have
delineated the boundary between the proper exercise of judicial dis-
cretion and infringement on matters properly decided by a jury in a
number of specific contexts, including jury instructions.
In Dempsey v. State,238 the Court of Appeals explored the tension
between a court's dual responsibility to provide guidance to the jury
and to refrain from trespassing on matters within its province. 239 In
Dempsey, the trial judge, after admitting the defendant's confession,
informed the jury that he believed the confession to be "a voluntary
statement in every regard," but added that the jury was the final arbi-
ter of this issue.2 4 ° On review, the Court of Appeals held this remark
to be an impermissible comment on a question of fact, properly de-
cided only by the jury.24 1 The court noted that, although a judge ini-
232. See, e.g., Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 427, 466 A.2d 1286, 1288-89 (1983) ("Implicit
in the definition [of judicial discretion] is the concept that judicial discretion applies ab-
sent a hard and fast rule.").
233. In re Don Mc., 344 Md. 194, 201, 686 A.2d 269, 272 (1996) (quoting State ex rel.
Carroll v. Junker, 482 P.2d 775, 784 (Wash. 1971)).
234. See, e.g., id. at 201-02, 686 A.2d at 272-73 (listing several factors for determining if a
juvenile should perform restitution as an example of "objective criteria" that allow ajudge
acting within her discretion to draw conclusions).
235. See Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203, 214, 522 A.2d 1338, 1343 (1987) (stating that "the
individual and total weight assigned to the evidence is within the exclusive province of the
jury" as long as there is legally sufficient evidence to support the conviction).
236. Id. at 210, 522 A.2d at 1341.
237. Id.
238. 277 Md. 134, 355 A.2d 455 (1976).
239. See id. at 136, 355 A.2d at 456 (holding as error a trial judge's instruction to the jury
that the judge had found the defendant's confession to be voluntary).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 150, 355 A.2d at 463.
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tially determines the voluntariness and hence admissibility of a
confession as a mixed issue of law and fact,2 4 2 the judge may not dis-
cuss the decision with the jury.243 While the court acknowledged that
"'it is sometimes difficult for the Court to assign reasons for its rulings
without saying something that may unintentionally affect the jury,' ' 244
the Dempsey court nevertheless found that, by commenting on the evi-
dence in this way, the trial judge committed reversible error.245
In addition to considering the facts of a case, the exercise ofjudi-
cial discretion may require a judge to consider certain judicially-cre-
ated factors. 246 One purpose of these factors is to guide judges, so
that they must consider the facts of the case in light of these factors,
instead of applying a rigid rule of their own. 247 Thus, in Colter v.
State,2 48 the Court of Appeals found reversible error in a trial judge's
refusal to allow an alibi witness to testify as a sanction for a violation of
discovery procedures. 249 This refusal was error because the judge had
failed to consider the nature of the discovery violation, the prejudice
to the parties by the violation, the timing of the ultimate disclosure of
the alibi witness, and possible reasons for the violation.25 °
More generally, Colter emphasized that when a judge is granted
discretion over a matter, he or she must in fact exercise that discre-
tion.251' A failure to exercise discretion may constitute reversible error
as surely as an active abuse of discretion. 52 The Colter court noted
that adopting a blanket rule of procedure does not constitute an exer-
cise of discretion.253 If a trial judge has discretionary authority over a
242. Id. at 144, 355 A.2d at 460 (quoting Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 357-58, 289 A.2d 575,
579 (1972)).
243. Id. at 148-49, 355 A.2d at 463.
244. Id. at 149, 355 A.2d at 463 (quoting Coffin v. Brown, 94 Md. 190, 203, 50 A. 567,
575 (1901)).
245. Id. at 154, 355 A.2d at 465.
246. See, e.g., Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 428, 466 A.2d 1286, 1289 (1983) (listing sev-
eral factors relevant to determining when the exclusion of alibi testimony constitutes re-
versible error (quoting Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 390-91, 456 A.2d 29, 37 (1983))).
247. See id. (criticizing a trial judge for applying a "hard and fast rule" of not granting a
continuance, instead of deciding the issue in light of the relevant factors).
248. 297 Md. 423, 466 A.2d 1286 (1983).
249. Id. at 428-30, 466 A.2d at 1289-90.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 426, 466 A.2d at 1288 (noting that "when a court has discretion to act, it
must exercise that discretion as that is one of its functions").
252. See id. at 431, 466 A.2d at 1290 (reversing conviction and remanding case for a new
trial when "trial judge did not exercise the discretion granted him under the rule").
253. See id. at 427-28, 466 A.2d at 1289 (noting that "the trial judge did not properly
exercise the discretion given him" when he "adopted a hard and fast rule" of procedure).
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particular issue, he or she must apply that authority "depending on
the facts and circumstances of each particular case."
25 4
Four years later, in Maus v. State,255 the Court of Appeals explic-
itly stated the importance of the active exercise of judicial discretion
in the context of a judicial determination of sentencing for parole
violations.2 56 The Maus court stressed that " [w] hen a court must exer-
cise discretion, failure to do so is error, and ordinarily requires
reversal."
25 7
An abuse of judicial discretion is considered harmless only if the
reviewing court can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the er-
ror did not influence the verdict.258 In Dempsey v. State,259 the Court
of Appeals stated that it was "unable to conclude" that a trial judge's
improper comment to the jury that a confession was entirely voluntary
did not so influence the verdict.260 Therefore the court reversed the
guilty verdicts and remanded the case for a new trial.2 6 ' In contrast,
in Rubin v. State62 the Court of Appeals found that a trial court's deci-
sion to admit testimony that should have been excluded as privileged
constituted harmless error because "the evidence of guilt was
overwhelming. "263
b. Offering Jury Instructions Under Maryland Rule 4-325.-
Maryland Rule 4-325 guides judges in deciding when jury instructions
should be given. 264 Rule 4-325(c) states, "The court may, and at the
254. Id. at 428, 466 A.2d at 1289 (criticizing a judge's rule of denying a continuance in
order to obtain additional evidence to any party in violation of a particular discovery rule
when that rule "provides the trial judge with authority to fashion a sanction other than
exclusion").
255. 311 Md. 85, 532 A.2d 1066 (1987).
256. See id. at 108, 532 A.2d at 1077 (observing that, in revoking probation, the judge
had discretion to consider the mitigating circumstance that the defendant had spent time
in a drug rehabilitation facility under circumstances similar to incarceration).
257. Id.
258. See Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 150, 355 A.2d 455, 463 (1976) (stating that
"[t]he burden of 'demonstrat[ing], beyond a reasonable doubt, that such error did not
contribute to the conviction,' is upon the beneficiary of the error" (quoting Dorsey v.
State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976))); see also Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659, 350
A.2d. at 678 (noting that "when an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a
reviewing court... is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in
no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed 'harmless' and a reversal is
mandated").
259. 277 Md. 134, 355 A.2d 455 (1976).
260. Id. at 154, 355 A.2d at 465.
261. Id., 355 A.2d at 465-66.
262. 325 Md. 552, 602 A.2d 677 (1992).
263. Id. at 578, 602 A.2d at 690.
264. MD. RULE 4-325.
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request of any party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law and
the extent to which the instructions are binding. '2 6 5 If ajudge fails to
do so, she commits an abuse of discretion.266 Significantly, subsection
(c) establishes that "[t]he court need not grant a requested instruc-
tion if the matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given."2 67
Maryland courts have debated the implications of this rule.
(1) Instructions to the Jury on the Applicable Law.-In Robinson
V. State,26 8 the Court of Appeals noted that the judicial obligation to
instruct the jury on the relevant law necessarily entails consideration
of the particular circumstances of the case.2 69 In Robinson, the defen-
dant argued that the trial judge erred by giving a "missing witness"
instruction, i.e., by informing the jury that the defendant's failure to
call an allegedly exculpatory witness allowed the jury to infer that the
witness would actually have testified unfavorably.270
The Court of Appeals noted that the witness's "existence and his
involvement in this case were not demonstrated by any evidence other
than the testimony of the defendant," and that therefore, "a fair infer-
ence from the unexplained failure to produce [the witness was] that
[the witness] was not involved at all" and would not be able to excul-
pate the defendant. 271 The Court of Appeals held that there was no
abuse of discretion in giving the "missing witness" instruction because
the facts presented were sufficient to support the trial judge's jury
instruction.272
(2) Inappropriate Commentary on Facts in Instructions.-If an
instruction improperly comments on the facts in a case, that instruc-
tion may constitute reversible error.2 73 Because of the authoritative
265. MD. RuLE 4-325(c).
266. Cf Rubin, 325 Md. at 585, 602 A.2d at 693 (noting that a "court, when properly
requested to do so, is obliged to instruct on the legal issues generated by the evidence").
267. MD. RULE 4 -325(c); seeDean v. State, 325 Md. 230, 23940, 600 A.2d 409, 413 (1992)(holding that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on
the crime of assault with intent to disfigure" when the instruction was not required by the
evidence in the case and when it was covered by other instructions given to the jury).
268. 315 Md. 309, 554 A.2d 395 (1989).
269. See id. at 319, 554 A.2d at 400 (noting that "the underlying facts [in the case] were
sufficient to permit the unfavorable inference, and the trial judge did not abuse his discre-
tion in giving the instruction").
270. Id. at 312, 554 A.2d at 396.
271. Id. at 317, 554 A.2d at 399.
272. Id. at 319, 554 A.2d at 400.
273. See Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203, 214, 522 A.2d 1338, 1343 (1987) (reversing a convic-
tion on the ground that a disputed judicial remark was "an indirect comment on the gen-
eral weight of the evidence as to each count and outside the permissible scope of
comment").
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position of trial judges, the Court of Appeals has been reluctant to
conclude that an improper instruction will not influence a verdict.
274
In Gore v. State, the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction be-
cause ajudge attempted to explain certain principles of law to the jury
in response to what the trial judge believed to be an inappropriate
statement in the defense attorney's closing argument. 275 Although
the Court of Appeals recognized that the trial judge probably in-
tended only to explain the concept of legally sufficient evidence to the
jury, the court concluded that the judge's remarks were "an indirect
comment on the general weight of the evidence as to each count and
outside the permissible scope of comment.
27 6
(3) Omission of Jury Instructions.--The significance of an
omitted jury instruction varies with the specific circumstances of a
case. Maryland courts assume that juries can and will follow instruc-
tions given to them, even if the instructions require them to disregard
particularly prejudicial testimony.2 77 Accordingly, if the omission of
the instruction means that erroneously admitted evidence will be con-
sidered by the jury, or that relevant evidence will be disregarded, the
omission may be improper.278
In Smith v. State, the Court of Appeals noted that a defendant is
entitled, upon request, to an alibi defense instruction whenever "the
evidence in a criminal case generates the issue of alibi," as long as the
matter is not covered by other instructions. 279 The Smith court found
that the defendant's uncorroborated testimony that he was out of
state at the time of the crime was sufficient to raise the alibi issue, and
274. See Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 149, 355 A.2d 455, 463 (1976) (remarking that
because of their "'high and authoritative position [s],'" trial judges ought to be "exceed-
ingly careful" in their remarks during trial, "and should carefully refrain, either directly or
indirectly, from giving expression to an opinion upon the existence or not of any fact,
which should be left to the finding of the jury" (quoting Elmer v. State, 239 Md. 1, 10-11,
209 A.2d 776, 782 (1965))).
275. Gore, 309 Md. at 211-12, 522 A.2d at 1342 (holding improper the trial judge's in-
struction that he must deny a motion for judgment of acquittal if he believes that there is
legally sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction). In that case, the trial judge corrected
defense counsel's statement to the jury that there was "insufficient testimony" on a particu-
lar point by informing the jury that "the counts [charged] could never go to you if there
were not evidence sufficient under the law; whether you believe it... is for you, the Jury, to
decide." Id. at 204-05, 522 A.2d at 1338.
276. Id. at 214, 522 A.2d at 1343.
277. SeeDennison v. State, 87 Md. App. 749, 760, 591 A.2d 568, 573 (1991) ("It is gener-
ally held that the jury can and will follow curative instructions.").
278. See Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 177, 486 A.2d 196, 196 (1985) (holding that "the
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on alibi constituted [reversible] error").
279. Id. at 180, 486 A.2d at 198.
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that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on this issue was there-
fore improper. 28 0
However, in Rubin v. State,28 1 the Court of Appeals held that even
if a particular instruction seemed to be required at the time it was
requested, a judge's failure to give it was harmless error when the
prosecutor did not make the expected argument that the instruction
was intended to address.2 8 2 A failure to give a particular jury instruc-
tion may constitute harmless error if the reviewing court can find be-
yond a reasonable doubt that its omission did not prejudice the losing
party.2
8 3
(4) Proposed Instructions Fairly Covered by Instructions Given.-
Rule 4-325(c) does not require that a proposed instruction be offered
if that instruction is "fairly covered" by other instructions.2 8 4 Mary-
land courts have considered the application of this aspect of the rule
in a number of contexts.
In England & Edwards v. State,285 the Court of Appeals held that
an instruction relating to the possibility of error in eyewitness testi-
mony may be "fairly covered" by a general instruction which states
that, among other things, the defendant "'is entitled to every infer-
ence in his favor which can be reasonably drawn from the evi-
dence.' 28 6 The court held that the trial judge therefore committed
no error in refusing to give the eyewitness instruction. 28 7
Similarly, in Henry v. State,28 8 the Court of Appeals held that cer-
tain proposed instructions in a death penalty sentencing were covered
by the instructions given.2 89 In that case, a trial judge's general expla-
280. Id. at 183, 486 A.2d at 200.
281. 325 Md. 552, 602 A.2d 677 (1992).
282. Id. at 585-86, 602 A.2d at 693.
283. See id. (concluding that no prejudice resulted because the prosecutor never made
the argument addressed by the omitted instruction).
284. MD. RULE 4-325(c).
285. 274 Md. 264, 334 A.2d 98 (1975).
286. Id. at 274-75, 334 A.2d at 104 (quoting the jury instructions of the trial court). In
this case, the defendant requested a specific instruction as to "the possibility of human
error or mistakes" in eyewitness identifications. Id. at 274, 334 A.2d at 104. While the
instructions the court gave noted that the identification of an accused person by a single
eyewitness may be enough for conviction, it also stated that "'[w]here two inferences may
be drawn from the same set of facts, one consistent with guilt and one consistent with
innocence, the defendant is entitled to the inference which is consistent with innocence.'"
Id. at 275, 334 A.2d at 104 (quoting the jury instructions of the trial court).
287. See id. at 276, 334 A.2d at 105 (stating that "where the point of law embodied in the
requested instruction is fairly covered in the instructions actually given, no error is commit-
ted by the refusal to grant the requested instruction" (citations omitted)).
288. 324 Md. 204, 596 A.2d 1024 (1991).
289. Id. at 251, 596 A.2d at 1048.
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nation of the role of mitigating circumstances in a death penalty case
appropriately covered a requested instruction specifying that "a single
mitigating circumstance is sufficient to justify a life sentence."290
c. The Appropriateness of Jury Instructions on Eye-witness Identifi-
cation.-In Branch v. State,291 the Court of Appeals concluded that eye-
witness testimony is sufficiently credible to serve as the sole basis of a
conviction.292 The court did not discuss in that case the issue of
whether a trial judge must give a cautionary jury instruction on eyewit-
ness identification. In England & Edwards v. State,293 the court upheld
the trial judge's decision to refuse a request for such a cautionary in-
294 Tecu
struction. The court found, however, that the requested identifica-
tion was fairly covered by other instructions given to the jury.
295
Before Gunning, therefore, the question of when, if ever, a jury in-
struction on eyewitness identification must be given was unanswered
in Maryland.296
Other courts have reached varying conclusions as to when, if
ever, such an instruction must be given. In United States v. Telfaire,
29 7
the court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in send-
ing the case to the jury when only one witness, the robbery victim,
identified the defendant as his assailant.298 While acknowledging "the
traditional recognition that identification testimony presents special
problems of reliability,"299 the court held that the identification at is-
sue in Telfaire did not present "special difficulties" requiring an in-
struction dealing with eyewitness testimony.3"' The eyewitness-
robbery victim in Telfaire had "adequate opportunity to observe" and
also "spontaneous [ly]" identified the defendant.3 "' However, the
court appended a model instruction to its opinion and wrote that
290. Id. at 248-50, 596 A.2d at 1046-47.
291. 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986).
292. See id. at 183, 502 A.2d at 499 ("'Identification by the victim is ample evidence to
sustain a conviction.'" (quoting Walters v. State, 242 Md. 235, 237-38, 218 A.2d 678, 680
(1966))).
293. 274 Md. 264, 334 A.2d 98 (1975).
294. See id. at 276, 334 A.2d at 105.
295. See id. at 274-76, 334 A.2d at 104-05.
296. Cf Gunning, 347 Md. at 341, 701 A.2d at 378 (noting that "[t]he appropriateness of
such an [eyewitness testimony] instruction is generally unsettled among the various
jurisdictions").
297. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
298. Id. at 554 & n.4.
299. Id. at 555.




"failure to use this model ... would constitute a risk in future cases
that should not be ignored."30 2
The Telfaire model instruction listed detailed factors that a jury
should consider in determining the reliability of eyewitness testi-
mony.30 3 These factors included the witness's opportunity to observe
the events described, the strength of the witness's recollection, occa-
sions when the witness failed to identify the defendant, and the credi-
bility of the identification witness. 0 4
In United States v. Holley,3 °5 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that when a criminal case contains only eyewitness testi-
mony as evidence of identification, the Telfaire instruction should be
given, with modifications appropriate to the case. 30 6 The court em-
phasized that it adopted the Telfaire rule only for cases involving un-
corroborated eyewitness testimony.3 0 7  In Holley, only a single
eyewitness identification connected the defendant to the bank rob-
bery with which he was charged. 3 8 The court noted that it would view
with "grave concern" a trial judge's failure to give the Telfaire instruc-
tion or its equivalent.30 9
In United States v. Brooks, 1 ° the Fourth Circuit clarified its holding
in Holley, noting that the Telfaire instruction is necessary only when
there are "'special difficulties '' 31 1 with the identification. 3 1 2 The
Brooks court noted that other jurisdictions have "'strongly urged"' that
the instruction be given in cases in which identification is uncertain,
but have refused to find that the omission of the instruction always
constitutes reversible error.31 3 Thus, the court concluded that if the
evidence in support of a witness's identification is "overwhelming," a
302. Id. at 557.
303. See id. app. at 558-59 (appending the model instruction to the text of the opinion).
304. Id.
305. 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974).
306. See id. at 275 ("In Telfaire the District of Columbia Circuit adopted generally forjudges within the district a model instruction ... permitting variation and adaptation to
suit the proof and contentions of a particular case. We now do likewise as to the district
judges in this circuit.").
307. Id. at 275.
308. Id. at 274.
309. Id. at 275.
310. 928 F.2d 1403 (4th Cir. 1991).
311. Id. at 1406 (quoting United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 556 (1972) (per
curiam)).
312. See id. (emphasizing that "Telfaire does not purport to compel in every case where
there is significant identification testimony an extended instruction on the reliability of
identification testimony").
313. Id. at 1407 (quoting United States v. Thoma, 713 F.2d 604, 607 (10th Cir. 1983)).
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criminal defendant is not prejudiced by the absence of the instruc-
tion, and reversal is not required.314
Other courts have expressly rejected the use of a cautionary in-
struction on eyewitness testimony. In Conley v. State, 15 the Supreme
Court of Arkansas held that the Telfaire instruction improperly com-
mented on the evidence in the case.3" 6 That court further held that
the instruction impermissibly dealt with the weight a jury should give
identification evidence. 17
In Hopkins v. State,3 8 the Supreme Court of Indiana determined
that the Telfaire instruction impermissibly singled out eyewitness testi-
mony. 19 The court noted that under Indiana law, no one witness's
testimony should be emphasized to the jury in jury instructions.32
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Gunning v. State, the Court of Ap-
peals determined that, while an instruction on eyewitness identifica-
tion is not mandatory, a trial judge must exercise his or her discretion
in considering whether the instruction should be given based on the
facts of the case and the other instructions offered.32 1 The court held
that the trial judge in the present case failed to exercise such discre-
tion, thereby committing reversible error.3 22
The court first addressed whether a trial judge is required to give
an instruction on eyewitness identification.323 The court observed
that courts in different jurisdictions have not reached a consensus as
to when such an instruction is mandatory or indeed whether it is ever
appropriate.324
314. Id. at 1409.
315. 607 S.W.2d 328 (Ark. 1980).
316. See id. at 330 (stating that the trial court was correct to reject the proffered Telfaire
instruction because "the instruction contains comments on the evidence," and noting that
"[t]his is a practice permitted in federal court but not in Arkansas").
317. See id. (stating that the instruction was further improper because it "concerned the
weight to be given to identification testimony, a subject not covered by the Arkansas Model
Jury Instructions").
318. 582 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1991).
319. See id. at 353 (noting that "Indiana law, unlike federal law . . . is distinctly biased
against jury instructions which single out eyewitness identification testimony").
320. See id. (stating that "a trial court should not give instructions which tend to empha-
size the testimony of any single witness").
321. See Gunning, 347 Md. at 348, 701 A.2d at 381-82 (finding that the trial judge must
make preliminary determinations regarding the necessity of the requested instruction).
322. Id. at 354-55, 701 A.2d at 384-85.
323. See id. at 340-41, 701 A.2d at 377-78 (summarizing the initial arguments presented
by the parties).
324. See id. at 341, 701 A.2d at 378 ("The appropriateness of such an instruction is gen-
erally unsettled among the various jurisdictions.").
1999]
MARYLAND LAW REviEW
The majority began its analysis with an examination of cases ap-
plying the "Telfaire approach," which requires the instruction to be
given if the reliability of an identification is seriously challenged. 25
The court noted that courts adopting the Telfaire view have done so
because of the tendencies ofjuries to overrate the reliability of eyewit-
ness testimony. 26 The Court of Appeals noted that the goal of the
Telfaire instruction is to ensure that the jury considers "the totality of
the circumstances [under which the identification [is] made] ."327
The court contrasted these cases with holdings from other juris-
dictions that have rejected the use of eyewitness identification instruc-
tions."' Some of these courts have found that instructions on
eyewitness identification constitute per se improper judicial commen-
tary on evidence.3 29 Others have suggested that offering the instruc-
tion improperly emphasizes eyewitness testimony.
Concluding that neither the Telfaire approach nor an absolute
prohibition was satisfactory, the court adopted a rule that placed the
decision whether to offer an eyewitness identification instruction
"within the sound discretion of the trial court."330 The Court of Ap-
peals noted that this "flexible approach" of leaving eyewitness identifi-
cation instruction to the trial court's discretion has several benefits. 1
It prevents the appellate court from imposing rigid requirements on
trial courts under the threat of automatic reversal, avoids issuance of
the instruction when the facts of the case indicate the reliability of the
identification, and permits the decision on instructions to be made by
the trial judge, who is best able to evaluate its usefulness.33 2
325. Id.; see supra notes 303-304 and accompanying text (discussing when the Telfaire
instruction should be used); see also United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, app. 558-59
(providing the full text of the instruction).
326. See Gunning, 347 Md. at 343, 701 A.2d at 379 ("Proponents of the Telfaire approach
emphasize that eyewitness identifications are perhaps less reliable than the average juror
appreciates, and consider a cautionary instruction necessary to minimize the risk of errone-
ous convictions.").
327. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 275
(4th Cir. 1974)).
328. Id. at 344-45, 701 A.2d at 380 (citing Conley v. State, 607 S.W.2d 328 (Ark. 1980);
Hopkins v. State, 582 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1991); State v. Classen, 571 P.2d 527 (Or. App.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 590 P.2d 1198 (Or. 1979)).
329. See id. at 344, 701 A.2d at 380 (noting that some 'jurisdictions have expressly re-jected Telfaire-like instructions . .. based on the conclusion that eyewitness identification
instructions amount to an impermissible judicial comment on the evidence").
330. Id. at 345, 701 A.2d at 380.
331. Id. at 345-46, 701 A.2d at 380-81 (quoting United States v. Brooks, 928 F.2d 1403,
1408 (4th Cir. 1991)).
332. See id. (quoting Brooks, 928 F.2d at 1408).
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Next, the court considered whether the language of Maryland
Rule 4-325(c) prohibited or required an eyewitness identification in-
struction. 3 The court rejected the State's argument that the identifi-
cation instruction "goes beyond an explanation of the substantive law"
and thus improperly discusses particular factors that the jury should
determine itself in weighing testimony on identification. 3  Instead,
the court compared such an instruction to one that advises the jury to
determine whether a proffered alibi covered the entire time period of
the crime."' Such an "evidentiary instruction" is permitted under
Maryland law as part of an instruction on applicable law.336
Having held that offering an instruction on eyewitness testimony
does not violate Rule 4-325, the court further considered whether the
rule requires the giving of such an instruction. 337 Although the court
found that the proposed instruction could constitute a proper expla-
nation of law, it noted that a requested jury instruction should only be
given if the trial judge finds that the evidence presented at trial "sug-
gests the need" for the instruction. 33" The court clarified that Rule 4-
325(c) is not "absolute"; an instruction correctly stating the law must
also be appropriate to the facts of the case and relate to issues not
covered in other instructions in order to be mandatory.339 The court
discussed several factors to consider in determining whether the evi-
dence suggests the need for the instruction: the certainty of the iden-
tification, the extent to which the identification is at issue, and the
degree to which other evidence corroborates the identification. 4 °
Moreover, as stated in Maryland Rule 4-325(c), the requested instruc-
tion is unnecessary if the point made by the instruction is "fairly
cover[ed]" by other instructions given to the jury.3 41 Finally, if a trial
judge decides that the evidence in a case justifies an instruction on
eyewitness identification, he or she is not obligated to use the exact
333. Id. at 347, 701 Md. at 381.
334. Id.
335. Id. (citing Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 178, 486 A.2d 196, 198 (1985)).
336. See id. (noting that the evidentiary value of the alibi instruction does not remove it
from the category of "applicable law").
337. Id. at 348, 701 A.2d at 381-82.
338. Id., 701 A.2d at 382.
339. Id. at 347-48, 701 A.2d at 381-82.
340. Id. at 348, 701 A.2d at 381.
341. MD. RULE 4-325(c). In discussing this point, the Court of Appeals cited Jackson v.
State, 69 Md. App. 645, 519 A.2d 751 (1987), in which the Court of Special Appeals held
that the identification issue could be addressed sufficiently by an instruction that directed
the jury "to consider the testimony of all the witnesses concerning identification and give
the testimony such weight as the jury thought should be given it." Gunning, 347 Md. at
349, 701 A.2d at 382 (quoting Jackson, 69 Md. App. at 660, 519 A.2d at 758).
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language proposed by the defendant's attorney.142 The judge may se-
lect his or her own wording, provided that the instruction is "accurate
and 'fairly covers' the requested instruction."34
After concluding that the decision to give an eyewitness instruc-
tion falls within a trial judge's discretion, the Court of Appeals ex-
amined whether the judge presiding over Gunning and Harris had
properly exercised this discretion. 44 The court began with the prem-
ise that a judge is required to exercise his or her discretion whenever
confronted with a matter that falls within it.345 Failure to do so may
constitute error, which "'ordinarily requires reversal.' '346 The court
emphasized that the decision made in exercising discretion must take
into account the peculiar circumstances of the case at hand.3 47 There-
fore, a judge may not decide discretionary issues by adopting a gen-
eral rule to be applied to all cases. 4 8
In evaluating the actions of the trial judge in Gunningand Harris,
the court held that he erred in failing to make an "individualized de-
termination" that the instruction was unnecessary in each case.349
Although the judge believed that the instruction was improper be-
cause it was a comment on an issue of fact,35° the Court of Appeals
rejected the judge's "unyielding rule"3 5 ' and stated that the judge
should have at least considered the eyewitness identification instruction
in both Gunning and Harris.35 2 Therefore, the court vacated both con-
victions and remanded the cases to the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City for new trials.353
342. Gunning, 347 Md. at 350, 701 A-2d at 382-83.
343. Id., 701 A.2d at 383 (quoting King v. State, 36 Md. App. 124, 373 A.2d 292 (1977);
Nelson v. State, 5 Md. App. 109, 245 A.2d 606 (1968)).
344. Id. at 351, 701 A.2d at 383.
345. See id. ("It is well settled that a trial judge who encounters a matter that falls within
the realm ofjudicial discretion must exercise his or her discretion in ruling on the matter."
(citing Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 426, 466 A.2d 1286, 1288 (1983))).
346. Id. (quoting Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 108, 532 A.2d 1066, 1077 (1987)).
347. See id. at 352, 701 A.2d at 383-84 ("A proper exercise of discretion involves consid-
eration of the particular circumstances of each case.").
348. See id., 701 A.2d at 384 (characterizing the use of "uniform" rules in discretionary
matters as error).
349. See id. at 351, 353, 701 A.2d at 383, 384 ("[W]e hold that the judge's unyielding
adherence to this predetermined position amounts to . . . a failure to properly exercise
discretion.").
350. Id.
351. Id. at 355, 701 A.2d at 385.
352. Id. at 351, 701 A.2d at 383.
353. Id. at 355, 701 A.2d at 385. In Gunning's case, which, unlike Harris's, had been
affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals also reversed the intermedi-
ate court's decision. Id.
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Although the majority refused to establish rigid rules in deter-
mining when the eyewitness instruction should be given,"' it men-
tioned several factors that might guide a trial judge in exercising his
or her discretion. 5 5 The court stated that a request for the eyewitness
identification instruction should be given "careful consideration"
when "uncorroborated eyewitness testimony is a critical element of
the State's case and doubts have been raised about the reliability of
that testimony. '3 56 Conversely, the court noted that the instruction
will be less useful when there is corroboration of the defendant's role
in the act, when there are no reasonable doubts about the accuracy of
the identification, or when there are other instructions given to the
jury that adequately cover the topic. 3 57
Judges Raker and Wilner wrote an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part. While they agreed that the eyewitness instruc-
tion is not inherently improper,3 51 they added that such an instruc-
tion might be "required" in some cases.3 59  They emphasized,
however, that the extent to which a defendant was actually prejudiced
by judicial error must be taken into account by a reviewing court.
360
The judges concurred in the holding that the trial judge's failure to
exercise his discretion in Gunning's case prejudiced that defendant,
and that a new trial was therefore necessary. 361 In Harris's case, how-
ever, the judges concluded that the trial judge's error was "in no way
prejudicial to the defendant" and that Harris's conviction should be
upheld.362
354. See id. at 345, 701 A.2d at 380 (concurring "with those courts that have declined to
adopt. . . rigid rules on the appropriateness of an identified instruction").
355. Id. at 354, 701 A.2d at 385.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. See id. at 355-56, 701 A.2d at 385-86 (Raker, J. and Wilner,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (outlining their agreement with the majority).
359. Id. at 356, 701 A.2d at 385. The dissent suggested that "there really is no reason not
to give the instruction" when "(1) criminal agency is in dispute, (2) the State's case ...
rests, to any significant degree, on eyewitness identification evidence, and (3) ... the relia-
bility of the identification is significantly challenged by the defendant." Id. at 362, 701
A.2d at 389.
360. See id. at 359, 701 A.2d at 387 (examining the prejudicial effect of the trial judge's
errors).
361. Id. at 358, 701 A.2d at 386-87. The judges noted that in Gunning's case, the "evi-
dence presented a very clear conflict, which necessarily put into issue the accuracy of [the
witness's] identification." Id. at 361, 701 A.2d at 388.
362. Id. at 359, 701 A.2d at 387. The judges reviewed the evidence offered in Harris,
concluding that the jury had before it "a positive identification by a neutral eyewitness in a
nearly perfect daylight setting, with no hint of suggestiveness and no evidence casting any
doubt on [the witness's] ability to observe what occurred and to report that observation
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4. Analysis.-Although consistent with previous Maryland rul-
ings on the importance of judicial discretion, the court's opinion in
Gunning does not take into consideration the peculiar problems that
accompany eyewitness testimony. In Gunning, the court emphasized
that a trial judge should be free to tailor jury instructions to the case at
hand.363 However, scientific evidence suggests that eyewitness identi-
fications of strangers are both extremely unreliable and of strong sig-
nificance to jurors. 64 Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to
find that a cautionary instruction is appropriate in many cases turning
on such testimony. The Court of Appeals should have established
clear and relevant factors that trial judges would be required to con-
sider in deciding whether or not to offer eyewitness testimony instruc-
tions. Such an inquiry would not excessively limit trial judges'
discretion over jury instructions.
a. The Exercise ofJudicial Discretion over Eyewitness Identification
Instructions.-As the court noted in Gunning, few jurisdictions agree
on the correct treatment of eyewitness testimony in jury instruc-
tions.365 Placing the decision to give an instruction on eyewitness
identification within a judge's discretion is consistent with holdings
from other jurisdictions. 366 Moreover, the court's description ofjudi-
cial discretion comports with holdings from other Maryland cases,
accurately." Id. Thejudges also noted that the instructions given to the jury in Harris may
have "fairly covered" the eyewitness identification issue. Id.
363. Gunning, 347 Md. at 346-47, 701 A.2d at 381 (noting that the decision to give a
cautionary instruction "must be decided upon the particular facts of the case" (quoting
State v. Custer, 421 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ohio 1981))).
364. See infra notes 369-370 and accompanying text (discussing the persuasive nature of
eyewitness identifications).
365. See Gunning, 347 Md. at 341, 701 A.2d at 378 (noting that "[t]he appropriateness of
such an instruction is generally unsettled among the various jurisdictions"); see, e.g., Conley
v. State, 607 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ark. 1980) (rejecting the Telfaire instruction as an improper
comment on the evidence); Hopkins v. State, 582 N.E.2d 345, 353 (Ind. 1991) (holding
that a Telfaire instruction was unnecessary because Indiana law "'is distinctly biased against
jury instructions which single out eyewitness identification testimony'" (quoting Brown v.
State, 468 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ind. 1984))); State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236, 1244 (Kan. 1981)
(concluding that a cautionary instruction should be given in any criminal case "in which
eyewitness identification is a critical part of the prosecution's case and there is a serious
question about the reliability of the identification"); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah
1986) (stating that, in view of the problems of eyewitness perception, trial courts must give
a cautionary instruction "whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and
such an instruction is requested by the defense").
366. See, e.g., State v. Dyle, 899 S.W.2d 607, 610-11 (Tenn. 1995) (listing jurisdictions
which "leave the decision to the discretion of the trial court").
910
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
which state that if a judge has discretion to decide a particular issue,
he or she must exercise that discretion. 67
However, the perceptual problems of eyewitness identification of
strangers are sufficiently serious to justify requiring an instruction in
some cases.36 8 This is particularly true in light of the extremely per-
suasive nature of eyewitness identifications. 36 9 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has commented that "doubts over the strength
of the evidence of a defendant's guilt may be resolved on the basis of
the eyewitness' seeming certainty when he points to the defendant
and exclaims with conviction that veils all doubt, '[T]hat's the
man! "370
In a number of jurisdictions, when certain touchstones are pres-
ent, an eyewitness instruction must be given. In United States v.
Brooks,371 the Fourth Circuit held that the Telfaire instruction should
be given when there is a strong chance of misidentification, "uncer-
tainty or qualification in the identification testimony," or other "spe-
cial difficulties." 372 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah has stated
that trial judges should give cautionary instruction "whenever eyewit-
ness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is
requested by the defense.3 73 Even the Gunning court suggested that
when uncorroborated eyewitness testimony is a vital element of the
State's case and when doubts have been raised about the reliability of
the identification testimony, the instruction would be particularly ap-
propriate.3 74 A trial judge bound by these considerations in weighing
the necessity for the instruction is required to examine whether such
367. See, e.g., Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 426, 466 A.2d 1286, 1288 (1983) (noting that
"when a court has discretion to act, it must exercise that discretion").
368. See Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identifi-
cation, 64J. APPLIED PSYCH. 440, 440 (1979) (stating that "staged-crime research indicates
that eyewitness identifications are often unreliable"); cf Dye, 899 S.W.2d at 609 (citing
scholarly opinion for the proposition that "eyewitness testimony poses special problems in
the administration of justice").
369. See Cindy J. O'Hagan, When Seeing is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testi-
mony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 742 (1993) (noting that "despite [the] risk [that human memory
processes will err], juries tend to blindly rely on eyewitness identifications").
370. Kampshoff v. Smith, 698 F.2d 581, 585 (2d Cir. 1983) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1967)). In Gunning, the court down-
played these issues, noting only that an instruction may be useful in some cases
"[a] lthough jurors might know generally that a witness's perception ... is not always relia-
ble and that memory is not infallible." Gunning, 347 Md. at 350, 701 A.2d at 383.
371. 928 F.2d 1403 (4th Cir. 1991).
372. Id. at 1409 (citation omitted).
373. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986).
374. See Gunning, 347 Md. at 354, 701 A.2d at 385 (noting that when these circumstances
are present, the instruction should be given "careful consideration").
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touchstones exist in the specific case at hand. Thus, requiring an in-
struction when these conditions are present need not defeat the goal
of Rule 4-325 that the jury instructions in a case be properly tailored
to the particular facts and circumstances of that case. 375 This goal was
central to the court's analysis in Gunning.76
A rule requiring an eyewitness identification instruction in partic-
ular circumstances would not constitute an unwarranted instrusion
into a judge's discretion. Under such a rule, a trial court would still
be required to exercise its discretion to determine if these circum-
stances were present in a particular case.37 7 This process would be
comparable to that established by the Court of Appeals for the giving
of alibi instructions. The Court of Appeals, in Smith v. State,378 held
that when the "issue of alibi" is "generat[ed]" in a case, the trial judge
must offer an instruction particularly addressing that issue. 7 9 The
court offered specific guidance to trial judges on when that issue was
generated.38 ° The factors noted in Telfaire or other cases could simi-
larly guide trial judges in determining when eyewitness instructions
must be given. In Smith, there was no suggestion that such a guideline
represented an unwarranted interference with trial judges' discretion
over jury instructions.3
Requiring eyewitness instructions when the eyewitness testimony
in a case is uncorroborated, "critical" to the State's case, and has been
met with questions as to its reliability382 would constitute a reasonably
minor incursion into the discretion of trial judges while comporting
with holdings in Maryland and other jurisdictions on the treatment of
eyewitness testimony. Such a rule would continue to require judicial
discretion to avoid unnecessary instructions. The Court of Special Ap-
375. See Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 585, 602 A.2d 677, 693 (1992) (noting that "[a]
court ... is obliged to instruct on the legal issues generated by the evidence" in a case).
376. See Gunning, 347 Md. at 346-47, 701 A.2d at 381 (stating that the determination of
whether an eyewitness instruction should be given "'cannot be directed by a general rule,
but must be decided upon the particular facts of the case"' (quoting Ohio v. Guster, 421
N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ohio 1981))).
377. See Brooks, 928 F.2d at 1407 (finding that "the Telfaire instruction ... is compelled
only where the evidence in the case" renders misidentification likely, a determination
which must be made by the trial judge).
378. 302 Md. 175, 486 A.2d 196 (1985).
379. Id. at 180, 486 A.2d at 198.
380. See id. (noting that most jurisdictions hold that "the defendant's uncorroborated
testimony ... is sufficient to generate the issue").
381. See id. at 183, 486 A.2d at 200 (stating that "it is not the function of the trial judge to
... select some cases in which to give the alibi instruction" (quoting Hudson v. State, 381
So. 2d 344, 346 (Fla. 1980))).
382. Gunning, 347 Md. at 354, 701 A.2d at 385.
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peals, in a decision quoted with approval in Gunning,31 3 refused to
require an instruction on eyewitness testimony unreliability when the
instruction was "not particularly appropriate" to the facts of the
case. 31 4 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit noted that an eyewitness identifi-
cation instruction was not needed when the witness making the identi-
fication was well acquainted with the defendant and the conditions of
the encounter testified to were "adequate to permit easy recogni-
tion.1 s3 5 By only requiring eyewitness instructions when certain fac-
tors are met, there is little risk that unwarranted instructions will be
mandated. Under such a procedure, the trial judge remains "in the
best position to evaluate whether this charge is needed in the case
before it."'86 However, the standards for that evaluation are sharp-
ened to ensure that the finders of fact are better able to weigh the
value of potentially scientifically unreliable evidence. 38 7
Finally, where the factors noted by the court in Gunning are pres-
ent, it is unlikely that an eyewitness instruction would be "fairly cov-
ered" by more general instructions on the burden of proof or the
weighing of evidence. It is a recurring theme in Maryland jurispru-
dence that when offering jury instructions, a trial judge should have
discretion to determine whether a proposed instruction is covered by
other instructions given.388  In England & Edwards v. State,389 the
Court of Appeals found that a proposed instruction on eyewitness tes-
timony was properly covered by a general caution that the defendant
was entitled "'to every inference in his favor."'3 90 However, the in-
structions proposed in that case were more general than either the
proposed MICPEL instruction in Gunning or the Telfaire instruction
383. Jackson v. State, 69 Md. App. 645, 519 A.2d 751 (1987).
384. See Gunning, 347 Md. at 349-50, 701 A.2d at 382 (discussing the Jackson opinion);
Jackson, 69 Md. App. at 661, 519 A.2d at 758-59 (finding "the trial judge committed no
error in refusing to instruct the jury as requested"). In that case, the eyewitness-victim
spent several hours with the individual identified before the crime occurred, and the iden-
tification was corroborated by other witnesses. Id. "This was not a case of a brief encoun-
ter under conditions of poor illumination." Id., 519 A.2d at 758. Thus, "[t] here was no
suggestion in the evidence of any of the factors adversely affecting accuracy of identifica-
tion that were stressed in the requested instruction." Id., 519 A.2d at 759.
385. United States v. Brooks, 928 F.2d 1403, 1408 (4th Cir. 1991).
386. Gunning, 347 Md. at 346, 701 A.2d at 381.
387. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that when
identification testimony presents "special difficulties," a cautionary instruction increases
the jury's ability to "evaluate the reliability of the identification").
388. See Gunning, 347 Md. at 348, 701 A.2d at 382 (noting that "Maryland law.., is clear
that a requested instruction need not be given where other instructions 'fairly cover' the
subject matter of the requested instruction").
389. 274 Md. 264, 334 A.2d 98 (1975).
390. Id. at 274-75, 334 A.2d at 104 (quoting the trial court's jury instructions).
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adopted by the Fourth Circuit. 91 As such, the England & Edwards
instructions were unlikely to add to the jury's understanding of the
scientific problems of particular types of eyewitness identification. 392
While such a general instruction may be fairly covered by other
instructions related to the burden of proof or the weight of evidence,
an instruction such as the one in Telfaire directing the factfinder's at-
tention to particular issues would not be covered by the broader in-
structions. Additionally, a blanket warning that eyewitness testimony
should be "scrutinized with extreme care" is likely to add little to a
jury's understanding of the particular issues that may be raised by the
uncorroborated and challenged identification under adverse condi-
tions for observing strangers.393 In contrast, mandating a more de-
tailed instruction when a trial judge determines that particular factors
are present in a case not only directly addresses the issues in a case,
but also takes into account the potential scientific problems of the
testimony considered. 9"
b. The Perceptual Problems of Eyewitness Identification of Stran-
gers.-Many courts have noted the uncertainty of eyewitness identifica-
tions and the resultant dangers of mistaken identification. 95 Justice
Frankfurter commented:
391. See id. at 274, 334 A.2d at 104 (quoting the defendant's requested instruction).
The instruction requested in England & Edwards contained only a general remark that
"testimony tending to prove identity [should] be scrutinized with extreme care" and that
the jury should consider "the possibility of human error" while deliberating. Id. The pro-
posed MICPEL instruction in Gunning, on the other hand, advised the jury to consider
certain specific factors in weighing the eyewitness identification, including "the witness' [s]
opportunity to observe," the duration of the opportunity to observe, and "the witness' [s]
state of mind." Gunning, 347 Md. at 336, 701 A.2d at 376 (alterations in original). Simi-
larly, the Telfaire model instruction raises for the jury's consideration the questions of
whether the witness had "the capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the of-
fender," whether the identification was the product of his or her "own recollection," and
whether the witness may have been affected by external circumstances in his or her identi-
fication of the defendant. Telfaire, 469 F.2d app. at 558.
392. See infra notes 397-423 and accompanying text (discussing some of the scientific
problems associated with eyewitness identifications).
393. See, e.g., England &Edwards, 274 Md. at 274, 334 A.2d at 104 (where the proposed
instruction stated that "testimony tending to prove identity [should] be scrutinized with
extreme care").
394. See State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236, 1244 (Kan. 1981) (stating that requiring a cau-
tionary instruction when particular circumstances exist in a case properly provides "stan-
dards" to the jury "so that the credibility of eyewitness identification testimony can be
intelligently and fairly weighed").
395. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) ("The vagaries of eyewit-
ness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of
mistaken identification.").
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What is the worth of identification testimony even when un-
contradicted? The identification of strangers is proverbially
untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are estab-
lished by a formidable number of instances in the records of
English and American trials. These instances are recent-
not due to the brutalities of ancient criminal procedure.
3 96
A number of studies have confirmed Justice Frankfurter's fear
that eyewitness identification of strangers is of doubtful reliability.
397
It has been suggested that rather than being a single event, the pro-
cess of memory can be divided into three stages: acquisition, storage
(or retention), and retrieval.3 98 At any point in these stages, external
events or internal factors may distort the final memory.3 9 9 Recall ac-
curacy of a crime may be affected by the duration of exposure to the
event,4° ° unfamiliarity with the physical surroundings in which the
event takes place,"° intervening suggestive questioning,4 °2 the races
396. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETrI 30 (1927).
397. See O'Hagan, supra note 369, at 745. This author observes:
[A problem] unique to eyewitness identifications is the human memory process,
which, contrary to popular belief, is a series of complex events. It is universally
accepted that the memory process takes place in three stages: (1) perception of
the event, (2) retention, and (3) retrieval of the stored information. Psycholo-
gists explain that information is transformed as it passes through each of these
stages, and it can be distorted by internal and external factors that can eventually
cause retrieval failure.
id. (citing ELIZABETH F. Lorrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 22 (1979); A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 57 (1979); Hadyn D. Ellis, Practical Aspects of Face
Memory, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 12, 12-13 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds.,
1984)).
398. Ellis, supra note 397, at 13.
399. O'Hagan, supra note 369, at 745.
400. Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator
Variables, 36J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 1546, 1549 (1978) (stating that "picture recog-
nition is a monotonically increasing function of functional exposure time").
401. Id. (stating that "[lack of familiarity with the size and/or distance of surrounding
objects can produce large distortions in estimates of the size, distance, and acceleration of
the perceptual target").
402. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, 15JuRIMETRICSJ.
188, 188 (1975) (noting that "the questions asked about an event influence the way a
witness 'remembers' what he saw").
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of the viewer and the viewed,40 3 the complexity of the event,40 4 and in
some circumstances the seriousness of the crime.4 °5
At the same time, eyewitness identification is particularly likely to
be believed byjuries.4 °6 It has been suggested thatjurors dramatically
overestimate the reliability of such testimony.40 7 In a simulated crimi-
nal trial arranged by one psychologist, eighteen percent of the 'ju-
rors" voted to convict a defendant when there were no eyewitnesses to
the crime, but seventy-two percent voted to convict when a credible
eyewitness was presented. 408 Even when the eyewitness's powers of
perception were discredited on cross-examination, sixty-eight percent
voted for conviction.40 9 One study has suggested that 'jurors' rate of
belief [of eyewitness testimony] is around 80% irrespective of the ac-
tual rate of witness accuracy. "410
The problems of eyewitness identification are particularly acute
when the witness makes an identification on the basis of a single brief
encounter. 411 This weakness in identification occurred in both the
Gunning and Harris cases. The attackers were viewed for only a few
moments by the respective eyewitnesses, Mr. Hoopes and Ms.
Carponetto. 412 As the dissent in Gunning pointed out, Ms. Carponetto
was more sure of the details she reported than was Mr. Hoopes and
403. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL
L. REv. 934, 936 (1984) (noting that "psychologists have compiled empirical evidence that
incontrovertibly demonstrates a substantially greater rate of error in cross-racial recogni-
tion of faces").
404. Wells, supra note 400, at 1549 (noting that "the complexity of an event can increase
later recognizability").
405. Id. at 1548-49 (suggesting that "the relationship between crime seriousness and eye-
witness accuracy may actually be curvilinear" although "it may be beyond the ethical and
practical limits of social psychologists to demonstrate the kind of crime severity necessary
to adequately test" this hypothesis).
406. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986) (noting the "great weight jurors
are likely to give eyewitness testimony").
407. Id. at 490 ("Perhaps it is precisely because jurors do not appreciate the fallibility of
eyewitness testimony that they give such testimony great weight.").
408. Loftus, supra note 402, at 189.
409. See id. (noting that 68% voted for conviction when the eyewitness was "discredited"
by the fact that the defense attorney showed that the eyewitness was not wearing glasses at
the time of the event and had 20/400 vision).
410. Wells et al., supra note 368, at 447.
411. See O'Hagan, supra note 369, at 745 ("During the perception stage 'event factors,'
such as exposure time, frequency, detail salience, and the degree of violence, may affect
the initial perception.").
412. See Gunning's Joint Record Extract at 29-30, Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 701
A.2d 374 (1997) (No. 132) (recording witness's testimony that the entire mugging incident
took "two and a half, three minutes"); Harris'sJoint Record Extract, Vol. I at 19, Gunning
v. State, 347 Md. 332, 701 A.2d 374 (1997) (No. 132) (recording witness's testimony that
she saw the attacker for "a minute, a minute and a half").
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was more physically and emotionally removed from the event.41 3 Nev-
ertheless, both cases may have implicated the distorting factors noted
above. It has been suggested that if such factors are present, the cer-
tainty of the witness may not be entirely relevant to the accuracy of the
memory.
4 14
"Frequently perceived features are, in general, more likely to be
permanently stored in memory than are rarely perceived features. 415
Moreover, the basic problems of perception inherent in eyewitness
testimony may be compounded by the necessary legal identification
process, by which an eyewitness selects the face seen from a lineup or
a photographic array.416
Cognitive psychologists describe a process known as
"pseudomemory," in which individuals remember prototypical facial
features rather than an entire face and therefore "recognize" a person
who possesses those features even if they have never before seen that
person.417 Researchers attribute this effect to the different speeds at
which the mind learns specific features and at which it learns relation-
ships between features.418 One test showed subjects a "prototype" face
created from the predrawn facial characteristics included in an Iden-
tikit, used by police to create images of suspects described by wit-
nesses. 419  Asked later to select the "prototype" face, subjects
identified a face with features seventy-five percent, fifty percent, and
twenty-five percent the same as features on the prototype far more
confidently than they recognized the actual test face. 420 The opera-
tion of pseudomemory may involve distinctly different types of brain
413. Gunning, 347 Md. at 359-60, 701 A.2d at 387-88 (Raker, J., and Wilner, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (comparing the facts of the two cases).
414. See ROBERT L. SOLSO, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 59 (5th ed. 1998) (noting that
"[dluring the reconstruction process similar memories may be mistaken for real memo-
ries"). The purpose of this Note is not to suggest that memories of traumatic events are
inherently unreliable. As Loftus notes, "flashbulb memories," including "[i]mages of such
public events [as assassinations], and more private [traumatic] events... are said to persist
with little subjectively experienced loss of clarity." ELIZABETH F. LoFTUS &JAMES M. DOYLE,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL § 2-7, at 22 (3d ed. 1997). The point is simply
that in particular circumstances, eyewitness identifications of strangers may be much less
reliable than their treatment in the criminal justice system implies.
415. SoLso, supra note 414, at 120.
416. See State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Kan. 1981) (referring to "[t]he problem
inherent in eyewitness identification from criminal lineups").
417. Solso, supra note 414, at 120.
418. See id. at 120-21 ("[Remembering a face] is something like a race in which two
runners run at different rates. The faster runner is analogous to feature learning, and the
slower runner is analogous to learning relationships [between features].").
419. Id.
420. Id. at 121, Figure 4.16.
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activity than true recollection.4"' The photographic array used in
many criminal cases, including Gunning and Harris,4 22 probably impli-
cates these processes. These problems are increased when cross-racial
identification is at issue.423
A consistent policy of warning the jury of possible risks of eyewit-
ness identification if certain factors are present could counteract these
problems.424 This alternative strikes a balance between legally ignor-
ing these problems and overemphasizing them in some cases by en-
couraging expert testimony on the issue. One scholar has suggested
that such instructions may not be enough to overcome the prejudice
that could result from an inaccurate identification.425 As a solution,
some propose that states should permit expert testimony on the fac-
tors that may skew eyewitness perception.426 It is not surprising that
the Court of Appeals did not consider this possibility in Gunning.
Maryland law assumes thatjuries can and will follow instructions given
to them, even if the instructions are to disregard improper testi-
mony.42 7 Moreover, defendants who are represented by public de-
fenders are extremely unlikely to have the financial resources to hire
scientific experts. Given that such testimony presumably would be too
421. Id. at 59.
It is known that true memories tend to be related to more physical and sensory
details than are false memories which tend to show activity in the frontal cerebral
cortex, where decision-making and associative memory seem to be located. It is
almost as if false memories are related to a search for sensory evidence. The
cerebral migration in creating a false alarm originates in the medial temporal
lobe, which is active when general recall takes place, and then moves to higher-
order associative regions. During the reconstruction process similar memories
may be mistaken for real memories.
Id.
422. See Gunning, 347 Md. at 338, 701 A.2d at 377 (stating that Ms. Carponetto identified
the defendant from a "photographic array"); Gunning v. State, No. 2031, slip op. at I (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. filed Aug. 8, 1995) (per curiam) (noting that "[t]hree days after the inci-
dent, OfficerJoseph Massey showed the victim's husband a photographic array from which
he identified appellant").
423. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 489 (Utah 1986) ("A good example of the effect of
preconceptions on the accuracy of perception is the well-documented fact that identifica-
tions tend to be more accurate where the person observing and the one being observed are
of the same race." (citing Wells, supra note 400; Johnson, supra note 403)).
424. See State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (Kan. 1981) (suggesting that "the problem
[of the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identifications) can be alleviated by a proper
cautionary instruction to the jury which sets forth the factors to be considered in evaluat-
ing eyewitness testimony").
425. See O'Hagan, supra note 369, at 753 (finding it "doubtful, however, that [such jury
instructions] will ameliorate . . . these problems").
426. See id. at 755 (discussing the nature and purpose of expert testimony on eyewitness
identifications).
427. See Dennison v. State, 87 Md. App. 749, 760, 591 A.2d 568, 573 (1991) (stating that
"[i]t is generally held that the jury can and will follow curative instructions").
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expensive for many defendants, a mandatory jury instruction is less
likely to result in a two-tier system of justice, in which wealthier de-
fendants are able to offer expert testimony to counter juror mis-
perceptions of eyewitness testimony while poorer defendants are
unable to counter those misperceptions at all.
5. Conclusion. -The Court of Appeals's decision in Gunning re-
flects the court's confidence in trial judges' abilities to determine
when particular evidence should prompt ajury instruction. While the
court offers general guideposts for when an identification instruction
should be given,42 the opinion emphasizes the necessity that a trial
judge exercise discretion in making this decision, instead of establish-
ing a general rule of procedure.429 The court rejects the suggestion
that eyewitness testimony raises unusual problems that justify the es-
tablishment of mandatory instructions on such testimony.4  In doing
so, the court overlooks credible scientific evidence demonstrating that
eyewitness identification raises unique problems for the criminal jus-
tice system. Insofar as juries tend to overestimate the reliability of eye-
witness identification and underestimate the problems of perception
inherent in identifying a stranger seen for a brief period of time,43'
the court should have required a cautionary instruction to be given
when eyewitness identification is uncorroborated and central to the
prosecution's case, in order to ameliorate the risks of unjust
convictions.
LESLIE H. SPIEGEL
428. See Gunning, 347 Md. at 354, 701 A.2d at 384-85 (providing that the instruction
should be given careful consideration "[w]hen uncorroborated eyewitness testimony is a
critical element of the State's case and doubts have been raised about the reliability of that
testimony" and that the instruction may be omitted when "there is corroboration of the
defendant's participation in the crime, when the circumstances surrounding the eyewit-
ness identification do not give rise to any reasonable doubts as to its accuracy, or when
other instructions contain criteria or guidance that is similar to the requested
instruction").
429. See id. ("In summary, the error in the instant cases lies perhaps in the trial judge's
abusing his discretion by failing to give an identification instruction but even more clearly
in failure to even exercise his judicial discretion.").
430. See id. at 345, 701 A.2d at 380 (refusing to adopt a "rigid rule[ ]" on the appropri-
ateness of an eyewitness identification instruction and instead leaving the issue to the trial
judge's discretion).




A. Violations of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children:
Implication on Subsequent Petitions for Adoption
In In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598,1 the Court of Appeals
considered whether the trial court erred in granting a third party's
adoption petition over the objection of the natural father and despite
violations of the express terms of the Interstate Compact on the Place-
ment of Children (ICPC).2 A unanimous court said no, holding that
the best interest of the child standard is the "golden rule"' in all adop-
tion proceedings and that the circuit court properly relied on this
standard in approving the adoption.4 In granting the adoption peti-
tion in this case, the court correctly proclaims that the best interest of
the child takes precedence over enforcement of ICPC procedures,
thereby upholding the best interest of the child standard as the pre-
vailing consideration in all adoption cases. In so doing, the court cre-
ated an informal analysis for determining the effect an ICPC violation
will have on a subsequent petition to adopt.
1. The Case.-In 1991, twenty-one-year-old Jerry C. (Jerry) met
an eighteen-year-old high school student, Amy S. (Amy), at a dance
club in Dutchess County, New York.5 Jerry and Amy met frequently at
various night clubs,6 and in the summer of 1991 Amy became preg-
nant after spending the night with Jerry.7 Shortly thereafter, Amy
moved to the other side of Poughkeepsie, New York to live with her
mother and stepfather.8 Several months later, when they ran into
each other at a nightclub, Amy informed Jerry that she was pregnant.9
Jerry, who was employed at the time, did not deny paternity and "ex-
pressed a willingness to support the child."1" Jerry's support consisted
1. 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997).
2. Id. at 301, 701 A.2d at 113; see also INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF
CHILDREN (Am. Pub. Human Servs. Ass'n 1997) [hereinafter ICPC] (consisting of ten arti-
cles defining the types of placements subject to the law and the procedures to be followed
in making interstate placements); see infra part 2.a (discussing the history and applicability
of the ICPC in interstate placements of children).
3. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 323, 701 A.2d at 124.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 301, 701 A.2d at 113.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 301-02, 701 A.2d at 113.
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of twice driving Amy to the hospital to receive prenatal care.1 Jerry
never offered to pay any of Amy's medical expenses. 12 Consequently,
Amy went to the Department of Social Services to obtain public assis-
tance for her medical expenses. 3 At the time she applied for public
assistance, Amy did not know Jerry's full name. The Department of
Social Services had to contact his employer for the information.
Jerry and Amy had little contact during the remaining months of
her pregnancy.14 Jerry tried to call Amy and visit her at her home, but
he was unable to speak to her or see her.15 During this time, Amy
received "home-teaching" and met frequently with a social worker.' 6
The social worker recommended adoption as an option for Amy and
her child.' 7 Through a friend, the social worker learned that Paul
and Deborah M. (Paul and Deborah), of Maryland, wanted to adopt a
baby.' 8 Amy agreed to the adoption, and she called Paul and
Deborah to begin negotiating the terms of the adoption.19 The nego-
tiations included several telephone conversations and one meeting.2 °
Amy represented that she did not know the name of the natural father
and that he was "out of the picture."21
11. Id., 701 A.2d at 114. Because of the pregnancy, Amy experienced problems with
her mother and stepfather. Id, at 302-03, 701 A.2d at 114. Perceiving these problems,
Jerry's mother invited Amy to move into Jerry's home. In re Adoption/Guardianship No.
3598, 109 Md. App. 475, 480, 675 A.2d 170, 173 (1996), rev'd, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110
(1997). Amy declined this invitation. In reAdoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 303,
701 A.2d at 114.
12. In re Adaption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 303, 701 A.2d at 113-14.
13. Id. n.2, 701 A.2d at 114 n.2.
14. Id. at 303, 701 A.2d at 114.
15. Id. Amy confirmed that, on one occasion, her mother and stepfather turned Jerry
and his mother away from Amy's home because Amy did not want to see Jerry. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 303-04, 701 A.2d at 114.
19. Id. at 304, 701 A.2d at 114. The arrangement agreed upon is called an "independ-
ent adoption." H.JOSEPH GITLIN, ADOPTIONS: AN AroRNEV's GUIDE TO HELPING ADOPTIVE
PARENTs 9 (1987). While a few states require that all adoptions involving unrelated parties
be conducted by an authorized placement agency, most states allow birth parents to make
a placement without an agency. Id. A facilitator, usually an attorney, brings together birth
parents and prospective adoptive parents and they negotiate the terms of the adoption
directly or through the facilitator. Id. Generally, in an agency directed adoption, the birth
parents simply surrender the child to the agency which in turn places the child in foster
care pending the application approval of prospective adoptive parents. See In re Lynn M.,
312 Md. 461, 464 n.1, 540 A.2d 799, 800 n.1 (1988) (discussing the difference between
independent and agency adoptions). The birth parents in an arrangement independent
of an agency, in contrast, have more power to select the adoptive parents and often dis-
charge the baby into the temporary custody of the intended adoptive parents while the
court's final adoption decree is pending. Id
20. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 304, 701 A.2d at 114.
21. Id.
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In April 1992, Paul and Deborah agreed with Amy on the terms
of the adoption. 22 Pursuant to the agreement, Paul and Deborah re-
tained an attorney to represent Amy and to administer the documents
necessary to comply with the ICPC.2' Amy and her attorney filed the
initial application with the New York State ICPC Administrator.24 On
the application, Amy indicated that the natural father was
"unknown.25
Amy gave birth to Baby Girl S. (Baby S.) in Poughkeepsie on May
3, 1992.26 Jerry and his family attempted to see Baby S. two days
later.2' Hospital security, however, escorted them out before they
were able to see the child. Upon their removal, Amy's attorney gave
custody of Baby S. to Deborah, the intended adoptive mother.29
Deborah then took the baby to her father's house in New Paltz, New
York to await permission from the New York and Maryland ICPC Ad-
ministrators to take the baby to Maryland. °
On the same day, Amy, through her counsel, filed an Affidavit
Relating to the Biological-Father's Consent and an Extrajudicial Con-
sent Form 2-G with the Surrogate's Court of Ulster County, New
York."1 Both forms were necessary to grant Amy permission to place
the child with the adoptive parents. 32 To expedite her child's place-
ment and, ultimately, the adoption, Amy made false statements in
both documents as to Jerry's identity and did not notify Jerry of the
Surrogate Court proceeding.33
22. Id.
23. Id., 701 A.2d at 114-15.
24. Id. This application, Form ICPC-100A, acts as the initial interstate placement re-
quest. Mitchell Wendell & Betsey R. Rosenbaum, Interstate Adoptions: The Interstate Compact
on the Placement of Children, in 1 ADOPIsON LAW AND PRACTICE app. 3-A § 3-A.01.05 (Joan
Heifetz Hollinger ed., December 1998 & Supp. April 1998). By completing the form, New
York provides formal written notice to Maryland of its intention to make a placement in its
state and, effectively, asks Maryland to make a finding as to whether the placement would
be in the child's best interest. Id.
25. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 304, 701 A.2d at 115. Prior to trial,
all parties stipulated that Amy knew the Respondent's name and whereabouts. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 304, 701 A.2d at 115.
28. Id. at 304-05, 701 A.2d at 115.
29. Id. at 305, 701 A.2d at 115.
30. Id.
31. Id. Amy's affidavit stated: "The biological father of the child is unknown to [the
natural mother] and no person has taken steps to establish legal responsibility for the
child." Id. (alteration in original). Similarly, Amy stated in the Extrajudicial Consent Form
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On May 7, 1992, four days after the birth of Baby S., Jerry filed a
petition for a Filiation Order in the Family Court of Dutchess County,
New York, seeking to be declared the father of Baby S.34 Amy's attor-
ney responded in a letter in which he informed the court that Amy
admitted that Jerry was the natural father.35 The attorney requested
an entry of a decree of paternity to facilitate the Surrogate Court pro-
ceeding.36 Notwithstanding the letter, Jerry was not declared the nat-
ural father until June 7, 1993, because Amy subsequently contested
Jerry's paternity.37
Two weeks after the birth, between May 16 and May 18, 1992,
Paul and Deborah returned to Maryland with Baby S. because their
attorney in Maryland notified them that the ICPC Administrators in
Maryland and New York had verbally approved the adoption.3 8 In
fact, however, neither New York nor Maryland ever approved the ap-
plication.3" On May 22, 1992, Paul and Deborah filed a Complaint for
Adoption and Change of Name in the Circuit Court for Harford
County. ° The complaint named Jerry as the natural father, and ad-
mitted thatJerry had not consented to the adoption of Baby S.41 The
complaint also included a Show Cause Order and Notice of Objection
to be served on Jerry.42
On June 18, 1992, the Circuit Court for Harford County granted
Paul and Deborah temporary custody of Baby S.43 The Show Cause
Order was issued on the same day in order to notify Jerry that he had
the right to protest the adoption of Baby S.4 He evaded service by
34. Id at 306, 701 A.2d at 115.
35. Id. The attorney's letter informed the Family Court of Dutchess County that Amy
had entered into an adoption agreement before the birth of Baby Girl S., and that the
ICPC requirements were "near completion." Id., 701 A-2d at 115-16. Also, the letter ac-
knowledged that the father was entitled to notice of the proceeding in the Surrogate Court
given a recent decision in New York. Id., 701 A.2d at 116. Nevertheless, Jerry was not
notified of the proceedings. Id. at 307 n.5, 701 A-2d at 116 n.5. Furthermore, the affidavit
and consent form filed with the Surrogate Court were not corrected to reflect Amy's admis-
sion that Jerry was the natural father. Id.
36. Id. at 306, 701 A.2d at 116.
37. Id. at 307, 701 A.2d at 116. The paternity dispute caused considerable delay be-
cause it made it necessary for Amy, Jerry, and Baby S. to have blood drawn, which could
not be done until the child was six months old. Id
38. Id.
39. Id. The ICPC Administrator for New York left a message with the office of Paul's
and Deborah's attorney stating approval had been granted. Id. n.6. The attorney inter-
preted the message to mean that both states had granted approval. Id.






mail and private process numerous times45 and was finally served by
Amy's attorney at a paternity hearing in New York in April 1993.46
Nonetheless, Jerry had knowledge of the adoption petition pending in
Harford County as early as August 1992. 4"
On June 11, 1993, after receiving the Order of Filiation from the
Dutchess County, New York court declaring him to be the natural fa-
ther, Jerry filed a notice of objection to the adoption in the Circuit
Court for Harford County.48 Subsequently, an attorney was appointed
to represent the interests of Baby S.4" The court-appointed attorney
was charged with investigating the case and recommending to the
court a placement that would serve the child's interest and welfare.5 °
In addition, a social worker was assigned to conduct a similar investi-
gation." Despite two letters of request, Jerry did not make himself
available for an interview with the social worker, but the attorney did
have the opportunity to meet with him.5 2 In reports submitted to the
court, both concluded that the interest of Baby S. would be best
served by permanent placement with the adoptive parents.53
On March 7, 1994, the adoption petition came to trial before the
Circuit Court for Harford County.5 4 In a sixty-three page memoran-
dum opinion issued November 9, 1994, the trial court granted Paul
45. Id. The first Show Cause Order was served in July 1992 by restricted certified mail.
Id. It was returned and marked "unclaimed." Id. The Show Cause Order was then at-
tempted to be served by private process. Id, 701 A.2d at 116-17. In a sworn affidavit, the
process server stated that several attempts were made to serve Respondent at his home. Id.
at 308, 701 A.2d at 117. The process server even tried to set up an appointment, butJerry
did not reply. Id.
46. Id. at 308, 701 A.2d at 117.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 309, 701 A.2d at 117.
49. Id. Section 5-323 of the Family Law Article mandates the appointment of separate
counsel for a child when the termination of a natural parent's rights is at issue. MD. CODE
ANN., FAm. LAw § 5-323 (Supp. 1998).
50. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 309, 701 A.2d at 117.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 308 n.9, 701 A.2d at 117 n.9.
53. Id. at 309, 701 A.2d at 117. In a letter to the court, the attorney for Baby S. stated:
When I speak with [the adoptive parents], what they tell me is honest and consis-
tent with my observations. Jerry [and his mother], on the other hand, seem to
put the best "spin" on everything they say to me, apparently saying what they
think I want to hear. There is frequently a sense of dissonance between their
words and my perceptions.
Id. n.9.
54. Id. at 310, 701 A.2d at 117. Jerry had also filed a motion to dismiss the adoption
petition on December 14, 1993, citing violations of the ICPC. Id. The court denied the
motion. Id.
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and Deborah's adoption petition. 55 Judge Cypert 0. Whitfill deter-
mined that Petitioner's violation of the ICPC was not intentional be-
cause they had transported the child into Maryland on a "good faith"
belief that approval had been given. 56 Judge Whitfill based his deci-
sion not to return the child to New York "while the wheels of bureau-
cracy grind" on both precedent and his belief that the purpose of the
ICPC had been met by placing this child with Paul and Deborah.57
Judge Whitfill further considered Jerry's argument that his rights had
been impaired because of the several violations of the ICPC. Balanc-
ing Amy's conduct and that ofJerry, Judge Whitfill acknowledged that
Amy's lies were unfortunate, but he determined that the only reason
to remove the child from Paul and Deborah's care would be to "cor-
rect some injustice perpetrated on [Jerry] by [Amy], [Paul and
Deborah], or one or more of the State authorities."5 " Judge Whitfill
reasoned that no injustice was perpetrated upon Jerry and that he was
not denied any substantial right.59 Jerry, rather, "simply did not move
quickly enough to plan for and provide a home for an infant child....
It would be a grave injustice on the child to require her to break the
bonds she has established with [Paul and Deborah] .... "'0 Thus, the
court entered the final adoption decree on March 24, 1995.61
Jerry appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that dismissal of
the adoption petition was appropriate under the circumstances, be-
cause Paul and Deborah had subverted ICPC procedures and had pur-
posefully held the child in Maryland until the child's best interests
necessitated adoption.6 2 Jerry also argued that the trial judge erred
when he determined, pursuant to Section 5-312 of the Family Law
Article, that it was in the child's best interest to approve the adoption
without Jerry's consent.6 3 The Court of Special Appeals agreed, and
55. In reAdoption of a Minor, No. 3598-7-20, at 63 (Harford Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 9, 1994),
rev'd, In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. 475, 675 A.2d 170 (1996),
rev'd, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997).
56. In re Adoption of a Minor, No. 3598-7-20, at 59-62.
57. Id. at 61.
58. Id. at 57.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. In reAdoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. 475, 487, 675 A.2d 170, 176
(1996), rev'd, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997). The respondent filed a motion to reopen
the case before the trial court based on new evidence. Id The motion was denied. Id.
62. Appellant's Brief at 13, In reAdoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. 475,




in a 2-1 decision, the court reversed the trial court's decision and or-
dered the adoption dismissed.64
Writing for the majority, Judge Bloom, joined by Judge Cathell,
held the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss the adop-
tion on the basis of the ICPC violations.6" The court found that either
Paul and Deborah or their attorney had knowingly violated the ICPC,
which violation rendered the Maryland Compact Administrator "pow-
erless" to determine the best interests of Baby S.66 The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals was unwilling to permit Petitioner's "flagrant" violations
of the ICPC to be excused under the "guise" of best interest of the
child standard. 6' The court noted that here, unlike other cases involv-
ing ICPC violations, there was a "willing and able" natural father seek-
ing custody.6 8 The court contended that "the [best interest of the
child] exception swallows up the rule" because courts that are con-
fronted with a violation will grant the adoption as "the most attractive
course" given that the child will have bonded with the adoptive par-
ents.69 Thus, the court opined, overlooking ICPC violations based on
the best interest of the child standard sends a message to adoptive
parents that violating the ICPC "is not only permissible but
advantageous. "70
The Court of Special Appeals further noted that Jerry's failure to
receive notice of New York Surrogate Court proceedings was repre-
hensible.7" The court surmised that neither the New York Compact
office nor the Surrogate Court would have allowed Paul and Deborah
to remove the child had Jerry been identified as the biological fa-
ther.7 2 The majority also found that while it was "obligated" to accept
the findings of the trial court, those findings supported only the con-
clusion that Amy had good reason to seek adoption as an option.7 3
The court, asserting "there is not a scintilla of evidence ... that [Jerry]
did not want to assume the role of father," determined that the trial
court did not properly follow the statutory requirements for granting
an adoption to a third party without a natural parent's consent."
64. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. at 518-19, 675 A.2d at 191.
65. Id. at 503, 675 A.2d at 184.
66. Id. at 492, 675 A.2d at 178.
67. Id, at 507, 675 A.2d at 186.
68. Id at 510, 675 A.2d at 187.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 491-93, 675 A.2d at 178-79.
72. Id. at 504, 675 A.2d at 184.
73. Id. at 514, 675 A.2d at 189.
74. Id. at 507, 675 A.2d at 186.
926 [VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
Judge Hollander dissented from the majority opinion, contend-
ing that the majority had exceeded its standard of review under the
guise of abuse of discretion. The trial court, Judge Hollander as-
serted, was permitted to conclude that the ICPC violations were not
made in bad faith and, thus, did not warrant dismissal of the adoption
petition based on a balancing of "all the facts, circumstances, and eq-
uities" before it.
7 6
Paul and Deborah appealed the Court of Special Appeals's deci-
sion. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether the
trial court abused its discretion in relying on the best interest of the
child standard to grant the adoption petition despite the violation of
the ICPC.
7 7
2. Legal Background.-The Court of Appeals has, on numerous
occasions, ruled on cases in which a natural parent contests the adop-
tion of a child by a third party.7' The court has also addressed the
issue of appropriate sanctions for violations of the ICPC.79 No case in
Maryland, however, has dealt with a natural parent seeking to stop an
adoption based on a violation of the ICPC.8 ° The novel question that
this case presents warrants an examination of the ICPC. It is also help-
ful to explore Maryland statutory law governing a court's ability to ef-
fectuate an adoption without the consent of a natural parent.
75. Id. at 521, 675 A.2d at 192 (Hollander, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 519, 675 A.2d at 192.
77. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 310, 701 A.2d at 113.
78. See, e.g., In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 112-13, 642 A.2d 201,
208 (1994) (granting a petition for termination of parental rights over the objection of the
natural mother because she was found indefinitely unfit to care for her child); Walker v.
Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 275-76 (1960) (upholding adoption decree over
the objection of the biological father because he made no effort to see or provide for his
child); King v. Shandrowski, 218 Md. 38, 42-44, 145 A.2d 281, 284-85 (1958) (holding that
the granting of an adoption petition is warranted over the objection of the natural mother
where the child has been in the custody of the intended adoptive parents for three years
with the consent of both natural parents); Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 120-21, 43
A.2d 186, 193 (1945) (affirming decree granting custody of child to foster parents because
the natural father and mother, in separate appeals, failed to demonstrate any material
change in their circumstances).
79. See In reAdoption No. 10087, 324 Md. 394, 413, 597 A.2d 456, 466 (1991) (holding
that retroactive compliance is the proper recourse when a child has been brought to Mary-
land in violation of the IGPC).
80. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. 475, 507, 675 A.2d 170,
186 (1996) (noting that cases in which courts have used the best interest of the child
standard to excuse an ICPC violation did not involve a natural parent contesting the adop-
tion), rev'd, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997).
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a. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.-An inter-
state compact is a binding contract between party states that takes the
form of a statute enacted by the legislature of each member state."'
The Compact Clause of the Constitution, which authorizes such inter-
state compacts, provides that "[n] o State shall, without the Consent of
Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State." 2 The requirement of congressional consent, however, has
been held to apply only to compacts that infringe on federal powers.8 3
Thus, the ICPC does not demand congressional consent because its
primary focus, child welfare, is a traditional state concern. 4
The ICPC traces its roots to a small group of social service admin-
istrators in the 1950s who were concerned about the problems associ-
ated with interstate adoption and foster care placements.8 5 The New
York State Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation re-
sponded to those concerns by drafting the ICPC.8 6 The goal was to
create procedures that would facilitate interstate adoptions, thereby
increasing the number of acceptable placements for children. 7 To-
ward this end, the ICPC extends jurisdiction of a party state into the
border of another party state to allow for investigation of a proposed
placement prior to adoption or foster care, and supervision of that
placement once it has been made. 8
The ICPC consists of ten articles establishing procedures to be
followed in making an interstate pre-adoptive or foster care place-
ment. o Primarily, its function is to protect children by requiring pro-
cedures to be followed in making and maintaining placements for
children awaiting foster care and permanent adoptive homes.90 The
language found in Article I articulates this function by outlining the
ICPC's purpose and policy. Its first objective includes maximizing the
81. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS & AGENCIES vi (1983).
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
83. SeeVirginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893) (finding that, in considering the
constitutionality of a boundary compact entered into and agreed upon by Virginia and
Tennessee, "the prohibition [against entering into such a compact] is directed to the for-
mation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which
may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States").
84. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 296, at vi.
85. Bernadette W. Hartfield, The Role of The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
in Interstate Adoption, 68 NEB. L. REv. 292, 295 (1989).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 296.
89. THE SECRETARIAT TO THE ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS OF THE INTERSTATE COM-
PACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACE-
MENT OF CHILDREN 11 (Maryland Department of Human Resources, reprint 1987).
90. Id. at 3.
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opportunity for children "to be placed in a suitable environment and
with persons or institutions having appropriate qualifications and fa-
cilities."9 Second, the ICPC strives to apprise the state in which the
child is to be placed of the circumstances surrounding the place-
ment.92 Third, the ICPC grants power to the state from which the
child is coming to evaluate the proposed placement.93 Finally, clarity
of jurisdictional conflicts is a goal of the ICPC.94
The Compact Administrator in each member state coordinates
ICPC matters within that state.95 Article VII of the ICPC authorizes
the compact administrators to jointly promulgate compact rules and
regulations.96 The organizing body through which such rules and reg-
ulations are administered is the Association of Administrators of the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children,97 which is affiliated
with the American Public Human Services Association (the Associa-
tion). The Association provides for a Secretariat of the Association of
Administrators.98 The Secretariat coordinates ICPC activities on a na-
tional level, including issuing advisory opinions with regard to imple-
mentation of ICPC procedures at the state level.99 The opinions,
while not legally binding, are often cited by courts as persuasive au-
thority in ICPC matters.'
The prerequisites for accomplishing a lawful interstate placement
are contained in Article III. The procedures are applicable to all in-
terstate placements of a child for the purpose of providing a foster
care or adoptive situation, whether facilitated by a public or private
adoption agency or an individual "except for those placements ex-




95. Id. at 5.
96. Id. at 14.
97. AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASSOCIATION, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACE-
MENT OF CHILDREN: COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL 4.1 (Compact Provisions, An In-
terpretive Commentary) (1982) [hereinafter COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL].
98. COMPACT ADMINISTRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 311, at 4.1.
99. Id.
100. See GITLIN, supra note 19, at 116; e.g., In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109
Md. App. 475, 500, 675 A.2d 170, 182 (1996) (relying, in part, on an advisory opinion
issued by the Secretariat in 1993 that specifically rejected retroactive compliance as a
means to deal with ICPC violations to argue that such an approach would not have been an
appropriate course for the trial court to take), rev'd, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997); In
reAdoption ofJon K., 535 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (Fam. Ct. 1988) (finding authority in a 1988
Secretariat Opinion to rule that the court did not have the ability to make a preliminary
conclusion as to the child's best interests because it rested within the statutory obligation
of the compact administrator to make such a determination).
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pressly exempted in article VIII of ICPC."'' 1 To effectuate a valid
placement, the sending agency10 2 must submit written notice to the
receiving state 103 of the intention to place the child. 10 4 The notice
includes information such as the identity and address of the parents
or legal guardians, and the name and address of the person or institu-
tion with which the child is to be placed.1 05 Also, the notice must
provide an explanatory statement as to the reason for the proposed
placement. 10 6 The child must not be brought into the receiving state
until the office of the Compact Administrator of the receiving state
notifies the sending agency, in writing, "that the proposed placement
does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child."107
Violations of the provisions of the ICPC may result in sanctions.
Article IV provides for two penalties.1 08 First, failure to observe ICPC
procedures is considered a breach of a party state's child placement
laws, thus providing for punishment in either state.' 09 Second, a viola-
tion by a licensed child placement agency constitutes grounds for sus-
pension or revocation of that license.' The ICPC does not expressly
provide for sanctions against biological parents, prospective adoptive
parents, or their counsel, for violations occurring in an independent
adoption."1
101. See GUIDE TO INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, supra note
303, at 5; see also Wendell & Rosenbaum, supra note 24, § 3-A.03, at 3A-4 (explaining that
Article VIII of the ICPC exempts those placements which are made between close relatives of
the child or persons acting as full guardian for the child); cf infra note 152 and accompa-
nying text (noting that some courts have held the ICPC inapplicable to independent
adoptions).
102. A "sending agency" is defined as an officer of a party state, a corporation, charita-
ble organization, association, or individual which sends or brings a child into another party
state. GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, supra note
303, at 11.
103. A "receiving state" is the state to which the child is to be sent or brought. Id.
104. Id. at 12.
105. Id.
106. Id. The child's social and case history, a report on the homestudy of the prospec-
tive adoptive parents, and "[a]ny other information necessary for the particular case" are
attached to the notice as additional documentation. Wendell & Rosenbaum, supra note
24, § 3-A.05, at 3A-6.
107. GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, supra note
303, at 12; see Wendell & Rosenbaum, supra note 24, § 3-A.05, 3A-6 to 3A-7 (noting that the
"negative phraseology is important" because the standard is not the "best" placement, but
that which will be safe and unlikely to be detrimental to the child).
108. GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, supra note
303, at 12.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 13.
111. Id But see, e.g., In re Adoption of Calynn, M.G., 523 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (Sur. Ct.
1987) (upholding a petition to adopt despite violations of the ICPC, but imposing mone-
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b. Violations of the ICPC as a Basis for Dismissing Adoption Peti-
tions.-To date, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have en-
acted the ICPC." 2 Even with full participation, however, the integrity
of the ICPC has suffered because of noncompliance with its proce-
dures. The ineffectiveness of the ICPC is most apparent in the con-
text of independent adoptions. First, attorneys inexperienced in
interstate adoptions may be unaware of the existence of the ICPC or
unfamiliar with the idiosyncratic requirements of individual compact
offices.1 13 Additionally, some parties may intentionally fail to comply
with the ICPC procedures. Parties may choose to thwart the ICPC
provisions to avoid the stricter regulations on independent adop-
tions 1 1 4 or to avoid having to comply with the ICPC's time-consuming,
bureaucratic procedures.1 1 5 Time may be crucial if immediate place-
ment with the adoptive parents is desired.1 16 Lastly, noncompliance
may be encouraged because the ICPC does not directly provide for
penalties for violating its provisions in the context of an independent
adoption." 7
tary sanctions on the adoptive parents' attorney as a means to prevent continued circum-
vention of the ICPC procedures). See supra text accompanying note 19 (distinguishing
independent adoptions from those facilitated by an agency).
112. GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, supra note
303, at 3.
113. See GITLIN, supra note 19, at 112; Mark T. McDermott, Interstate Compact on the Place-
ment of Children, in ADOPTIONS AFTER THE NEW RULES D-01, D-7 (Md. Inst. for Continuing
Professional Educ. of Lawyers, Inc. 1996) (asserting that "dealing with the ICPC is on of
the biggest challenges" faced by adoption practitioners).
114. See Hartfield, supra note 84, at 304-05 (explaining controls placed on independent
adoptions by states may include complete prohibition of anyone other than a parent or
legal guardian from effectuating an adoptive placement or the imposition of restrictions
on those persons who can act as a facilitator of an independent adoption); see McDermott,
supra note 113, at D-18 to D-20 (discussing means by which states regulate the independent
adoptive process).
115. Hartfield, supra note 84, at 305; see McDermott, supra note 113, at D-06 (discussing
the obstacles posed by invoking the ICPC, including the unwillingness of some compact
offices to coordinate with the requirements of the other state involved in the proposed
adoption).
116. See supra text accompanying note 19 (explaining that one of the advantages of an
independent adoption is immediate placement with the intended adoptive parents).
117. GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, supra note
303, at 12-13; see In reAdoption No. 10087, 324 Md. 394, 410 n.7, 597 A.2d 456, 464 (1991)
(noting that the ICPC as enacted in Maryland provides for violations to be punished under
the laws of either party state jurisdiction or, in terms of an authorized sending agency, for
suspension or revocation of its license to place children but finding that "[n] o other Mary-
land law imposes a penalty for violation of the ICPC").
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(1) Maryland.-The ICPC was enacted in Maryland in 1975
in substantially the same form as the model law.118 The Maryland
courts have recognized that the provisions of the ICPC bind the citi-
zens of Maryland because enforcing its provisions is the obligation of
the participating states.119 At the same time, the court has made clear
that the decision to grant an adoption petition is dictated by that
which would best serve the interest and welfare of the child
involved. 120
In Maryland, the best interest of the child is considered in all
contested adoptions and "in all cases where those interests are injeop-
ardy."12' The standard is not articulated by any single definition'22
and, ultimately, the determination is made by the exercise of the
broad discretionary authority vested in the trial judge.
The importance of the best interest of the child standard is
marked by its numerous characterizations. A child's best interest has
been referred to as the "paramount"123 or "primary"1 24 consideration
of "transcendent importance, 1 1 25 and the "predominate theme"'126 in
adoption cases. Thus, the overarching consideration in the case at
bar was not the respondent's interest in raising his child, but that
which would promote the child's best interest.
The court has also found it equally important that the best inter-
est of the child not be adjudicated on generic principles, but rather
118. Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, ch. 266, 1975 Md. Laws 1351
(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-601 to -611 (1991 & Supp. 1998)).
119. Bernhardt v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 339 Md. App. 334, 344, 385 A.2d 1197, 1202
(1978).
120. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 559, 640 A.2d 1085,
1096 (1994) (noting that the best interest of the child standard "has long been the stan-
dard used in Maryland to decide contested adoption cases").
121. See id., 640 A.2d at 1095-96 (applying the best interest of the child standard to
resolve dispute between natural father and prospective adoptive parents); Dietrich v. An-
derson, 185 Md. 103, 120, 43 A.2d 186, 193 (1945) (concluding that the best interest of the
child would be served with a third party over objections from both natural parents).
122. See Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 703, 655 A.2d 901, 908-09 (1995) (noting that
the definition of the best interest of the child standard "is often an elusive one"); Ross v.
Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 175 n.1, 372 A.2d 582, 585 n.1 (1977) (listing the various ways of
defining the best interest of the child standard).
123. See Beckman, 337 Md. at 703, 655 A.2d at 908 (stating that "the paramount consider-
ation must always be that which fulfills the needs of the child").
124. See Winter v. Director of the Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 217 Md. 391, 396, 143 A.2d 81,
84 (1958) (maintaining that "[w]hile the natural rights of parents should be carefully
guarded, the welfare and best interests of the child are the primary considerations in all
adoption proceedings").
125. See Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116, 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945).
126. See In re Lynn M., 312 Md. 461, 463, 540 A.2d 799, 800 (1988).
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determined on the facts and circumstances presented by each case.1
2 7
It is worth noting this distinction, because it affirmatively recognizes
the child as an individual with unique interests. This idea is perhaps
more readily identified in the legislation that requires a child to be
appointed her own counsel in certain adoption or guardianship pro-
ceedings, including those involving involuntary termination of paren-
tal rights.128 The law in Maryland, therefore, directs the focus of the
trial judge to the best interest of the particular child before the court,
not to the best interest of the "hypothetical child." '129
In In re Adoption No. 10087,13° the Court of Appeals held that the
best interest of the child standard is applied in all adoption proceed-
ings, including those in which ICPC violations are in question.131 The
only case of its kind in Maryland, the court in In re Adoption No. 10087
considered the appropriate sanction for ICPC violations in an in-
dependent adoption facilitated by an attorney. 132 The case involved a
Maryland couple who placed an advertisement expressing their desire
to adopt a child.1" The couple identified themselves by pseudonyms
and gave a post office box address to preserve their anonymity.
1 3 1
The natural mother, a resident of Virginia, contacted the couple di-
rectly. 135 Both natural parents executed the requisite consent forms
and affidavits in anticipation of adoption proceedings. 136 The docu-
ments, however, did not contain the names or addresses of the pro-
spective adoptive parents. 3 v Before the birth of the baby, the couple,
with the assistance of their attorney, attempted to adhere to the
ICPC. 138 The Virginia compact office instructed the couple that it was
necessary for the birth mother to submit a handwritten application
127. See Lippy v. Breidenstein, 249 Md. 415, 420, 240 A.2d 251, 254 (1968) (explaining
that what is held to be in the best interest of the child "necessarily depends on the facts
and circumstances in each case" (citing Shetler v. Fink, 231 Md. 302, 190 A.2d 76 (1963))).
128. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-323 (a) (1) (i) (Supp. 1998) (stating the requirements
for appointing counsel to "the individual to be adopted").
129. In reAdoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. 475, 520, 675 A.2d 170, 192
(1996) (Hollander, J., dissenting).
130. 324 Md. 394, 597 A.2d 456 (1991).
131. See id. at 412, 597 A.2d at 465 (finding that "[t]he fact that the ICPC had been
violated in this case does not mandate dismissal; rather it indicates the need for a prompt
determination of the best interest of this child" (emphasis added)).
132. Id. at 413-14, 597 A.2d at 466.





138. Id. at 401, 597 A.2d at 459. The couple "notif[ied] the compact offices in both
Maryland and Virginia of the approaching adoption." Id.
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that included the names and addresses of the adoptive parents.139
The couple refused to comply. 140 In response, the Virginia compact
office would not process the placement.141 The Maryland ICPC office
received all of the necessary documentation, but it could not approve
the placement without the Virginia office's approval. 142 Upon the
birth of the baby, the couple transported the child to Maryland with
the knowledge that they did not have ICPC approval. 143 The couple
subsequently filed an adoption petition in the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County.'4 4 The trial court dismissed the petition on the
grounds that the placement had been made in violation of the
ICPC. 145 In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals af-
firmed the decision. 14
6
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals and granted the petition to adopt.147 The court noted
that compliance with the ICPC, although necessary to assure the qual-
ity of the placement, is not "a substitute for ajudicial determination of
the child's best interest.' 14' The court further articulated that an
ICPC violation does not mandate dismissal of an adoption petition. 149
Such a violation demands "prompt determination of the best interest
of this child."'150 The court encouraged circuit courts to consider "ret-
roactive ICPC compliance" as an alternative to dismissing or approv-
ing adoption petitions without compliance. 15 1
(2) Other Jurisdictions.-The ICPC's effectiveness also has
been frustrated by the lack of uniform interpretation when a violation
occurs.
1 5 2 For example, at least one jurisdiction has held that the
ICPC does not apply to independent adoptions.1 53 Other jurisdic-
139. Id., 597 A.2d at 459-60.




144. Id. at 402, 597 A.2d at 460.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 424, 597 A.2d at 471.
148. Id. at 411, 597 A.2d at 465.
149. Id. at 412, 597 A.2d at 465.
150. Id.
151. Id. The court also expressly found that the ICPC applies to independent adop-
tions. Id. at 404-05, 597 A.2d at 461-62. But see id. at 425-26, 597 A.2d at 472 (Eldridge, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the ICPC is not applicable to
independent adoptions).
152. Hartfield, supra note 84, at 303.
153. See In re Adoption of M.M. 652 P.2d 974, 981 (Wyo. 1982) (holding that the ICPC
does not apply to placements that precede independent adoptions); see also In re Adoption
[VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
tions have removed children from pre-adoptive placements on the
grounds of ICPC violations.154 Still, some courts have ordered that
the ICPC procedures be complied with before proceeding with an
adoption petition. For example, in In re Adoption ofJon K.,'55 a New
York Family Court dismissed a petition for adoption without prejudice
until the New York Compact Administrator proceeded under the pro-
visions of the ICPC.' 56 The child in the case was brought to New York
under peculiar circumstances and without the formal consent of the
natural parents or compliance with the ICPC.' 57 The prospective
adoptive parents, who lived in New York, had long wished to have chil-
dren and were interested in adopting a child.15 The couple's aunt
contacted them from California to inform them that a woman was
seeking an adoptive home for her child. The couple arranged for the
aunt to transport the child from California to New York. Three
months after the child arrived in New York, the natural parents ap-
peared in a court in California to acknowledge that they had surren-
dered the child to the adoptive parents.' 59 The New York Family
Court refused to proceed with the adoption petition before the appro-
priate investigation and evaluation of the proposed placement was
complete in accordance with ICPC procedures.1 60 The court rea-
soned that it was premature to determine whether the adoption was in
the best interest of the child until such procedures were followed.16
The majority of courts, in contrast, have found that ICPC viola-
tions have little consequence on subsequent petitions for adoption.
Three New York cases decided at the trial level, for example, found
that judicial examination of an adoption petition was sufficient to de-
termine the child's best interest even though ICPC compliance had
No. 10087, 324 Md. at 429-30, 597 A.2d at 474 (Eldridge,J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (asserting that "the ICPC is inapplicable to a 'placement' in connection with
an independent adoption").
154. See T.W.S. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 466 So. 2d 387, 389 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (reversing a lower court's order to terminate state-supervised foster
care and place a child with the paternal grandparents because the lower court failed to
comply with any ICPC procedures or other statutory mandates).
155. 535 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Fam. Ct. 1988).
156. Id. at 660.
157. Id. at 661.
158. Id.
159. Id. The couple had no knowledge of the identity of the natural parents prior to the
child's arrival in New York and had limited contact by telephone only subsequent to the
birth of the child. Id




not been met.162 Similarly, an intermediate appellate court in Florida
held that a violation of the ICPC would not nullify subsequent adop-
tion proceedings when "no harm was suffered by the failure to com-
ply."' 63 In In re Adoption of C.L. W., the court considered an adoption
petition in which the natural mother was seeking to revoke her con-
sent to the adoption and reinstate her parental rights.'64 The natural
parents and prospective adoptive parents negotiated the terms of the
adoption of the unborn child, and agreed that the prospective adop-
tive parents would come to Pennsylvania to pick up the child immedi-
ately after the birth. 65 On the day of delivery the natural parents
executed consent forms.16 6 Three days later, however, the natural
mother decided that she wanted the baby returned to her and her
attorney notified the prospective adoptive mother.167 Nonetheless,
the adoptive mother left for Florida with the child without notifying
the appropriate Pennsylvania or Florida agencies of her intention to
transport the child or to institute adoption proceedings in Florida.'68
The natural mother executed a revocation of her consent, and she
was granted custody by a Pennsylvania court. 6 The Florida circuit
court, however, refused to enforce the Pennsylvania custody decision
and awarded temporary custody to the prospective adoptive par-
ents.' 7 ° The natural mother did not appeal the decision of the Flor-
ida court.17
1
Subsequently, the prospective adoptive parents filed a petition
for adoption, which the natural mother contested, in part because the
adoptive parents had failed to comply with ICPC provisions requiring
proper notification and investigation of the placement before the
162. See In reAdoption of Calynn, M.G., 523 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730, 731 (Sur. Ct. 1987) (fail-
ing to invoke the ICPC did not mandate dismissal because child's best interests were served
with the prospective adoptive parents where the natural mother could not be found); In re
Adoption of Baby Boy M.G., 515 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199, 201 (Sur. Ct. 1987) (finding that dis-
missal of the adoption petition unwarranted where parties complied with New York law but
could not gain ICPC approval because the law of the sending party state prohibited attor-
ney-facilitated adoptions); In reAdoption of Baby "E," 427 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707, 711 (Fam. Ct.
1980) (finding that, despite violations, the "essential ingredients" of the ICPC where the
child had lived all of its life with the adoptive parents).
163. See In reAdoption of C.L.W., 467 So. 2d 1106, 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).







171. Id. at 1109.
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child could be transported to Florida.' 72 The Florida court concluded
that a violation of the ICPC could not provide grounds for dismissal of
the adoption petition because "no harm was suffered by the failure to
comply with its requirement of notification to [the appropriate
agency] .173
Likewise, in In re C.M.A., 7 4 a Minnesota court held that ICPC
violations do not necessarily mandate that final adoption decrees be
vacated.1 75 In that case, the natural mother, who was married but sep-
arated from her husband, informed the natural father, who was not
her husband, that she was pregnant, and advised him of her expected
due date.1 76 The birth mother made arrangements for the child to be
adopted by a couple in Minnesota. 177 The prospective adoptive par-
ents traveled to New Hampshire upon the child's birth and returned
to Minnesota with the child and the birth mother, but without com-
plying with ICPC procedures.1 7 ' The adoptive couple filed a subse-
quent petition for adoption in a Minnesota trial court. v1 7  The natural
father's name did not appear on the child's birth certificate and, in
his place, the natural mother's husband signed his consent to the
adoption as the "presumptive father."8 ° In New Hampshire, the nat-
ural father instituted a paternity action, which was dismissed because
the action was not timely filed in accordance with statutory law. 8 '
Through the proceedings, the natural father learned that the child
had been adopted in Minnesota. l8 2 The Minnesota court learned of
the paternity action one month after the adoption decree became
final. 1
83
172. Id. The natural mother also argued that Pennsylvania had jurisdiction over the
initial custody proceedings and that Florida lacked jurisdiction to enter its own custody
decree. Id.
173. Id. at 1111.
174. 557 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
175. Id. at 354.
176. Id. The natural mother claimed that, upon receiving this information, the natural
father advised her to seek an abortion and terminated their relationship. Id. The natural
father later sought to retain his parental rights, but failed to contribute to prenatal care as
required by New Hampshire law. Id. at 354-55.
177. Id. at 355. The natural mother found the prospective adoptive parents through a
licensed Minnesota adoption agency. Id. The birth mother and the prospective adoptive




181. Id. The natural father's subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied. Id.
182. Id. The Minnesota court did not know of the paternity action until its dismissal,




The Minnesota trial court granted the natural father's motion to
vacate the adoption, finding that the adoptive parents and the natural
mother violated the ICPC when they transported the child to Minne-
sota without proper authorization, and that the natural father was en-
titled to notice of the Minnesota adoption proceeding.' 1 4 The
appellate court, reversing the decision of the lower court, first ex-
amined the rights of the natural father. The court found that, under
the laws of Minnesota, the natural father was not entitled to notice of
the Minnesota proceedings.1 1 5 The natural father failed to file an affi-
davit of his intent to retain parental rights, as required by Minnesota
law, when he learned of the child's placement in the state."8 6 The
court thus concluded that, according to Minnesota law, the natural
father's consent was not needed to effectuate the adoption because he
was not entitled to notice of the proceedings."8 7 Second, the appel-
late court held that vacating the adoption decree was not an appropri-
ate remedy under the circumstances of the case. The court's
reasoning led it to acknowledge that the ICPC does not provide for
specific penalties "when a person, rather than an agency, fails to com-
ply with the compact's notice requirements." ' The court further
reasoned that neither the adoptive parents nor their attorney know-
ingly violated the pre-placement provisions or purposefully ignored
New Hampshire laws or ICPC procedures in bad faith."8 '
Finally, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in Baby Girl v. Michael,19°
held that an ICPC violation does not, per se, permit revocation of the
natural parent's consent to the adoption.19 1 In that case, the prospec-
tive adoptive parents traveled from Arkansas to a hospital in Missouri
where the intended adoptive child was born the previous day.'9 2 The
hospital social worker obtained the natural mother's consent, and the
child was placed in the care of the prospective adoptive parents the
184. Id. at 355-56.




189. Id. at 357-58. The court expressly adopted the factors set forth in the analysis of the
Court of Special Appeals in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598 in which the court con-
cluded that there was indeed a knowing violation of the ICPC. Id. The Minnesota court
stated, "Although an analysis of some factors under the Maryland test is arguably favorable
to [the natural father], we conclude that overall the factors weigh, more favorably on the
side of the birth mother and the adoptive parents." Id,
190. 850 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
191. Id. at 71.
192. Id. at 66. The Director of Nursing at the hospital where the natural mother gave
birth called the prospective adoptive father in Arkansas to inform him that the natural
mother was considering adoption for her child. Id.
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same day. 19 3 The couple returned to Arkansas immediately thereafter
without complying with the ICPC or substantive Missouri law, which
required the couple to file a petition for transfer of custody.1" 4 An
Arkansas court stayed the prospective adoptive parents' adoption peti-
tion until they complied with Missouri law.195 The Missouri trial court
subsequently dismissed the natural mother's pending action to revoke
her consent finding that the transfer of custody was not at issue and
that the natural mother could not simply "change her mind" after ex-
ecuting a valid consent to the adoption.196 On appeal, the Missouri
Supreme Court refused to adopt a per se rule that would permit revo-
cation of consent when there is an ICPC violation, but noted, without
elaborating, that revocation of consent "may be a proper remedy or
sanction in appropriate circumstances."197 The court concluded that
such matters were more properly decided on a case-by-case basis
under the discretion of the trial judge. 98 The court thus remanded
the case for further proceedings.199
The majority of courts, therefore, follow an informal rule that
violations of the ICPC will not automatically prevent the granting of a
subsequent petition to adopt. This rule apparently reflects the courts'
hesitation to allow ICPC procedures to usurp judicial scrutiny of adop-
tion petitions. Instead, the courts will likely consider the impact the
violation has on involved parties and whether the ICPC's purpose of
providing a safe, suitable placement has been met.
Only one court, the Montana Supreme Court, has revoked the
consent of a birth parent as a penalty for the adoptive parents' viola-
tion of the ICPC, thus resulting in the dismissal of an adoption peti-
tion. In In re Adoption of T.M.M.,200 the natural mother of a five-year-
old child, residing in Mississippi, executed documents relinquishing
her parental rights and consenting to the adoption of her child by a
couple from Montana.20 1 The couple transported the child from Mis-
sissippi to Montana without making any effort to comply with the
ICPC.2 °2 The prospective adoptive parents filed a petition for adop-
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. The prospective adoptive parents never filed the necessary petition. Id.
196. Id. at 67.
197. Id. at 71.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 608 P.2d 130 (Mont. 1980).




tion and attached the parental consent documentation.2 °3 The court
entered an ex parte order terminating the natural mother's parental
rights.2 °4 One month later, the natural mother appeared in the Mon-
tana trial court and filed an action to withdrawal her previously exe-
cuted consent.20 5 The trial court dismissed the natural mother's
action and she appealed, asserting that the prospective adoptive par-
ents did not comply with ICPC procedures.2 6 The Supreme Court of
Montana found that the couple violated Article III of the ICPC, be-
cause they did not provide written notice to the appropriate Montana
agency of their intention to bring the child to Montana.2" 7 The court
relied on Article IV of the ICPC, which provides for the "suspension
or revocation of any license, permit, or other legal authorization" as a
sanction for ICPC violations. 20 8 Equating parental "consent" to the
prospective adoptive parent's "legal authorization," the court found
the ICPC violation as grounds for revocation of the natural mother's
consent.
20 9
c. Granting an Adoption Petition Without the Consent of Natural
Parents.-The law in Maryland embraces the belief that a child's best
interest will be served in the care of a natural parent.210 This pre-
sumption is supported by what the court has articulated as a biological
parent's "natural affection" for his child, which manifests in a desire
to care for and raise the child. 211 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
has made an effort to guard the rights of natural parents by warning
that the "welfare and best interest of the child must be weighed with




207. Id. at 133. The court disagreed with the prospective adoptive parent's contention
that the ICPC was only applicable to adoptions facilitated by an agency. Id. at 132. Finding
the ICPC controlling, the court also disagreed with the couple's argument that the proce-
dures of the ICPC were merely "technical" and of little "consequence" given the fact that
they were acting in the child's best interest. Id.
208. Id. at 134 (quoting Article IV of the ICPC).
209. Id.
210. See Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952) (explaining that "there
is a primafacie presumption that the child's welfare will be best subserved in the care and
custody of its parents rather than in the custody of others").
211. See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178 n.4, 372 A.2d 582, 587 n.4 (1977) (explain-
ing that a natural parent is preferred because the natural affection "a parent [shows] for a
child is as strong and potent as any that springs from human relations and leads to desire
and efforts to care properly for and raise the child, which are greater than another would
be likely to display" (quoting Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 188, 148 A.2d 387 (1959))).
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great care against every just claim of an objecting parent. "212 Courts
have exercised particular caution when granting adoption decrees be-
cause "[u] nlike awards of custody .... adoption decrees cut the child
off from the natural parent, who is made a legal stranger to his
offspring. "213
The rule at common law upheld the parents' natural right to the
custody of their children.2 14 But, as the court in Ross v. Hoffman clari-
fied, this rule is no longer "viable."2 5 The court indicated that this
important natural right cannot be enforced when it appears contrary
to a child's best interest.216 In Ross v. Pick, the court explained that
the principle that the state has an obligation to ensure the welfare of
its children is derived from the belief that "a child from the time of
birth owes allegiance to the State, and the state in return is obligated
to regulate the custody of the child whenever necessary for its wel-
fare. 21 7 This guardian role of the state is codified in Section 5-312 of
the Family Law Article, which allows a court to effectuate an adoption
without the consent of a natural parent.218 The statute stands for the
212. See Walter v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 276 (1960) (noting that the
Court of Appeals "'has indicated that it will not permit trial courts to decree adoptions
over the expressed objection of the natural parent or parents, save in very strong cases'"
(quoting John S. Strahorn, Jr., Adoption in Maryland, 7 MD. L. REV. 275, 295 (1943))).
213. Id., 157 A.2d at 275.
214. See Hoffman, 280 Md. at 176, 372 A.2d at 586 (stating that "[i]t was the rule of the
common law that parents have the natural right to the custody of their children").
215. Id.
216. Id. ("[T]he right of a parent to the custody of the child [will] not be enforced
inexorably, contrary to the best interest of the child, on the theory of an absolute legal
right." (citing Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952))).
217. Ross, 199 Md. at 351, 86 A.2d at 468.
218. MD. CODE ANN., F'Am. LAw § 5-312(b) (Supp. 1998). Subsection (b) provides, in
pertinent part, that a court can grant an adoption petition, "[w]ithout the consent of the
child's natural parent," to an individual who has cared for a child for at least six months, if
by clear and convincing evidence the court finds that:
(1) it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the natural parent's
rights as to the child;
(2) the child has been out of the custody of the natural parent for at least 1
year;
(3) the child has developed significant feelings toward and emotional ties
with the petitioner; and
(4) the natural parent:
(i) has not maintain meaningful contact with the child during the time
the petitioner has had custody despite the opportunity to do so; [or]
(ii) has repeatedly failed to contribute to the physical care and support
of the child although financially able to do so ....
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principle that a parent's right to raise his child is not absolute because
"a parent has no inherent property right in a child." '219
Section 5-312 requires a court to find by "clear and convincing
evidence" that the child's best interest is served in granting the adop-
tion, and thus terminating the rights of the natural parent.220 The
court has traditionally relied on evidence of unfitness or extraordinary
circumstances to rebut the presumption that a child's best interest is
served by placing him in the custody of a natural parent.22' The court
originally enumerated factors that would constitute "exceptional cir-
cumstances" in a disputed custody case.2 22 In In re Adoption/Guardian-
ship No. A91-71A, the court explicitly adopted those factors, noting
that the contested adoption decisions had rested upon similar ele-
ments as the contested custody cases.223 Factors that may rise to the
level of exceptional circumstances and thus sever the right of the nat-
ural parent include how long the child has been away from the natu-
ral parent and the child's age when a third party assumed care for the
child.22 4  The court has also contemplated the emotional conse-
quence the change would have on the child and has further looked at
the time in which the natural parent sought to reclaim the child.225
Moreover, the court has found it useful to consider the "nature and
strength of the ties" between the third party and the child. 226 Finally,
the court has considered the depth and the authenticity of the natural
219. See Winter v. Director of the Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 217 Md. 391, 396, 143 A.2d 81,
84 (1958) (discussing the "validity" of legislation that permits the granting of adoptions
without the consent of a natural parent).
220. MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 5-312; see supra note 218 (providing text of section 5-
312).
221. See Winter, 217 Md. at 396, 143 A.2d at 84 (finding that the presumption can be
"forfeited by abandonment, unfitness of the parent, or where some exceptional circum-
stances render the parents' custody of the child detrimental to the best interests of the
child").
222. See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 191, 370 A.2d 582, 593 (1977) (articulating the
"factors... emerg[ing] from.., prior decisions which may be of probative value in deter-
mining the existence of exceptional circumstances").
223. 334 Md. 538, 561-62, 640 A.2d 1085, 1096-97 (1994).
224. Hoffman, 280 Md. at 191, 370 A.2d at 593 (stating that the court should consider
such circumstances as "the length of the time the child has been away from the biological
parent [and] the age of the child when care was assumed by the third party"); see also King
v. Shandrowski, 218 Md. 38, 44, 145 A.2d 281, 285 (1958) (considering the length of time
child had been with the prospective adoptive parents); Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103,
119, 43 A.2d 186, 193 (1945) (concluding in a custody decision in which child lived with
foster parents from 10 months of age through age five that "[i]t is an obvious fact, that ties
of blood weaken, and ties of companionship strengthen by lapse of time").
225. In re Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 562, 640 A.2d at 1097.
226. See Hoffman, 280 Md. at 191, 370 A.2d at 593 (stating that the court should consider
"the nature and strength of the ties between the child and the third party custodian").
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parent's aspiration to have the child, as well as the stability and secur-
ity of the child's future with the natural parent.22 7 The court in In re
Adoption No. A91-71A explained that these factors "reflect the impor-
tance of examining the natural parent's behavior with regard to the
child" and "such behavior provided important insight into the par-
ent's character, motivation, or ability to fulfill parental
responsibilities."228
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In In re Adoption/Guardianship No.
3598, the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals,
holding that the trial court's decision to grant a third party petition to
adopt over the objection of the natural father was not an abuse of
discretion despite violations of the ICPC.229 Judge Bell, writing for a
unanimous court, began the analysis by restating that the standard of
review in all adoption cases is "whether the trial court, in making its
determination, abused its discretion or made findings of fact that
were clearly erroneous." 230 The court explored the principal of judi-
cial discretion, which does not find its authority in a statute or rule. 31
Judicial discretion embodies, rather, a "'reasoned decision based on
the weighing of various alternatives. '232
The Court of Appeals criticized the Court of Special Appeals for
exceeding its role as a reviewing court by "embark[ing] on an in-
dependent fact-finding mission and substitut[ing] its judgment for
that of the trialjudge. '233 The court noted that an abuse of discretion
is not found where an appellate court could have reached a different
decision, but when the holding of a court is not supported by the
weight of the facts or logic before it.234 The court further explained
227. See In re Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 562, 640 A.2d at 1097 (asserting that the
court should consider "the sincerity of the natural parent's desire to rear the child" and
"the relative effect upon the child's stability of having one, as opposed to another, or both
of the relationships continue"); Hoffman, 280 Md. at 191, 370 A.2d at 593 (maintaining
that the court should look at "the intensity and genuineness of the parent's desire to have
the child [and] the stability and certainty as to the child's future in the custody of the
parent").
228. In re Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 563, 640 A.2d at 1097.
229. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 316, 701 A.2d at 316.
230. Id. at 311, 701 A.2d at 118 (citing Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 468, 648 A.2d
1016, 1023 (1994); In re Adoption No. 11137, 106 Md. App. 308, 314, 664 A.2d 443, 446
(1995); Coffey v. Department of Soc. Servs., 41 Md. App. 340, 347-48, 397 A.2d 233, 238
(1979)).
231. Id. at 312, 701 A.2d at 118.
232. Id. (quoting Judge v. R & T Constr. Co., 68 Md. App. 57, 60, 509 A.2d 1236, 1237
(1986)).
233. Id. at 331, 701 A.2d at 128.




that the duty of the trial court is to weigh conflicting evidence and
assess the credibility of witnesses, thereby making trial judges better
situated to decide questions within the discretion of the trial court.
2 5
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals noted that the intermediate
appellate court should interfere with the decisions of trial judges only
when there is clear error.2 6
The court then turned to the purpose for which the ICPC was
enacted by its member states.23 7 Maryland's participation in the
ICPC, the court stated, assures that the child receives "'the maximum
opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment.' ' 2 3 The court
recognized that mandatory compliance with ICPC procedures helps
achieve this purpose. 239 The court noted, however, that there was "no
evidence" that the Maryland Compact Administrator would have re-
jected the placement of Baby S. in Maryland if properly informed of
Jerry's objection to the adoption because the procedures set forth in
the ICPC do not provide for the withholding of an adoption petition
"on the basis that a non-custodial parent is contesting the adop-
tion. '"240 The court concluded that the ICPC was not created for the
purpose of protecting the rights of natural parents, but rather was in-
tended to ensure the safety of interstate placements for children. 241
The Court of Appeals, specifically addressing the legal rights of
the respondent, reasoned that the respondent's efforts to oppose
Amy's decision to proceed with the adoption would have been fu-
tile.2 42 The court examined New York law which indicated that an
unwed father must "'tak[e] every available avenue to demonstrate
that he is willing and able to enter into the fullest possible relation-
ship with his . . . [child].' 24 3 The court noted that a natural father
must be capable of assuming responsibility for the care and custody of
the child within a six-month period immediately preceding the pro-
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Samuel R. Rosoff, Ltd., 195 Md. 421, 436,
73 A.2d 461, 467 (1950)).
237. Id. at 314, 701 A.2d at 119 (stating that the purpose for the ICPC was to "facilitat[e]
interstate adoption and increas[e] the number of acceptable homes for children in need
of placement").
238. Id., 701 A.2d at 120.
239. Id. at 315, 701 A.2d at 120 (citing Bernhardt v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 39 Md. App.
334, 344, 385 A.2d 1197, 1202 (1978)).
240. Id. at 317, 701 A.2d at 121.
241. Id. at 317-18, 701 A.2d at 121.
242. Id. at 318, 701 A.2d at 121.
243. Id. at 319, 701 A.2d at 122 (quotinglnreRaquel Marie X, 559 N.E.2d 418, 425 (N.Y.
1990)).
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posed adoptive placement. 244 Further, the court found that a biologi-
cal father's action must be "prompt" and "substantial" in order to
invoke constitutional protection. 245 The court concluded, therefore,
that even if the respondent received notice of the Surrogate Court
proceedings, the respondent's consent would probably not have been
required to carry out the adoption of Baby Girl S.246
Next, the Court of Appeals discussed the appropriate sanctions
for ICPC violations. The court noted that the ICPC does not contem-
plate sanctions against adoptive parents who violate the ICPC. 2 47 Re-
affirming its holding in In re Adoption No. 10087, the court emphasized
that a violation of the ICPC does not mandate dismissal of an adop-
tion petition. 24' Rather, a violation of ICPC placement procedures
"indicates the need for a prompt determination of the best interest of
[the] child" based on the facts and circumstances presented before
the trialjudge.249 The court reaffirmed its instruction in In re Adoption
No. 10087 that retroactive compliance be ordered where possible, but
stated that "retroactive compliance in this case would be impractical
and inequitable, four years having passed since the violation of the
ICPC occurred. 2
5 0
The court revisited the decision of the Montana Supreme Court
in In Matter of Adoption of T.M.M.,25 which the court noted is "the only
reported opinion in which an independent adoption was dismissed by
a court as a sanction [for] adoptive parents violating the ICPC."2 5 2
The court refused to adopt the Montana court's analysis because it did
not rely on the best interest of the child standard, and noted that
"certainly, the best interest of the child remains the overarching con-
sideration and the needs of the child should not be subordinate to the
enforcement of the ICPC." 253 The court acknowledged, however, that
a trial court could be presented with circumstances in which dismissal
of an adoption petition because of a violation of the ICPC would be
244. Id.
245. See id. (quoting In re Raquel Marie X, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 607).
246. Id. (citing In re Adoption of Emily Ann, 522 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Fam. Ct. 1987)).
247. Id. at 320, 701 A.2d at 122.
248. Id. at 321, 701 A.2d at 123 (citing In reAdoption No. 10087, 324 Md. 394, 412, 597
A.2d 456, 465 (1991)).
249. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Adoption No. 10087, 324 Md. at 412, 597
A.2d at 465).
250. Id. at 320-31, 701 A.2d at 122-23.
251. 608 P.2d 130 (Mont. 1980).
252. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 322, 701 A.2d at 124.
253. Id. at 323, 701 A.2d at 124.
1999]
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an appropriate remedy.2" 4 The court adopted factors initially articu-
lated by the Court of Special Appeals to be considered in making such
a determination.2 5
Finally, the court discussed the "golden nile" in adoption cases,
which is the "best interest of the child."2 56 While the "controlling fac-
tor"257 is not the natural parents' interest in raising the child, the
court recognized the importance of this "natural and legal right. ''258
The court noted that in Maryland, a prima facie presumption exists
that the child's best interest will be served in the custody of its par-
ents.25" The court explained that this presumption can, however, be
rebutted when evidence of a parent's unfitness or the indication of
exceptional circumstances exist.260 The court reviewed those factors
set forth in Section 5-312 of the Family Law Article, which the trial
judge must find by "clear and convincing" evidence before effectuat-
ing an adoption without the consent of a natural parent, including a
finding that it is in the child's best interest.26 1 In addition, the court
noted that a judge is prohibited from granting an adoption without
the consent of the natural parent "solely because a natural parent has
been deprived of custody of the child by the act of the other natural
parent.
262
Applying the foregoing reasoning, the court found that trial
judge exercised "sound judgment" in finding that the respondent's
legal rights were not impaired because he had not taken sufficient
action in a timely manner to make himself physically or financially
responsible for Baby S. The court further found it within the trial
court's discretion to conclude that the Respondent's effort to make
meaningful contact with Baby S. went only so far as his interest "in
pursuing the legal gamesmanship." 265 In closing, the court remarked
254. Id; see infra notes 294-295 and accompanying text (discussing the factors to be
considered).
255. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 323, 701 A.2d at 124.
256. Id. at 323-24, 701 A.2d at 124 (citations omitted).
257. Id. at 324, 701 A.2d at 124 (quoting Petrini v. Petrini 336 Md. 453, 469-70, 648 A.2d
1016, 1023 (1994)).
258. Id. at 324, 701 A.2d at 125 (quoting In rejessica M., 312 Md. 93, 113, 538 A.2d 305,
315 (1988)).
259. Id. at 324-25, 701 A.2d at 125 (citing Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463,
468 (1952)).
260. Id. at 325, 701 A.2d at 125.
261. Id. at 326, 701 A.2d at 125-26.
262. Id. at 329, 701 A.2d at 127.
263. Id. at 328, 701 A.2d at 126 (quoting In re Adoption of a Minor, No. 3598-7-20
(Harford Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 9, 1994), rev'd, In reAdoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md.
App. 475, 675 A.2d 170 (1996), rev'd, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997)).
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that "it is crystalline" that the findings of the trial court were neither
clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.264
4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals's decision in In re Adoption!
Guardianship No. 3598 to uphold the adoption decree over the objec-
tion of the natural father and despite violations of the ICPC implicates
several important issues. First, in granting the adoption, the court
stands firmly behind the best interest of the child standard as the ap-
plicable standard in any case in which a child's welfare is ultimately
adjudicated. Second, the court implies that in determining the appro-
priate course to take in the face of an ICPC violation, it will use an
analysis based upon the gravity of the violation, including whether, if
the ICPC had been properly implemented, the placement would have
been approved. Finally, the court's action suggests that a violation of
ICPC procedures will not have significant relevance in a later petition
to adopt before a circuit court in Maryland.
a. The Best Interest of the Child Standard and the Teachings of In
re Adoption No. 10087-More than a decade ago, one commentator
articulated the tension that arises between the ICPC and the best in-
terest of the child standard that remains appropriate today:
The predicament which the courts face is whether to allow
the best interests of the child standard to control when the
ICPC has been violated. If the best interests standard con-
trols, then the adoption may be granted despite violation of
the ICPC. Alternatively, if the violation of the ICPC is fatal to
an otherwise desirable adoption, then a child may be de-
prived of the only family he has ever known, returned to a
natural parent who is marginally capable of providing ade-
quate care, or placed in foster care to await an uncertain
future.265
The court in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598 correctly relied on
the best interest of the child in deciding to grant the adoption over
the protest of the natural father and despite violations of the ICPC
because the best interest of the child standard is unquestionably
"firmly entrenched" in Maryland law.266 The Court of Special Appeals
264. Id. at 331, 701 A.2d at 128.
265. Hartfield, supra note 84, at 319.
266. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 323-26, 701 A.2d at 124-26
(asserting that the best interest of the child standard is to be used in such situations); Ross
v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 175, 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977) (stating that the "best interest




proposed to strictly enforce the ICPC "whenever appropriate" when a
child has been denied his or her natural parent because of the viola-
tion."' This would effectively vitiate the discretion of the trial judge
to make a determination regarding the best interest of the child
before it.268 Consequently, the court's proposition would have done
violence to the established notion that what is best for one child is not
necessarily best for all children. 269
The Court of Special Appeals declared that it was not, in fact,
requiring automatic dismissal of adoption petitions for ICPC viola-
tions. 270 Instead, the court asserted, the trial judge must "make a case-
by-case determination" weighing "numerous factors" including
whether the ICPC violation impaired the substantive rights of the nat-
ural parent.27' The decision of the intermediate appellate court, how-
ever, demonstrates a different rule. The Court of Special Appeals
struck down the trial court's decision to allow the petitioners to adopt
Baby S., claiming that the lower court abused its discretion by denying
the respondent's motion to dismiss the adoption petition on the
grounds of the ICPC violation. 27 2 Under the Court of Special Ap-
peals's analysis, the circuit court should not make such summary dis-
missals, but rather balance the factors before it. The circuit court
opinion extensively balanced the significance of the ICPC violations
and the impact of the violations on the rights of respondent as pre-
scribed by the intermediate court.27 3 The circuit court, for instance,
considered the gravity of Amy's untruths on the ICPC documenta-
tion.274 Also, in accordance with the decision in In re Adoption No.
A71-91A,275 the judge made specific findings of exceptional circum-
267. In reAdoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. 475, 506, 675 A.2d 170, 185
(1996), rev'd, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997). The Court of Special Appeals did not
explain those facts or circumstances that would rise to a level of appropriateness such as to
require the child's return to a natural parent. Id.
268. Id. at 541 (Hollander, J., dissenting) (relying on In re Adoption No. 10087 to con-
clude that, "the trial court must have discretion to balance the type and gravity of an ICPC
violation with the child's best interests, in light of all the facts and circumstances in the
particular case").
269. Id. at 519-20 (criticizing the majority for proposing that "as a matter of ICPC policy,
that the 'best interest of the child' is actually the best interest of children in general, as
opposed to the particular child before the court").
270. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. at 503, 675 A.2d at 184.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. In reAdoption of a Minor, No. 3598-7-20, at 29 (Harford Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 9, 1994),
rev'd, In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. 475, 675 A.2d 170 (1996),
rev'd, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997).
274. Id. at 15.
275. 334 Md. 538, 640 A.2d 1085 (1994).
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stances that would rebut the presumption that the interests of Baby
Girl S. would be better served in the care of a natural parent.276 The
circuit court, furthermore, diligently considered the requirements of
Section 5-312 of the Family Law Article, which governs the power of
courts to grant adoptions when the consent of a natural parent is with-
held.27" Finally, the circuit court adhered to the statutory require-
ment of appointing an attorney to represent the interests of Baby S.,
as well as a social worker to aid in the decision making process. 278
Notwithstanding the circuit court's application of this balancing test,
the Court of Special Appeals declared that the circuit court's findings
of fact were clearly erroneous. 279 The Court of Appeals correctly dis-
agreed with intermediate appellate court's reliance on facts in the rec-
ord that were contrary the findings of the trial court in an attempt to
overturn the lower court's decision under the guise of abuse of
discretion.
The Court of Special Appeals relied on In re Adoption No. 10087280
to make its case for effective revocation of the best interest of the child
standard when a natural parent contends an ICPC violation has im-
paired his substantive rights. 281 The intermediate court found that In
re Adoption No. 10087 was not determinative as to the remedy for all
ICPC violations because the Court of Appeals was not confronted with
a natural parent contesting the adoption.282 The Court of Special Ap-
peals took note of the Court of Appeals's reaction in In re Adoption No.
10087 to the analysis set forth in In re Adoption of T.M.M., 28 3 to which
the Court of Appeals remarked that such a summary dismissal would
be inappropriate where there were no natural parents to whom the
child could be returned. 284 The Court of Special Appeals, presuma-
bly, interpreted this observation to mean that dismissal is appropriate
where a natural parent is willing to assume care and custody of the
276. In re Adoption of a Minor, No. 3598-7-20, at 39.
277. Id. at 26.
278. Id. at 4, 27.
279. In reAdoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. 475, 511, 675 A.2d 170, 187
(1996) (asserting that "the trial court erred in finding that it was in the best interests of the
child to terminate appellant's parental rights"), rev'd, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997).
280. 324 Md. 394, 597 A.2d 456 (1991).
281. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. at 496-99, 675 A.2d at 188-82
(discussing the conclusions made by the Court of Appeals in In re Adoption No. lO087when
faced with an ICPC violation).
282. Id. at 498-99, 675 A.2d at 181 (finding that "[t]he factual situation in In reAdoption
No. 10087 is distinguishable from this case").
283. Id. at 495-96, 675 A.2d at 180; see supra notes 199-208 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the analysis in In re Adoption of T.M.M.).
284. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. at 498-99, 675 A.2d at 181.
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child. Ultimately, the intermediate court relied on the warning in In
re Adoption No. 10087 that the Court of Appeals would not tolerate
adoptive parents "illegally remov[ing] a child from another state and
hold[ing] it in Maryland until a sufficient time elapse[d] so that the
child's welfare dictate [d] adoption. "285
The Court of Special Appeals failed to properly build on the
foundation provided by the decision in In re Adoption No. 10087.
Although the Court of Special Appeals may have been correct in its
literal interpretation of In re Adoption No. 10087, the case stands for
the proposition that the trial judge is vested with the discretion to
weigh ICPC violations and that such violations will not provide for a
perfunctory dismissal of subsequent petitions to adopt.2" 6 Per se dis-
missal is not appropriate because, as the court in In re Adoption No.
10087was quick to remind the courts, the "'golden rule"' in adoption
cases "is and has always been, the best interest of the child." '287 Fur-
ther, dismissal is improper because the circuit court, not the state
compact office, is the correct forum for conclusive determination of a
child's best interest.2 8
In re Adoption No. 10087 provided further instruction that ICPC
violations are appropriately weighed in terms of the best interest of
the child.2 9 The Court of Appeals in that case had the opportunity to
strengthen the ICPC when it considered the analysis set forth in In re
Adoption of T.M.M2 9 ° The court, however, was unwilling to accept any
analysis that did not put the best interest of the child above all. 29 1 The
Court of Appeals in In re Adoption No. 10087 explained that the best
interest of the child must be considered to assure the needs of the
child are met.29 2 Moreover, although the court at that time was not
faced with adjudicating the rights of a natural parent, it logically fol-
lows that lack of consent of a natural parent is simply a factor that
285. See id. (quoting In re Adoption No. 10087, 324 Md. at 414, 597 A.2d at 466).
286. See In re Adoption No. 10087, 324 Md. at 412, 597 A.2d at 465 (holding that an ICPC
violation does "not mandate dismissal; rather it indicates the need for a prompt determina-
tion of the best interest of this child").
287. Id. at 411, 597 A.2d at 464 (quoting In re Lynn M., 312 Md. 461, 463, 340 A.2d 799,
800 (1988)).
288. Id. at 412, 597 A.2d at 465.
289. See id. at 411, 597 A.2d at 465 (announcing that "[t]he appropriate forum for final
determination of the best interest of the child is [not the compact office but] the adoption
proceeding in the circuit court.. ").
290. See id. at 412, 597 A.2d at 465 (considering the decision of the Montana court).
291. Id.
292. See id. at 414, 597 A.2d at 466 (finding that "[w]here the welfare of a child is at
stake ... the court should... evaluate the best interest of the child and consider whether
some action should be taken to assure the child's needs will be met").
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should be weighed in the best interest analysis. The rule adopted by
the Court of Special Appeals, which would direct the circuit court
judge to dismiss an adoption petition where an ICPC violation has
implicated the substantive rights of a natural parent, without consider-
ing the child's best interest is, therefore, a contradiction of the deci-
sion in In re Adoption No. 10087.293 The In re Adoption No. 10087 court
could not have been more poignant when it said, "[w] here the welfare
of a child is at stake, the court should not, like Pontius Pilate, wash its
hands of the matter."
29 4
b. Articulating the Appropriate Analysis to be Applied to ICPC Vio-
lations. -In In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that the dismissal of an adoption petition based on a
violation of the ICPC might be warranted where appropriate circum-
stances are presented before the trial court.295 The court adopted
those factors articulated by the Court of Special Appeals that a circuit
court should consider in making such a determination. 296 The court
failed, however, to explain how these factors should be weighed in
terms of the best interest of the child analysis. The language of the
ICPC provides no further insight because it neither expressly contem-
plates penalties in the context of an independent adoption nor speaks
to the best interest of the child. Thus, it is necessary to examine how
the court made its determination to grant the adoption decree despite
violations of the ICPC and compare the decision to cases in other
jurisdictions.
The Court of Appeals in this case was faced with more than a
technical violation of ICPC procedures. The court recognized that
293. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. 475, 503-06, 675 A.2d
184-85 (1996) (explaining that although a trial court should not dismiss adoption petitions
for only a "de minimis" violation of the ICPC, the motion to dismiss was appropriate in this
case where Jerry had been "deprived" of Baby S. because of the violation), rev'd, 347 Md.
295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997).
294. In re Adoption No. 10087, 324 Md. at 414, 597 A.2d at 466.
295. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 323, 701 A.2d at 124.
296. Id. The factors set out by the Court of Special Appeals are:
whether the violation (1) was knowingly committed by the adoptive parents or
their attorney; (2) impaired the rights of a natural parent; (3) was more than a
mere procedural technicality that adversely affected both the receiving and send-
ing state's ability to determine the best interests of the child; (4) impeded the
sending state's jurisdiction to determine the best interests of their children; (5)
circumvented a sending state's laws in order to effectuate the adoption; and (6)
was made to enhance the adoptive parent's ability to form emotional ties with the
child in order to dictate adoption in receiving state's courts.
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the respondent's substantive rights were implicated and, like the trial
court, appropriately gave deference to considering those rights.
297
First, the Court of Appeals inquired as to whether the petitioners
would have been granted ICPC approval.29 The petitioners satisfied
the ICPC's ultimate goal of providing safe placements for children
across state lines.299 The petitioners were licensed foster care parents,
providing care for nine children for periods of one night to eight
months. 30 0 A recent home study conducted by an authorized agency
had determined that the petitioners and their home offered a suitable
environment.301 The court further found it credible that the adoptive
mother waited in New York for two weeks for compact approval.30 2
The completed New York application was sent to the Maryland com-
pact office with a note to call the petitioners with verbal approval.
0 3
Considering these facts, the court concluded that the trial court did
not make findings of fact that were clearly erroneous or abuse its dis-
cretion in making the determination that the best interest of Baby S.
had been met and the goals of the ICPC had been achieved.30 4
Second, the court inquired into whether the ICPC violation im-
paired respondent's legal rights. 3 5 This inquiry led the court to reex-
amine the New York Surrogate Court proceeding to which the
respondent did not receive notice. 30 6 The court questioned whether
the respondent would have been successful in objecting to the adop-
tion.30' According to New York law, the respondent's consent would
not have been needed to effectuate this adoption because the respon-
dent failed to contribute to Amy's prenatal care, and he did not make
a plan to raise his daughter six months preceding the child's adoptive
297. Id. at 316-19, 701 A.2d 110, 121-22 (discussing the protections afforded respon-
dent's legal fights); see In re Adoption of a Minor, No. 3598-7-20, at 29 (Harford Cty. Cir.
Ct. Nov. 9, 1994) (stating that "[h]ad the only issue in this case been the question of [the]
best interests of the child, we would have decided the matter from the bench the day the
trial was completed.... It is the concern for [the respondent's] legal rights ... that has
caused us to struggle with this matter"), rev'd, In reAdoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109
Md. App. 475, 675 A.2d 170 (1996), rev'd, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997).
298. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 316, 701 A.2d at 120-21 (con-
cluding "[t]hat the interest may well be found to have been met along with the purpose
and goals of the ICPC to have been achieved").
299. Id.
300. Id. at 303 n.3, 701 A.2d at 114 n.3.
301. Id. at 316, 701 A.2d at 121.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 330-31, 701 A.2d at 127-28.
305. Id. at 316-19, 701 A.2d at 121-22.
306. Id. at 318, 701 A.2d at 121.
307. Id.
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placement that would have enabled him to assume full responsibil-
ity."' 8 Amy's failure to identify the respondent as the child's natural
father did not, therefore, diminish the respondent's legal right to
raise his child.3 °9 Respondent, not taking swift action to assume his
parental responsibility, would not have been afforded the protection
of the law. 310
Thus, the analysis of the Court of Appeals suggests an informal
analysis for determining the appropriate course to take in the face of
an ICPC violation. The court implies that a circuit court should con-
sider the gravity of the violation within the best interest analysis, in-
cluding whether, if the ICPC had been properly implemented, the
placement would have been approved. When the substantive rights of
a party are indicated, the circuit court should consider whether the
party was afforded adequate protection of the law.
The majority of courts in other jurisdictions have likewise indi-
cated that ICPC violations will not automatically mandate dismissal of
a subsequent petition to adopt. Courts have demonstrated analysis
similar to the Court of Appeals when ICPC violations are indicated in
adoption proceedings. In the three New York decisions reported at
the trial level, for instance, the courts determined that while technical
compliance with the ICPC was lacking, the adoptive placement ful-
filled the goals of the ICPC and, thus, the placement would have been
granted.311 In In re Adoption of Baby Boy M.G.,3 12 the analysis of the
New York trial court's decision treads even further onto the ICPC's
significance for adoption petitions. ICPC approval was denied in this
case by the Tennessee compact office because state law forbade adop-
tions facilitated by an attorney. The New York court was unmoved by
the failure to gain ICPC approval in Tennessee because New York law
had, in all other respects, been complied with. 13 Of course, in these
308. Id. at 318-19, 701 A.2d at 121.
309. Id. at 319, 701 A.2d at 122.
310. Id. at 318-19, 701 A.2d at 121-22. The Court of Appeals found this attitude toward
parental rights to be in line with the Supreme Court decision of Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983). Id. at 324 n.16, 701 A.2d at 124 n.16. In Lehr, the Supreme Court explained
that the biological connection between a natural father and his child is significant only
because it affords the biological father a unique opportunity to form a relationship with his
child. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. If, the Court explained, the natural father fails to take advan-
tage of this opportunity by accepting the responsibility of parenthood, "the Federal Consti-
tution will not automatically compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child's best
interests lie." Id.
311. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text (discussing the New York trial court
decisions that declined to dismiss the adoption petitions for ICPC violations).
312. 515 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sur. Ct. 1987).
313. Id. at 201.
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decisions, the courts acknowledged that the natural parents could no
longer be found and that the children had known no other parents
other than their adoptive families.314 Thus, to dismiss the adoption
petitions would have been against the best interests of the children
before these courts.
In re Adoption of T.M.M., 15 the case in which the Montana
Supreme Court did not discuss the best interest of the child when
dismissing an adoption petition based on violations of the ICPC, was
also not so far off from position of other courts.3 16 The court, rebuk-
ing the adoptive parents for their complete failure to comply with the
ICPC before they transported the child from Mississippi to Montana,
dismissed the adoption proceeding on the grounds of the ICPC viola-
tion. 17 The facts of the case, however, were significantly different
than other cases implicating the ICPC. Unlike other cases in which
the child concerned was an infant, the child in the Montana case was
five years old when natural mother executed her consent to adop-
tion.31s That is, the adoptive parents were not the only parents the
child had ever known. Also, the natural mother was not afforded a
hearing at which to relinquish her consent, but rather, her consent
was waived in a document witnessed and notarized by a relative of the
adoptive parents and a resident of Mississippi.319 Perhaps, then, the
creative maneuver of revoking parental consent by equating it with
"legal authorization" allowed the court to escape from an uncomforta-
ble set of facts.32°
Particularly in cases in which the rights of a natural parent are
concerned, courts are reluctant to use ICPC violations as the means by
which to dismiss adoption petitions.321 Courts, instead, consider the
gravity of the violation and apply their substantive law to determine if
the natural parent's rights were adequately protected. The Supreme
314. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text (indicating that in all three deci-
sions the natural parents could not longer be located).
315. 608 P.2d 130 (Mont. 1980).
316. See id. at 130-34 (relying on the language of the ICPC rather than applying the best
interest of the child standard); see supra notes 199-208 and accompanying text (discussing
In re Adoption of TM.M.).
317. In re Adoption of T.M.M., 608 P.2d at 134.
318. Id. at 131.
319. Id.
320. See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text (explaining how the court equated
parental consent with the "legal authorization" provided for in the ICPC).
321. See supra notes 162-198 and accompanying text (discussing In reAdoption of C.L.W,
In re C.M.A., and Baby Girl v. Michael in which the rights of a natural parent were
implicated).
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Court of Missouri in Baby Girl v. Michael'22 concluded that an ICPC
violation may provide a basis for the dismissal of an adoption petition,
but, like the Court of Appeals in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598,
left the decision to the discretion of the trial judge.323 The Missouri
court relied, rather, on its substantive law that required the prospec-
tive adoptive parents to obtain a transfer of custody order to hold that
the subsequent custody actions were null.324
Likewise, in Minnesota, the appellate court in In re C.M.A. 25 held
that the ICPC could not provide the basis by which to vacate an adop-
tion decree. 26 The court found that the ICPC violation did not in-
jure the natural father's parental rights although the birth mother did
not identify the natural father and he did not execute his consent.3 27
Under New Hampshire law, the natural father's consent would not
have been needed because his paternity action was dismissed for fail-
ure to timely file.328 Minnesota relied on its substantive law, not the
ICPC, to determine that the natural father was not entitled to notice
because his consent would not have been needed to effectuate the
adoption.329
Finally, even faced with a bad faith violation of the ICPC, courts
will be unlikely to mandate dismissal of subsequent adoption petitions
because it would erode the court's role in adjudicating the interests of
the child in such proceedings. In In re Adoption of C.L. W, 330 for in-
stance, the prospective adoptive parents made no effort to comply
with the ICPC and left Pennsylvania even after being notified by the
natural mother's attorney that she wanted to relinquish her con-
sent.13 ' The court determined that the failure to obtain ICPC ap-
proval was not injurious because the compact office "made the same
determination concerning the best interests of the child as it would
have been required to make" prior to the placement.332 On the issue
322. 850 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
323. See id. at 71; In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 331, 701 A.2d at 128
(stating that in regard to an adoption petition, "it is the trial judge's role to assess the
evidence and the credibility of witnesses, and to resolve the conflicting evidence").
324. See Michael, 850 S.W.2d at 68.
325. 557 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
326. Id. at 359. The court stated that the "unknowing violation does not provide an
adequate basis for vacating the decree." Id.
327. Id. at 358-59. The nondisclosure of the father's identity "may have created confu-
sion in the district court, but his identity was not material to the proceedings." Id. at 359.
328. Id. at 356.
329. Id. at 356-58.
330. 467 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
331. Id. at 1108.
332. Id. at 1111.
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of consent, the court saw no reason not to apply Florida substantive
law to the adjudication the natural mother's legal consent because she
was on notice that Florida law would apply to the adoption
proceedings.333
Maryland and other jurisdictions, therefore, appear to be in the
majority on the question of the implication of ICPC violations on sub-
sequent petitions to adopt. Courts will continue to determine the best
interests of the child by examining such factors as the harm caused by
the ICPC violations, including whether the natural parents can be lo-
cated or whether the adoptive parents are the only family the child
has ever known.334 Courts suggest they will also determine whether, if
proper procedures had been followed, ICPC approval would have
been granted.335 Finally, even where the legal rights of a natural par-
ent are concerned, courts will be unwilling to allow ICPC violations to
provide for perfunctory dismissal without consideration of the child's
best interest.336 Instead, courts will apply the substantive law of their
state to ensure that a natural parent's rights were protected.337
c. Policy Considerations. -In determining that an ICPC viola-
tion does not automatically mandate dismissal of an adoption peti-
tion, even when the substantive rights of a natural parent are
implicated, the Court of Appeals preserved the power of the circuit
courts to balance the interests before them.338 Any abrogation of a
333. Id.
334. See, e.g., In re Adoption No. 10087, 324 Md. 394, 412, 597 A.2d 456, 465 (1991)
(explaining the court's unwillingness to require that a child's welfare be left uncertain or
that the child be placed in the supervision of the sending or receiving state when no one
has come forward for custody of the child); In re Adoption of Calynn, M.G., 523 N.Y.S.2d
729, 730, (Sur. Ct. 1987) (allowing the finalization of the adoption petition where natural
mother could not be located "rather than leaving this child's future unsettled").
335. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby "E," 427 N.Y.S.2d 705, 707, 711 (Fam. Ct. 1980)
(approving adoption petition despite ICPC violations because the "essential ingredients" of
the ICPC had been met).
336. See supra notes 162-198 and accompanying text (discussing In re Adoption of CL. W,
In re C.M.A., and Baby Girl v. Michael in which the rights of a natural parent were
implicated).
337. See, e.g., In reAdoption of C.L.W, 467 So. 2d at 1111 (finding no reason not to apply
state substantive law, as courts generally do, in the instant case especially when considering
the whether the natural mother properly executed consent to the adoptive parents); In re
C.M.A., 557 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (applying the substantive law of Min-
nesota to conclude that the natural father was not entitled to notice of the adoption
proceedings).
338. See supra notes 229-235 and accompanying text (discussing the discretionary au-
thority vested in the trial courts).
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trial court's discretion to make a determination of the best interest of
a child would contradict the established law in Maryland."' 9
The holding in this case moves the court toward acknowledging
that the ICPC is not the appropriate mechanism upon which to deny a
subsequent adoption petition.34 ° The language of the ICPC does not
mention adoption or adoption proceedings, but rather speaks only to
the interstate "placements" of children. 41 Of further note is that the
Maryland adoption statutes do not contain language creating a con-
nection between the ICPC and subsequent adoption petitions, thus
suggesting a lack of legislative intent to do so.342 The ICPC's rele-
vance in adoption proceedings is also marked by the lack of a penalty
provision for adoptive parents or their attorneys. 43 Finally, the ICPC
does not contemplate the rights of any party.344 The procedures are
only intended to protect the safety of the children placed across state
lines.345
Courts faced with an ICPC violation, especially where an agency is
not involved in the placement, have minimal guidance on which to
rely. Courts undoubtedly recognize that dismissing adoption petitions
and returning children to a natural parent unprepared to care for the
child, or, in their absence, turning children over to the care of the
state is not a satisfactory remedy.346 Although at least one authority
has argued that such action would deter adoptive parents and attor-
339. See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text (explaining that the best interest of
the child standard has long been recognized as the prevailing consideration in all proceed-
ings involving children's welfare).
340. See In re Adoption No. 10087, 324 Md. 394, 430, 597, A.2d 456, 474 (1991) (El-
dridge, J., dissenting) (arguing that an ICPC violation is irrelevant in a subsequent adop-
tion proceeding).
341. GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, supra note
303, at 11-15.
342. MD. CODE ANN., F m. LAw §§ 5-301 to -415 (1991 & Supp. 1998); see In reAdoption
No. 10087, 324 Md. at 434, 597 A.2d at 476 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (noting that the ICPC
is not referenced in the Maryland adoption statutes).
343. GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, supra note
303, at 11-15; see In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 320, 701, A.2d at 122
(observing that section 5-605 of the Maryland code "does not provide sanctions .... that
could or should be imposed on adoptive parents who violated the ICPC. .. ").
344. GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, supra note
303, at 11-15.
345. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 317, 701, A.2d at 121 (asserting
"the ICPC was not designed to protect the rights of birth parents; instead, its is designed to
ensure that placements for children across state lines are safe. ).
346. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
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neys from thwarting the ICPC,3 47 children should not be made a "mar-
tyr" for the ICPC.348 The Court of Appeals has likewise given limited
instruction to the circuit courts, except to explain that retroactive
compliance with the ICPC should be sought whenever practical. 4 9
However, in cases in which a Maryland circuit court finds a bad faith
violation or circumstances that are particularly egregious, the court
should be able to punish the perpetrators. Imposing sanctions on
parties found to be at fault may serve as an appropriate course of ac-
tion for Maryland circuit courts.3 50 For example, the New York court
in Adoption of Calynn, M.G. saw fit to reduce attorney's fees for failure
to comply with the ICPC.3 5 ' Furthermore, ICPC violators, it has been
argued, could be held amenable to the child protection laws of Mary-
land.152 The violators could be sanctioned under section 5-521 of the
Family Law Article.
3 53
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals properly granted the
adoption petition over the natural father's objection and despite viola-
tions of the ICPC. The court correctly concluded that ICPC approval
would have been granted and that the father would not have been
successful in his attempt to stop the adoption. The court's ruling for-
tifies the best interest of the child standard as the prevailing concern
in all instances in which the welfare of a child is adjudicated, even
those implicating the ICPC.
347. See COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL 3.152 (Secretariat Opinion No. 60) (1993)
(asserting that "[i]t would not take many dismissals of adoption petitions and removal of
children from homes in violation of placement laws to stop these efforts at evasion").
348. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 109 Md. App. 475, 525, 675 A.2d 170,
195 (1996) (Hollander, J., dissenting) (stating that the trial court judge had "reasonably
concluded that Baby Girl S. should not be made a martyr for the ICPC").
349. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 321, 701 A.2d at 123 (explain-
ing that in In re Adoption No. 10087 "[w]e commented that the most appropriate sanction
for an ICPC violation is retroactive compliance"). The court in In re Adoption No. 10087
recognized the problem confronted by circuit courts. 324 Md. 394, 414, 597 A.2d 456, 466
(1991). The court invited the Maryland legislature "to address the concerns raised by the
limited ability to enforce the ICPC in private adoptions." Id.
350. The Court of Special Appeals in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598 denied the
attorney's fees of the adoptive parent's attorney. 109 Md. App. at 510, 675 A.2d at 187.
Reversing the decision, the Court of Appeals did not address the issue. In re Adoption!
Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 701 A.2d 110 (1997).
351. See In re Adoption of Calynn, M.G., 523 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (1987) (reducing attor-
ney's fees of the adoptive parents as provided for by New York law because "the bar should
recognize that repeated circumvention of the court's rules cannot persist without sanctions
being applied").
352. See McDermott, supra note 113, at D-03 n.2 (arguing that section 5-521 makes it a
misdemeanor for anyone to place a child illegally in the state).
353. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-521 (1999).
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The holding further directs the circuit courts not to automatically
dismiss adoption petitions for violations of the ICPC. The circuit
courts should, instead, consider the seriousness of the violation within
the best interest analysis, including whether, if the ICPC had been
properly implemented, the placement would have been approved. In
cases in which the legal rights of a party are indicated, the circuit
court should consider whether the party was afforded adequate pro-
tection of the law.
The court in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598 has brought the
court closer to stating that the ICPC is not the appropriate mechanism
upon which to deny a subsequent adoption petition. Although ICPC
procedures play an important role in protecting the lives of children,




A. Maryland Properly Limits Decision and Reads Provision Under the
Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act as Only Allowing
Disclosure of Medical Records by the Provider in Possession of the Records
In Warner v. Lerner,' the Court of Appeals concluded that a physi-
cian with a medical malpractice suit pending against him could not
obtain and use the medical records of a patient of another medical
provider, if that patient is in no way involved in the malpractice
claim.2 In so doing, the court reversed the decision of the Court of
Special Appeals' and determined that section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) of the
Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act (Records Act) 4 had
no application under the facts of the case.5 The court held that the
statute only allowed the health care provider in possession of the medi-
cal records the discretion to disclose those records; because the physi-
cian in Warner was not in possession of the records, the statute's
allowance for disclosure did not apply to him.6 The court declined to
decide whether section 4-305(b) (1) (iii)7 should be read to allow the
provider in possession of the medical records to disclose to a second
provider's attorney the medical record of an individual who is not a
patient of the second provider and is uninvolved in the claim against
the second provider.8 As a result, the court's holding was a narrow
one. By limiting its decision, the Court of Appeals correctly left it to
1. 348 Md. 733, 705 A.2d 1169 (1998).
2. See id. at 739-40, 705 A.2d at 1174-75.
3. Warner v. Lerner, 1.15 Md. App. 428, 693 A.2d 394 (1997), rev'd, 348 Md. 733, 705
A.2d 1169 (1998).
4. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I §§ 4-301 to -309 (1994 & Supp. 1998). Section 4-
305(b) (1) of the Records Act provides:
(b) Permitted Disclosure.-A health care provider may disclose a medical record
without the authorization of a person in interest:
(1) (i) To the provider's authorized employees, agents, medical staff, medical
students, or consultants for the sole purpose of offering, providing, evaluating, or
seeking payment for health care to patients or recipients by the provider;
(ii) To the provider's legal counsel regarding only the information in the
medical record that relates to the subject matter of the representation; or
(iii) To any provider's insurer or legal counsel, or the authorized employees
or agents of a provider's insurer or legal counsel, for the sole purpose of handling
a potential or actual claim against any provider ....
Id. § 4-305(b) (1).
5. Warner, 348 Md. at 73940, 705 A.2d at 1173.
6. Id.
7. See supra note 4.
8. See Warner, 348 Md. at 740 n.3, 705 A.2d at 1173 n.3 (noting "we need not decide in
this case whether § 4-305(b) (1) (iii) should be read to permit [a provider in possession of
medical records] to disclose to a provider's insurer or attorney the medical record of some-
one who was not a patient of the provider").
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the legislature to make any necessary changes to the broad language
of the statute.
1. The Case.-William S. Warner was a patient of Dr. Horst
Schirmer, a urologist with privileges at Union Memorial Hospital.' In
1992, Warner was treated by Dr. Schirmer for urinary/genito
problems.10 During the course of that treatment, Warner disclosed
personal information to Dr. Schirmer with the understanding that the
information would remain confidential." While not expressly averred
by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that the medical records
dealing with Warner's treatment were incorporated into the medical
records of Union Memorial Hospital.
12
Unrelated to Warner's treatment, Leo Kelly, Jr. sued Dr. Brad
Lerner, a urologist with privileges at Union Memorial Hospital,'" for
medical malpractice.' 4 Byjoint agreement, Mr. Kelly and Dr. Lerner
submitted the claim to binding arbitration.' 5 Mr. Kelly retained Dr.
Schirmer as an expert witness to testify that Dr. Lerner breached ap-
plicable standards of care by performing a certain urological proce-
dure on Mr. Kelly. 6 In an effort to discredit Dr. Schirmer's testimony
9. Id. at 735, 705 A.2d at 1170-71. The court noted that the appeal arose from the
granting of a motion to dismiss; therefore the court had to "assume as fact the well-pleaded
material allegations in the complaint and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn
from them." Id., 705 A.2d at 1170 (citing Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 135-36, 492
A.2d 618, 628 (1985)). Although the complaint did not allege exactly how Dr. Lerner
obtained the pathology report, the court noted:
It seems implicit from the argument made both in the circuit court and in this
Court that, rather than physically rummaging through the actual records, Lerner
obtained the report through the Union Memorial Hospital computer system.
From the allegation that he obtained the report "wrongfully" and "in violation of
[Maryland Code, §§ 4-301 through 4-309 of the Health-General Article]," it is also
implicitly alleged that he obtained it without requesting or receiving permission
from Union Memorial, from Dr. Schirmer, or from Mr. Warner.
Id. at 737, 705 A.2d at 1171.
10. Id. at 735, 705 A.2d at 1170.
11. Id., 705 A.2d at 1170-71. The data given to Dr. Schirmer included "personal and
private data referable to the PlaintifFs urinary/genito health." Joint Record Extract at E.1,
Warner v. Lerner, 115 Md. App. 428, 693 A.2d 394 (1997), revd, 348 Md. 733, 705 A.2d
1169 (1998) (No. 1368).
12. Warner, 348 Md. at 735, 705 A.2d at 1171.
13. Id., 705 A.2d at 1170.
14. Warner v. Lerner, 115 Md. App. 428, 429, 693 A.2d 394, 394 (1997), rev'd, 348 Md.
733, 705 A.2d 1169 (1998).
15. Warner, 348 Md. at 735 & n.2, 705 A.2d at 1171 & n.2. RetiredJudge Hilary Caplan
heard the case. Id. at 735, 705 A.2d at 1171.
16. Warner, 115 Md. App. at 429, 693 A-2d at 394. Mr. Kelly was a patient of both Dr.
Lerner and Dr. Schirmer. Warner, 348 Md. at 735, 705 A.2d at 1171. The operation per-
formed on Mr. Kelly by Dr. Lerner is called a transurethral resection of the prostate
(TURP). Warner, 115 Md. App. at 429, 693 A.2d at 394. Dr. Schirmer gave deposition
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at the arbitration hearing, Dr. Lerner obtained from the medical
records of Union Memorial Hospital a copy of a pathology report of
an operation Dr. Schirmer performed. 7 The pathology report Dr.
Lerner obtained was that of Mr. Warner.1 8
At the arbitration proceeding, cross-examination of Dr. Schirmer
involved public disclosure of Mr. Warner's urological history and
treatment; Mr. Warner's confidential medical records were made pub-
lic without his authorization. 9
Following the arbitration hearing, Mr. Warner petitioned the Cir-
cuit Court of Baltimore City for relief from Dr. Lerner's alleged viola-
tion of the Records Act.2" According to Mr. Warner's theory, Dr.
Lerner willfully violated the Records Act, section 4-302, by obtaining
Mr. Warner's urological records from Union Memorial Hospital's col-
lection of medical records, 2' and Mr. Warner was damaged when the
confidential information was intentionally made public by Dr. Lerner
at the arbitration hearing.22 Dr. Lerner filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, claiming that: (1) the complaint failed to show a statutory
violation; (2) that the disclosure was permissible under sections 4-305
and 4-309; and (3) the disclosure during the arbitration proceeding
was absolutely privileged. 23
The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, noting that the
language used by the legislature in section 4-305(b)(1)(iii) of the
testimony that the "performance of a TURP on a patient with acute or chronic prostatitis
constituted malpractice." Brief of Appellee at 2, Warner v. Lerner, 348 Md. 733, 705 A.2d
1169 (1998) (No. 69). Dr. Schirmer further testified that according to Mr. Kelly's patho-
logical report, the TURP procedure should not have been performed. Id.
17. Warner, 348 Md. at 736-37, 705 A.2d at 1171.
18. Id. at 737, 705 A.2d at 1171. Mr. Warner's pathology report was practically identi-
cal to Mr. Kelly's. Brief of Appellee at 2, Warner (No. 69). The report showed that Mr.
Warner also had acute and chronic prostatitis, and that Dr. Schirmer had performed a
TURP procedure on him, thus discrediting any testimony by Dr. Schirmer that the per-
formance of such an operation on an individual with acute or chronic prostatitis consti-
tuted malpractice. Id.
19. See Warner, 348 Md. at 736, 705 A.2d at 1171 (citing the allegations in Mr. Warner's
complaint). Judge Caplan found that Dr. Lerner was not liable. Brief of Appellee at 3,
Warner (No. 69).
20. Brief of Appellee at 3, Warner (No. 69).
21. Warner, 348 Md. at 736, 705 A.2d at 1171. Section 4-302(a) provides:
(a) In generaL- A health care provider shall:
(1) Keep the medical record of a patient or recipient confidential; and
(2) Disclose the medical record only:
(i) As provided by this subtitle; or
(ii) As otherwise provided by law.
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-302(a) (Supp. 1998).
22. Brief of Appellee at 3, Warner (No. 69).
23. Warner, 348 Md. at 736, 705 A.2d at 1171.
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Records Act provided Dr. Lerner with the opportunity to gain access
to Mr. Warner's medical records for use in the malpractice suit against
him.24 In so holding, however, the court expressed great reservations
about the statute and the authorization it provided for an uninter-
ested person to gain access to medical records without the knowledge
of the patient to whom the record relates.25 Specifically, the court
expressed concern about the lack of notice to the patient, the lack of
opportunity for the patient to contest the disclosure, and the lack of
consideration by a court of competent jurisdiction to review the issue
for the possible need of a protective order.26
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling.
27
Upon examining section 4-305(b) (1) (iii), the court addressed the ex-
tremely broad nature of the word "any," and the numerous possibili-
ties for interpretation of this word in the context of the statute.28
Interpreting the statute according to its plain meaning, the court held
that section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) permitted Dr. Lerner to gain access to
Mr. Warner's records without his consent.29 The court stated that it
found this result adverse to some of the Act's purposes, including for-
tification of confidentiality and the creation of procedures under
which records may be released without the patient's prior consent.
30
While the court stated it was obligated to interpret the law as it was
clearly written, it urged the legislature to reexamine the language of
subsection 4-305(b) (1) (iii) due to its potential for abuse. 1
24. Warner v. Lerner, 115 Md. App. 428, 430-31, 693 A.2d 394, 395 (1997), rev'd, 348
Md. 733, 705 A.2d 1169 (1998) (quoting the oral opinion of the circuit courtjudge). The
circuit court, paraphrasing the language of section 4-305 (b) (iii), concluded that under the
section, "any provider may obtain any record of any patient if those records will assist in the
defense of a lawsuit against that health care provider." Id. at 430, 693 A.2d at 395 (quoting
the oral opinion of the circuit court judge).
25. Id. (quoting the oral opinion of the circuit court judge).
26. Id. (quoting the oral opinion of the circuit court judge).
27. Id. at 433, 693 A.2d at 396.
28. Id. at 438, 693 A.2d at 399. The court described the legislature's use of this word as
"dangerously overbroad." Id.
29. Id. at 433, 693 A.2d at 396. The court noted that statutory language must be ac-
cepted as written and not as the court would like it to be. Id. (citing Department of Econ.
& Employment Dev. v. Taylor, 108 Md. App. 250, 277, 671 A.2d 523, 537 (1996), affd, 344
Md. 687, 690 A.2d 508 (1997) (per curiam)).
30. Id. Further addressing the apparent inconsistencies between the purposes of the
Records Act and the language of section 4-305(b) (1) (iii), the court stated: "While we
surmise that the drafters may have intended that the terms of discretionary disclosure
should be applicable to a legal action in which the patient has a direct interest .. this
intent stands in diametric opposition to the actual language used in the Act." Id.
31. Id. at 441, 693 A.2d at 400; see also id. at 437, 693 A.2d at 398 (arguing that
"[g] ranting a health care provider unbridled discretion to disclose a confidential record is
not only completely at odds with the legislative intent of the Act, but also repugnant").
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The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review whether Dr.
Lemer could properly obtain Mr. Warner's medical records under the
authorization of section 4-305 (b) (1) (iii) of the Records Act.32
2. Legal Background.-
a. Section 4-305(b).-In Warner, the court construed several
provisions of the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act,
which is codified at sections 4-301 through 4-309 of the Health-Gen-
eral Article of the Maryland Code.33 The Records Act was first en-
acted in 1990,3 4 and was the end product of Senate Bill 584,3
proposed by the Senate Health Subcommittee in response to a per-
ceived need for revision of the rules for disclosure of mental health
records and for revision of the confidentiality of medical records in
general.36
Under the provisions of the bill, a health care provider was re-
quired to keep medical records confidential, with disclosure of infor-
32. Warner, 348 Md. at 734, 705 A.2d at 1170.
33. Id.
34. Confidentiality of Medical Records Act, ch. 480, 1990 Md. Laws 2023 (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I §§ 4-301 to -309 (1994 & Supp. 1998)).
35. S.R. 584, 396th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1990).
36. Public Health-Medical Records-Confidentiality: Hearings on S. 584 Before the Senate Econ.
and Envtl. Affairs Comm., 396th Legis., Reg. Sess. 1 (Md. 1990) [hereinafter Hearings] (testi-
mony of Senator Paula C. Hollinger, Chairman, Health Subcomm.). The Floor Report on
Senate Bill 584 noted the need for revision of the law governing the confidentiality of
medical records due to the "serious emotional, physical, and financial harm to an individ-
ual that may result from the improper disclosure of all types of health care information."
SENATE ECON. & ENVrL. AFFAIRS COMM., CONFIDENTIALITY OF MEDICAL REcoRDs, S. 396-584,
Reg. Sess. 3 (Md. 1990). The Preamble to Chapter 480 of the Acts of 1990, which gives
more insight into the Legislature's intent, provides:
WHEREAS, Medical records contain personal and sensitive information that
if improperly used or disclosed may result in significant harm to the emotional,
financial, health care, and privacy interests of a patient or recipient; and
WHEREAS, Patients and recipients need access to their medical records to
enable them to make informed decisions concerning their health care and to
correct inaccurate or incomplete information about themselves; and
WHEREAS, In order to retain the full trust and confidence of patients and
recipients, health care providers have an interest in assuring that the information
in medical records will not be improperly disclosed, and that clear and certain
rules exist for the disclosure and redisclosure of this information; and
WHEREAS, In order to protect the privacy of a patient or recipient, that
disclosure of information from a medical record without the authorization of a
person in interest be limited to the information that is relevant to the purpose for
which disclosure is sought and, when feasible and appropriate, to a review of the
record by a person who acknowledges the duty not to redisclose the identity of
the patient or recipient.
1990 Md. Laws at 2024.
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marion permitted only under certain delineated circumstances.37 The
bill set out specific circumstances under which a medical record may
or must be disclosed, and to whom such disclosure is permitted or
required. 38 There were three categories of disclosure: (1) mandatory
disclosure with the authorization of a person in interest,39 (2) discre-
tionary disclosure without the authorization of a person in interest,4 °
and (3) mandatory disclosure without the authorization of a person in
interest." This disclosure scheme was incorporated into Maryland
law through Chapter 480 of the Acts of 199042 and was codified at
Health-General Article sections 4-303, 4-305, and 4-306, respectively.
43
During the 1990 legislative session, the Senate Economic and En-
vironmental Affairs Committee heard testimony from the Chairman
of the Drafting Committee for the Uniform Health-Care Information
Act, K. King Burnett,44 in which he discussed access to medical
records through court or administrative processes.45 Specifically, Mr.
Burnett expressed concern that Maryland law did not address the situ-
ation in which an individual's medical records are sought when the
individual is not a party to the litigation and is not given notification
37. Hearings, supra note 36, at 1-2 (testimony of Senator Paula C. Hollinger, Chairman,
Health Subcomm.).
38. Id. at 2-3.
39. Id. at 2. Mandatory disclosure was required to be made to a "person in interest,"
defined as:
[A]n adult on whom a health care provider maintains a medical record, that
adult's duly appointed personal representative if he is deceased, a person author-
ized to consent to health care for that adult, a minor under certain conditions, a
parent, guardian, custodian or representative of the minor designated by a court.
Id. (noting that "[a] provider must disclose health information to these people").
40. Id. Discretionary disclosures that could be made without the authorization of the
person in interest included disclosure made to:
[A] provider's authorized employees, agents or consultants. A provider's legal
counsel, a person who uses the information for educational or research purposes,
a government agency, another health care provider who may be treating the pa-
tient in question, a third party payor or worker's comp claimant or for the deliv-
ery of emergency health care needs of the patient.
Id.
41. Id. Mandatory disclosures that were required to be made even without the authori-
zation of the person in interest included disclosures made to "individuals investigating
suspected neglect or abuse of a child or adult, to grand juries and prosecution and law
enforcement agencies, to health professional licensing and disciplinary boards, to a pro-
vider or the provider's insurer or legal counsel, and to a medical or dental review commit-
tee." Id.
42. Confidentiality of Medical Records Act, ch. 480, 1990 Md. Laws 2023 (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I §§ 4-303, -305, -306 (1994 & Supp. 1998)).
43. See HEALTH-GEN. I §§ 4-303, -305, -306.
44. See Hearings, supra note 36, at 3-6 (testimony of K. King Burnett, practicing
attorney).
45. Id.
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of the use of his medical records.46 Noting that the Uniform Health
Care Information Act incorporates a procedure of notification to non-
parties whose medical records are sought,47 Mr. Burnett urged the
legislature to adopt a similar compulsory process scheme that would
be applicable to all medical records in Maryland.4" Mr. Burnett pro-
posed an amendment that was modeled after the Uniform Act section
46. Id. at 5-6. Mr. Burnett noted: "In these instances, most medical professionals are
simply producing the records rather than seeking to fight the summons or subpoena or
even to notify the patient.... There is no hard law on this in Maryland, it is important that
it be resolved, and that some privacy safeguards be established." Id. at 5.
47. Section 2-10 5(a) (1), (a) (2), and (b) of the Uniform Health-Care Information Act
provides:
(a) Health-care information may not be disclosed by a health-care provider pursu-
ant to compulsory legal process or discovery in any judicial, legislative, or adminis-
trative proceeding unless:
(1) the patient has consented in writing to the release of the health-care
information in response to compulsory process or a discovery request; [or]
(9) a court has determined that particular health-care information is subject
to compulsory legal process or discovery because the party seeking the informa-
tion has demonstrated that the interest in access outweighs the patient's privacy
interest.
(b) Unless the court, for good cause shown, determines that the notification
should be waived or modified, if health-care information is sought ... in a civil
proceeding or investigation under paragraph (9) of subsection (a), the person
seeking discovery or compulsory process shall mail a notice by first-class mail to
the patient or patient's attorney of record of the compulsory process or discovery
request at least [ten] days before presenting the certificate required under sub-
section (c) to the health-care provider.
UNIF. HEALTH-CARE INFO. ACT § 2-105(a) (1), (a)(9), (b), 9 U.L.A. 494 (1988).
48. Hearings, supra note 36, at 6 (testimony of K. King Burnett, practicing attorney)
(noting that Senate Bill 584 incorporated a notification procedure only for records relat-
ing to mental health services).
966
1999] MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
on compulsory process;49 however, it was not incorporated in the final
bill as enacted.5 °
Mr. Burnett's concerns with the proposed Senate Bill 584 focused
on section 4-305 (b) (1) (iii), as it did not contain a compulsory process
section.5 Section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) of Senate Bill 584 stated:
A health care provider may disclose a medical record without
the authorization of a person in interest . . . [t]o any pro-
vider's insurer or legal counsel, or the authorized employees
or agents of a provider's insurer or legal counsel, for the sole
purpose of handling a potential or actual claim against any
provider.52
This section thus authorizes a health care provider, in preparation for
a trial, to make use of the medical records of a patient who is com-
49. K. King Burnett, Principal Proposed Amendment, S. 396-584, Reg. Sess. 6 (1990).
The proposed amendment, which was modeled after section 2-105 of the Uniform Health-
Care Information Act, provided as follows:
Section 4-308. Compulsory Process
(a) Health-care information may not be disclosed by a health-care provider pur-
suant to compulsory legal process or discovery in any judicial, legislative, or ad-
ministrative proceeding unless:
(1) the patient has consented in writing to the release of the health-care
information in response to compulsory process or a discovery request;
(2) the patient has waived the right to claim confidentiality for the health-
care information sought;
(3) the patient is a party to the proceeding and has placed his [or her] physi-
cal or mental condition in issue; [or]
(9) a court has determined that particular health-care information is subject
to compulsory legal process or discovery because the party seeking the informa-
tion has demonstrated that the interest in access outweighs the patient's privacy
interest.
(b) Unless the court, for good cause shown, determines that the notification
should be waived or modified, if health-care information is sought under para-
graph (2), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) or in a civil proceeding or investigation
under paragraph (9) of subsection (a), the person seeking discovery or compul-
sory process shall mail a notice by first-class mail to the patient or the patient's
attorney of record of the compulsory process or discovery request at least [ten]
days before presenting the certificate required under subsection (c) to the
health-care provider.
Id. at 7 (first and third alteration in original); see also infta notes 108-111 and accompanying
text (noting that had the legislature enacted the proposed compulsory process amend-
ment, a Warner-like situation would never have arisen and the major concerns addressed by
the concurrence about a broad reading of subsection 4-305(b)(1)(iii) would have been
resolved).
50. See Confidentiality of Medical Records Act, ch. 480, 1990 Md. Laws 2023 (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., HEALm-GEN. I §§ 4-301 to -309 (1994 & Supp. 1998)).
51. See Hearings, supra note 36, at 3-6 (testimony of K. King Burnett, practicing
attorney).
52. S. 584, 396th Leg., Reg. Sess. 12-13 (Md. 1990).
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pletely uninvolved in the claim, without giving any notification of this
use to the patient. Had Mr. Burnett's concerns been heeded, a com-
pulsory process section would have been added to the Maryland Con-
fidentiality of Medical Records Act that applied to all medical records,
not simply to mental health records. 53 However, the statute was en-
acted with a compulsory process provision applicable only with regard
to mental health records,5 4 and section 4-305(b)(1)(iii), as stated
above,55 was enacted.
b. Principles of Statutoiy Interpretation.-In attempting to gain
insight into the intent of the legislature for a given statute, the Court
of Appeals has repeatedly stated that "[t] he cardinal rule of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legis-
lature. '56 The language of the statute itself is the primary source in
determining the legislative intent. 57 The court has further explained
that in looking at the statutory language, "[i] f the words of the statute,
construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are
clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give ef-
fect to the statute as it is written."58 The Maryland judiciary has also
adopted the general rule that lacking any ambiguity, courts should
refrain from attempting "under the guise of construction, to supply
omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute, or to insert excep-
tions not made by the Legislature. '59
Commentators have criticized the canons of statutory construc-
tion adopted and employed by the Court of Appeals.6 ° In Kaczorowski
53. See Hearings, supra note 36, at 7 (testimony of K. King Burnett, practicing attorney).
54. HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-306.
55. Id. § 4-305.
56. Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 520, 671 A.2d 495, 498 (1996) (citing Oaks v. Connors,
339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)).
57. See id. at 520-21, 671 A.2d at 498-99 (citing Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429).
58. Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 428 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quotingJones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204 (1994)).
59. Amalgamated Cas. Ins. Co. v. Helms, 239 Md. 529, 536, 212 A.2d 311, 316 (1965);
see also McCance v. Lindau, 63 Md. App. 504, 512, 492 A.2d 1352, 1356 (1985) ("We think
that judges in the guise of interpreting statutes should not convert the law from what it
really is to what the judges think it ought to be." (citing R. v. Ramsey, I C. & E. 126, 136
(1883))).
60. See, e.g., Melvin J. Sykes, A Modest Proposal for a Change in Maryland's Statutes Quo, 43
MD. L. REv. 647, 649 (1984). Sykes argues:
The Court of Appeals of Maryland phrases the various canons of statutory
construction differently, but all of the canons have two things in common: They
say that the job of the court is to discover the actual intention of the legislature;
and they emphasize the importance of statutory language. These canons, particu-
larly when strung together in a case, have a magisterial tone and an aura of the
inexorable absolute. My aim is to show that these canons of construction are
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v. Mayor of Baltimore,6" the court acknowledged these concerns; how-
ever, it decided to continue adherence to the canons, noting that if
they are used properly, "they afford an opportunity for principled de-
cision making, as opposed to ad hoc judicial legislation."62 The court
stated it would continue to recognize legislative preeminence, while
also attempting to give straightforward rationales for its decisions.63
The court also noted that "the plain-meaning rule does not force us to
read legislative provisions in rote fashion and in isolation."64 Explain-
ing that by engaging in statutory interpretation the court is attempt-
ing to reach the legislative purpose or goal behind the statute, the
court stated that it may consider "external manifestations" other than
simply the words of the statute alone.65 The external manifestations
of legislative purpose that may be considered by the court include
items such as a legislative committee report, a bill title, amendments
to the bill, and other legislative history.6 6 Of course, after ascertaining
the intent of the legislature, it is possible that the intent may be in
direct opposition to the plain meaning of the statute. When faced
with such a dilemma, the Maryland courts have at times upheld the
legislative intent, and in so doing, ignored the plain language of the
statute.67
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Warner, the Court of Appeals held
that section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) permits only the health care provider in
mere boilerplate and should be abandoned because they often are misleading
and inconsistent.... I merely suggest that inserting rules of interpretation helter-
skelter in opinions is misleading and that the two favorite canons-one requiring
a court to search for the actual intent of a legislature and the other requiring a
court to divine the plain meaning of a statute-are too general to be useful in
deciding whether a particular statute dictates a particular result.
Id. at 649-50 (citation omitted).
61. 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987).
62. Id. at 512, 525 A.2d at 631.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 514, 525 A.2d at 632.
65. Id. at 515, 525 A.2d at 632.
66. Id., 525 A.2d at 633 (citing State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327, 344-45,
524 A.2d 51, 59 (1987)).
67. See Sykes, supra note 60, at 656-57 (discussing three different interpretations of the
plain meaning rule used by the Court of Appeals, and stating that "[according to the third
statement of the rule, a court may disregard the plain meaning of a statute, if the 'real
intent' of the legislature is inconsistent with the plain meaning"); e.g., State v. Fabritz, 276
Md. 416, 422, 348 A.2d 275, 279 (1975) ("In construing statutes.... results that are unrea-
sonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided whenever possible
consistent with the statutory language, with the real legislative intention prevailing over the
intention indicated by the literal meaning." (citing B.F. Saul Co. v. West End Park, 250 Md.
707, 256 A.2d 591 (1968); Sanza v. Maryland Bd. of Censors, 245 Md. 319, 226 A.2d 317
(1967); Heiceht v. State, 225 Md. 251, 170 A.2d 212 (1961))).
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possession of medical records to have the discretionary authority to dis-
close the records without the authorization of the patient.68 In con-
sidering this case, the court examined several sections of the Maryland
Confidentiality of Medical Records Act.69 The court addressed sec-
tion 4-302(a), which lays out the duty of a health care provider to
maintain the confidentiality of patients' medical records, allowing for
disclosure only as provided by law. v° The court also looked at section
4-303, which requires "a health care provider to disclose a medical
record on the authorization of a person in interest."7 Neither party
asserted that Dr. Lerner or Union Memorial Hospital had the authori-
zation of a person in interest to disclose the medical records to either
Dr. Lerner or his attorney, and thus section 4-303 was inapplicable to
the instant case. 2 The court then considered section 4-306, which
provides for the mandatory disclosure of medical records without the
authorization of a person in interest." Section 4-306 is applicable in
six enumerated circumstances,7 4 none of which were found to be
present.
75
68. Warner, 348 Md. at 739-40, 705 A.2d at 1172-73.
69. See id. at 73841, 705 A.2d at 1172-73.
70. Id. at 738, 705 A.2d at 1172. While section 4-302(b) does exempt certain types of
information from the Records Act, neither party suggested that any of the exemptions
applied to the instant case. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 738-39, 705 A.2d at 1172.
74. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-306(a) (1994) (providing mandatory disclo-
sure of a medical record without authorization of a person in interest for various types of
investigations, including investigations of suspected abuse or neglect and investigations of
the provision of health services; disclosure also mandated to a health care provider or the
provider's insurer or legal counsel when a civil action is initiated by the person in interest).
75. Warner, 348 Md. at 738-39, 705 A.2d at 1172. The court noted the relevance of
section 4-306(a) (3), which requires the disclosure "[t]o a health care provider or the pro-
vider's insurer or legal counsel, [of] all information in a medical record relating to a pa-
tient or recipient's health, health care, or treatment which forms the basis for the issues of
a claim in a civil action initiated by the patient, recipient, or person in interest." Id. at 738, 705
A.2d at 1172 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-306(a) (3)).
The court noted that if Mr. Warner had been the claimant and the report was pertinent to
the claim, the hospital may have had to disclose the record to Dr. Lerner under this provi-
sion. Id.
The court also examined section 4-306(a) (6), which requires the disclosure of a medi-
cal record "[i]n accordance with compulsory process, a stipulation by a patient or person
in interest, or a discovery request permitted by law to be made to a court, an administrative
tribunal, or a party to a civil court, administrative, or health claims arbitration proceeding."
Id. at 739, 705 A.2d at 1172 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-306(a)(6)). This section had no relevance to the instant case
because Mr. Warner's medical record was not acquired pursuant to any of the above
processes. Id.
970
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
The court based its decision in Warner on section 4-305, which
relates to permissive disclosures.76 The court focused on subsection
(b) (1)(iii), which the lower courts relied on to find that Dr. Lerner
had authority to disclose Mr. Warner's pathology report.77 Section 4-
305 (b) (1) (iii) permits disclosure of medical records by a health care
provider without the authorization of the person in interest "l[t] o any
provider's insurer or legal counsel, or the authorized employees or
agents of a provider's insurer or legal counsel, for the sole purpose of
handling a potential or actual claim against any provider."78 The
court noted that the lower courts focused on the adjective "any" as
permitting disclosure to Dr. Lerner's legal counsel, "as the legal coun-
sel for 'any provider."' 79 The court, however, characterized that ap-
proach as flawed, stating that section 4-305 was not applicable under
the facts of the case." ° According to the Court of Appeals, section 4-
305 only gives discretion to a health care provider in possession of med-
ical records to disclose the records without the consent of the person
in interest. 1 As Union Memorial Hospital was the health care pro-
vider in possession of Mr. Warner's pathology report, section 4-
305(b) (1) (iii) would only give authorization to Union Memorial Hos-
pital to disclose the report to Dr. Lerner's attorney.8 2 Thus, by gain-
ing access to the records himself, Dr. Lerner prevented Union
Memorial Hospital from exercising its discretion under section 4-
305(b) (1) (iii). 8 3 In summary, the court stated it could find nothing
76. Id. Unlike section 4-306, in which disclosures are mandatory even without the au-
thorization of a person in interest, the language of section 4-305(b) provides for nine cir-
cumstances in which "[a] health care provider may disclose a medical record without the
authorization of a person in interest." HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-305(b) (emphasis added). In
fact, section 4-305(a) expressly states that "[t]his section may not be construed to impose
an obligation on a health care provider to disclose a medical record." Id. § 4-305(a).
77. Warner, 348 Md. at 739, 705 A.2d at 1172-73.
78. HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-305(b) (1) (iii).
79. Warner, 348 Md. at 739, 705 A.2d at 1172-73.
80. Id., 705 A.2d at 1173.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 739-40, 705 A.2d at 1173.
83. Id. at 740, 705 A.2d at 1173. The court chose not to decide whether section 4-
305(b) (1) (iii) would give authority to Union Memorial Hospital to disclose to a provider's
attorney or insurer the medical records of an individual who was not a patient of the pro-
vider. Id. at n.3. However, the court did find it noteworthy that while section 4-
305(b) (1) (iii) authorizes disclosure to "any provider's insurer or legal counsel," it does not
authorize disclosure to the provider. Id. (quoting HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-305 (b)(1)(iii)). The
court noted the anomaly created by the disclosure scheme of section 4-305(b) (1) (iii), if
the Legislature did in fact intend to permit disclosure by a provider in possession of medi-
cal records to a second provider's attorney or insurer, and yet not to the second provider
him or herself. Id. The court further stated that the failure of section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) to
authorize disclosure to the provider "may well be an indication that the provision was in-
tended to be restricted to the situation in which the possessor of the medical records ... is
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in any provision of section 4-305 that authorized Dr. Lerner to access
Mr. Warner's medical records without the consent of the hospital.8 4
In a concurring opinion, Judge Raker agreed with the majority to
the extent the court held that section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) did not give
authorization to Dr. Lerner to obtain the medical records of Mr.
Warner on his own.8 5 Judge Raker wrote separately, however, to state
her rejection of the "expansive reading" of 4-305(b) (1) (iii) adopted
by the lower courts, under which Lerner, through his counsel, could
obtain Warner's medical records without his prior consent or authori-
zation. 6 Judge Raker dismissed the idea that Union Memorial had
any authorization to disclose Mr. Warner's medical records if it chose
to do so.87 To further clarify her position, Judge Raker stated that she
did not believe that section 4-305 gave discretion to a hospital, or any
other health care provider, to assist a doctor faced with a malpractice
action "by releasing to the doctor's insurer or legal counsel records of
a person other than the plaintiff."8 Focusing on the facts of the in-
stant case, Judge Raker asserted that she would hold that section 4-
305 (b) (1) (iii) did not authorize Union Memorial Hospital to disclose
Mr. Warner's medical records, absent Mr. Warner's consent.8 9
the provider being sued, for only in that setting would the 'provider' have no need to have
the records disclosed to it." Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Raker made clear that in
such a situation, she would hold that Union Memorial Hospital would have no authority
under 4-305(b) (1) (iii) to disclose Mr. Warner's records to assist Dr. Lerner in his malprac-
tice suit, absent Mr. Warner's consent. Id. at 741-42, 705 A.2d at 1174 (Raker, J., concur-
ring); see infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Raker's concurring
opinion).
84. Warner, 348 Md. at 740, 705 A.2d at 1173. Having addressed and rejected the no-
tion that Dr. Lerner had authorization under the Records Act to obtain and disclose Mr.
Warner's medical records, the court addressed the issue of whether Mr. Warner properly
stated a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 740-41, 705 A.2d at
1173. The court turned to section 4-309, which sets forth violations of the subtitle and the
resultant penalties. Id. The court specifically focused upon section 4-309(b), which im-
poses liability on any person who obtains a medical record under false pretenses or
through deception, and section 4-309(d), which authorizes liability for actual damages
from any person who knowingly violates a provision of the subtitle. Id. The court found
the factual allegations in the complaint and Warner's claim that Lerner obtained the pa-
thology report "wrongfully, willfully and in violation of the above statute" sufficient to state
a claim that the record was obtained knowingly by either false pretenses or through decep-
tion. Id. at 741, 705 A.2d at 1173. The court held that the complaint stated a cause of
action for damages under section 4-309, thus finding the Court of Special Appeals in error
for affirming the judgment of the circuit court to dismiss the claim. Id., 705 A.2d at 1173-
74.
85. Id. at 741, 705 A.2d at 1174 (Raker, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 741-42 & n.1, 705 A.2d at 1174 & n.1.
87. Id. at 74142, 705 A.2d at 1174.
88. Id. at 742, 705 A.2d at 1174.
89. Id.
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To support her position, Judge Raker relied upon the Preamble
to the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act and its indica-
tion of the General Assembly's intent "to protect the privacy of pa-
tients and to maintain the confidentiality of medical records, while
establishing clear and certain rules for disclosure of those records."'
She asserted that the broad interpretation given section 4-305 by the
lower courts counteracted the purposes behind the Records Act and
rendered the confidentiality of medical records illusory. 1 Judge
Raker further noted her disdain for the broad reading of the section
as it would allow the publication of medical records, without consent
or knowledge of the patient, in a lawsuit in which the patient has no
connection, and "with no timely opportunity to object, complain, or
to secure a protective order."'9 2
4. Analysis.-In Warner v. Lerner, the Court of Appeals held that
only the health care provider in possession of medical records is given
the discretion to disclose those records without the authorization of
the patient. 3 The court limited its holding to the specific facts of the
instant case.94 It chose not to address the issue of whether a provider
in possession of a patient's medical records had discretion under sec-
tion 4-305(b) (1) (iii) to "disclose to a provider's insurer or attorney
the medical record of someone who was not a patient of the pro-
vider. '9 5 The court correctly avoided setding on a reading of section
4-305(b) (1) (iii) that would be in conflict with the plain meaning of
the statute or its history, and properly left it to the legislature to make
any changes it deemed necessary.
In interpreting section 4-305(b) (1) (iii), the Court of Appeals
managed to stay within the framework of the plain-meaning rule as
described in Kaczorowski, while simultaneously coming to a result that
promotes the goals and purposes set forth by the legislature in enact-
ing the Records Act. Under the plain-meaning rule described in Kac-
zorowski, the words of the statute are relied upon in an effort to
discover the purpose, aim, or policy of the statute.96 The court in
Kaczorowski noted, however, that the plain-meaning rule is not inflexi-
90. Id. (quoting Confidentiality of Medical Records Act preamble, ch. 480, 1990 Md.
Laws 2023, 2024).
91. Id. at 743, 705 A.2d at 1174.
92. Id.
93. Warner, 348 Md. at 739-40, 705 A.2d at 1172-73.
94. See id. at 740, 705 A.2d at 1173.
95. Id. at n.3.
96. Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987).
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ble and does not require a statute be read in "rote fashion. '97 In at-
tempting to discover legislative intent, a court may thus "consider the
consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and
adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable re-
sult, or one which is inconsistent with common sense."'9 8
Section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) provides that "[a] health care provider
may disclose a medical record without the authorization of a person
in interest . . . [t]o any provider's insurer or legal counsel."99 Re-
jecting the Court of Special Appeals's focus upon the word "any," the
court instead concentrated on the phrase "health care provider" in
section 4-305(b)."'
In Warner, the Court of Appeals held that Dr. Lerner did not have
possession of Mr. Warner's medical records;1 1 rather, Union Memo-
rial Hospital was the provider in possession of the medical records.' 0 2
To reach the result desired by Dr. Lerner, section 4-305(b) (1) (iii)
would have to be read as authorizing a provider without possession of
medical records the discretion to obtain and disclose those medical
records, without first obtaining permission from either the patient or
the possessor of the patient's medical records. Such authorization
would create an illogical result, especially when considered in light of
the Records Act's intent to "protect the privacy of patients and to
maintain the confidentiality of medical records. ' 10 3 In a decision be-
tween a health care provider in possession of medical records or a
provider without possession, the court chose the more logical mean-
ing of the phrase "health care provider." Thus, in determining the
plain meaning of section 4-305 (b) (1) (iii) as only allowing disclosure
by the provider in possession of the medical records, the court fol-
lowed Kaczorowski, adopting the construction which best avoids an "il-
97. Id. at 514, 525 A.2d at 632.
98. Id. at 513-14, 525 A.2d at 632 (citing Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69,
75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)).
99. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-305(b) (1) (iii) (Supp. 1998).
100. See Warner, 348 Md. at 739, 705 A.2d at 1173.
101. Id.
102. Id. Although the court stated that while Dr. Lerner might have been able to show
that some policy of Union Memorial Hospital granted him permission to gain access to Mr.
Warner's medical records in order to defend against the malpractice initiated by Mr. Kelly,
Mr. Warner's allegations implicitly rejected such permission. Id. at 741, 705 A.2d at 1173.
Since the issue was brought on appeal from the granting of a motion to dismiss the action,
the court was bound to "assume as fact the well-pleaded material allegations in the com-
plaint and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them." Id. at 735, 705 A.2d
at 1170 (citing Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 135-36, 492 A.2d 618, 628 (1985)).
103. Id. at 742, 705 A.2d at 1174 (Raker, J., concurring).
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logical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with
common sense."'
1 04
Examining the plain language of the statute is only the starting
point in divining legislative intent. The court must also look to the
external manifestations of the Legislature's intent. 105 Judge Raker's
concurring opinion in Warner appears correct in its view that the inter-
pretation given section 4-305 (b) (1) (iii) by the lower courts is contrary
to the purposes of the Records Act, which is to protect the privacy of
patients and maintain the confidentiality of medical records.° 6 How-
ever, an examination of the relevant legislative history weakens the
assertion that the Legislature did not intend the result reached by the
lower courts. As the Court of Appeals noted in Kaczorowski, the legisla-
tive history of a statute may be taken into account when searching for
legislative purpose, even in unambiguous statutes. 10 7 The relevant
legislative history of section 4-305 (b) (1) (iii) shows that the Legislature
was forewarned that section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) left open the possibility
104. Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513-14, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md.
69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)). In its analysis, the court chose not to focus on the word
.any," as had been the focus of the statutory interpretation undertaken by the Court of
Special Appeals. Warner, 348 Md. at 739, 705 A.2d at 1173. In opposition to the holding of
the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals strongly implied that if it had so chosen
to focus its inquiry, it probably would have reached the conclusion that section 4-
305(b) (1)(iii) did not authorize Dr. Lerner's attorney to obtain and disclose Mr. Warner's
medical records. Id. at 740 n.3, 705 A.2d at 1173 n.3. The court indicated that even had
Union Memorial Hospital (the provider in possession) disclosed the records to Dr. Ler-
ner's attorney, the court probably would not have read section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) as permit-
ting such a result. The plain language of section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) does not provide for
disclosure to any provider's legal counsel and to any provider, as would be necessary to
achieve the result Dr. Lerner sought, since he was not originally in possession of Mr.
Warner's medical records. The court described a reading of section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) that
allowed disclosure to the provider's attorney or insurer but not to the provider as an anom-
aly. Id. Discussing this anomaly, the court indicated what its reading of the word "any"
might be when it stated:
[t]hat may well be an indication that the provision was intended to be restricted
to the situation in which the possessor of the medical records, or perhaps an
employee or agent of that possessor, is the provider being sued, for only in that
setting would the "provider" have no need to have the records disclosed to it.
Id.
105. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15, 525 A.2d at 632-33; see supra notes 65-66 and accom-
panying text (noting the various "external manifestations" of the legislature's intent a
court may consider when interpreting a statute).
106. See Warner, 348 Md. at 743, 705 A-2d at 1174-75 (Raker, J., concurring) ("Disclosure
of non-patient records could hardly have been the intent of the General Assembly when, in
the interest of expanding the confidentiality of medical records, the General Assembly
enacted the Maryland Confidentiality of Records Act."); see also supra note 36 (quoting the
preamble to the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act).
107. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 515, 525 A.2d at 633 (citing Ogrinz v.James, 309 Md. 381,
390, 524 A.2d 77, 82 (1987)).
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that the medical records of individuals who are neither parties to the
litigation, nor notified of the use of their medical records, could be
obtained."0 8 An amendment was proposed to combat this potential
problem. This amendment would have required one of several condi-
tions to be met before medical records could be disclosed under such
circumstances, including one condition that required the patient to
consent in writing to the release of his or her medical records in re-
sponse to compulsory process or a discovery request.109 Clearly, the
Legislature was aware of the possibility of a situation like Warner aris-
ing due to the language of subsection 4-305(b) (1) (iii). In fact, had a
compulsory process section been added to relate to all medical
records as had been suggested to the Legislature," 0 Judge Raker's
concerns regarding a broad reading of section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) would
have been resolved."' It chose not to do so. If the Legislature had
originally intended to give notice to a patient and prevent a Warner-
like situation, it would have taken steps to achieve this result, either by
incorporating the amendment requiring compulsory process for all
medical records or by some other method.
Rather than legislating through case law, the court properly left it
to the legislature to amend the statute. Judge Raker's concurrence
and the Court of Special Appeals's opinion, however, sent a strong
message to the legislature of the need for reexamination of the issue.
108. See Hearings, supra note 36, at 3-6 (testimony of K. King Burnett, practicing attor-
ney) (warning that under the proposed bill, the protective measures of notification to
persons who are not parties to the litigation "is limited to records relating to mental health
services"); supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (summarizing the testimony of K. King
Burnett).
109. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (quoting the proposed amendment).
110. See K. King Burnett, Principal Proposed Amendment, S. 396-584, Reg. Sess. 5
(1990) (discussing section 4-307, which mandates compulsory process only in regard to the
disclosure of mental health records, and advising that "[t ] he provisions should relate to all
medical records" and "[t]here is no rational basis for a distinction between mental health
records and others (they are often mixed anyway)"). The legislature added compulsory
process provisions in both section 4-306(a) (6) (for mandatory disclosures) and section 4-
307(h) (v) (dealing with mandatory disclosures of mental health records). See MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I §§ 4-306(a) (6), -307(h) (v) (1994). The legislature seems to have con-
sidered the benefits of compulsory process for certain types of disclosures of medical
records, and yet chose not to incorporate such a provision for giving notice for permissive
disclosures of medical records pursuant to section 4-305(b).
111. See Warner, 348 Md. at 743, 705 A.2d at 1174 (Raker, J., concurring) (noting her
concern that under the interpretation given section 4-305(b) (1)(iii) "[r]ecords could ...
be published, without a patient's knowledge or consent, in a lawsuit in which the patient
has no interest or connection thereto, and with no timely opportunity to object, complain,
or to secure a protective order").
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The legislature, swiftly responding to Warner,"2 enacted Senate Bill
649 as Chapter 630 of the Acts of 1998.113 Section 4-305(b) (1) (iii)
was amended only to provide for the disclosure of medical records of
a claimant whose medical records relate to the claim.1 14 Thus, no
longer can a situation like Warner arise, in which the records of a pa-
tient with no involvement in a lawsuit are obtained and used in that
lawsuit, without giving any notice to the patient. The new section 4-
305(b) (1) (iii) will not offend concepts of confidentiality and privacy
because a claimant should be on notice that his or her records may be
used in the suit he or she brought. The swift action by the legislature
gives support to the court's decision in Warner. The court correctly
avoided engaging in ad hoc legislation, thus properly leaving legisla-
tive duties to the legislature. Through the Warner opinion, however,
the court sent a strong message to the legislature about the potential
conflict between the Confidentiality of Medical Records Act's goals of
confidentiality and privacy and the result that was possible under sec-
tion 4-305(b) (1) (iii).
5. Conclusion.-The Warner court's interpretation of section 4-
305(b) (1) (iii) correctly stayed within the plain meaning of the statute
and simultaneously reached a result consistent with the Confidential-
ity of Medical Records Act's stated goals of privacy for the patient and
confidentiality of medical records. The result under Warner left open
the possibility that section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) authorized providers to ob-
tain and disclose the medical records of a patient who is not related to
the claim, with no need to notify that patient. The court refrained
112. See Disclosure of Medical Records-Health Care Provider's Insurer or Legal Counsel: Hearings
on S. 649 Before the Senate Econ. and Envtl. Affairs Comm., 412th Legis., Reg. Sess. 1 (Md.
1998) (testimony of Senator Paula C. Hollinger, Chairman, Health Subcomm.) (stating
that Senate Bill 649 "arises from the case of Warner v. Lerner which demonstrates that a
loophole exists in Maryland law regarding the confidentiality of medical records").
113. Act of May 21, 1998, ch. 630, 1998 Md. Laws 3065 (codified at MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I § 4-305 (Supp. 1998)). Chapter 630 states in pertinent part:
(b) A health care provider may disclose a medical record without the author-
ization of a person in interest:
(iii) to any provider's insurer or legal counsel, or the authorized employ-
ees or agents of a provider's insurer or legal counsel, for the sole purpose of
handling a potential or actual claim against any provider if the medical record is
maintained on the claimant and relates to the subject matter of the claim.
Id. at 3067-68.
114. Id. at 3068. Note that the statute is now narrower than it would have been had it
incorporated the compulsory process section recommended by Mr. Burnett. As amended,
section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) only authorizes the disclosure of the medical records of claimants,
with no provision for obtaining and disclosing the medical records of nonclaimant pa-
tients. See id.
1999]
978 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:604
from legislating by case law, correctly leaving the decision to the legis-
lature to change the language of section 4-305(b) (1) (iii).
The Warner court sent a message to the legislature of a possible
need for revision of section 4-305(b) (1) (iii) to avoid compromising
the goals under the Records Act. The legislature's answer to Warner
was to amend the statute to make clear that it does not authorize the
disclosure of the medical records of a patient not involved in the suit
and unaware of the use of his or her records.
AMY BETH LEAsuRE
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
X. INSURANCE
A. Maryland Common Law Judicial Remedies Run Concurrent with
Administrative Remedies for Alleged Acts of Fraud, Negligence, and
Negligent Misrepresentation by an Insurer
In Zappone v. Liberty Life Insurance Co.,1 the Court of Appeals held
that common law judicial remedies for insurance fraud, negligence,
and negligent misrepresentation are fully concurrent with the admin-
istrative remedies provided for under the Unfair Trade Practices subti-
tle of the Maryland Insurance Code.2 Thus, an aggrieved insured may
pursue "recognized independent tort remed[ies] without first invok-
ing and exhausting the administrative remedy under the Unfair Trade
Practices subtitle of the Insurance Code."' The court reasoned that
"where neither the statutory language nor the legislative history dis-
close an intent that the administrative remedy is to be exclusive, and
where there is an alternative judicial remedy under another statute or
under common law or equitable principles, there is no presumption
that the administrative remedy was intended to be exclusive."4 Even
though there is a presumption that the legislature intended an admin-
istrative remedy to be primary to common law remedies, the court
further reasoned that this presumption is rebuttable, and other fac-
tors are pertinent.5 In so ruling, the Court of Appeals reached a logi-
cal summation of its prior case law and clarified its former
presumptions concerning the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The re-
sult will produce greater judicial uniformity and consistency by provid-
ing clear guidance to Maryland courts as they determine when an
administrative remedy is exclusive, primary, or concurrent in relation
to judicial remedies.
1. 349 Md. 45, 706 A.2d 1060 (1998).
2. Id. at 68, 706 A.2d at 1071. At the time of these proceedings, the Maryland Insur-
ance Code was codified at Article 48A of the 1957 Code. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 212-
240J (1994) (recodified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 27-101 to -911 (1997). In
1997, the Maryland General Assembly recodified these provisions at Title 27 of the new
Insurance Article, entitled "Unfair Trade Practices and Other Prohibited Practices." 1997
Md. Laws ch. 35 (recodified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 27-101 to -911 (1997)).
This Note will use the code citations in effect when the case was decided by the circuit
court.
3. Zappone, 349 Md. at 68, 706 A.2d at 7071.
4. Id. at 63, 706 A.2d at 1069.
5. Id. at 64, 706 A.2d at 1069.
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1. The Case.-In March 1989, William Ray Miller, co-owner of
First Financial Resources, Inc., an independent insurance agency,6
contacted Ricardo Zappone, the sole shareholder and an employee of
Print-A-Copy, Inc.,7 regarding the purchase of a life insurance policy.8
Miller told Zappone that the policy, the Executive Wealth Builder II,
would satisfy Zappone's needs of providing benefits in the event of
premature death and would accrue a large cash value over a short
period to provide for his retirement.9 Miller further represented,
through computer-generated illustrations, that a one-time premium
payment of $500,000 could fully fund the policy."0 Miller also claimed
that no other premiums would be necessary for the policy to stay in
effect and perform as illustrated, and that the policy would provide
the needed cash accumulation for Zappone's retirement.'" In addi-
tion to the one-time premium payment, Miller told Zappone, a binder
payment of $10,000 would be required to start the policy.' 2
Zappone agreed to purchase the policy, and at Miller's sugges-
tion, Zappone financed the purchase of the policy pursuant to a "split-
dollar" 3 agreement between himself and Print-A-Copy.14 According
to the agreement, Print-A-Copy loaned Zappone $510,000 to pay the
policy's premium, and Zappone conveyed a security interest in the
proceeds of the policy, up to the amount of the loan, to Print-A-
Copy. 15 To finance the loan, Print-A-Copy obtained a loan from Mary-
land National Bank for $510,000, and Print-A-Copy granted its security
interest in the policy to the bank as collateral for the loan.' 6 Zappone
was convinced to fund the policy in this manner by Miller's represen-
6. Id. at 52, 706 A.2d at 1064. First Financial is the licensed managing general agency,
while Miller is the licensed general agent for Liberty Life Insurance Company in the State
of Maryland. Id.
7. Id. Print-A-Copy is a small business providing printing, copying, and office supply
services in Montgomery County, Maryland. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 53, 706 A.2d at 1064. The plan consisted of a life insurance policy with a face
amount of one million dollars that could be used as a deferred compensation plan to




13. Id. A "split dollar" arrangement typically involves a situation where an employee is
in need of permanent life insurance protection but lacks sufficient resources to make the
required premium payments. STANFORD A. WYNN, THE INSURANCE COUNSELOR 23 (1991).
The employer, however, has sufficient resources and is willing and able to assist the em-
ployee in obtaining the needed insurance protection. Id. The arrangement usually pro-
vides for a sharing or "splitting" of the policy benefits to repay the employer. Id.
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tation that Print-A-Copy's interest payments on the loan would be tax
deductible. 7
Zappone's tax advisor later informed Zappone that the interest
Print-A-Copy paid on the Maryland National loan was not deducti-
ble. i" When Zappone confronted Miller about the tax consequences
of the interest payments, Miller maintained that the interest payments
were deductible.1"
In May 1990, Liberty Life notified Zappone that his $510,000 pre-
mium payment exceeded, by $407,034.48, the statutory maximum that
could be paid into a life insurance policy.2 ° The written notice ad-
vised Zappone that he would be taxed on any policy distributions in
excess of the amount of premiums paid if the premiums exceeded the
new statutory limits, and advanced several options that would rectify
the problem.2 The letter also stated that if Zappone failed to make
an election by May 30, 1990, Liberty Life would automatically place
the excess premium payment in an "advance premium deposit ac-
count."22 Zappone contacted Miller upon receipt of the letter, and
Miller allegedly told him not to worry about the letter because he
would "take care of it."23 Zappone did not respond to the letter be-
cause he believed that Miller was making the necessary
arrangements. 24
In July 1990, Liberty Life deposited the excess premium amount
in an "advance premium deposit" account 25 after receiving no re-
17. Id. Liberty Life issued the policy to Zappone in July 1989. Id. at 54, 706 A.2d at
1064. However, instead of a one-time premium payment as agreed, the policy called for
monthly premiums. Md First Financial corrected this problem with Liberty Life and the
policy was converted to a single premium policy. Id.
18. Id. at 54, 706 A.2d at 1064.
19. Id.
20. Id., 706 A.2d at 1065.
21. Id. The options set forth by Liberty Life were: (1) Zappone could deposit the
excess premium payment in an "'advance premium deposit account,' which would auto-
matically pay the maximum allowable statutory amounts into the policy, while the interest
on the accounts would be taxed annually, and Zappone could withdraw interest or princi-
ple at any time"; (2) Zappone could deposit the excess premium payment into a "'side
fund account' which would operate like an advance premium deposit account but the
interest would be tax deferred and Zappone would not have access to the interest as it
accrued"; (3) Zappone could have the excess premium amount refunded, which would
then require an annual premium payment; or (4) Zappone could keep the full amount
already in the policy, and be taxed on the excess policy distributions as originally described
in the letter. Id. at 54-55, 706 A.2d at 1065.
22. Id. at 55, 706 A.2d at 1065.
23. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id.
25. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose as well as describ-
ing an advance premium deposit account).
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sponse from Zappone.26 Upon receiving a letter from Liberty Life
informing him of the election, Zappone again contacted Miller, who
suggested the execution of a special "side fund agreement."2 7 The
creation of this agreement, Miller explained to Zappone, would "solve
any tax problems associated with the large premium amount and with-
out creating new tax liabilities or reducing the policy's cash value."2"
Because of these representations, Zappone signed the "special side
fund agreement," thereby switching the policy from one funded by an
"advanced premium deposit" to one funded by a "special side fund
agreement."
29
In mid-1992, Zappone's estate-planning specialist informed him
that the establishment of the special side-fund agreement and the issu-
ance of a monthly insurance premium would prevent the insurance
policy from performing as represented by Miller and Liberty Life un-
less substantial additional premiums were paid.3 ° Zappone learned
that at the end of the twelve years when he intended to begin with-
drawing from the policy, the policy would be worth $400,000 less than
the face value of the policy, substantially less than the amount Miller
represented, and would be insufficient to fund his retirement.31
Subsequently, Zappone and Print-A-Copy filed a multi-count
complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging
fraud, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation against Miller,
First Financial, and Liberty Life.32 After extensive discovery, various
motions for summary judgment and dismissal were filed by all three
defendants.3  The circuit court ruled that the allegations of fraud,
negligence, and negligent misrepresentation fell under the unfair
trades practices provisions of the Insurance Code, which constituted
the exclusive remedy for "all claims of unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tices by insurers or insurance agents in connection with the sale of
26. Zappone, 349 Md. at 55, 706 A.2d at 1065.
27. Id. As the court explained:
A side fund agreement is a special interest bearing account from which annual
premium payments are made for a life insurance policy to insure compliance with
the requirements of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act (TAMRA), 26
U.S.C. § 7702A (1994). This agreement acts as an escrow account in that the
funds deposited therein accrue interest and must be used to pay the annual pre-
miums on the insurance policy which comply with the TAMRA rules for the
policy.
Id. at 55 n.3, 706 A.2d at 1065 n.3.
28. Id. at 55, 706 A.2d at 1065.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 55-56, 706 A.2d at 1065.
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insurance." 4 Relying on the holding of Vicente v. Prudential Insurance
Co. of America,35 the circuit court reasoned that because plaintiffs as-
serted claims expressly covered by the Insurance Code, their sole rem-
edy would be an administrative hearing before the Insurance
Commissioner.36 Zappone and Print-A-Copy timely appealed, and the
Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari to hear the case before the
Court of Special Appeals reviewed the matter to determine "if the pro-
visions of the Insurance Code pertaining to unfair trade practices by
insurers and their agents provide the exclusive or primary remedy for
alleged acts of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence by
an insurer or agent in connection with the sale of insurance."3 7
2. Legal Background.-
a. Unfair or Deceptive Practices Prohibited by the Insurance
Code.-In 1947, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a fifteen sec-
tion subtitle in the Insurance Code titled "Unfair Trade Practices."38
The purpose of these provisions was:
[T]o regulate trade practices in the business of insurance in
accordance with the intent of Congress, . . . by defining, or
providing for determination of, all such practices in this state
which constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or
deceptive acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade prac-
tices so defined or determined.39
The most relevant provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices subti-
tle are as follows. Article 48A, section 215 provides the general rem-
edy of cease and desist orders for violations of the Unfair Trade
Practices subtitle.4 ° Section 215 reads, in pertinent part:
(a) When issued.-If, after a hearing thereon of which notice
of such hearing and of the charges against him were given in
person, the Commissioner finds that any person in this State
34. Id. at 57, 706 A.2d at 1066.
35. 105 Md. App. 13, 24, 658 A.2d 1106, 1111 (1995).
36. Zappone, 349 Md. at 57, 706 A.2d at 1066. The Vicente court expressly held that
claims covered by the Unfair Trade Practices Act are exclusive. Vicente, 105 Md. App. at 24,
658 A.2d at 1111.
37. Zappone, 349 Md. at 50, 706 A.2d at 1062.
38. 1997 Md. Laws ch. 35 (recodified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 27-101 to -
911 (1997)).
39. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 212 (1994) (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-101
(1997)). While the Maryland General Assembly has recodified the Insurance Code, the
substance has remained largely intact. Zappone, 349 Md. at 51, 706 A.2d at 1063.




has engaged or is engaging in any act or practice defined in
or prohibited under this subtitle, the Commissioner shall or-
der such person to cease and desist from such acts or
practices.
(c) Order of Court upon appeal.-In event of such an appeal,
to the extent that the Commissioner's order is affirmed the
court shall issue its own order commanding obedience to the
terms of the Commissioner's order.
(d) Effect of order on other liability, penalty orforfeiture.-No or-
der of the Commissioner pursuant to this section or order of
the court to enforce it shall in any way relieve or absolve any
person affected by such order from any other liability, pen-
alty, or forfeiture under law.4'
Section 216 allows the Insurance Commissioner to define practices as
unfair and/or deceptive that are not actually defined in the subtitle as
against public policy.42 This section provides for an injunction of the
unfair and/or deceptive act if the act has not been discontinued after
a final administrative determination.
Section 217 mainly concerns misrepresentations about insurance
policies.44 This section prohibits the misrepresentation of terms, ben-
efits or advantages of any policy issued.45 False information and ad-
vertising that "is untrue, deceptive or misleading" is prohibited by
section 218.46 According to section 233(e)(1), it is a "fraudulent in-
surance act for a person to... [k] nowingly or willfully make any false
or fraudulent statement or representation in or with reference to any
application for insurance. 47 Other sections provide remedial provi-
sions for violations for the section involved.48
In addition to the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle, Article 48A,
sections 35-404" furnish general administrative and judicial review
41. Id.
42. Id. § 216 (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 27-104, -105 (1997)).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 217 (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-202 (1997)).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 218 (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-203 (1997)).
47. Id. § 233(e)(1) (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-406 (1997)).
48. See, e.g., id. § 230A(e) (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-305 (1997)) (provid-
ing that "[t]he commissioner may impose a penalty... for each violation of" this section);
Id. § 233 (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-406 (1997)) (stating that "[a] person who
violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor"); Id. § 234AA(g) (recodified as MD. CODE
ANN., INS. § 2 7 -502(g) (1997)) (allowing the fine to be imposed by the commissioner); Id.
§ 234C (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-501 (1997)) (authorizing the commis-
sioner to order an insurer to accept a particular risk).
49. Id. §§ 35-40 (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 2-210 to -215 (1997)).
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remedies that enforce the provisions and principles of the Insurance
Code. Moreover, Article 48A, section 55 authorizes the Insurance
Commissioner to refuse to issue or renew an insurer's license as well
as revoke or suspend that license if the insurer violates any provision
of Article 48 or "[k] nowingly fails to comply with any lawful rule, regu-
lation or order of the Commissioner. "50 Article 48A, section 55A is
the monetary penalty provision of the insurance code allowing penal-
ties of not less than one hundred dollars or more than fifty thousand
dollars "in lieu of or in addition to revocation or suspension of an
insurer's" license.51
While the above sections illustrate the comprehensiveness of the
Insurance Code, no sections specifically address any jurisdictional
concerns, specifically whether the Insurance Commissioner has exclu-
sive, primary, or concurrent jurisdiction with the courts for common
law claims.
b. Coordinating Administrative Remedies with Judicial Reme-
dies.-When the legislature provides for administrative remedies in
specified areas of the law, the question whether alternative judicial
remedies are available arises. The answer depends on whether the
legislature intended the administrative remedy to be exclusive of,52
primary to,53 or concurrent54 with judicial remedies.
(1) When Administrative Remedy is Deemed Exclusive.-When
an administrative remedy is deemed exclusive, the sole authority to
provide a remedy lies with the appropriate governmental agency; a
judicial action at law or in equity is preempted.55 In this instance, a
court has no jurisdiction over an action brought by a plaintiff.56 Fur-
thermore, when an administrative remedy is exclusive, but provides
for a right of judicial review, the "exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies doctrine" requires a claimant to first exhaust the prescribed ad-
50. Id. § 55 (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 4-113 (1997)).
51. Id. § 55A (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 4-113(d) (1997)).
52. White v. Prince George's County, 282 Md. 641, 653-54, 387 A.2d 260, 267 (1978)
(finding that the administrative remedy provided under the Maryland Tax Code is a claim-
ant's exclusive remedy for taxes erroneously paid under mistake of law).
53. McCullough v. Witter, 314 Md. 602, 613, 552 A.2d 881, 886 (1989) (noting that
when "a plaintiff has both an administrative remedy and an independent judicial action,"
the administrative action is usually deemed primary).
54. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282
Md. 588, 386 A.2d 1216 (1978) (finding that the tax appeal tribunals and the courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of contract construction).
55. See White, 282 Md. at 649, 387 A.2d at 265.
56. Id.
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ministrative procedures to their conclusion before resort to the courts
for judicial review of the administrative decision.57
To determine whether an administrative remedy is exclusive, the
courts normally look to the legislature's intent.5s Normally, the courts
have held that an administrative remedy will be deemed exclusive
when the legislature expressly indicates that the administrative rem-
edy is exclusive or when the claim is created and based on a statutory
right and no other recognized alternative common law remedy is
available. For example, in Moats v. City of Hagerstown,59 law enforce-
ment officers were charged with intentionally misrepresenting facts
concerning overtime reports.60 The officers sought to waive their
right to a hearing under the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights
(LEOBOR) and instead pursue a grievance under their collective bar-
gaining agreement.61 The court held that the procedures of LE-
57. See id. ("[Wlhere the special statutory scheme for relief is exclusive and provides
for judicial review of the administrative decision, one must normally exhaust the adminis-
trative remedy before recourse to the courts under the judicial review provisions." (citing
Soley v. State Comm'n on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521, 526, 356 A.2d 254 (1976);
Leatherbury v. Gaylord Fuel Corp., 276 Md. 367, 373-76, 347 A.2d 826 (1975))); see also
Maryland-Nat'l Capital, 282 Md. at 602, 386 A.2d at 1226 (explaining that the exhaustion of
administrative remedies doctrine "demands that a party fully pursue administrative proce-
dures before obtaining limited judicial review and contemplates a situation in which the
claim asserted is enforceable initially by administrative action exclusively" (citing Mazzola v.
Southern New England Tel. Co., 363 A.2d 170, 174 (Conn. 1975))). The Court of Appeals
has recognized that there are exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doc-
trine. The court listed five exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine in Prince George's County
v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 284-85, 418 A.2d 1155, 1161 (1980). First, the doctrine need not
be applied when the legislature has explicitly intended that exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not required before the institution of a judicial action. Id. at 284, 418 A.2d at
1161 (citing White, 282 Md. at 649, 387 A.2d at 265). Second, when there is a direct attack
on the authority of the legislative body to pass legislation from which relief is sought, ex-
haustion is not required. Id. at 284-85, 418 A.2d at 1161 (citing Harbor Island Marina v.
Calvert County, 286 Md. 303, 308, 407 A.2d 738, 741 (1979)). Third, a party is not re-
quired to exhaust an administrative agency's remedies when the agency's specified proce-
dures are not authorized. Id. at 285, 418 A.2d at 1161 (citing Stark v. Board of
Registration, 179 Md. 276, 284-85, 19 A.2d 716, 720 (1941)). Fourth, when an agency
cannot provide "to any substantial degree a remedy," a party should not have to exhaust
the administrative remedy. Id. (citing Poe v. Baltimore City, 241 Md. 303, 308-09, 216 A.2d
707, 709 (1966)). Lastly, when the issues in the action only tangentially or incidentally
involve matters that fall within an agency's expertise but do not, "in any meaningful way,
call for or involve applications of its expertise," the exhaustion doctrine need not be in-
voked. Id. (citing Maryland-Nat'l Capita4 282 Md. at 594-604, 386 A.2d at 1222-27).
58. White, 282 Md. at 649, 387 A.2d at 265 (citing Maryland-Nat'l Capital 282 Md. at 595-
96, 386 A.2d at 1216; Reiling v. Comptroller, 201 Md. 384, 387-89, 94 A.2d 261 (1953);
Wasena Housing Corp. v. Levay, 188 Md. 383, 391, 52 A.2d 903 (1947); Tawes v. Williams,
179 Md. 224, 228, 17 A.2d 137 (1941)).
59. 324 Md. 519, 597 A.2d 972 (1991).
60. Id. at 521, 597 A.2d at 973.
61. Id.
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OBOR are exclusive.62 After examining the language and history of
LEOBOR, Judge Eldridge found, inter alia, the language in LEOBOR
stating that "any local legislation shall be preempted by the subject
and material of this subsection" expressly intended LEOBOR to be an
officer's exclusive remedy.63
In White v. Prince George's County,64 the Court of Appeals handled a
dispute over recordation taxes that were alleged to have been volunta-
rily but illegally collected in Prince George's County.6 5 Because there
was no recognized alternative judicial action available for taxes volun-
tarily paid under mistake of law, the court held that if the plaintiffs
were entitled to a refund, the Maryland Tax Code would be the exclu-
sive statutory remedy for recovery of special taxes erroneously paid.66
In dicta, the court stated that "absent a legislative indication to the
contrary, it will usually be deemed that the Legislature intended the
special statutory remedy to be exclusive."67
A year after the White decision, the Court of Appeals in Department
of Human Resources v. Wilson6" considered whether the Employment
Security Administration (ESA) had unlawfully refused to pay weekly
unemployment benefits.69 In holding that these issues are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the ESA Board of Appeals, the Wilson court
relied, inter alia, on the dicta in White, stating that " [o]rdinarily, where
62. Id. at 530, 597 A.2d at 977.
63. Id. at 527, 597 A.2d at 975-76. Judge Eldridge also reasoned that "when the Gen-
eral Assembly enacts a comprehensive administrative remedial scheme, that administrative
remedy is generally deemed exclusive." Id. at 529, 597 A.2d at 977 (citing Board v. Secre-
tary of Personnel, 317 Md. 34, 42-43, 562 A.2d 700, 704 (1989); Clinton v. Board of Educ.,
315 Md. 666, 678, 556 A.2d 273, 279 (1989); Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 18, 511 A.2d 1079, 1087 (1986); Commission on Human
Relations v. Mass Transit Auth., 294 Md. 225, 230, 449 A.2d 385, 387 (1982); Maryland
Dep't of Human Resources v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 643-45, 409 A.2d 713, 715-17 (1979)).
64. 282 Md. 641, 387 A.2d 260 (1978).
65. Id. at 643, 387 A.2d at 262.
66. Id. at 653-54, 387 A.2d at 267. The court examined the history of the common law
rule relating to tax refund actions and the statutory provisions for relief. Id. at 653, 387
A.2d at 267. It found that plaintiffs had no alternative statutory remedy and no right under
the common law to recover money voluntarily paid under a mistake of law. Id.
67. Id at 649, 387 A.2d at 265 (citing State Dep't of Assessment & Taxation v. Clark,
281 Md. 385, 401, 380 A.2d 28, 37 (1977); Dubois v. City of College Park, 280 Md. 525, 533,
375 A.2d 1098, 1104 (1977); Soley v. State Comm'n on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521,
526, 356 A.2d 254, 257 (1976); Agrarian, Inc. v. Zoning Inspector, 262 Md. 329, 332, 277
A.2d 591, 592 (1971)).
68. 286 Md. 639, 409 A.2d 713 (1979).
69. Id. at 643, 409 A.2d at 716.
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a statutory administrative remedy is provided, it will be deemed
exclusive."70
While both White and Wilson held the administrative remedy to be
exclusive because the statutory scheme authorizing the administrative
remedy created the cause of action and no alternative action existed
for the plaintiffs, these two cases seemingly added a new presumption
that administrative remedies are usually deemed exclusive to alterna-
tive judicial remedies.
In contrast to the above cases, in Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Merling,71 the Court of Appeals recognized that an insurance agent
terminated by an insurer had an independent action at common law,
even though he also had a statutory remedy under section 234B7 2 of
the Unfair Trade Practices Act.7" The agent filed an action for con-
version and tortious interference with his property rights when the
insurer contacted his policyholders prior to the expiration of their
policies in order to solicit their business." The court heard the
agent's claims despite the remedies available through section 234B,
which provides an agent with rights and remedies regarding termina-
tion and continuation of business.75
In determining when specific administrative remedies are
deemed exclusive in the face of alternative judicial remedies, the
courts have also alluded to a distinction between purely statutory rem-
edies and those that constitute common law causes of action. In Muhl
v. Magan (Magan 1),76 a physician complained of an insurance com-
pany's failure to underwrite his liability insurance before the Insur-
70. Id. (citing White, 282 Md. at 649, 387 A.2d at 265; Scheider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64,
68, 81 A.2d 226, 228 (1950)). Many courts following the White and Wilson decisions have
since cited to this reasoning in analyzing the relationship between administrative and judi-
cial remedies, thereby further solidifying this rationale in Maryland jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Board of Educ. v. Secretary of Personnel, 317 Md. 34, 42, 562 A.2d 700, 704 (1989) ("Ordi-
narily, where a statutory administrative remedy is provided, it will be deemed to be exclu-
sive."); Veydt v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 94 Md. App. 1, 12, 614 A.2d 1318, 1324 (1992)
("'[A] bsent a legislative indication to the contrary, it will usually be deemed that the Legis-
lature intended a special statutory remedy.., to be exclusive.'" (quoting White, 282 Md. at
649, 387 A.2d at 265)); McClean Contracting Co. v. Maryland Transp. Auth., 70 Md. App.
514, 522, 521 A.2d 1251, 1255 (1987) (same).
71. 326 Md. 329, 605 A.2d 83 (1992).
72. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234B (1994) (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-
503 (1997)).
73. Travelers Indem. Co., 326 Md. at 339-42, 605 A.2d at 87-89.
74. Id. at 333-35, 605 A.2d at 85. Merling contended that this interference caused his
former clients not to renew their insurance policies through him. Id. at 335, 605 A.2d at
86. He also contended that he, and not Travelers Indemnity, was the exclusive owner of
the information collected in regard to his clients. Id.
75. Id. at 336-42, 605 A.2d at 86-89.
76. 313 Md. 462, 545 A.2d 1321 (1988).
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ance Commissioner.77 The claim, if proven, would fall under the
Unfair Trade Practices subtitle addressed in the Insurance Code 8. 7
Judge Rodowsky, writing for the court, said Magan had no contract
with the insurance company and that Magan's requested relief to
compel the insurance company to enter into a contract with him was a
"form of relief generally unknown to the common law." 79 The only
remedy available to Magan was the exclusive remedy created by the
Maryland General Assembly involving situations whereby insurers who
decline to accept a particular risk may be in violation of Article 48A,
sections 234A and 234C8 ° of the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle.8 '
The court recognized that "where the General Assembly has provided
a special form of remedy and has established a statutory procedure
before an administrative agency for a special kind of case, a litigant
must ordinarily pursue that form of remedy and not bypass the admin-
istrative official."8 2
(2) Administrative Remedy is Deemed to be Primary to Judicial
Remedy-The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a 'Judicially created
rule designed to coordinate the allocation of functions between courts
and administrative bodies," and applies only when there is a statutorily
created administrative remedy as well as an alternative judicial remedy
available to redress a particular wrong.83 When the legislature dele-
gates authority to an administrative agency to provide specified reme-
dies for the violation of statutorily created rights, the courts use the
doctrine to determine whether a litigant is first required to pursue a
remedy with the administrative agency before a remedy can be had in
77. Id. at 469-70, 545 A.2d at 1325.
78. Id. at 465-77, 545 A.2d at 1322-28.
79. Id. at 480, 545 A.2d at 1330.
80. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 234A, 234C (1994) (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS.
§§ 27-501, 27-505 (1997)).
81. Magan I, 313 Md. at 480, 545 A.2d at 1330.
82. Id. (citing Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155
(1980)).
83. See Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena,
282 Md. 588, 601, 386 A.2d 1216, 1225-26 (1978) (citing Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
426 U.S. 290, 303 (1976); United States v. Western Pac. KR Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956));
see also Maryland House of Correction v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 257-58, 703 A.2d 167, 173-74
(1997) (noting that the primary jurisdiction doctrine was judicially created to allocate
functions between the courts and administrative agencies and comes into play when the
court and agency have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter (citing Washington Subur-
ban Sanitary Comm'n v. Mitchell & Best, 303 Md. 544, 561-62, 495 A.2d 30, 39 (1985))).
See generally Michael Botein, Primary Jurisdiction: The Need for Better Court/Agency Interaction,
29 RUTGERS L. REv. 867 (1976) (discussing how the doctrine of primary jurisdiction coordi-
nates the interaction between courts and agencies and how this interaction can be made
more efficient).
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the courts.8 4 Typically, newly created agencies mean the addition of
newly created legal authority, with no explicit abridgment of the pre-
existing power of the courts over common law remedies previously
available to redress a wrong now dealt with by statute.8 5 The doctrine
is thus invoked when both the agency and the judiciary have "concur-
rent jurisdiction over the same matter and there is no statutory provi-
sion to coordinate the work of the court with that of the agency. '8 6 In
this situation, the courts ordinarily implement the doctrine to allocate
initial decision-making responsibility to agencies for an action that
"raises issues or relates to subject matter falling within the special ex-
pertise of an administrative agency." " As a result, there is a presump-
tion that an administrative remedy is intended to have primary
jurisdiction to alternative judicial remedies.8
The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of primaryjurisdiction
in Clinton v. Board of Education.9 Parents filed a complaint against the
Howard County School Board seeking interlocutory and permanent
injunctive relief to enjoin the school board from displacing or reas-
signing their children, who were nonresidents of the county, from the
elementary school they were attending.9 ° The school board filed a
counterclaim seeking to recover the children's school tuition because
84. Maryland-Nat'l Capita 282 Md. at 599-600, 386 A.2d at 1224-25.
85. 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 22:1, at 81 (2d ed. 1983)
(discussing the nature and function of primary jurisdiction).
86. Maryland-Nat'l Capital, 282 Md. at 601, 386 A.2d at 1226 (citation omitted) (citing
Mordhorst v. Egert, 223 N.W.2d 501, 504 (S.D. 1974); Mercury Motor Express, Inc. v.
Brinke, 475 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1973)).
87. Id. at 602, 386 A.2d at 1226 (citing Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 63-64); Writers Guild
of Am., West, Inc. v. F.C.C., 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1089-90 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Louis L. Jaffe,
Primaiy Jurisdiction Reconsidered: The Antitrust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 577, 579 (1954)). In
addition, when an agency's remedy "is deemed primary, it is appropriate for the trial court
to retain . . . jurisdiction over the independent judicial action pending invocation and
exhaustion of the administrative procedures." McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 613,
552 A.2d 881, 886 (1989) (citing Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Craw-
ford, 307 Md. 1, 18, 511 A.2d 1079, 1087 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774,
792-93, 506 A.2d 625, 634 (1986)).
88. Fields, 348 Md. at 257, 703 A.2d at 174 ("[W]here there is a pre-existing common-
law or statutory judicial remedy for the same matter, and where the legislature fails to
specify which remedy is primary, the usual legal presumption is that the administrative
remedy is primary and must be 'first invoked and followed' before resort to the courts");
Maryland Reclamation Assoc., Inc. v. Harford County, 342 Md. 476, 493, 677 A.2d 567, 576
(1996) ("[T]his Court has 'ordinarily construed the pertinent [legislative] enactments to
require that the administrative remedy be first invoked and followed' before resort to the
courts."); Hubbard, 305 Md. at 786, 506 A.2d at 631 ("[W]e have ordinarily construed the
pertinent enactments to require that the administrative remedy be first invoked and
followed.").
89. 315 Md. 666, 556 A.2d 273 (1989).
90. Id. at 668-70, 556 A.2d at 274-75.
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the children did not meet the residency requirements in the county.91
Plaintiffs contended that charging tuition is repugnant to the Educa-
tion Article of the Maryland Code, which requires a general system of
free public schools.92 The issue was whether the Maryland State
Board of Education or the courts should first interpret the Maryland
Constitution in reference to education.93 Under the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine, the Court of Appeals held that the Board of Education
would be given the initial opportunity to consider whether the issue of
charging nonresident children tuition is repugnant to the Maryland
constitution.94 The court explained that it has been confronted in the
past with issues that are within the jurisdiction of an agency as well as
that of the court and that "[o]rdinarily, when there are two forums
available, one judicial and the other administrative, each able to af-
ford essentially the same remedy, and no statutory directive indicating
which should be pursued first, a party is often first required to run the
administrative remedial course before seeking a judicial solution."95
(3) Administrative Remedy Deemed to be Concurrent with an Alter-
native Judicial Remedy.-When an administrative remedy is deemed to
be concurrent with an alternative judicial remedy, a claimant may pur-
sue an independent judicial remedy without first invoking and ex-
hausting the statutorily prescribed administrative remedy.9 6 Despite
the presumption that when both an administrative remedy and an al-
ternative judicial remedy are available it is presumed that the adminis-
trative remedy is primary to the judicial remedy,97 this presumption is
rebuttable, and often courts will find that the administrative and judi-
cial remedies are fully concurrent.98 When a court is trying to deter-
mine if an administrative remedy is concurrent with, rather than
91. Id. at 670, 556 A.2d at 275.
92. Id. at 671, 556 A.2d at 276.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 668, 556 A.2d at 274.
95. Id. at 678, 556 A.2d at 279 (citing Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n
v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 601, 386 A.2d 1216, 1226 (1978); Department of
Human Resources v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 645, 409 A.2d 713, 717 (1979)).
96. See Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 23,
511 A.2d 1079, 1090 (1986).
97. See cases cited at supra note 88.
98. See Maryland House of Correction v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 258, 703 A.2d 167, 174
(1997) (noting that the Court of Appeals has on occasion "held that the administrative
remedy is not primary and that resort may be had to the concurrent judicial remedy with-
out invoking or exhausting the administrative procedures"); Maryland Nat'l Capita4 282
Md. at 596, 386 A.2d at 1223 (finding that the legislature did not intend "to endow tax
appeal tribunals with authority, to the exclusion of courts of ordinary jurisdiction, to deter-
mine the validity" of a lease agreement's noncontestability clause).
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primary to, a judicial remedy, the court may sometimes look to the
comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme,"9 the agency's interpreta-
tion of the statute it is entitled to administer, 100 or the nature of the
alternative judicial cause of action pursued by the plaintiff.10 1
In Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission v. Craw-
ford, 102 the court examined whether a plaintiff was required to pursue
99. See Department of Human Resources v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 645, 409 A.2d 713,
717 (1979) ("[W]hen the Legislature enacts a comprehensive remedial scheme ..., trial
courts generally should not act until there has been compliance with the statutory compre-
hensive remedial scheme.").
100. In National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 292 Md. 75, 437
A.2d 651 (1981), the court gave deference to the agency that was charged with administer-
ing and enforcing the state legislation prohibiting employment discrimination. Id. at 80,
437 A.2d at 653-54. Because the Maryland Commission on Human Relations (MHRC) had
continuously operated on the premise that the legislature did not intend it to preempt the
field of employment discrimination, the court reasoned that the administrative remedies
provided by the MHRC are concurrent with judicial remedies. Id.
The weight actually given to an agency's interpretation was tackled in Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission, 305 Md. 145, 501 A.2d 1307 (1986). The court
found that the weight accorded to an agency's interpretation of a statute depends upon a
number of considerations. Id. at 161, 501 A.2d at 1315. First, an agency's interpretation
should be given more weight "when the interpretation has been applied consistently and
for a long period of time." Id. When an agency has "engaged in a process of reasoned
elaboration in formulating its interpretation of the statute," the agency's interpretation
should be given additional weight. Id. at 161-62, 501 A.2d at 1315. Lastly, if the agency's
interpretation of the statute is the product of neither contested adversarial proceedings
nor formal rule promulgation, the interpretation is entitled little weight. Id. at 162, 501
A.2d at 1315.
101. SeeBoard of Educ. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 791, 506 A.2d 625, 633 (1962) ("[W]e
have held that a concurrent judicial remedy may be pursued without the necessity of invok-
ing and exhausting a statutorily prescribed administrative remedy [when] the legal issue
did not involve an interpretation of a law administered by the agency."). The Court of
Appeals determined that tax appeal tribunals and the courts have concurrent jurisdiction
in the interpretation of contract provisions in Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning
Commission v. Washington National Arena, 282 Md. 588, 600, 386 A.2d 1216, 1225 (1978).
Maryland-National Capital involved whether a lessee could voluntarily agree to relinquish
his statutory right to appeal a determination that improvements on demised premises were
taxable. Id. at 591, 386 A.2d at 1220. The court found that the Maryland legislature did
not intend to endow the tax appeal tribunals with exclusive authority to determine the
validity of a noncontestability clause of a lease agreement. Id. at 600, 386 A.2d at 1025.
The court reasoned that the enforceability of the waiver provision did not arise under the
tax statutes, but rather was a question of contract construction. Id. at 598, 386 A.2d at
1224. The court continued:
[T]he fact that an agency may be empowered to decide a legal question that is
encompassed by its incidental jurisdiction does not, absent a contrary indication
from the Legislature, necessarily deprive the courts of all authority to adjudicate a
point of law they could otherwise decide. And certainly no one would doubt the
power of the courts of general jurisdiction in this state to construe, interpret and
enforce provisions of contracts, leases, and other written instruments.
Id. at 598-99, 386 A.2d at 1224.
102. 307 Md. 1, 511 A.2d 1079 (1986).
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and exhaust administrative remedies available under the employment
discrimination provisions of the Maryland Code with the Maryland
Human Relations Commission (MHRC) prior to filing her employ-
ment discrimination case.10 3 The plaintiff, Crawford, brought a suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983104 and the Maryland Constitution alleging
that her employer, Capital Park, had denied her an employment
transfer because of her race.105 Defendants contended that because
the Maryland Code created a statutory right against discrimination
and provided an appropriate administrative remedy with the MHRC
for any alleged violations of that right, the plaintiff must first invoke
and pursue the available administrative remedy before resort to the
courts. 10 6 The court noted that the presumption that an administra-
tive remedy should ordinarily be invoked and exhausted before resort
to an independent judicial remedy is based partially upon an infer-
ence of the comprehensiveness of the statutorily created scheme. 107
However, after determining that the remedial provisions of the
MHRC were not as comprehensive as other administrative remedies in
the Maryland Code, the court concluded that the legislature did not
intend an employee to first invoke and exhaust the administrative pro-
cedures.108 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs ac-
tion did not involve an interpretation of any part of the Human
Relations Commission Article of the Maryland Code, but an interpre-
tation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
the administrative remedy was deemed concurrent with judicial
remedies."1
c. Past Case Law Interpreting the Jurisdiction of the Unfair Trade
Practices Subtitle of the Insurance Code. -In Magan v. Medical Mutual Lia-
bility Insurance Society (Magan I1),"1 the Court of Special Appeals held
that an individual cannot maintain, in addition to a statutory remedy,
a tort action for damages in circuit court based upon the same issues
advanced or that should have been advanced in the administrative
103. Id. at 30, 511 A.2d at 1094.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (providing a civil remedy for the deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and laws).
105. Crawford, 307 Md. at 4, 511 A.2d at 1080.
106. Id. at 10, 511 A.2d at 1083.
107. Id. at 25-26, 511 A.2d at 1091.
108. Id. at 26, 511 A.2d at 1092. The court stated that "the matter of employment dis-
crimination is dealt with by five relatively brief sections... which do not comprehensively
cover the entire field." Id. at 26, 511 A.2d at 1092 (quoting National Asphalt Pavement
Ass'n v. Prince George's County, 292 Md. 75, 79, 437 A.2d 651, 653 (1981)).
109. Id. at 25, 511 A.2d at 1091.
110. 81 Md. App. 301, 567 A.2d 503 (1989).
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proceeding.'11 Appellant, a physician, brought a separate tort action
against his insurer alleging that the insurer's failure to insure him
constituted a breach of duty under section 234A(a) of the Maryland
Insurance Code.'12 This statutory claim was also pending before the
Insurance Commissioner. 1 3 The court found that the appellant
should not be able to circumvent any administrative remedy by pursu-
ing a separate claim for damages because his "factual predicate for his
tort claims are founded on a statutory violation which carries with it a
statutory remedy"; no recognized alternative remedy existed under
common law principles." 4 The court also noted that the Insurance
Code is comprehensive and establishes a uniform method of appeal
for those harmed by an insurer's violations. 1 5
In Veydt v. Lincoln Life Insurance Co.," 6 the Court of Special Ap-
peals concluded that an agent suing an insurer for terminating an at-
will insurance agency agreement is generally a matter to be resolved
under the Insurance Code." 7 After terminating the plaintiffs agency
agreement, the insurance company notified policyholders that the
agency relationship had been terminated and informed them that
they had the right to continue with their policies under the appellee's
policies."1 ' The agent alleged common law claims at the trial court
level that this notice to policyholders constituted a type of invasion of
privacy (false light) and "tortious interference with business relation-
ships.""' 9 The Veydt court used the trial court's reasoning that the ter-
mination letters, which were the basis of Veydt's claims, are so
intricately combined with the act of termination that they cannot con-
stitute a separate cause of action. 120 The trial court further stated that
if a common law claim can be asserted from a letter of termination,
111. Id. at 303, 567 A.2d at 504.
112. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 234A(a) (1994) (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-
501 (1997)). Section 234A(a) provides in pertinent part:
No insurer.., shall... refuse to underwrite ... a particular insurance risk... for
any reason based in whole or in part upon race, color, creed, sex, or blindness of
an applicant or policyholder or for any arbitrary, capricious, or unfairly discrimi-
natory reason .... No insurer... may cancel or refuse to underwrite or renew a
particular insurance risk or class of risk except by the application of standards
which are reasonably related to the insurer's economic and business purposes.
Id.
113. Magan II, 81 Md. App. at 307-09, 567 A.2d at 506-07.
114. Id. at 308, 567 A.2d at 506.
115. Id. at 307, 567 A.2d at 506.
116. 94 Md. App. 1, 614 A.2d 1318 (1992).
117. Id. at 20-21, 614 A.2d at 1328.
118. Id. at 3, 614 A.2d at 1319.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 4, 614 A.2d at 1320.
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which states only a fact of termination, as required by Maryland Arti-
cle 48A, section 234B, that subsection would have no validity.1
2 1
Moreover, the court found that the legislature had intended section
234B to be exclusive because it had authorized the Insurance Com-
missioner to be fully charged with the responsibility to remedy viola-
tions of Article 48A, and because section 234B provides a complete
procedure and remedy.
122
In Vicente v. Prudential Insurance Co.,123 the Court of Special Ap-
peals held that the administrative remedies set forth in the Unfair
Trade Practices subtitle are exclusive. 124 Vicente involved two insureds
who brought a common law tort action against a health insurer and its
agent based on the agent's alleged misrepresentations that the health
insurer was licensed to sell health insurance in Maryland and that the
insurer met the capitalization requirements imposed by the Insurance
Code and regulations. 125 While the plaintiffs acknowledged that the
Unfair Trade Practices subtitle of the Insurance Code prohibited the
wrongs alleged in the complaint, they did not invoke their administra-
tive remedy and instead pursued a remedy in court, arguing that
although the commissioner had jurisdiction, the plaintiffs were not
required to "exhaust the administrative remedies" under the Insur-
ance Code before maintaining their common law tort action. 1 26 The
plaintiffs contended that the language of section 215(d) of the Insur-
ance Code clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend reme-
dies under the Insurance Code to be exclusive. 127 The Court of
Special Appeals disagreed, holding that the exclusive remedies for the
wrongs alleged by the plaintiff were those set forth in the Unfair
Trade Practices subtitle. 128 The intermediate court's decision was
based on the "general exhaustion of remedies rule" that "'where a
statute provides a special form of remedy, the plaintiff must use that
121. Id.
122. Id. at 6, 19, 614 A.2d at 1321, 1328.
123. 105 Md. App. 13, 658 A.2d 1106 (1995), overruled by Zappone, 349 Md. at 66, 706
A.2d at 1071.
124. Id. at 23-24, 658 A.2d at 1111.
125. Id. at 15, 658 A.2d at 1107. The plaintiffs contended that the misrepresentations
resulted in damages because the health insurance policy paid no part of their hospitaliza-
tion or medical expenses, totaling $23,181.40, while the policy was in effect. Id. The com-
plaint alleged negligent misrepresentation, fraud and constructive fraud. Id.
126. Id. at 18, 658 A.2d at 1108-09.
127. Id. Section 215(d) states: "No order of the Commissioner pursuant to this section
or order of court to enforce it shall in any way relieve or absolve any person affected by
such order from any other liability, penalty, or forfeiture under the law." MD. ANN CODE
art. 48A, § 215(d) (1994) (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-103(e) (1997)).
128. Vicente, 105 Md. App. at 23-24, 658 A.2d at 1111.
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form [of remedy] rather than any other. ""1129 Relying on its decisions
in Magan I,30 Veydt v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co.,' and the
Court of Appeals's decision of Magan ,12 the court found that the
Maryland Insurance Code did provide a "special form of remedy" for
the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the only remedies the plaintiffs could pur-
sue were those provided by the Insurance Code.133
The Vicente court relied on the language of Magan /34 and Magan
II that concluded the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle is comprehen-
sive, 135 and that when there is a special statutory remedy and proce-
dure before an "agency for a special kind of case, a litigant must
ordinarily pursue that form of remedy and not bypass the administra-
tive official."' 36 The Vicente court concluded because all three cases
involved issues within the purview of the Unfair Trade Practices Act of
the Insurance Code, and because in Magan IIand Veydt the court held
that the legislature intended the remedies set forth in section 55A to
be exclusive, that tortious conduct of an insurer must also fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Insurance Code.13 7
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Zappone v. Liberty Life Insurance Co.,
the Court of Appeals held that the Maryland General Assembly did
not intend "to preclude claimants from pursuing a recognized in-
dependent tort remedy" for fraud, negligence, and negligent misrep-
resentation "without first invoking and exhausting the administrative
remedy under the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle of the Insurance
Code." '38 The opinion explicitly overruled Vicente, which held that
the remedies set forth in the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle are
"exclusive."' 39
The issue in Zappone, as stated by the court, was whether "the pro-
visions of the Insurance Code pertaining to unfair trade practices by
insurers and their agents provide the exclusive or primary remedy for
129. Id. at 16, 658 A.2d at 1107 (quoting Bits 'N' Bytes Computer Supplies, Inc. v. Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co., 97 Md. App. 557, 573, 631 A.2d 485 (1993) (citing Solely v.
State Comm'n on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521, 526, 356 A.2d 254 (1976))).
130. 81 Md. App. 301, 567 A.2d 503 (1989).
131. 94 Md. App. 1, 614 A.2d 1318 (1992).
132. 313 Md. 462, 545 A.2d 1321 (1988). See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text
(discussing Magan 1).
133. Vicente, 105 Md. App. at 23-24, 658 A.2d at 1111.
134. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (discussing Magan 1).
135. Vicente, 105 Md. App. at 20-22, 658 A.2d at 1109-11 (citing Magan I, 313 Md. at 465-
68, 545 A.2d at 1322-24; Magan II, 81 Md. App. at 307, 567 A.2d at 506).
136. Id. at 20, 658 A.2d at 1110 (quoting Magan I, 313 Md. at 480, 545 A.2d at 1330).
137. Id. at 23-24, 658 A.2d at 1111.
138. Zappone, 349 Md. at 68, 706 A.2d at 1071.
139. Id. at 66, 706 A.2d at 1071 (citing Vicente, 105 Md. App. at 24, 658 A.2d at 1111).
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alleged acts of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence by
an insurer or agent in connection with the sale of insurance." 140 To
resolve this question, Judge Eldridge, writing for a unanimous court,
began by articulating the three possible relationships between an ad-
ministrative remedy and ajudicial remedy, 4 noting that the question
of which relationship applies to a particular administrative remedy is
"ordinarily a question of legislative intent."' 42 While the legislature
occasionally sets forth its intent as to whether an administrative rem-
edy is to be exclusive, primary, or concurrent, no such intention was
expressly set forth in the Insurance Code.' 43 The court noted, how-
ever, that various principles have been developed and applied to re-
solve the question in the absence of an express legislative intent.1
44
The court set forth the following principles: (1) "[o]rdinarily a
statutory administrative and judicial review remedy will be treated as
exclusive only when the Legislature has indicated that the remedy is
exclusive or when there exists no other recognized alternative statu-
tory, common law, or equitable cause of action;'"145 (2) "where neither
the statutory language nor the legislative history disclose an intent
that the administrative remedy is to be exclusive, and where there is
an alternative judicial remedy under another statute or under com-
mon law or equitable principles, there is no presumption that the ad-
ministrative remedy was intended to be exclusive," but rather "a
presumption that the administrative remedy is intended to be pri-
mary, and that a claimant cannot maintain the alternative judicial ac-
tion without first invoking and exhausting the administrative
remedy;"'146 and (3) "the presumption that the Legislature intended
140. Id. at 50, 706 A.2d at 1062.
141. Id. at 60-61, 706 A-2d at 1067-68. An administrative remedy may be exclusive of,
primary to, or fully concurrent with an alternative judicial remedy. See supra notes 52-54.
142. Zappone, 349 Md. at 60-61, 706 A.2d at 1067-68 (citing Maryland Reclamation As-
soc., Inc. v. Harford County, 342 Md. 476, 493, 677 A.2d 567, 576 (1996)).
143. Id. at 61-62, 706 A.2d at 1068 (noting that "most often statutes fail to specify the
category in which an administrative remedy falls").
144. Id. at 62, 706 A.2d at 1068.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 63, 706 A-2d at 1069 (citations omitted). The court noted that there is dicta
to the contrary. Id. (citing Department of Human Resources v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 643-
44, 409 A.2d 713, 716 (1979); White v. Prince George's County, 282 Md. 641, 649, 387 A.2d
260, 265 (1978)). Although only briefly mentioned in a footnote, but of extreme signifi-
cance, the court corrected a presumption in Department of Human Resources v. Wilson and
White v. Prince George's County. Id. at 63 n.7, 706 A.2d at 1069 n.7. The court held that the
statement in Wilson that when a statutory remedy is provided, it is deemed exclusive, is
incorrect. Id. The court noted that some courts inadvertently substituted the word "exclu-
sive" for "primary." Id.
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the administrative remedy to be primary [where an alternative judicial
remedy exists] is rebuttable."1 4
The court listed several factors to be considered in determining
whether an administrative remedy is primary to or fully concurrent
with alternative judicial remedies: (1) "any indications of legislative
intent reflected in the statutory language, the statutory framework, or
the legislative history" of the statute; 4 ' (2) "[t]he comprehensiveness
of the administrative remedy";' 49 (3) "the administrative agency's view
of its own jurisdiction"; ° and of most importance, (4) "the nature of
the alternative judicial cause of action pursued by the plaintiff.' 151
Using these principles as guides, the court first found that the
remedies provided by the Insurance Code for the alleged acts of fraud
by the defendants were not the exclusive remedies available to the
plaintiffs.152  In support of its conclusion, the court stated that
"[n]either the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle nor the general reme-
dial provisions of the Insurance Code contain any language indicating
that the administrative remedies there provided for are exclusive, 153
and found that the plaintiffs had "set forth recognized common law
causes of action" against the defendants. 154
Having resolved this question, the court still faced the question
whether the administrative remedies provided by the Insurance Code
were primary to the alternative judicial remedies the plaintiffs
147. Id. at 64, 706 A.2d at 1069.
148. Id., 706 A.2d 1069-70 (citing National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Prince George's
County, 292 Md. 75, 79, 437 A.2d 651, 653 (1981); Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 596-97, 386 A.2d 1216, 1223-24 (1978)).
149. Id., 706 A.2d at 1070 (noting that "a very comprehensive administrative remedial
scheme is some indication that the Legislature intended the administrative remedy to be
primary").
150. Id. at 65, 706 A.2d at 1070.
151. Id. With regard to this factor the court stated:
Where that judicial cause of action is wholly or partially dependent upon the
statutory scheme which also contains the administrative remedy, or upon the ex-
pertise of the administrative agency, the Court has usually held that the adminis-
trative remedy was intended to be primary and must first be invoked and
exhausted before resort to the courts.
Id.
152. Id. at 66-67, 706 A.2d at 1071.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 67, 706 A.2d at 1071 ("[T]he cause of action provided by the Insurance Code
was not the only recognizable cause of action encompassing the plaintiffs claims."); see id.
at 62, 706 A.2d at 1068 ("Ordinarily a statutory administrative and judicial review remedy
will be treated as exclusive only when the Legislature has indicated that the administrative
remedy is exclusive or when there exists no other recognized alternative statutory, com-
mon law, or equitable causes of action." (citations omitted)).
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sought.1 5 In making this determination, the court found that the
statutory language of the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle suggested
that the administrative remedy was concurrent.1 56 Subsection (d) of
section 215 of the Insurance Code states that no administrative order
shall "in any way relieve" any person "from any other liability ...
under law." 15' This language, the court reasoned, indicates that the
legislature did not intend the remedies provided to be exclusive of or
primary to judicial remedies.1 5 ' Next, even recognizing that the Un-
fair Trade Practices subtitle of the Insurance Code is "somewhat com-
prehensive, no prior decision by [the Court of Appeals] has viewed
those provisions as sufficiently all-encompassing so as to preclude re-
sort to a fully independent common law remedy." 159 Furthermore,
the court noted, the Insurance Commissioner does not view the ad-
ministrative remedy under the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle to be
primary."' In addition, and most importantly, because the plaintiffs
asserted claims totally dependent upon common law tort principles,
no interpretation by the Insurance Code is involved.161 Thus, resort
to the expertise of the Insurance Commissioner to interpret the Insur-
ance Code or its regulations would be irrelevant. 162 The courts are
equally qualified to interpret common law tort claims sounding in de-
ceit and negligence.16
Accordingly, the court held that the "circuit court erred in hold-
ing that the plaintiffs were required to invoke and exhaust their ad-
ministrative remedies under the Insurance Code." '6 4
155. Id. at 67-68, 706 A.2d at 1071.
156. Id. at 68, 706 A.2d at 1071.
157. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 215(d) (1994) (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-
103(e) (1997)).
158. Zappone, 349 Md. at 68, 706 A.2d at 1071.
159. Id. at 67, 706 A.2d at 1071.
160. Id. at 67-68, 706 A.2d at 1071. The Maryland Insurance Commissioner submitted
an amicus brief in support of Zappone's position. Id. at 59 n.4, 706 A.2d at 1067 n.4. The
brief asserted that the Court of Special Appeals's decision in Vicente v. Prudential Insurance
Co. of America, 105 Md. App. 13, 658 A.2d 1106 (1995), is inconsistent with prior decisions
of the Court of Appeals and the statutory language of the Insurance Code. Zappone, 349
Md. at 59 n.4, 706 A.2d at 1067 n.4. The Commissioner urged that the Unfair Trade
Practices subtitle of the Insurance Code does not supersede a claimant's right to sue an
insurer for alleged tortious conduct or breach of contract arising out of the purchase of
insurance. Id. The Commissioner further argued that when the legislature does not ex-
pressly indicate that an administrative remedy is to be exclusive or primary, and a claimant
has alternative judicial causes of action under the common law, "the plaintiff has a choice
as to which remedy to pursue." Id.
161. Zappone, 349 Md. at 67, 706 A.2d at 1071.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 66, 706 A.2d at 1070-71.
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4. Analysis.-In Zappone, the Court of Appeals held that com-
mon law causes of action run concurrent with administrative remedies
for actions falling under the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle of the
Maryland Insurance Code.165 The dispositive issue in Zappone was de-
termining when an administrative remedy is to be exclusive, primary,
or fully concurrent with alternative judicial remedies.166 While there
is no fixed formula for making such a determination, the court pro-
vided a practical framework for guiding this and future decisions.
The newly enunciated roadmap will increase clarity, quality, and effi-
ciency in the decision making process, decrease the potential for con-
flicts among legal institutions, and avoid undue delay in resolving
disputes between parties. However, since these qualities overlap, it
will be better to analyze each guidepost set forth by the court
individually.
First, the Zappone court clarified that a statutory remedy will only
be viewed as exclusive when the legislature explicitly states the in-
tended remedy is exclusive or when no other recognized alternative
statutory, common law, or equitable remedy exists. 16 7 This presump-
tion is not necessarily new, but it is the first time that it has been an-
nounced in such explicit terms. Past case law, such as Magan I and
Magan II, alluded to the fact that the administrative remedy was exclu-
sive only because there was no other remedy available.16 Further-
more, Magan I and Magan II, where there was only a statutory remedy
available, are now easily reconciled with Travelers Indemnity because in
the latter case, there were alternative judicial remedies available.169
The court also corrected the rationale in Wilson and White that
"absent a legislative indication to the contrary, it will usually be
deemed that the Legislature intended the special statutory remedy to
165. Id. at 68, 706 A.2d at 1071.
166. Id. at 58-60, 706 A.2d at 1066-68.
167. Id. at 62, 706 A.2d at 1068; see Bowman v. Goad, 348 Md. 199, 202, 703 A.2d 144,
146 (1997) (concluding that when "no common law action lies for the recovery of taxes or
governmental fees which the plaintiff has voluntarily paid under a mistake of law.., any
statutorily prescribed [administrative] refund remedy is exclusive"); Insurance Comm'n v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 339 Md. 596, 623, 664 A.2d 862, 876(1995) (holding that "where the only avenue for relief is the statutorily prescribed adminis-
trative [remedy,]" that is a claimant's "exclusive remedy"); Muhl v. Magan, 313 Md. 462,
480, 545 A.2d 1321, 1330 (1988) (finding that when a claimant seeks "a form of relief
generally unknown to the common law," and the only available remedy is an administrative
remedy, that remedy is deemed to be exclusive).
168. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (indicating that, in order to bypass an
available administrative remedy, one must pursue a recognized alternative remedy under
common law principles).
169. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (reviewing common law actions al-
lowed even though the claimants had available administrative remedies).
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be exclusive.' 170 By concluding that some Maryland opinions may
have inadvertently substituted the word "exclusive" for "primary,"t
the court reconciled cases that ruled on common law claims in the
face of a comprehensive statutory remedial scheme. 172 Judge El-
dridge further emphasized when a claimant has both an administra-
tive remedy and an alternative judicial remedy, in the absence of
statutory language or history to the contrary, there is no presumption
that the administrative remedy is deemed exclusive. 17' Thus, cases
that have cited to White or Wilson are now suspect in light of the Zap-
pone decision.
174
The Zappone court's clarification regarding the potential avenues
for relief will prevent parties from spending time and effort trying a
case before the wrong tribunal. Judicial efficiency is served; parties
will not waste time by trying cases that should have been properly
brought in another jurisdiction. There is also a practical standpoint:
if the only remedy currently available is a special statutory remedy,
that remedy should be followed. 175 Jurisdictional conflicts between
legal institutions will not arise if the claimant cannot pursue a possible
alternative remedy. 176 The refusal to find a presumption may also be-
lie the court's hesitation to relinquish any of its decisional autonomy
in favor of an agency.' 7
170. White v. Prince George's County, 282 Md. 641, 649, 387 A.2d 260, 265 (1978); see
also Department of Human Resources v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 643-644, 409 A.2d 713, 716
(1979).
171. Zappone, 349 Md. at 64 n.7, 706 A.2d at 1069 n.7.
172. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Merling, 326 Md. 329, 339-44, 605 A.2d 83, 88-90
(1992) (dealing with common law principles as well as statutory principles under the Insur-
ance Code concerning the relationship between insurers and agents); Twelve Knotts v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 87 Md. App. 88, 99-102, 589 A.2d 105, 111-12 (1991) (analyzing
common law tort remedies that would also fall under the Unfair Trade Practice subtitle of
the Insurance Code); see also supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing the facts
of Travelers Indemnity Co. in more depth).
173. Zappone, 349 Md. at 63, 706 A.2d at 1070.
174. Id. at 63 n.7, 706 A.2d at 1069 n.7. Department of Human Resources v. Wilson, 286 Md.
639, 643-44, 409 A.2d 713, 716 (1979), was cited by the Zappone court because it had incor-
rectly stated: "[o] rdinarily, where a statutory administrative remedy is provided, it will be
deemed exclusive." Id. While the Zappone court did agree with Wilson's ultimate holding, it
did so because no recognized alternative remedy for the plaintiff's claims existed. Id.
175. See White, 282 Md. at 650-51, 387 A.2d at 266 (holding that a common law action
does not lie to recover taxes erroneously paid under a mistake of law and since the only
remedy available is a special statutory remedy, "that remedy obviously must be followed").
176. Id.
177. See generally 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RiCHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 14.1, at 277 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing how courts cannot give effect to a legisla-
ture's "overriding purpose of creating an agency with broad statutory responsibilities with-
out requiring courts to relinquish some portion of their decisional autonomy in favor of
the agency").
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When applying the above principle to the present case, the court
quickly disposed of this issue, finding that the Insurance Code lacked
language that would lead to the conclusion that the remedies pro-
vided under the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle were intended to be
exclusive."' 8 The court's conclusion that the language "'in any way
relieve' any person 'from any liability ... under law"' supports non-
exclusivity seems sufficient. The court, however, could have added ad-
ditional support to its holding by examining the language of other
sections of the Insurance Code. For example, because several other
sections of the Insurance Code explicitly state that the applicable ad-
ministrative remedy is exclusive, by implication, it can be said that if
the legislature wanted the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle to be exclu-
sive-it would have done so explicitly.179
Second, the Zappone court validated the presumption that an ad-
ministrative remedy is primary and must be exhausted before a claim-
ant can pursue alternative remedies in the courts.' Prior case law
using the word "exhaustion" in the primary jurisdiction doctrine may
have led to confusion."8 ' The courts have normally interpreted the
administrative remedy to be first invoked and followed before pursu-
178. Zappone, 349 Md. at 66-67, 706 A.2d at 1071.
179. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 25(4) (1994) (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS.
§ 2-202(a) (1997)) ("[T]he Commissioner has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce by adminis-
trative action the laws of the State that relate to the underwriting or rate-setting practices of
an insurer."); id. § 6-412 (recodified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 8-420 (1997)) ("[T]he right
of indemnification and reimbursement under this subsection shall not be exclusive of
other rights to which an individual may be entitled as a matter of law."); id. § 133(c) (re-
codified as MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 9-204 (1997)) ("[A] delinquency proceeding is the ex-
clusive method of liquidating, rehabilitating, reorganizing, or conserving an insurer.").
180. Zappone, 349 Md. at 67, 706 A.2d at 1071; see Maryland Reclamation Assoc., Inc. v.
Harford County, 342 Md. 476, 493, 677 A.2d 567, 576 (1996) (finding that the court's have
"'ordinarily construed the pertinent [legislative] enactments to require that administrative
remedy be first invoked and followed' before resort to the courts" (quoting Board of Educ.
v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 786, 506 A.2d 625, 631 (1986))); Clinton v. Board of Educ., 315
Md. 666, 678, 556 A.2d 273, 279 (1989) (determining that "[o]rdinarily, when there are
two forums available, one judicial and the other administrative.... and no statutory direc-
tive indicating which should be pursued first, a party is often first required to run the
administrative remedial course before seeking a judicial solution"); Hubbard, 305 Md. at
786, 506 A.2d at 631 (recognizing that the courts have ordinarily required that the admin-
istrative remedy be first invoked and followed).
181. In Bits 'N'Bytes Computer Supplies, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 97 Md.
App. 557, 572, 631 A.2d 485, 493-94 (1993), the court realized that the parties' confusion
of the issue of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine was possibly due to the
"loose language of some appellate opinions." See, e.g., Department of Human Resources v.
Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 647, 409 A.2d 713, 718 (1979) (stating that "[t]he claimants failed to
exhaust the effective, available [administrative] remedy ... before seeking declaratory re-
lief from the trial court").
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ing judicial remedies.1 2 For example, in Maryland House of Correction
v. Fields, the court found that when an administrative remedy is
deemed primary, the administrative remedy must be pursued and ex-
hausted before resort to the courts.""3 The use of the word "ex-
hausted" could be misinterpreted as the court's use of the "exhaustion
of administrative remedies doctrine" which says that an administrative
remedy that falls under the doctrine is deemed exclusive.18 4 Thus,
there is no independent civil court action after an administrative rul-
ing, only limited judicial review of the ruling.185 However, under the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, an independent civil action is available
along with a judicial review of the administrative decision.1 8 6 This
may have incorrectly led the courts to use the words "exclusive" when
it actually meant "primary" in past opinions. 187 The above presupposi-
tion alleviates this possible misconception by stating that "there is no
presumption that the administrative remedy was intended to be
exclusive." 188
182. See Clinton, 315 Md. at 678, 556 A.2d at 279 ("[O]rdinarily, when there are two
forums available, one judicial and the other administrative, each able to afford essentially
the same remedy, and no statutory directive indicating which should be pursued first, a
party is often first required to run the administrative remedial course before seeking a
judicial solution.").
183. 348 Md. 245, 258, 703 A.2d 167, 174 (1997) (citing Hubbard, 305 Md. at 786, 506
A.2d at 631).
184. See Bits 'N'Bytes, 97 Md. App. at 572, 179 A.2d at 493-94 ("The parties confusion on
[the exhaustion doctrine] may stem from the term 'exhaustion' itself which perhaps im-
plies, incorrectly, that independent judicial action always can be pursued after an adminis-
trative remedy is exhausted. This confusion is also evident in loose language in some
appellate opinions.").
185. See Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 296 Md.
46, 51, 459 A.2d 205, 209 (1983) (generalizing that a party can resort to the courts only
after there is a final order by the administrative agency); Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park &
Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 602, 386 A.2d 1216, 1226
(1978) (stating that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows only judi-
cial review and arises in a situation when a claim is enforceable initially by administrative
action exclusively); Bits 'N'Bytes, 97 Md. App. at 572, 631 A.2d at 493 ("[T]he doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies 'demands that a party fully pursue administrative
procedures before obtaining limited judicial review [of the administrative decision]."'); see
also White v. Prince George's County, 282 Md. 641, 649, 387 A.2d 260, 265 (1978) (assert-
ing that when an administrative remedy is exclusive, one must normally exhaust the rem-
edy before proceeding to the court for judicial review).
186. See Bits 'N' Bytes, 97 Md. App. at 573-74, 631 A.2d at 494 (noting that the primary
jurisdiction doctrine applies when a court and administrative agency have concurrent juris-
diction over a matter and there is no statutory provision to coordinate work between the
court and the agency).
187. Zappone, 349 Md. at 63 n.7, 706 A.2d at 1069 n.7 ("Sometimes opinions.., seem to
use the word 'exclusive' when the court actually means 'primary."'); see supra note 174 and
accompanying text (describing a case that confused this issue).
188. Zappone, 349 Md. at 63, 706 A.2d at 1069.
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Although not mentioned in the opinion, the court impliedly rec-
ognized that the presumption that an administrative remedy is in-
tended to have primary jurisdiction to alternative judicial remedies
has several valid functions. The proposition acknowledges that public
agencies should normally have the initial opportunity to settle dis-
putes that affect them. First, courts realize that there are occasionally
situations that require the need for an agency's specialized expertise
in resolving an issue and a higher quality decision will thus result be-
cause of this specialized knowledge." 9 This gives a reviewing court
the benefit of an agency's findings that are within the agency's
expertise. 190
Allowing resolution outside the court system is another function
that promotes judicial economy and efficiency. 191 Agencies are also
usually the best equipped to promote uniformity and consistency in
the regulation of business.19 2 The uniformity and consistency of an
agency's decision would be frustrated if many different courts pos-
189. See PIcHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 206 (1985) (not-
ing that one consideration when deciding to invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine is
"the extent to which the agency's specialized expertise makes it a preferable forum for
resolving the issue"); see KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLIT-
ICAL SYSTEM 385-86 (1982) (opining that administrative agencies should be vested with the
discretion to determine disputes that affect them). In United States v. Western Pacific Rail-
road Co., 352 U.S. 59, 60-61 (1956), the government refused to pay established rate for
"incendiary bombs" when it shipped napalm in steel casings. Id. The Army claimed that
the lower rate for "gasoline in steel drums" applied and thus were eligible for the lower
tariff rate applicable to gasoline. Id. at 61. The Supreme Court found that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction applied and referred the issue to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. Id. at 63. The Court reasoned that because the agency had approved the rates for
"incendiary bombs" and "gasoline" shipments, the agency had a specialized knowledge of
the factors that caused it to draw the distinctions reflected in the tariff. Id. at 65-67.
190. Leonard E. Cohen, Some Aspects of Maryland Administrative Law, 24 MD. L. Ra~v. 1, 24-
25 (1964) (discussing the rationale behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction).
191. See Craig Lyle Ltd. Partnership v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 483 (D.
Minn. 1995) (announcing that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has several functions,
one of which is the promotion of judicial economy and efficiency by allowing resolution
outside the court system).
192. In Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952), the Supreme
Court held that uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business conferred to an
agency is secured by the expertise of the agency. The Court went further to say that "the
limited functions of review by the judiciary is more rationally exercised, by preliminary
resort to ascertain and interpret the circumstances and underlying legal issues to agencies
that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experi-
ence, and by more flexible procedure." Id. at 575; see also PIERCE ET AL., supra note 189, at
206 (noting that one consideration when deciding to invoke the primary jurisdiction doc-
trine is "the need for uniform resolution of the issue"); WARREN, supra note 189, at 385
("Agencies are best equipped to promote unified regulatory policies through informed
opinion and flexible procedures.").
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sessed the ability to determine an issue."' Furthermore, the legisla-
ture creates an agency for the purpose of applying a statutory scheme
to particular factual situations.194 The primary jurisdiction doctrine
permits the agency to carry out this function by giving an agency ini-
tial jurisdiction over an issue.
The court explained that when the primary jurisdiction doctrine
is invoked, a claimant cannot maintain an alternative judicial action
without first exhausting all administrative remedies.1 95 By requiring a
party to fully exhaust all administrative procedures before resort to
the courts, as part of the primary jurisdiction presumption, the Zap-
pone court recognized several additional benefits. As an initial matter,
it is more efficient to avoid premature interruption of the administra-
tive process.1 96 This allows the results of the administrative process to
be judicially reviewed at the conclusion rather than to permit the par-
ties to seek judicial intervention at various intermediate stages.' 97
Also, as agencies are not part of the judicial branch of government,
requiring exhaustion protects an administration's autonomy.
19 8
Courts should not interfere with an agency's determinations until it
has completed its action, or has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction.' 99
An agency will also be given the opportunity to discover and correct
its own mistakes through its own appellate process.2° If a claimant is
required to fully pursue and exhaust all administrative remedies,
193. See Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440 (1907) (noting
that railroad rates fall under the Interstate Commerce Commission because of the Act's
objective to achieve national uniformity of railroad shipment rates, and this goal would be
frustrated if numerous courts across the country could enforce ad hoc judgments of the
reasonableness of such rates).
194. See Far East Conference, 342 U.S. at 574 ("[A] gencies created by Congress for regulat-
ing the subject matter should not be passed over.").
195. Zappone, 349 Md. at 63, 706 A.2d at 1069.
196. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (finding that the primary pur-
pose of exhaustion is to avoid the premature interruption of the administrative process);
Soley v. State Comm'n on Human Relations, 277 Md. 521, 526, 356 A.2d 254, 257 (1976)
(permitting interruptions of the administrative process at various stages may undermine
the purpose of the administrative agency). See generally 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 177,
§ 15.2, at 309 (discussing reasons for the exhaustion).
197. McKart, 395 U.S. at 194; Soley, 277 Md. at 527, 356 A.2d at 257. The McKart Court
reasoned that an "agency, like a trial court, is created for the purpose of applying a statute
in the first instance. Accordingly, it is normally desirable to let the agency develop the
necessary factual background upon which decisions should be based." McKart, 395 U.S. at
193-94. The Court further stated that "since agency decisions are frequently of a discre-
tionary nature or frequently require expertise, the agency should be given the first chance
to exercise that discretion or to apply that expertise." Id. at 194.
198. McKart, 395 U.S. at 194; see supra note 196 and accompanying text (noting that
exhaustion avoids premature interruption of the administrative process).
199. McKart, 395 U.S. at 194.
200. Id. at 195.
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courts may never have to intervene.201 Finally, the "frequent and de-
liberate flouting of administrative processes could weaken the effec-
tiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its
procedures. 2
0 2
The Zappone court also realized that the primary jurisdiction pre-
sumption is not an inflexible doctrine, but rather a practical one that
is rebuttable via the consideration of other factors. One such factor is
whether there are any indications of legislative intent reflected in the
statutory language or framework, or the statute's legislative history. 20 3
The legislature often describes the scope of an agency's power in
broad and ambiguous language. 20 4 Thus, to determine whether there
is any language in the statute that will guide a court in ascertaining
legislative intent, a court needs to examine not only the plain mean-
ing of the statute, but also relationships among the conduct at issue,
the effects of that conduct, and the agency's responsibilities under the
statute.2 °5
Using the same language that it used to determine that the stat-
ute was not exclusive, the Zappone court determined that this language
in the Insurance Code "certainly suggests that the administrative lan-
guage is not primary. "206 While the language of "'in any way relieve'
any person 'from any other liability... under law"' can easily be inter-
preted as not being exclusive and allowing other remedies (i.e., judi-
cial remedies), the plain meaning of the statute does not say that the
remedy is not primary or that it is clearly concurrent. Accordingly,
the court should have invoked the presumption that the administra-
tive remedy is intended to be primary when there are alternative judi-
cial remedies. 20 7 No remedies are taken away from a claimant when
the primary jurisdiction doctrine is invoked; they are only delayed un-
til all administrative remedies are exhausted. The Zappone court
should have then continued its analysis with the assumption that the
administrative remedy is primary until rebutted by any of the other
following factors.
Comprehensiveness of the remedial scheme is a factor for the
court to consider in determining the application of the presump-
201. Id.; Soley, 277 Md. at 526, 356 A.2d at 257.
202. McKart, 395 U.S. at 195.
203. Zappone, 349 Md. at 64, 706 A.2d at 1069.
204. See 2 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 177, § 14.2, at 281 (analyzing how to determine the
scope of an agency's jurisdiction from statutory language).
205. Id.
206. Zappone, 349 Md. at 68, 706 A.2d at 1071.
207. Id. at 63, 706 A.2d at 1069.
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tion.2 °8 The more comprehensive the administrative remedies, the
more likely the legislature intended the administrative scheme to be
primary.209 The rationale is that the legislature would not have pro-
vided an elaborate administrative framework if it did not want it to be
implemented. The purpose of the agency would not be served if
claimants were not required to bring their claims to the regulatory
authority empowered to enforce the act. Furthermore, as stated in
Department of Human Resources v. Wilson,210 a comprehensive remedial
scheme "establishes, as public policy," that mandatory resort to an
agency "produces the most efficient and effective result" of the intent
of the legislature.211
Although the Zappone court stated that the Unfair Trade Practices
subtitle of the Insurance Code was "somewhat comprehensive," it il-
logically found that the subtitle was not comprehensive enough to
lend support for the invocation of the primary jurisdiction doc-
trine.21 2 This holding is contrary to prior case law, that held similarly
elaborate statutory schemes sufficient to invoke the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine. 21 3 For instance, in Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Protection
Division, 4 the Court of Appeals found that the Consumer Protection
Division (CPD) had primary jurisdiction in consumer protection mat-
ters.215 Reasoning that the numerous provisions of the Consumer
Protection Act gave the CPD the ability to receive complaints, initiate
investigations, issue cease and desist orders, and to exercise "any other
function, power, and duty appropriate to protect and promote the
welfare of consumers," the court held that the CPD must have concur-
rent jurisdiction with the courts and that this is "precisely the situation
208. Id. at 64, 706 A.2d at 1070.
209. Id.
210. 286 Md. 639, 409 A.2d 713 (1979).
211. Id. at 645, 409 A.2d at 717.
212. Zappone, 349 Md. at 67, 706 A.2d at 1071.
213. The court cited several cases when it announced the proposition that a compre-
hensive remedial scheme is evidence that the legislature intended the administrative rem-
edy to have primary jurisdiction over a particular matter. Id. at 64-65, 706 A.2d at 1070.
The court compared Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division, 338 Md. 188, 196, 657
A.2d 788, 792 (1995) ("[T]he [consumer protection division's] jurisdiction is clearly evi-
denced by numerous provisions of the Consumer Protection Act.") and Board of Education
v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 787-92, 506 A.2d 625, 631-34 (1986) (noting the State Board of
Education's broad authority to interpret the provisions of the Education Article and to
decide disputes arising under the article) with Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning
Commission v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 25-26, 511 A.2d 1079, 1091-92 (1986) (noting that the
primary jurisdiction rule did not apply due to the non-exclusive nature of the Human
Relations Committee's jurisdiction).
214. 338 Md. 188, 657 A.2d 788 (1995).
215. Id. at 197, 657 A.2d at 792.
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for which the primary jurisdiction doctrine was created to
coordinate."
2 16
Sections of the Unfair Trade Practice subtitle give the Insurance
Commissioner the same general ability as the CPD has in the area of
consumer protection, such as regulating unfair and deceptive acts
under the Insurance Code.217 Yet, the Zappone court failed to draw an
analogy between Luskin and Zappone to find primary jurisdiction or at
least support for the doctrine. s
Moreover, Moats v. City of Hagerstown found that the Law Enforce-
ment Officers' Bill of Rights was comprehensive because it comprised
twenty pages in the Maryland Annotated Code.219 In contrast, Mary-
land-National Capital Park & Planning v. Crawfor d 220 found that five rel-
atively brief sections dealing with employment discrimination was not
comprehensive. 221  The Unfair Trade Practices subtitle consists of
fifty-plus pages and over thirty-five sections. Despite this, the Zappone
court held the subtitle was not comprehensive enough to lend sup-
port to the invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
Also troubling is the Zappone court's dismissal of the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals's statement that the Insurance Code is comprehensive. 222
Rather, the Zappone court asserted no case had ever viewed the Insur-
ance Code as sufficiently all-encompassing as to require the invocation
of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.223 The court characterized Equi-
table Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Maryland Commission on
Human Relations224 as standing for the proposition that the regulatory
provisions of the Insurance Code are not so extensive as to indicate a
216. Id. at 196-97, 657 A.2d at 792.
217. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text (describing sections of the Unfair
Trade Practices subtitle of the Maryland Code).
218. The appellees in Zappone did contend that because "an aggrieved claimant may file
a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner, request an investigation and a hearing on
the complaint with the Insurance Commissioner, and if dissatisfied with the Commis-
sioner's resolution of the matter, obtain judicial review in the circuit court," any adminis-
trative remedy under the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle must be exclusive by implication.
Zappone, 349 Md. at 59, 706 A.2d at 1067.
219. 324 Md. 519, 524, 597 A.2d 972, 974 (1991).
220. 307 Md. 1, 511 A.2d 1079 (1986).
221. Id. at 26, 511 A.2d at 1092.
222. See Magan v. Medical Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc'y, 81 Md. App. 301, 307, 567 A.2d 503, 506
(1989). The court stated that "[t]he Insurance Code provides a comprehensive adminis-
trative structure and establishes a uniform method of appeal for an individual aggrieved by
an insurer's violation of the Maryland Insurance Code." Id.
223. Zappone, 349 Md. at 67, 706 A.2d at 1071 (citing Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of
the United States v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 290 Md. 333, 430 A.2d 60
(1981)).
224. 290 Md. 333, 430 A.2d 60 (1981).
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legislative intent that the Insurance Commissioner should have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over discriminatory practices in the sale of insurance,
but should have concurrent jurisdiction with the Commission on
Human Relations (Commission).225 However, Equitable Life is distin-
guishable from the present case for two reasons. First, Equitable Life
dealt with a jurisdiction question between two administrative agencies
while Zappone considered the jurisdiction between an administrative
agency and the judiciary. Second, and most important, the Equitable
Life court never examined the extensiveness of the regulatory provi-
sions to conclude concurrent jurisdiction, but concluded there was
concurrent jurisdiction because of an interpretation of the statutory
language of the relevant Article.2 2 6 After examining the statute, the
court found that there was no language that would "exclude, exempt
or preempt insurers from the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Commission." '227
By giving judicial deference to the agency's own interpretation of
the law, the Zappone court explained an additional factor to help re-
duce potential jurisdictional conflicts between agencies and courts. 2 2 8
An agency's interpretation may be relied on by the court out of es-
teem and respect, and judicial efficiency for the specialized under-
standing of the agency. In addition, because the legislature has
placed an agency in charge of the execution of a statute, the agency's
interpretation of that statute should be entitled weight.229 This is es-
pecially true when the legislature has not altered the administrative
construction of the statute; thus, in the absence of action, there is
implied approval of the administration's interpretation.230
The Zappone court relied on the Insurance Commissioner's inter-
pretation to determine that the administrative remedies were concur-
rent with judicial remedies. While the court stated that it relied on
the agency's interpretation, it never discussed the weight a court is
entitled to give to an agency's interpretation of the statutes it en-
forces. 231 The court also noted the subtitle has remained substantially
225. Zappone, 349 Md. at 67, 706 A.2d at 1071.
226. Equitable Life, 290 Md. at 337-39, 430 A.2d at 63-64.
227. Id. at 338, 430 A.2d at 63. The court also found that the language was "plain and in
need of no explanation." Id.
228. Zappone, 349 Md. at 65, 706 A.2d at 1070.
229. United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982); 2 DAvis, supra note 85, § 29.16, at
399.
230. See 2 DAviS, supra note 85, § 29.16, at 403 (citing NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural
Elec. Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 177 (1981)).
231. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that should be
analyzed in determining how much weight should be given to an agency's interpretation of
the statutes it enforces).
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unchanged for forty years23 2 and cited the commissioner's well rea-
soned amicus brie 33in support of concurrent remedies. Thus, the
case offers support for judicial deference to the commissioner's inter-
pretation of the Unfair Trade Practices subtitle.
Lastly, the Zappone court emphasized the "nature of the alterna-
tive judicial cause of action pursued by the plaintiff. '2 4 If the litiga-
tion does not depend on the "statutory scheme which also contains
the administrative remedy" or the expertise of the administrative
agency, there is no need for the administrative remedy to be deemed
primary.215 If a person's claims are within the conventional compe-
tence of the courts, and the judgment of a technically expert body is
not likely to be helpful, there is no need to resort to the expertise of
an agency.23 6 A trial judge has the same expertise, if not more, to
decide common law tort claims that are wholly independent of an ad-
ministrative remedy.2 7 This highlights the discretionary application
of these factors and alludes to the fact that a decision depends upon
whether the court actually feels confident that it can answer the con-
fronted question itself without resorting to the expertise of the avail-
able agency.
On a broader level, this competence factor may reveal the court's
desire not to make a claimant suffer an unnecessary, complicated de-
lay from the invocation and referral of an issue to an agency under
the primary jurisdiction doctrine. 23" This proposition validly recog-
nizes that a litigant's interests in immediate judicial review may some-
times outweigh the government's interests in efficiency or
administrative autonomy.23 9 This is especially true in a situation in
which a competent court can resolve the matter more expeditiously
and an agency can contribute only limited aid. In the case at hand,
the court ultimately used this factor to conclude that the available ad-
ministrative remedies were fully concurrent with any available judicial
232. Zappone, 349 Md. at 51, 706 A.2d 1063 ("The General Assembly has from time to
time added some provisions to the 1947 statute. Nevertheless, the substance of the 1947
enactment has largely remained intact.").
233. Id. at 59 n.4, 706 A.2d at 1067 n.4; see supra note 160 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the contents of the Insurance Commissioner's amicus brie]).
234. Zappone, 349 Md. at 65, 706 A.2d at 1070.
235. Id. at 65-66, 706 A.2d at 1070.
236. Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1976).
237. Zappone, 349 Md. at 65-66, 706 A.2d at 1070.
238. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 177, § 14.1, at 272-73; § 14.6, at 301.
239. See West v. Bergland, 611 F.2d 710, 718-20 (8th Cir. 1979) (discussing the need for
balancing of governmental and individual interests when deciding if exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies is required).
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remedies. An insurance policy is a contract;240 there is no need to
interpret any portion of the Insurance Code in order to adjudicate an
action of fraud or negligence in purchasing that contract. The signifi-
cant weight given this factor by the court in deciding that the court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Insurance Commissioner for in-
surance fraud by an insurer is understandable and is best stated by the
Supreme Court in Nader v. Allegany Airlines, Inc.:241
Referral of the misrepresentation issue to the [agency] can-
not be justified by the interest in informing the court's ulti-
mate decision with 'the expert and specialized knowledge'
... of the [agency]. The action brought by petitioner does
not turn on a determination of the reasonableness of a chal-
lenged practice-a determination that could be facilitated by
an informed evaluation of the economics or technology of
the regulated industry. The standards to be applied in ac-
tion for fraudulent misrepresentation are within the conven-
tional competence of the courts, and the judgment of a
technically expert body is not likely to be helpful in the ap-
plication of these standards to the facts of this case. 2
42
5. Conclusion.--Through its decision in Zappone, the Court of
Appeals has provided a procedural basis for determining whether an
administrative remedy is exclusive, primary, or concurrent with alter-
native judicial remedies. Zappone dissolves ambiguities in prior case
law and provides a clear framework so parties can determine whether
a complaint should initially be raised before an agency or a court.
This newly announced framework is a prescription for decreased liti-
gation and increased certainty in the law.
While the new road map the court employed provides better gui-
dance than in the past, the highly discretionary portion of the rebuttal
of primary jurisdiction needs additional guidance. Especially trouble-
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 55 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1981).
241. 426 U.S. 290 (1976); see also Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v.
Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 598-99, 386 A.2d 1216, 1224 (1978) (discussing
judicial competence in the area of contract interpretation).
242. Nader, 426 U.S. at 305-06 (citation omitted). An argument could be made that
because the purpose of the Insurance Commissioner would be circumvented if the primary
jurisdiction doctrine was not invoked, a well regulated insurance industry may be harmed
if alleged victims of deceptive acts or practices prohibited by the Unfair Trade Practices
subtitle are not required to bring their claims before the regulatory authority empowered
to enforce that subtitle. Furthermore, because a claimant may take his case to court, the
Insurance Commissioner may never become aware of the alleged deceptive acts. While the
claimant may receive monetary relief, the Insurance Commissioner's remedies of cease
and desist orders, or loss of license may never be utilized to stop future tortious acts.
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some is that the court does not assign any weight to three of the four
factors.2 4 3 Ultimately, the weight given to these factors will most likely
depend on which way the court wants to resolve the substantive ques-
tion. As a result, although litigation overall will be reduced, any fu-
ture litigation problems will most likely arise in the discretionary
feature of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
JASON W. BRIDGES
B. Finding that the Duty to Defend Precedes Notice, Maryland Holds the
Liability Insurer Responsible for Pre-Notice Fees and Expenses
In Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,2 44 the
Court of Appeals reevaluated the scope of a liability insurer's duty to
defend a claim against its insured, considering whether an insurer
could be held accountable for the out-of-pocket expenditures that its
insured paid prior to giving proper notice of the claim.245 In a unani-
mous decision, the court held that an insurer is liable for the reason-
able costs and expenses that an insured incurs before notifying its
insurer of a pending claim. 246 Reasoning that the duty of an insurer
to defend its insured exists as soon as there is a claim to defend,2" 7 the
243. Zappone, 349 Md. at 64-66, 706 A.2d at 1069-70. The court never assigned weight to
the comprehensiveness of the remedial scheme, the agency's interpretation of the statutes
it is entitled to enforce, and the legislature's intent in the statutory language. The court,
however, did say that the weight given to the nature of the alternative judicial cause of
action is "extremely significant." Id. at 65, 706 A.2d at 1070.
244. 347 Md. 32, 698 A.2d 1078 (1997).
245. Id. at 35, 698 A.2d at 1079. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari "to consider
the one question of whether [the insured] was entitled to reimbursement for reasonable
litigation expenses incurred prior to [the date the insurer was notified of the claim]". In
decisions preceding Sherwood, the Court of Special Appeals had consistently held that an
insurer had no duty to defend until it received notice from the insured. See, e.g., Oweiss v.
Erie Ins. Exch., 67 Md. App. 712, 718-19, 509 A.2d 711, 714-15 (1986) (holding that "the
[insurer's] duty to defend did not arise until it was notified [of the amended declaration]
and asked to assume the cost of defense" (citing Brohawn v. Transmerica Ins. Co., 276 Md.
396, 407, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975); Washington v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App.
288, 297, 482 A.2d 503, 507 (1984))); Washington, 60 Md. App. at 297, 482 A.2d at 507
(asserting that "[the insurer] had no duty to defend ... until the assured requested a de-
fense" (citing 14 GEORGEJ. COUCH ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 51:35, at 444 (2d ed. rev.
vol. 1982))). Accordingly, prior to Sherwood, a liability insurer was not liable for any litiga-
tion expenses that its insured incurred before the insured notified the insurance company.
246. Sherwood, 347 Md. at 50, 698 A.2d at 1087.
247. Id. at 44, 698 A.2d at 1083-84. The court stated:
[I]t would seem clear that the [insurer's] right to control the defense necessarily
attaches as soon as there is something to defend . . . [and] [t]he the duty to
defend, rationally, should attach at the same moment the correlative right to con-
trol attaches, i.e., when the claim is made or ... when an insured occurrence
happens.
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court extended section 482 of Article 48A of the Annotated Code of
Maryland,24 8 now section 19-110 of the Insurance Article,2 4 9 to apply
to pre-notice expenses. 25" By so holding, the Court of Appeals elimi-
nated the distinction between pre- and post-notice expenses, establish-
ing that unless the insurer can prove the delay in notice caused actual
prejudice, the delay is irrelevant to the insurer's obligations to pay for
those litigation expenses that the policy holder incurred before giving
notice of the occurrence of an insured event.
1. The Case.--On February 23, 1989, Hartford Accident and In-
demnity Company (Hartford) issued a Comprehensive General Liabil-
ity Insurance Policy to Sherwood Brands, Inc. (Sherwood), a North
Carolina corporation that marketed and distributed food products.2 5 '
Under the terms of the policy, Hartford agreed to pay "those sums
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because
of. . . 'advertising injury' to which this insurance applies."252 Addi-
tionally, Hartford retained "the right and duty to defend any 'suit'
seeking those damages" and the right to "investigate and settle any
claim or 'suit' at [its] discretion. '25 3 The terms of the policy obligated
Sherwood to notify Hartford "promptly of an 'occurrence' which may
result in a claim," and to provide "prompt written notice of the claim
or suit."254 Sherwood was also required to provide copies of all legal
papers to Hartford, and to cooperate in any investigation, defense, or
Id.
248. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1979) (recodified as amended at MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 19-110 (1997)).
249. Section 19-110 of the Insurance Article reads:
An insurer may disclaim coverage on a liability insurance policy on the
ground that the insured or a person claiming the benefits of the policy through
the insured has breached the policy by failing to cooperate with the insurer or by
not giving the insurer required notice only if the insurer establishes by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the lack of cooperation or notice has resulted in
actual prejudice to the insurer.
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-110. Although the current version of the statute is codified as
section 19-110, this change was not effective until October 1, 1997, more than one month
after the Sherwood decision. Sherwood, 347 Md. at 40, 698 A.2d at 1082. Thus, the Court of
Appeals in Sherwood, as well as prior Maryland decisions, refers to the statute as section 482.
Id.; see, e.g., T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. P.T.P., Inc., 331 Md. 406, 414-15, 628 A.2d 223, 227 (1993).
To avoid confusion, the statute will hereinafter be referred to as section 482.
250. Sherwood, 347 Md. at 49, 698 A.2d at 1086 (rejecting the insurance company's con-
tention that the statute "has no application to pre-notice expenses").
251. Id. at 35-36, 698 A.2d at 1079-80.
252. Id. at 36, 698 A.2d at 1080 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
253. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
254. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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settlement.255 Under the terms of the policy, any payment Sherwood
made for its own defense, without Hartford's consent, was to be at its
own cost.
2 5 6
Between January and August 1989, one of Sherwood's competi-
tors in the food industry, Osem Food Industries, filed several com-
plaints alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices against
Sherwood.257 Sherwood failed to immediately notify Hartford of each
complaint.2 58 Although the last amended complaint was filed on Au-
gust 14, 1989, Sherwood did not notify Hartford of the lawsuit or pro-
vide the insurance company with copies of the court papers until June
18, 1991.259 This notice arrived two-and-a-half years after Osem filed
its original lawsuit, and one year and ten months after Osem filed its
last amended complaint.
2 60
Hartford denied coverage on September 18, 1991, on the sole
ground that Osem's suit rested on allegations that occurred before
the inception of Sherwood's policy.2 61 Hartford did not assert that it
255. Id. at 37, 698 A.2d at 1080.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 35-38, 698 A.2d at 1079-80. Osem first filed suit against Sherwood on January
6, 1989 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. Id. at
35, 698 A.2d at 1079. Osem's claim alleged that Sherwood had been using soup mix pack-
aging that was confusingly similar to the package used by Osem, and Sherwood consented
to a court order enjoining it from the use of the objectionable packaging. Id. at 35-36, 698
A.2d at 1079. The order was issued on January 31, 1989, nearly one month before Hart-
ford issued the insurance policy to Sherwood on February 23, 1989. Id. at 36, 698 A.2d at
1079-80. On February 27, 1989, Osem supplemented its complaint against Sherwood, ad-
ding claims based on Sherwood's continued use of packaging "virtually identical and con-
fusingly similar" to Osem's packaging. Id. at 37, 698 A.2d at 1080. According to Osem,
although Sherwood had made some changes in the challenged packaging, they were insuf-
ficient to satisfy the court-ordered injunction. Id. Finally, on August 14, 1989, Osem filed
an amended complaint against Sherwood. Id. at 37-38, 698 A.2d at 1080. In addition to
incorporating the January 6 complaint and the February 27 supplement, Osem made new
claims of defamation, unfair competition, and deceptive trade practices. Id. Specifically,
Osem alleged that "Sherwood disseminated to an Osem customer false and misleading
statements concerning Osem and its products." Id. at 38, 698 A.2d at 1080.
258. Id. at 37-38, 698 A.2d at 1080-81. Sherwood also failed to notify Hartford of Osem's
original January 6, 1989 complaint when it applied to Hartford for liability insurance. Id.
at 39, 698 A.2d at 1081.
259. Id. at 38, 698 A.2d at 1080-81. Sherwood did not consider the prospect of notifying
Hartford until May 1991 when it retained a new attorney. Id. It was this new attorney who
suggested that Sherwood notify Hartford of the pending suit, a possibility that Sherwood
had not previously considered. Id. According to Sherwood, it simply did not realize that
Osem's claim might be covered by the Hartford policy. Id.
260. Id. at 35-38, 698 A.2d at 1079-81. Osem's original complaint was filed on January 6,
1989. Id. at 35, 698 A.2d at 1079. It was supplemented on February 27, 1989, and
amended for the last time on August 14, 1989. Id. at 37, 698 A.2d at 1080. Sherwood
notified Hartford on June 18, 1991. Id. at 38, 698 A.2d at 1081.
261. Id. at 38, 698 A.2d at 1081.
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denied coverage because of Sherwood's delayed notice.262 Following
the denial of coverage, Sherwood continued to defend the lawsuit
and, eventually, on November 30, 1992, settled with Osem for
$100,000.26
3
On June 25, 1993, Sherwood filed a breach of contract claim
against Hartford.264 Sherwood sought (1) a declaratory judgment
that Hartford had a duty to defend and indemnify Sherwood under
the policy, (2) ajudgment that Hartford had breached its contract by
failing to do so, and (3) damages for the breach.265 In its defense,
Hartford primarily argued that Osem's claims arose prior to the incep-
tion of Sherwood's policy.26 6 Additionally, Hartford contended that
no coverage existed because Osem's claim did not constitute "advertis-
ing injury" as defined in the policy,267 and that by not informing Hart-
ford of Osem's claims when Sherwood applied for the coverage,
Sherwood had made a material misrepresentation.268
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County denied Hartford's
motion to dismiss and granted Sherwood's motion for partial sum-
mary judgment, reasoning that the allegations presented in Osem's
February 1989 supplement to its complaint regarding Sherwood's new
packaging arose after the insurance policy took effect.269 The court
held that, as a matter of law, Hartford had a duty to defend Sherwood
in the Osem lawsuit. 27° At a separate hearing, Judge William P. Tur-
ner held that "Hartford had a duty to indemnify Sherwood and to pay
262. Id. Although Hartford noted in a previous communication with Sherwood that the
notice of Osem's lawsuit was significantly delayed and asserted the possibility of prejudice
from this delayed notice, Hartford did not deny coverage on these grounds. Id. Instead, in
its September 18, 1991 letter to Sherwood, it relied entirely on its conclusion that "all of
the allegations occurred prior to the inception date of the Hartford policy." Id.
263. Id. at 39, 698 A.2d at 1081.
264. Id.; Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Sherwood Brands, Inc., 111 Md. App. 94, 99, 680
A.2d 554, 556 (1996) (indicating that Sherwood requested a declaratory judgment against
the insurance company and "alleged that Hartford had wrongfully refused to provide a
defense for Sherwood when it was sued by Osem"), vacated, 347 Md. 32, 698 A.2d 1978
(1997).
265. Sherwood, 347 Md. at 39, 698 A.2d at 1081.
266. Id.
267. Id. The policy defined the term "advertising injury" to include "the misappropria-
tion of advertising ideas or style of doing business." Id. at 36, 698 A.2d at 1080.
268. Id. at 39, 698 A.2d at 1081.
269. Id. (noting that the circuit court reasoned that "at a minimum, the allegations relat-
ing to the 'red package' set forth in the February 27 supplement arose after the policy was
issued").
270. Id.; Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Sherwood Brands, Inc., 111 Md. App. 94, 99, 680
A.2d 554, 557 (1996) (noting the trial court "held that Hartford, as a matter of law, had a
duty to defend Sherwood under the terms of the [insurance] policy"), vacated, 347 Md. 32,
698 A.2d 1978 (1997).
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legal costs incurred by Sherwood in defense of the Osem litiga-
tion."271 On the issue of damages, the jury found that Sherwood's
defense costs and the settlement amount were reasonable, and the
court entered judgment against Hartford in the amount of
$497,366.272 This amount included the pre-notice expenses incurred
by Sherwood.2 7 3 Hartford then appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals. 2
74
Hartford argued on appeal that it was not liable for any costs in-
curred by Sherwood before it gave the requisite notice.275 Sherwood
countered that under section 482 of article 48A of the Maryland
Code, "an insured is entitled to pre-notice defense costs and expenses
when the insurer has not demonstrated actual prejudice as a result of
the delay in receiving notice. ' 2 76 The Court of Special Appeals agreed
with Hartford, holding that the insurance company did not become
obligated to provide a defense for Sherwood until the company re-
ceived notice on June 18, 1991, and could therefore not be liable for
the expenses Sherwood incurred before that time.27 7 The court fur-
ther held that "section 482 applies only when it is claimed that the
insured has breached a condition," and not when coverage is denied
based on the scope of coverage.278 The court reasoned that the policy
did not permit Sherwood to recover out-of-pocket expenses without
271. Sherwood, 111 Md. App. at 99, 680 A.2d at 557.
272. Sherwood, 347 Md. at 39-40, 698 A.2d at 1081. The jury award was broken down as
follows: a total of $182,103.00 in reasonable fees paid to Sherwood's original two attorneys;
$102,688.00 in reasonable fees paid to the Sherwood attorney retained in May of 1991;
$100,000.00 paid in settlement to Osem; and an additional $112,573.00 paid in litigation
expenses and attorney's fees. Id.
273. Id.
274. Sherwood, 111 Md. App. at 100, 680 A.2d at 557. Sherwood also filed an appeal of
the trial court's decision, arguing that the court erred in failing to award prejudgment
interest on the damages. Id.
275. Id. Hartford also contended that the trial court was incorrect when it held that (1)
Hartford had a duty to defend Sherwood, (2) Sherwood did not make a material misrepre-
sentation in its application for coverage, (3) the two and one-half year delay in notice did
not prejudice Hartford, and (4) Hartford was liable for the costs Sherwood incurred
before the effective date of the insurance policy. Id. The Court of Special Appeals found
that the trial judge was legally correct when it found Hartford had a duty to defend, that
Sherwood did not make a material misrepresentation, and that Hartford was not
prejudiced by the delay in notice. Id. at 107-13, 680 A.2d at 561-63. Following the trial
court's decision, Sherwood agreed with Hartford that the insurance company was not lia-
ble for the payment of any fees and expenses incurred by Sherwood before the effective
date of the policy. Id. at 120, 680 A.2d at 567.
276. Id. at 117, 680 A.2d at 565; see infra note 299 and accompanying text (quoting
section 482).
277. Sherwood, 111 Md. App. at 116, 680 A.2d at 564-65.
278. Id. at 119, 680 A.2d at 566.
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Hartford's consent.17 ' Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals va-
cated the circuit court's decision, thereby releasing Hartford's liability
for Sherwood's pre-notice litigation costs.2"' Sherwood then filed a
petition with the Court of Appeals, which granted certiorari281 to con-
sider the sole issue of whether Hartford was liable for the reasonable
expenses Sherwood incurred prior to the date of notice.2 8 2
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Notice Requirement as a Condition Precedent to Insurance
Coverage.-Prior to 1964, Maryland courts required that the language
of an insurance contract, including the notice requirement, be read
literally.28 Consequently, the Court of Appeals construed the in-
sured's obligation to provide prompt notice as a condition precedent
to coverage.284 Allowing the insurance company to dictate the terms
of the insurance policy, the court consistently held that the plain
meaning of the policy's language must, as in any other type of con-
tract, be read literally.285 Thus, the court gave considerable weight to
279. Id. at 116-17, 680 A.2d at 565 ("Insurance policy provisions forbidding the volun-
tary incurring of costs are routinely upheld . . . [and] [s]uch provisions have been con-
strued to preclude the payment of pre-notice attorneys' fees by insurers." (citing Lafarge
Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 400 (5th Cir. 1995); Northern Ins. Co. v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1992); Gribaldo, Jacobs, Hones & Assocs. v.
Agrippina Versicherunges A.G., 476 P.2d 406 (Cal. 1970))).
280. Id. at 116, 680 A.2d at 564-65.
281. Sherwood Brands v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 344 Md. 116, 685 A.2d 450
(1996).
282. Id. Following the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, Sherwood and Hartford
entered into an agreement settling all disputes except the issue of pre-notice expenses.
Sherwood, 347 Md. at 35 n.1, 698 A.2d at 1079 n.1.
283. See, e.g., Watson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 231 Md. 266, 271, 189 A.2d
625, 627 (1963) (applying the language of the insurance contract literally because "when
the language employed in [an insurance contract] is unambiguous, such a policy is to be
construed as other contracts"); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 159 Md. 631,
636, 152 A.2d 523, 525 (1930) (noting that "it has been repeatedly held by this court that
when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, courts have no right to make new
contracts for the parties").
284. See, e.g., Watson, 231 Md. at 271, 189 A.2d at 627 (interpreting the notice require-
ment as a "condition precedent to an action against the insurer"); Lennon v. American
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 208 Md. 424, 430, 118 A.2d 500, 503 (1955) (reasoning that the
notice requirement is such an important provision to the insurance contract that "as a
general rule, compliance by the insured with the requirement of notice is a condition
precedent to the right of recovery"); Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Perkins, 169 Md. 269,
273, 181 A. 436, 438 (1935) (finding that the notice requirement is a condition "which
cannot be waived or altered except by an indorsement").
285. See, e.g., Watson, 231 Md. at 271, 189 A.2d at 627 (reading the language literally
because "when the language employed ... is unambiguous, such a policy is to be construed
as other contracts").
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the insurer's interest in controlling any lawsiiit, while ultimately pro-
viding very little protection to the insured.286
The Court of Appeals allowed the interests of the insurer to con-
trol the outcome in Lennon v. American Farmers Mutual Insurance Co.
2 8 7
In Lennon, the insured was sued as a result of his involvement in a
traffic accident.2"' Although he requested that the insurance com-
pany defend the suit shortly after it was filed, the suit was not filed
until nineteen months after the automobile accident.28 9 After stating
that "[t]he purpose of the provision in an insurance policy that the
insured shall give the insurer notice of an accident as soon as practica-
ble is to give the insurer an opportunity to make an adequate investi-
gation of the circumstances, '290 the court described the notice
requirement as "an important provision for the insurer's protection,
not only against fraudulent claims, but also against claims which are
invalid although made in good faith." 291 Thus, the court justified the
general rule requiring notice as a condition precedent to an insured's
right to liability insurance coverage. 292
Time and again, the Court of Appeals addressed the question
whether "the insurer ... [is] liable under its policy of insurance even
though the assured failed to comply with a condition precedent of the
policy requiring the giving of written notice of an accident as soon as
practicable." 29 3 In Watson v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
29 4
the court explicitly rejected the insured's argument that a better rule
would be to require the insurance company to show that the delay in
notice caused it actual prejudice before it could legally deny cover-
286. See, e.g., Lennon, 208 Md. at 430, 118 A.2d at 503 (emphasizing that strict adherence
to the notice requirement is necessary for the insurer's protection).
287. 208 Md. 424, 118 A.2d 500 (1955) (explaining the importance of the notice re-
quirement for the insurer). Other cases demonstrate the court's protectionist attitude to-
ward the insurer. See, e.g., Watson, 231 Md. at 272, 189 A.2d at 627 (explicitly rejecting a
proposed prejudice requirement that would have prevented the insurance company from
denying coverage); Perkins, 169 Md. at 273, 181 A. at 438 (refusing to exempt the insured
from the notice requirement when there was no endorsement from the insurance
company).
288. Lennon, 208 Md. at 426, 118 A.2d at 501.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 430, 118 A.2d at 502.
291. Id., 118 A.2d at 503.
292. Id. (citing Lewis v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 142 Md. 472, 480, 121 A. 259 (1923);
McCarthy v. Rendle, 119 N.E. 188 (Mass. 1918)).
293. Watson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 231 Md. 266, 269, 189 A.2d 625, 626
(1963); see also American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 159 Md. 631, 636, 152 A.2d
523, 525 (1930) (rejecting insured's contention that its failure to promptly notify the in-
surer might not relieve the insurer from liability).
294. 231 Md. 266, 189 A.2d 625 (1963).
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age.2" 5 Noting that the requirement of actual prejudice was "not in
accord with the Maryland decisions,"296 the Watson court reaffirmed
that notice must be given in strict accordance with the insurance pol-
icy in order to hold the insurer liable for coverage. 29 7 Accordingly,
whether the insurance provider suffered actual prejudice caused by
delayed notice was irrelevant. This result engendered reaction from
the Maryland General Assembly, which acted to rectify the pro-insurer
judicial stance.
b. The Requirement of Actual Prejudice.-In 1964, the Mary-
land General Assembly initiated the first significant change in the in-
surer's liability. In response to the Watson court's rejection of the
prejudice requirement, the Maryland General Assembly enacted sec-
tion 482 of article 48A of the Maryland Code.2 98 The statute, effective
June 1, 1964, states:
Where any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on any
policy of liability insurance issued by it, on the ground that
the insured or anyone claiming the benefits of the policy
through the insured has breached the policy by failing to co-
operate with the insurer or by not giving requisite notice to
the insurer, such disclaimer shall be effective only if the in-
surer establishes, by a preponderance of affirmative evidence
that such lack of cooperation or notice has resulted in actual
prejudice to the insurer.29 9
Thus, the liability of an insurer became enforceable after delayed no-
tice as long as the insurer did not suffer actual prejudice as a result of
295. Id. at 272, 189 A.2d at 627 (rejecting the appellant's contention that "even though
the notice condition herein involved is a condition precedent, it is unavailable to the Com-
pany as a denial of liability under the policy, unless the Company was prejudiced by the
failure to give prompt notice").
296. Id.
297. Id. at 272-73, 189 A.2d at 628.
298. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. House, 315 Md. 328, 332, 554 A.2d 404, 406
(1989) (recognizing that section 482 was enacted to address the Watson decision); Wash-
ington v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App. 288, 293, 482 A.2d 503, 505 (1984) (same).
The Maryland General Assembly acted out of concern for the lack of protection the courts
had given those covered by liability insurance. See T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. P.T.P. Inc., 331 Md.
406, 422-23, 628 A.2d 223, 230-31 (1993) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (stating that by enacting
section 482, the General Assembly "sought to protect consumers of liability insurance ...
by providing that an insurance company may not disclaim coverage under any liability
insurance policy on the ground that the insured failed to give 'requisite notice to the
insurer' unless the insurer established that the failure resulted in actual prejudice").
299. Act of April 7, 1964, ch. 185, 1964 Md. Laws 445, 446, repealed and re-enacted by Act of
April 29, 1966, ch. 205, 1966 Md. Laws 445 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., INS.
§ 19-110 (1997)).
1999] 1019
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:604
that delay."° Following the enactment of section 482, the Maryland
courts acknowledged that the notice requirement was no longer a
condition precedent to the insurer's liability, but refused to extend
the duty to defend to apply before notice was given. 30 ' Because the
courts applied section 482 only to the post-notice costs of the litiga-
tion, actual prejudice was required to alleviate the insurer's duty to
defend a lawsuit after it received notice, but the insured could never
recover any pre-notice legal expenses. °2 This pro-insurer position
embraced by the Maryland courts was consistent with the former judi-
cial requirement that notice be a condition precedent to insurance
coverage. °
Over the next thirty years, the Maryland courts diligently applied
this interpretation of section 482 to insurers' liability. In Washington v.
Federal Kemper Insurance Co.,3°4 the Court of Special Appeals noted that
the notice requirement was no longer a condition precedent to insur-
300. See House, 315 Md. at 332, 554 A.2d at 406 (noting that section 482 made policy
provisions requiring notice to an insurer "covenants and not conditions" and that the stat-
ute measures "by the standard of actual prejudice the materiality of any breach of those
covenants by the insured for the purpose of determining if the breach excuses perform-
ance by the insurer"); see also infra note 299 and accompanying text (quoting section 482).
301. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 791 F. Supp.
1079, 1082, 1084 (D. Md. 1992) (mem.) (noting that under Maryland law, "late notice to
an insurer will not eliminate its obligations under a liability policy unless the insurer can
prove that it has been prejudiced by the delay," but stating that "an insurer's obligation to
defend is triggered only when the insured tenders to the insurer the defense of an action
which is potentially within the policy" (citing Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Exch., 67 Md. App. 712,
718-19, 509 A.2d 711, 714 (1986); Washington, 60 Md. App. at 288, 480 A.2d at 503)); House,
315 Md. at 332, 554 A.2d at 406 (asserting that section 482 "makes policy provisions requir-
ing notice to ... the insurer covenants and not conditions"); Oweiss, 67 Md. App. at 717,
509 A.2d. at 714-15 (finding that the insurer's "duty to defend did not arise until it was
notified... and asked to assume the costs of defense" (citing Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 276 Md. 396, 407, 347 A.2d 842, 850 (1975); Washington, 60 Md. App. at 297, 482 A.2d
at 507)).
302. See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Sherwood Brands, Inc., 111 Md. App. 94, 116,
680 A.2d 554, 564-65 (1996) (holding that because the insurer has no duty to defend
before it receives notice it "does not have an obligation to pay [the insured's] attorney's
fees incurred before that date"), vacated, 347 Md. 32, 698 A.2d 1078 (1997); see, e.g., Mount
Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 99 Md. App. 545, 564, 638 A.2d 1196, 1205
(1994) (holding the insurer "did not have any duty to defend.., until it received notice"
and therefore, the insured is only entitled to reimbursement for the reasonable and neces-
sary expenses it incurred after the date of notice); Oweiss, 67 Md. App. at 719-20, 509 A.2d
at 715 (finding that the insurer had a duty to assume the cost of defense, but only after
receiving notice of a covered claim); Washington, 60 Md. App. at 297-98, 482 A.2d at 507-08
(finding that there was no duty to defend before notice was given and, because notice was
given after judgment, insurer had no obligation to pay the cost of defense).
303. See supra note 284 for examples of the court's decisions prior to 1964.
304. 60 Md. App. 288, 482 A.2d 503 (1984).
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ance coverage.3°5 In Washington, a dissatisfied customer sued an in-
sured construction company."' The construction company failed to
give the requisite notice to its insurer, instead notifying it sixteen
months after being served in the suit and shortly after an unfavorable
verdict in the case.3" 7 The court held that although the delay in no-
tice did not automatically disqualify the insured from coverage, the
insurance company had demonstrated that the delay caused actual
prejudice sufficient tojustify the insurer's denial."0 ' Additionally, the
Washington court rejected the insured's claim that the insurance com-
pany still had a duty to pay the insured's counsel fees.30 9 Stating that
"[the insurer] had no duty to defend ... until the assured requested a
defense," the court found that the insurer had no obligation to pay
where the request was made after the case had been tried.310
The court's reasoning in Washington was consistent with its other
liability insurance decisions. Following the enactment of section 482,
the Court of Special Appeals repeatedly held that although a delay in
notice did not completely alleviate the insurer of its duty to defend a
lawsuit, that duty could not arise until notice was given. 11 Accord-
ingly, insurance companies were never held accountable for pre-no-
tice expenses, no matter how reasonable.3
12
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Hartford Ac-
cident & Indemnity Co., the Court of Appeals held that a liability in-
305. Id. at 293, 482 A.2d at 505 (stating that "[p]rior to 1964, the rule in Maryland was
that an insurer was not liable to defend an insured unless there was compliance by the
insured with the policy requirement of notice . . . [and] [c]ompliance with the policy
provision was a condition precedent to the insurer's liability, whether or not the insurer
was prejudiced," but that "the law in Maryland presently requires proof... that the insurer
suffered actual prejudice").
306. Id. at 290, 482 A.2d at 504.
307. Id. at 291, 482 A.2d at 504.
308. Id. at 296, 482 A.2d at 507 (finding that "the mere entry of the adverse judgment is
affirmative evidence of actual prejudice to the insurer").
309. Id. at 297, 482 A.2d at 507.
310. Id., 482 A.2d at 507-08.
311. See Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 99 Md. App. 545, 564, 638
A.2d 1196, 1205 (1994) (holding that the insurance company was not responsible for pre-
notice attorney's fees because it "did not have any duty to defend [the insured] until it
received notice"); Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Exch., 67 Md. App. 712, 718-19, 509 A.2d 711, 714-15
(1986) (holding that the insurer's "duty to defend did not arise until it was notified. ... and
asked to assume the cost of the defense").
312. See, e.g., Scottsdale, 99 Md. App. at 564, 638 A.2d at 1205 (holding that the insured
"is entitled to reimbursement for the reasonable and necessary expenses it incurred after
[the date of notice]"); Oweiss, 67 Md. App. at 719-20, 509 A.2d at 715 (concluding that the
insurance company had a "duty to assume the [insured's] cost of [the] defense" upon
notice of a covered claim).
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surer may be responsible for litigation expenses incurred by the
insured prior to receiving proper notice of the insured's claim,
thereby expanding the scope of the insurer's obligation to pay for its
insured's defense.313 The court considered the following question:
whether, in light of [section 482 of article 48A of the Mary-
land Code], an insurer is liable for pre-notice fees and costs
incurred in the defense of a lawsuit when (1) the insurer
breaches its duty to defend after receiving delayed notice of
the suit, (2) the insured's delay in giving notice is uninten-
tional and in good faith, (3) the insurer is not prejudiced by
the delay, and (4) the fees and costs are reasonable and
would have been incurred by the insurer has timely notice
been given.314
The Sherwood court relied on three levels of reasoning to reach
the conclusion that the insurer's duty to defend exists before it re-
ceives notice of a claim and, in so doing, accepted three fundamental
propositions. First, the court concluded that the insurer's duty to de-
fend a claim against its insured and its right to control the defense of
that claim are "reciprocal or correlative provisions" of the insurance
contract.315 Second, the court reasoned that the right to control the
defense must attach "as soon as there is something to defend."
63 1
Third, the court established new law by asserting that the duty to de-
fend should apply at the same moment the insurer gains the right to
control the defense without regard to the timing of notice.3 17 Thus,
the obligation of the insurance company to defend its insured at-
taches at the moment the insured becomes entitled to coverage.
Once the court established that the commencement of the in-
surer's duty to defend predated the receipt of notice, it addressed the
breach of this duty.318 The court concluded that, although the obliga-
tion to defend the insured arises before notice, an insurer does not
breach this duty until it is notified of a claim and declines coverage
313. Sherwood, 347 Md. at 50, 698 A.2d at 1087.
314. Id. at 40, 698 A.2d at 1082.
315. See id. at 43, 698 A.2d at 1083 (reasoning that the "right to control the defense.., is
important to the insurer as a mechanism for protecting and minimizing its duty of indem-
nification [and] [i]f it is to be liable for any judgment rendered against the insured, it has
a right to make certain that a proper defense is made").
316. Id. at 44, 698 A.2d at 1083 (reasoning that "it would hardly be sound to conclude
that the right [to control the defense] does not exist or does not arise until notice is given,
for if that were the case, the right to control vested in the insurer would effectively be
within the control of the insured").
317. Id., 698 A.2d at 1083-84.
318. Id. at 46, 698 A.2d at 1084.
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without legal justification. 19 Clarifying the impact of the rule on the
insurer's liability, the court noted that because the insurer is no
longer exempt from the duty to defend before it receives notice, it is
no longer reasonable to absolve the insurer of its pre-notice
obligations.32 °
The court reasoned that when the duty to defend arises prior to
notice, questions regarding pre-notice obligations depend on a "fact-
specific inquiry and analysis" of the breach. 321 For this analysis, the
court identified two factors that will control the insurer's liability: (1)
whether the insurance company undertakes the defense upon notice,
and (2) if it declines coverage and does not undertake the defense,
whether the insurance company's grounds for the denial are legally
valid.322 The court concluded that where the insurance company
honors its duty by defending its insured, there is no breach of con-
tract.3 23 In such a case, however, the court reasoned that the insurer
can still be responsible for the pre-notice expenses if the delay did not
cause it actual prejudice within the meaning of section 482.324
Similarly, where the insurance company declines coverage based
on the delay in notice, if it is unable to prove that the delay cause it
actual prejudice, it will be liable for the entire cost of the defense,
both post- and pre-notice.3 25 Finally, the court addressed the situation
in Shervood, where an insurance company declines to defend its in-
sured on some basis other than delayed notice.32 6 The court first con-
cluded that if Hartford's grounds for denying coverage had been
valid, the insurer would have had no obligation to Sherwood.3 27 How-
319. Id.
320. Id. at 47-48, 698 A.2d at 1085.
321. Id. at 48, 698 A.2d at 1085.
322. Id. at 48-50, 698 A.2d at 1085-86. The court discussed three circumstances that
would impact an insurance company's obligation to pay pre-notice expenses: (1) an insur-
ance company may undertake the defense upon receiving delayed notice, (2) an insurer
may decline coverage following delayed notice, asserting that the delay was a material
breach; or (3) an insurer may decline coverage for a reason other than the delay. Id. at 48-
49, 698 A.2d at 1085-86. In this case, the court dealt primarily with the third possibility;
Hartford had denied coverage, but not on the grounds of delayed notice. Id. at 50, 698
A.2d at 1086.
323. Id. at 48, 698 A.2d at 1086.
324. Id. ("The relevant question as to pre-notice expenses.., is whether the insurer has
been prejudiced within the meaning of § 482 .. ").
325. Id. at 49-50, 689 A.2d at 1086 (concluding that an insurer who fails to prove that it
was "prejudiced by the delayed notice... would be in no better position, with respect to
pre-notice expenses, than the insurer who . .. undertakes the defense").
326. Id. at 50, 698 A.2d at 1086-87.
327. Id., 698 A.2d at 1086 (asserting that "if the court ultimately agrees [that the claim is
outside the policy coverage], there is no obligation to reimburse the insured for any litiga-
tion expenses, whether incurred before or after the notice was given").
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ever, if the insurer had a duty to defend, which it breached by denying
coverage, "the insurer is liable for all damages incurred by the insured
as a result of [the] breach."3 2' Reiterating its conclusion that the in-
surer's duty to defend its insured "arises upon the happening of an
insured event, '3 29 the court held that Hartford was liable for all ex-
penses of the litigation, including those Sherwood incurred prior to
its notice to the insurer.33 °
4. Analysis.-At a time when liability insurance is a priority for
many,3 3 1 the Sherwood court held that an insurer could be liable for
the reasonable pre-notice legal expenses incurred by its insured.3 32
By extending the insurer's duty to defend to encompass liability for
reasonable pre-notice legal fees, the court has virtually eliminated the
need for a distinction between pre- and post-notice expenses. 3
- Con-
sequently, if an insurance company cannot establish that a delay in
notice has caused it actual prejudice, the delay will have no effect on
the insurer's obligation to provide a defense for its insured.
Thus, the Sherwood decision marks the second major change in
Maryland law regarding the relationship between the liability insurer's
duty to defend its insured and the insured's obligation to provide
prompt notice of any claim potentially within its policy. Like the ini-
tial application of section 482, Sherwood eroded the notice require-
ment by changing the way courts construe the insured's contractual
obligation to promptly notify its insurance company of a potentially
covered claim. 33 4 The Court of Appeals has finally brought Maryland
328. Id. (citing Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. v. Electro Enter., 287 Md. 641, 648-49, 415
A.2d 278, 282-83 (1980); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 409-10, 347 A.2d
842, 851 (1975)). In such a situation, the court noted that the timing of notice is irrele-
vant. Id. Because the insurer's decision not to defend was unrelated to any delay in notice,
the delay should not be considered in evaluating the insurer's liability. Id. at 50, 698 A.2d
at 1086-87.
329. Id. at 48, 698 A.2d at 1085. Sherwood's agreement with Hartford was an "occur-
rence" insurance policy. Id. at 37, 698 A.2d at 1080.
330. Id. at 50, 698 A.2d at 1087 (holding "that Hartford is liable for the pre-notice fees
and expenses incurred by Sherwood, which the jury found to be reasonable").
331. SeeKent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1629, 1629
(1994) (assessing the growing demand for liability insurance and concluding that "liability
insurance pervades economic life in the United States").
332. Sherwood, 347 Md. at 50, 698 A.2d at 1087.
333. The Court of Appeals decided that if an insurer can prove that a delay in notice
caused it to suffer actual prejudice, it will not be liable for any expenses, either pre- or post-
notice. Id. at 49, 698 A.2d at 1086. If, on the other hand, the insurer is unable to demon-
strate any prejudice as a result of the delay, it will be liable for all expenses, both pre- and
post-notice. Id. at 49-50, 698 A.2d at 1086.
334. See supra notes 301-312 and accompanying text (discussing how section 482 quali-
fied the application of the notice requirement).
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insurance law completely within the public policy requirements of sec-
tion 482 and has allowed the insured to more fully depend on liability
insurance.
a. The Need for Dependable Liability Insurance.--Since the
1980s, the incidence of litigation in the United States has skyrock-
eted. 35 Along with this increase has come a growing demand for lia-
bility insurance. 36 Consequently, individuals and businesses are
paying very high premiums for peace of mind as well as for protection
from the actual cost and burden of litigation.33 v In fact, some com-
mentators have characterized the growing public concern over liabil-
ity as absolute paranoia. 338 At the same time, others are urging the
insured to focus ever more closely on the critical details of liability
insurance.339 Noting that the policies are complex, contain a variety
of conditions on coverage, and that the standards for coverage are
often imprecise,3 40 attorneys are being urged to closely monitor the
insurance status of their employers and clients. 41
Before Sherwood, this careful attention to the details of liability
coverage was crucial in Maryland. Some of the best advice to corpo-
rate counsel was "[t]hink [i]nsurance [a]fter a [1]oss [o]ccurs," and
335. See Steven W. Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for Liability Insurance: An
Insurance Economics Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1681, 1686 (1994) (noting the expansion of
actual and potential liability in the mid-1980s).
336. See id. (stating that "the demand for liability insurance increased as actual and po-
tential liability expanded").
337. See Syverud, supra note 331, at 1630-31 (discussing the expense of liability
insurance).
338. See id. at 1629 (asserting that Americans "habitually consider both the possible at-
tendant legal liability [of our actions] and how to insure against it").
339. See, e.g., Howard Ende et al., Liability Insurance: A Primer for College and University
Counse 23J.C. & U.L. 609, 612 (1997) (encouraging counsel to focus on liability insurance
policies because of the "enormous liabilities faced by colleges and universities"); Eugene R.
Anderson et al., Liability Insurance: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 49 Bus. LAW. 259, 291
(1993) (urging corporate counsel to be intimately familiar with the corporation's insur-
ance policies, and to always "Think Insurance").
340. The insurer's duty to defend is governed by the "potentiality rule." See Anderson et
al., supra note 339, at 272; Andrew Janquitto, Insurer's Duty to Defend in Maryland, 18 U.
BALT. L. REv. 1, 10-17 (1988) (discussing the potentiality rule). Under this rule, an insurer
has a duty to defend its insured if the allegations in the claimant's pleadings "create a
potential that the insurer will have a duty to indemnify." Id. at 2. The duty to defend may
even arise from allegations made in bad faith and ambiguous allegations. Id. at 14-15.
Thus, it is not always easy to determine whether a claim falls within a policy's coverage.
While some suggest the proper rule for the insurer is "when in doubt, defend," this is not
always the practice. Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 1A R. LONG &
M. RHODES, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 5.01 (1987)).
341. See Anderson et al., supra note 339, at 291-92 (advising counsel to "THINK INSUR-
ANCE" and to pay particular attention to the requirements and scope of corporate insur-
ance coverage).
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"[e]nsure [t]hat [a]ll [n]otices [a]re [t]imely."3 42 Certainly, deter-
mining whether a claim might be covered by a policy can be a daunt-
ing task. For example, the "analysis requires detailed knowledge
about the legal theories of the underlying claim," as well as an exami-
nation of every insurance policy sold to the corporation and any other
companies' insurance policies that might list the corporation as an
additional insured.343 Considering the complexity, it is not that sur-
prising that corporations with in-house counsel fail to recognize that a
claim might be covered by an existing policy.
It is even less surprising when outside counsel fails to raise the
issue of insurance.144 Less familiar with the corporation's policies and
less concerned with the eventual cost to the client (as long as the im-
mediate funds are available), a retained attorney might fail to investi-
gate whether the claim is covered.345 A complete failure to address
the insurance issue can have dire consequences for the insured, who
suffers the unnecessary burden of defending the entire lawsuit. But,
before Sherwood, even a relatively slight delay in realizing that a claim
might be covered by an insurance policy could bring expensive conse-
quences. Even when a claim would fall within the policy coverage, any
out-of-pocket expenditures made by the insured before notice could
never be recovered. 46
Considering the high costs of litigation, it can be critical to an
individual's or business's future that the fees and expenses associated
with a defense are covered. Frequently, the costs of a defense greatly
342. Id. (advising corporate counsel to immediately "determine which policies may in-
sure the claim," and "act to protect the corporation by ensuring that notice is given in a
timely and proper fashion").
343. Id. at 292.
344. This is precisely what happened in Sherwood. The corporation employed three at-
torneys at various times in the course of the Osem litigation. See Sherwood, 347 Md. at 37,
698 A.2d at 1080-81. Each attorney was employed only for the purpose of defending the
claims brought by Osem. Id.; see also supra note 259 (noting Sherwood's change in attor-
neys and the failure to realize that Osem's claim might be covered by the Hartford policy).
345. There are several reasons that an attorney retained to defend a single lawsuit might
fail to raise the issue of insurance. First, the failure could be the same type of oversight
that can plague in-house counsel. Second, the failure could be brought about by the attor-
ney's focus on the task at hand. Retained to defend the lawsuit, insurance coverage may be
out of the attorney's area of expertise or perceived range of responsibility. Third, an attor-
ney may be motivated by a desire to maintain control of the defense. If an insurance
company undertakes the defense, the previously retained attorney will have lost a client.
While this is clearly an unethical motive, the possibility of deceit illustrates the complex
relationships between corporations, their attorneys, and their insurers.
346. See supra notes 301-313 and accompanying text (discussing the state of insurance
liability before the Sherwood decision).
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exceed the amount of judgment or settlement.3 47 Consequently, the
insurer's duty to defend, and assume the costs of litigation, are at least
as important as its duty to indemnify.3 48 Thus, the insured that enters
into a contract needs to be able to rely on its insurer to fulfill this
important obligation. However, before Sherwood, with pre-notice ex-
penses firmly beyond the scope of the insurer's responsibility, liability
insurance was a high-risk venture.349 If a business or individual could
not count on an insurer to cover the initial costs of a lawsuit, the high
premiums for a policy appeared even less reasonable. 5 °
b. The Actual Prejudice Requirement.--The Sherwood court in-
creased the dependability of liability insurance by explicitly extending
the prejudice requirement codified in section 482 to apply to pre-no-
tice expenses.351 Consequently, an insurer may not disclaim coverage
on the basis of delayed notice unless it can prove that the delay caused
it to suffer some actual prejudice. 52
(1) What is Actual Prejudice?-Although the standard is ap-
plied inconsistently,3 53 "actual prejudice" is best understood consider-
ing the typical terms of an insurance contract. Courts will generally
find that an insurer has been prejudiced as the result of a breach
when "the purposes of the breached policy requirement are de-
feated."3 4 The requirement of prompt notice is generally intended
to allow the insurer to (1) investigate and evaluate claims, (2) weed
out fraudulent claims, (3) evaluate its position to determine its ights
347. See Anderson et al., supra note 339, at 272 (stating that the insurer's duty to defend
"is of paramount importance to policyholders because the costs of defense may far exceed
the amount of judgments and settlements"). This was the case in the Sherwood litigation.
Sherwood and Osem eventually settled for $100,000. Sherwood, 347 Md. at 39, 698 A.2d at
1081. The jury later found that Sherwood's reasonable expenses in defending the action,
including pre-notice expenses, were $397,366. Id. at 39-40, 698 A.2d at 1081 (providing a
break-down of the jury award).
348. SeeJanquitto, supra note 340, at 2 (noting that "[e]ach [of the duty to defend and
the duty to indemnify] is an important benefit").
349. See Anderson et al., supra note 339, at 290 (noting that businesses are already
"under pressure to self-insure" because it appears to be a cheaper option).
350. Much discussion has centered around the temptation to self-insure. See, e.g., id.
(advising corporations not to self-insure despite the fact that the option appears "cheap in
comparison to the cost of purchasing real insurance").
351. See supra notes 332-334 and accompanying text (discussing Sherwoods impact on the
insurer's liability).
352. See supra note 299 and accompanying text (quoting section 482).
353. The standard is frequently applied without any concrete definition. See Richard L.
Suter, Insurer Prejudice: Analysis of an Expanding Doctrine In Insurance Coverage Law, 46 ME. L.
REV. 221, 222 (1994) (asserting that "courts have failed to develop a broadly recognized,
comprehensive definition of the term").
354. Id. at 223.
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and responsibilities, (4) maintain adequate revenues and establish
more accurate renewal premiums, and (5) take steps to prevent losses
from similar risks in the future. 55 Thus, where the insurer can prove
that, due to the delay, it was unable to further one or more of these
goals, it will not be obligated to perform the contract.3 56
(2) How Maryland's Actual Prejudice Requirement Compares to
OtherJurisdictions.-Although the Sherwood decision mandates that an
insurer cannot disclaim pre-notice expenses without proof of preju-
dice, Maryland practitioners must keep in mind that neighboring ju-
risdictions differ in their approach to pre-notice expenses. While the
majority of states have adopted some version of the actual prejudice
doctrine, 57 most decline to apply the rules to pre-notice expenses. 58
This may prove to be a critical consideration when advising clients on
the purchase of liability insurance.
355. Id. at 223-24; see also Lennon v. American Farmers Mut. Ins. Co, 208 Md. 424, 430,
118 A.2d 500, 503 (1955) (discussing the purposes behind the notice requirement).
356. Suter, supra note 353, at 224 (noting that courts have found prejudice "where one
or more of the purposes of [the notice] requirement has been defeated"). There are also
commonly noted exceptions to the prejudice requirement. Id. In these situations, the
contract is not enforced even if there was no prejudice to the insurer. Id. The exceptions
are (1) a bad faith delay, (2) terms in a "claims made policy," and (3)the entry ofjudgment
before notice. Id. Thus, to enforce a contract against the insurer following a delay in
notice, the contract must be for an "occurrence" policy, the delay must be in good faith,
and notice must occur before a judgment in the claim at issue.
The basic difference between "occurrence" and "claims-made" insurance policies has
been summarized as follows:
A "claims-made" policy frequently requires that the "occurrence" happen during
the policy period, the claim be made against the policyholder during the policy
period and that the claim be reported to the insurance company during the re-
porting period. In contrast, an "occurrence" policy provides coverage for injury
or damage which happens during the policy period, regardless of when the claim
for injury or damages is first made against the policyholder.
Anderson, supra note 339, at 264 (footnotes omitted).
357. See Eugene R. Anderson, Calling Attention to the Late Notice Problem, RiSK MGMT., Nov.
1992, at 26, 34-35 (charting the late notice rules for the fifty states). As one commentator
has noted:
Traditionally, if an insured failed to comply with such notification or cooperation
requirements, the insurer could flatly deny coverage of the claim. Recently, how-
ever, an increasing number of courts are requiring that the insurer show that it
has been prejudiced in some way before it can deny coverage for the insured's
failure to comply with such requirements.
Suter, supra note 353, at 221 (footnote omitted).
358. See id.
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c. Sherwood Furthers Good Public Policy.-In Maryland, the
insured has a duty to read its insurance policy.359 If the insured does
not object to any provision in the policy, it is presumed to have under-
stood and consented to all the terms.36° Particularly where the in-
sured is a "sophisticated business entity," it will be bound to every term
in the policy. 6 Under the Hartford-Sherwood policy, Sherwood was
not only required to promptly notify the insurance company of any
event that might give rise to coverage under the policy, it was explicitly
forbidden from making any payments in its own defense without Hart-
ford's consent.3 62 Ordinarily, as a business entity that commonly deals
with contracts in various contexts, Sherwood would not be able to es-
cape the literal consequences of these provisions.363
There is, however, an important exception to the foregoing rules
of construction: when a provision of an insurance contract is against
Maryland public policy, it cannot be enforced.3 64 The controlling
public policy is determined, in part, by those principles set forth in
state statutes, including the Insurance Code.365 Even when the invali-
dation of a provision of an insurance contract would result in ex-
panding the insurer's contractual commitment, the public policy must
359. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ben Lewis Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 121
Md. App. 467, 473, 710 A.2d 338, 341 (1998) (discussing obligation of insured to read and
understand the terms of his or her insurance policy).
360. Id.
361. Twelve Knotts Ltd. Partnership v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 87 Md. App. 88, 104,
589 A.2d 105, 113 (1991) (holding the insured accountable for the provisions in its policy
because it was a "sophisticated business entity" and the provision was "clear and
unambiguous").
362. See supra notes 252-256 and accompanying text (describing the Hartford insurance
policy purchased by Sherwood).
363. See supra note 361 and accompanying text (underscoring reasonableness of in-
sured's obligation to understand policy when it is a sophisticated entity with experience
negotiating contracts).
364. See Litz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 346 Md. 217, 224, 695 A.2d 566, 569 (1997)
(stating that "[a]n insurance contract, like any other contract, is measured by its terms
unless a statute, a regulation, or public policy is violated thereby" (quoting Pacific Indem.
Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 A.2d 486, 488 (1985))); see also Sean
W. Gallagher, Note, The Public Policy Exclusion and Insurance for Intentional Employment Dis-
crimination, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1256, 1258 (1994) (noting that although there is a "strong
public policy favoring the enforcement of contracts as they are written," courts refuse to
enforce some provisions on the grounds that they violate public policy).
365. See Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 120 Md. App. 216, 230, 706 A.2d 650, 657 (1998)
(noting that "[w]hen a clause in an insurance policy is contrary to State public policy, as set
forth in the Insurance Code or other statute, it is invalid and unenforceable" (citing Blue
Bird Cas. Co. v. Amalgamated Cas. Ins. Co., 109 Md. App. 378, 388, 675 A.2d 122, 127
(1996) (citingJennings v. GEICO, 302 Md. 352, 356, 488 A.2d 166, 168 (1985)))).
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control. 6 6 Thus, the public policy set forth in section 482 should
override any conflicting provisions in the Hartford-Sherwood policy.
Section 482 is in direct conflict with those provisions that would
limit the insured's recovery of litigation expenses when the insurance
company is not harmed. The statute keeps an insured from incurring
the costs of litigation for failing to give the requisite notice when the
insurer is not prejudiced by the delay." 7 Clearly, the public policy
propounded by this rule puts the insured's right to recover under the
insurance policy before adherence to the notice requirement. Thus,
it is logical and fair that the notice requirement should not be en-
forced when compliance would not have changed the parties'
circumstances.3 68
By eliminating the distinction between pre- and post-notice ex-
penses, a remnant from the construction of the notice requirement as
a condition precedent to coverage,3 6 9 the Court of Appeals created a
much more reasonable relationship between the rights of insurance
companies and their insured. Not only does the rule make much
more sense, it holds the insurer accountable for its end of the stan-
dard liability policy, while alleviating the extreme consequences suf-
fered by an insured who gave late notice. This fundamental fairness
of the Shenvood rule is best illustrated by weighing the impact of the
old rule on the insured against the potential effects of the Sherwood
rule on insurance companies.
(1) The Old Rule and the Insured. -Before Sherwood, a delay in
notice was a major limiting factor in the insurer's obligations, regard-
366. Cf Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Md. App. 45, 58,
675 A.2d 1059, 1066 (1996) (noting that holding the insurer liable for claims not covered
by its policy or recoverable in the state where the insurance was provided "would expand
the insurer's contractual commitment under the insurance policy beyond that which was
contemplated by the parties," and that this would only be permissible where there is "an
overriding public policy justification for doing so").
367. See supra note 299 and accompanying text (quoting section 482).
368. Although the Sherwood court did not consider a public policy argument, this is simi-
lar to the court's conclusion that, logically, where the notice requirement is no longer a
condition precedent to coverage, the insurer's duty to defend should arise before notice.
Sherwood, 347 Md. at 45, 698 A.2d at 1084. The Sherwood court reasoned that
[w]here ... the duty to notify is merely a covenant.., the logic of... holding
[that there is no duty to defend until notice is given] becomes significantly atten-
uated, for it creates a time gap between the insurer's right to control the defense
and its duty to provide one that has no legal underpinning.
Id.
369. Id. (reasoning that the distinction between pre- and post-notice obligations is logi-
cal "[w] here the duty of notification is regarded as a condition precedent to the insurer's
duty to defend").
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less of whether the delay could be shown to prejudice the insurer.37 °
Because the insurer's duty to defend did not arise until notice, those
expenses incurred by the insured prior to notice could not be consid-
ered when computing damages caused by the insurer's eventual
breach. Thus, the insured was never entitled to recover for this signif-
icant monetary loss."7
Under this construction, after paying premiums for protection
from the potentially astronomical cost of litigation, the insured would
lose coverage for pre-notice expenses for failing to provide prompt
notice to the insurer. Often, an insured would lose coverage for fail-
ing to identify an occurrence as potentially within the scope of the
policy.372 The circumstances surrounding Sherwood are a perfect ex-
ample of the difficulty an insured might have identifying a situation
that might trigger its insurance coverage. According to Sherwood, it
never considered the possibility that Osem's claims might be covered
by the Hartford policy until immediately before it gave proper notice
of the lawsuit.373 Under the old rule, while the insurer would still
realize the benefit of the bargain by receiving premiums, the insured's
benefit would be drastically restricted if it did not realize a lawsuit
might be covered.374 A layperson should not be held to the standard
of identifying any occurrence that triggers the "potentiality of cover-
age" that would give rise to a legitimate duty to defend.3
(2) Sherwood and the Insurer.-Although Sherwood expanded
the liability of the insurer as construed by the courts, it did not create
a burden greater than that contemplated by the insurance company
370. See supra notes 299-312 and accompanying text (discussing the Maryland courts'
application of section 482).
371. See supra notes 311-312 and accompanying text (explaining that because the in-
surer had no duty to defend until it received prior notice, it was never liable for expenses
incurred before notice).
372. See, e.g., Oweiss v. Erie Ins. Exch., 67 Md. App. 712, 715, 509 A.2d 711, 713 (1986)
(stating that insured failed to notify its insurance company of an incident because there
was no visible damage and no police report was filed); cf Lennon v. American Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co., 208 Md. 424, 433, 118 A.2d 500, 504 (1955) (holding that the insured was
not required to notify his insurance company because no covered event actually occurred).
373. Sherwood, 347 Md. at 38, 698 A.2d at 1081.
374. See Ende et al., supra note 339, at 660-61 (noting that "[f]orfeiture of insurance is a
massive and disproportionate penalty in relation to the policy holder's relatively harmless
noncompliance with a condition in the insurance policy").
375. For a discussion of the potentiality rule, see Janquitto, supra note 340, at 10-17
(discussing the scope of the insurer's duty to defend in Maryland); see also Travelers In-
dem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 69 Md. App. 664, 671, 519 A.2d 760, 764 (1987)
(discussing the potentiality rule).
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when it drafted the policy.376 In exchange for a premium and the
right to control the defense, the insurer agreed to defend the insured
in covered litigation.3 7' Any delay in notice that does not cause some
prejudice to the insurer will not disrupt this relationship. By its na-
ture, the prejudice requirement protects the insurer from suffering
either a diminished ability to control the defense or a greater obliga-
tion for expenses.
One risk involved in placing a greater burden on the insurer is
that insurance rates will increase and coverage will be less accessible to
the consumer. In a case such as Sherwood, that risk simply does not
apply. Under Sherwood, an insurance company can only be held liable
for litigation expenses potentially within the scope of coverage when it
was (1) promptly notified of the claim as required by the policy or (2)
a delay in notification did not prejudice the insurer's ability to provide
a defense.378 Thus, the insured is entitled to no more than was con-
templated by the insurance company when it drafted the policy and
set its premiums. Accordingly, the insurer is not really burdened by
the expansion in Sherwood.
d. Insurance Companies Take Note.-The Sherwood decision
represents a break in Maryland law from the rule in mostjurisdictions.
In fact, the Court of Appeals recognized that the Sherwood interpreta-
tion of section 482 was contrary to thirty years of decisions by the
Court of Special Appeals.379 There are three points for insurance
companies to consider in the Sherwood decision. First, the court relied
on a logical interpretation of section 482 when it found that the preju-
dice requirement should apply evenly to pre- and post-notice ex-
penses. 8 ° Second, the court allowed the insured to recover pre-
notice expenses in spite of a contract provision explicitly barring re-
376. See supra note 325 and accompanying text (indicating that insurers are obligated to
reimburse insureds for reasonable costs absent prejudice; thus a duty to pay pre-notice
expenses is not beyond the scope of coverage initially contemplated by the insurer when
the policy was issued).
377. SeeJanquitto, supra note 340, at 3.
378. See Sherwood, 347 Md. at 48-50, 698 A.2d at 1086-87 (identifying situations that
would not impact availability of coverage).
379. See id. at 44, 698 A.2d at 1084 (acknowledging that "[a] number of courts, includ-
ing the Court of Special Appeals, have stated that the duty to defend does not arise until
the insurer is notified of the claim and asked to undertake the defense").
380. See id. at 43-44, 698 A.2d at 1083 (citing no authority for the conclusions that (1)
the duty to defend and the right to control the defense are correlative provisions, and (2)
the right to control the defense necessarily attaches as soon as there is something to
defend).
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covery of such expenses without the company's consent.381 Arguably,
this allowance interferes with the rights of the contracting parties to
realize the benefit of their bargain, yet the court completely fails to
address this issue. Third, the court's discussion of the instances where
an insurer either undertakes the defense following a delay in notice or
declines coverage based on the delay is not within the parameters of
the issue in Sherwood.382 The Court of Appeals extended section 482
to apply to pre-notice expenses in these instances, as well as in the
situation described in Sherwood.383
Where the insurer undertakes the defense following a delay in
notice or denies coverage based on perceived prejudice resulting
from the delayed notice, the company should argue that Sherwood
does not control, because the court did not consider such facts in that
case. Certainly, the decision does not apply to "claims made policies,"
a bad faith delay, or notice received afterjudgment114 This may be a
small consolation, however, to the insurance companies that have just
been exposed to much greater potential liability.
5. Conclusion.-By eliminating the distinction between pre- and
post-notice expenses, the Court of Appeals expanded the scope of the
liability insurer's obligation to provide a defense for its insured. In-
creasing the dependability of liability insurance, Sherwoods impact on
the contractual obligation of the insurer within its liability insurance
policy is fair and reasonable. By holding an insurer liable for litiga-
tion expenses it would have incurred had it received notice of the
claim earlier, the court does not place a greater obligation on the
381. See id. at 37, 698 A.2d at 1080 (noting that the Hartford policy "stated that an
insured would not, except at its own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obli-
gation, or incur any expense without Hartford's consent").
382. Id. at 48-50, 698 A.2d at 1085-86; see also supra note 314 and accompanying text
(discussing the issue in Sherwood, as framed by the Court of Appeals). Hartford denied
Sherwood's coverage on the basis that the claim was not covered by the policy. Sherwood,
347 Md. at 38, 698 A.2d at 1081. Rather than limiting itself to a discussion of the instant
facts, the Court of Appeals considered the obligation of the insurer when it declines cover-
age based on delayed notice, as well as its obligation when it undertakes the defense after
such a delay. Id. at 48-50, 698 A.2d at 1085-86 (recognizing that the issue in Sherwood was
not denial of coverage based on delayed notice).
383. Before Sherwood, no Maryland court had applied the prejudice requirement of sec-
tion 482 to pre-notice expenses. See supra notes 301-313 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the law in Maryland prior to Sherwood and concluding that under no circumstances
could an insurer be obligated to reimburse pre-notice expenses). Instead, the courts re-
peatedly held that the insurer could not be liable for any expenses incurred by the insured
before it gave proper notice. See id.; see also supra note 312 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 356 (explaining the three exceptions to the prejudice rule); see also
Sherwood, 347 Md. at 37, 698 A.2d at 1080 (noting that Sherwood's policy with Hartford was
an "occurrence" policy).
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insurer than what it contracted to provide. This decision will, in many
instances, alleviate the drastic consequences that previously fell upon
the insured who failed to make the difficult identification of a claim
that could fall within the potentiality of coverage.
CARA J. HEFLIN
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XI. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Expanding the Application of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of
Professional Conduct
In Post v. Bregman,1 the Court of Appeals held that an attorney
may invoke a violation of Rule 1.5(e)2 of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules
of Professional Conduct (MLRPC or Rules) outside the disciplinary
context, as a defense to a breach of contract claim, in order to render
a fee-sharing agreement unenforceable.' In so doing, the court has
unequivocally recognized that the MLRPC embody an expression of
public policy having the force of law.4 As a result, violations of other
provisions in the MLRPC similarly may be recognized in proceedings
outside the disciplinary context. In a case subsequent to Bregman, Son
v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar,5 the Court of Appeals inter-
preted and applied Bregman in a manner suggesting this result.6
1. The Case.-In August 1989, Stanley Taylor met with Andrew
Bregman after finding himself without an attorney in his pending
workers' compensation suit.7 Because Bregman's firm did not handle
workers' compensation cases, he referred Taylor to Post, an attorney
specializing in this area of law.8 Taylor retained Post to represent him
in both his workers' compensation suit and in a third-party action
against the suppliers of the toxic substances that he believed to have
1. 349 Md. 142, 707 A.2d 806 (1998).
2. Rule 1.5(e) provides:
A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only
if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or,
by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for
the representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the
lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1998).
3. Bregman, 349 Md. at 168, 707 A.2d at 818.
4. See id. (adopting the premise that MLRPC 1.5(e) "constitute[s] a supervening state-
ment of public policy to which fee-sharing agreements by lawyers are subject and that the
enforcement of Rule 1.5(e) is not limited to disciplinary proceedings").
5. 349 Md. 441, 709 A.2d 112 (1998).
6. See id. at 465, 709 A.2d at 123-24 (remanding for consideration the issue whether
the payment of a fee should be rescinded as a violation of Rule 5.4 or 7.2, in light of
Bregman).
7. Bregman, 349 Md. at 147, 707 A.2d at 808. Taylor's suit arose after he was diag-
nosed with chronic myelogenous leukemia. Id. Taylor's first attorney, who was not a party
to these proceedings, withdrew when Taylor's benefits were initially denied. Id.
8. Id. at 14748, 707 A.2d at 808.
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caused his illness.9 The retainer agreement regarding the third-party
action entitled Post to one-third of any recovery if the case was settled
and forty percent of the recovery if a complaint was filed and discov-
ery undertaken. 10 The agreement also provided that if Post retained
co-counsel, he would not increase the fees already agreed to by
Taylor.1
In June 1990, Post retained the firm of Connerton, Ray & Simon
(Connerton) as co-counsel in the third-party tort action against the
manufacturers of the toxic substance.12 Post agreed to split equally
seventy-five percent of any recovery with Connerton, with the remain-
ing twenty-five percent going to Bregman.'5 On June 14, 1990, Post
wrote a letter to Bregman confirming that Bregman had been the re-
ferring attorney in both the workers' compensation claim and the
third-party action.' 4 In this letter, Post referred to a previous discus-
sion regarding Bregman's continuing role in the litigation and indi-
cated that Connerton had agreed that Bregman should expect to
"contribute 25% of all out-of-pocket expenses and an appropriate allo-
cation of the labors of litigation."'" Bregman claimed that he re-
sponded to this letter on June 21, 1990,6 writing that his firm would
expect to receive the entire twenty-five percent fee even if they did not
do this proportion of the work on the case and clarifying that it was
Post's responsibility to delegate the appropriate amount of work.' 7
Although the Connerton firm, as lead counsel, filed suit against
the manufacturers of the chemical at issue in the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia in September 1990, Connerton withdrew
from the case in October of 1991."8 As a result, Post contacted the
firm of Paulson, Nace, Norwind & Sellinger (Paulson), which agreed
to become lead counsel and to pay for the expenses associated with
this role.19 To create this arrangement with Paulson, Post was forced
to restructure the existing fee agreements, conceding to Paulson's de-
mand that it receive two-thirds, rather than one-half, of the total con-
9. Id. at 148, 707 A.2d at 808.
10. Id.
11. Id., 707 A.2d at 808-09.
12. Id., 707 A.2d at 809.
13. Id. at 149, 707 A.2d at 809.
14. Id. at 148, 707 A.2d at 809.
15. Id. at 149, 707 A.2d at 809.
16. Post claimed never to have seen this letter, although he also did not deny receiving
it, and a copy properly addressed to Post became part of the record. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 149-50, 707 A.2d at 809.
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tingency fee.2" In a letter dated December 21, 1991, Post notified
Bregman of the new arrangement, writing that the new agreement
with Paulson was "reasonable considering the fact that he [Barry
Nace, of Paulson] is taking on the expenses as well."'21 With Paulson's
firm taking two-thirds of any fees generated, Post proposed that he
divide the remaining one-third with Bregman on a "60/40 basis in an
effort to be reasonably fair."2 2 Bregman accepted the proposal, ad-
ding in handwriting at the bottom of Post's letter that his (Bregman's)
portion of the fee should include costs and unpaid fees owed; this
addition was agreed to and initialed by Post.
23
Taylor's third-party action was settled on November 1, 1994, with
Post receiving $260,000, one-third of the gross fee. 24 Although Post
conceded that Bregman's share of the fee was between $80,000 and
$90,000, Post offered $50,000 to settle the matter on the ground that
Bregman had contributed little to the litigation.25 Bregman rejected
this offer the next day.26 On November 28, 1994, Post filed a com-
plaint for declaratory relief in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, seeking the court's declaration that the December 21, 1991
letter agreement between Post and Bregman was "unenforceable as
against public policy."27 Post alleged that "Bregman drafted no docu-
mentation, participated in no court depositions, attended no court
hearings or conferences, and expended no material amount of time
or money on the case." 28 Post argued that Bregman's demand for
forty percent of Post's share of the fee was a "'per se' violation of Rule
1.5(e) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct" because
Bregman did not take any significant responsibility in the litigation.
29
20. Id. at 149-50, 707 A.2d at 809-10.




25. Id. at 150-51, 151 n.3, 707 A.2d at 810 & n.3.
26. Id. at 151, 707 A.2d at 810.
27. Id. The Complaint erroneously referred to the letter of December 20, sent by Post
to Nace, an attorney at Paulson, although Bregman's acceptance of Post's December 21
letter constituted the agreement between them. Id. at 151 n.4, 707 A.2d at 810 n.4.
28. Id. at 151, 707 A.2d at 810.
29. Id. In an amended complaint, Post also alleged that there was no written agree-
ment with Taylor for joint representation; that Taylor was advised, and consented to, joint
representation of all co-counsel except for Bregman; that in order to obtain the division of
fees claimed by Bregman, Bregman would have been required to perform services in pro-
portion thereto; and that the existence of "an alleged fee sharing agreement" does not
create an exception to the requirements of Rule 1.5(e). Id. at 151-52, 707 A.2d at 810.
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In response to Post's complaint, Bregman filed a counterclaim
for declaratory judgment and breach of the fee-splitting contract. 3°
Bregman argued that his firm completed a substantial amount of work
associated with the third-party action, was listed as co-counsel of rec-
ord through the duration of the tort litigation, and did not violate
Rule 1.5 (e)." Moreover, Bregman asserted that, even if a violation of
Rule 1.5 (e) occurred, Post's actions were the cause of such a violation
and should therefore not impinge on his right to receive his share of
the fee. Post then renewed his earlier motion for summary
judgment.32
Although Post and Bregman disputed numerous facts, they did
stipulate to the following: (1) Bregman was listed as co-counsel in the
pleadings throughout the Taylor tort litigation; (2) Taylor did not
enter into separate retainer agreements with the Connerton or Paul-
son firms; (3) neither Post nor the Paulson firm made an accounting
of the time they spent on the Taylor litigation; (4) Bregman's firm
assisted in drafting the initial and amended complaints filed in the
Taylor litigation; and (5) Bregman's firm did not fail to perform every
task assigned to it throughout the course of the Taylor litigation. 33
The circuit court, viewing the matter as a breach of contract case,
found that Post's December 20, 1991 letter to Bregman constituted a
contract and that Post had breached it.34 The circuit court reasoned
that the ethical strictures of Rule 1.5(e) did not constitute a defense
to the breach of contract, especially because Post himself made the
proposal at issue.35 The circuit court granted Bregman's motion for
summary judgment based on the breach of contract counterclaim,
awarded him a $104,000 fee plus interest and costs of litigation, and
thus rendered Post's motion for declaratory judgment moot.36
In Post's appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, he asserted,
among other things, that the circuit court erred in finding that the fee
agreement was not governed by Rule 1.5(e) of the MLRPC.37 While
acknowledging Post's general assertion that parties entering into a
contract do so with knowledge that their agreement incorporates ex-
30. Id. at 152, 707 A.2d at 810.
31. Id., 707 A.2d at 810-11.
32. Id., 707 A.2d at 811.
33. Id. at 152-53, 707 A.2d at 811.
34. Id. at 155, 707 A.2d at 812.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 155-56, 707 A.2d at 812.
37. Id. at 156, 707 A.2d at 812.
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isting law,38 the appellate court held that the MLRPC have never been
construed as the kind of "law" that traditionally has been incorporated
into contracts.39 Instead, the appellate court classified the MLRPC as
rules that merely "govern the conduct of lawyers in an effort to main-
tain the integrity of the legal profession."4 In light of this limited
scope, the court determined that it could not elevate the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct to the height of statutes enacted through the full
legislative process.41
Post also argued that the MLRPC constitute 'judicial precedent"
and as such should be read into the agreement.42 Rejecting this argu-
ment, the court reasoned that, even if contracts do incorporate judi-
cial precedent, the MLRPC lack the distinguishing characteristic of
judicial precedent: "slow and deliberate interpretation of already ex-
isting law, rather than the creation of new law."4" By contrast to "al-
ready existing law" originating from the legislature or common law,
the MLRPC are promulgated by the Court of Appeals of Maryland
and subject to change at any time.44 Finally, the appellate court cited
the Rules themselves, which provide that "'nothing in the Rules should be
deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-discipli-
nary consequences of violating such a duty."' 45
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine "whether a
fee-sharing agreement between lawyers is subject to MLRPC Rule
1.5(e) and may be rendered unenforceable if in violation of that
rule."46
38. Post v. Bregman, 112 Md. App. 738, 757, 686 A.2d 665, 674 (1996), rev'd, 349 Md.
142, 707 A.2d 806 (1998).
39. See id. at 758-59, 686 A.2d at 674-75 (distinguishing between "rules passed by the
judiciary for the purpose of regulating the conduct of attorneys" and "[s]tatutes .. .
[which] are law for the purposes of interpreting contracts").
40. Id. at 758, 686 A.2d at 674.
41. See id. at 759, 686 A.2d at 674-75 (distinguishing legislative enactments from rules
passed by the judiciary, which are grounded in "the fierce protection that the judicial
branch must exercise of its ability to govern itself free from interference by the
legislature").
42. Id. at 759-60, 686 A.2d at 675. Post derived this argument from the general propo-
sition that "parties to a contract are presumed to contract mindful of existing law and that
all relevant laws, including judicial precedent, are read into the agreement just as if ex-
pressly provided by them." Id. at 756, 686 A.2d at 673 (citing Wright v. Commercial & Say.
Bank, 297 Md. 148, 153, 464 A.2d 1080, 1083 (1983)).
43. Id. at 761, 686 A.2d at 676.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 762, 686 A.2d 676 (quoting MD. LAwYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Scope Note (1996)).
46. Bregman, 349 Md. at 146-47, 707 A.2d at 808. The court also considered whether
there was a sufficient dispute of material fact regarding Bregman's performance to pre-
clude summary judgment. Id.
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2. Legal Background.--Since the adoption of the Maryland Law-
yers' Rules of Professional Conduct, Maryland courts have given the
rules varying effect outside the realm of the disciplinary context.
While some cases illustrate that the MLRPC will be narrowly applied,
other cases stand for the proposition that Maryland has consistently
given effect to the MLRPC outside the area of disciplinary proceed-
ings.47 The competing paradigms set forth in the cases will be ex-
amined, with particular attention on those suggesting the position
ultimately taken in Bregman. In addition, cases from other jurisdic-
tions applying their version of Rule 1.5 will be discussed. Finally, a
brief examination of case law involving legal malpractice will help to
illustrate the potential impact of the Bregman decision. Before these
discussions, however, a review of Rule 1.5 and the Court of Appeals's
power to govern the bar under the MLRPC is necessary in order to
provide a proper historical and theoretical framework.
a. Rule 1.5(e) and Court's Power to Govern the Bar Under
MLRPC.-The Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct,
which are based on the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, were adopted by the Court of Appeals on
April 15, 1986, and took effect on January 1, 1987.48
The court adopted ABA Model Rule 1.5(e) exactly as it was writ-
ten.49 The predecessor to MLRPC 1.5(e) was Maryland's Disciplinary
Rule 2-107, which was superseded in 1987.50 MLRPC 1.5(e) signifi-
cantly expanded Rule 2-107 by allowing fee splitting between lawyers
without regard to the proportion of services performed, so long as
each of the lawyers assumed joint responsibility for the client's case.51
47. See id. at 164-65, 707 A.2d at 817 (noting that "[t]his Court and indeed most courts,
have given effect to at least some of the rules embodied in the Code outside the discipli-
nary context," and citing cases).
48. 13 Md. Reg. 3 (1986). Since 1983, the year in which the ABA adopted and promul-
gated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, thirty-nine states and the District of Co-
lumbia have adopted the ABA's Model Rules. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM
HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
Ducr app. 4 at 1269-70 (2d ed. Supp. 1998) (listing in alphabetical order the states that
have adopted the ABA standards).
49. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1983) with MD. LAw-
YERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1987). See also supra note 2 (contain-
ing the text of the Maryland rule).
50. See MD. LAwYERs' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Editor's Note (1987) (noting
that the Md. Code of Professional Responsibility, which contains Canon 2 DR-2-107, is
superseded by the MLRPC, which contains 1.5(e), effective January 1, 1987).
51. See supra note 2 for the text of MLRPC 1.5(e). Disciplinary Rule 2-107(A) allowed
a division of fees only if:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure
that a division of fees will be made.
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Prior to Bregman, no Maryland court had issued a ruling interpreting
MLRPC 1.5(e).52
The Court of Appeals has recently recognized its dominion over
the regulation of the state bar. In Attorney General v. Waldron,5" the
court ruled that regulating the practice of law falls under the "consti-
tutional grant ofjudicial authority to the courts of this State,"54 which
is "reposed inherently in the judiciary."55 The court made it clear
that, although it must defer to statutes of the legislative branch, the
constitution mandates that nothing compromise the judiciary's power
to conduct its independent functions, one of which is regulating the
practice of attorneys in the state.56
b. General Application of MLRPC Outside of Disciplinary Proceed-
ings.-The Court of Appeals's decision in Bregman implicates the
broader issue of the applicability of the MLRPC outside of the discipli-
nary context; a review of Maryland law addressing this issue is there-
fore necessary. The Scope Note accompanying the MLRPC asserts
that "[v] iolation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause or action nor
should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached."57 Moreover, using any of the Rules as procedural weapons
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and responsibility
assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable compensation
for all legal services they rendered the client.
MD. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrly DR 2-107(A) (1984) (repealed 1987) (emphasis
added).
52. SeeMD. LAwwPos' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (Comment) (listing
no cases).
53. 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981).
54. Id. at 692, 426 A.2d at 934 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 694, 426 A.2d at 936 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 699, 426 A.2d at 938. This case was relied upon extensively by the majority in
Bregman for the proposition that the MLRPC constitute public policy and have the force of
law. See Bregman, 349 Md. at 163, 707 A.2d at 816.
57. MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope Note (1988). The Note
goes on to state that:
The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure
for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to
be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be sub-
verted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The
fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a
lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an
antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforce-
ment of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be deemed to aug-
ment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences
of violating such a duty.
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undermines the purposes of the Rules.5" Case law illustrates that
courts in Maryland abide by the principal that a violation of a rule
shall not create a basis for liability.
An example of a court's limited application of the MLRPC is
found in the case of In re Criminal Investigation No. 13.59 The appel-
lant, a chemical company, was under investigation by the Attorney
General for alleged violations of Maryland's Hazardous Substance
Control Law and the Water Pollution Control Law.6° The company
insisted that its counsel be present if the Attorney General's Office
interviewed any of its employees. 61 When the Attorney General's Of-
fice informed the company that it would not honor their request
when interviewing nonmanagerial employees, the company filed an
ex parte injunction, relying on Rule 4.2.62 The Circuit Court for
Dorchester County denied the injunction, pointing to the long-stand-
ing rule that courts of equity do not have jurisdiction in criminal
cases.6" The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed on the same
ground, but also stated that the company had inappropriately relied
on Rule 4.2 in presenting its argument.
64
Similarly, in Kersten v. Van Grack,6 5 the Court of Special Appeals
rejected the claim, based on the MLRPC, that service of process
should be a nondelegable duty of an attorney.66 In Kersten, a law firm
(Van Grack), having been engaged to sue Carol Kersten and others in
a third party action, employed a process server, Richard Allen James,
to serve process on Kersten.67 James submitted false affidavits stating
that he had personally served Kersten, when in fact he had not done
so. As a result Kersten never received notice of the suit, never re-
58. Id.
59. 82 Md. App. 609, 573 A.2d 51 (1990).
60. Id. at 610-11, 573 A.2d at 52.
61. Id. at 611, 573 A.2d at 52-53.
62. Id., 573 A.2d at 53. Rule 4.2 provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 4.2 (1990).
63. In re Criminal Investigation No. 13, 82 Md. App. at 611-12, 573 A.2d at 53.
64. See id. at 612, 573 A.2d at 53 (arguing that, even if the Attorney General's Office
violated Rule 4.2, this "would not provide the appellant with the solace it seeks," on the
ground that the Rules do "'not give rise to a cause of action [or] create any presumption
that a legal duty has been breached'" (quoting MD. LAwYERs' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
Duc Scope Note (1990))).
65. 92 Md. App. 466, 608 A.2d 1270 (1992).
66. Id. at 476, 608 A.2d at 1275-76.
67. Id. at 467, 608 A.2d at 1271.
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sponded to it, and had a default judgment entered against her.68
Kersten then sued Van Grack on the ground that the law firm was
liable for the actions of its process server,69 arguing in part that the
firm was liable for these acts because, although the process server was
an independent contractor, service of process was a "non-delegable
dut[y] of the employer."7 ° Kersten relied on the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct "as an expression of public policy that service of
process should be a non-delegable duty of attorneys. "71 The court re-
jected that argument, pointing to the proscription in the Scope Note
against the use of the rules outside of disciplinary proceedings.
7 2
Moreover, the court held that "[t]he Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct... are not a reflection of public policy, nor do they provide
a basis upon which to impose liability."73
Although courts refused to apply the MLRPC as a basis for civil
liability prior to Bregman, they have given some effect to the Rules in a
number of cases outside the disciplinary context, thereby suggesting a
development towards the court's holding in Bregman.7 4 The following
cases, which are discussed in Bregman itself, illustrate such a
progression.
In Cardin v. State,75 the Maryland judiciary narrowly applied a pro-
vision of the MLRPC outside the realm of disciplinary proceedings.
The case involved Jerome Cardin, an attorney convicted of five counts
of theft for improper receipts of monies during the course of repre-
senting a financial institution.76 Appealing his conviction on a
number of grounds, Cardin argued that the jury instructions given by
the trial judge improperly invoked Disciplinary Rule 2-107, the prede-
cessor to MLRPC 1.5(e).7 7 The court held that the jury instruction
68. Id. at 467-68, 608 A.2d at 1271.
69. Id. at 467, 608 A.2d at 1271. The Court of Special Appeals rejected Kersten's claim
that the firm was vicariously liable for the acts of the process server. Id. at 468-75, 608 A.2d
at 1272-75.
70. Id. at 475, 608 A.2d at 1275.
71. Id. at 476, 608 A.2d at 1275.
72. Id. (citing MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope Note (1992)).
73. Id. (citing MD. LAWERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope Note (1992); In re
Criminal Investigation No. 13, 82 Md. App. 609, 612-13, 573 A.2d 51 (1990)); see also supra
notes 59-64 (detailing the court's holding in In re Criminal Investigation No. 13).
74. See infra notes 75-114 (giving examples of cases where courts applied the rules
outside of the disciplinary context).
75. 73 Md. App. 200, 533 A.2d 928 (1987).
76. See id. at 204-09, 533 A.2d at 930-33 (discussing the facts leading up to the attor-
ney's convictions, as well as the counts against the attorney upon which the convictions
were based).
77. See id. at 209-10, 533 A.2d at 933 (listing Cardin's contentions of error on appeal).
The judge instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:
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was not erroneous, on the ground that "[i] t was entirely proper for
the jury to consider whether a fee splitting arrangement that would
violate the canons of ethics governing Cardin's profession was consis-
tent with a bona fide belief that he was entitled to the money."7 The
use of the Rules in this instance, to draw inferences concerning the
defendant's state of mind, illustrates that Maryland courts were willing
to recognize the public policy implications of the Rules prior to
Bregman. Although not a groundbreaking proclamation of the
MLRPC's status as public policy, the use of the ethics rule in this lim-
ited instance nonetheless contravened the strict proscription on the
use of the rules set forth in the Scope Note.7 9
The Court of Appeals similarly applied a provision of the MLRPC
in Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A.,8 ° a worker's compensation case in-
volving an appeal of the disqualification of the injured claimant's at-
torney. David Harris, an attorney, injured his back in the course of his
employment.8 Harford Mutual Insurance Co. (Harford), the em-
ployer's insurance carrier, appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City following a Worker's Compensation Commission ruling in favor
of Harris.8 2 After a mistrial was declared in Circuit Court, and prior to
the start of the new trial, Harford filed and was granted a Motion for
Disqualification of Claimant's Attorney on the ground that, because
Harris's attorney was a member of his firm, proceeding in the suit
would be inconsistent with the MLRPC, which state that a lawyer shall
Any conduct by a defendant related to his receipt and handling of money which
was likely to mislead or conceal is relevant to the question of intent.
You have heard evidence that certain conduct of the defendant may be un-
ethical fee splitting in violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-107 of the Maryland Code
of Professional Responsibility for attorneys ....
A violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-107 is not a crime in and of itself. However,
if you conclude that the defendant's conduct violated Disciplinary Rule 2-107, you
may consider that evidence as relevant to the defendant's intent, the defendant's
good character or lack thereof, the defendant's knowledge of the conduct ofJef-
frey Levitt [one of the purchasers of Old Court Savings and Loan, with which
Cardin had been engaged in a prohibited fee splitting agreement] when the de-
fendant received funds from Mr. Levitt, and whether the defendant had a good
faith honest belief that he was entitled to the monies he received.
Id. at 212-13, 533 A.2d at 934. For the text of DR 2-107, see supra note 51.
78. Cardin, 73 Md. App. at 215, 533 A.2d at 935.
79. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (describing the limitations on the
application of the disciplinary rules set forth in the Scope Note); see also supra notes 59-73
(describing two cases in which courts heeded the Scope Note's limitation).
80. 310 Md. 310, 529 A.2d 356 (1987).
81. Id. at 313, 529 A.2d at 357. Harris was the sole stockholder and president of David
S. Harris, P.A., and was represented throughout the litigation by a member of his firm. Id.
82. Id.
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not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to testify.8 3
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to answer the question of
whether "an immediate appeal lies from a pretrial order disqualifying
counsel in a civil case."8 4 Although the court found that the collateral
order doctrine precluded Harris from immediately appealing the cir-
cuit court's interlocutory order, it held that "in further proceedings in
this case counsel's conduct will be governed by Rule 3.7. '' 5 By clearly
stating that the MLRPC would apply to counsel in subsequent pro-
ceedings, the court once again applied the Rules in a context outside
of disciplinary proceedings.8 6 Although far from an explicit recogni-
tion of the MLRPC as public policy, the court's application of the
Rules nonetheless illustrates its willingness to overlook the proscrip-
tion in the Scope Note and recognize the strength and relevance of
the MLRPC outside the context of disciplinary proceedings.
In Prahinski v. Prahinski,17 the Court of Appeals looked to the
Rules of Professional Conduct in deciding whether the goodwill of a
solo law practice constituted marital property.8 8 Prahinski originated
as a divorce proceeding between Leo and Margaret Prahinski in the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County." After extensively review-
ing decisions in other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals distin-
guished the goodwill of a legal practice from that of other professions
or businesses by virtue of the fact that "a lawyer's goodwill cannot be
sold by the lawyer. '" ° Moreover, the court noted that "[o]f equal im-
portance is the fact that Maryland lawyers are governed by the Rules
83. Id. Harford alleged that Harris's attorney violated Rule 3.7, which provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in
the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's
firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7
[Conflict of Interest: General Rule] or Rule 1.9 [Conflict of Interest: Former
Client].
MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.7 (1987).
84. Harris, 310 Md. at 313-14, 529 A.2d at 358.
85. Id. at 320, 529 A.2d at 361.
86. Id.
87. 321 Md. 227, 582 A.2d 784 (1990).
88. Id. at 228-29, 241, 582 A.2d at 784, 790-91.
89. Id. at 228, 582 A.2d at 784. The Circuit Court ordered a monetary award for one-
half of the value of the law practice to the wife, who was the secretary at the inception of
the firm and later became its office manager. Id.
90. Id. at 241, 582 A.2d at 790.
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of Professional Conduct, which deal specifically with situations in
which lawyers and non-lawyers work together."'" The court pointed
out that Rule 5.492 "clearly prohibits Leo from making Margaret a
partner in his law practice.""3 In light of this prohibition, the court
held that the goodwill of a spouse's legal practice is not marital prop-
erty.94 Like the Cardin and Harris courts, the court in this instance did
not explicitly recognize the notion that the MLRPC constitute public
policy.9 5 However, by reasoning that lawyers operate under the Rules,
and that Rule 5.4 prohibited Margaret from becoming a partner in
the firm, the court recognized the strength and relevance of the
MLRPC outside of disciplinary proceedings. The court's treatment of
the MLRPC reflected its growing willingness to equate the rules with
public policy.
In Harris v. Baltimore Sun Co.,96 the Court of Appeals looked to
Rule 1.697 and its relationship to the Maryland Public Information
Act98 (MPIA) in order to clarify the duties of a public defender when
91. Id., 582 A.2d at 791.
92. Rule 5.4 provides in pertinent part:
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities
of the partnership consist of the practice of law....
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation
or association authorized to practice law for profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative
of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reason-
able time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof, or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgement of
the lawyer.
MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1990).
93. Prahinski, 321 Md. at 241, 582 A.2d at 791.
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text (describing the court's treatment of
the MLRPC in Cardin and Harris).
96. 330 Md. 595, 625 A.2d 941 (1993).
97. Rule 1.6 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are im-
pliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated
in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act...
(2) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act. .
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy be-
tween the lawyer and the client... ;
(4) to comply with these Rules, a court order or other law.
MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1993).
98. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 10-611 to -628 (1993).
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requested to disclose information regarding his client.99 In Harris, the
Baltimore Sun (Sun), under the MPIA, sought records of expenses
incurred by the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) in a leading
capital murder case." °° OPD refused to turn over the records on the
ground that they were confidential under Rule 1.6, and thus covered
by section 10-615 of the MPIA, which required the custodian not to
release confidential records.1"1 The Office of the Public Defender ar-
gued that OPD attorneys owed their client the same level of confiden-
tiality under Rule 1.6 demanded from all attorneys in their
dealings. 102 The court weighed the requirements of Rule 1.6 in inter-
preting the limits of the MPLA, noting that the MLRPC "are designed
to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulat-
ing conduct through disciplinary agencies."'0 3  In looking to the
MLRPC to make the crucial determination of whether the OPD attor-
ney had an obligation to release the records, the court implicitly rec-
ognized the relevance of the Rules outside the scope of disciplinary
proceedings. Notably absent from the court's interpretation and ap-
plication of Rule 1.6 was any discussion of the Scope Note's prohibi-
tion against using the Rules outside of disciplinary proceedings.' 0 4
In Advance Finance Co. v. Trustees of Client's Security Trust Fund,10 5
the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Rules did not provide any
basis for civil liability, but applied Rule 1.15, concerning a lawyer's
obligation to safeguard a client's property, to determine whether the
fiduciary status of attorneys entitled a consumer loan company to re-
imbursement from the Clients' Security Trust Fund (the Fund) for
unrepaid loans to the attorneys' clients."a 6 Advance Finance Co. (Ad-
vance) was seeking reimbursement for loans it had made to personal
99. See Harris, 330 Md. at 597, 625 A.2d at 942 (declaring that the appeal "involves the
scope of counsel's duty of confidentiality" under Rule 1.6); see alsoJames V. McFaul, Note,
Narrowing the Scope of the Rule of Confidentiality, 53 MD. L. REv. 963, 975 (1994) (criticizing
Harris for limiting the scope of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, especially in relation to
public agencies affected by the Maryland Public Information Act).
100. Harris, 330 Md. at 597, 625 A.2d at 942. The capital murder trial was that of John
Frederick Thanos, who was charged with two counts of murder in Baltimore County. Id. at
598, 625 A.2d at 942. Specifically, the Sun sought records for "receipts for 'motel, meal
and travel' for those [public defender] attorneys; and records of the fees and expenses
paid to four expert witnesses." Id. at 599, 625 A.2d at 942.
101. Id. at 599-600, 625 A.2d at 943.
102. Id. at 600, 625 A.2d at 943.
103. Id. at 603, 625 A.2d at 944-45 (quoting MD. LAwyERs' RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Scope Note (1993)).
104. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Scope Note's prohibi-
tions on use of the rules).
105. 337 Md. 195, 652 A.2d 660 (1995).
106. Id. at 204-11, 652 A.2d at 664-67.
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injury plaintiffs secured by assignments of future earnings from their
personal injury claims.107 The loans were never repaid because the
two attorneys representing a number of the personal injury plaintiffs
never remitted the loan arrearages to Advance.10 8 Advance, who won
default judgments against the two subsequently disbarred attorneys,
sought repayment of the loans from the Fund, which denied their
claim.10 9 The purpose of the Fund, created by the Court of Appeals
under a grant of authority by the General Assembly and financed by
state bar fees, is "'to maintain the integrity of the legal profession by
paying money to reimburse losses caused by defalcations of law-
yers.""' 0 The Fund denied Advance's claim on the grounds that the
attorneys were not attorneys for Advance, nor acting as fiduciaries for
the company.11 In reviewing the Fund's denial, the court acknowl-
edged Advance's argument that Rule 1.15 (b) imposed fiduciary duties
on the attorneys." 2 The court examined the history and commentary
regarding Rule 1.15(b) and concluded that, in view of this Rule and
the statutory purpose of the Fund, the attorneys were fiduciaries for
Advance. 3 The court was careful to point out that it had merely rec-
ognized the fiduciary duty of the two attorneys, and that the Rule did
not create a basis for civil liability, which would be contrary to the
guidance of the Scope Note to the MLRPC. 1 4 However, in using Rule
1.15(b) to confer fiduciary status on the attorneys, and hence dis-
bursement by the Fund to a nonclient (Advance), the court nonethe-
less recognized the impact the Rules have outside the disciplinary
context. This case, like its predecessors applying the MLRPC, illus-
107. Id. at 197, 652 A.2d at 661.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 199, 652 A.2d at 661-62.
110. Id. at 200, 652 A.2d at 662 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF. § 10-311 (b)
(1989)).
111. Id. at 199, 652 A.2d at 662.
112. Id. at 204-05, 652 A.2d at 664-65. Rule 1.15(b) provides:
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has
an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as
stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client,
a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other
property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by
the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such
property.
MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15(b) (1995).
113. Advance Fin., 337 Md. at 207-08, 652 A.2d at 666 (noting that, while the Rules do
not impose civil liability, the "instant proceeding is not an action seeking directly to impose
civil liability ... but a claim by Advance for reimbursement by the Fund").
114. Id.
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trates that a strong relationship exists between effective public policy
and the application of the MLRPC.
c. Application of Fee-Splitting Rules in Other Jurisdictions.-
Other jurisdictions have given effect to their corresponding ethical
rules regarding referral fee provisions when assessing the enforceabil-
ity of an agreement between lawyers. The following cases, which the
Bregman court discussed, illustrate the methods and reasoning em-
ployed by other jurisdictions.
In Dragelevich v. Kohn, Milstein, Cohen & Hausfeld,l a5 a dispute
arose between attorneys concerning a division of fees. J. Walter
Dragelevich (Dragelevich) represented Tauro Brother Trucking Com-
pany, which wished to file an antitrust action against several rail-
roads.1 6 Dragelevich contacted Jerry Cohen of Kohn, Milstein,
Cohen & Hausfeld (Kohn, Milstein), who agreed to serve as lead
counsel in the case." 7 The agreement indicated that Kohn, Milstein
would take the case on a contingent fee basis, with Kohn, Milstein
receiving eighty percent of the fees, and Dragelevich receiving the re-
maining twenty percent.1 1 Affidavits submitted by both parties indi-
cated that Kohn, Milstein spent substantially more time and resources
on the case than Dragelevich. 1 9 The court was faced with the ques-
tion of "whether a fee-splitting agreement between attorneys is en-
forceable when the actual contribution of an attorney in the case
differs substantially from the proportion of fees to which he would be
entitled under the agreement."12 ° The court, without explanation, as-
serted that this question was governed by Disciplinary Rule 2-107(A)
of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility. 121 After surveying
115. 755 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
116. Id. at 190.
117. Id. Dragelevich in turn would serve as local co-counsel in the case. Id
118. Id. The agreement also indicated that if Dragelevich contributed more to the case
than what was originally contemplated, the 20% would be modified accordingly. Id.
119. Id. at 191. According to the submitted affidavits, Kohn, Milstein "expended
upwards of 5000 hours in that case, including more than 4000 hours of attorney time." Id
In contrast, Dragelevich averred that he spent 134.9 hours on the case. Id
120. Id
121. Id. Disciplinary Rule 2-107(A) provides:
A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not a
partner or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure
that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and responsibil-
ity assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable compensation
for all the legal services they rendered the client.
See id. (quoting OHIo CODE oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A) (1984)).
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cases from other courts that have faced similar questions,122 the court
concluded that it "would accept what appears to be the majority view,
that DR 2-107(A) precludes enforcement of the agreement alleged in
this case."1 2' The court pointed to the undisputed fact that
Dragelevich's time spent on the case amounted to three percent of
the total attorney time spent on the case, a proportion that failed to
meet the "plain language of the rule . .. that the division of fees
among counsel must be 'made in proportion to the services per-
formed and responsibility assumed by each."'
124
Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc. ,125 a case cited with approval in
Bregman, originated as a Title VII action and turned into a dispute
between attorneys regarding a referral fee agreement.126 The dispute
arose when the referring attorney modified a valid fee-splitting agree-
ment with the attorney representing the plaintiff in the Title VII suit,
such that each attorney would be compensated for the hours he
worked multiplied by his hourly rate. 127 The attorney representing
the plaintiff argued that the modification voided the earlier agree-
ment, and that the current arrangement need not conform to Rule
1.5 because it did not constitute a fee-splitting agreement.'22 The Sev-
enth Circuit disagreed, holding that the new agreement fell within the
meaning of a fee-splitting agreement under Rule 1.5 and was there-
fore subject to its requirements.129 The court reasoned that Rule 1.5
was controlling in this case because the Illinois Supreme Court had
determined that the Rules bind its state courts as a matter of law.'
30
Because the modification of the fee-splitting agreement was never put
in writing, in direct contravention to the writing requirement in
1.5(f), the Seventh Circuit held that the modification was invalid and
unenforceable, and that the terms of the original agreement con-
trolled the division of the fees.' 3
122. See id. at 192-93 (discussing cases from other jurisdictions concerning fee-splitting
and the division of responsibility).
123. Id. at 193.
124. Id. at 193 & n.8.
125. 72 F.3d 1294 (7th Cir. 1995).
126. Id. at 1296.
127. Id. at 1296-97. The change was made after the attorneys realized that their original
estimate of the award they would receive at settlement was high, and that the current pros-
pect of recovery would adversely affect the attorney's firm. Id.
128. Id. at 1304.
129. See id. (reasoning that the substitute agreement on its face stated that it was an
agreement to split fees).
130. Id. at 1302.
131. Id. at 1305.
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In Scolinos v. Kolts,132 a California court held that a referral fee
agreement between attorneys was unenforceable on public policy
grounds based on violations of California's Rules of Professional Con-
duct governing fee agreements. 133 Scolinos involved a wrongful termi-
nation suit that settled for $390,000, $90,000 of which was paid to
Kolts, the principal attorney.13 4 Kolts received the case when the ap-
pellant, Scolinos, referred it to him upon an oral agreement that Kolts
would pay Scolinos one-third of any fees recovered from the case.
1 35
The court held that as the agreement did not abide by the writing
requirement of Rule 2-108, it was "unenforceable on public policy
grounds."13 6 The court reasoned that allowing the enforcement of an
unethical fee agreement through court action when the attorney seek-
ing enforcement would be subject to disciplinary proceedings would
run contrary to the public policy that the Rules seek to protect.1 37
In In re Estate of Katchatag,18 the Supreme Court of Alaska af-
firmed a probate court's ruling that a fee-splitting agreement entered
into by two lawyers was invalid.' 39 Elena and Van Abel Katchatag orig-
inally contacted Leonard Kelley, an attorney, regarding a potential
medical malpractice case on behalf of Elena. 4 ' Kelley then contacted
another attorney specializing in this area, William Donohue, about as-
suming the role of co-counsel in the case.' 4 ' Prior to the start of litiga-
tion of the wrongful death claim, Donohue entered into a contingent
fee agreement with Katchatag, brought in additional counsel, and re-
ceived approval of the contingency agreement from a probate
court. 142 After prevailing in the medical malpractice wrongful death
action, Donohue moved for approval of his costs and fees from the
probate court, but subsequently requested a delay of this ruling pend-
ing any claims for costs and fees filed by Kelley, the original referring
132. 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31 (Ct. App. 1995).
133. Id. at 34.
134. Id. at 32.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 34. Rule 2-108 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Cali-
fornia requires that the " ' client consent[ ] in writing to employment of the other person
licensed to practice law after a full disclosure has been made in writing that a division of
fees will be made and the terms of such division.'" See id. at 33 (quoting CAL. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2-108 (1988)).
137. Id. at 34.
138. 907 P.2d 458 (Alaska 1995).
139. Id. at 459.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 460. The fee agreement between Donohue and Katchatag did not include
the fee arrangement that, according to Kelley (the original referring attorney), he had
made verbally between himself and Donohue. Id. at 459.
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attorney. 14' Donohue argued that Kelley was not entitled to any fee
because the latter had not entered into a written agreement, as re-
quired by Alaska Bar Rule 35(e),144 and because Kelley had done little
work on the case.1 45 The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the dis-
pute was governed by the Bar Rules because they operated with the
force of law. 14 6 Because Kelley failed to secure the fee agreement in
writing, the court held there was no valid enforceable fee sharing
agreement because "Bar Rule 35(e) (2) was not satisfied."' 47
d. Application of Ethics Rules in Three Legal Malpractice Cases.-
One area of law particularly relevant to the strength of the MLRPC
outside of disciplinary proceedings is legal malpractice. The following
three cases, two from jurisdictions outside of Maryland, are illustrative
of the possible impact of Bregman.
In Maryland, the Scope Section of the MLRPC states that a viola-
tion of a rule does "not give rise to a cause of action." 4 ' In Hooper v.
Gill,'4 9 the Court of Special Appeals observed that, although the ques-
tion was not resolved as to whether a violation of a provision in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the predecessor to MLRPC, pro-
vided a basis for a civil action, the Rules contain a statement that they
"do 'not give rise to a cause of action."""0 The Hooper court ruled,
however, that because the plaintiff never proved damages, the court
did not have to resolve the question of whether the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility furnished a basis for a civil suit.' 5 ' Since Hooper,
no Maryland court has resolved this issue.
143. Id. at 460.
144. Id. Rule 35(e) states, in pertinent part:
(e) Fee Divisions Between Attorneys. A division of fees between attorneys who are
not in the same firm may be made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each attorney or, by
written agreement with the client, each attorney assumes joint responsibility for
the representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all attorneys
involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
See id. at 463-64 (quoting ALASKA BAR RULES 35(e)).
145. Id. at 460-61.
146. Id. at 463 (citing Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, Inc. v. McApline, 810 P.2d 162
(Alaska 1991)).
147. Id. at 464.
148. MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope Note (1989).
149. 79 Md. App. 437, 557 A.2d 1349 (1989).
150. Id. at 442, 557 A.2d at 1351 (quoting MD. LAwYERs' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUcr Scope Note (1989)).
151. Id. at 444, 557 A.2d at 1352-53.
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Other jurisdictions have confronted the question in different
ways. In Lipton v. Boesky,' 52 Luce Lipton sued her former attorney,
Boesky, for malpractice arising out of Boesky's representation of her
in a construction contract dispute.153 On appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals of Michigan, Lipton argued that Boesky's multiple violations of
Michigan's Code of Professional Responsibility gave rise to a cause of
action for malpractice. 154 The court analyzed that argument by analo-
gizing a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility to a situa-
tion in which an act implicates both criminal law and tort law. 155 In
this situation, "[t]he same wrongful act may be offensive to the private
individual as well as to the public generally. '156 The court reasoned
that the Code of Professional Responsibility constitutes a general stan-
dard of behavior expected by the public from lawyers in that state, so
that it would be unfair to prohibit a specific client from relying on
those standards in a professional relationship with her attorney."'
Thus, the court concluded that, "as with statutes, a violation of the
Code is rebuttable evidence of malpractice."158
In Fishman v. Brooks, 5 ' a legal malpractice case arising out of a
car-bicycle accident, the client obtained a jury verdict finding that his
attorney's negligent representation of him resulted in a settlement
award for less than his claim was worth.16 ° In affirming the relevance
of testimony concerning ethical standards, the court concluded that,
although a violation of a disciplinary rule was not an "actionable
breach" in and of itself, "[a] s with statutes and regulations, however, if
a plaintiff can demonstrate that a disciplinary rule was intended to
protect one in his position, a violation of that rule may be some evi-
dence of the attorney's negligence."161
152. 313 N.W.2d 163 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
153. See id. at 164 (reviewing the facts giving rise to the case).
154. Id. at 164-65. The alleged legal malpractice set forth in the plaintiff's complaint
included: (1) failure to oppose a motion for summary judgement in open court, a viola-
tion of DR-2110; (2) allowance of a defaultjudgment in the same action, a violation of DR-
6101; (3) failure to file a breach of contract suit while representing to his clients that he
was in the process of doing so, a violation of DR-7-101, DR-6-101(A)(3), and DR- 1-
102(A) (4); and (4) misrepresentation to clients over the terms of an agreement, a viola-
tion of DR-6-101 and DR 1-102(A) (4). Id.
155. Id. at 166.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 166-67.
158. Id. at 167 (citing Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1976)).
159. 487 N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1986).
160. Id. at 1378.
161. Id. at 1381.
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Post v. Bregman, the Court of Ap-
peals ruled that a violation of Rule 1.5(e) of the MLRPC may be used
as a defense to a breach of contract in proceedings outside of the
disciplinary context.162 Prior to analyzing the question whether a vio-
lation of the MLRPC could render a fee agreement between lawyers
unenforceable, the court considered two other issues. First, the court
declined to determine whether Bregman violated Rule 1.5(e).163 Sec-
ond, the court ruled that the issues involved in the declaratory judg-
ment motions were clearly different from those raised in the summary
judgment action, 164 and that the circuit court should have entered its
judgment in accordance with the general rule that requires a court to
rule on a declaratory judgment even when the judgment concerns an
alternative claim in the same action pending between the parties. 161
a. Effect of MLRPC 1.5(e).-Turning to the central question
of the effect of MLRPC 1.5(e), the court began its analysis by noting
that both the circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals, as well as
Post himself, had characterized Post's arguments regarding Rule
1.5 (e)'s effect on the fee agreement in distinct ways that reflected two
views of the Rules. 166 The court characterized Post's argument in the
circuit court proceedings as a defense to a breach of contract claim.1 67
Post was asserting that, because the MLRPC was a statement of public
policy, any violation of Rule 1.5(e) rendered the fee agreement unen-
162. Bregman, 349 Md. at 168, 707 A.2d at 825.
163. Id. at 158-59, 707 A.2d at 814. The court based its decision on the general rule
that, on an appeal from a summary judgment that is potentially reversible on the grounds
relied on by the trial court, an appellate court cannot sustain the summary judgment on
other grounds, if the trial court had the option to deny the summary judgment on those
other grounds. Id. (citing Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Med. Ctr., 313 Md. 301, 314 n.5, 545
A.2d 658, 664 n.5 (1988)). Therefore, the question of Bregman's violation was obviated by
the Court of Special Appeal's conclusion that such a violation could not be used as a de-
fense to the enforcement of the agreement. Id.; see also Post v. Bregman, 112 Md. App.
738, 762, 686 A.2d 665, 676 (1996) (finding that to interpret whether the contract violates
the MLRPC would "augment... extra-disciplinary consequences of violating" the MLRPC
(quoting Mr. LAwYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope Note (1996))), revd, 349
Md. 142, 707 A.2d 806 (1998).
164. The declaratory actions were seeking an explicit ruling as to the parties' rights
under Rule 1.5(e), while the summary judgment motion was based on the breach of con-
tract claim. Bregman, 349 Md. at 160, 707 A.2d at 815.
165. Id., 707 A.2d at 814-15. Both parties sought specific determinations on whether the
fee agreement was governed by MLRPC 1.5(e), whether or not there was a violation of that
rule, and the effect, if any, of such a violation on the fee agreement. Id., 707 A.2d at 815.
The court concluded that on remand, the circuit court must declare the rights of the
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forceable as against that public policy.' 6 8 The court viewed the Court
of Special Appeals's characterization of Post's argument as an asser-
tion that Rule 1.5(e) was implicitly incorporated into the agreement,
so that any infraction of the Rule would operate as a violation of the
contract itself.
169
The court characterized these two arguments as components of
the larger question of whether the Rules constitute public policy hav-
ing the force of law.17 ° Addressing this question, the court recognized
the disparity in the application of similar disciplinary rules among dif-
ferent jurisdictions, 7 ' and located the cause of this disparity in the
origins of the disciplinary rules. 72 In jurisdictions where the Rules
were promulgated by bar associations and then "enacted" by lower
court systems, courts have held that these rules do not have the force
of law, but instead constitute internal, self-imposed ethical regula-
tions.1 7 3 In contrast, the court noted that in Maryland, the Rules were
adopted by the highest court in the state under its constitutionally-
endowed power to regulate the bar and its practice of law.' 74 The
court observed that the Rules "serve to regulate virtually every aspect
of the practice of law," a profession whose "integrity . . . is vital to
nearly every other institution and endeavor of our society. 171 In light
of the extensive nature of the regulations, and the fundamental im-
portance of the legal profession in society, the court held that the
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 162, 707 A.2d at 815.
171. See id., 707 A.2d at 815-16 (discussing cases from Maine, Michigan, New York, and
Utah as jurisdictions that treat the Rules as internal regulations of the bar).
172. See id., 707 A.2d at 816 (distinguishing the state Bar Association from the judicial
system as distinct bodies that promulgated the rules of conduct for a particular state).
173. Id. at 162-63, 707 A.2d at 816. The court cited decisions from a number ofjurisdic-
tions. See In re Dineen, 380 A.2d 603, 604 (Me. 1977) (finding that, because the discipli-
nary rules were adopted by the Maine Bar Association and not by the court, "the code of
professional responsibility and the disciplinary rules do not have the force of positive law");
People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 449, 454 (Mich. 1979) (refusing defendant's request to
suppress evidence in light of the assistant prosecutor's violation of DR-7-104 (A) (1) on the
ground that the provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility are merely "self-im-
posed internal regulations prescribing the standards of conduct for members of the bar");
State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397, 400 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (declining to overturn the murder
conviction of the defendant merely on the basis of a violation of Rule 4.2 of the Utah Rules
of Professional Conduct, and quoting language from Green, 274 N.W.2d at 454, that the
Rules are only "self-imposed internal regulations").
174. See Bregman, 349 Md. at 162-63, 707 A.2d at 816 (holding that the exertion of this
power fell well within the constitutional realm of the judiciary's power to regulate the
affairs and conduct of lawyers practicing in the state (citing Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289
Md. 683, 696-97, 426 A.2d 929, 936-37 (1981))).
175. Id. at 163, 707 A.2d at 816.
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Rules "constitute an expression of public policy having the force of
law." 176
Having determined that the Rules have the force of law and con-
stitute public policy, the court turned to the narrower issue of their
enforceability outside of disciplinary proceedings, specifically whether
Rule 1.5(e) governed the fee agreement entered into by Post and
Bregman. 77 The court noted that in Maryland, as well as a majority
ofjurisdictions, courts have already recognized the effect of the Rules
outside of the context of disciplinary proceedings. 178 The court cited
a number of Maryland cases in which it had applied various Rules
outside this context, from determining the fiduciary status of a lawyer
to allowing a jury to hear evidence of a Code violation in order to
consider whether the lawyer had the requisite criminal intent when he
received stolen funds. 179  In addition, the court approved of cases
from five different jurisdictions where courts had applied their version
of the Rules to fee agreements between attorneys."8 Having dis-
176. Id. As for jurisdictions with opposing views of the authority and role of their ethical
codes, the court reasoned that such rulings were simply irrelevant to its analysis. Id. at 164,
707 A.2d at 816. The court noted, however, that a number ofjurisdictions shared identical
opinions regarding the power of their respective Codes. See Citizens Coalition for Tort
Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162, 170-71 (Alaska 1991) (holding that a citizen
group's proposal to alter rules regarding contingent fees already addressed by the Alaska
Bar Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibility represented an impermissible inter-
ference with the court's inherent authority to prescribe rules of court); In re Vrdolyak, 560
N.E.2d 840, 845 (Ill. 1990) (per curiam) (interpreting the state's ethical code as "an exer-
cise of this court's inherent power over the bar and as rules of court ... operat[ing] with
the force of law"); Succession of Cloud, 530 So. 2d 1146, 1150 (La. 1988) (holding that
"[t]he standards in the Code of Professional Responsibility which govern the conduct of
attorneys have the force and effect of substantive law," so that a contract between an attor-
ney and her client in violation of disciplinary rules must be invalidated "in order to pre-
serve the integrity of [the court's] inherent judicial power" (citations omitted)).
177. Bregman, 347 Md. at 164, 707 A.2d at 817.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 164-65, 707 A.2d at 817 (citing Advance Fin. Co. v. Trustees, 337 Md. 195,
205-08, 652 A.2d 660, 665-66 (1995) (using Rule 1.15(b) to determine the fiduciary status
of an attorney in assessing liability); Harris v. Baltimore Sun Co., 330 Md. 595, 605-10, 625
A.2d 941, 945-48 (1993) (applying Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information) to determine
a public defender's obligations under the Public Information Act to release information to
a newspaper regarding his client); Prahinski v. Prahinski, 321 Md. 227, 241, 582 A.2d 784,
790-91 (1990) (applying Rules 5.4(b), (d) to determine that the goodwill of a lawyer's
practice is not marital property); Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A., 310 Md. 310, 320, 529 A.2d
356, 361 (1987) (holding that Rule 3.7 is the appropriate standard in determining whether
the attorney in question ought to be disqualified); Cardin v. State, 73 Md. App. 200, 214-
15, 533 A.2d 928, 935 (1987) (holding that ajury could consider evidence of a violation of
a provision of the Disciplinary Code in determining whether the attorney in question had
criminal intent when he received stolen funds)).
180. Id. at 166, 707 A.2d at 817-18 (citing Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc. 72 F.3d
1294, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Illinois law and holding that a fee agreement was
unenforceable because it did not comply with the writing requirement of Illinois' counter-
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cussed these cases, the court "adopt[ed] the premise emanating from
those cases that MLRPC 1.5(e) does constitute a supervening state-
ment of public policy to which fee-sharing agreements by lawyers are
subject," and that the Rule is enforceable outside of the disciplinary
context.
1 81
The court was quick to point out that its decision was not creating
a per se defense against the enforcement of an otherwise valid fee
agreement merely based on technical, insubstantial infractions of the
Rule."8 2 In order to guard against unfair abuse, the court constructed
a set of required guidelines for courts to follow when presented with a
defense to the enforceability of a fee-sharing agreement based on a
violation of Rule 1.5(e).' 83 If a court does find a violation of the Rule,
it must then consider:
(1) the nature of the alleged violation, (2) how the violation
came about, (3) the extent to which the parties acted in
good faith, (4) whether the lawyer raising the defense is at
least equally culpable as the lawyer against whom the defense
is raised and whether the defense is being raised simply to
escape an otherwise valid contractual obligation, (5) whether
the violation has some particular public importance, such
that there is a public interest in not enforcing the agree-
ment, (6) whether the client, in particular, would be harmed
by enforcing the agreement, and, in that regard, if the agree-
ment is found to be so violative of the Rule as to be unen-
forceable, whether all or any part of the disputed amount
should be returned to the client on the ground that, to that
part to Rule 1.5(e)); In reP & E Boat Rentals, Inc., 928 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying
Louisiana law, and invalidating referral fee agreement between lawyers on the ground that
to enforce the agreement would contravene the Louisiana Code of Professional Conduct);
Dragelevich v. Kohn, Milstein, Cohen & Hausfeld, 755 F. Supp. 189, 194 (N.D. Ohio 1990)
(applying Ohio law and holding a fee-sharing agreement invalid because there was evi-
dence that the attorney demanding 20% of the fee did little work in the case); Matter of
Estate of Katchatag, 907 P.2d 458, 464 (Alaska 1995) (refusing to enforce referral fee
agreement between attorneys because the client was unaware of the agreement, which vio-
lated ethical requirements); Scolinos v. Kolts, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31, 34 (Ct. App. 1995) (hold-
ing a fee agreement invalid on the grounds that the client did not approve of the
agreement in writing in contravention of California's version of Rule 1.5(e)); Belli v. Shaw,
657 P.2d 315, 319 (Wash. 1983) (declining to enforce fee agreement that violated Wash-
ington state's counterpart to Rule 1.5(e)).
181. Bregman, 349 Md. at 168, 707 A.2d at 818.
182. Id., 707 A.2d at 819. The court was concerned with potential misuse of the defense,
asserting that its application would be inappropriate if it would be "manifestly unfair and
inequitable not to enforce the agreement." Id.
183. Id. at 169-70, 707 A.2d at 819.
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extent, the fee is unreasonable, and (7) any other relevant
considerations. 1
8 4
Moreover, the court emphasized that whether a party invokes a
violation of Rule 1.5(e) as a defense or argues that the Rule should be
incorporated into the contract, courts must keep in mind that the de-
fense is equitable in nature, and that principles of fairness should ap-
ply. 185 The court remanded the case to the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County with instructions to enter a decision in accord-
ance with its opinion."'
Judge Chasanow, joined by Judge Eldridge, filed a dissenting
opinion, in which he criticized the majority's equitable standard, argu-
ing that this test is applied in no other jurisdiction, and that it was
"vague, amorphous... and at best problematic."18 7 Judge Chasanow
asserted that the trial court properly granted summary judgement by
rejecting Post's application of Rule 1.5.188 He also claimed that the
standard of reasonableness of a contingent fee contract should be
based at the time the contract was entered into, not after the fact.'
4. Analysis.-In Post v. Bregman, the Court of Appeals ruled that
an attorney may invoke a violation of Rule 1.5(e) of the MLRPC
outside the disciplinary context as a defense to a breach of contract
claim, in order to render that contract unenforceable. 9 0 Given the
judiciary's consistent application of the MLRPC outside the realm of
disciplinary proceedings, the court's characterization of the Rules as
public policy having the force of law was a correct assessment.1 ' The
decision's clearest and most immediate impact is on referral fee agree-
ments between attorneys. A recent case, Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Da-
vis, Rider & Tomar,9 2 is illustrative of the approach the court may take
when faced with a violation of a MLRPC provision in a contract dis-
pute. While an expansion of the MLRPC to the realm of referral fee
agreements is most notable, the strength of the court's holding that
the Rules constitute an expression of public policy may have opened
184. Id. (footnote omitted).
185. Id. at 170, 707 A.2d at 819.
186. Id., 707 A.2d at 819-20.
187. Id. at 187, 707 A.2d at 828 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 178-79, 707 A.2d at 823-24.
189. Id. at 180-81, 707 A.2d at 825.
190. Bregman, 349 Md. at 168, 707 A.2d at 818.
191. See supra notes 75-114 (detailing Maryland cases in which the courts have given
effect to the MLRPC).
192. 349 Md. 441, 709 A.2d 112 (1998).
1058 [VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
the door for future application of the Rules in situations other than
referral fee disputes.
a. The Court's Predictable Expansion of the MLRPC.-The
Bregman court pointed to a line of Maryland cases in which courts gave
varying effects to the MLRPC beyond the realm of disciplinary agree-
ments.' Although the particular applications of the MLRPC in these
cases differ greatly, each case implicitly recognized the strength and
relevance of the MLRPC outside the context of disciplinary proceed-
ings.194 The MLRPC are essentially a codification of the standard of
behavior expected of all members of the bar. Whenever an issue or
controversy arises that implicates any provision of the MLRPC, a court
is in a position where declining to apply a rule would undermine not
just the rule in question, but the very existence of the MLRPC as a
whole and indeed the power of the courts to regulate the bar. The
Bregman court recognized this argument and cited cases in which
courts held similar positions when it held that Rule 1.5(e) and the
MLRPC as a whole is a statement of public policy enforceable outside
of the disciplinary context.
19 5
b. Effect on Referral Fee Agreements.-The court made it clear
that in order to succeed with the defense of a violation of the MLRPC,
the violation must be a substantial one.19 6 The cases upon which the
court relied in order to recognize this defense demonstrate the vari-
ous kinds of violations that may render a contract unenforceable.197
For example, Rule 1.5(e) mandates that the client be advised of and
193. Bregman, 349 Md. at 164-65, 707 A.2d 817; see also supra notes 75-114 (discussing
cases in which courts have given effect to the MLRPC).
194. See supra notes 75-114 (discussing the weight given to the MLRPC in situations re-
moved from disciplinary proceedings).
195. Bregman, 349 Md. at 168, 707 A.2d at 818. The Bregman court pointed out the
obviously bizarre outcome that would occur if it enforced an agreement "when that very
enforcement, or perhaps even the existence of the agreement sought to be enforced,
would render the lawyer subject to discipline." Id. (citing Scolinos v. Kolts, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
31 (Ct. App. 1995)); see also Scolinos, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34 (noting that "[i]t would be
absurd if an attorney were allowed to enforce an unethical fee agreement through court
action, even though the attorney potentially is subject to professional discipline for enter-
ing into the agreement.").
196. See Bregman, 349 Md. at 169, 707 A.2d at 819 (noting that an otherwise valid fee-
sharing agreement should not be struck down "merely because of a minor technical defi-
ciency with respect to the professional rules" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Christensen v. Eggen, 562 N.W.2d 806, 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997))).
197. See id. at 166-68, 707 A.2d at 817-18 (surveying several cases in which professional
conduct violations rendered a fee-sharing contract invalid); see also supra notes 115-147 and
accompanying text (describing three instances in which courts from other jurisdictions
applied their corresponding fee provisions).
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have no objections to the participation of all of the attorneys in her
case."' With respect to this requirement,199 the court cited In re Estate
of Katchatag,200 which invalidated a fee agreement where the attorneys
neither advised the client of an existing referral fee nor disclosed the
identity of the attorneys involved. 20 1 This citation suggests that the
Court of Appeals also would refuse to enforce a fee sharing agreement
under these circumstances. This nonenforcement would be sensible,
because the client's awareness of and consent to a division of fees is a
fundamental and not merely technical requirement of Rule 1.5(3).
Other cases relied on by the court indicate that it will permit a
party to invoke the defense if there is evidence that lawyers did too
little work to merit the established percentage of a referral fee. 20 2
Rule 1.5(e) requires that the fees must either be divided in propor-
tion to the work performed by all parties, or that each attorney agree
to assume joint responsibility in the case.20 3 The court cited
Dragelevich v. Kohn, Milstein, Cohen & Hausfeld,2 °4 in which a United
States District Court applied Ohio law to render a fee agreement un-
enforceable on the ground that the party demanding the referral fee
did not do the work in proportion to his demand.20 5 Faced with a
similar violation of MLRPC 1.5(e), courts in Maryland may likewise
apply the Bregman rule to invalidate an otherwise valid fee-splitting
agreement. Such an application would be reasonable given the plain
language of MLRPC 1.5(e) and the interests it seeks to protect. Those
interests include protecting the client from abusive fee agreements
and ensuring that lawyers receive fees in proportion to the work and
responsibility they assume in the case.
It is important to note that the Bregman court emphasized that
mere technical violations of the MLRPC should not warrant their use
198. See supra note 2 (setting forth the text of Rule 1.5(e)).
199. See Bregman, 349 Md. at 167, 707 A.2d at 818.
200. 907 P.2d 458 (Alaska 1995); see supra notes 138-147 (discussing this case).
201. In re Estate of Katchatag, 907 P.2d at 464. The Bregman court also cited Belli v. Shaw,
657 P.2d 315 (Wash. 1983), which refused to enforce a referral fee agreement because the
client had not approved it and because the referring attorney had done so little work on
the case.
202. See Bregman, 349 Md. at 167, 707 A.2d at 818 (citing to In Matter of P&E Boat Rentals,
Inc., 28 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1991), and Belli v. Shaw, 657 P.2d 315 (Wash. 1983), cases in
which courts refused to enforce fee-splitting agreements because the referring attorney did
not do a significant amount of the work).
203. SeeMD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1998) (stating that
division of fees may be made only if "(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed
by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsi-
bility for the representation" (emphasis added)).
204. 755 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
205. Id. at 194; see supra notes 115-124 (discussing the facts of this case).
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as a breach of contract defense.2 °6 Consider this example, which illus-
trates the court's concerns. Attorney A refers his client to Attorney B
and enters into a valid fee-splitting agreement with Attorney B. Attor-
ney B later desires to terminate the fee-splitting agreement with Attor-
ney A so that he can retain all of the fees generated from the case.
Knowing that a court will not enforce an invalid fee agreement, Attor-
ney B acts so as to render the fee agreement invalid by modifying the
agreement without putting it in writing. This violation, however, is
only minor or technical. In such a scenario, the Bregman decision in-
dicates that the Court of Appeals would recognize the insubstantial
nature of the violation and would uphold the fee agreement, on the
ground that it would be inequitable for Attorney B to retain all gener-
ated fees.207
c. Application of Bregman to Other Fee Agreements. -In Son v.
Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar,2 ° 8 the Court of Appeals, rely-
ing on its ruling in Bregman, considered whether an arrangement be-
tween an attorney and a third party concerning a consulting
agreement involving the attorney's client violated MLRIPC 5.4209 or
MLRPC 7.2,21° and was therefore void on public policy grounds. l
The court reversed the Court of Special Appeals,212 which had held
that a violation of MLRPC 5.4 or 7.2 was not a basis for holding the
contract unenforceable.
213
206. Bregman, 349 Md. at 168-69, 707 A.2d at 818-19.
207. See id. at 169, 707 A.2d at 819 (emphasizing that minor technical violations of the
MLRPC may not render the otherwise valid fee-sharing agreement invalid); see also id. at
181-82, 707 A.2d at 825 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (creating a hypothetical scenario to
argue that the focus of any examination of a contract's ethical consequence should begin
at the point when the contract is entered into, rather than "through hindsight based on
fortuitous events that occurred later").
208. 349 Md. 441, 709 A.2d 112 (1998).
209. MLRPC 5.4 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share
legal fees with a nonlawyer," with certain exceptions. MD. LAwYERs' RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1998).
210. MLRPC 7.2(c) provides in pertinent part that:
A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the law-
yer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising or
written communication permitted by this Rule and may pay the usual charges of a
not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization.
MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(c) (1998).
211. Son, 349 Md. at 461, 709 A.2d at 121-22.
212. Id. at 461-62, 709 A.2d at 122. The court emphasized its holding in Bregman that
the MLRPC was an embodiment of public policy. Id.
213. Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar, 114 Md. App. 190, 219, 689 A.2d
645, 659 (1997), rev'd, 349 Md. 441, 709 A.2d 112 (1998).
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The Son case arose out of a crippling accident suffered by Danny
Son (Son) on August 2, 1992.214 Son's then-wife, Tae Yon So (Ms.
Son) retained Gary A. Stein (Stein), of the firm Margolius, Mallios,
Davis, Rider & Tomar (Margolius), to represent the Son family as it
sought compensation for the accident.215 The issue before the court
involved the way in which the settlement proceeds were distributed
between Margolius, and a third party, Jennifer Park.216
According to Ms. Son, she contacted Park within a short time fol-
lowing the accident in order to receive her assistance in finding ap-
propriate counsel.217 The evidence indicates that on August 12, Ms.
Son, Park, and Stein met, and Ms. Son signed three agreements. 21 8
The first agreement, entitled "Employment Contract" was between
Ms. Son and Park and promised to pay Park ten percent of any recov-
ery in consideration for the help that she would provide the Sons in
the course of any proceedings. 219 The other two contracts were re-
tainer agreements, signed only by Ms. Son, to employ the Margolius
firm as counsel to pursue claims arising out of the accident.220
214. Son, 349 Md. at 443, 709 A.2d at 113. The accident occurred as Son was attempting
to change a flat tire on the shoulder of a highway. Id. Son was struck by a tractor-trailer,
which caused him to be comatose for several weeks and rendered him quadriplegic. Id.
215. Id. Stein eventually initiated litigation proceedings and later negotiated a settle-
ment in the sum of $4,850,000 for the Son family. Id.
216. Id. The evidence indicated that the settlement award to Margolius should have
been $1,382,250, equal to 28.5% of the settlement. Id. However, the firm only kept
$1,139,750, equal to 23.5% of the award. Id. The remaining 5% of the fee went to Park,
who received $242,000 from the firm as a part of an alleged consulting agreement. Id. At
the time of the accident, Park was widely known in the Korean community as one who used
her English and Korean language skills to assist Koreans facing various problems. Id. at
447-48, 709 A.2d at 115. Park was also known personally by the Son family because they
had employed her as their bookkeeper for two months in 1987. Id. at 448, 709 A.2d at 115.
Park reported that for 15 years, she had been assisting Koreans in a variety of tasks, includ-
ing locating counsel. Id.
217. Id. Ms. Son testified that she was aware that Park had assisted other Koreans in
finding representation. Id. The day after receiving the call from Ms. Son, Park arrived at
the hospital to discuss the issue of counsel with the Son family. Id. Park brought a list of
three attorneys to the hospital, of which Stein was the first on the list, and told the Son
family that she would charge them a fee of 10%, notwithstanding attorney's fees, of any
recovery the Son family received. Id.
218. Id. at 449, 709 A.2d at 115-16.
219. Id. The 10% award was being given to Park to compensate her for being the
"spokesperson and consultant for both of us [Mr. and Mrs. Son] so that to the best of her
abilities, she can cooperate with both of us and the attorney we select." Id. The agreement
further stated that Park would "prepare for any and all questions relative to the hospital
and the law suit, and respond to the attorney and others on behalf of me and my husband
upon consultation with us." Id. The agreement was written in Korean. Id. at 449, 709 A.2d
at 115.
220. Id., 709 A.2d at 116. The retainer agreements were identical, except the compensa-
tion to be awarded to the Margolius firm varied between the two versions. Id. One version
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Although Stein testified that he was not aware of the agreement be-
tween Park and Son, the court found that he became aware of it in
November 1992 when he signed another agreement to help imple-
ment a new arrangement entered into between Park and Son. 221 This
new agreement clarified Park's duties to the Son family and modified
the fee awarded to Park.2 2 2 On December 3, 1992, two new retainer
agreements were entered into between Son and Margolius. 22 Like
the previous retainer agreements, the only discrepancy between the
two agreements was the fees. 2 24 One year later, the case was settled
for $4,850,000.225 Son asserted that he never authorized payments to
be made to Park, and he filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgom-
ery County against Stein, Margolius, and Park, seeking compensation
for the $242,500 remitted to Park, and the $1,139,750 given to
of the retainer agreement stated that the fee would be "equal to 33 1/3 % (or 40% if case
is tried) percent [sic] (33 1/3-40%) of the total amount of any settlement or judgment
obtained in the case." Id. The other version stated that the fee would be "equal to 30% (or
35% if case is tried) percent [sic] (33 1/3-40%) of the total amount of any settlement or
judgment obtained in the case." Id. at 449-50, 709 A.2d at 116.
221. Id. at 450, 709 A.2d at 116. On September 20, 1992, prior to the signing of the
formation of the new employment agreement with Park, Park visited the hospital with a
General Power of Attorney for Mr. Son to sign. Id. at 451, 709 A.2d at 116. Although, as
the court noted, Mr. Son's condition was unclear, the form was signed by him, thereby
appointing his wife "as his attorney-in-fact with general authority, among other things, to
enter into all manner of contracts, prosecute suits, and 'take all steps and remedies neces-
sary and proper for the conduct and management of [his] business affairs...." Id. at 451,
709 A.2d at 116-17.
222. Id. at 451-52, 709 A.2d at 117. The agreement indicated that:
the Sons were willing "to assign to Ms. Park a nominal portion of six and one-half
percent (6.5%) of any recovery they may receive from any source as result of their
claims" and Ms. Park was willing "to provide her extensive consulting services to
Clients in return for an assignment of said 6.5% of any recovery obtained, unless
the case is settled prior to trial in which case the consultant's fee is 5%.
Id. at 452, 709 A.2d at 117. The consulting services contemplated in the agreement con-
sisted of:
advocacy and negotiation with health care providers and community resources to
assist clients in their day-to-day activities during the pending litigation, investiga-
tion services, research, paralegal support to the attorney representing Clients in
their claim, acting as a liaison between Clients' attorney and the Korean commu-
nity and other support services to Clients and their attorney as may be required
from time to time.
Id
223. Id. at 454, 709 A-2d at 118.
224. Id. The first retainer agreement awarded the Margolius firm with "28.5% of any
settlement and 33 1/3% of any judgment obtained." Id. The second agreement provided
for "23.5% of any settlement and 26.83% of any judgment." Id.
225. Id. at 455, 709 A.2d at 118. The Margolius firm paid itself $1,139,750, which repre-
sented only 23.5% of the total fee. Id., 709 A.2d at 119. The day after receiving its fee, the
Margolius firm delivered a check to Park for $242,500. Id.
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Margolius.226 Son filed five counts in all; the first, his chief complaint,
was that Park's referral fee constituted a violation of Maryland's Barra-
try Law.2 2 7 The remaining counts "charged a variety of torts, all based
principally on the asserted concealment from Son of the allegedly ille-
gal agreement."2 8 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to con-
sider two questions: the narrow barratry issue; and, in light of its
recent holding in Bregman, "whether agreements entered into by law-
yers that were in contravention of applicable MLRPC rules could be
declared void as against public policy." 229
Having decided in Bregman that Rule 1.5 (e) and the MLRPC have
the force of law and constitute public policy, the court held that Rule
5.4 and 7.2 deserved similar treatment. The court therefore con-
ducted a Bregman analysis. 2 11 Considering all of the evidence in the
record, the court concluded that a question of material fact still ex-
isted, and that it would be necessary for the circuit court to "(1) make
appropriate findings of fact from the disputed evidence, and (2) de-
pending upon those findings, consider the factors mentioned in Post
v. Bregman.''231 In remanding the case to the circuit court, the Court
of Appeals further held that if the circuit court finds a violation of
MLRPC 5.4 or 7.2, the attorney should be required to refund a por-
tion of the fees accrued. 23 2 This ruling has arguably created a cause of
action for Son because it essentially states that Son is due some refund
if the lower court concludes that a violation of the rule has oc-
curred. 233 This is a clear extension of the Bregman holding, as well as
an arguable contravention of the Scope's proscription against using
violations of the MLRPC as a basis for civil liability.23 4
226. Id. at 443-44, 709 A.2d at 113.
227. Id. at 444, 709 A.2d at 113; see MD. CODE ANN., Bus. OCC. & PROF. § 10-604(a)(1)
(1995) ("Without an existing relationship or interest in an issue: a person may not, for
personal gain, solicit another person to sue or to retain a lawyer to represent the other
person in a lawsuit . . ").
228. Margolius, 349 Md. at 444, 709 A.2d at 113. The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, and the Circuit Court granted the defendant's motion, giving no rea-
son. Id.
229. Id. at 446, 709 A.2d at 114. The Court of Appeals first examined the question of
barratry, affirming the lower court's dismissal of that charge. Id. at 456-61, 709 A.2d at 119
(reasoning that the barratry law bars lawyers from soliciting clients, but that in this case Mr.
Stein did not solicit Son because Park referred Son to Mr. Stein).
230. See id. at 461-65, 709 A.2d at 122-23 (applying the Bregman factors, such as "the
nature of the violation" and "how it came about" in order to determine whether violation
of the MLRPC warranted holding the agreement unenforceable).
231. Id. at 465, 709 A.2d at 123.
232. Id., 709 A.2d at 123-24.
233. Id. at 468, 709 A.2d at 125 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
234. Id.
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d. Possible Impact Beyond Referral Fee Agreements. -Perhaps the
most significant aspect of the court's decision in Post v. Bregman was its
determination that the Rules, as public policy, have the force of
law.2" 5 This liberal interpretation of the effect of the MLRPC will
likely open new avenues for applying the Rules. Cases in the area of
legal malpractice illustrate this possible expansion.
In Hooper v. Gill, the Court of Special Appeals faced the question
of whether violations of ethics rules in legal malpractice actions are
admissible as evidence of a breach of standard of care.23 6 In Hooper,
the court stated that no court in Maryland had ever answered the
question of whether a violation of Maryland's Code of Professional
Responsibility23 7 provided a basis for liability in a legal malpractice
case. 23 8 The Hooper court, however, pointed to other jurisdictions that
allow a violation of ethical rules to serve as evidence of malpractice.239
These jurisdictions, the court pointed out, view their corresponding
ethics code as having the force of law.24°
Now that the Bregman court has placed Maryland into the cate-
gory of states classifying their ethics rules as public policy having the
force of law,241 the question arises whether future Maryland courts will
treat violations of the Rules either as a cause of action in itself or as
evidence of malpractice. Although perhaps not envisioned by the
Bregman court, such a development in legal malpractice law is conceiv-
able given the court's forceful and unequivocal interpretation of
MLRPC as a statement of public policy having the force of law.
235. See Bregman, 349 Md. at 164, 707 A.2d at 816-17 ("MLRPC constitutes a statement of
public policy ... and it has the force of law.").
236. See Hooper v. Gill, 79 Md. App. 437, 441, 557 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1989) (discussing
the plaintiffs attempt to introduce evidence regarding violations of the MLRPC as evi-
dence of his attorney's breach of contract); supra notes 149-151 (discussing Hooper); see also
Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice: Do The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Define It?, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 57-58 (1998) (discussing
the impact of the Model Rules on legal malpractice in different jurisdictions including
those that classify their ethics codes as public policy with the force of law).
237. The Code of Professional Responsibility was superseded by the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct in 1987. 13 Md. Reg. 3 (1986).
238. Hooper, 79 Md. App. at 442, 557 A.2d at 1352.
239. Id. at 443-44, 557 A.2d at 1352 (citations omitted).
240. Id. The court cited a number of cases. See Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377,
1381 (Mass. 1986) (holding that any violation of an ethics rule is not a per se breach of
duty, but "[a] s with statutes and regulations.... if a plaintiff can demonstrate that a disci-
plinary rule was intended to protect one in his position, a violation of that rule may be
some evidence of the attorney's negligence" (citations omitted)); Lipton v. Boesky, 313
N.W.2d 163, 167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (ruling that the Code of Professional Responsibility
constitutes public policy and "as with statutes, a violation of the Code is rebuttable evi-
dence of malpractice").
241. Bregman, 349 Md. at 164, 707 A.2d at 816.
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5. Conclusion.-In Post v. Bregman, the Court of Appeals held
that an attorney may invoke a violation of Rule 1.5(e) of the MLRPC
as a defense to a breach of contract claim in order to render that
contract unenforceable.242 This outcome is consistent with a recent
line of Maryland cases suggesting the strength and relevance of the
MLRPC outside the confines of disciplinary proceedings.243 Although
this unquestionably constitutes an extension of the scope of the
MLRPC regarding fee agreements, the court was careful to place limi-
tations on the defense. However, given the clarity and strength of the
court's argument that the MLRPC constitute public policy and have
the force of law, violations of other provisions in the MLRPC similarly
may be recognized outside of the disciplinary context, most notably in
legal malpractice actions.
MARK T. ODULIO
242. Id. at 168, 707 A.2d at 818-19.
243. See supra notes 75-114 and accompanying text (describing cases in which courts
gave credence to the MLRPC).
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XII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Abrogation of the Jury's Traditional Role in Determining
Punitive Damages
In Bowden v. Caldor, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals considered
whether the Maryland Constitution guarantees a plaintiff the option
of a new trial when a court reduces a punitive damages award for ex-
cessiveness. 2 The majority held that, consistent with Article 23 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, a court may reduce an excessive puni-
tive damages award without granting a plaintiff the option of a new
trial.3 The court reasoned that judges may reduce verdicts without
violating a plaintiff's right to a trial by jury because, unlike the federal
constitution, Maryland's constitution does not contain a "Reexamina-
tion Clause."4 Furthermore, the court concluded that a trial court
could reduce a punitive damages award without granting a new trial
because factors limiting punitive damages awards are principles of
Maryland common law, rather than questions of fact.5 As character-
ized by the Court of Appeals, the application of legal principles does
not violate either the Reexamination Clause or the Maryland Consti-
tution, which preserve only the right to a jury trial with regard to is-
sues of fact. In its analysis, the majority misinterprets the function of
the Reexamination Clause. The court also misconstrues Supreme
Court precedent that sanctions appellate review of a trial judge's re-
fusal to grant a new trial in cases involving excessive compensatory
and punitive damages verdicts. Moreover, the majority seemingly ig-
nores the Maryland common law tradition of preserving the jury's role
in determining both compensatory and punitive damages awards. As
a result, the court sacrifices a plaintiff's common law right to ajury by
his or her peers for the sake ofjudicial economy. This decision could
ultimately result in unfettered judicial discretion in ascertaining ap-
propriate punitive damages awards, inconsistent treatment of similarly
situated plaintiffs, and forum shopping. Finally, it may also deter
plaintiffs from asserting legal rights they would otherwise pursue.
1. 350 Md. 4, 710 A.2d 267 (1998).
2. Id. at 43, 710 A.2d at 286.
3. Id. at 47, 710 A.2d at 288.
4. The Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment states that "no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court." U.S. CONST. amend. VII, cl. 2.
5. Bowden, 350 Md. at 47, 710 A.2d at 288 ("[T]he court, in applying legal principles
to reduce ajury's punitive damages award, is performing a legal function and not acting as
a second trier of fact.").
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1. The Case.-Petitioner Samuel David Bowden, a sixteen year-
old African American, was hired as a customer service representative
in March 1988 by Caldor, a regional retail department store.6 On
June 15, 1988, two employees of Caldor's security department de-
tained Bowden soon after he arrived at work.' The Caldor security
personnel held Bowden in a small, windowless store office for more
than four hours, interrogated him, and accused him of stealing
money and merchandise from the store.8 Bowden repeatedly denied
the accusations, and the security guards thwarted every attempt he
made to contact his parents or leave the room.9 Ultimately, as a result
of intimidation and fear, Bowden yielded to the officers' demands and
signed a written statement stating that he committed theft at the
store.1a  Upon securing a confession, the officers released Bowden,
and Bowden promptly informed his parents of the interrogation and
coercion."
Bowden and his mother returned to the store the following day
to discuss the matter with another store manager and the security
manager.12 During the encounter, the store manager shouted racial
slurs at Bowden, grabbed Bowden's arm, led him to the store's secur-
ity office, and insisted that Bowden and his parents recompense Cal-
dor for the alleged theft. 3 Bowden refused the officer's demands and
was subsequently handcuffed, escorted through the store, and de-
tained in open view of store customers and his fellow employees. 4
Baltimore County police officers eventually arrived at the store to
arrest him. 5 Ajuvenile court dismissed the charges against Bowden
in December 1988 due to insufficient evidence. 16





11. Id. Bowden was finally released from the store office at approximately 11:00 p.m.,
nearly two hours after Caldor's scheduled closing time. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 13, 710 A.2d at 271. According to the evidence presented at trial, the store
manager specifically said: "You people-you nigger boys make me sick, but you're going
to burn for this, you sucker." Id. at n.1. Moreover, the security manager smirked in re-
sponse to the store manager's comment indicating that the security manager shared the
same acrimonious sentiment towards African Americans. Id.
14. Id. at 13, 710 A.2d at 271.
15. Id.
16. Id. The juvenile court found there was insufficient evidence to conclude Bowden
was responsible for the thefts. Id. In fact, the court concluded that Caldor failed to prove
the alleged thefts occurred at all. Id.
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Bowden brought a civil action against Caldor and several of its
security personnel, alleging false imprisonment, malicious prosecu-
tion, defamation, wrongful discharge, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.17 The jury awarded Bowden $110,000 in compen-
satory damages apportioned in varying amounts among the five torts
alleged in the suit.i" The jury also awarded Bowden $350,000 in puni-
tive damages; however, the jury made no indication regarding the ap-
portionment of the award among the various torts.1 9 Thereafter,
Caldor filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV), a new trial, and/or a remittitur.2 ° The circuit court granted
the JNOV motion on the wrongful discharge and intentional infliction
of emotional distress counts, 21 but upheld the punitive damages award
and denied a new trial.22
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's rulings concern-
ing liability,23 but reversed the denial of a new trial on the issue of
punitive damages because the punitive damages award had not been
apportioned among the specific tort counts. 24 Consequently, the case
was remanded to the circuit court for a new trial to calculate punitive
17. Id. Bowden brought the action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking
compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. A separate trial was held exclusively for the determination of punitive damages.
Id.
20. Id. Remittitur is defined as:
The procedural process by which an excessive verdict of the jury is reduced. If
money damages awarded by a jury are grossly excessive as a matter of law, the
judge may order the plaintiff to remit a portion of the award. In the alternative,
the court may order a complete new trial or a trial limited to the issue of dam-
ages. The court may also condition a denial of a motion for new trial upon the
filing by the plaintiff of a remittitur in a stated amount.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 897 (6th ed. 1991).
21. Bowden, 350 Md. at 13, 710 A.2d at 271. The court's decision to grantJNOV on two
counts reduced the compensatory damages award from $110,000 to $60,000. Id. at 13-14,
710 A.2d at 271.
22. Id. at 14, 710 A.2d at 271.
23. Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 663-64, 625 A.2d 959, 974 (1993). The Court
of Appeals granted certiorari before the Court of Special Appeals had an opportunity to
hear the case. Id. at 641, 625 A.2d at 963.
24. Id. at 663-64, 625 A.2d at 974. Judge Chasanow explained for the court:
The requirement of a compensatory damages foundation protects defendants
from being punished for acts that the trial court determines the defendant did
not commit. In assessing punitive damages, ajury might have been influenced by
the number of distinct civil wrongs the defendants committed. In light of this
concern . . . the award of punitive damages must be vacated and a new trial or-
dered for the sole purpose of calculating punitive damages based on the three
remaining torts ....
Id. at 663, 625 A.2d at 974.
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damages based on the three viable counts of false imprisonment, defa-
mation, and malicious prosecution.25
Following a second trial on punitive damages in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City, ajury awarded Bowden $9 million in punitive dam-
ages, $3 million apportioned to each of the three torts for which liabil-
ity was proved.26 Caldor filed a "Motion for remittitur and/or JNOV
and/or for a new trial" in response to the large award of punitive dam-
ages." The circuit court denied the motions for JNOV and a new
trial, but granted the motion for remittitur, finding the award of $9
million excessive.2" The court reduced the punitive damages award
from $9 million to $350,000, allocating the award among the three
torts.
2 9
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's ruling
based on its understanding of the Court of Appeals's previous deci-
sion-granting a new trial to calculate punitive damages-as limiting
the punitive damages award for the three remaining torts to
$350,000.30 The Court of Special Appeals indicated:
"[B] ecause a punitive damage award on retrial in excess of
what was awarded in the original trial is inconsistent with the
mandate and opinion of the Court of Appeals, then it neces-
sarily follows that there would be no constructive purpose of
the trial court to offer [Bowden] the choice between remitti-
tur and a new trial because no matter how many new trials
were given, a verdict over $350,000 would not be permitted
to stand."31
25. Id. at 663, 625 A.2d at 974.
26. Bowden, 350 Md. at 14-15, 710 A.2d at 272. Both sides presented new evidence at
the new trial. Id. The judge instructed the jury as to the purpose of awarding punitive
damages and the requisite proof for an award. Id. at 15, 710 A.2d at 272. While the jury
learned the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the first trial for the three re-
maining counts, it did not learn the amount of punitive damages awarded by the firstjury.
Id.
27. Id. at 15, 710 A.2d at 272.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court reduced the award to the exact amount awarded in the first trial,
allocating $116,500 for defamation, $117,000 for malicious prosecution, and $116,500 for
false imprisonment. Id. Supporting its decision to reduce the award, the circuit court
emphasized the unfairness of subjecting the defendants to an award grossly exceeding the
award by the firstjury and expressed concern that a higher award would result in a "chil-
ling effect" on a defendant's right to appeal. Id.
30. Id. at 17, 710 A.2d at 273.
31. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., No. 2056 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. May 15, 1996)).
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Bowden then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Court of
Appeals granted.3 2 On appeal, Bowden presented the following argu-
ments to Maryland's highest court: (i) the intermediate court errone-
ously construed the Court of Appeals's earlier opinion as precluding a
punitive damages award in excess of $350,000 on retrial; (ii) the cir-
cuit court erred when it focused on the chilling effect a higher dam-
ages award on retrial would have on a defendant's right to appeal;
33
and (iii) the circuit court's reduction of the jury's award and failure to
grant the option of a new trial on punitive damages violated his right
to ajury trial under Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.3 4
2. Legal Background.-The availability of punitive damages in
tort actions is well established under Maryland law.35 Maryland courts
have consistently held that the two principal goals of punitive damages
awards are punishment and deterrence.36 While Maryland law per-
mits punitive damages, a plaintiff has no right or entitlement to such
32. Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 343 Md. 745, 684 A.2d 836 (1996).
33. In justifying its reduction of the punitive damages award, the circuit court ex-
plained that "[t]o subject the defendants to nine million dollars in punitive damages after
they successfully appealed an award of $350,000 [demonstrates a] kind of arbitrariness and
violation of fundamental fairness.'" Bowden, 350 Md. at 15, 710 A.2d at 272 (quoting the
trial court). Furthermore, the circuit court stated that " 'the Court of Appeals doesn't in-
tend to bushwhack successful appellants and that the price of succeeding on appeal is not
to be hit with a very large damage claim.'" Id. at 15-16, 710 A.2d at 272 (quoting the trial
court). The circuit court relied on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989), to support its conclusion that a punitive damages
award in excess of the initial $350,000 would be fundamentally unfair. In Pearce, the
Supreme Court held that in the case of a retrial following a successful appeal, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred a judge from vindictively imposing a
harsher sentence on a criminal defendant absent subsequent misconduct. Id. at 725-26.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Bowden's argument that the principle established in
Pearce applied only in criminal cases. Bowden, 350 Md. at 19-20, 710 A.2d at 274.
34. Bowden, 350 Md. at 17-18, 710 A.2d at 273. Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights states that "[t]he right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in
the several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum
of five thousand dollars, shall be inviolably preserved." MD. CODE ANN., CONST., DECL. Or
RTS. art. 23, cl. 2 (1981 & Supp. 1998).
35. See Medairy v. McAllister, 97 Md. 488, 497, 55 A. 461, 464 (1903) (affirming award
of punitive damages where compensation for actual loss to plaintiff would be clearly insuf-
ficient); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Barger, 80 Md. 23, 34-35, 30 A. 560, 563 (1894)
(affirming jury's award of punitive damages where plaintiff was violently assaulted); Phila-
delphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R.R. Co. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 304 (1884) (establish-
ing malice requirement to justify punitive damages award).
36. See, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 537-38, 682 A.2d
1143, 1161 (1996) ("The purpose of punitive damages is ... to punish the defendant for
egregiously bad conduct toward the plaintiff, [and] to deter the defendant and others
contemplating similar behavior.").
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damages.3 v Once awarded, trial courts have discretion to review a pu-
nitive damages verdict for excessiveness.38
37. SeeAdams v. Coates, 331 Md. 1, 15, 626 A.2d 36, 43 (1993) ("[T]he trier of fact has
discretion to deny punitive damages even where the record otherwise would support their
award." (citing Nast v. Lockett, 312 Md. 343, 349, 539 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1988), overruled on
other grounds by Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 460, 601 A.2d 633, 652 (1992);
Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 616, 56 A.2d 813, 816 (1948); MARYLAND
CIVIL PA-rFERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10:6 (a), at 226 (1984))).
38. See Ellerin v. Fairfax Sav., F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 242, 652 A.2d 1117, 1130 (1995)
("[T]he amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury is reviewable by the trial court for
excessiveness." (citing Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 624, 541 A.2d 969, 976 (1988);
Conklin v. Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 64, 257 A.2d 187, 194 (1969); Turner v. Washington
Sanitary Comm., 221 Md. 494, 503, 158 A.2d 125, 130 (1960))). Maryland trial and appel-
late courts have the authority to review punitive damages awards based on well established
common law principles which provide that punitive damages awards must comport with
the gravity of the defendant's misconduct. See id. In Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon
Evander &Associates, 88 Md. App. 672, 714, 596 A.2d 687, 708 (1991), the Court of Special
Appeals addressed whether Maryland punitive damages law satisfied the implicit require-
ments regarding the review of punitive damages awards as outlined in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1991). These requirements include: instructions
to guide the jury's discretion; post-trial standards to scrutinize awards; and appellate review
of punitive damages awards. Alexander, 88 Md. App. at 714-15, 596 A.2d at 708. The court
found that similar requirements existed under Maryland law and delineated several princi-
ples employed to guide the jury's and the court's discretion when determining the appro-
priate award of punitive damages. Id. at 715-16, 596 A.2d at 708-09. According to the
guidelines articulated in Alexander, punitive damages may be imposed only: (i) where
there is "outrageous conduct"; (ii) upon a showing of "actual malice" on the part of a
defendant; (iii) to punish the wrongdoer and deter the wrongdoer and others from engag-
ing in the same conduct; (iv) on an individual basis; and (v) where there is actual loss and
thus an underlying award of compensatory damages. Id. To determine the need for a new
trial based on excessive damages, the trial court must consider whether the verdict is
"grossly excessive," "inordinate," "outrageously excessive," or "shocks the conscience." See
Banegura, 312 Md. at 624, 541 A.2d at 976 (discussing the standard to be applied by a trial
judge to determine whether a new trial should be granted because of an excessive verdict).
The Supreme Court recently held in BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
568 (1996), that punitive damages awards are subject to limits, as a matter of federal consti-
tutional law, under the Due Process Clause. The BMWCourt evaluated three "guideposts"
to conclude that the $2 million dollar punitive damages award against BMW transcended
constitutional limits under the Due Process Clause: the degree of reprehensibility of the
conduct; the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award; and the difference between the punitive damages award and the
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Id. at 574-75. In light of the
limits established in BMW, the Bowden court rearticulated the principles of Maryland com-
mon law applicable to judicial review of punitive damages awards for excessiveness. Bow-
den, 350 Md. at 27-40, 710 A.2d at 278-85. The Bowden court explained that the principles
articulated in its opinion were not minimum constitutional requirements but rather modi-
fications of the Maryland common law. Id. at 27, 710 A.2d at 278. The court identified
nine principles courts should evaluate when assessing the appropriateness of a punitive
damages award: proportionality of the award to the gravity of the defendant's behavior;
proportionality to the defendant's ability to pay; the deterrence value of the award; the
amount of civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct;
comparable punitive damages awards in the jurisdiction; other punitive damages awards
against the defendant for the same conduct; whether multiple punitive damages awards
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Maryland trial courts enjoy broad discretion when reviewing jury
verdicts for excessiveness. Absent clear abuse of discretion in refusing
to remit an award or order a new trial on damages based on a trans-
gression of common law limits for punitive damages awards, a trial
court's ultimate decision as to excessiveness is generally "not open on
appeal. '39 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that, under the Sev-
enth Amendment, appellate review of a district court's denial of a mo-
tion to set aside compensatory and punitive awards as excessive is
permissible under an abuse of discretion standard.4" In Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc.,4 1 the Court held that appellate review of a
district court's denial of a motion to set aside a compensatory dam-
ages award as excessive did not offend the Reexamination Clause of
the Seventh Amendment.42 Justice Scalia, however, adamantly dis-
sented in Gasperini, opining that appellate review of a compensatory
were imposed for the same instance of misconduct; the plaintiffs reasonable costs and
expenses resulting from the defendant's conduct, including litigation expenses not in-
cluded in an award of compensatory damages; and whether the punitive damages award
bears a reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages award. Id. at 27-40, 710 A.2d
at 278-85.
39. Alexander, 88 Md. App. at 717, 596 A.2d at 709 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Continental Cas. Co. v. Mirabile, 52 Md. App. 387, 399, 449 A.2d 1176, 1184
(1982)). The Alexander court vacated the punitive damages award on the ground that it
was excessive as a matter of federal constitutional law. Id. at 721, 596 A.2d at 711. The
Court of Special Appeals proposed three options to deal with the award: (i) assume au-
thority implicit from Haslip to reduce the award to what it regarded as a proper amount;
(ii) vacate the award and remand the case for reconsideration by the trial judge in the
exercise of his authority to require a further remittitur; or (iii) vacate the award and direct
a new trial. Id. The court mandated a new trial on the issue of damages, reasoning that
the reduction of a punitive damages award by an appellate court is an option "foreign to
Maryland procedure and not one [to be] select[ed] ... where.., more traditional options
exist." Id. at 721-22, 596 A.2d at 711.
While Haslip and BMW established a substantive due process right to be protected
from excessive punitive damages awards, neither opinion indicated that an appellate court
should undertake to calculate the proper award when it determines a particular punitive
damages award is excessive. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 586 ("Whether the appropriate remedy
requires a new trial or merely an independent determination by the Alabama Supreme
Court of the award ... is a matter that should be addressed by the state court in the first
instance."); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15-23 (discussing post-trial procedures established by Ala-
bama to ensure meaningful review of punitive damages awards in determining whether the
award exceeds common law limits).
40. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 (1996) (holding that
the Seventh Amendment permits appellate review, for abuse of discretion, of a trial judge's
denial of a motion to set aside ajury award of compensatory damages as excessive); Brown-
ing-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989) (stating that the role of a
federal appellate court is to review, under an abuse of discretion standard, a district court's
determination of whether a new trial or remittitur should be ordered because of an exces-
sive punitive damages award).
41. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
42. Id. at 436. See supra note 4 for the text of the Reexamination Clause.
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damages award is prohibited under the Reexamination Clause.4" Jus-
tice Scalia distinguished appellate review involving compensatory
damages from appellate review involving punitive damages to recon-
cile his dissent in Gasperini with the Court's opinion in Browning-Ferris
Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.4 4 In Browning-Ferris, the Court implicitly
approved appellate review of the trial court's decision to deny a new
trial where punitive damages awards were claimed to be excessive.45
Justice Scalia justified the Browning-Ferris decision by characterizing
punitive damages as a legal determination rather than a factual one,
thus subjecting them to appellate review.46 The majority and dissent-
ing opinions in Gasperini evaluated the Reexamination Clause in the
context of appellate review of compensatory and punitive damages
awards under a limited abuse of discretion standard.47 Neither opin-
ion, however, addressed the issue of judicial determination of an ap-
propriate award when the court finds an award excessive.
Traditionally, upon determining that a damages award is exces-
sive, Maryland courts will offer the plaintiff either an opportunity to
remit the damages to an appropriate amount determined by the judge
or the option of a new trial.48
Before Bowden, the Court of Appeals had never addressed
whether Article 23 of the Maryland Constitution mandates a new trial
in cases involving either excessive compensatory or punitive dam-
ages.49 Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states:
The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceed-
ings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the
43. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 449 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 459 (citing Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. 257).
45. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279.
46. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 459 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 434-37; id. at 453-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. See Conklin v. Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 64, 257 A.2d 187, 194 (1969) ("[T]he Mary-
land practice of granting a new trial by the trial judge in tort cases where the sole ground is
an excessive verdict, unless the plaintiff remits the portion of the verdict which the trial
court deems excessive, is well established."); Turner v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 501-02, 158 A.2d 125, 129 (1960) ("The trial practice of granting a
new trial sought by the defendant, unless the plaintiff remit a portion of the verdict which
the trial court deems excessive, is well established in Maryland."); Mezzanotte Constr. Co.
v. Gibons, 219 Md. 178, 183, 148 A.2d 399, 402 (1959) ("It is generally recognized that a
trial court may pass an order for a new trial, unless the plaintiff shall remit a part of a
verdict which the court deems excessive." (citing 2 POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 347; 39
AM.JUR. New Trial § 210; 66 C.J.S. New Trial § 209)). See generally Podolski v. Sibley, 12 Md.
App. 642, 647, 280 A.2d 294, 297 (1971) ("The trial practice of granting a new trial sought
by the defendant unless the plaintiff remit a portion of the verdict which the trial court
deems excessive is well established in Maryland.").
49. Bowden, 350 Md. at 43, 710 A.2d at 286.
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amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five thousand dol-
lars, shall be inviolably preserved.5 °
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue
under the Seventh Amendment. 51 The Seventh Amendment contains
language similar to the Maryland Constitution:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-ex-
amined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.
5 2
The federal appellate courts are divided on the question whether a
plaintiff has a right to a new trial when a jury's punitive damages
award is reduced because it is excessive.53
50. MD. CODE ANN., CONST., DECL. OF RTs. art. 23, cl. 2 (1981 & Supp. 1998).
51. See Bowden, 350 Md. at 43, 710 A.2d at 286. The Supreme Court strongly suggests in
both Browning-Ferris and Gasperini that a court is required to offer the plaintiff the option of
a new trial under the Seventh Amendment when it reduces a damages verdict. See Brown-
ing-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989) ("[T]he role of the dis-
trict court is to determine whether the jury's verdict is within the confines set by state law,
and to determine... whether a new trial or remittitur should be ordered."); see also Gasper-
ini, 518 U.S. at 435 (quoting the above language from Browning-Ferris and stating that the
analysis of whether an award of compensatory damages exceeds legal limits is similar to the
analysis involving punitive damages). Furthermore, in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474
(1935), the Court stated:
Where the verdict returned by a jury is palpably and grossly inadequate or exces-
sive, it should not be permitted to stand; but, in that event, both parties remain
entitled, as they were entitled in the first instance, to have ajury properly deter-
mine the question of liability and the extent of the injury by an assessment of
damages.
Id. at 486.
52. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. The second clause of the Seventh Amendment, the Reex-
amination Clause, is not contained in the text of the Maryland Constitution. MD. CODE
ANN., CONST., DECL. OF RTs. art. 23.
53. Compare, e.g., Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 207 (1st Cir. 1987)
(holding that courts should determine the appropriate measure of punitive damages when
a jury's award is excessive, in order to avoid the "intolerable burden" of retrial on the
parties and the court), Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80, 102 (6th Cir. 1980) (recalculating
punitive damages on appeal instead of remanding for a new trial), and Guzman v. Western
State Bank, 540 F.2d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 1976) (reducing punitive damages award from
$25,000 to $10,000 without providing option of a new trial) with Continental Trend Re-
sources, Inc. v. Oxy USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 643 (10th Cir. 1996) (directing the trial court
to grant a new trial limited to punitive damages should the plaintiffs decline to accept the
reduced award), Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1258 (9th Cir. 1993) ("To avoid any
conflict with the Seventh Amendment, the preferable course is to afford the party awarded
the grossly excessive punitive damages ... the option of either accepting the remittitur of
the punitive damage award or a new trial on that issue."), Defender Indus., Inc. v. North-
western Mut. Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Seventh
Amendment "guarantees the right to ajury determination of the amount of punitive dam-
ages" and reversing the lower court's decision to reduce an excessive award without grant-
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:604
The Fourth Circuit's review of the issue in Defender Industries, Inc.
v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co.54 is illustrative of the nebulous
aspects involved in determining whether a plaintiff has a right to a
jury calculation of punitive damages. In Defender Industries, a federal
district court found a $5 million punitive damages award excessive,
and, in lieu of following the established practice of ordering a new
trial nisi remittitur,55 the court reduced the award to $10,000.56 The
district court's decision was consistent with then existing Fourth Cir-
cuit precedent. In Shamblin's Ready Mix, Inc. v. Eaton Corp.,5 7 the
Fourth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee
a plaintiff the right to a jury determination of punitive damages.58
The Shamblin court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Tull v.
United States59 in arriving at its conclusion.6 ° In Tull, the Supreme
Court held that the determination of the amount of a civil penalty
imposed for violation of a federal statute could be delegated to a trial
judge.6" The Shamblin court extended the Tull Court's reasoning to
ing the plaintiff the option of a new trial), and McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383,
1391 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the judge violated proper procedure in reducing the
award without giving the plaintiff the option of a new trial). Although several federal cir-
cuit courts have reduced punitive damages awards themselves upon finding ajury award of
punitive damages excessive, none of these courts addressed the constitutional issue of the
right to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment. See Rowlett, 832 F.2d at 207; Shim-
man, 625 F.2d at 102; Guzman, 540 F.2d at 954. The Fourth Circuit noted this absence of
discussion regarding the constitutional authority of courts to reduce excessive punitive
damages without granting the option of a new trial in Defender Industries and held that a
new trial must be offered under the Seventh Amendment when an award is initially
deemed excessive. Defender Industries, 938 F.2d at 507.
54. 938 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1991).
55. New trial nisi remittitur indicates that a new trial will be granted unless the plaintiff
agrees to remit the award; nisi is Latin for "unless." BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARV, supra note
20, at 725; see also Defender Industries, 938 F.2d at 505 ("Under traditional procedure, a
district court ... could set aside the excessive verdict by granting a new trial or a new trial
nisi remittitur." (citing Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 278-79; 11 CH-ARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815 (1973 & Supp. 1991))).
56. Defender Indus., Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F. Supp. 252, 261
(D.S.C. 1989), revd, 938 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1991).
57. 873 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1989).
58. Id. at 742 ("[W]e hold that the seventh amendment does not require that the
amount of punitive damages be assessed by a jury.").
59. 481 U.S. 412 (1987). In Tul, the government sought civil penalties and injunctions
against a real estate developer under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 414. After examination of
the legislative history of the Clean Water Act, the Court concluded that Congress intended
trial judges to assess civil penalties, and that this assessment procedure was consistent with
the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 427. The Court held that in cases where specific penalties
are established by the law, jury determination of the amount of penalty is not required
under the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 426-27.
60. Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 741-42.
61. Tul4 481 U.S. at 427.
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punitive damages awards, concluding that "[t]here is no principled
distinction between civil penalties and the modem concept of puni-
tive damages" because both serve to punish misconduct.62 The
Shamblin court also reiterated the holding in Tull that the "determina-
tion of a remedy in a civil trial is not an essential function of a jury
trial."63
Nonetheless, in Defender Industries, the Fourth Circuit refused to
accept its previous application of Tull to punitive damages and re-
versed Shamblin, finding that the assessment by ajury of the amount of
punitive damages "is an inherent and fundamental element of the
common-law right to trial byjury."64 The court in Defender repudiated
Shamblin's extension of Tull, stating that the Tull reasoning applied
only to civil penalties that were specified by statute and imposed for
the violation of a federal statutory law.65 The Defender court based its
decision-that a plaintiff is guaranteed the right to a jury assessment
of the amount of punitive damages-on the common-law right to a
trial by jury established in the first clause of the Seventh
Amendment. 66
On the other hand, some federal circuit courts hold that judicial
economy concerns outweigh the preservation of a litigant's common-
law right to assessment of punitive damages by ajury. For example, in
Shimman v. Frank,67 the Sixth Circuit reduced an excessive punitive
damages award itself, instead of remanding for recalculation in a new
trial.6" The court felt the case was appropriate for direct remission
because the parties had pursued resolution for over six years and be-
cause uncontested evidence was presented adequately in the record. 69
Likewise, in Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,7" the First Circuit ques-
tioned the utility of remanding a case solely for a determination of
punitive damages, stressing that remand would "place an intolerable
burden on the parties and the court."7'
Finally, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has also addressed this is-
sue, under its state constitution, in Kang v. Harrington.2 The Kang
62. Shamblin's, 873 F.2d at 742.
63. Id. at 741.
64. Defender Indus., Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502, 507 (4th
Cir. 1991).
65. Id. at 506.
66. Id. at 507.
67. 625 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1980).
68. Id. at 102.
69. Id. (holding that "[b]oth sides deserved final adjudication").
70. 832 F.2d 194 (lst Cir. 1987).
71. Id. at 207.
72. 587 P.2d 285 (Haw. 1978).
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court held that when a jury assesses punitive damages, remittitur with-
out the option of a new trial would violate the Hawaii State Constitu-
tion provision, 73 which states: "In suits at common law where the
value in controversy shall exceed five thousand dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved. '7 4 This provision is similar to Mary-
land's, because neither has a clause analogous to the Seventh Amend-
ment's Reexamination Clause.
Thus, although Maryland courts traditionally provide an option
of remittitur or new trial where damages are deemed excessive, the
right to a new trial had never been addressed prior to the Bowden
decision.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Bowden v. Caldor, the Court of Ap-
peals held that Article 23 of the Maryland Constitution does not guar-
antee a right to a new trial upon a judicial finding that a punitive
damages award is excessive. To reach this conclusion, the court evalu-
ated the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. The
court then examined the way Maryland courts have handled excessive
damages determinations, ultimately locating the lack of a right to a
new trial in the characterization of the judicial determination of an
appropriate punitive damages award as a legal question.
The Court of Appeals began its opinion by agreeing with Bow-
den's argument that its prior decision did not indicate that the
$350,000 punitive damages award initially constituted a limit on the
amount of punitive damages the second jury could award.75 The
court emphasized that the evidence presented at the second trial
could be different as could the judgment of the new jury.76 In fact,
the court stated that the prior vacated award should receive no consid-
eration at the new damages trial.77 Furthermore, the court concluded
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
bars a judge from imposing a harsher sentence on a defendant's suc-
cessful appeal, does not apply to tort actions for money damages.78
73. Id. at 293 n.3.
74. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
75. Bowden, 350 Md. at 19, 710 A.2d at 274.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 20, 710 A.2d at 275 ("The effect of the granting of a new trial is to set aside
the Ijudgment] and leave the cause in the same condition as if no judgment had been
entered." (quoting Tiller v. Elfenbein, 205 Md. 14, 19, 106 A.2d 42, 44 (1954) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
78. Id. at 19-20, 710 A.2d at 274-75. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court's
holding in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490
U.S. 794 (1989), precluded ajudge from giving a harsher sentence to a criminal defendant
on appeal, absent misconduct subsequent to the initial sentencing. The Bowden court fur-
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The Court of Appeals relied on Supreme Court opinions examin-
ing the Seventh Amendment to interpret Article 23 of the Maryland
Constitution, 79 particularly focusing on the majority opinion and Jus-
tice Scalia's dissent in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.8" The Bow-
den court argued that, in Gasperini, the Supreme Court held that the
Seventh Amendment requires a plaintiff to be given the option of a
new trial when a court reduces a compensatory damages award for
excessiveness.8 The Court of Appeals concluded that the Supreme
Court's position was based on the second clause of the Seventh
Amendment, the Reexamination Clause, which states that "no fact
tried by a jury, shall otherwise be re-examined in any Court" rather
than the first clause, which states that "the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved." 82 The Court of Appeals distinguished the Maryland Con-
stitution from the Seventh Amendment because the former contains
no Reexamination Clause.83 While the court did not elaborate on the
significance of the absence of this clause, it did suggest that direct
judicial review and judicial determination of a damages award is com-
patible with Article 23.84
While recognizing that the Court of Appeals had not considered
the right to a new trial upon the reduction of either a compensatory
or punitive damages award, the court discussed Maryland practice
when damages are found excessive.85 The court noted that the option
ther explained, however, that "[n]o decision of this Court, of the Supreme Court, or of the
highest court in any state, applying this rationale to a civil tort action for money damages,
ha[s] been called to [its] attention." Bowden, 350 Md. at 20, 710 A.2d at 274-75.
79. Id. at 44, 710 A.2d at 286-87. The court recognized that the Seventh Amendment
was inapplicable to state court proceedings but nevertheless found the Seventh Amend-
ment cases instructive because the Seventh Amendment and Article 23 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights contain similar clauses establishing the right of trial byjury on factual
issues. Id. Federal appellate courts that have addressed the constitutionality of remittitur
without the option of a new trial relied on the right of trial by jury clause to conclude that,
under the Seventh Amendment, a trial court must give a plaintiff the option of a new trial
when it reduces an excessive punitive damages verdict. See supra notes 64-66 and accompa-
nying text.
80. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
81. Bowden, 350 Md. at 44, 710 A.2d at 286-87 (citing Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-33).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Bowden, 350 Md. at 44, 710 A.2d at 287.
83. See Bowden, 350 Md. at 44-45, 710 A.2d at 287. Article 23 of the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights provides that "the right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings
... shall be inviolably preserved." MD. CODE ANN., CONST., DECL. OF RTS. art. 23, cl. 2
(1981 & Supp. 1998).
84. Bowden, 350 Md. at 44-45, 710 A.2d at 286-87 (interpreting Supreme Court prece-
dent as holding that a plaintiff is guaranteed the option of a new trial when a court reduces
a compensatory damages verdict based on the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh
Amendment, and declaring that the Maryland Constitution contains no such clause).
85. Id. at 46, 710 A.2d at 287.
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of a new trial typically accompanies a court's reduction of a compensa-
tory damages award. 86 Nonetheless, the court identified Maryland de-
cisions that reduced punitive damages awards without granting a new
trial.17 In addition, the court noted that a court is permitted to re-
duce a jury's award of compensatory damages to comply with a statu-
tory cap on noneconomic damages. 88
The Court of Appeals's conclusion that a plaintiff has no right to
a new trial when a punitive damages award is found excessive was
grounded in distinction between law and fact.8 The court character-
ized factors limiting the size of punitive damages awards as principles
of law and described Maryland common law and federal due process
limits on punitive damages"° as legal limits similar to statutory limita-
tions or caps. 1 The court reasoned that in applying legal principles
to reduce a jury's punitive damages award, a court "is performing a
86. Id. (citing Conklin v. Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 64-66, 257 A.2d 187, 194 (1969);
Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Smith, 222 Md. 206, 223, 159 A.2d 823, 833 (1960); Turner v. Wash-
ington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 501-03, 158 A.2d 125, 129-30 (1960);
Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 624-25, 541 A.2d 969, 976-77 (1988)); see also supra note
48 and accompanying text.
87. Bowden, 350 Md. at 46, 710 A.2d at 288 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser,
267 Md. 406, 425, 298 A.2d 16, 27 (1972); Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 434, 24 A.2d
917, 923 (1942)). Actually, neither of the cases cited by the court involved a finding and
subsequent reduction of excessive punitive damages. In Cliser, the jury inadvertently trip-
led the same award; in Heinze, the appellate court found that no grounds existed for the
imposition of punitive damages. See Cliser, 267 Md. at 425, 298 A.2d at 27; Heinze, 180 Md.
at 434, 24 A.2d at 923.
88. Bowden, 350 Md. at 46, 710 A.2d at 288 (citing Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342,
370-75, 601 A.2d 102, 116 (1992)).
89. Id. at 47, 710 A.2d at 288.
90. The factors limiting punitive damages awards referred to by the court include: pro-
portionality to the gravity of the defendant's wrong, proportionality to the defendant's
ability to pay, the deterrence value of the amount awarded, the legislative policy reflected
in statutes setting criminal fines, comparable awards within the jurisdiction, existence of
other awards against the defendant for the same conduct, whether multiple torts arose
from a single occurrence of bad conduct, the plaintiff's reasonable litigation costs, and the
relationship to the underlying compensation damages award. Id. at 27-39, 710 A.2d at 278-
85; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
91. Bowden, 350 Md. at 47, 710 A.2d at 288. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on
Justice Scalia's dissent in Gasperini to support its law-fact distinction between compensatory
and punitive damages. Id. at 44-47, 710 A.2d at 286-88. In the context of deciding whether
federal appellate review of a district court's refusal to set aside an arguably excessive award
was precluded by the Seventh Amendment's Reexamination Clause, Justice Scalia stated:
Unlike the measure of actual damages suffered, which presents a question of his-
torical or predictive fact, the level of punitive damages is not really a "fact" "tried"
by thejury. In none of our cases holding that the Reexamination Clause prevents
federal appellate review of claims of excessive damages does it appear that the
damages had a truly "punitive" component.
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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legal function and not acting as a second trier of fact," and therefore
not impairing the "right of trial by jury of all issues of fact" that is
guaranteed by Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
9 2
Conceding that reducing a punitive damages award involves a review
of evidence, the court compared the function to the grant of a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict.93 Finally, the court held that while
a trial court may, in its discretion, grant a plaintiff a new trial option,
the court is not required to do so under Article 23."
4. Analysis.-To conclude that a litigant does not have a right to
a new trial when a court reduces an excessive punitive damages ver-
dict, the Bowden court misinterpreted the function of the Reexamina-
tion Clause of the Seventh Amendment, and the significance of the
absence of a similar clause in the Maryland Constitution. The court
also misapplied Justice Scalia's law-fact distinction in Gasperini con-
cerning appellate review of punitive damages awards to the issue of
judicial determination of punitive damages awards under Article 23 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In holding that Samuel Bowden
did not have a constitutional right to a new trial for punitive damages,
the Bowden court disregarded Maryland, Fourth Circuit, and Supreme
Court precedent which strongly indicated, and in one instance ex-
pressly held, that the jury has an exclusive role in determining puni-
tive damages verdicts. Moreover, the Bowden decision undermined a
well-established tradition and practice of giving the jury discretion to
determine the amount of damages a particular defendant's conduct
merits.
a. Misinterpretation of Maryland and Supreme Court Precedent.-
The majority opinion in Bowden mistakenly interprets Gasperini's hold-
ing concerning the effect of the Seventh Amendment's Reexamina-
tion Clause on appellate review of a damages award. The court reads
Gasperini as implicating and, ultimately, diminishing the right to ajury
trial on damages after a court finds an initial punitive damages award
unacceptable.95 Although the Seventh Amendment does not apply to
questions of Maryland constitutional law, the majority relies heavily on
92. Bowden, 350 Md. at 47, 710 A.2d at 288; see MD. CODE ANN., CONST., DECL. OF RTS.
art. 23, cl. 2 (1981 & Supp. 1998).
93. Bowden, 350 Md. at 47, 710 A.2d at 288.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 56, 710 A.2d at 293 (Bell, C.J., dissenting and concurring). The court held
that after an initial punitive damages award is rejected by a trial or appellate court, the
plaintiff is not guaranteed a new determination of the proper award by ajury. Bowden, 350
Md. at 47, 710 A.2d at 288.
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Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion concerning the Reexamination
Clause to conclude that Maryland litigants do not have a right to a
new trial when a punitive damages award is deemed excessive by a trial
judge. 6
The Court of Appeals mischaracterized the holding of Gasperini.
A careful reading of Gasperini reveals that the decision focused on ap-
pellate review of ajury verdict as opposed to the right to ajury deter-
mination of the actual award. In Gasperini, the Supreme Court held
that the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment did not
prohibit a federal appellate court's review, under an abuse of discre-
tion standard, of a federal trial court's refusal to set aside a compensa-
tory damages award as excessive.97 After reviewing recent decisions
such as Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,"9 the Court, for
the first time, expressly held that "'nothing in the Seventh Amend-
ment ... precludes appellate review of the trial judge's denial of a
motion to set aside [a jury verdict] as excessive."' 9  The majority did
not question that the damages determination should be made by the
jury °100
Justice Scalia's cogent dissent, on which the Bowden court relied,
distinguished between punitive and compensatory damages only in
the context of the authority of an appellate court to review a trial
judge's refusal to set aside an award for excessiveness.10' As the Bow-
den dissent emphasized, 'Justice Scalia's concern was not with a jury
determination of punitive damages, but rather the nature of the in-
96. Bowden, 350 Md. at 44-47, 710 A.2d at 286-88.
97. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 435-36 (1996). The Court
acknowledged the traditional and well-recognized authority of trial judges to grant new
trials in cases of excessive damages. Id. at 433 ("[T]he reexamination clause does not
inhibit the authority of trial judges to grant new trials for any of the reasons for which new
trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States."
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a))). In contrast, the Court noted that appellate review of a
trial court's assessment as to the appropriateness of damages "is a relatively late, and less
secure, development." Id. at 434 (noting that appellate review of a federal trial court's
denial of a motion to set aside a jury's verdict as excessive "was once deemed inconsonant
with the Seventh Amendments's reexamination clause" (citing Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S.
436, 437-38 (1894); Williamson v. Osenton, 220 F. 653, 655 (4th Cir. 1915))).
98. 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989) (indicating that appellate courts may review, under an
abuse of discretion standard, a trial court's refusal to set aside a punitive damages verdict
for excessiveness without violating the Seventh Amendment). Note that Gasperini and
Browning-Ferris are distinguishable, as Gasperini addressed appellate review of compensatory
damages and Browning-Ferris involved punitive damages.
99. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 436 (omission in original) (alteration in original) (quoting
Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 164 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
100. See id. at 433-36.
101. Id. at 458-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bowden, 350 Md. at 58, 710 A.2d at 293 (Bell,
C.J., dissenting and concurring).
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quiry into the excessiveness of those damages."1 °2 Justice Scalia im-
plicidy authorized appellate review of punitive damages under the
Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment because punitive
damages are governed by legal standards. 113 Yet the Bowden court at-
tempted to expand his position, citing his opinion as support for the
proposition that the determination of the actual amount of punitive
damages is a legal question.' 4 Justice Scalia did not suggest that a
reviewing court had the authority to determine what the proper
amount of punitive damages should be. 105 Thus, the holding in Bow-
den is questionable because it misconstrued Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in order to support its argument that the determination of
punitive damages is a question of law.106
In short, while review of a punitive damages verdict for excessive-
ness can be characterized as a legal question and thus permissible
under the Reexamination Clause, the determination of the actual
award is a factual question preserved for the jury under the first clause
of the Seventh Amendment. Since Article 23 of the Maryland Consti-
tution is analogous to the first clause of the Seventh Amendment, a
plaintiff should be entitled to ajury determination of a punitive dam-
ages award even when a court finds an initial award excessive.
107
Neither the majority or dissent in Gasperini suggests anything else.
The Bowden majority also misinterprets the importance of the Re-
examination Clause with regard to judicial determinations of punitive
damages awards. While the Reexamination Clause of the Seventh
Amendment was the foundation of Scalia's argument against appel-
late review involving compensatory damages, its existence or nonexis-
tence in the Maryland Constitution should not affect the right to a
trial by jury for damages. The Bowden majority misread Gasperini as
locating the requirement of the option of a new trial when a court
reduces a compensatory damages award as excessive in the Reexami-
102. Bowden, 350 Md. at 58, 710 A.2d at 293 (Bell, C.J., dissenting and concurring).
103. Gasperini, 517 U.S. at 459 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Nor can any weight be assigned
to our statement in Browning Ferris ... seemingly approving appellate abuse-of-discretion
review of denials of new trials where punitive damages are claimed to be excessive ....
Unlike the measure of actual damages... the level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact'
'tried' by the jury.").
104. Bowden, 350 Md. at 47, 710 A.2d at 388 (applying Justice Scalia's analysis pertaining
to appellate review of a punitive damages award under the Reexamination Clause of the
Seventh Amendment to the issue of judicial determination of a punitive damages award
under the right of trial by jury clause of Article 23).
105. Gasperini, 517 U.S. at 459 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Bowden, 350 Md. at 47, 710 A.2d at 288.
107. MD. CODE ANN., CONST., DECL. OF RTs. art. 23, cl. 2 (1981 & Supp. 1998).
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nation Clause of the Seventh Amendment.' °8 Yet the Supreme Court
neither stated nor implied that the right to a new trial was based on
the Reexamination Clause; rather, it evaluated the Reexamination
Clause in the context ofjudicial review for excessiveness, not appellate
determination of an appropriate award.1"9 Thus, the absence of a Re-
examination Clause in Maryland's constitution should be irrelevant to
the Bowden majority, because, according to Supreme Court precedent,
the clause concerns appellate review only. 10
It is, therefore, evident that the Bowden majority misinterpreted
the significance of the Reexamination Clause. Accordingly, the ma-
jority's holding that the absence of a Reexamination Clause permits
the reduction of a punitive damages award without the option of a
new trial is flawed.
b. Usurpation of the Jury's Traditional Role. -The Bowden court
held that in reducing a punitive damages award, the court performs a
legal function rather than acting as a second trier of fact.1"' In partic-
ular, the majority likened the reduction of a punitive damages award
to the grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 12 The com-
parison to a JNOV is inappropriate; the characterization of a punitive
damages award reduction as a legal determination is contrary to tradi-
tional treatment of damages by Maryland, Fourth Circuit, and
Supreme Court cases.
First, Maryland and Supreme Court precedent strongly indicate,
and the Fourth Circuit expressly holds, that the determination of a
punitive damages award is exclusively a question for the jury. For ex-
ample, in Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Associates,
Inc.," ' the Court of Special Appeals, faced with ajury award for puni-
tive damages in excess of due process limits, refused to reduce the
damages award, reasoning that Maryland traditionally requires a new
trial when an appellate court finds a damages award excessive." 4 The
108. Bowden, 350 Md. at 44, 710 A.2d at 286-87.
109. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 434-36.
110. Id.
111. Bowden, 350 Md. at 47, 710 A.2d at 288.
112. Id.
113. 88 Md. App. 672, 596 A.2d 687 (1991).
114. Id. at 722, 596 A.2d at 711; see also Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 624, 541 A.2d
969, 976 (1988) ("A trial judge, upon finding a verdict excessive, may order a new trial
unless the plaintiff will agree to accept a lesser sum fixed by the court." (citing Conklin v.
Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 67, 257 A.2d 187, 196 (1969); 2 POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 347
(4th ed. 1969)); Conklin, 255 Md. at 67, 257 A.2d at 196 (recognizing and accepting federal
trial judges' unchallenged power to deny a motion for a new trial provided plaintiffs ac-
cepted a reduced damages award on remittitur); Medairy v. McAllister, 97 Md. 488, 497, 55
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Court of Special Appeals emphasized the importance of giving proper
guidance to the jury to insure appropriate awards.1 15 More impor-
tantly, the Alexander court stated: "It is for the jury to determine the
amount of damages; the role of judges is merely to assure that it has
not exceeded the instructions given it or the supervening legal con-
straints placed on its discretion." 1
6
The Fourth Circuit in Defender Industries also discussed extensively
the common-law right of a trial by jury under the Seventh Amend-
ment. 1 7 Referring to numerous Supreme Court cases that stress the
fundamental nature of a jury assessment of the amount of punitive
damages, 1 8 the Fourth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment
guaranteed a right to ajury determination of the amount of punitive
damages." 9 In Browning-Ferris, the Supreme Court examined proper
appellate review of the excessiveness of punitive damages awarded by
a jury.'2 0 Although the Court sanctioned appellate review of lower
court decisions as to the appropriateness of punitive damages awards,
the Court stated: "It is not our role to review directly the award for
excessiveness, or to substitute our judgment for that of thejury.... In
reviewing an award of punitive damages, the role of the district court
is to determine . . . whether a new trial or remittitur should be or-
dered." '12 1 Thus, according to the Supreme Court, even though deter-
mining whether a punitive damages award is excessive is a legal
function, the reassessment of the appropriate award remains a funda-
mental element of the common-law right to a trial by jury.12 2 The
jury's well-established role in the assessment of punitive damages was
articulated in Day v. Woodworth:' 23
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in
... all actions on the case for torts, ajury may inflict what are
A. 461, 464 (1903) (explaining that when punitive damages are warranted a court can "on
motion for a new trial, afford protection against excessive verdicts, but if the circumstances
be such as may entitle a plaintiff to such damages, it is the duty of the Court to submit that
question to the jury"); Fraidin v. Weitzman, 93 Md. App. 168, 217, 611 A.2d 1046, 1070
(1992) (vacating excessive punitive damages award and remanding case to trial court for
reconsideration of remittitur, or if rejected, a new trial).
115. Alexander, 88 Md. App. at 722-23, 596 A.2d at 711-12.
116. Id. at 722, 596 A.2d at 711.
117. Defender Indus., Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502, 506 (4th
Cir. 1991).
118. Id. (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Pa-
cific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
119. Id.
120. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 278-79.
121. Id.
122. Id.; see also Defender Industries, 938 F.2d at 506.
123. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1852).
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called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a de-
fendant ....
This has been always left to the discretion of the jury, as
the degree of punishment to be thus inflicted must depend
on the peculiar circumstances of each case. 1 2 4
Based on these opinions, the traditional role of the jury in assessing
punitive damages awards, even after the awards are found excessive, is
well established under both the United States and Maryland common
law.
The Bowden majority justified usurpation of a jury determination
of punitive damages when an initial award is found excessive by com-
paring the court's function in reducing the award to the function of a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 125 This comparison is illogical.
When a court grants a JNOV, it concludes that the evidence does not
support the verdict and nullifies the judgment.1 26 A JNOV is analo-
gous to a court's determination that a punitive damages award ex-
ceeds legal limits.1 27 Both are legal determinations and threshold
inquiries.' 28 The analogy becomes untenable, however, when it is ex-
tended to ajudge's subsequent determination of what award would be
appropriate. This determination is not based solely on legal princi-
124. Id. at 371; see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991). The
majority opinion, as well asJustice Scalia's concurrence in Haslip, review the long-standing
tradition of punitive damages in American law. Id. at 15-18; id. at 25-28 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). Both opinions cite early cases supporting a jury determination of punitive damages
although recognizing the possibility of appellate review where verdicts were influenced by
passion, prejudice, or a clear mistake of the law or of the facts involved in the case. Haslip,
499 U.S. at 15-18; id. at 25-28 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Barry v. Edmunds, 116
U.S. 550, 565 (1886) ("[N]othing is better settled than . . . in . . . other actions for torts
where no precise rule of law fixes the recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function of
the jury to determine the amount by their verdict."); THEODORE SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF
DAMAGES 537 n.1 (Henry Dwight Sedgwick ed., 4th ed. 1868) ("[I]n cases proper for exem-
plary damages, it would seem impracticable to set any bounds to the discretion of the jury,
though in cases where the wrong done.., is greatly disproportioned to the amount of the
verdict, the court may exercise the power it always possesses to grant a new trial for exces-
sive damages.").
125. Bowden, 350 Md. at 47, 710 A.2d at 288.
126. See Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 326, 389 A.2d
887, 904-05 (1978) (explaining that a motionJNOV tests the legal sufficiency of evidence);
Goldman, Skeen & Wadler, P.A. v. Cooper, Beckman & Tuerk, L.L.P., 122 Md. App. 29, 64-
65, 712 A.2d 1, 18 (1998) (stating that to resolve a motion for JNOV, the court should
evaluate the legal sufficiency of the evidence and strike the jury's verdict should the evi-
dence prove inadequate to support the jury's verdict).
127. See Bowden, 350 Md. at 60-61, 710 A.2d at 295 (Bell, CJ., dissenting and concurring)
(illustrating that courts serve a threshold function when they review a verdict for excessive-
ness and evaluate sufficiency of evidence for a motion JNOV).
128. Id. at 60, 710 A.2d at 295.
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ples; rather, it is limited by legal principles.12 9 Under Maryland and
federal law, litigants are guaranteed that a jury, using a permissible
level of discretion, will determine whether a defendant's conduct mer-
its punitive damages and what level of damages accomplishes goals of
deterrence and punishment.1 3 ° This level of damages depends on the
specific circumstances of each case. 3' Consequently, absent express
constraints, such as a cap or statutory limitations, the assessment of a
punitive damages award is a factual determination reserved without
exception for the jury.13 2 The Court of Appeals decision in Murphy v.
Edmonds'33 requires a conclusion that a trial judge should not assume
the jury's role in determining an acceptable amount of punitive dam-
ages. Although the Court of Appeals held that a statutory cap on
noneconomic damages in tort actions did not violate the right to a
jury trial, the court stressed that:
[i]f the General Assembly had provided . .. that the trial
judge, rather than the jury, should determine the amount of
noneconomic damages or the amount of noneconomic dam-
ages in excess of $350,000, a substantial issue concerning the
validity of the statute would be presented. The General As-
sembly, however, did not attempt to transfer what is tradi-
tionally a jury function to the trial judge.'34
It is evident that judicial usurpation of the right to a jury determina-
tion of damages is inconsistent with the prior understanding of the
Article 23 right to a trial by jury as emphasized in Edmonds.'35 Further-
more, while similar caps or legislative provisions limiting punitive
129. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989) (stating
that the role of the court in reviewing punitive damages awards is to assess whether the
award is within the legal limits established by state law and to determine whether a new
trial or remittitur should be mandated).
130. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1991) (discussing the
extensive common-law tradition of leaving the assessment of punitive damages awards to
the discretion of the jury); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc., Inc.,
88 Md. App. 672, 714-16, 596 A.2d 687, 708-10 (1991) (discussing common-law principles
underlying a jury determination of punitive damages).
131. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993) (plural-
ity opinion) (describing the difficulty involved in comparing punitive damages awards be-
cause facts and circumstances unique to each case affect the jury's assessment); Haslip, 499
U.S. at 16 ("[Punitive damages awards have] been always left to the discretion of the jury,
as the degree of punishment to be thus inflicted must depend on the peculiar circum-
stances of each case." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1852))).
132. Bowden, 350 Md. at 63, 710 A.2d at 296 (Bell, C.J., dissenting and concurring).
133. 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992).
134. Id. at 373, 601 A.2d at 117.
135. Id. (stating that transfer of the traditional jury function of assessing damages to a
trial judge would raise a serious issue concerning the right to a jury trial).
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damages awards would likely comport with constitutional require-
ments under Edmonds, unfettered judicial discretion in assessing dam-
ages after an initial award is found excessive "flies in the face of Article
23" providing that the "'right of trial by jury of all issues of fact in
Court proceedings . . . shall be inviolably preserved."1 3 6
c. Ramiflcations of Judicial Power to Assess Punitive Damages.-
In the spirit and tradition underlying Maryland common-law rights,
judges should be prohibited from assessing punitive damages awards.
It is well established under Maryland law that punitive damages serve
to punish egregious misconduct and to deter similar behavior in the
future.13 7 Moreover, the assessment of a punitive damages award is
not formulaic; to the contrary, it involves discretionary calculations
and consideration of a variety of factors. 38 The discretionary nature
of punitive damages assessment troubles many advocates for tort re-
form who feel that judicial determination of punitive damages awards
are necessary to curtail punitive damages that are awarded in a "ran-
dom and capricious manner." '39 While inappropriate and excessive
punitive damages awards present problems that need to be addressed,
usurpation of the jury's traditional role in assessing punitive damages
is not the solution.
As noted above, determination of punitive damages awards by a
jury has long been considered an inviolable right under the Maryland
and federal constitutions. 40 The existence of this long-standing tradi-
tion reflects the notion that ajury is best suited to determine whether
certain conduct violates society's standards of decency and to ascer-
tain the extent to which certain conduct should be condemned and
136. Bowden, 350 Md. at 61, 710 A.2d at 295 (Bell, C.J., dissenting and concurring)
(omission in original) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CONST., DECL. OF RTS. art. 23, cl. 2 (1981
& Supp. 1998)). Several states have legislatively imposed limits whereby the amount of a
punitive damages award may not exceed three times the amount of the plaintiff's actual or
compensatory damages. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992) (per
curiam) (holding that a Florida statute limiting punitive damages did not violate the right
to trial by jury); Bagley v. Shortt, 410 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga. 1991) (rejecting constitutional
challenge to Georgia statute limiting punitive damages); Seminole Pipeline Co. v. Broad
Leaf Partners, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 730, 758 (Tex. App. 1998, no writ) (holding that Texas
statutory cap on punitive damages was permissible under state constitution).
137. Bowden, 350 Md. at 22, 710 A.2d at 276.
138. See supra note 38 (delineating factors to evaluate when determining the availability
and amount of punitive damages).
139. See Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 564-65 (1992) (advocat-
ing for punitive damages reform to "reduce[ ] the threat of runaway jury verdicts, pro-
mote[ ] settlements, and increase[ ] certainty in commercial transactions by establishing
reasonable boundaries for awards").
140. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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punished. 41 Thus, punitive damages awards should reflect values and
established norms in our communities and indicate the level of repre-
hensibility associated with the condemned behavior.142 These values
and norms are best manifested in ajury.145 Bias is less likely to occur
when multiple jurors contribute to the determination of a damages
award."' Although judges must play a neutral and unbiased role in
the judicial process, 45 political pressures associated with reelection
and appointment to an appellate court may influence the amount of
punitive damages assessed by a judge against a certain defendant.
146
Some writers suggest that jury confusion often results in excessive
punitive damages verdicts because jurors misunderstand instructions
provided to them.a47 Rather than commandeer the traditional role of
the jury in computing punitive damages, advocates for reform should
strive to clarify jury instructions so that the purpose and criteria for
punitive damages awards are clearly conveyed.
148
Legislative limits may also resolve the dispute surrounding assess-
ment of punitive damages. Statutory limits provide reasonable con-
straints determined by the legislature, thereby eliminating broad
judicial discretion regarding appropriate damages awards. 149 Thus,
141. See supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional role of
the jury in deciding whether punitive damages should be awarded under particular cir-
cumstances of each case).
142. See generally Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the
Seventh Amendment, and the Politics ofJury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 142, 145 (1991) (arguing
that discretionary punitive damages must be assessed by a jury to preserve the Seventh
Amendment's commitment to a representational and participatory democracy).
143. See id. ("Because the likelihood of punitive damages determines how much protec-
tion the people get from violations of their nominal legal rights, sincere commitment to
popular government through juries requires jury assessment of punitive damages.").
144. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury Decisionmaking, in VERDicr:
ASSESSING THE CIVLJURY SYSTEM 341, 344 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (arguing that biases
or prejudices by individual jurors can be neutralized by other jurors; however, the individ-
ual bias of a judge cannot be counterbalanced in the same manner).
145. See MD. RULE 3-505 (authorizing recusal of judge who is unable to provide a fair
and impartial trial); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455a (1994) ("Any justice, judge, or magistrate of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.").
146. See Scheiner, supra note 142, at 159, 168-69 (emphasizing thatjurors do not have to
consider political ramifications of their decisions as do judges).
147. See Lisa M. Sharkey, Comment, Judge or Juiy: Who Should Assess Punitive Damages ?, 64
U. CIN. L. REv. 1089, 1132 (1996) (contending thatjudges understand the significance and
goals of punitive damages better than juries and that jury awards often reflect confusion).
148. See Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc., Inc., 88 Md. App.
672, 715-16, 596 A.2d 687, 708-10 (1991) (discussing principles governing punitive dam-
ages awards and their use as jury instructions).
149. See, e.g., Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 373, 601 A.2d 102, 117 (1992) (demon-
strating that a legislative cap on noneconomic damages removes the possibility of unfet-
tered judicial discretion to reduce damages awards when they are in excess of $350,000).
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the jury retains its role in ascertaining punitive damages awards be-
cause specific, codified legal limits prevent a judge from substituting
his personal judgment for that of the jury.150 Statutory limits would
address concerns surrounding excessive damages awards without ab-
rogating the traditional function of the jury in assessing damages
awards. 1
5
As noted earlier, several federal appellate courts have reduced
excessive punitive damages awards without providing the option of a
new trial, reasoning that the interest in judicial economy outweighed
potential injustice experienced by litigants. 152 Again, while problems
associated with our overburdened judicial system need attention, fun-
damental and traditional rights enjoyed for years in Maryland and in
the federal court system should not be sacrificed for the sake ofjudi-
cial economy. Our judicial system should provide a forum for dis-
putes where ajury of peers renders judgment and where rights can be
vindicated. Vindication of rights is particularly significant in cases
where punitive damages are available because defendants have be-
haved in an egregious and heinous manner.153 Interests in conserving
resources and saving time and money should not outweigh a plaintiffs
interest in securing justice in a public forum for an egregious wrong.
If the law permits judges to substitute their judgment for that of ajury
and to reduce punitive damages awards without any guidance from
the legislature, plaintiffs may be reluctant to bring costly and time
consuming lawsuits.154 Furthermore, plaintiffs who decide to initiate
actions as a result of a defendant's outrageous misconduct might
choose to settle early instead of proceeding to trial.' 55 Such a result
would undermine an important goal of our justice system because
public vindication of rights would not occur and the conduct of many
150. See id. (maintainingjury's role in determining noneconomic damages while impos-
ing a cap of $350,000 determined by the legislature, not trial judges).
151. See id.; see also supra note 136 (listing state courts upholding statutes that proscribe
punitive damages awards in excess of three times a plaintiff's compensatory damages
award).
152. See supra notes 67-71 (identifying specific examples ofjudicial reduction of a puni-
tive damages award without providing the option of a new trial).
153. See Scheiner, supra note 142, at 225 ("Because punitive damages are ... necessary
for the full vindication of the rights of the relatively poor and powerless against their eco-
nomic and political superiors, allegiance to the values embodied in the seventh amend-
ment requires jury assessment of these awards.").
154. See Sharkey, supra note 147, at 1135 (discussing the possibility that plaintiffs will
settle early or forego bringing suit where reduction of a punitive damages award is likely).
155. See Scheiner, supra note 142, at 194-95 ("The expected verdict controls decisions to
commit a tort .... to bring suit, to settle ... and perhaps most importantly, the availability,
quantity, and quality of plaintiffs' legal services."); Sharkey, supra note 147, at 1135.
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culpable and deplorable defendants would go unpunished by the
community.
Two final noteworthy ramifications of the Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Bowden include inconsistent judicial treatment of punitive
damages awards deemed excessive and potential forum shopping.
The last sentence in the majority opinion indicates that a court, after
finding that a punitive damages award is excessive, may grant a new
trial, but is not required to do so under the Maryland Constitution.156
This holding will likely result in inconsistent treatment of similarly sit-
uated plaintiffs. Depending on the particular judge, some plaintiffs
whose initial awards are deemed excessive will be afforded another
opportunity to receive a jury determination of damages while others
will be forced to accept ajudicial reduction. 157 Arbitrary and varying
treatment of plaintiffs seeking punitive damages awards will create un-
predictability that could persuade plaintiffs to settle out of court when
they would otherwise seek ajury determination of punitive damages.
Forum shopping is also a potential consequence that is not dis-
cussed by the court in Bowden. In light of the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Defender Industries, potential litigants could circumvent Bowden
by filing in federal court.1 58 Assuming jurisdictional requirements are
established, plaintiffs would benefit from the application of substan-
tive Maryland law while enjoying the procedural guarantees of the Sev-
enth Amendment. 159 This would aggravate an already burdened
federal court system and would undermine goals promoting judicial
economy in the federal system. 160
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals opinion in Bowden illogi-
cally interprets otherwise instructive Supreme Court precedent con-
cerning judicial review of punitive damages awards. The majority
ignores the rich and significant tradition involving the right to dam-
ages assessment by a jury that is embodied in Maryland common
law.16' Bowden undermines Maryland common-law tradition and ren-
ders the right to a trial by jury meaningless in cases where a defend-
156. Bowden, 350 Md. at 47, 710 A.2d at 288.
157. See id. (holding that the court has discretion to grant a new trial or to reduce an
excessive verdict itself).
158. See Defender Indus., Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502, 507 (4th
Cir. 1991) (holding that under the Seventh Amendment, a court must give a plaintiff the
option of a new trial when it deems a punitive damages award excessive).
159. See id.
160. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (demonstrating that concern for judi-
cial economy is often the basis for a decision not to grant a new trial when a court finds a
verdict excessive).
161. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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ant's behavior is most worthy of condemnation by representatives of
the community. While judicial economy and grossly excessive dam-
ages awards are concerns that merit attention, the common-law right
to a jury by one's peers should not be renounced when other resolu-
tions exist. Statutory limits on punitive damages awards would curtail
extreme awards, yet preserve the jury's role in assessing damages. 162
Although judges would be authorized under statute to reduce awards
within the legislatively determined constraints, they would not be per-
mitted to substitute their assessment of damages for that of the jury.163
Accordingly, an emphasis on statutory limits would better reflect the
spirit and tradition of Maryland law.
BRIDGET E. CARLw
B. Raising the Standard for Punitive Damages: Undermining Traditional
Purposes and Insulating Reprehensible Conduct
In Le Marc's Management Corp. v. Valentin,164 the Court of Appeals
held that to recover punitive damages in an action for defamation, a
plaintiff must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the de-
fendant had actual knowledge that the defamatory statement was
false. 165 The court also concluded that punitive damages are not re-
coverable in a defamation action where the plaintiff proves only that
the defendant acted with "reckless disregard" for the truth. 166 Over-
ruling past precedent, this decision significantly raised the standard
for awarding punitive damages in defamation actions in particular,
and in intentional tort actions generally. 167
The new standard articulated in Le Marc's renders punitive dam-
ages virtually unattainable in a defamation case in Maryland. More-
over, the decision disserves the basic purposes of punitive damages.
By requiring a defendant to prove actual malice in the sense of actual
162. See supra notes 133-136 (discussing jury's role in assessing damages up to a legisla-
tively imposed limit).
163. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text (discussing the function of legisla-
tive caps in limiting damages awards while preserving the jury's role in determining dam-
ages awards).
164. 349 Md. 645, 709 A.2d 1222 (1998).
165. Id. at 653, 709 A.2d at 1226; see also id. at 656, 709 A.2d at 1228 (setting forth the
'clear and convincing" requirement).
166. Id. at 655, 709 A.2d at 1227.
167. See id. at 658, 709 A.2d at 1229 (Bell, CJ., dissenting) ("Today, citing Zenobia and its
progeny, and, in particular Ellerin, the majority overrules these cases and replaces the stan-
dard they announced with one requiring that the plaintiff establish the defendant's actual
knowledge of the falsity of the defamatory statement."). For a discussion of Zenobia and
Ellerin, see, respectively, infra notes 260-275, 276-283 and accompanying text.
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knowledge, the Court of Appeals has significantly reduced the capac-
ity of punitive damages to punish and deter misconduct. The result is
that the Court of Appeals has established one of the most stringent
punitive damage requirements in the nation, t 68 and left Maryland
with a standard that shields reprehensible conduct.
1. The Case.--On September 18, 1989, Sovran Bank of Maryland
(Bank) terminated teller-trainee Francisco Valentin for falsifying his
employment application.169 The termination stemmed from Valen-
tin's former employment with Le Marc's Fifth Avenue Cards, Inc., a
Hallmark Card store located in New York City and owned by Le
Marc's Management Corporation.17 0 Valentin began to work as a
stock room clerk for Le Marc's in late 1987.17' After deciding to leave
Le Marc's, on June 6, 1988, Valentin submitted a letter of resignation
to his manager.1 7
2
Valentin moved to Maryland and eventually was hired by Sovran
Bank as a teller-trainee. 173 Sovran Bank, with Valentin's permission,
requested references from Valentin's former employers, including Le
Marc's.1 74 Robert Sauer, Le Marc's corporate administrator, returned
the Bank's reference form and indicated that Valentin had been "ter-
minated due to pilferage." 175 The Bank then suspended Valentin and
gave him four days to clear his record, or else permanently lose his
job.176
Valentin immediately telephoned Sauer and the next day traveled
to New York to meet with him. 177 Prior to meeting with Valentin,
168. See infra notes 329-343 and accompanying text (discussing varying punitive dam-
ages standards).
169. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 648, 709 A.2d at 1224. Sovran Bank also informed Valentin
that he no longer was eligible for future employment with the Bank. Id.
170. Id. at 646, 709 A.2d at 1223. This Note refers to both corporations collectively as
"Le Marc's."
171. Id.
172. Id. at 647, 709 A.2d at 1223. Although Valentin testified that he submitted a letter
to his manager, the letter was neither introduced in evidence nor even found. Id. Le
Marc's corporate administrator testified that the letter was not in Valentin's personnel file;
Valentin testified that he had not kept a copy. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. Although this assertion turned out to be false, see infra text accompanying note
178, Le Marc's had suspected employee theft, and had given polygraph tests to the store
employees in May 1989. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 647, 709 A.2d at 1223. The polygraph exam-
iner told Sauer that the results were difficult to interpret, due to the limited ability of
Valentin (whose first language was Spanish) to speak English, but that he believed Valentin
was holding back information." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 647, 709 A.2d at 1223.
177. Id. at 647, 709 A.2d at 1223-24.
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Sauer reviewed Valentin's employment file and determined that he
(Sauer) had erroneously informed Sovran Bank that Valentin had
been fired for theft. 1 78 Sauer, however, also questioned Valentin as to
his knowledge of employee thefts during his tenure with Le Marc's. 179
Sauer drafted a document which indicated that, although Valentin
himself never stole merchandise, he discovered other employees do-
ing so and "did not want to say anything to [his] manager about [this]
... situation[ ] .""0 Believing that his record would be cleared, Valen-
tin signed the document and returned to Maryland. 181
Sauer mailed a letter to Sovran Bank to correct the original erro-
neous reference, and attached the document that Valentin had
signed.182 Shelia Balog, a personnel department employee for the
Bank, testified that Sauer's "letter and the attached document cast
doubt on Valentin's 'credibility,' indicated that he was 'covering
[something] up,' and had told the Bank a 'half truth."" 83 The Bank
then fired Valentin for falsifying his employment records.' 84
On August 17, 1990, Valentin filed a defamation action against
Le Marc's in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.185 The jury
found that Le Marc's had in fact defamed Valentin, and awarded him
$25,000 in compensatory damages and $130,000 in punitive dam-
ages. 186 After granting Le Marc's motion for remittitur, the trial court
reduced the punitive damages to $75,000.187 On appeal, the Court of
Special Appeals found that the trial court's punitive damages jury in-
struction was inadequate because it failed to articulate that the proper
178. Id. at 647, 709 A.2d at 1224.
179. Id. at 648, 709 A.2d at 1224. Sauer also discovered that Valentin's personnel file
contained notes indicating that Valentin had told his manager that he suspected some of
his fellow employees were stealing merchandise. Id.; see also supra note 175 (discussing the
polygraph test previously administered to Valentin).
180. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 648, 709 A.2d at 1224 (second and third alteration and ellipsis
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Id.
182. Id
183. Id. (alteration in original). The letter Sauer sent the bank to correct the original
erroneous reference stated in pertinent part: "Thus [Valentin's] reason for termination
was stated incorrectly due to human error. Our physical file on [Valentin] does not reflect
a pilferage situation directly with him. Please strike from the record this reason for termi-
nation." Id.
184. Id.
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standard for such an award is that of "clear and convincing"
evidence.s 8
On remand, the trial court considered only the issue of the puni-
tive damages award."8 ' Following the Court of Special Appeals in-
struction, the trial court instructed the jury as to the clear and
convincing standard of proof, and added the following instruction
concerning malice, the legal sufficiency of which the Court of Appeals
later addressed:
Malice exists, one, when the person making the statement
deliberately lies or makes the statement with knowledge that
it is false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity or,
two, when the person making the statement had an obvious
reason to distrust either the accuracy of the statement or the
source from which the person learned of the statement or,
finally, item three, when the statement is invented by the
person making it or is so inherently improbable that only a
reckless person would say, write, or print it.1"0
The jury subsequently awarded Valentin $700,000 in punitive dam-
ages.191 During Le Marc's second appeal to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari to determine
"the appropriate standard under Maryland common law[ ] for the al-
lowance of punitive damages in defamation actions."
1 92
2. Legal Background. -
a. Defamation.-In Maryland, many of the changes in the
law of defamation193 came about as a result of the United States
188. Id. The Court of Special Appeals decision was unreported. See 101 Md. App. 728
(1993) (listing unreported opinions).
189. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 649, 709 A.2d at 1224.
190. Id. at 649, 709 A.2d at 1224-25; see also id. at 656, 709 A.2d at 1228 (noting that "the
trial court [was] guided somewhat by the overly broad 'reckless disregard' standard for
punitive damages set forth in our earlier defamation cases").
191. Id. at 649, 709 A.2d at 1225.
192. Id. at 646, 709 A.2d at 1223.
193. Defamation is composed of both libel and slander. See 1 JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN
K. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAw AND PRACTICE § 13.03, at 7 (1998) ("Slander is con-
cerned with oral defamation while libel is involved with written defamation.").
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Supreme Court's decisions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,19 4 Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts,1 95 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.'9 6
In New York Times, an elected official from Alabama brought suit
in state court alleging that he had been defamed by an advertisement
printed in the New York Times.'97 The advertisement contained false
information regarding alleged police activity directed towards stu-
dents participating in a civil rights demonstration. 9 ' The Supreme
Court reasoned that, when public officials were involved, the usual
defense of truth to a defamation action would be insufficient to pro-
tect a speaker's First Amendment right to engage in vigorous public
debate. 9 9 Thus, the Supreme Court held that a public official suing
for damages for a defamatory statement regarding his official conduct
could only recover punitive damages if he proved that "the statement
was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."2 ' Further-
more, the Court indicated that proof of actual malice must be of "con-
vincing clarity" in order to satisfy the constitutional standard
applicable to defamation actions brought by public officials in re-
sponse to criticism of their official conduct.2 0 ' Finally, the Court as-
serted that evidence supporting only a finding of negligence in failing
to discover the falsity of a statement would be insufficient to show the
recklessness presumed by the actual malice standard.20 2
Three years later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,2 °3 a plurality of
the Supreme Court extended its holding in New York Times from pub-
lic officials to public figures generally.20 4 In Curtis, a university ath-
194. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 590, 702 A.2d 230,
244-45 (1997) (noting that, before New York Times and its progeny, "numerous English
common law principles governing libel and slander actions were routinely applied in Mary-
land defamation cases without any consideration or mention of the constitutional free
press clauses or the strong public policy favoring freedom of the press" (citing Domchick v.
Greenbelt Consumer Servs., 200 Md. 36, 4549, 87 A.2d 831, 836-38 (1952))).
195. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion).
196. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
197. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256-59. Although Sullivan, the Commissioner of
Public Affairs for Montgomery, Alabama, was not mentioned directly in the advertisement,
he alleged that the word "police," as used in certain parts of the advertisement, referred to
him, and that the allegations of improper police conduct would be imputed to him. Id. at
258.
198. Id. at 256.
199. Id. at 279.
200. Id. at 279-80.
201. Id. at 285-86.
202. Id. at 287-88.
203. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion).
204. Id. at 155. See generally id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (defining public
figures as persons who are "intimately involved in the resolution of important public ques-
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letic director alleged that he had been defamed by an article which
claimed that he had, prior to a game, given an opposing football team
his own team's plays, defensive patterns, and other "significant
secrets."2"5 In extending the New York Times "actual malice" standard
to public figures, the Curtis plurality reasoned that the First Amend-
ment required a higher degree of protection not only for criticism of
public officials, but also for the "dissemination of the individual's
opinions on matters of public interest."206 Thus, the plurality found
that a "'public figure' who is not a public official may also recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substan-
tial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasona-
ble conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers. '"20
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,2 08 the Supreme Court held that in a
defamation case involving a person who was neither a public official
nor a public figure, the New York Times "actual malice" standard did
not apply.209 The Gertz Court decided that it would be left to the
states individually to decide the standard for liability in defamation
actions against private individuals.210 The Court also indicated that in
a defamation action involving a private person, a plaintiff cannot re-
cover compensatory damages unless he can at least prove negli-
gence.2 1 ' Finally, the Court held that to recover punitive damages in
such a case, the plaintiff is required to prove, by clear and convincing
tions or, [those who] by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at
large").
205. Curtis Publ'g, 388 U.S. at 136 (plurality opinion).
206. Id. at 149; see also id. at 150 ("The guarantees of freedom of speech and press were
... designed to prevent... 'any action of the government by means of which it might
prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential
.... ' (quoting 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs 886 (8th ed. 1927))).
207. Id. at 155.
208. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
209. Id. at 346-47.
210. Id. at 347. The Court reasoned that this approach "recognizes the strength of the
legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputa-
tion, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defama-
tion." Id at 348. But see id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that this approach had
the partial effect of "deprecating the reputation interest of ordinary citizens and rendering
them powerless to protect themselves").
211. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (stating that "so long as they do not impose liability with-
out fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual"). By
eliminating strict liability, the Court left states free to choose between the "actual malice"
standard of New York Times or a negligence standard. See supra note 200 and accompanying
text (discussing the New York Times "actual malice" standard).
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evidence, that the defamatory statements were made with "knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,"212 i.e., actual malice.
Following the Supreme Court's decisions in New York Times, Curtis
Publishing and Gertz, the Maryland Court of Appeals substantially
changed Maryland's common law of defamation.21 In Jacron Sales Co.
v. Sindorf2 14 the Court of Appeals, noting the "compelling need for
consistency and simplicity in the law of defamation,"215 applied the
Gertz principle to a private person regardless of whether the action
involved a media or non-media defendant, and regardless of whether
the subject matter was one of public or private concern. 216 Under
Jacron, in any action where the plaintiff is not a public official or pub-
lic figure, 217 the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was at least
negligent in failing to ascertain the falsity and the defamatory nature
of his statements. 218 As to the quantum of proof necessary to establish
the fault of the defendant, the Jacron court specifically rejected the
"clear and convincing" test "applied in the public-official and public-
figure sphere." 219 Instead, the court held that in "purely private" defa-
mation cases, proof by a preponderance of the evidence was suffi-
cient. 220 Furthermore, the court held that although actual damages
are recoverable, a plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages in any
defamation action unless he establishes liability "under the more de-
manding New York Times standard of knowing falsity or reckless disre-
gard for the truth." 2 2 1
In General Motors Corp. v. Piskor,2 22 the Court of Appeals, reaffirm-
ing its holding inJacron, clarified that a plaintiff may not recover "pre-
212. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
213. See Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 593, 702 A.2d 230, 246 (1997) (noting
that, after these opinions, the Court of Appeals "substantially changed the Maryland com-
mon law regarding defamation actions even in areas where the changes were not man-
dated by the First Amendment and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights"
(citations omitted)).
214. 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
215. Id. at 593, 350 A.2d at 696.
216. See id. at 592, 350 A.2d at 695 (arguing that there is no basis for distinguishing
between media and non-media cases because "[i]ssues of public interest may equally be
discussed in media and non-media contexts").
217. The Jacron court referred to such cases as "purely private defamation." Id. at 596,
350 A.2d at 697.
218. See id. at 594-96, 350 A.2d at 696-97 (noting that, under Getz, while the court can-
not adopt a strict liability standard, it can adopt a negligence standard or a more stringent
one, and adopting the former in cases of "purely private defamation").
219. Id. at 597, 350 A.2d at 698.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 601, 350 A.2d at 700.
222. 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976).
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sumed or punitive damages unless he meets the New York Times
standard of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 22 3 In
Piskor, a line worker sued General Motors for slander, assault, and
false imprisonment after he was detained and searched by security
guards for suspicion of theft.2 2 4 A jury awarded the employee com-
pensatory damages totaling $1500 and punitive damages in the
amount of $25,000.225 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
award, finding that "there was sufficient evidence ... to support the
verdict for punitive damages. "226 The Court of Appeals granted certi-
orari and reaffirmed its holding inJacron that, under Gertz, a State may
not permit recovery of punitive damages unless the New York Times test
of "knowing or reckless falsity" is met.2 27 The Piskor court reversed the
award of punitive damages because the jury found General Motors
liable on all three claims, but did not establish to what extent the pu-
nitive damages were linked to slander.228 The court remanded the
case with the instruction that Piskor could recover punitive damages
only by meeting "the New York Times standard of knowing falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth."
229
In Marchesi v. Franchino,23 ° the Court of Appeals clarified the stan-
dard of defamatory conduct necessary to overcome a conditional priv-
ilege and thus to warrant an award of punitive damages. In Marchesi,
the Court of Appeals found that Jacron "'not only retained the com-
mon law conditional privileges, but actually adopted the test of consti-
tutional malice articulated in New York Times . . . as the exclusive
standard for defeating the qualified privilege.' 231  Furthermore, the
court clarified that "actual malice" consists of "knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for truth," and that malice in the sense of "ill will" is
an insufficient basis for awarding punitive damages.2 32
b. Punitive Damages.--Over the last twenty-five years, the
Maryland Court of Appeals has significantly altered the appropriate
223. Id. at 175, 352 A.2d at 817.
224. Id. at 166-67, 352 A.2d at 812.
225. Id. at 167, 352 A.2d at 812.
226. Id. at 170, 352 A.2d at 814.
227. Id. at 174, 352 A.2d at 816.
228. Id. at 175, 352 A.2d at 817.
229. Id.
230. 283 Md. 131, 387 A.2d 1129 (1978).
231. Id. at 135 n.5, 387 A.2d at 1131 n.5 (quoting Comment, The Maryland Court of Ap-
peals: State Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 36 MD. L. Rav. 622,
647 n.161 (1977)).
232. See id. at 138-39, 387 A.2d at 1133 (noting that "ill-will or bad motives towards the
plaintiff are not elements of the New York Times standard" (citations omitted)).
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standard for awarding punitive damages.233 Although the court first
developed a somewhat more lenient standard under which punitive
damage awards were permissible upon a showing of implied malice,234
the court later shifted to a significantly stricter standard, both of ac-
tual malice itself235 and the type of proof necessary to show actual
malice, 236 prior to its decision in Le Marc's. During this time, the
court also distinguished torts simply from torts arising out of a con-
tractual relationship in considering whether an award of punitive
damages could be made, but then overruled this distinction. 23 7
In Davis v. Gordon, 82 3  the Court of Appeals held that punitive
damages are an extraordinary remedy, to be awarded only when the
defendant acted with "an element of fraud, or malice, or evil intent,
or oppression entering into and forming part of the wrongful act. 239
The court clarified that negligence alone would not support an award
of punitive damages because "punitive damages are awarded as a pun-
ishment for the evil motive or intent with which the act is done. '240
The court expanded the Davis decision in Smith v. Gray Concrete
Pipe Co.2 41' The Smith court found that the plaintiff in an automobile
accident could recover punitive damages by showing that the defend-
ant operated his motor vehicle with "a wanton or reckless disregard
for human life" and with knowledge of the dangers and risks of such
conduct, because this state of mind constituted the equivalent of mal-
ice necessary to support such an award.242 By defining reckless disre-
gard for human life as "such conduct as would carry an implication of
malice or as conduct from which one would draw a necessary inference
of malice, 243 the court extended the availability of punitive damages
233. See supra notes 213-232 and accompanying text (chronicling the development of
punitive damages in the context of defamation in Maryland). As a preliminary matter, it is
important to note that punitive damages are allowed only in tort actions, and that the
plaintiff must first establish an award of compensatory damages to be entitled to punitive
damages. See Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4, 22, 25, 710 A.2d 267, 276, 277 (1998).
234. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
235. See infra notes 268-271 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 272-273 and accompanying text.
237. See infra notes 244-255, 260 and accompanying text.
238. 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944).
239. Id. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Philadel-
phia, Wilmington & Baltimore R.R. Co. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 307 (1884)).
240. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hoeflich, 62 Md. at 307).
241. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972), overruled by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325
Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
242. Id. at 168, 297 A.2d at 731.
243. Id. at 167, 297 A.2d at 731 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting St. Paul at
Chase v. Manufacturers Life Ins., 262 Md. 192, 238-39, 278 A.2d 12, 34 (1971)).
1100 [VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
to negligence actions in which the plaintiff could show either actual
malice or "implied malice."
In H&R Block, Inc. v. Testerman,2 " the Court of Appeals decided
that Smith's implied malice standard did not extend to a negligence
action arising out of a contractual relationship. The Testerman court
first determined that the implied malice standard did not extend to
an action arising out of a contractual relationship because the holding
in Smith was "confined to a wanton or reckless disregard for human life,
and to the operation of a motor vehicle."' 245 Second, the court deter-
mined that a showing of "actual malice"-defined as "the perform-
ance of an act without legal justification or excuse, but with an evil or
rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliber-
ately and willfully injure the plaintiff' 246-was a prerequisite to recov-
ering punitive damages in a tort claim arising out of a contractual
relationship.247
The Testerman court noted that "[a] Ithough the doctrine of puni-
tive damages has been associated traditionally with the field of torts,"
there were a number of Maryland cases which awarded punitive dam-
ages in tort actions "arising out of contractual relationships."2 48 An
award of punitive damages in such cases, however, has long required a
showing of actual malice.249 The Testerman court noted that there
were, not surprisingly, "only two Maryland cases in which punitive
damages have been allowed for a tort arising out of a contractual rela-
tionship." 250 In both cases, actual malice was established upon a show-
ing of conduct "marked by an evil motive or intent.
251
The Court of Appeals refined its Testerman decision in Wedeman v.
City Chevrolet C0.2 52 The Wedeman court clarified that, although Tes-
terman held actual malice to be necessary to recover punitive damages
in a tort arising out of a contractual relationship, a tort that preceded
the contractual relationship did not arise under it, so that a plaintiff
could recover punitive damages in this situation under the standard of
244. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975), overruled by Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633.
245. Id. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54.
246. Id. at 43, 338 A.2d at 52 (citing Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 314,
297 A.2d 758, 760 (1972)).
247. Id. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54.
248. Id. at 44, 338 A.2d at 52-53.
249. Id. at 44-45, 338 A.2d at 53 (citing Damazo v. Washby, 259 Md. 627, 638, 270 A.2d
814, 819 (1970)).
250. Id. at 45, 338 A.2d at 53 (citing Rinaldi v. Tana, 252 Md. 554, 250 A.2d 533 (1969);
Mc-Clung-Logan v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136, 172 A.2d 494 (1961)).
251. Id. at 46, 338 A.2d at 53.
252. 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976), overruled by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md.
420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
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implied malice.25 '3 Thus, the court found that no proof of actual mal-
ice was required to warrant an award of punitive damages when the
plaintiff is induced by fraud to enter into a contract. 254
The court reaffirmed the Testerman-Wedeman distinction between
torts "arising out of contract" and torts simply in Schaefer v. Miller.255
In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Eldridge argued that the Tes-
terman-Wedeman standard should be overruled.156 Judge Eldridge ar-
gued that it is irrational to have the requisite malice depend on the
timing of the tortious act, i.e., whether it occurred before or after the
contract with which it was associated, as opposed to the conduct of the
defendant.257 Because the purpose of punitive damages is to punish
and deter outrageous conduct, the standard for awarding such dam-
ages should depend on the nature of the conduct rather than its tim-
ing.251 Judge Eldridge also pointed out that the Testerman-Wedeman
rule had been "arbitrarily and inconsistently applied. 2
59
The Testerman-Wedeman "arising out of contract" distinction for
punitive damages was finally overruled in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Ze-
nobia.26° The Zenobia court specifically noted the fact that "in recent
years there ha[d] been a proliferation of claims for punitive damages
in tort cases, and awards of punitive damages have often been ex-
tremely high."26 The court was also influenced by the "renewed criti-
cism of the concept of punitive damages in a tort system designed
primarily to compensate injured parties for harm. '"262 Accordingly,
the Zenobia court found it necessary to "more precisely define the na-
ture of conduct potentially subject to a punitive damages award in
253. See id. at 528-30, 366 A.2d at 10-11. The court defined implied malice as "conduct
of an extraordinary nature characterized by a wanton or reckless disregard for the ights of
others." Id. at 532, 366 A.2d at 13 (citing St. Paul at Chase v. Manufacturers Life Ins., 262
Md. 192, 238-39, 278 A.2d 12, 34-35 (1971)).
254. Id. at 529-30, 366 A.2d at 11.
255. 322 Md. 297, 587 A.2d 491 (1991) (plurality opinion).
256. Id. at 312, 587 A.2d at 499 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
257. Id. at 320-22, 587 A.2d at 502-04.
258. See id. at 321-22, 587 A.2d at 503-04; infra notes 329-334 and accompanying text
(discussing the purposes of punitive damages).
259. Schaefer, 322 Md. at 312, 587 A.2d at 499 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
260. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
261. Id. at 450-51, 601 A.2d at 648 (citing 2J. GHARDI &J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES
LAW AND PRACTICE § 21.01, at 2 (1985); M. PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES (Rand, The
Institute for Civil Justice, 1987); D. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against
Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHi. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982);J. Sales & K. Cole, Punitive
Damages: A Relic that Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 117, 1154 (1984)).
262. Id. at 451, 601 A.2d at 648. The Zenobia court found the criticism in Maryland to be
"partly fueled and justified because juries are provided with imprecise and uncertain char-
acterizations of the type of conduct which will expose a defendant to a potential award of
punitive damages." Id.
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non-intentional tort cases."26 3 Relying heavily on Judge Eldridge's
concurring opinion in Schaefer, the Zenobia court decided that the tim-
ing of a tort in relation to the "formation of a contractual relationship
should not determine whether actual or implied malice is required for
allowing an award of punitive damages." '264 Instead, the court held
that the availability of punitive damages should "depend upon the hei-
nous nature of the defendant's tortious conduct. '265 The court rea-
soned that this standard would further the purposes of punitive
damages-punishment and deterrence-by applying to all defendants
whose conduct is "characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, or
fraud. '2 66 The Zenobia court noted that, absent a uniform standard
for punitive damages, "[t] he irrational and inconsistent application of
a punitive damages standard undermines the objective of deterrence
because persons cannot predict, and thus choose to abstain from, the
type of behavior that is sanctioned by a punitive damages award.
267
The court also held that "implied malice" was no longer an ap-
propriate basis for allowing punitive damages under Maryland com-
mon law. 268 The court found that the implied malice test articulated
in Smith "resulted in inconsistent jury verdicts involving similar
facts. ' 26 9 Furthermore, the Smith standard provided "little guidance
for individuals and companies to enable them to predict behavior that
[would] either trigger or avoid punitive damages liability, and it un-
dermine [d] the deterrent effect of [punitive damage] awards."270 Ac-
cordingly, the Zenobia court found that to recover punitive damages in
non-intentional tort actions, the defendant's conduct must evidence
"actual malice," defined as "evil motive, intent to injure, ill will or
fraud.
271
In addition to making it more difficult to obtain punitive dam-
ages by requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with
actual (and not merely implied) malice, Zenobia raised the bar with
respect to the plaintiffs standard of proof.27 2 The court held that in
"any tort case a plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evi-
263. Id.
264. Id. at 454, 601 A.2d at 649.
265. Id.
266. Id., 601 A.2d at 650.
267. Id. at 455, 601 A.2d at 650.
268. Id. at 459-60, 601 A.2d at 652. In so ruling, the Zenobia decision explicitly overruled
Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972). Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460,
601 A.2d at 652.
269. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 459, 601 A.2d at 652.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652.
272. Id. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657.
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dence the basis for an award of punitive damages."27 The court rea-
soned that this heightened standard of proof was appropriate in light
of the "penal nature" of punitive damages, and their "potential for
debilitating harm."274 Finally, although the court held that the
heightened standard of "clear and convincing evidence" applies to "all
tort actions," it suggested that the requirement of showing "actual
malice" might be limited to non-intentional tort actions.
275
Three years after Zenobia, however, the court extended its re-
quirement of showing "actual malice" to intentional torts in Ellerin v.
Fairfax Savings, FS.B.2 76 The Ellerin court considered the appropriate
standard for allowing punitive damages in a fraud action.2 7 7 The
court noted that, in most cases, punitive damages are allowed in ac-
tions where the defendant's tortious conduct "is characterized by
knowing and deliberate wrongdoing."278 Thus, the court first consid-
ered whether fraud inherently involves the state of mind contem-
plated by the actual malice standard. 279  The court focused its
attention on the element of knowledge required by fraud, i.e., "that
[the] falsity [of the defendant's representation] was either known to
the defendant or that the representation was made with reckless indif-
ference as to its truth. ' 28 0 The court characterized "reckless indiffer-
ence" as "the defendant's awareness that he does not know whether
the representation is true or false."2 1 The court found that, although
such reckless indifference does encompass a level of knowledge, albeit
knowledge that one does not know the truth or falsity of one's repre-
sentation, actual knowledge of the falsity is necessary to support an
award of punitive damages for fraud.28 2 The court reasoned that,
although reckless indifference to the truth represented a higher de-
gree of knowledge than negligence or gross negligence, it did not rise
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 460 n.21, 601 A.2d at 653 n.21 (asserting that Zenobia does not "modify the
legal principles concerning the type of conduct which will support an award of punitive
damages in so-called intentional tort actions").
276. 337 Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995).
277. Id. at 219, 652 A.2d at 1118.
278. Id. at 228, 652 A.2d at 1123.
279. See generally id. at 229-31, 652 A.2d at 1123-24 (comparing the elements of fraud to
the actual malice standard).
280. Id. at 229, 652 A.2d at 1123 (quoting Nails v. S & R, 334 Md. 398, 415-16, 639 A.2d
660, 668-69 (1994)).
281. Id. at 231, 652 A.2d at 1124.
282. Id. at 234-35, 652 A.2d at 1126.
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to the level of the "actual malice" required for an award of punitive
283damages. 28
In Montgomery Ward v. Wilson,284 the Court of Appeals clarified
the holdings of Zenobia and Ellerin. The Wilson Court pointed out that,
although these prior decisions modified the standards for allowing pu-
nitive damages, they were guided by the "traditional policy and pur-
pose of punitive damages in Maryland, which have been 'articulated
in our cases for over a century. '285 This purpose is "to punish a de-
fendant whose conduct is characterized by evil motive, intent to in-
jure, or fraud, and to warn others contemplating similar conduct of
the serious risk of monetary liability."286 In view of this purpose, the
Wilson court clarified that, under Zenobia and Ellerin, "actual malice" in
the sense of "conscious and deliberate wrongdoing" must be the basis
for an award of punitive damages, and that this standard applies to
both intentional and non-intentional torts.28 7 Finally, with respect to
both intentional and non-intentional torts, the Wilson Court reaf-
firmed the Zenobia requirement that a plaintiff meet the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard of proof for an award of punitive
damages.288
In Scott v. Jenkins,28' an intentional tort case, the court once again
summarized and clarified its stance on allowing punitive damages in
both intentional and non-intentional tort actions. The Scott court
stated:
Since Zenobia, we have made it abundantly clear that "with
respect to both intentional and non-intentional torts,.., an
award of punitive damages must be based upon actual mal-
ice, in the sense of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, evil
or wrongful motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud." 2 0
The Scott court also reaffirmed that actual malice must be shown by
"clear and convincing evidence" to recover punitive damages.29 1
283. Id, At the same time, however, the court noted that most fraud involves "the form
of the tort which is characterized by the defendant's deliberate deception of the plaintiff
by means of a representation which he knows to be false," so that most fraud would involve
the actual malice required for an award of punitive damages. Id. at 234, 652 A.2d at 1126.
284. 339 Md. 701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995).
285. Id. at 734, 664 A.2d at 932 (quoting Ellerin, 337 Md. at 227, 652 A.2d at 1122).
286. Id. (quoting Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 454, 601 A.2d 633, 650
(1992)).
287. Id. at 733, 664 A.2d at 932.
288. Id. at 734, 664 A.2d at 932.
289. 345 Md. 21, 690 A.2d 1000 (1997).
290. Id. at 33-34, 690 A.2d at 1006 (quoting Wilson, 339 Md. at 733, 664 A.2d at 932).
291. Id. at 29, 690 A.2d at 1003-04.
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3. The Court's Reasoning. -In Le Marc's Management Corp. v. Valen-
tin, the Court of Appeals held that an award of punitive damages is
permitted in a defamation action only if the plaintiff proves, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge
that the defamatory statement was false.29 2 Writing for the majority,
Judge Eldridge began his analysis by summarizing the state of Mary-
land common law with regard to defamation and punitive damages.
293
In Maryland, a plaintiff seeking punitive damages "in any defamation
action" carries the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that the defendant acted with "knowledge of... falsity or with
reckless disregard for the truth. ' 29 4 Thus, the "actual malice" neces-
sary to recover punitive damages in the context of defamation does
not mean "ill will, spite, hatred, or intent to injure. "295
Dealing generally with an award of punitive damages, the Le
Marc's court found that in any tort action, such an award must be
based on the defendant's "conscious wrongdoing."296 Applying this
requirement of conscious wrongdoing to defamation actions, the Le
Marc's court reasoned that proof of the defendant's actual knowledge
that the defamatory statement was false is a prerequisite to recovering
punitive damages in defamation actions. 29 7
Turning to the specific question of the appropriateness of using
"reckless disregard" as a standard for an award of punitive damages in
defamation actions, the Le Marc's court focused on its previous deci-
sion in Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, FS.B.29 Ellerin specifically held that,
in the context of fraud, "reckless indifference" as to the truth, i.e., not
knowing whether a misrepresentation is true of false, does not suffice
to support an award of punitive damages because this state of mind
falls short of the conscious wrongdoing or "actual malice" required by
292. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 653, 709 A.2d at 1226.
293. Id. at 651, 709 A.2d at 1225.
294. Id. In Maryland, this burden applies to any plaintiff, regardless of a party's status as
a public official, public figure, or private individual, and regardless of the subject matter.
This blanket requirement differs from the Supreme Court's distinctions in defamation
cases. See id. at 650-51, 709 A.2d at 1225; supra notes 194-212 (discussing the Supreme
Court's defamation jurisprudence).
295. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 651, 709 A.2d at 1225.
296. Id. at 652, 709 A.2d at 1226.
297. Id. at 652-53, 709 A.2d at 1226. The court did note, however, that "actual knowl-
edge ... does include the wilful refusal to know." Id. at 652 n.4, 709 A.2d at 1226 n.4
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420,
462 n.23, 601 A.2d 633, 654 n.23 (1992)).
298. See id. at 653, 709 A.2d at 1226 (noting that the "recent opinion which is most
pertinent to the present case is Ellerin").
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such an award.299 Applying Ellerin to the case at hand, the Le Marc's
court found that "Ellerin supports actual knowledge of the falsity [of a
defamatory statement] as the sole standard for the award of punitive
damages in defamation cases. '"300 The court reasoned that, just as
"reckless indifference" in the context of fraud would not support an
award of punitive damages because it does not involve the conscious
wrongdoing contemplated by such an award, "reckless disregard" in
the context of defamation would not support an award of punitive
damages for the same reason. Therefore, while a plaintiff may recover
compensatory damages by showing the defendant's reckless disregard
for the falsity of a defamatory statement, the plaintiff must show some-
thing more-actual malice, i.e., actual knowledge of the falsity of the
defamatory statement-in order to recover punitive damages in a def-
amation action.
30 1
In a dissenting opinion, ChiefJudge Bell described the majority's
decision as a continuation of an "inexorable campaign ... to elimi-
nate punitive damages and thereby insulate certain reprehensible
conduct from proper punishment." °3 2 Chief Judge Bell first noted
that, although the majority may not have intended to eliminate puni-
tive damage awards from Maryland law, this was the practical effect of
establishing a standard "virtually impossible to meet. "303
Chief Judge Bell also disagreed with the majority's "actual knowl-
edge" standard.30 4 ChiefJudge Bell pointed out that, while the major-
ity acknowledged that "acting with 'reckless indifference' indicates
that the defendant has 'actual knowledge' of his or her lack of knowl-
edge as to the veracity or falsity of the statement," what must be estab-
lished under Le Marc's "is that the defendant knew, in fact, that the
statement was false."30 5 Chief Judge Bell argued that such reasoning
ignores the fact that conduct characterized as "reckless indifference"
is "no less reprehensible than the conduct engaged in with actual
knowledge." 30
6
Pointing out that "[t]he damage to the defamed person is the
same whether the defamer actually knows that what he or she is saying
299. Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 235-37, 652 A.2d 1117, 1126-27
(1995); see also supra notes 276-283 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
300. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 654, 709 A.2d at 1227.
301. See id. at 655, 709 A.2d at 1227 (concluding that "'reckless disregard' must be re-
jected as a standard for the award of punitive damages in defamation cases").
302. Id. at 656, 709 A.2d at 1228 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 658, 709 A.2d at 1229.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 658-59, 709 A.2d at 1229.
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is false or simply knows that he or she does not know if the statement
is true or false," Chief Judge Bell also argued that the majority's deci-
sion allows a defamer to "publish a false statement about the plaintiff
with impunity, without any investigation beyond his or her own




a. Logical Extension of Prior Case Law. -In Le Marc's Manage-
ment Corp., the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that an award of punitive
damages must be based on the defendant's "'conscious and deliberate
wrongdoing. "'308 The court found that, in the context of defamation,
this requirement entails that the defendant possess actual knowledge
that the defamatory statement was false. 0 9 One interpretation of this
decision is that it is simply a logical extension of the court's previous
holding in Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, F.S.B.3 1 As already noted, the Le
Marc's court found that because Ellerin rejected "reckless indifference"
as an appropriate basis for a punitive damage award in the context of
fraud, the logical extension is to reject "reckless disregard" as the basis
for such an award in the context of defamation. 3 11 Therefore the
strengths and flaws of Le Marc's stem from the court's previous hold-
ing in Ellerin. The reasoning of Ellerin, however, did not adequately
address the justifications for the court's "actual knowledge" require-
ment in fraud cases, and should not have been extended to Le Marc's.
As Chief Judge Bell noted in his Ellerin dissent, "making a representa-
tion of a fact, with intent to deceive and actual knowledge that the
speaker does not know whether it is fact or not, is as much a misrepre-
sentation as one made with actual knowledge of falsity and that actual
knowledge of the former is as reprehensible as actual knowledge of
the latter." '312 Furthermore, prior to Ellerin, it was "well settled, that a
defendant, intending to mislead the plaintiff and fully aware that he
or she does not know whether the representation he or she makes is
true or false, commits the tort of fraud or deceit."3 3 The Le Marc's
307. Id. at 659-60, 709 A.2d at 1129-30.
308. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 652, 709 A.2d at 1226 (quoting Montgomery Ward v. Wilson,
339 Md. 701, 733, 664 A.2d 916, 932 (1995)).
309. Id. at 654, 709 A.2d at 1227.
310. 337 Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995). See supra notes 276-283.
311. See Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 654, 709 A.2d at 1227 ("It is clear that the holding in Ellerin
supports actual knowledge of the falsity as the sole standard for the award of punitive
damages in defamation cases as well.").
312. Ellerin, 377 Md. at 244, 652 A.2d at 1131 (Bell, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
313. Id.
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court therefore should not have based its reasoning on its previous
holding in Ellerin, because, now, the law of punitive damages with re-
spect to defamation carries the same flaw as that law with respect to
fraud, namely, an inapplicability to genuinely reprehensible conduct.
Le Marc's found that actual malice requires a showing that the
defendant had actual knowledge of the falsity of the statement." 4
The court reached this holding even though it conceded that both
"reckless disregard" and "reckless indifference" encompass a level of
actual knowledge, albeit one that "is not a level sufficient to satisfy the
actual knowledge of falsity required for punitive damages. '"315
By requiring a level of actual knowledge higher than knowing
that one does not know the truth or falsity of a defamatory statement,
the Maryland Court of Appeals practically eliminates punitive damage
awards for defamation cases in Maryland.3" 6 To establish what a de-
fendant consciously knew, a plaintiff will likely need nothing short of a
"smoking-gun" type of admission. The result is a standard that dis-
serves the traditional purposes of punitive damages by insulating rep-
rehensible conduct.
b. The New Standard.-The first and most obvious conse-
quence of the Le Marc's decision is that Maryland courts now require a
higher standard of proof for plaintiffs seeking punitive damage awards
in defamation cases.317 Prior to Le Marc's, a plaintiff seeking punitive
damages could succeed upon showing that the defendant had acted
"with reckless disregard for the truth."3"8 Le Marc's develops a more
stringent standard, specifically rejecting reckless disregard for the
truth as an appropriate basis for punitive damages, and holding that
such an award requires a showing of actual malice in the limited sense
of the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the defamatory state-
314. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 653, 709 A.2d at 1226.
315. Id. at 654, 709 A.2d at 1227.
316. See id. at 656, 709 A.2d at 1228 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (finding that the majority's
decision raises "the standard for the allowance of punitive damages ... to a level that is
virtually impossible to meet").
317. See id. at 658, 709 A.2d at 1229 ("In this case, the majority has changed the standard
for award of punitive damages in defamation cases.").
318. SeeMarchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 139, 387 A.2d 1129, 1133 (1978) (holding
that a showing of the defendant's "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth" is
sufficient to overcome a conditional privilege defense, and adopting this standard for puni-
tive damages). With respect to the degree of proof required, the Le Marc's court reaf-
firmed its previous holding in Zenobia that clear and convincing evidence of the basis for
an award of punitive damages is required for such an award in "any tort." Compare Le
Marc's, 349 Md. at 656, 709 A.2d at 1228 (requiring clear and convincing proof of actual
knowledge) with Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 469, 601 A.2d 633, 657
(1992) (requiring this type of evidence to get punitive damages in any tort).
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ment. 19 Because the court bases its decision on Zenobia and its prog-
eny, the majority overrules Marchesi, Piskor, and Jacron Sales, "and
replaces the standard they announced with one requiring that the
plaintiff establish the defendant's actual knowledge of the falsity of
the defamatory statement. "320
Le Marc's can be seen as the culmination of a series of cases in
which the Maryland Court of Appeals has consistently raised the bar
with respect to a plaintiff's burden for obtaining an award of punitive
damages.3 2 ' These cases have changed the requirements for punitive
damage awards in a number of torts, including products liability,
3 22
fraud and deceit, 23 and now defamation.3 2 4 The result of these deci-
sions, and Le Marc's in particular, is the creation of a standard that all
but eliminates punitive damage awards in Maryland.3 25 This conse-
quence is evident from the fact that, since the 1992 Zenobia decision,
the Court of Appeals has overruled an award of punitive damages, or
affirmed a reversal of such an award by an appellate court, in fourteen
of fifteen cases.3 26 The only case to come before the court during this
period in which it affirmed an award of punitive damages was one in
which the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appellate
review.
32 7
With respect to defamation in particular, the Le Marc's decision
renders punitive damages virtually impossible to achieve. To require
a plaintiff to prove that a defendant acted with malice is a difficult
standard by itself. Requiring a plaintiff to prove the defendant had
actual knowledge of something as specific as the falsehood of his or
her statement is an even higher bar. In creating such a high standard,
the Court of Appeals has significantly undercut the traditional pur-
poses of punitive damages.3 28 In doing so, the Court has pushed
319. See generally Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 651-53, 709 A.2d at 1225-26 (comparing prior case
law concerning standards for punitive damages in other torts with the appropriateness of
punitive damages in a defamation case).
320. Id. at 658, 709 A.2d at 1229 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
321. See supra notes 260-291 and accompanying text (discussing the series of punitive
damage decisions from Zenobia to Scott in which the plaintiffs burden for proving punitive
damages was increased).
322. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460-62, 601 A.2d at 652-53.
323. See Ellerin v. Fairfax Sav., F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 235-36, 652 A.2d 1117, 1126-27
(1995).
324. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 653, 709 A.2d at 1226.
325. See id. at 656, 709 A.2d at 1228 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
326. See id. at 657, 709 A.2d at 1228 (citing cases).
327. See id. (referring to Macklin v. Robert Logan Assocs., 334 Md. 287, 312, 639 A.2d
112, 124 (1994)).
328. See id. at 657-58, 709 A.2d at 1228-29 (objecting to the "allowance of reprehensible
conduct being insulated from punishment by way of punitive damages").
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Maryland into a small group of jurisdictions that either have done
away with punitive damage awards, or like Maryland, have rendered
them practically extinct.
c. Traditional Purposes of Punitive Damages in the United States
and Maryland.-In significantly raising the bar with respect to punitive
damages, the court's decision in Le Marc's ignores the traditional pur-
poses of punitive damages. As far back as 1791 in American common
law, punitive damages have been used to serve a number of pur-
poses.329 Development of punitive damages in the twentieth century
has led to two widely accepted purposes: punishment and deter-
rence.3 ' 0 Although some jurisdictions have rejected punitive damages
altogether 3 3 1 in almost all states, punitive damages are well estab-
lished as a means of punishing wrongdoers and deterring reprehensi-
ble behavior.332 This widely accepted purpose is also embraced by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:
329. See 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 1.4, at 15 (3d
ed. 1995) (discussing the "arrival" in America of punitive damages from English common
law, and citing American cases as early as 1791). On this account, punitive damages have
been used to "justify verdicts that were excessive in relation to the actual damages
awarded," compensate for mental anguish, compensate for other intangible harms, deter
the wrongdoer, redress unequal punishment at criminal law, and prevent revenge. Id.
§ 1.3(B-G), at 7-11.
330. Id. § 1.4(B), at 17.
331. Five jurisdictions in the U.S. have totally prohibited punitive damages: Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, and Washington. See I GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note
193, §§ 4.06 to -.12; see also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997) (prohibiting an award of
punitive damages in all actions, unless specifically authorized by statute); McCoy v. Arkan-
sas Natural Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 385-86 (La. 1932) ("There is no authority in the law of
Louisiana for allowing punitive damages in any case, unless it be for some particular wrong
for which a statute expressly authorizes the imposition of some such penalty."); City of
Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (Mass. 1943) (finding that
punitive damages are not allowed unless expressly authorized by statute); Abel v. Conover,
104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960) (noting that "a fundamental rule of law in this state [is]
that punitive, vindictive, or exemplary damages will not be allowed"); Spokane Truck and
Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1073-74 (Wash. 1891) (finding that because it is unjust to
interject the penal element of a criminal trial into a civil proceeding, plaintiffs are not
allowed to recover punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages).
In addition, three jurisdictions in the United States, Connecticut, Michigan, and
Texas, treat punitive damages as compensatory. See 1 GHIARDm & KIRCHER, supra note 193,
§§ 4.02 to -.05 (finding that in Connecticut, Michigan, and Texas, "although the terms
'punitive damages' or 'exemplary damages' are generally used, the application of the law
relating to those damages is such that they are, at least in part, truly compensatory in
nature").
332. 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 329, § 2.2 (finding that in those jurisdictions
which allow punitive damages, "punitive damages [are] too popular and well established to
be discarded"); see also id. § 2.2 (A) (1) (finding that "[t]he most frequently stated purpose
of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for his wrongdoing and to deter him and
others from similar misconduct").
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Punitive damages are damages, other than compensa-
tory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to pun-
ish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and
others like him from similar conduct in the future.333
In Maryland, punitive damages have been awarded for the same rea-
sons, namely "to punish the defendant for egregiously bad conduct
toward the plaintiff, [and] also to deter the defendant and others con-
templating similar behavior." '334
The Court's decision in Le Marc's does not specifically discuss the
purposes of punitive damages in defamation, or in any other tort.
The decision does, however, reiterate that punitive damage awards in
tort cases must be based on the defendant's "conscious and deliberate
wrongdoing, evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, ill will, or
fraud."335 This basis makes sense because only conduct of this nature
can be rightfully punished and effectively deterred. Where the Le
Marc's decision falls short, however, is not in failing to recognize the
purposes of punitive damages, but in eliminating punitive damages
with respect to conduct of the sort to which these damages, and the
purposes behind them, are traditionally applicable. By shielding de-
fendants who make statements with an intent to defame and actual
knowledge that they do not know whether their statement is true or
false, the Le Marc's decision prohibits the application of a long recog-
nized penalty to clearly reprehensible conduct.
d. Maryland's Standard Compared to OtherJurisdictions.-In af-
firming its "recent decisions"336 requiring the basis for punitive dam-
ages to be proved by clear and convincing evidence, the Court of
Appeals has chosen to become part of a slight majority ofjurisdictions
that demand such a level of proof to establish a punitive damage
award. In the United States, twenty-eight jurisdictions require that a
punitive damage award be based on clear and convincing evidence.337
Only one state, Colorado, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
333. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979).
334. Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 350 Md. 4, 22, 710 A.2d 267, 276 (1998) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Owens-Corning v. Garrett, 343 Md.
500, 537-38, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161 (1996)).
335. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 652, 709 A.2d at 1226 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 733, 664 A.2d 916, 932 (1995)).
336. Id. at 653, 709 A.2d at 1226.
337. RicHARD L. BLATr ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND
PRACricE § 8.2, table 8-1 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
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and the balance of the jurisdictions require proof of the basis for pu-
nitive damage awards by a preponderance of the evidence. 38
Requiring proof that the defendant acted with malice is a stan-
dard followed by fifteen jurisdictions.3 9 Because twenty-five jurisdic-
tions require only a showing that the defendant's conduct was more
egregious than gross negligence, thus falling short of requiring proof
of malice, Maryland law falls into the minority of jurisdictions requir-
ing actual malice.34°
It is important to note, however, that the application of these
standards varies significantly. For example, some "malice" jurisdic-
tions allow an award of punitive damages based on a showing of im-
plied malice,341 an idea explicitly rejected in Maryland law.342 The Le
Marc's decision has pushed Maryland further down the path towards
abolishing the principle of punitive damage awards.3 43 Maryland is
now one of the most difficult jurisdictions in the United States for a
plaintiff to recover punitive damages and the result is a standard that
shields reprehensible conduct.
e. Shielding Reprehensible Conduct.-In holding that punitive
damage awards in a defamation case must be based on actual knowl-
edge that the defamatory statement was false, the Le Marc's court
shields reprehensible conduct and thus undermines the traditional
purposes of punitive damages. As the majority in Le Marc's concedes,
the "reckless indifference" towards the truth or falsity of a defamatory
statement that is insufficient to support an award of punitive damages
does in fact encompass "a level of actual knowledge," namely, "actual
knowledge that he or she did not know whether the statement was
true or false." 44 Following Le Marc's, a defendant who acts with this
admitted level of actual knowledge will not be subject to punitive dam-
ages. The important result of Le Marc's is that these reckless actors will
no longer be subject to punitive damages, even though their level of
actual knowledge will produce the same damage to the plaintiff as the
338. Id.
339. Id. § 3.2.
340. Id.
341. Arizona, Maine, and Ohio allow an award of punitive damages based on a showing
of implied malice. Id
342. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 459, 601 A.2d 633, 652 (1992)
(rejecting the implied malice standard); supra notes 268-271 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Zenobia's treatment of this issue).
343. See supra notes 316, 328, 340 and accompanying text (noting that the practical ef-
fect of Le Marc's is to eliminate punitive damages in defamation, and comparing Maryland
to other jurisdictions).
344. Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 654, 709 A.2d at 1227.
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higher level of actual malice. 45 Further, the fact that actual malice
includes "the wilful refusal to know" offers little relief. 46 Willful re-
fusal to know is a form of knowledge that "exists where a person be-
lieves that it is probable that something is a fact, but deliberately shuts
his or her eyes or avoids making a reasonable inquiry with a conscious
purpose to avoid learning the truth." '3 4 7 The fact that actual malice
includes this state of mind does not, however, address the situation in
which a defendant should have made further inquiries, but for any
reason besides a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth, did
not do so. Furthermore, proving that a defendant deliberately shut
his or her eyes is just as difficult as proving he or she acted with actual
knowledge because in both cases proof of the actor's mental state at
the time is necessarily required.
The conduct of acting with reckless disregard concerning the
truth should be deterred as forcefully as the conduct of acting with
actual knowledge of the falsity. Punitive damages can deter both types
of conduct, because acting with reckless disregard and acting with ac-
tual knowledge of the falsity of a statement both encompass a level of
actual knowledge, and because both involve "conscious and deliberate
wrongdoing."348 For this reason, punitive damages are necessary to
deter both types of conduct.
Rendering punitive damages inapplicable to conduct involving
reckless disregard illustrates both their necessity and the inconsistency
of applying them only to conduct involving actual knowledge. First,
punitive damages are necessary in this context. Traditionally, defama-
tion has been used to recover "damages suffered to one's reputation
by a wrongful communication." 49 A wrongful communication made
with actual knowledge of falsity or a wrongful communication made
with the actual knowledge that one does not know the truth or falsity
345. See id. at 658, 709 A.2d at 1229 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) ("The damage to the de-
famed person is the same whether the defamer actually knows that what he or she is saying
is false or simply knows that he or she does not know if the statement is true or false.").
346. See Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 653 n.4, 709 A.2d at 1226 n.4 (recognizing that "actual
knowledge .. . does include the wilful refusal to know" (quoting Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 462 n.23, 601 A.2d 633, 654 n.23 (1992))).
347. State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 458, 583 A.2d 250, 253 (1991) (Chasanow, J.,
concurring).
348. See Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 652, 709 A.2d at 1226 (finding conscious and deliberate
wrongdoing to be the appropriate basis for a punitive damage award) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 733, 664 A.2d 916,
932 (1995)).
349. 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 329, § 9.6(a), at 543.
1114 [VOL. 58:604
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
still results in damage to the plaintiffs reputation.350 The tort of defa-
mation allows for compensation for the plaintiff in either situation.
Without punitive damages, however, an actor's egregious conduct, de-
spite knowledge that such conduct could damage the plaintiffs repu-
tation, is not punished or deterred.
A second result of the higher standard is that it no longer matters
if the defendant's actions are negligent or grossly negligent. Any ac-
tion falling short of actual malice, defined as actual knowledge, will
result in liability for compensatory damages only. The result is that
punitive damages do not punish or even have a deterrent effect to-
wards grossly negligent conduct. As then Judge Bell noted in Zenobia,
"from the standpoint of a defendant's pocketbook, [because] it makes
no difference in the award of damages, whether he or she is negligent
or grossly negligent .... requiring that [the] defendant ... pay com-
pensatory damages for the victims's injuries is not likely to have a de-
terrent effect."351
Applying this reasoning to defamation highlights the potential
problem. Not only does Le Marc's fail to deter potential defendants
who act with reckless disregard, it encourages potential defamers to
decide that the less they know about a subject, the better, because an
uninformed defendant, even when "a brief investigation would have
made clear the falsity of the statement," will not be subject to punitive
damages. 52
5. Conclusion.-With Le Marc's Management Corp. v. Valentin, the
Court of Appeals has yet again raised the standard for an award of
punitive damages in defamation cases. The former standard of reck-
less disregard allowed for punitive damages to deter and punish
wrongdoers. The Court of Appeals's current standard leaves the po-
tential for punitive damage awards only in specific and rare cases in
which actual knowledge is demonstrated by clear and convincing evi-
dence, a virtually insurmountable requirement.
With regard to defamation, this situation is particularly trouble-
some. As Chief Judge Bell notes in his Le Marc's dissent, the result is
350. See Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 659, 709 A.2d at 1229 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (finding that
in either situation the "damage to the defamed person is the same").
351. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 484-85, 601 A.2d 633, 665 (1992)
(Bell, J., concurring and dissenting).
352. See Le Marc's, 349 Md. at 659-60, 709 A.2d at 1229-30 (Bell, CJ., dissenting) (inter-
preting the majority as saying that "as long as there is no evidence that the defamer actually
knew the information was false and, I suppose, did not shut his or her eyes to what must
have been obvious, it does not matter that a brief investigation would have made clear the
falsity of the statement").
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that "the defamer may publish a false statement about the plaintiff
with impunity, without any investigation beyond his or her own
records, and, yet, remain insulated from the risk of punitive dam-
ages." '353 More importantly, Chief Judge Bell points out that after the
Le Marc's decision, this "is precisely what will happen with more and
more frequency," 54 so that the decision will undercut not only the
purposes of punitive damages, but the foundation of the tort of defa-
mation itself.
IAN C. TAYLOR
353. Id. at 660, 709 A.2d at 1230.
354. Id.
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XIII. TORTS
A. Parent-Child Immunity: The Time for a Change is Overdue
In Eagan v. Calhoun,' the Court of Appeals held that when a mi-
nor child brings a wrongful death action against a surviving parent for
the murder or voluntary manslaughter of the other parent, the excep-
tion to the doctrine of parent-child immunity established in Mahnke v.
Moore2 applies as a matter of law.3 In so holding, the court presented
a modest rule that reaffirmed the court's commitment to the doctrine
of parent-child immunity. However, the court evaded the larger issue
concerning the continuing viability of this doctrine, which is founded
upon social policy justifications formulated in earlier decades.4 An
evaluation of these policy arguments reveals that they no longerjustify
application of the immunity rule. Therefore, the court should com-
pletely or partially abrogate the doctrine. Unfortunately, the court
missed its opportunity to do so and refused to create a general excep-
tion to parent-child immunity for claimants in wrongful death
actions.5
1. The Case.--On May 13, 1992, John Calhoun angrily kicked
the ladder on which his wife, Gladys Calhoun, stood,6 causing her to
fall to her death.7 After her fall, John Calhoun failed to assist his wife
by either administering CPR8 or calling for assistance, and left his wife
1. 347 Md. 72, 698 A.2d 1097 (1997).
2. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); see infra text accompanying notes 73-74 (stating
the exception established by Mahnke).
3. Eagan, 347 Md. at 83-84, 698 A.2d at 1103.
4. See Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50
FoRDuiAM L. REV. 489, 508 (1982) ("In the ninety years since the initial adoption of [par-
ent-child] immunity, society's view of the child, and the parent-child relationship, has
changed radically.").
5. See Eagan, 347 Md. at 83, 698 A.2d at 1103 (stating that the circumstances warrant-
ing application of the Mahnke exception "do not necessarily arise merely because culpable
conduct causes the death of a family member," and holding that therefore the Mahnke
exception does not apply to every wrongful death case).
6. Calhoun v. Eagan, 111 Md. App. 362, 370, 681 A.2d 609, 612 (1996), vacated, 347
Md. 72, 698 A.2d 1097 (1997). Although John Calhoun told the police he was angry at his
wife, he later testified that he kicked the ladder because he was angry with himself and his
marital transgressions. Id. at 372, 681 A.2d at 614.
7. Eagan, 347 Md. at 77, 698 A.2d at 1100. The actual cause of Mrs. Calhoun's death
was disputed atJohn Calhoun's criminal trial. Eagan, 111 Md. App. at 371-72, 681 A.2d at
613. A police detective testified that he believed Mrs. Calhoun's head wounds resulted
from blows to the head from a blunt object rather than her fall from the ladder. Id. In
contrast, the medical examiner concluded that Mrs. Calhoun died from head injuries sus-
tained in her fall; however, he could not preclude the possibility that her injuries came
from another source. Id. at 372, 681 A.2d at 613.
8. John Calhoun had CPR training. Eagan, 347 Md. at 78, 698 A.2d at 1100.
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unattended for nearly ten hours.9 Furthermore, he prevented others
from saving his wife by initially concealing her situation from the au-
thorities and the couple's minor children, Laura and Kevin Cal-
houn.1" After Mrs. Calhoun's death was revealed, police questioned
John Calhoun three times; each time he denied responsibility for his
wife's death. 1 John Calhoun finally admitted to killing his wife, but
he confessed only after police confronted him with damaging infor-
mation.12 Charged with several offenses, John Calhoun ultimately
pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and received a prison sentence
of five years.13
James Eagan, the court-appointed guardian of Laura and Kevin
Calhoun, filed a wrongful death claim against John Calhoun in the
Circuit Court for Howard County.14 John Calhoun answered by as-
serting that the doctrine of parent-child immunity barred his chil-
dren's claim for the wrongful death of their mother.15 In response,
Eagan filed an amended complaint containing allegations intended to
invoke a recognized exception to parent-child immunity.16 John Cal-
houn continued to assert the immunity defense in two motions for
summary judgment and at trial through motions for judgment. 17 The
court denied the motions after finding that "the plaintiff had
presented sufficient facts to place the case within the exception to the
immunity doctrine set forth in Mahnke v. Moore," 8 which holds that
parent-child immunity will not apply when a child suffers "injuries re-
sulting from [a parent's] cruel and inhuman treatment or . . .mali-
cious and wanton wrongs."19
9. Id.
10. Id. (noting the existence of "evidence that Gladys [Calhoun] did not die instantly
from the fall but survived for some period of time").
11. Id.
12. Id. Shortly before her death, Gladys Calhoun foreshadowed her fate when she said
to a coworker, "'If I die suddenly, it won't be an accident. You don't know what [John] is
capable of doing.'" Eagan, 111 Md. App. at 369, 681 A.2d at 612. John Calhoun possessed
a motive to kill Gladys because he was having an affair with another woman and wanted a
divorce, but worried about "the financial implications" of a divorce. Eagan, 347 Md. at 78,
698 A.2d at 1100.
13. Eagan, 347 Md. at 78, 698 A.2d at 1100.
14. Id. at 78-79, 698 A.2d at 1100-01.
15. Id. at 79, 698 A.2d at 1101.
16. Id. The amended complaint alleged John's conduct was "(1) intentional, outra-
geous, intolerable, without legal justification or excuse, influenced by hatred or spite, and
performed in order to deliberately injure or cause damage to Gladys, or (2) so reckless,
wanton or wilful as to be tantamount to an intentional disregard of Gladys's rights." Id
17. Id.
18. Id,
19. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951).
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At the close of the trial, the jury was asked to decide three ques-
tions contained in the verdict sheet.2° In response to the first ques-
tion, the jury found that John Calhoun "committed a wrongful act
that caused Gladys's death."21 The jury declined to answer the second
question that asked whether John Calhoun's conduct was "atrocious,
showed a complete abandonment of the parental relation, was inten-
tional, wilful, or malicious. " " The court found the jury did not need
to answer this question in order to proceed to the question of dam-
ages. 23 In response to the third question, which asked for the jury's
assessment of damages, the jury awarded the children a total of
$2,360,000.24
John Calhoun appealed the judgments to the Court of Special
Appeals. 25 In considering whether parent-child immunity protected
John, the court rejected Eagan's argument that the children's cause of
action was not barred by the immunity doctrine because it derived
from their mother, who would not have been barred from bringing
suit.26 The court found that a wrongful death action was personal to
the children; therefore, parent-child immunity could be a defense to
the children's wrongful death action.
27
The court then examined the exception to the immunity doc-
trine established in Mahnke v. Moore and determined that the critical
question under Mahnke was whether John Calhoun's conduct objec-
tively, rather than subjectively, indicated an abandonment of the pa-
rental relationship. 28 Rejecting John Calhoun's claim that the lower
court erred when it denied his motions for judgment, the court identi-
fied sufficient facts to create a jury question as to the applicability of
the Mahnke exception.29 However, the court held that the jury did not
determine the applicability of the Mahnke exception because it failed
20. Eagan, 347 Md. at 79, 698 A.2d at 1101.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 80, 698 A.2d at 1101.
23. Id.
24. Id. As compensation for the children's loss of the financial support of their
mother, the jury awarded Laura Calhoun seventy thousand dollars and Kevin Calhoun
ninety thousand dollars. Id. In addition to these economic damages, each child received
one million dollars for "mental anguish, emotional pain, loss of society, companionship,
comfort, protection, parental care, attention, advice, counsel, training, and guidance." Id
Finally, the jury awarded both children one hundred thousand dollars each for education
expenses they could have reasonably expected their mother to pay. Id.
25. Id.
26. Calhoun v. Eagan, 111 Md. App. 362, 383, 681 A.2d 609, 619 (1996), vacated, 347
Md. 72, 698 A.2d 1097 (1997).
27. Id. at 385, 681 A.2d at 620.
28. Id. at 393, 681 A.2d at 624.
29. Id. at 398, 681 A.2d at 626.
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to answer the second verdict sheet question." Therefore, the court
remanded the case for a new trial.3
Disappointed with this outcome, Eagan petitioned the Court of
Appeals, which granted certiorari to consider whether the Mahnke ex-
ception applies as a matter of law to wrongful death actions based
upon voluntary manslaughter.32
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Creation of Parent-Child Immunity.-The doctrine of
parent-child immunity precludes a tort action between a parent and a
minor child for conduct resulting in personal injury. 33 The doctrine
finds its origins in American jurisprudence, as English common law
courts never recognized the doctrine.34 At English common law, a
child retained a legal identity distinct from her parents35 and could
therefore maintain a property action against them.36 Although the
English courts lacked an opportunity to specifically address whether a
child possessed a right to recover for personal injuries,37 treatises writ-
ten by nineteenth century Englishmen provide a "glimpse" into "the
state of the English mind" on the topic. 38 The unanimous view was
that a child's "right to redress" for a personal wrong was "beyond de-
bate" and "the only doubtful question was whether a duty had been
violated" by the parent.39
The concept of parental immunity originated with the American
judiciary in a series of cases known as "the great trilogy."4° The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court was the first court to recognize parent-child im-
30. Id. at 398-400, 681 A.2d at 626-27.
31. Id. at 400, 681 A.2d at 628.
32. Eagan, 347 Md. at 74, 81, 698 A.2d at 1098, 1102.
33. See Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 22-23, 152 A. 498, 449-50 (1930) (adopting
the doctrine of parent-child immunity for the first time in Maryland).
34. SeeMahnkev. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 64, 77 A.2d 923, 924 (1951) ("[T]here is nothing
in the English decisions to suggest that at common law a child could not sue a parent for a
personal tort."); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 906 (N.H. 1930) ("There has never been a
common-law rule that a child could not sue its parents.").
35. Dunlap, 150 A. at 906 (citing William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1030, 1056 (1930)).
36. Id. at 907.
37. Id,
38. d
39. Id. at 907-08 ("[T]he view . . . held was that the capacity of the child to sue the
parent for tort was so clear that it would be superfluous to do more than declare it.").
40. Hollister, supra note 4, at 495 n.41 (quoting Edwin D. Akers & William H. Drum-
mond, Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent &
Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 182 (1961)).
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munity.41 In Hewlett v. George,42 the court described two possible
scenarios when a child sues a parent for personal injuries.43 If "the
parent is under obligation to care for, guide, and control [the child],
and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and
obey [the parent]," then the court will bar the child's claim." How-
ever, if the parent-child relationship is "dissolved," the court noted
that "it may be the child could successfully maintain an action against
the parent for personal injuries."45 In the absence of precedent,46 the
court based its decision on social policy justifications. 47 The court de-
scribed the parent-child relationship as imposing responsibilities on
parent and child.4" Because of this special relationship, the ability of
a minor child to obtain civil redress for personal injuries caused by a
parent would undermine " [t] he peace of society, and of the families
composing society."49 According to the court, a child's claim for pro-
tection from "parental violence and wrong-doing" could only be ad-
dressed by the criminal justice system.5°
Shortly thereafter, in McKelvey v. McKelvey,51 the Tennessee
Supreme Court issued the second "trilogy" decision,52 which recog-
nized parental immunity in a child's action against her father and
stepmother for cruel disciplinary punishment.53 Drawing an analogy
between parent-child and interspousal immunity, the court reasoned
41. Id. at 493-94.
42. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). The Mississippi Reports spells the first party's name in this
case as "Hewlett" whereas the Southern Reporter spells the name as "Hewellette." Refer-
ences to this case will follow the spelling used by the official state reporter.
43. Id, at 887. In this case a minor daughter brought a tort claim against her mother
alleging malicious commitment to an insane asylum. Id. The daughter was married but
living apart from her husband. Id Because the factual record did not adequately address
"[w] hether she had resumed her former place in her mother's house, and the relationship




46. Both commentators and the courts have noted the lack of authoritative support for
the decision in Hewlett. See Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 545-46, 505 A.2d 826, 828 (1986)
(noting the absence of "any judicial decision or any other authority" in support of the
Hewlett decision, but that it was nevertheless adopted in Maryland); Hollister, supra note 4,
at 494 (noting that the Hewlett court "neither cited authority for [its] holding, nor gave any
further explanation of its reasoning").




51. 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
52. Hollister, supra note 4, at 495 n.41 (quoting Akers & Drummond, supra note 40, at
182).
53. McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 664.
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that society not only required, but expected both the wife and child to
obey the husband and father.54 In pursuit of obedience, the parent's
"right to control [his child] involved the subordinate right to restrain
and inflict moderate chastisement upon the child. 55 Consequently,
the court reasoned that injuries resulting from punishment for the
child's failure to obey her parents did not provide the child with a
cause of action.56
In Roller v. Roller,57 the final decision in the trilogy,58 the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held that a daughter could not maintain a cause
of action against her father for rape.59 In its refusal to permit this tort
action, the court expressed its fear that permitting an action for a
"heinous crime" would lead it down a slippery slope toward permitting
an action for a tort of a less "heinous" nature.6" The court also raised
the possibility that, if damages were recovered, the tortfeasor parent
might profit from his crime because he might inherit these damages if
his child died before him.61 In addition, the child's recovery of dam-
ages from the parent threatens the financial resources available to the
other children in the family.62 The court noted that this drain on
family resources also threatens society because society will bear the
burden of supporting the other children if family resources are
inadequate.68
The justifications for parent-child immunity asserted by this tril-
ogy of cases form the cornerstone of subsequent decisions, including
those in Maryland, which created and maintained the parent-child im-
munity doctrine.
54. Id at 665.
55. Id. at 664 (noting that the right to control a child "grew out of the corresponding
duty... to maintain, protect, and educate it").
56. Id.
57. 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905).
58. Hollister, supra note 4, at 495 n.41 (quoting Akers & Drummond, supra note 40, at
182).
59. Roller, 79 P. at 789.
60. Id. The court noted:
[I]f it be once established that a child has a right to sue a parent for a tort, there
is no practical line of demarkation which can be drawn, for the same principle
which would allow the action in the case of a heinous crime ... would allow an
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b. Maryland Adopts and Then Limits Parent-Child Immunity.-
In Schneider v. Schneider,6 4 the Maryland Court of Appeals joined those
states that had "blindly" adopted the doctrine of parent-child immu-
nity.65 In Schneider, a mother sued her minor son for injuries received
while she was a passenger and her son was the driver of an automobile
involved in an accident.6 6 The court emphasized that allowing a par-
ent to sue her child places the parent in the perplexing and contradic-
tory position of playing both plaintiff and defendant in the same
suit.6 7 Reasoning that the "antagonisms" inherent in such a suit
threaten the preservation of the family,68 the court established a mu-
tual immunity preventing parents and children from maintaining civil
suits for personal injuries against each other.69
Since establishing parent-child immunity, the Court of Appeals
has been notably reluctant to alter the doctrine7 ° and has limited it on
only three occasions. Twenty-one years after adopting the doctrine,
the court recognized the first exception in Mahnke v. Moore.7" In
Mahnke, a child sued her father's estate to recover for personal inju-
ries sustained when her father murdered her mother and then com-
64. 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).
65. Id. at 23-24, 152 A. at 500; see also Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 545, 505 A.2d 826, 828
(1986) (stating that numerous jurisdictions "blindly followed" the doctrine of parent-child
immunity created by the Hewlett court without any authoritative precedent).
66. Schneider, 160 Md. at 19-20, 152 A. at 498.
67. Id at 22-23, 152 A. at 499-500. In a suit by a parent against her child the parent
plays opposing roles because a minor cannot represent himself in a suit and a parent is
typically appointed guardian ad litem for the purpose of representing the minor in the
suit. Id at 23, 152 A. at 500. Consequently, a parent who is charged with protecting her
minor child's person and property would defend her child in a suit she instituted. Id.
Appointing someone other than the parent as guardian does not resolve this conflict be-
cause "the natural dependence of the child on the parent would inevitably leave him
largely subject to the parent's guidance and direction." Id.
68. Id. at 23-24, 152 A. at 500 ("Both natural and politic law, morality, and the precepts
of revealed religion alike demand the preservation of [the family relationship] in its full
strength and purity." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting JAMES SCHOULER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAw OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 223, at 345 (1898))).
69. Id.; see also Frye, 305 Md. at 546, 505 A.2d at 828 ("[In Schneider,] this Court broad-
ened the Hewlett rule that a minor child has no right to assert any claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parents .... So the rule was construed as
applying not only to actions by the minor child against the parent, but also to suits by the
parent against the minor child.").
70. See, e.g., Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 471-81, 697 A.2d 468, 471-76 (1997) (refus-
ing to abrogate parent-child immunity to allow an emancipated child to sue her parents for
injuries received in an automobile accident which occurred when she was unemanci-
pated); Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 627-28, 650 A.2d 252, 256-57 (1994) (refusing to
create an exception for motor vehicle torts or to extend the protection of parent-child
immunity to step-parents); Frye, 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839 (upholding the application
of parent-child immunity to negligence and motor vehicle tort actions).
71. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
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mitted suicide in her presence.72 The court reasoned that the policy
of granting immunity in order to maintain discipline in the home no
longer applied when a parent committed acts that demonstrated a
"complete abandonment of the parental relation. 73 While upholding
parental immunity for negligence, the Court of Appeals held that a
minor "child shall have a right of action against a parent for injuries
resulting from cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious and
wanton wrongs. 7
4
In Waltzinger v. Birsner,75 the Court of Appeals recognized a sec-
ond exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine. In Waltzinger, a
mother sued her adult son for injuries resulting from his negligent
operation of an automobile. 76 The court distinguished these facts
from those in Schneider, in which a mother sued her minor son and
the court applied parent-child immunity as a bar to the suit.77 The
Waltzinger court reasoned that the need for parental discretion was
missing in a relationship between a parent and an adult child. 78 Fur-
thermore, a parent of an adult child does not have a duty to support
the child. 79 Relying on these justifications, the court held that a par-
ent can maintain a suit against a child who was emancipated when his
tortious conduct injured his parent.8"
Finally, in Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas,8' the Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether a minor could maintain an action against a parent's
business partner.8 2 In Hatzinicolas, a child sued her father's partner-
72. Id. at 63, 77 A.2d at 924. In Mahnke, the court described in detail the terrifying
experience of a five-year old child. Id. With his child watching, a father shot his child's
mother, "thereby blowing away the right side of her head, a portion of her skull coming to
rest on the kitchen table, and her body collapsing backward over a chair with her head
resting in one pool of blood and her feet resting in another." Id. After keeping his child
with her mother's dead body for seven days, the father "committed suicide in [the child's]
presence by shooting himself with a shotgun, thereby causing masses of his blood to lodge
upon her face and clothing." Id.
73. Id. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926.
74. Id. ("Ordinarily, the parent is not liable for damages to the child for a failure to
perform a parental duty, or for excessive punishment of the child not maliciously inflicted,
or for negligent disrepair of the home provided by the father.").
75. 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1957).
76. Id. at 111-12, 128 A.2d at 618-19. The son left his car with his mother inside in the
backseat. When the car began to roll down the driveway, his mother was injured as she
attempted to maneuver into the front to set the car brake. Id.
77. Id. at 125, 128 A.2d at 626.
78. Id. at 126, 128 A.2d at 627.
79. See id. (noting that the adult son was not "entitled to receive any services from [his
mother]").
80. Id.
81. 314 Md. 340, 550 A.2d 947 (1988).
82. Id. at 341, 550 A.2d at 948.
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ship after she was injured by a slicing machine on the premises of her
father's partnership business."s The court noted that the fundamen-
tal premise of the parent-child immunity doctrine is "the protection of
family integrity and harmony and the protection of parental discre-
tion in the discipline and care of the child." 4 The court found that
neither of these concerns are "significantly impaired" by a child's suit
against a parent's partner.85 The Court of Appeals created a third
exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine by holding that it
does not preclude a child's suit against a parent's partner because the
policy rationales for the doctrine do not support its application to the
partnership relationship.86
In the seventy years since Schneider, Maryland courts have rejected
requests to create additional exceptions to the parent-child immunity
doctrine.8 7 These decisions have given the courts ample opportunity
to enunciate the rationales underlying the doctrine of parent-child
immunity," The rationales advanced share the ultimate goal of pre-
serving the family relationship." A rationale frequently cited is the
public's interest in protecting "family integrity and harmony."' Ac-
cording to this rationale, tort actions between parent and child intro-
duce potentially destructive elements of discord into the family unit.9 '
Thus, by preventing these actions, the immunity doctrine preserves
the family unit.92
A second rationale asserted in support of parent-child immunity
is the need to protect the ability of parents to discipline and control
83. Id. at 342-43, 550 A.2d at 948.
84. Id. at 357, 550 A.2d at 955 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Frye v.
Frye, 305 Md. 542, 551, 505 A.2d 826, 831 (1986)).
85. Id at 358, 550 A.2d at 956. The court conceded that a child's suit against a parent's
partner "may impair, or even destroy" the partnership relationship. Id However, the
court noted parent-child immunity was not created to protect the partnership relationship.
Id.
86. Id.
87. See supra note 70 (citing decisions of the Court of Appeals refusing requests to
modify or abrogate the parent-child immunity rule); see also Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 43
Md. App. 1, 4, 403 A.2d 379, 381 (1979) (refusing to recognize a "business exception" to
parent-child immunity for a minor child injured while working as an employee of a
parent).
88. See, e.g., Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 625, 650 A.2d 252, 255 (1994) (summariz-
ing the policy justifications for parent-child immunity).
89. See Frye, 305 Md. at 548, 505 A.2d at 829 ("The rule is founded upon the relation in
which the parent and the unemancipated minor child stand to each other.").
90. Id. at 551, 505 A.2d at 831.
91. See Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 126, 128 A.2d 617, 627 (1956) (stating that
tort actions between parent and child "would disrupt and destroy the peace and harmony
of the home").
92. See Fye, 305 Md. at 552, 505 A.2d at 831.
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their children.9" Allowing children to challenge these discretionary
decisions regarding child rearing undermines parental authority
because:
[t]he level of parental guidance necessary to rear responsi-
ble, productive members of society simply cannot be attained
in a situation where parents must constantly weigh the bene-
fit of helping a child to understand an important lesson
against the looming specter of being hauled into court by an
opportunistic attorney for the child.94
Since both the child and the law depend upon the parent to fulfill his
parental duties, the parent should be able to carry out this responsibil-
ity "free and unfettered. 9 5
A third rationale advanced by Maryland courts for the immunity
relates to the public's interest in preventing fraudulent and collusive
claims between the injured individual and the insured, who are both
family members.96 While the possibility of fraud and collusion is pres-
ent in all liability insurance actions, this possibility is "'considerably
increased"' when a child sues a parent.97 In these suits, the "insured
has every incentive to lose"9" because the proceeds of the recovery
flow to the insured's child and thereby reduce the amount of funds
the insured must contribute to support his child.99 This incentive on
the part of the insured may damage the insurer's ability to litigate its
case because the insurer "may not receive the necessary cooperation
from a family defendant in providing adequate information for the
insured's defense, [and] a defendant may be too helpful to the plain-
tiff family member and may prejudice the jury by his statements.""1 °
Moreover, a child is particularly susceptible to his parent's influ-
93. See id. at 551, 505 A.2d at 831; see also Warren, 336 Md. at 626, 650 A.2d at 255-56
("We are not willing to open the door to rebellious children and frustrated parents and
allow the courts to become the arbitrator of parent-child disputes and the overseer of pa-
rental decisions.").
94. Warren, 336 Md. at 626, 650 A.2d at 255-56 (quoting Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d
906, 913 (Miss. 1992) (en banc) (Lee, J., dissenting)).
95. Frye, 305 Md. at 551, 505 A.2d at 831.
96. See Warren, 336 Md. at 625, 650 A.2d at 255 (citing the "prevention of fraud and
collusion" as a policy justification for parent-child immunity).
97. Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 733 n.13, 272 A.2d 435, 442 n.13 (1971) (quoting
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 116, at 889 (3d ed. 1964)).
98. Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 478, 697 A.2d 468, 475 (1997).
99. See Hollister, supra note 4, at 500-01 ("There can be no doubt that when insurance
will pay for all or part of the plaintiffs recovery there is an incentive for family members to
conspire to obtain an unjustified award at the expense of the insurance company.").
100. Frye, 305 Md. at 566, 505 A.2d at 838.
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ences 10 and a parent may pressure the child into participating in
fraudulent and collusive claims.
A fourth rationale advanced for the doctrine of parent-child im-
munity concerns the allegedly draining effect on family resources that
is caused by a child's suit against a parent. 10 2 This rationale asserts
that recovery of damages by an injured child "might potentially saddle
a family with a judgment that they can ill-afford to pay because ... it
exceeds available insurance."1 3 While such ajudgment would benefit
the injured child, it would be to the detriment of the other innocent
family members.1"4
The final rationale for parent-child immunity concerns the possi-
bility of a parent-tortfeasor benefiting from the monetary damages
awarded to the child if the child dies before the parent and the parent
inherits the damages.10 5
c. The Wrongful Death Action. -At common law, a civil action
for damages against a tortfeasor who caused the death of another
"abated upon the death of the person thus injured."1 0 6 This led to the
odd outcome that the tortfeasor who injured another could be held
civilly liable whereas the tortfeasor who caused the death of another
escaped civil liability.1 0 7 England remedied this problem in 1846 with
passage of the Fatal Accident Act, commonly known as Lord Camp-
bell's Act.1 08
Six years later, the Maryland legislature followed England's
lead' o9 and adopted the Wrongful Death Act," 0 which creates a cause
101. Cf Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 23, 152 A. 498, 499 (1930) ("[T]he natural
dependence of the child on the parent would inevitably leave him largely subject to the
parent's guidance and direction.").
102. See Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 625, 650 A.2d 252, 255 (1994) (citing "the
threat that litigation will deplete family resources" as a policy justification for parent-child
immunity).
103. Renko, 346 Md. at 480, 697 A.2d at 476.
104. Id.
105. See Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788, 789 (Wash. 1905) (stating that a common sense
rationale for parent-child immunity is that "if a child should recover a judgment from a
parent, in the event of its death the parent would become heir to the very property which
had been wrested by the law away from him").
106. Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 333, 65 A. 49, 50 (1906).
107. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945
(5th ed. 1984) (stating that at common law "it was cheaper for the defendant to kill the
plaintiff than to injure him, and that the most grievous of all injuries left the bereaved
family of the victim, who frequently were destitute, without a remedy").
108. Id.
109. See Stewart, 104 Md. at 334, 65 A. 49 at 50 (describing Maryland's Wrongful Death
Act as "almost a literal transcript of Lord Campbell's Act").
110. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. §§ 3-901 to -904 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
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of action against a tortfeasor "whose wrongful act causes the death of
another." '11 The Act "created a new cause of action for something for
which the deceased person never had, and never could have had [at
common law which was] the right to sue... [for] the injury resulting
from his death." 1 2 This right of action belongs to certain designated
individuals called "primary beneficiaries," which include the dece-
dent's wife, husband, parent, and child.' If no person qualifies as a
"primary beneficiary," a person "related to the deceased person by
blood or marriage" and "substantially dependent upon the deceased"
may bring a wrongful death suit." 4 Although the Act provides for two
classes of beneficiaries, only one class may recover, and the primary
class has priority." 5 The beneficiaries in a wrongful death action can
recover damages measured in terms of economic, and possibly
noneconomic, losses occasioned by the death of the deceased. 1 6
The Wrongful Death Act places a prerequisite on the right of
beneficiaries to file a wrongful death suit against a tortfeasor. For
beneficiaries to bring a wrongful death action, the decedent must
have been able "to maintain an action and recover damages if death
had not ensued."' 1 7 Consequently, any defense that would have
blocked the decedent's action for damages, such as parent-child im-
munity, similarly blocks the beneficiaries' cause of action." 8 In Smith
v. Gross," 9 the Court of Appeals held that parent-child immunity bars
a wrongful death action brought by one parent of a deceased minor
111. Id. § 3-902(a).
112. Stewart, 104 Md. at 341, 65 A. 49 at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Tucker v. State ex rel. Johnson, 89 Md. 471, 479, 43 A. 778, 780 (1899)).
113. CTS. &Jun. PROC. § 3-904(a) (Supp. 1998).
114. Id. § 3-904(b).
115. See id. (providing a cause of action to "secondary beneficiaries" only if there are no
persons who qualify as "primary beneficiaries"); see also Flores v. King, 13 Md. App. 270,
274, 282 A.2d 521, 523 (1971) (interpreting the Wrongful Death Act as "disjunctive and
not conjunctive," providing a cause of action for wrongful death to only one of the two
classes of beneficiaries).
116. See CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-904(c), (d). Damages for noneconomic losses, or sola-
tium damages, include "mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, com-
panionship, comfort, protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice,
counsel, training, guidance, or education where applicable." Id. § 3-904(d).
117. Id. § 3 -901(e) (emphasis added).
118. See Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 148-49, 571 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1990) (holding that
parent-child immunity is a defense to a mother's wrongful death action against a father for
the death of their minor child); Frazee v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 255 Md. 627, 633, 258
A.2d 425, 428 (1969) (holding that the contributory negligence of the decedent is a de-
fense to a wrongful death action); Baltimore & Potomac R.R. Co. v. State ex rel. Abbot, 75
Md. 152, 159, 23 A. 310, 311 (1892) (holding that assumption of risk by the decedent is a
defense to a wrongful death action).
119. 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990).
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against the other parent.120 The court explained that the defense of
parent-child immunity was not excepted from the general rule that
defenses against the decedent are defenses to a wrongful death action
because "[i]f the legislature intended that the judicially created par-
ent-child immunity rule be excepted from the legislatively created...
wrongful death action[ ], it has had ample opportunity to say so.
1 21
The court refused to create an exception to the immunity rule based
upon the death of a child.
122
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Eagan v. Calhoun, the Court of Ap-
peals firmly adhered to its resolve to retain the doctrine of parent-
child immunity. 123 Furthermore, the court concluded that the doc-
trine may be invoked as an absolute defense in wrongful death ac-
tions. 124 However, the court held that if the wrongful death action is
based on the murder or voluntary manslaughter of one parent by the
other, as opposed to mere negligence, parent-child immunity "should
not apply as a matter of law."1
1 2
The court began its discussion by flatly rejecting Eagan's request
to completely abrogate the doctrine of parental immunity.1 26 Next,
the court addressed Eagan's argument that parental immunity did not
bar the children's wrongful death action because the action derived
from their mother, who could have commenced the suit and recov-
ered damages had she lived. 127 In rejecting this argument, the court
distinguished between survival and wrongful death actions based
upon who files the suit and the yardstick used to measure damages.1
21
While a survival action is brought by the decedent's personal repre-
sentative, a wrongful death action is brought by a spouse, parent, or
120. Id. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224. In Smith, a mother sued a father for the death of their
minor son in an automobile accident. Id at 141, 571 A.2d at 1220.
121. Id. at 144, 149, 571 A.2d at 1221, 1224.
122. Id. at 150, 571 A.2d at 1224. In his dissent, Judge Eldridge persuasively argued that
the parent-child immunity rule should not apply to wrongful death claims when the death
of a child removed the need to protect family harmony and discipline. Id. at 154, 571 A.2d
at 1226 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
123. Eagan, 347 Md. at 81, 698 A.2d at 1102.
124. Id. at 82, 698 A:2d at 1102.
125. Id. at 84, 698 A.2d at 1103.
126. Id. at 81, 698 A.2d at 1102. The court refused to revisit the question of the viability
of the parent-child immunity doctrine in light of its recent consideration of this question
in Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 697 A.2d 468 (1997). Eagan, 317 Md. at 81, 698 A.2d at
1102.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 82, 698 A.2d at 1102. For a discussion of the differences between the survival
and wrongful death actions, see Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 158-59, 297




child.129 In a survival action, the measure of damages is the injury to
the decedent, whereas in a wrongful death action, the measure is the
claimant's own personal loss ensuing from the loss of the decedent.1 30
Characterizing the wrongful death action as "personal . . . to the
claimant," the court held that because Eagan stood "in the stead of"
the children, his wrongful death action could be barred by the immu-
nity defense. 131
Having determined that Eagan's claim could be barred by the
immunity doctrine, the court turned to the question whether the case
fell within an exception to the doctrine of parental immunity. 132 Ex-
plicitly declining to apply the Mahnke exception 13 3 to all wrongful
death cases, the court noted that " [t] ragic deaths often arise from acts
of negligence or excessive, but non-willful, behavior on the part of
family members ... and although such tragedies may well put a seri-
ous strain on some of the family relationships, they do not generally
destroy a parent-child relationship.' 3 4 However, the court held that
when the wrongful death action arises from the murder or voluntary
manslaughter of one parent by the other, parental immunity does not
bar the action as a matter of law.135 The court emphasized that when
a parent kills a child's other parent, the public policies underlying the
parent-child immunity doctrine disappear.1 3 6  By his actions, the
tortfeasor-parent legally abandons the parental relationship and de-
stroys family harmony, even if he continues to provide for the care of
his children and intends to reunite with them after serving his crimi-
nal sentence.137 Therefore, the court found that when the reasons
underlying the immunity no longer exist, the need for the immunity
similarly disappears.' 38 The court reasoned that this position is consis-
129. Eagan, 347 Md. at 82, 698 A.2d at 1102.
130. Id.
131. Id, at 82-83, 698 A.2d at 1102-03.
132. Id. at 83, 698 A.2d at 1103.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74 (stating the exception established by
Mahnke).
134. Eagan, 347 Md. at 83, 698 A.2d at 1103. In the case of deaths resulting from the
negligent operation of an automobile, the courts have upheld the application of parent-
child immunity. See, e.g., Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 148-49, 571 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1990)
(holding parent-child immunity barred survival and wrongful death actions against a father
for the death of his son in an automobile accident caused by the father's negligence); Latz
v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 725, 272 A.2d 435, 438 (1971) (holding parent-child immunity
barred a father's suit against a minor daughter for the death of her mother due to the
daughter's negligent driving).
135. Eagan, 347 Md. at 84, 698 A.2d at 1103.
136. Id. at 85, 698 A.2d at 1104.
137. Id. at 84-85, 698 A.2d at 1103-04.
138. Id.
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tent with Mahnke because " [t] he murder or voluntary manslaughter of
a spouse or child by a parent necessarily constitutes cruel and inhu-
man treatment, not just of the person killed but of the other family
members as well."' 3 9 Furthermore, allowing a child to bring a suit for
damages in this situation is consistent with the "slayer's rule," which
asserts that persons should not profit from the murder or voluntary
manslaughter of another. 4 '
Finally, the court considered whether John Calhoun's conduct
causing his wife's death was intentional, which the court found to
hinge upon his "mental state." '41 If Calhoun intended to kill his wife,
he would be guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter and parent-
child immunity would not apply.' 4 2 Because his state of mind was dis-
puted, 43 it would normally be the jury's task to determine this issue
on remand.144 However, the court's use of the record, along with the
motions filed by Calhoun, "spared" the lower court from having to
hold a new trial.' 45 The court concluded that Calhoun's guilty plea to
the charge of voluntary manslaughter constituted an admission, albeit
a rebuttable one, of his mens rea.146 Moreover, Calhoun's concession
in the wrongful death action that he was guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter1 4 7 estopped him from rebutting the guilty plea.1 48 This un-
rebutted guilty plea established the killing as voluntary
139. Id. at 85, 698 A.2d at 1103-04.
140. Id., 698 A.2d at 1103. The slayer's rule evolved in Maryland from three decisions:
Schifanelli v. Wallace, 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513 (1974), Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 150
A.2d 251 (1959), and Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933). In its present form,
the rule provides:
(1) [A] person who kills another may not share in the distribution of the dece-
dent's estate, either as an heir or as a beneficiary under a will, and may not, as a
beneficiary, collect the proceeds under an insurance policy on the decedent's life
"when the homicide is felonious and intentional," and (2) the person may share
in the distribution and may collect life insurance proceeds "when the homicide is
unintentional even though it is the result of such gross negligence as would
render the killer criminally guilty of involuntary manslaughter."
Eagan, 347 Md. at 85, 698 A.2d at 1104 (quoting Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 111-12, 512
A.2d 389, 392 (1986)).
141. Eagan, 347 Md. at 86, 698 A.2d at 1104.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see supra note 6 (describing the evidence on Calhoun's state of mind).
144. Eagan, 347 Md. at 86, 698 A.2d at 1104.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 87, 698 A.2d at 1105.
147. Id. In a memorandum of law attached to his affidavit that was filed in support of
his motion for summaryjudgment in the wrongful death action, Calhoun stated the follow-
ing through his attorney:
In the case of JOHN C. CALHOUN, the death of GLADYS ESTHER CALHOUN
was homicide, homicide was voluntary manslaughter, Mr. Calhoun was the criminal
agent, he was not adjudicated insane by the court. He was convicted of voluntary
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manslaughter.149 Therefore, the court applied the Mahnke exception
as a matter of law, barred the imposition of parent-child immunity,
and upheld the jury's verdict against Calhoun. 50
4. Analysis.-In Eagan v. Calhoun, the Court of Appeals refused
to abrogate the doctrine of parent-child immunity or to create a gen-
eral exception for wrongful death actions. The holding fails to recog-
nize the rights of children in two related respects. First, by refusing to
recognize that the policies underlying the immunity no longer sup-
port application of the rule, the court improperly denies a child a
cause of action against a parent based upon an outdated rule. Sec-
ond, by declining to create an exception for wrongful death actions, a
child's well-being is sacrificed for the second time, the first occurring
when one parent died as a result of the other parent's conduct.
a. Underlying Policies No Longer Support the Doctrine.-Parent-
child immunity is a doctrine predicated on social policies. If the poli-
cies no longer support the doctrine, there is no basis for the doc-
trine's existence. After examining the policy justifications for the
immunity, courts in other states as well as commentators have found
that the policies do not withstand scrutiny."' Because the parent-
child immunity rule contradicts the general rule of liability for wrong-
doing, sound policies must exist for the immunity.' 52 An analysis of
manslaughter and incarcerated. The elements are prima facie within the ambit of
the slayer's rule.
Id. This memorandum of law was originally filed by Calhoun's attorney in a custody pro-
ceeding for his children. Id.
148. Id. at 87-88, 698 A.2d at 1105. Maryland has embraced the principle of estoppel by
admission, which holds that:
a party will not be permitted to maintain inconsistent positions or to take a posi-
tion in regard to a matter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one
previously assumed by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full
knowledge of the facts, and another will be prejudiced by his action.
Id. at 88, 698 A.2d at 1105 (quoting 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 68, at 694-95
(1966)).
149. Id. at 88, 698 A.2d at 1105.
150. Id.
151. The debate concerning the future of parent-child immunity clearly illustrates Pros-
ser's observation that "the law of torts is a battleground of social theory." KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 107, § 103, at 15; see cases cited infra notes 154-160, 163-164, 168-169, 172-174,
178-179; see also Hollister, supra note 4, at 496-508 (criticizing the rationales advanced in
support of parent-child immunity). But see Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 565, 505 A.2d 826,
838 (1986) ("Even in the light of changed conditions and increased knowledge, the [par-
ent-child immunity] rule has not become fundamentally unsound in the circumstances of
modern life. It is not a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to our people.").
152. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905,909 (N.H. 1930) (stating that parent-child immu-
nity "should not be tolerated at all except for very strong reasons").
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the policies enumerated in support of the immunity reveals that they
are not convincing and, therefore, parent-child immunity should be
completely abrogated.
A significant justification for parent-child immunity is the public
policy goal of maintaining and preserving family harmony. 153 The
crux of this argument is that precluding tort actions between parent
and child prevents the introduction of the disharmony associated with
a lawsuit into the family relationship. However, this argument is illu-
sory because the conduct underlying the lawsuit, rather than the law-
suit itself, disturbs family tranquility.154 Tranquility and harmony can
only be returned to the family by permitting the injured child to bring
a claim against the wrongdoer for damages.155
Furthermore, the family harmony rationale does not explain the
absurdity of denying children civil redress for personal injuries in-
flicted by their parents while simultaneously permitting suits against
parents by children to protect their property and contract rights.15'
This discrepancy is particularly troublesome since courts have indi-
cated that "some of the most bitter disputes arise over property.
1 57
Nor have the courts adequately explained why a suit between a parent
153. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing the "family harmony"
justification).
154. See Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869, 871 (N.M. 1981) ("The arguments that
family relationships will be weakened or destroyed by bringing a lawsuit is not persuasive.
The relationships will be affected to a much greater extent by the conduct between the
parties that causes the lawsuit to be filed."); Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275, 277 (Ohio
1984) ("If any disruption to family harmony or tranquility occurs, it is more likely to hap-
pen as a result of tortious conduct, rather than as a result of allowing redress of the wrong-
ful actions which led to injury."); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1971) ("The
speculative theory of family disruption upon which the doctrine of parental immunity is
largely based has been criticized and rejected by legal scholars without exception. As they
point out, it is the injury itself which is the disruptive act . ).
155. See Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193 (N.Y. 1969) (observing that "family
unity can only be preserved" by allowing a mother to sue her unemancipated son for inju-
ries she sustained as a passenger in a car he was driving).
156. See Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 418 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) ("An action to en-
force property or contract rights is surely no less adversarial than an action in tort, and in
theory, at least, it would present the same threat to family harmony."); Glaskox v. Glaskox,
614 So. 2d 906, 911 (Miss. 1992) (en banc) ("No sound justification appears for the fact
that the law protects a minor's contract or property rights, but offers no redress to the
child for injury to his person." (citing Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970) (in
banc))); Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d at 193 (noting that parent-child suits involving contracts,
wills, and inheritances have been maintained).




and a minor child is any more disturbing to domestic tranquility than
a suit between a parent and an adult child. 15 1
The existence of liability insurance further undermines the fam-
ily harmony rationale. When a parent carries an insurance policy, an
action between a parent and child does not place them in adversarial
roles and therefore does not disturb family harmony because the in-
surance carrier defends the torffeasor.1'5 Additionally, the presence
of insurance may alleviate the financial and emotional burden on the
family by providing an outside source of funding for the child's
injuries.1 60
The second justification for parent-child immunity asserts that
the immunity preserves the authority of a parent to discipline and
control the child.161 The United States Supreme Court has affirmed
the rights of parents to raise their children in the manner that they
choose. 1 62 Nevertheless, "a blanket rule of immunity" is not justified
merely because a parent may be acting within parental authority.'63
Furthermore, the discipline and control justification reflects the out-
dated principle that a master can only control his servant if the servant
is completely subordinated to the will of the master.164 Similarly, to
build a successful family relationship, parents and society do not need
to -treat children as an inferior group.'65 Children will not revolt
against their parents merely because they possess the right to civil re-
158. See Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d at 194. The Gelbman court cited with approval the dissent-
ing opinion in Badigan v. Badigan, 174 N.E.2d 718, 720 (N.Y. 1961) (Fuld, J., dissenting).
Id. at 193 (citing Badigan, 174 N.E.2d at 721 (Fuld, J., dissenting)). In his dissent in Badi-
gan, Judge Fuld argued that "[i]f filial duty or family peace is the test, it is impossible to
understand why a distinction should be made between minor children and those who are
adult. The Biblical command, 'Honor thy father and thy mother,' does not end at 21."
Badigan, 174 N.E.2d at 721 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
159. See Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (Mass. 1975) (recognizing that the
parties to the litigation are actually the child and the parent's insurance company, not the
parent and the child); Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d at 193-94 (same).
160. See Rousey, 528 A.2d at 420; Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d at 914.
161. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing the "discipline and con-
trol" justification).
162. See Hollister, supra note 4, at 505 n.109 (noting that "the parents' right to raise
their children, even when they elect to do so in an unorthodox manner" is constitutionally
protected (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944))).
163. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 652 (Cal. 1971) (in bank).
164. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 910 (N.H. 1930).
165. See id. ("In this age it can hardly be necessary or even desirable that the child be
reared in the atmosphere of one under the control of an absolute tyrant.").
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dress for wrongs they experience as a result of their parents'
conduct.
166
The third justification asserts that a child's suit against a parent
will deplete the family's financial resources. 167 This argument ignores
the reality of the "widespread prevalence of liability insurance. 168
When insurance exists, parents do not pay damages out of the family's
resources. While the potential for a judgment greater than the insur-
ance policy exists, in these cases it is unlikely that the deficiency will
be pursued by the child.1 69 Furthermore, intrafamily suits about prop-
erty, contract, and tort claims all threaten family finances but the im-
munity only operates as a bar to tort claims.'
70
The possibility of parent and child conspiring to defraud the in-
surance carrier is the fourth justification for parent-child immunity.17 1
The danger of fraud and collusion in a suit between a parent and
child is not unusual; indeed this possibility exists in virtually every lia-
bility insurance case. 1 72 Yet precedent demonstrates that judges and
juries are competent to distinguish the meritorious claim from the
fraudulent claim.1 71 In addition to jury trials, other methods of hin-
166. See id. ("The danger that insubordination will arise from possible knowledge of a
right to complain of willful wrong has been magnified out of all proportion to the facts of
life.").
167. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (discussing the "protection of family
resources" justification).
168. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 653.
169. Cf id. ("[Iun truth, virtually no such suits [between parent and child] are brought
except where there is insurance." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fleming
James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549,
553 (1948))).
170. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text (discussing this contradiction in the
framework of the "family harmony" justification for the parent-child immunity doctrine).
171. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (discussing the "collusion and fraud"
justification).
172. See Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 420 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (noting that the
possibility of collusion and fraud did not prevent the abrogation of the interspousal immu-
nity doctrine in the District of Columbia). The possibility of fraud even exists in an action
between a parent and adult child, however, the argument in support of parent-child immu-
nity based on the possibility of fraud "fails to explain how the possibility of fraud would be
magically removed merely by the child's attainment of legal majority." Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194 (N.Y. 1969).
173. See Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975) ("We constantly depend on
efficient investigations and on juries and trial judges to sift evidence in order to determine
the facts and arrive at proper verdicts."); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135, 142
(Kan. 1980) ("[I]t is unreasonable to eliminate causes of action of an entire class of per-
sons simply because some undefined portion of the designated class may file fraudulent
lawsuits .... [C]ourts must depend upon the efficiency of the judicial processes to ferret
out the meritorious from the fraudulent in particular cases."); Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d at 194
("[W]e rely upon the ability of the jury to distinguish between valid and fraudulent
claims.").
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dering the success of fraudulent claims include "l[t] he deterrent effect
of a perjury charge, extensive and detailed pretrial discovery proce-
dures, the opportunity for cross-examination, and the availability of
summary judgment motions. 174
The presence of insurance also figures prominently in the court's
consistent deferral to the legislature on the issue of creating an excep-
tion to parent-child immunity for motor tort injuries. The Court of
Appeals explains that the courts are not competent to balance the
reasons for a motor tort exception against the social policies for the
General Assembly's compulsory automobile liability insurance
scheme.1 75 However, the court is exactly the forum where two sides
present opposing positions and have their dispute decided by an im-
partial observer. The court expressed its reluctance to "carfuffle the
legislature's insurance scheme. "176 While admirable, this concern ig-
nores the fact that the General Assembly can pass legislation when
unhappy with a court's decision.
177
The immunity justifications are based on abstract principles from
which courts have drawn a priori consequences. 178 While permitting
suits between parent and child might a priori result in unstable fami-
lies, out of control children, fraudulent and collusive suits, financial
ruin for families, and tortfeasors profiting from their crimes; those
states that have eliminated or never adopted parent-child immunity
have not experienced the dire consequences presumed to result from
intra-family suits.
1 79
Because the justifications advanced in support of the parent-child
immunity doctrine are not sufficient to sustain the doctrine, the court
in Eagan should have abrogated the doctrine. However, given the
court's consistent adherence to the doctrine of parent-child immunity
it seems unlikely that it would recognize these deficiencies and the
need for abrogation. Therefore, in the alternative, the court should
174. Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275, 278 (Ohio 1984).
175. See Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 565-67, 505 A.2d 826, 838-39 (1986).
176. Id. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839.
177. For example, in United States v. Streide 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993), the court
ruled that Maryland's statutory cap on noneconomic damages did not apply to wrongful
death actions. Id. at 537, 620 A.2d at 907. After this decision, the General Assembly
amended the statute to expressly apply to wrongful death actions. Act of May 26, 1994, ch.
477, 1994 Md. Laws 2292 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-
108(d)(2)(ii) (1995)).
178. See Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388, 391 (Ohio 1985) (stating that in the cases
creating parent-child immunity, "the doctrine was stated as a maxim, and the reasons ad-
vanced were an a piori analysis").
179. See id.; see also Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1971) (arguing that the conse-
quences of permitting suits between parent and child are merely "speculative").
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create a general exception to the immunity for claimants in wrongful
death actions.
b. Application of Parental Immunity to Wrongful Death Actions.-
Throughout the nation's courts, a general rule does not exist as to the
applicability of parent-child immunity in wrongful death actions.18 0
An examination of the purpose and language of Maryland's Wrongful
Death Act and the nature of a wrongful death action indicates that
parent-child immunity should not preclude a wrongful death suit by
children against their parents, regardless of whether it is based on
negligent or intentional conduct.
When interpreting the Wrongful Death Act, the Court of Appeals
has stated that because the statute is "in derogation of the common
law, [it] must be construed strictly." '' This is a harsh rule consider-
ing that the United States Supreme Court has noted that "[d]eath
statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of the law
.... It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging process of
construction were to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to be
remedied." 182 Since the legislature adopted the Wrongful Death Act
to remedy an intolerable situation at common law,' the court's inter-
pretation of the statute should not frustrate this purpose.184 Permit-
ting a defendant to raise parent-child immunity as a defense against
the beneficiary foils the good intentions of the legislature to provide
the beneficiaries of the deceased with a cause of action.
A review of the language of Maryland's Wrongful Death Act fur-
ther supports the proposition that parent-child immunity should not
apply to the beneficiaries in a wrongful death action. Allowing par-
ent-child immunity to bar a beneficiary's wrongful death action be-
cause of his relationship to the tortfeasor leads to a bizarre result.
The Act categorizes a "child of the deceased" as a primary benefici-
180. See Annotation, Action Against Parent By or on Behalf of Unemancipated Minor Child for
Wrongful Death of Other Parent, 87 A.L.R.3D 849, 852-54 (1978) (discussing the ways in which
courts apply parent-child immunity to wrongful death actions).
181. State ex rel. Dunnigan v. Cobourn, 171 Md. 23, 25, 187 A. 881, 882 (1936) (citing
Allen v. Seff, 160 Md. 240, 153 A. 54 (1931); Demczuk v. Jenifer, 138 Md. 488, 114 A. 471
(1921); 2J.G. SUTHERLAND & JOHN LEwis, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION § 632,
at 1142 (2d ed. 1904)).
182. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., Inc., 300 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1937).
183. At common law, a tortfeasor who caused the death of another escaped civil liability
because the action died with the victim. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104
Md. 332, 333, 65 A. 49, 50 (1906).
184. Cf Barrett v. Charlson, 18 Md. App. 80, 91-93, 305 A.2d 166, 173-74 (1973) (inter-
preting an amendment to the Wrongful Death Act based on the intentions of the legisla-
ture, in addition to a literal reading).
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ary.185 Minor and adult children are not distinguished for the pur-
poses of pecuniary damage awards. 186 An adult child can recover
pecuniary damages from a parent because neither the Wrongful
Death Act nor the doctrine of parent-child immunity prevents recov-
ery. However, under the rule adopted in Eagan, parent-child immu-
nity may prevent a child from recovering damages in a wrongful death
suit against a parent. 187 This outcome seems contrary to common
sense because a minor child probably has less of an ability to support
herself than an adult child and therefore the minor child ought to be
able to recover for the economic losses occasioned by her parent's
death.
The indirect nature of a wrongful death action implies that par-
ent-child immunity should not apply to wrongful death beneficiaries
because the immunity precludes suits between parent and children
for direct injuries.188 A wrongful death suit is a suit to recover for the
beneficiaries' indirect injuries resulting from the defendant's actions
resulting in direct bodily injury to the decedent.189 The beneficiary in
a wrongful death action does not seek recovery for direct injuries in-
flicted by the defendant on the beneficiary. The Court of Appeals
recognized the indirect-direct distinction when it stated that damages
recovered for wrongful death do not belong to the "direct victim" and
are not measured in terms of the "direct victim['s]" injury. 9 °
While the wrongful death action is an action for indirect injuries,
the parent-child immunity doctrine was established in cases of direct
injuries. The great trilogy of cases from which the doctrine developed
all involved the application of the immunity in cases of direct injuries:
185. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-904(a) (Supp. 1998).
186. See id. § 3-904(c).
187. Eagan, 347 Md. at 82, 698 A.2d at 1102.
188. See infra note 189.
189. The Wrongful Death Act compensates for the pecuniary value of the life lost as well
as "mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort,
protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, gui-
dance, or education." CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-904(d). Compensation under the Act is not
based upon the decedent's pain and suffering that occurs as a direct result of the
tortfeasor's actions. See Minkin v. Minkin, 7 A.2d 461, 463 (Pa. 1939) (holding that despite
the doctrine of parent-child immunity, a minor can bring an action against a surviving
parent for the wrongful death of the other parent); Recent Case, 44 DICK. L. REV. 143, 143-
44 (1940) (stating that the court in Minkin permitted recovery because "the injury [was] an
indirect tort," and the common law rule precluding a child from suing his parent applied
only when a "personal tort" was involved).
190. United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 540, 620 A.2d 905, 909 (1993) ("[R]ecovery
for 'death' under the wrongful death act does not compensate for the 'personal injury' to
the direct victim of the tortious conduct.").
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mother commits daughter to insane asylum;' 9 ' parents corporeally
punish daughter; 9 2 father rapes daughter.'93 Each of these three
cases involved "personal injuries suffered at the hands of the par-
ent."1"4 Similarly, when the Court of Appeals adopted the immunity
in Schneider v. Schneider, the mother's personal injuries were received
directly as a result of her son's negligent driving.' 95 Since the Wrong-
ful Death Act applies to indirect injuries and the parent-child immu-
nity applies to direct injuries, the immunity should not prevent
wrongful death claims.
Unfortunately, the Eagan court ignored this indirect theory and
instead emphasized form over substance by focusing on the personal
nature of a wrongful death action.' 96 Substantively, a wrongful death
action between parent and child is more similar to a suit for injury to
property than a tort against a person.' 97 The property the child loses
is the pecuniary support from the parent she could have expected had
the parent lived.' Despite the threat to family harmony,109 parental
immunity has not barred property related causes of action between
parent and child.20 0 Because, in substance, the nature of a wrongful
death action is that of a suit for injury to property, parent-child immu-
nity should not extend to claimants under the Wrongful Death Act.
c. Recognizing a Mahnke Exception as a Matter of Law.-In
Eagan, the court departed, albeit slightly, from its previous interpreta-
tions of the doctrine of parent-child immunity and the Mahnke excep-
191. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text (discussing Hewlett v. George).
192. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing McKelvey v. McKelvey).
193. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (discussing Roller v. Roller).
194. Hewlett v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891).
195. Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 20, 152 A.2d 498, 499 (1930).
196. Eagan, 347 Md. at 82, 698 A.2d at 1102 (framing the question as to the applicability
of parent-child immunity in general to a wrongful death action in terms of the nonderiva-
tive character of the action).
197. See Minkin v. Minkin, 7 A.2d 461, 465 (1939) (Stern,J, concurring) ("An action for
damages resulting from a parent's death is to recover for a property loss-the deprivation of
support that would have been received from the deceased parent had he lived."). Recov-
ery for wrongful death is not intended to punish the tortfeasor. See Cohen v. Rubin, 55
Md. App. 83, 101-02, 460 A.2d 1046, 1056 (1983) (holding that punitive damages cannot
be recovered under the Wrongful Death Act).
198. Minkin, 7 A.2d at 465. See generally Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 560-61, 505 A.2d 826,
835-36 (1986) (discussing the statutory duty of parents to support and care for their
children).
199. McCurdy, supra note 35, at 1075 ("It is common knowledge that some of the most
acrimonious family disputes have arisen in respect to property.").
200. KEETON ET AL., supra note 107, § 122, at 904 ("In matters affecting property, causes
of action seem always to have been freely recognized on the part of either the parent or the
child." (footnotes & citations omitted)).
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tion. In its refusal to apply the Mahnke exception to all wrongful
death actions, the court reasoned that it is not the outcome of the
defendant's conduct that matters, but rather whether the conduct
rises beyond negligence to an intentional act.20 ' According to the
court, negligent killings may test the strength of the family but they do
not destroy the family.2 2 This position is consistent with previous de-
cisions applying parent-child immunity when the defendant's negli-
gence resulted in death.203
While refusing to recognize an exception to the immunity for all
wrongful death actions, the court did recognize an exception for a
specific category of wrongful death actions. The court held a wrong-
ful death action arising from the murder or voluntary manslaughter of
a spouse or child automatically fits within the Mahnke exception for
cruel and inhuman treatment.204 At first glance this holding seems to
be consistent with Mahnke because both Mahnke and Eagan involved
the murder of one parent by the other.205 However, Eagan lacks an
element that is present in Mahnke and stressed by later decisions as
well. The Mahnke court described the father's murder of his child's
mother and his suicide, both in the presence of the child, as a "tort
against an eyewitness. '2 6 Subsequent discussions of Mahnke that re-
fused to apply parent-child immunity also pointed out that the crimes
in Mahnke were committed in front of the child.2 7 The Eagan chil-
dren did not witness the death of their mother. In this sense, Eagan
expands upon the Mahnke exception by applying it to deaths not wit-
nessed by the children, contrary to the court's stated intention to nar-
rowly interpret Mahnke.2°s
201. Eagan, 347 Md. at 83, 698 A.2d at 1103.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 148-49, 571 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1990) (granting
a father immunity from a wrongful death suit by his wife for his negligent operation of an
automobile resulting in the death of his child); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 732-33, 272
A.2d 435, 442 (1971) (barring a father's action for damages for the death of his wife
caused by the daughter's negligence).
204. Eagan, 347 Md. at 85, 698 A.2d at 1104.
205. See id. at 77, 698 A.2d at 1100; Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 63, 77 A.2d 923, 924
(1951).
206. Mahnke, 197 Md. at 69, 77 A.2d at 927.
207. See Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. 1, 4, 403 A.2d 379, 381 (1979) (describ-
ing the violent facts in Mahnke in order to demonstrate what constitutes the complete
abandonment of the parental relationship and noting that the murder took place in the
presence of the child); Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 225, 388 A.2d 568, 571
(1978) (same).
208. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. at 4, 403 A.2d at 381 ("Mahnke does not represent an ex-
pandable exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine, but instead should be narrowly
construed." (citing Montz, 40 Md. App. at 224-25, 388 A.2d at 571)).
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A comparison of the injuries in Eagan and Mahnke further illus-
trates this difference. The Eagan children's injuries stemmed from
their loss of the economic support of their mother and the injury to
their feelings occasioned by the death of their mother.2 0 While the
child in Mahnke undoubtedly suffered similar injuries, her complaint
alleged injuries specifically connected to her horrific experience,
which was comparable to the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 210
Although the Eagan court appeared to expand upon the Mahnke
exception, the reformulation of Mahnke in criminal terms also af-
firmed previous decisions refusing to abrogate parent-child immunity
in cases of negligence and motor torts. In its clarification of the
Mahnke exception, the Eagan court did not include involuntary man-
slaughter within the types of killings constituting cruel and inhuman
treatment. 211 Involuntary manslaughter is "the killing of another un-
intentionally and without malice (1) in doing some unlawful act not
amounting to a felony, or (2) in negligently doing some act lawful in
itself, or (3) by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty."212
Courts in other jurisdictions have upheld the application of parent-
child immunity in cases involving involuntary manslaughter. 213 The
Eagan court also excluded manslaughter by automobile from its list of
acts constituting cruel and inhuman treatment. 2 14 Maryland courts
have consistently declined to create an exception to parent-child im-
munity for motor vehicle torts. 215 By holding that only murder and
209. Eagan, 347 Md. at 79, 698 A.2d at 1101.
210. Mahnke, 197 Md. at 63, 77 A.2d at 923.
211. Eagan, 347 Md. at 83, 698 A.2d at 1103.
212. Rolfes v. State, 10 Md. App. 204, 207, 268 A.2d 795, 796 (1970) (quoting State v.
Gibson, 4 Md. App. 236, 242, 242 A.2d 575, 578 (1968), affd, 254 Md. 399, 254 A.2d 691
(1969)).
213. See Perkins v. Robertson, 295 P.2d 972 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) ("We conclude
that the rule that unemancipated minors cannot sue a parent... also applies to wrongful
death actions based on negligence." (citing Strong v. Strong, 267 P.2d 240 (Nev. 1954),
overruLed by Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Nev. 1974) ("Strong erroneously held
that Nevada's wrongful death statute did not repeat the common law rule of immunity of
the parent from suit by a minor child. There is no common law rule of parental immu-
nity." (citation omitted)))).
214. Eagan, 347 Md. at 83, 698 A.2d at 1103. Manslaughter by automobile is a misde-
meanor for "causing the death of another as the result of the driving, operation or control
of an automobile.., or other vehicle in a grossly negligent manner." MD. ANN. CODE art.
23, § 388 (Supp. 1998).
215. See, e.g., Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 627, 650 A.2d 252, 256 (1994); Frye v.
Frye, 305 Md. 542, 566, 505 A.2d 826, 838 (1986); Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 125-
26, 128 A.2d 617, 626-27 (1957); Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 224, 388 A.2d 568,
570 (1978); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 725, 272 A.2d 435, 438 (1971).
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voluntary manslaughter fall within the Mahnke exception as a matter
of law, the Court of Appeals adhered to its precedent.
While not disputing the cruelty and inhumaneness of murder
and voluntary manslaughter, it is interesting to note that the court did
not raise the "malicious and wanton wrongs" exception established in
Mahnke. A possible reason for the court's omission is that by defini-
tion, murder, but not manslaughter, rises to the level of a malicious
and wanton wrong.2 1 6 A second reason may be that the malicious and
wanton wrong exception only exists when the parent directly injures
the child either physically or by forcing the child to witness the perpe-
tration of the acts, as in Mahnke. Finally, the omission of the excep-
tion may have been an innocent oversight.
Thus, the Eagan court added greater clarification to the Mahnke
exception for cruel and inhuman treatment. Anytime a child sues for
the wrongful death of a parent, parent-child immunity does not apply
as a matter of law if the claim is based upon the murder or voluntary
manslaughter of one parent by the other.21 7
5. Conclusion.-In Eagan v. Calhoun, the Court of Appeals assists
future cases by clarifying that the Mahnke exception to parent-child
immunity applies as a matter of law to wrongful death actions brought
for murder or voluntary manslaughter. Unfortunately, the decision
affirms the status quo in Maryland by refusing to recognize the failure
of the policies underlying parent-child immunity, thereby assuring an
uphill battle for children who seek civil redress for wrongs inflicted
upon them by their parents.
AIMkE M. ACETO
B. Silent Application of a Limited Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in the
State of Maryland
In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Flippo,218 the Court of Appeals
considered whether the defendant, Baltimore Gas and Electric Com-
pany (BGE), could be held liable for injuries sustained by a nine-year-
old boy who unintentionally made contact with overhead electrical
wires owned by BGE that ran through a tree he was climbing.2 1 9 The
216. See Lindsay v. State, 8 Md. App. 100, 104 n.4, 258 A.2d 760, 763 n.4 (1969) ("The
essential distinction between murder and manslaughter.., is the presence or absence of
malice." (omission in original) (citing Chisley v. State, 202 Md. 87, 95 A.2d 577 (1953))).
217. Eagan, 347 Md. at 85, 698 A.2d at 1104.
218. 348 Md. 680, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998).
219. See id. at 688, 705 A.2d at 1148.
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Court of Appeals held that the traditional Maryland trespasser liability
rule22 ° did not apply to the circumstances of this case, 221 because
Flippo had the status of a licensee by invitation as to the tree at the
time he made contact with BGE's wire. 2 2 2 The court used an ordinary
negligence standard instead of looking to traditional landowner liabil-
ity rules. 223 The court overruled Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Lane,
2 24
Murphy v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.,2 25 Mondshour v. Moore226 Grube
v. Mayor of Baltimore,227 and State ex rel. Stansfield v. Chesapeake & Poto-
mac Telephone Co.2 2 8 to the extent those cases could be read as holding
that the defendants owed no duty of care to plaintiffs who were not
trespassers on the real property but who injured themselves by coming
into contact with the defendants' personal property located
thereon. 229 In so doing, the Court of Appeals has silently adopted a
limited attractive nuisance doctrine applicable to children who have a
right to be on the real property but injure themselves as a result of
trespass to personal property of another located on the premises.
1. The Case.--On October 1, 1992, J.J. Flippo (Flippo), a nine-
year-old boy, and his sister were playing with other children in Rich-
ard and Christine Gaineses' backyard. 23" Two of the children, Flippo
and Robbie Gaines, decided to climb a white pine tree located near
the rear property line.2 1 There was evidence that Flippo and Gaines
220. Id. at 689, 705 A.2d at 1148 (noting that in Maryland the only duty owed to trespass-
ers on real property, even those of "tender years," is to "not willfully or wantonly injure or
entrap the trespasser" (citing Murphy v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 290 Md. 186, 190, 428
A.2d 459, 462-63 (1981)).
221. Id. at 694, 705 A.2d at 1151.
222. Id. at 695, 705 A.2d at 1151.
223. Id. at 699, 705 A.2d at 1153.
224. 338 Md. 34, 656 A.2d 307 (1995), holding limited by Hippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d
at 1151.
225. 290 Md. 186, 428 A.2d 459 (1981), holding limited by Flippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d
at 1151.
226. 256 Md. 617, 261 A.2d 482 (1970), holding limited by Hippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d
at 1151.
227. 132 Md. 355, 103 A. 948 (1918), holding limited by Hippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at
1151.
228. 123 Md. 120, 91 A. 149 (1914), holding limited by Hippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at
1151.
229. Hippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at 1151; see also id. at 696, 705 A.2d at 1152 (distin-
guishing Lane, Murphy, Mondshour, Grube, and Stansfield on the ground that the plaintiffs in
those cases "intentionally trespassed on real property or made contact with the property of
the defendant in a manner that may have constituted contributory negligence or assump-
tion of risk as a matter of law").
230. Id. at 687, 705 A.2d at 1147.
231. Id.
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had permission to climb the tree.232 Since 1967, BGE has had an ease-
ment giving it a right-of-way over the rear boundaries of the Gaines
property where the tree is located, 23 3 and, consequently, there were
two high voltage electric wires running through the upper branches of
the tree. 2 4 Flippo had climbed more than halfway up the tree when
his foot slipped and he began to fall.235 As he fell, he reached out
with his hand and made contact with one of the electrical wires. 236 As
a result, Flippo sustained severe burns2 37 to his hands and left foot.
238
In 1993, Flippo's mother filed a negligence suit against BGE in
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County seeking damages for her
son's injuries. 239 The suit alleged that BGE was negligent in its failure
to trim the tree that Flippo had been climbing when he came into
contact with the electrical wire.24" At trial, the jury returned a verdict
for Flippo and awarded $487,516 in compensatory damages. 241 How-
ever, because there was insufficient evidence to support some of the
money awarded for Flippo's future medical expenses, the trial court
reduced the award to $483,162.242 BGE appealed the decision to the
Court of Special Appeals, asserting that the trial court had committed
ten reversible errors.243 The Court of Special Appeals upheld the cir-
cuit court decision in favor of Flippo. 244 The court held that because
the Plaintiff's contact with the electrical wire was "not an intentional
or volitional act," he was not a trespasser on BGE's personal prop-
erty.245 Therefore, BGE was not entitled to jury instructions relating
232. Id.
233. Id. at 687 n.2, 705 A.2d at 1147 n.2.
234. Id. at 687, 705 A.2d at 1147. BGE knew that the tree in the Gaineses' yard was one
that the children might be likely to climb. See id. at 702, 705 A.2d at 1155 (finding "that
the white pine tree Flippo was climbing was easy to climb and that BGE was aware of the
existence of such climbable trees"); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 112 Md. App. 75,
89, 684 A.2d 456, 463 (1996) (stating that evidence at trial showed that the tree had "low,
ladder-like branches, particularly those that children are likely to come in contact with in
residential neighborhoods" and that BGE had classified the tree as "climbable"), afJrd, 348
Md. 680, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998).
235. Hippo, 348 Md. at 687, 705 A.2d at 1147.
236. Id.
237. Id.; Fippo, 112 Md. App. at 81, 684 A.2d at 459.
238. See Brief and Appendix of Appellant at 5-6, Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 348
Md. 680, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998) (No. 4).
239. See Hippo, 348 Md. at 686, 705 A.2d at 1147.
240. Id. at 687, 705 A.2d at 1147.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Hippo, 112 Md. App. at 80-81, 684 A.2d at 458.
244. Id. at 81, 684 A.2d at 458-59.
245. Id. at 85-87, 684 A.2d at 461 (stating that while "no tortious intent.., is required in
order for one to be a trespasser," volition, i.e., "a conscious intent to do the act that consti-
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to the amount of care owed by a landowner to a trespasser. 24 6 The
court also determined that because of the foreseeability of harm to
young children who might be lured by the low-lying branches to climb
the tree and come into contact with the electrical wires, "a jury could
reasonably conclude that the duty of BGE to exercise a high degree of
attention and care24 7 included the duty to 'trim, top, or cut down"'
the tree.2 4 s The court also stated that the trial court provided ade-
quate jury instructions concerning contributory negligence. 249 Fur-
thermore, the court held that because BGE suffered no prejudice
from the omission ofjury instructions concerning assumption of risk,
it did not constitute reversible error.
250
BGE appealed the Court of Special Appeals's decision. The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider: (1) whether Flippo's
unintentional contact with the wire during the fall constituted a tres-
pass on BGE's personal property as a matter of law; (2) whether BGE
had a duty to identify and trim "climbable" trees located near its elec-
trical wires that are located in residential areas; (3) whether Flippo's
knowledge of both the dangers of electricity and the presence of over-
head wires prior to climbing the tree constituted contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law; and (4) whether the court erred in refusing
tutes the entry upon someone else's real or personal property," is required and that there-
fore "[a]n involuntary entry onto another's property is not a trespass").
246. Id. at 87, 684 A.2d at 462. BGE had requested that the jury be instructed that a
trespass will exist even if the contact with the personal property was accidental or inadver-
tent. Furthermore, BGE wanted the jury to be instructed that this rule applied to personal
property regardless of the plaintiffs status in relation to the real property and regardless of
the plaintiffs age. Id, 684 A.2d at 461-62.
247. See id. at 88, 684 A.2d at 462 ("The primary rule relative to the diligence required of
electric companies, running through all of the decisions, is that they must observe such
care as is commensurate with the danger involved." (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v. Corbett, 227 Md. 411, 425, 177 A.2d 701, 709
(1962))).
248. Id. at 90-91, 684 A.2d at 463 (reasoning that BGE's classification of the tree Flippo
climbed when he injured himself as climbable demonstrated that BGE had at least "im-
plied cognizance of reasonably foreseeable harm" to children in the area).
249. Id. at 92-93, 684 A.2d at 464 (concluding the jury instruction on contributory negli-
gence was "both accurate and adequate" because "[i]t informed the jury that the plaintiff
cannot recover if his own negligence is a cause of his injury-not the sole cause, not a
major cause-but a cause").
250. Id. at 96-97, 684 A.2d at 466. While contributory negligence is based on an objec-
tive standard, the assumption of risk defense would have required the heavier burden of
proof that Flippo actually knew that the electrical wires were located overhead running
through the tree and that he actually appreciated the danger of those wires before he
decided to climb the tree. Since the trial court had submitted the issue of contributory
negligence to the jury, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Flippo, the Court of
Special Appeals found no reversible error. Id.
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to give jury instructions on assumption of risk, even though it in-
structed the jury on contributory negligence.251
2. Legal Background.-In Baltimore Gas & Electric v. Flippo, the
Court of Appeals stated that it overruled five of its previous decisions
relating to the duty owed to an individual who comes into contact with
and is subsequently injured by the personal property of another to the
extent that these opinions could be read as holding that no duty is
owed to individuals who had a right to be on the real property where
the personal property was located.252 Examination of these five deci-
sions demonstrates the evolution of Maryland's landowner liability
rules, shifting from a strict application at the beginning of the century
to an analysis closely approximating the attractive nuisance doctrine
in Flippo.25 3
Prior to the Court of Appeals's decision in Flippo, Maryland stood
as the only state that refused to recognize any form of an attractive
nuisance doctrine. 254 The Supreme Court first discussed the attrac-
251. Flippo, 348 Md. at 688, 705 A.2d at 1148.
252. Id. at 695, 705 A.2d at 1151.
253. Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing
thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor
knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know
and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death
or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area
made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden
of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children in-
volved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or
otherwise to protect the children.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1966). The rule set forth in section 339 is com-
monly referred to as the "attractive nuisance" doctrine. Id. cmt. b. The Court of Appeals
has consistently refused to adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine. See infra notes 254-264
and accompanying text.
254. See 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAw OF TORTS § 27.5, at 166 n. 27 (2d ed. 1986)
(commenting that while Vermont and Ohio have also not affirmatively recognized an at-
tractive nuisance doctrine, these jurisdictions have come to recognize some form of a duty
of care to trespassers whose presence is known or reasonably anticipated by the land-
owner); Holly L. Drumheller, Note, Maryland's Rejection of Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 55
MD. L. REv. 807, 807 (1996) (discussing the Maryland Court of Appeals's refusal "to follow
the national trend of accepting the attractive nuisance doctrine" in Baltimore Gas &Electric
Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 656 A.2d 307 (1995)).
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tive nuisance doctrine in the landmark case of Railroad Co. v. Stout.25 5
The Court began the opinion by stating that children should not be
judged by the same standards as an adult.256 The case involved a
young boy who injured himself while playing on one of the railroad's
unlocked turntables.2 5 7 The Court stated that the railroad company
knew or should have known that the turntable would be an appealing
play item for the children. 25 8 Furthermore, the Court concluded that
the danger could have been eliminated without great expense to the
railroad company by replacing the broken lock on the turntable.2 59
Thus, although the boy trespassed on both the real and personal
property of the railroad company, the Court recognized that sufficient
evidence existed of negligence on the part of the railroad company
for a jury to find in favor of the child.26 °
The Maryland Court of Appeals first faced the attractive nuisance
issue in Mergenthaler v. Kirby.2 6 1 In that case, a twelve-year-old boy in-
jured himself while stealing scrap metal from the defendant's fac-
tory.26 2 The Court of Appeals distinguished its opinion from Stout by
noting the illegal purpose of the child's trespass.26" Thus, the Court
of Appeals determined that the child's status as a thief barred his
recovery.2 6 4
In keeping with this early decision in Mergenthaler, Maryland has
traditionally followed a landowner liability system of classification in
analyzing the duty owed to individuals injured on or by the property
of another.26 5 This analysis places individuals into four categories,
each imposing a different legal duty of care: invitee, licensee by invi-
tation, bare licensee, and trespasser.2 66 Because invitees remain on
255. 84 U.S. 657 (1873).
256. Il at 660 (explaining that while an adult must be free from fault in order to re-
cover in an action alleging negligence of another, "[t]he care and caution required of a
child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each
case by the circumstances of that case").
257. Id. at 658.
258. Id. at 662.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 663.
261. 79 Md. 182, 28 A. 1065 (1894).
262. Id. at 183, 28 A. at 1066.
263. Id. at 186, 28 A. at 1067.
264. Id. (explaining that where an individual is engaged in a criminal act against the
defendant while trespassing on the defendant's property, he is afforded no protection
from the defendant).
265. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 44, 656 A.2d 307, 312 (1995)
(citing Wagner v. Doehring, 315 Md. 97, 101-02, 553 A.2d 684 (1989)), holding limited by
Flippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at 1151.
266. Id.
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the premises for purposes related to the landowner's business, the
landowner must exercise reasonable care towards his invitees in assur-
ing the safety of the premises. 267 A typical social guest is classified as a
licensee by invitation, and as such he "takes the premises as his host
uses them."26 8 A licensee by invitation is owed a duty of reasonable
care, and the landowner must warn of known dangerous conditions
on the premises that would not normally be discovered.269 While a
licensee by invitation is a social guest, a bare licensee enters the prem-
ises with the consent of the landowner but "for his or her own conven-
ience or purpose."270 Trespassers enter the property of others without
their consent or without any privilege to do so. 2 71 A landowner owes
no duty to bare licensees or trespassers "except to refrain from will-
fully or wantonly injuring or entrapping" them.2 72 However, a land-
owner may not "create new and undisclosed sources of danger without
warning the licensee," thus providing a slightly greater level of protec-
tion to the bare licensee over the mere trespasser.273
Because one may be injured either on the real or personal prop-
erty of another, two points must be considered in determining the
scope of the duty owed to an injured party. First, there is no distinc-
tion between the duty owed to someone injured by contact with real
property from that which is owed to one injured by personal prop-
erty.274 Second, a duty of care towards others arises from the posses-
267. See Wagner, 315 Md. at 102, 553 A.2d at 686 ("A landowner must use reasonable and
ordinary care to keep the premises safe for an invitee, defined as one permitted to remain
on the premises for purposes related to the owner's business." (citing Bramble v. Thomp-
son, 264 Md. 518, 521, 287 A.2d 265, 267 (1972))); Bramble, 264 Md. at 521, 287 A.2d at
267 ("The owner must use reasonable and ordinary care to keep his premises safe for the
invitee and to protect the invitee from injury caused by an unreasonable risk which the
invitee, by exercising ordinary care for his own safety, will not discover." (citing Morrison v.
Suburban Trust Co., 213 Md. 64, 68-69, 130 A.2d 915, 917 (1957); Peregoy v. Western Md.
R.R. Co., 202 Md. 203, 207, 95 A.2d 867, 869 (1953))).
268. Bramble, 264 Md. at 521, 287 A.2d at 267.
269. See Wagner, 315 Md. at 102, 553 A.2d at 686; Bramble, 264 Md. at 521-22, 287 A.2d at
267.
270. Wagner, 315 Md. at 102, 553 A.2d at 686-87.
271. I., 553 A.2d at 687.
272. Id. (noting that "the rule limiting liability to trespassers permits 'a person to use his
own land in his own way, without the burden of watching for and protecting those who
come there without permission or right'" (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 58, at 395 (5th ed. 1984))).
273. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co.,
282 Md. 238, 242, 384 A.2d 76, 79 (1978)).
274. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 44-45, 656 A.2d 307, 312 (1995)
(explaining that "landowner" or "premises" liability often overlooks the fact that "[t]he
same principles apply to personal property as to real property" (citing Murphy v. Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co., 290 Md. 186, 191 n.3, 428 A.2d 459, 463 n.3 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
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sion of the real or personal property at issue, rather than from
ownership.275
In State ex rel. Stansfield v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.,2 76
the Court of Appeals held that the defendant utility company was not
liable for the death of an adult individual who climbed a telephone
pole to retrieve a lost kitten and came into contact with "insufficiently
insulated wires."27 7 Because it was located in front of an individual's
home, he had a right to be on the property surrounding the pole but
not on the actual pole itself.27" The court held that because of the
inherent dangers of the utility pole, the telephone company intended
ascent of the pole to be limited to its employees;279 permission to
climb the pole did not extend by implied invitation to those living in
the immediate vicinity of the pole. 2 0 Therefore, the court held that
the plaintiff's decedent was, if not a trespasser, at best a mere licensee
with regard to the utility pole "to whom the defendant would owe only
the duty to avoid exposing [him] willfully to the risk of injury."281
Thus, the defendant was held not liable.28 2 The court noted that re-
covery would not be barred in instances where an individual enjoys a
more protected status than trespasser or mere licensee and is injured
by something that the utility company would consider a reasonably
foreseeable danger.
28 3
OND) OF TORTS § 217 cmt. a (1966))), holding limited by Flippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at
1511.
275. See id. at 45, 656 A.2d at 312 (stating "it is the possession of property, not the owner-
ship, from which the duty flows").
276. 123 Md. 120, 91 A. 149 (1914), holding limited by Hippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at
1151.
277. Id. at 123, 91 A. at 150. The utility pole had spikes projecting from it for use in
maintaining the pole which may have facilitated climbing by unauthorized individuals. Id.
at 122-23, 81 A. at 149-50.
278. Id. at 122, 91 A. at 149.
279. Id. at 125, 91 A. at 150.
280. Id. The plaintiff argued that the spikes projecting from the pole:
operated as an invitation to the public, and more particularly to the owners and
occupiers of the abutting properties, to ascend the pole by means of the spikes,
whenever they might have occasion to do so for any proper purpose, and espe-
cially for the preservation of the life of animals or human beings, or for the recov-
ery of personal property.
Id. at 122, 91 A. at 149.
281. Id. at 124, 91 A. at 150.
282. Id. at 127, 91 A. at 151.
283. See id. (noting that liability would attach in situations where "the persons involved
in the accidents were not trespassers or mere licensees on the defendant's property, but
were in adjacent positions where they could rightfully be, and where they might be reason-
ably expected to come in close proximity to the source of danger"); see supra notes 265-273
and accompanying text (describing the varying duties owed by a property owner to persons
on his property).
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Following Stansfield, the court next considered the duty owed to a
child injured because he trespassed on the personal property of a util-
ity company. In Grube v. Mayor of Baltimore,2 4 the Court of Appeals
considered the liability of city officials and the electric company for
injuries sustained by a ten-year-old boy who climbed an electric pole
located in a school yard.285 The boy climbed the electric pole to
watch a summer baseball game and slipped, grabbing an electrical
wire as he fell.2 86 The accident caused severe burns on the boy's hand
and a fractured skull from the subsequent fall.28 7 School officials had
taken precautions to remove low-lying maintenance access spikes on
the pole in order to deter children playing after school hours from
climbing on it.288 The Grube court interpreted Stansfield as "conclu-
sively establish [ing]" that the defendant utility company could not be
held liable, noting that the only exception to this would be if the court
recognized the attractive nuisance doctrine based on the plaintiff's
young age. 289 The court, however, declined to apply the doctrine in
this case, when the boy knew or should have known that he did not
have permission to climb the pole.29 ° While the boy had a right to be
in the school yard, the act of climbing the pole made him a trespasser
with respect to the electric company's personal property.29 1 In af-
firming the lower court's judgment in favor of the defendants by re-
jecting the attractive nuisance doctrine, the court stated:
Children should receive all reasonable protection from the
courts, but however much such an injury as this boy sus-
tained is to be regretted, it does not justify mulcting inno-
cent people or corporations in damages for injuries
sustained by a boy over [ten] years of age who had no right
to do what he did do, and who did it in a way that shows he
knew he had no right to do it.29 2
By refusing to treat the boy any differently than the adult in Stansfield,
the Grube court established Maryland's rule of rejecting the applica-
284. 132 Md. 355, 103 A. 948 (1918), holding limited by liippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at
1151.
285. Id. at 356, 103 A. at 949.
286. Id. at 357, 103 A. at 949.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 356, 103 A. at 949.
289. Id. at 358, 103 A. at 949.
290. Id. at 361, 103 A. at 951 ("The doctrines of attractive nuisances .. .may be justly
applied in some cases, but in this case we can find no just or reasonable ground upon
which a recovery can be had.").
291. Id. at 359-60, 103 A. at 950.
292. Id. at 361, 103 A. at 951.
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tion of the attractive nuisance doctrine to child trespassers on real and
personal property.
In Mondshour v. Moore,293 the court declined to adopt the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine where the plaintiff child trespassed on the mo-
tor vehicle of another.294 In that case, a six-year-old boy sustained
injuries when he was pulled under the wheel of a bus as he showed his
friend a "trick" that involved climbing on top of the rear wheel of the
bus while it was stopped at an intersection.29 The plaintiff recog-
nized that Maryland had long held that "[t] he owner of land owes not
duty to a trespasser or licensee, even one of tender years, except to
abstain from wilful or wanton misconduct and entrapment,
'296 but
urged the court to reject the rule to the extent it would deny recovery
to a child injured by the chattels of another because he was a tres-
passer as to the chattel.297 The court characterized the plaintiffs ar-
gument as essentially calling for application of the attractive nuisance
doctrine. 98 However, the court adhered strictly to its application of
traditional premises liability rules in labeling the child a trespasser
and determining there was no liability on the part of the defendant
bus company.2 99 The court found that the child's own negligence in
performing his "trick" caused his injuries, not a breach of any duty
owed to him by the bus company.3 0 0 Furthermore, the court reiter-
ated its position that there is no distinction between trespass to realty
and trespass to chattels for purposes of determining the duty owed by
293. 256 Md. 617, 261 A.2d 482 (1970), holding limited by Fippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d
at 1151.
294. Id. at 620, 261 A.2d at 483 (noting that even in the jurisdictions which have ac-
cepted the attractive nuisance doctrine, it will not be applied to situations involving a
child's encounter with automobiles or other motor vehicles).
295. Id. at 619, 261 A.2d at 483.
296. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fopma v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 254 Md. 232, 234, 254 A.2d 351, 352 (1969) (per curiam); Herring v. Christen-
sen, 252 Md. 240, 241,249 A.2d 718, 719 (1969); Levine v. Miller, 218 Md. 74, 79, 145 A.2d
418, 421 (1958)).
297. See id. at 619-20, 261 A.2d at 483.
298. Id. at 620, 261 A.2d at 483; see supra note 253 (quoting the Restatement's definition
of the attractive nuisance doctrine).
299. Mondshour, 256 Md. at 623, 261 A.2d at 485. The court stated:
[I]t is, in the end, far better that the established rules of law should be strictly
applied, even though in particular instances serious loss may be thereby inflicted
on some individuals, than that by subtle distinctions invented and resorted to
solely to escape such consequences, long settled and firmly fixed doctrines should
be shaken, questioned, confused or doubted.
Id. (quoting Demuth v. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315, 320, 37 A. 266, 266 (1897) (citing
Lovejoy v. Irelan, 17 Md. 525, 527 (1861))).
300. Id.
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the owner to an individual injured by contact with the property."0 '
While the court recognized the unfortunate nature of the child's inju-
ries, it placed greater importance on continuity and stability "in the
administration of the law."3 0 2
In Murphy v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 30 3 the court considered
two appeals dealing with landowner liability in one opinion.0 4 The
first appellant asked the court to adopt the attractive nuisance doc-
trine in order to hold the owners of a pond liable for the drowning
death of a child from a neighboring apartment building.0 5 However,
the court relied on Maryland precedent expressly rejecting the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine to deny the appellant's claim.30 6 The court
made clear that "if there is to be a change in the law with respect to
the duty owed a trespasser by a property owner . . . the Legislature
should make it."30
7
The second appellant received an electric shock when he
reached into an electric transformer box, which he believed to be a
garbage bin, in search of his missing CB radio.30" Although the appel-
lant made contact with the transformer under the mistaken belief that
it was a safe container, the court found that he was a trespasser on
BGE's personal property, and barred him from recovering for his
injuries.3 0 9
Both appellants in Murphy asked the court to consider aban-
doning the traditional landowner liability categories in favor of a gen-
eral negligence standard.1 0 The court declined in both instances,
finding those categories to be so deeply rooted in Maryland law as to
301. See id. at 622-23, 261 A.2d at 485 (quoting State ex rel. Altson v. Baltimore Fidelity
Warehouse Co., 176 Md. 341, 347-48, 4 A.2d 739, 742-43 (1939) (citing Jefferson v. Bir-
mingham Ry. & Elec. Co., 22 So. 546 (Ala. 1896); Gayv. Essex Elec. St. Ry. Co., 34 N.E. 186
(Mass. 1893); Rushenberg v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 19 S.W. 216 (Mo.
1891); Emerson v. Peteler, 29 N.W. 311 (Minn. 1886); Bishop v. Union R.R. Co., 14 R.I.
314 (1884); Hughes v. Macfie, 2 Hurl. & Colt. 744 (1863))).
302. See id. at 624, 261 A.2d at 485 (reasoning that necessary changes should be made by
the legislature, not by the courts (quoting Demuth, 85 Md. at 319-20, 37 A. at 266)).
303. 290 Md. 186, 428 A.2d 459 (1981), holding limited by Flippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d
at 1151.
304. Id. at 187-88, 428 A.2d at 461.
305. Id. at 193, 428 A.2d at 464.
306. Id. at 195, 428 A.2d at 465 (citing Osterman v. Peters, 260 Md. 313, 315, 272 A.2d
21, 22 (1971); Hensley v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 258 Md. 397, 411, 265 A.2d 897, 905
(1970)).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 188-89, 428 A.2d at 461-62.
309. Id. at 193, 428 A.2d at 464.
310. Id. at 191, 428 A.2d at 463.
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require no explanation for their necessityY11 However, in a separate
opinion, Judge Davidson declared that it was time for Maryland "to
abolish judicially-determined status distinctions as the sole determi-
nant of the standard of care owed by an owner or occupier of land to
an injured party" in favor of an ordinary negligence standard, applied
to trespassers as well as invitees and licensees, that takes into consider-
ation foreseeability and whether the owner exercised reasonable care
under all of the circumstances.312
The court inched closer to its holding in Flippo as it reviewed the
duty owed to a child injured through contact with the personal prop-
erty of another. In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Lane,3 13 the court
considered whether BGE owed a duty to a child who was injured when
he rolled down a hill at a playground on one of BGE's empty wooden
cable spools. 314 Several boys took an empty spool from the work site
and pushed it onto a playground where they took turns riding it down
a hill.315 After the plaintiff witnessed the other boys playing with the
spool, he unsuccessfully attempted to ride it, but became frightened
and fell off as the spool rolled over him.31 6 In considering whether
the child was a trespasser on BGE's spool, the court noted that "[i] t is
possible ... for a person to trespass upon personal property without
trespassing on the real property upon which the personal property
sits." '31 7 The boy was properly classified as an invitee with respect to
the public playground where BGE's spool rested.3 18 However, the
court also noted that there was a question whether BGE was in posses-
sion of the spool and exercising adequate control over it at the time of
the accident.319 If BGE had lost possession of the spool, then the
311. Id. The court explained:
The basis for the existing allocation of responsibility between owner and tres-
passer, reaffirmed today, has so frequently been broadcast by this Court over the
last century that it would be superfluous to do more here than refer those inter-
ested to the cases earlier cited and the authorities relied on in each.
Id.
312. Id. at 201-02, 428 A.2d at 468 (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
313. 338 Md. 34, 656 A.2d 307 (1995), holding limited by Fippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d
at 1151.
314. Id. at 40, 656 A.2d at 310. In the days prior to the accident, BGE was involved with
a construction project in an area that included both a day care center and playground. Id.
315. Id. at 41, 656 A.2d at 310.
316. Id. at 41-42, 656 A.2d at 310.
317. Id. at 45, 656 A.2d at 312 (citing Mondshour v. Moore, 256 Md. 617, 619-20, 261
A.2d 482 (1970); Grube v. Mayor of Baltimore, 132 Md. 355, 103 A. 948 (1918); State ex rel.
Stansfield v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 123 Md. 120, 91 A. 149 (1914)).
318. Id. at 40, 656 A.2d at 310 (explaining that the boy resided at Meade Village Hous-
ing Project, which owned the playground).
319. Id. at 47-48, 656 A.2d at 313-14.
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plaintiff could not have been a trespasser.32 Thus the jury could con-
sider "whether BGE, as a former possessor of the spool, breache [d] a
duty of care by failing to maintain adequate control over the spool." ''
While the court found that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude
that BGE no longer maintained possession of the spool at the time of
the accident, the court's decision was consistent with its earlier deci-
sions in Murphy, Mondshour, Grube, and Stansfield that a possessor of
personal property owes no duty of care to trespassers injured through
contact with that property.322
In a concurring opinion joined by Judge Bell, Judge Chasanow
pushed the court towards adoption of the attractive nuisance doctrine
in the case where children are injured trespassing on personal prop-
erty that is left on real property where the children have a right to
be.323 Judge Chasanow believed that the plaintiff was trespassing on
BGE's spool, but argued that the court should not extend the real
property principle, that an owner of land owes no duty to trespassers,
to children "who are invited onto land, but who may be trespassing on
chattels."324 He believed that because of the circumstances attendant
in those cases where the objects contacted by the children did not fit
in the category of an attractive nuisance, 25 adopting this limited ap-
plication of the attractive nuisance doctrine would not be inconsistent
with the court's previous rulings in Stansfield, Grube, and Mondshour.26
The majority opinion in Lane, like the opinions in Murphy, Mond-
shour, Grube, and Stansfield, adhered to the traditional landowner lia-
bility principle that one may be a trespasser to personal property even
though they are not trespassing on the real property surrounding
it.3 27 Because the majority of the Lane court determined that the
child had not trespassed upon BGE's abandoned spool, it never con-
sidered an application of the attractive nuisance doctrine. 28 Thus,
320. Id. ("A person cannot trespass to property unless another person has possession of
the property.").
321. Id. at 48, 656 A.2d at 314.
322. Id. (discussing the holdings of these previous cases in relation to the instant case).
323. See id. at 58, 656 A.2d at 318 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
324. Id. at 54, 656 A.2d at 316.
325. Id. at 60-62, 656 A.2d at 319-20 (explaining that the bus wheel in Mondshour and the
utility poles involved in Grube and Stansfield were not attractive nuisances likely to prompt
children to trespass on the personal property).
326. Id. at 62-63, 656 A.2d at 320-21.
327. Lane, 338 Md. at 44-45, 656 A.2d at 312 (citing Murphy v. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co., 290 Md. 186, 191 n.3, 428 A.2d 459, 463 n.3 (1981); Mondshour v. Moore, 256 Md.
617, 619-20, 261 A.2d 482, 483 (1970); Grube v. Mayor of Baltimore, 132 Md. 355, 103 A.
948 (1918); State ex rel. Stansfield v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 123 Md. 120, 91 A.
149 (1914)).
328. Id. at 47-48, 656 at 313-14.
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prior to Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Flippo, the Court of Appeals both
maintained the position that the trespasser liability rule applied to
those trespassing on personal property even if they were not trespass-
ers on the land on which the real property was located and continued
to reject the attractive nuisance doctrine.
3. The Court's Reasoning. -In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Flippo,
the Court of Appeals declined to apply the principle limiting liability
to trespassers in cases involving personal property when the plaintiff is
a social guest on the real property on which the personal property is
located.3 29 Because he was a social guest of the Gaines family, the
court initially classified Flippo as a licensee by invitation on their real
property.330 The court then determined that because BGE had a
nonexclusive easement over the Gaineses' property and Flippo was
rightfully located on that property, BGE could not prevent Flippo
from playing in the tree.3 3 1 Thus, Flippo could not be classified as a
trespasser on BGE's easement.332 However, because the court an-
nounced a new rule regarding plaintiffs trespassing on personal, but
not real, property, it did not need to answer the question whether
Flippo could be considered a trespasser as to BGE's electrical wire. 33
The new rule provided that when a plaintiff trespasses on personal
property but not on the real property where it is located, the tradi-
tional landowner liability rules limiting a property owner's liability to
the trespasser will not apply.334 Instead, the court applied an ordinary
negligence standard to determine whether BGE owed a legal duty to
trim the trees in close proximity to its overhead wires.3 3 5 Because
BGE could have reasonably foreseen that a child could be injured by
coming into contact with its wires while climbing the tree in the
Gainses' backyard, the court reasoned that a jury could find that the
utility company had a duty to either trim the tree or, in the alterna-
tive, to insulate the wires running through the upper branches of the
tree to prevent such accidents from occurring.336 Judge Chasanow,
writing for the majority, noted that the court's decision to uphold
BGE's liability for Flippo's injuries based on principles of ordinary
329. Flippo, 348 Md. at 699, 705 A.2d at 1153.
330. Id. at 689, 705 A.2d at 1148; see supra notes 265-273 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Maryland's landowner liability categories).
331. Flippo, 348 Md. at 689, 705 A.2d at 1148.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 694, 705 A.2d at 1150-51.
334. Id. at 694, 705 A.2d at 1151.
335. Id. at 699, 705 A.2d at 1153.
336. Id. at 702, 705 A.2d 1154-55.
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negligence was consistent with the holdings on similar issues in other
jurisdictions.337 Recognizing that its holding may be inconsistent with
its previous holdings in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Lane,33 Murphy
v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.,339 Mondshour v. Moore,14' Grube v. Mayor
of Baltimore,41 and State ex rel. Stansfield v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tele-
phone Co.,34 2 the court overruled those cases to the extent that they
were inconsistent with its new rule.343
BGE raised contributory negligence as a defense, arguing that
Flippo knew that electrical wires ran overhead in close proximity to
the tree.144 BGE also highlighted the fact that Flippo understood the
dangers associated with overhead electrical wires. 345 However, the
court rejected BGE's argument that Flippo was contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law.34 6 The court explained that in order to prove
that someone was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, it must
be shown that the individual engaged in "some prominent and deci-
sive act which directly contributed to the accident and which was of
such a character as to leave no room for difference of opinion
thereon by reasonable minds. '3 47 Because there was conflicting testi-
mony at trial as to whether Flippo knew or should have known there
were dangerous electrical wires running through the upper branches
of the tree, the court determined that the issue was properly submit-
ted to the jury for resolution.348
Furthermore, the court found that BGE suffered no prejudice
from the trial court's refusal to give ajury instruction on assumption
of risk.3 49 It pointed out that BGE would have to meet a higher stan-
337. Id. at 701, 705 A.2d at 1154 (citing Dolata v. Ohio Edison Co., 441 N.E.2d 837
(Ohio Ct. App. 1981); Petroski v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1976); Alabama Power Co. v. Taylor, 306 So. 2d 236 (Ala. 1975)).
338. 338 Md. 34, 656 A.2d 307 (1995), holding limited by Hippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d
at 1151.
339. 290 Md. 186, 428 A.2d 459 (1981), holding limited by Hippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d
at 1151.
340. 256 Md. 617, 261 A.2d 482 (1970), holding limited by Hippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d
at 1151.
341. 132 Md. 355, 103 A. 948 (1918), holding limited by Flippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at
1151.
342. 123 Md. 120, 91 A. 149 (1914), holding limited by Hippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at
1151.
343. Hippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at 1151.
344. Id. at 704-05, 705 A.2d at 1156.
345. Id. at 704, 705 A.2d at 1156.
346. Id. at 705, 705 A.2d at 1156.
347. Id. at 703, 705 A.2d at 1155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reiser v.
Abramson, 264 Md. 372, 378, 286 A.2d 91, 93 (1972)).
348. Id. at 705, 705 A.2d at 1156.
349. Id. at 707, 705 A.2d at 1157.
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dard of proof in order to absolve itself from liability under an assump-
tion of risk defense than it would under a contributory negligence
defense. 350 Relying on the Court of Special Appeals's declaration that
"[a defendant who proved] a case of contributory negligence . . .
would not necessarily establish an assumption of risk defense," the
Court of Appeals reasoned that BGE had not met its burden for the
latter defense.351 Therefore, because the jury considered and rejected
the less burdensome contributory negligence defense, the court deter-
mined that, even though it did not receive a separate instruction, the
jury had essentially considered and rejected the assumption of risk
defense as well. 52
4. Analysis.--In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Flippo, the Court of
Appeals applied existing Maryland tort law in unconventional ways to
achieve the desired outcome. First, the court analyzed the duty owed
to Flippo under principles of ordinary negligence rather than tradi-
tional premises liability law.353 Second, the court reasoned that ajury
could find that BGE had a duty to trim trees located on its utility ease-
ments in residential areas.354 Third, the court determined that the
trial court judge's failure to administer an assumption of risk jury in-
struction was nonprejudicial in light of BGE's failed contributory neg-
ligence defense.355 The effect is an opinion that closely approximates
an application of the attractive nuisance doctrine 356 without aban-
doning Maryland's long-standing refusal to adopt that doctrine.357
350. See id. (noting that a successful assumption of risk defense would require that BGE
show "that [Flippo] actually knew of the potential danger of overhead electric wires and
actually knew of the presence of this particular wire when he voluntarily subjected himself
to a risk of contact with the wire by climbing the tree" (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 112 Md. App. 75,
96, 684 A.2d 456, 466 (1996), affd, 348 Md. 680, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998))); supra note 250
and accompanying text.
351. Hippo, 348 Md. at 707, 705 A.2d at 1157 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Fippo, 112 Md. App. at 96, 684 A.2d at 466).
352. Id. at 707-08, 705 A.2d at 1157.
353. Id. at 699, 705 A.2d at 1153.
354. See id. at 701, 705 A.2d at 1154.
355. See id. at 707-08, 705 A.2d at 1157 (reasoning that "even if the trial court erred in
not submitting an assumption of risk instruction to the jury, BGE did not suffer any preju-
dice" because "the jury's findings that Flippo was not contributorily negligent would have
also precluded a finding that he assumed the risk").
356. See supra notes 254-264 and accompanying text (discussing the attractive nuisance
doctrine).
357. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 63, 656 A.2d 307, 321
(1995) (Chasanow, J., concurring) ("By 1985 there were only about three states that had
adopted neither the attractive nuisance doctrine nor a substitute such as the 'dangerous
instrumentality' rule.., nor the Restatement view. Of these states only one, Maryland, had
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a. Falling Between the Cracks of Maryland's Traditional Land-
owner Liability Analysis.--In Flippo, the Court of Appeals retreated from
its traditional hard-line application of the trespasser liability rule15 1 in
favor of a more relaxed general negligence standard limited to cases
involving trespass to personal property when the plaintiff is a social
guest on the real property on which the personal property is lo-
cated.35 9 In its opinion, the court first discussed Flippo's relation to
the tree and BGE's electrical wires in terms of landowner liability.3 60
The Court of Appeals determined that because Flippo was a social
guest of the Gaines family on the day the accident occurred, he is
properly classified as a licensee by invitation."' The court supported
its reasoning by noting that "Flippo climbed the Gaineses' tree with
their permission. '" 362 Furthermore, the court found that Flippo was
not a trespasser as to BGE's easement for utility wires.363 Easements
are "nonpossessory interest[s] in the real property of another. 3 64
The possessor of "an easement for ingress and egress" has the same
protection from liability to trespassers as landowners when the posses-
sor exercises "a degree of control over the land" effectively banning
trespassers from the premises.365 However, BGE held only a nonex-
clusive easement for its utility wires over the Gaines property,366 and
could not restrict or otherwise affect the Gaines family's use or enjoy-
reaffirmed its position in unqualified form in recent years." (omission in original) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 254, § 27.5, at 166)).
358. See supra notes 265-273 and accompanying text.
359. Hippo, 348 Md. at 699, 705 A.2d at 1153.
360. Id. at 693-94, 705 A.2d at 1150.
361. Id. at 689, 705 A.2d at 1148 (holding that "[a]s the Gaineses' social guest, Flippo
had a right to be on the Gaineses' property").
362. Id. at 692, 705 A.2d at 1150.
363. Id. at 690, 705 A.2d at 1149.
364. Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688, 484 A.2d 630, 635 (1984) (citing Condry v.
Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 320, 41 A.2d 66 (1945)). The Restatement of Property defines easements
as:
[a]n interest in land in the possession of another which
(a) entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of the land in
which the interest exists;
(b) entitles him to protection as against third persons from interference in such
use or enjoyment;
(c) is not subject to the will of the possessor of the land;
(d) is not a normal incident of the possession of any land possessed by the owner
of the interest, and
(e) is capable of creation by conveyance.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
365. See Wagner v. Doehring, 315 Md. 97, 107, 553 A.2d 684, 689 (1989).
366. Flippo, 348 Md. at 702, 705 A.2d at 1154-55.
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ment of their property.36 v Therefore, because Flippo was a licensee by
invitation on the Gaines property, he could not be excluded from en-
tering or playing in the area of land burdened by the easement.36
By classifying Flippo as a licensee by invitation, the court immedi-
ately distinguished the instant case from State ex rel. Stansfield v. Chesa-
peake & Potomac Telephone Co.,369 Grube v. Mayor of Baltimore,"' and
Mondshour v. Moore.371 In those cases the court determined that the
injured parties were all wrongfully located within close proximity to
the danger by trespassing on personal property.3 72 Additionally, the
plaintiffs in those cases all took affirmative steps towards making un-
authorized contact with the defendant's property,3m3 whereas Flippo
made accidental, unintentional contact with BGE's electrical wires.3 7 4
BGE argued that although Flippo's contact could be characterized as
"accidental" or "inadvertent," it would nonetheless be considered a
367. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 112 Md. App. 75, 83, 684 A.2d 456, 459
(1996) (stating that "BGE had neither a right of possession of the airspace in the vicinity of
its wires or a right to preclude others from that airspace and thus has no basis to assert that
[Flippo] was trespassing on its easement"), affd, 348 Md. 680, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998); Mill-
son v. Laughlin, 217 Md. 576, 585, 142 A.2d 810, 814 (1958) (explaining that the posses-
sors of the servient estate burdened by the easement are "entitled to use and enjoy [the]
property to the fullest extent consistent with the reasonably necessary use thereof [of the
holder of the dominant estate] in accordance with the terms and conditions of the grant").
368. Flippo, 348 Md. at 690, 705 A.2d at 1149.
369. 123 Md. 120, 91 A. 149 (1914), holding limited by Flippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at
1151.
370. 132 Md. 355, 103 A. 948 (1918), holding limited by Fippo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d at
1151.
371. 256 Md. 617, 261 A.2d 482 (1970), holding limited bytAppo, 348 Md. at 695, 705 A.2d
at 1151.
372. See id. at 622-23, 261 A.2d at 484-85 (finding that the plaintiff was a trespasser to the
transit company's personal property); Grube, 132 Md. at 359-60, 103 A. at 950 (finding that
while the child plaintiff was properly located in the school yard, he had no permission and
knew it was improper for him to climb the utility pole); Stansfield, 123 Md. at 123-25, 91 A.
at 150 (explaining that, because there was no implied or express permission for the plain-
tiff to take the affirmative action of climbing the defendant's utility pole for his own per-
sonal benefit, he was classified as a trespasser).
373. See Mondshour, 256 Md. at 619, 261 A.2d at 483 (explaining that the plaintiff injured
himself by climbing onto the wheel of a stopped transit bus in order to show his friend a
trick"); Grube, 132 Md. at 356, 103 A. at 949 (stating that plaintiff climbed up an electric
utility pole in order to watch a baseball game); Stansfield, 123 Md. at 122, 91 A. at 149
(explaining that plaintiff used maintenance spikes on a utility pole in order to climb up
the pole and rescue the family kitten).
374. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 112 Md. App. 75, 86-87, 684 A.2d 456, 461
(1996) (explaining that "Flippo's 'entry upon' or contact with BGE's personal property, its
electrical wire, was not an intentional or volitional act; it was an obviously involuntary reac-
tion"), affd, 348 Md. 680, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998). While the plaintiffs in Grube and Stansfield
did not voluntarily make contact with the electrical wires resulting in harm, they knew or
should have known of the electrical current running through the utility wires attached to
the poles. See Grube, 132 Md. at 361, 103 A. at 951; Stansfield, 123 Md. at 127, 91 A. at 151.
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trespass. 5 However, the court developed a new rule as it determined
that traditional landowner liability rules would not apply where the
plaintiff enjoyed the status of an invitee or licensee by invitation as to
the real property where the personal property in question was lo-
cated.37 6  Instead the court favored an ordinary negligence stan-
dard.3 77 Therefore, the court declined to entertain BGE's inadvertent
trespasser argument.3 78
The reasoning behind the new rule announced by the court in
Hippo is consistent with Judge Chasanow's concurring opinion in
Lane.3 79 In Lane, Judge Chasanow argued for a rule that would elimi-
nate the use of the trespasser doctrine in relation to all child plaintiffs
who are lawfully present on the real property, but are injured as a
result of trespass to personal property located thereon.3 80 He urged
that the attractive nuisance doctrine should apply to cases "[w]here
both the child and the chattel have equal rights on the realty. '381 In
Rippo, the nonexclusive nature of BGE's easement for electrical
375. Brief and Appendix of Appellant at 9-19, Flippo (No. 4).
376. Hippo, 348 Md. at 694, 705 A.2d at 1151.
377. Id. at 697, 705 A.2d at 1152 (citing Petroski v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 354
N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Alabama Power Co. v. Taylor, 306 So. 2d 236 (Ala. 1975);
Bridges v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co., 410 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966), Mullen v.
Wilkes-Barre Gas & Elec. Co., 77 A. 1108 (Pa. 1910)).
378. Hippo, 348 Md. at 693-94, 705 A.2d at 1150-51. Although the court never reached a
conclusion on this issue in the instant case, it had previously considered landowner liability
in the context of "inadvertent trespassers" in Bramble v. Thompson, 264 Md. 518, 520-21, 287
A.2d 265, 267 (1972). Bramble involved injured parties who labeled themselves "inadver-
tent trespassers" because they did not know they were trespassing on private property when
they docked their boat, disembarked from it onto a pier and were "attacked and injured"
by the landowner's dog. Id. In Bramble, the court declined to find an exception to the
trespass doctrine based solely on the fact that the plaintiffs did not intend to trespass on
the defendant's property. Id. at 522, 287 A.2d at 268. Still, those plaintiffs had taken af-
firmative steps towards entering the private property where they were injured. -d. at 522,
287 A.2d at 267. Because Hippo neither intended to trespass on BGE's property nor took
affirmative steps towards making contact with the electrical wires, the Court of Special
Appeals determined that "[a] bsent a volitional force or intent, an act cannot be affirmative
in nature, and thus cannot be the subject of an action for trespass." Flippo, 112 Md. App. at
86, 684 A.2d at 461. Thus, if the "inadvertent trespasser" exception found inapplicable in
Bramble were to be applied by the Court of Appeals, it would not have barred recovery for
Hippo's injuries. Id.
379. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 54, 656 A.2d 307, 316 (1995)
(Chasanow, J., concurring).
380. See id. (discussing the traditional principle that the only duty owed to trespassers to
real property regardless of their age is a duty to not "willfully or wantonly" injury them and
arguing that the court "should not extend that well established real property principle to
children who are invited onto land, but who may be trespassing on chattels").
381. Id. at 59, 656 A.2d at 319.
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wires 8 2 and Flippo's status as a "licensee by invitation ' resulted in
application of the rule suggested by Judge Chasanow because "the
child and the chattel" were both rightfully located on the Gaineses'
realty.3 4 Therefore, the court's manipulation of the landowner liabil-
ity categories in order to hold BGE liable for the child's injuries fol-
lows Judge Chasanow's earlier plea to adopt the attractive nuisance
doctrine in Maryland, albeit limited to cases where the child enjoys
the status of an invitee or licensee by invitation." 5 Therefore, the
court's holding in Hippo allows for a silent application of a limited
attractive nuisance doctrine whereby a defendant's liability toward
child plaintiffs who have an equal right to be located on the real prop-
erty where the defendant's personal property is located will be evalu-
ated under ordinary principles of negligence.386
The Hippo court, however, did not entirely embrace Judge Chasa-
now's suggestion in Lane that a limited attractive nuisance doctrine
should apply to all children trespassing with respect to personal prop-
erty, so long as the child and the chattel had "equal rights on the
realty."3 87 Rather, the Hippo court made it clear that it adopted a con-
servative approach specifically limiting the application of ordinary
principles of negligence to cases where the plaintiff enjoys the status
of either an invitee or licensee by invitation with respect to the real
property involved.388
The court's new rule is consistent with other jurisdictions that
have opted to apply ordinary negligence principles as a form of an
382. See Rippo, 348 Md. at 689, 705 A.2d at 1148 (noting that both BGE, as owner of the
dominant estate, and the Gainses, as owners of the servient estate, are entitled to use the
property).
383. Id.
384. See id. at 690, 705 A.2d at 1149 (concluding that "[s]ince BGE could not rightfully
exclude an invitee of the servient estate owner from the premises, Flippo was not a tres-
passer as to BGE's easement" (citing Wagner v. Doehring, 315 Md. 97, 108 n.5, 553 A.2d
684, 689 n.5 (1989))).
385. See supra notes 380-381 and accompanying text.
386. Flippo, 348 Md. at 697-98, 705 A.2d at 1152-53 (citations omitted). All of the cases
cited by the Court of Appeals as applying the ordinary negligence standard in cases involv-
ing trespasses to personal property involved child plaintiffs.
387. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 59, 656 A.2d 307, 319 (1995)
(Chasanow, J., concurring).
388. Fippo, 348 Md. at 699, 705 A.2d at 1153.
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attractive nuisance doctrine.3 89 Even if the court's new rule had been
applied in Lane, the court would have reached the same result."'
b. Reaching Beyond Traditional Landowner Liability in Search of
a Plaintiff-Friendly Remedy: Analyzing BGE's Liability Under Ordinary Prin-
cipals of Negligence. -After discussing the various landowner liability
categories, the court shifted its analysis to a general negligence stan-
dard and determined that a jury could find BGE had a duty to trim
the tree that Flippo was climbing the day of the accident.391 In order
to prove negligence, the plaintiff must show that the defendant owed
a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff, which the defendant failed
to perform, resulting in injury or loss to the plaintiff.392 The court
elaborated upon the Court of Special Appeals's discussion of utility
company liability in Dageforde v. Potomac Edison Co.,393 as it determined
that BGE owed a duty of reasonable care to Flippo. In Dageforde, the
Court of Special Appeals established that although a utility company
would not be liable for injuries to trespassers or licensees on the com-
pany's electrical pole, the company could be held liable for accidents
involving someone "in an adjacent position where they might be rea-
sonably expected to come in close proximity to the source of dan-
ger."394 Flippo fit within the rule announced in Dageforde based on his
status as a licensee by invitation on the Gainses' property.39 5
389. See Kahn v. James Burton Co., 126 N.E.2d 836, 625 (Ill. 1955) (explaining that
although no special duty is generally owed towards children as a class of plaintiffs, the
foreseeability of harm to children on the landowner's property will be a factor in determin-
ing the duty owed rather than just a strict adherence to landowner liability categories in
determining duty).
390. See Lane, 338 Md. at 48, 656 A.2d at 314 (explaining that because BGE failed to
maintain adequate control over the spool, Lane was not a trespasser as a matter of law to
the spool).
391. Hippo, 348 Md. at 702, 705 A.2d at 1154-55.
392. Id. at 700, 705 A.2d at 1153-54 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 76, 642
A.2d 180, 188 (1994)). The Restatement (Second) of Torts explains:
When an act is negligent only if done without reasonable care, the care which the
actor is required to exercise to avoid being negligent in the doing of the act is
that which a reasonable man in his position, with his information and compe-
tence, would recognize as necessary to prevent the act from creating an unreason-
able risk of harm to another.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 298 (1966).
393. 35 Md. App. 37, 369 A.2d 93 (1977) (involving a twelve-year-old boy who sustained
injuries after making contact with the electrical wires of a utility pole next to a tree in his
yard as he climbed either the tree or the pole to pick apples from the tree).
394. Id. at 42, 369 A.2d at 96 (citing State ex rel. Stansfield v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co., 123 Md. at 127, 91 A. at 151 (1914)).
395. Hippo, 348 Md. at 689, 705 A.2d at 1148.
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The court has long recognized the importance of employing a
standard of reasonableness guided by public safety concerns.396 The
court recognized that most jurisdictions make distinctions in cases in-
volving contact with electricity based on the classification of the in-
jured party (i.e. as a trespasser or as a licensee by invitation). The
court has consistently held that it is more desirable to adhere to stan-
dard applications of the law at the expense of a difficult or unpleasant
outcome than to alter interpretations for the benefit of a single plain-
tiff.39' However, in following other jurisdictions, the court decided
that ordinary negligence analysis should apply rather than the princi-
ple limiting liability to trespassers based on Flippo's permission to be
on the real property.399
The dangerous nature of electricity suggests that a higher degree
of care may be required in its use and maintenance.4 °° In Elippo, the
court found that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that BGE
owed a limited duty to trim the tree in the Gainses' backyard 40 ' based
on the foreseeable nature of the accident.40 2 The court argued that
396. See Pindell v. Rubenstein, 139 Md. 567, 580-81, 115 A. 859, 864 (1921) (finding it
unreasonable" and "contrary to the public safety and welfare" to allow someone with prop-
erty adjacent to a public highway where there are many pedestrians, including "children of
tender ages," to leave unattended broken fixtures on his fence which are poised to cause
injury to those utilizing the highway).
397. See Hippo, 348 Md. at 698-99, 705 A-2d at 1153.
398. See, e.g., Osterman v. Peters, 260 Md. 313, 317, 272 A.2d 21, 23-24 (1971). The
Osterman court, noting that "hard cases make bad law," stated:
"[B]etter that the established rules of law should be strictly applied, even though
in particular instances serious loss may be thereby inflicted on some individuals,
than that by subtle distinctions, invented and resorted to solely to escape such
consequences, long-settled and firmly-fixed doctrines should be shaken, ques-
tioned, confused, or doubted."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Demuth v. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315,
319-20, 37 A. 266 (1897) (citing Lovejoy v. Irelan, 17 Md. 525, 527 (1861))).
399. Hippo, 348 Md. 699, 705 A.2d 1153.
400. See id. at 700, 705 A.2d at 1154 (defining the scope of an electric company's duty to
use reasonable care to include "persons who are in lawful proximity to its electric wires,
and who could reasonably be anticipated to come, accidentally or otherwise, in contact
with them" (citing State ex rel. Stansfield v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 123 Md. 120,
125-26, 91 A. 149, 151 (1914); Brown v. Edison Elec. Co., 90 Md. 400, 406, 45 A. 182, 183
(1900))); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 112 Md. App. 75, 89, 684 A.2d 456, 463
(1996) ("In light of the gravity of the potential harm, those who transmit electrical current
must exercise a correspondingly high degree of care in so doing." (citing Manaia v. Poto-
mac Elec. Power Co., 268 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1959); Conowingo Power Co. v. Maryland, 120
F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1941)), afffd, 348 Md. 680, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998).
401. See Hippo, 348 Md. at 701, 705 A.2d at 1154 ("We do not hold that BGE has a
blanket duty to trim all trees that are located near its overhead electrical wires." (citing
Hippo, 112 Md. App. at 88, 684 A.2d at 462)).
402. See id. at 702, 705 A.2d at 1154 ("[T]here was sufficient evidence to permit ajury to
conclude that BGE could have reasonably foreseen that a child may have been injured as a
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because BGE had specific knowledge and documentation of the
hazards associated with the Gaineses' tree,4 °3 they were under a duty
to either trim the tree or insulate the wires running through it.40 4 Yet,
the Gaines family also knew that the branches on the tree were easily
climbable and could lead to a dangerous encounter with the utility
wires and chose to do nothing about it.4" 5
The court's reasoning that BGE owed an affirmative duty of rea-
sonable care to Flippo found additional support in the specifications
of BGE's easement for the utility wires.40 6 The easement gave BGE
unfettered permission to enter the property in order to maintain trees
in close proximity to its utility wires.40 7 Furthermore, the grant of the
easement was conditioned upon certain concessions in order to com-
ply with the "aesthetic requirements" of the real estate developer.40 8
BGE agreed specifically to run its utility wires along the rear portions
of the properties rather than in the front along the street and "to use
poles ten feet shorter than it normally or regularly used. '40 9 Thus, the
increased burden on BGE of trimming trees like the one at issue in
this case flows from the increased degree of risk involved under the
circumstances.4 t0
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals's decision in Baltimore Gas
& Electric Co. v. FHippo provides a plaintiff-friendly solution in a com-
mon tort case. Yet it accomplishes this task at the expense of dis-
result of its failure to trim the tree that Flippo was climbing or insulate the electric wire
that ran through the tree.").
403. See id., 705 A.2d at 1155 (explaining that BGE had classified the Gaineses' tree as
"climbable"); see also Hippo, 112 Md. App. at 89-90, 684 A.2d at 463 (determining that,
because BGE was aware of the hazards associated with climbable trees such as the white
pine located on the Gaines property, it "had implied cognizance of a reasonably foresee-
able harm to children such asJ.J. Flippo").
404. See Hippo, 348 Md. at 702, 705 A.2d at 1154.
405. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 8-9, Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md.
680, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998) (No. 4) (explaining that Mr. Gaines had warned Flippo not to
climb up "too high" in the tree as an indication that Mr. Gaines knew the children fre-
quently climbed the tree and wanted to make sure that Flippo and the other children fully
appreciated the danger of the electrical wires which ran through it).
406. See Hippo, 112 Md. App. at 90, 684 A.2d at 463 (explaining the terms of BGE's
easement).
407. See Hippo, 348 Md. at 702, 705 A.2d at 1155 (noting that BGE had the right to trim
trees under its easement "in order to provide clearance"); see also Hippo, 112 Md. App. at
90, 684 A.2d at 463 (stating that the easement "expressly conferred on BGE the right of
access at all times to the lines, the right to trim, top or cut down trees adjacent to the lines
to provide ample clearance").
408. Flippo, 112 Md. App. at 90, 684 A.2d at 463.
409. Id.
410. See id. (explaining that the "concessions increased the degree of care necessary to
avoid such accidents as occurred to the minor plaintiff in this case").
1164
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
torting the traditional landowner liability categories. As advocated by
Judge Chasanow's concurring opinion in Lane, the court rendered ob-
solete the traditional applications of Maryland landowner liability law
for child trespassers to personal property in cases where the child has
a right to be on the real property it rests upon.41 1 Furthermore, the
court left the door open for creation of a broad duty for public utility
companies that would be unnecessarily burdensome. The Court of
Appeals silently adopted an attractive nuisance doctrine applicable
only to trespasses upon personal property by children classified as in-
vitees or licensees by invitation. Although beneficial to the particular
child injured in the instant case, the court's decision came at the ex-
pense of Maryland's long-established refusal to dilute its landowner
liability analysis with the attractive nuisance doctrine.
DAWN P. LANZALO-rI
C. Limiting Tort Indemnity in Maryland to the Realm of Constructive
Liability
In Franklin v. Morrison,412 the Court of Appeals unanimously held
that Maryland law no longer permits indemnification based on de-
grees of negligence, while maintaining the rule allowing tort indem-
nity based on the active-passive negligence distinction.41 In so ruling,
the court created confusing precedent because application of the ac-
tive-passive negligence distinction necessarily relies on a comparison
of the negligence of joint torffeasors to determine, if such a determi-
nation can be made, who is primarily at fault. The active-passive dis-
tinction retained by the court depends only on the legal relationship
between the tortfeasors. As such, the court should have abandoned
the active-passive negligence distinction entirely to provide a better
rule as to when tort indemnity will be allowed in Maryland. Although
the Franklin decision implies that tort indemnity should be permitted
only in limited circumstances, primarily those in which liability is im-
411. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 54, 656 A.2d 307, 316 (1995)
(Chasanow,J., concurring) (arguing that the traditional trespasser liability doctrine should
not apply to children with respect to trespasses upon chattels when the child is properly
located on the premises).
412. 350 Md. 144, 711 A.2d 177 (1998).
413. Id. at 168-69, 711 A.2d at 189-90. The active/passive negligence distinction entities
a passively negligent tortfeasor to indemnity from an actively negligent tortfeasor. Id. at
160, 711 A.2d at 185-86 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 51, at 343 (5th ed. 1984)). The label of "active-passive" negligence is used to
describe the difference in the "gravity of the fault of two tortfeasors" or when there is "a
disproportion or difference in character of the duties owed by the two to the injured plain-
tiff." Id. at 155, 711 A.2d at 183 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra, § 51, at 343-44).
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posed on the prospective indemnitee as the result of a legal relation-
ship between the tortfeasors,414 the court does not expressly state this
policy. 41 5 Had the court concisely stated that in the absence of a spe-
cial relationship in which the indemnitee's liability to the plaintiff is
vicarious or constructive between the tortfeasors, tort indemnity
should not be applied, there would be more predictability in Mary-
land's tort indemnity law.
1. The Case.-On December 24, 1992, Michael Franklin (Frank-
lin) took his 1992 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer (the Blazer) to aJiffy Lube in
Beverly, Massachusetts, owned and operated by a franchisee, Lube
495, Inc. (Jiffy Lube), for routine servicing. 416 The routine servicing
required a technician to remove the rear differential check plug to
check and, if necessary, replenish the lubricant level, and then replace
the plug.417 In performing this routine check, the technician either
failed to replace or improperly replaced the differential check plug,
causing the differential fluid to leak in a gradual, undetectable man-
ner over the next several weeks. 418 This gradual process ultimately
produced sudden mechanical failure and disabled Franklin's Blazer
from moving.419
Franklin was not aware of any problems with his rear differential,
nor had he experienced any mechanical difficulties, until January 16,
1993, when he was driving on Route 50 in Prince George's County at
highway speed in the middle of the three westbound lanes.4 20 At that
time, Franklin heard a gear grinding noise emanating from the
Blazer's undercarriage, but the noise temporarily ceased. 42' The
noise then resumed, accompanied by a violent shaking and a burning
smell.422
414. A legal relationship between the tortfeasors may impose liability on one tortfeasor
only vicariously for the conduct of the other. See infra notes 479-489 (examining the legal
relationships recognized by Maryland courts).
415. Franklin, 350 Md. at 156-58, 711 A.2d at 183-84. For a further discussion of the
limited situations in which tort indemnity may be proper after Franklin, see infra notes 591-
611 and accompanying text.
416. Franklin, 350 Md. at 147, 711 A.2d at 179.
417. Id.
418. Id. Without adequate lubrication, the gears and bearings within the differential
gradually melted, fused together, and broke off due to excessive friction and heat. Id.
419. Id. at 148, 711 A.2d at 179.
420. Id. at 147, 711 A.2d at 179.
421. Id. at 147-48, 711 A.2d at 179.
422. Id. at 148, 711 A.2d at 179. When the violent shaking occurred, Franklin tapped his
brakes to maintain control of the Blazer while unsuccessfully attempting to drive the Blazer
to the right shoulder of the highway. Id,
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After Franklin first heard the noise, the Blazer continued to
move, traveling approximately 2100 feet before it decelerated rapidly
and steadily.4 23 The Blazer came to a complete stop in the center
lane.4 24 Franklin then exited the car and proceeded to the side of the
road where he waved his arms in an effort to alert oncoming traffic to
the disabled Blazer.4 25
Darlene Morrison, who was traveling behind Franklin in a 1990
Dodge Minivan with her two children, managed to stop suddenly be-
hind the disabled Blazer.4 26 While stopped in the center lane, Mrs.
Morrison's minivan was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by Dale Met-
tenbrink and owned by National Carriers, Inc. (National Carriers).427
The tractor-trailer dragged the minivan several hundred feet, result-
ing in a fiery explosion that killed Mrs. Morrison and her two
children.4 21
In March 1994, Glenn Morrison (Morrison), individually and as
personal representative of the estates of his wife Darlene Morrison
and his children, sued defendants Franklin, National Carriers, and
Jiffy Lube.4 29 Defendants filed cross-claims for indemnification and
contribution against each other.4 3 °
On August 31, 1995, almost one month before trial, Morrison set-
tled the claims against Defendants National Carriers andJiffy Lube.43
Under the agreement, all of Morrison's claims against the settling de-
fendants were released in consideration of a payment of $3.7 mil-
lion.43 2 Before trial commenced, Morrison dismissed his claims
against National Carriers and Jiffy Lube, and soon thereafter Franklin
dismissed his cross-claims against National Carriers.4  However,
Franklin maintained his cross-claim againstJiffy Lube for contribution
423. Id. at 159, 711 A.2d at 185.
424. See id. at 148, 711 A.2d at 179. Franklin testified that he was unable to pull over
after he learned of the problem because the Blazer was quickly decelerating and there was
heavy traffic in the right lane. Id.
425. Id., 711 A.2d at 179-80. Although Franklin allegedly tried to alert oncoming traffic
by waiving his arms, he did not put on his hazard lights before he exited the Blazer. Id. at
160, 711 A.2d at 185.
426. Id. at 148, 711 A.2d at 180. Mrs. Morrison was unable to change lanes because of
passing traffic. Id.
427. Id. at 148-49, 711 A.2d at 179-80.




432. Id. at 149-50, 711 A.2d at 180.
433. Id. at 151, 711 A.2d at 181.
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and indemnification, and Jiffy Lube remained in the case and main-
tained its cross-claim against Franklin for contribution.434
At trial, Morrison was proceeding solely against Franklin; defend-
ants Franklin and Jiffy Lube were proceeding against each other.435
During the trial, Morrison presented evidence from which the jury
could find that Franklin was negligent in two regards: (1) in failing to
move the Blazer to a safe location after he began experiencing
mechanical difficulties; and (2) in failing to warn approaching motor-
ists of the disabled Blazer.4 6 In defending himself against these
claims, Franklin argued that any negligence on his part was passive
negligence and that the accident was caused by the active negligence
of Jiffy Lube in failing to properly replace the check plug after serv-
icing the Blazer.4 7 Franklin's claim for indemnity against jiffy Lube
was based on the active-passive negligence distinction. "At the close of
the evidence, the trial court denied, inter alia, Franklin's motion for
judgment on his cross-claim for indemnity against Jiffy Lube."438
The jury returned a verdict for Morrison in his individual and
representative capacities in the amount of $10,756,000 after conclud-
ing that Franklin and Jiffy Lube were negligent and each proximately
caused the accident, but that National Carriers did not proximately
cause the accident.4 39 The court remitted the award to $6,806,000 in
accordance with Maryland's statutory cap on noneconomic damages,
and entered judgment for Morrison against Franklin in the remitted
amount.440 The judgment against Morrison was further reduced to
$3,403,000 at the hearing on posttrial motions when the court applied
Maryland's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA)
to the judgment.44 '
Franklin appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that
among the five errors of the circuit court was the court's failure to
434. Id. For a further discussion on the distinctions between contribution and indem-
nity, see infta note 449 and accompanying text.
435. Franklin, 350 Md. at 151, 711 A.2d at 181.
436. Id. at 151-52, 711 A.2d at 181.
437. Id. at 152, 711 A.2d at 181.
438. Id.
439. Id. Special interrogatories were submitted to the jury, asking whether National Car-
riers, Jiffy Lube, and Franklin each were negligent and whether that negligence proxi-
mately caused the accident. Id. The jury answered "yes" for both Jiffy Lube and Franklin
and "no" for National Carriers. Id.
440. Id. (applying the statutory cap on noneconomic damages set forth in MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (1995)).
441. Id. at 152, 711 A.2d at 181-82.
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grant Franklin's claim for indemnity from jiffy Lube.4 4 2 Franklin ar-
gued, as he did before the circuit court, that he was entitled to indem-
nity from Jiffy Lube because he was merely passively negligent while
Jiffy Lube was actively negligent.443 The Court of Special Appeals af-
firmed the decision of the circuit court in an unreported decision,
holding that Franklin's negligence was active negligence as a matter of
law, and that therefore he was not entitled to indemnification from
Jiffy Lube.4 4 4 Franklin petitioned for certiorari, which the Court of
Appeals granted.445
2. Legal Background.-Indemnity is defined as "reimburse-
ment,"" and involves shifting the entire loss to the indemnitor. In-
demnity may be based on an express contract or implied in law.447
Tort indemnity arises out of a "contract implied by law"'44 8 and arose
in response to the recognition that the rule barring contribution
among joint tortfeasors caused injustice in certain cases.44 9 Although
the early applications of indemnity law involved cases in which one
tortfeasor's liability was exclusively vicarious, courts began to address
the injustice which arose in cases where both parties were at fault, but
one was much less culpable than the other.450 With this expanded
notion of tort indemnity, the situations in which tort indemnity was
proper were no longer restricted to situations in which the indemni-
442. Id. at 153, 711 A.2d at 182. Franklin also argued on appeal that the jury should
have been furnished with the Release and Indemnity Agreement executed by the other
parties, and that the circuit court improperly calculated the credit under the release. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. The Court of Special Appeals also found that the release did not have to be
disclosed to the jury, and that the circuit court had correctly calculated the extent of the
credit under the release. Id.
445. 350 Md. 144, 711 A.2d 177 (1998).
446. BLACK's LAw DIcriONARY 769 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary further defines
indemnity as "[a] contractual or equitable right under which the entire loss is shifted from
a tortfeasor who is only technically or passively at fault to another who is primarily or
actively responsible." Id. (citing Moorhead v. Waelde, 499 So. 2d 387, 389 (La. Ct. App.
1986)).
447. Franklin, 350 Md. at 154, 711 A.2d at 182.
448. Id. (citing R.A. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L.
REv. 130, 146 (1932)).
449. Id. While indemnity permits total reimbursement, contribution refers to the
"[r] ight of one who has discharged a common liability to recover of another also liable, the
aliquot portion which he ought to pay or bear." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 446,
at 328. In other words, a defendant may be liable for the total loss in an indemnity action,
but in a contribution action, he is only chargeable with a ratable proportion. J.R. Kemper,
Annotation, Contribution or Indemnity Between Joint Tortfeasors on Basis of Relative Fault, 53
A.L.R.3D 184, 190 (1973) (citing 41 Am. JUR. 2D Indemnity §§ 2, 3 (1967)).
450. Franklin, 350 Md. at 154, 711 A.2d at 182 (quoting Vertecs Corp. v. Reichhold
Chems., Inc., 661 P.2d 619, 621 (Alaska 1983)).
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tee was only vicariously liable. To fully understand the legal back-
ground of the Franklin decision, it is necessary to examine both
indemnity at common law and indemnity law in Maryland.
a. Indemnity at Common Law.-At common law, whenever
the wrongful act of one person results in liability being imposed on
another merely by inference of law, "the latter may have indemnity
from the person actually guilty of the wrong. '451 However, an excep-
tion to this general indemnity rule, established in Merryweather v.
Nixan,4 52 holds that there is no right to contribution or indemnity
among fault-bearing tortfeasors.455 The Meryweather doctrine evolved
as an exception to the general indemnity rule, and was strictly applied
by the English courts to cases where the parties were equally at fault.4 5 4
Many jurisdictions in the United States, including Maryland,455
also recognized the harshness of the Merryweather rule that there can
be no contribution between joint actual tortfeasors.456 The harshness
of the rule was the inability to distribute the loss equally among joint
tortfeasors. This recognition resulted in several jurisdictions making
efforts to alleviate this problem by establishing exceptions to the Mer-
ryweather rule.457 There were many disparities among the various solu-
tions formulated to relax the harshness of the rule that there is no
right to contribution among joint tortfeasors.458 Many such solutions
involved changes in the law of tort indemnity.
451. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. County Comm'rs, 113 Md. 404, 414, 77 A. 930, 933
(1910) (citing Pearson v. Skelton, 150 Eng. Rep. 533, 533 (K.B. 1836); Wooley v. Batte, 172
Eng. Rep. 188, 188-89 (K.B. 1826)), overruled by Franklin, 350 Md. at 167, 711 A.2d at 189.
452. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). The case involved a claim for contribution, which
was denied, because both the plaintiff and defendant had participated in an act of conver-
sion and, as such, were both actual tortfeasors. Id
453. See B&O Railroad, 113 Md. at 414, 77 A. at 933 (citing Merryweather, 101 Eng. Rep.
1337). At common law, this exception was limited to cases where the party seeking indem-
nity or contribution acted in pari delicto with the other. See id. at 414, 77 A. at 933. Black's
Law Dictionary defines "in pari delicto" as "in equal fault; equally culpable or criminal, in a
case of equal fault or guilt." BLACK's LAw DIcrIoNARY, supra note 446, at 791.
454. See B&O Railroad, 113 Md. at 414-15, 77 A. at 933 ("The Courts do not favor exten-
sion of [the Meryweather] rule, and have shown a decided disposition to confine the excep-
tion to cases clearly falling within it." (citations omitted)).
455. See infra notes 459-509 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of tort
indemnity in Maryland).
456. See Kemper, supra note 449, at 190 (noting the severity of the common-law rule
barring contribution between tortfeasors).
457. Id.
458. Id. The variety of remedies, as well as the severity of the Merryweather rule, served as
the impetus for the National Conference on Uniform State laws to draft the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 1939. Id. at 190-91 (citing UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEAsORS AcT §§ 1-12 (amended 1995), 12 U.L.A. 185 (1996)).
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b. Indemnity Law in Mayland.-At the time of the Franklin
decision, Maryland courts lacked the objective criteria necessary for
predictability in the law of tort indemnity. In Maryland, the common-
law rule of indemnity was first recognized in Chesapeake & Ohio Canal
Co. v. County Commissioners.459 In Chesapeake, the Court of Appeals
held that Alleghany County, which had been held liable for injuries
caused by the defective condition of a bridge, was entitled to indem-
nity from the company that built the bridge.460 The court determined
that indemnity was reasonable because the county was not in pari
delicto461 with the company, and that the defective condition was
caused by and should have been repaired by the company.462 Because
the County's liability was not based on any negligence on their part
but was purely based on its nondelegable duty to maintain the bridge,
it was consistent with the longstanding rule of common law tort in-
demnity. The court reasoned that it did not "perceive from the na-
ture and facts of this case any ground for defeating the [county's] suit,
because of the principle of pari delicto."46 Stating that it was not fair
to bar indemnity to a defendant who could not "be charged with more
than a constructive default,"4 6 4 the court recognized the longstanding
common-law rule of implied tort indemnity but introduced the notion
of degrees of negligence.465 Despite this new language, the court re-
inforced the common-law principle that a party who was held liable
based on a legal relationship, without any personal fault or participa-
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939 was "designed to embody a
common policy expressive of the tendency, apparent in the law, to abandon the common-
law rule denying the right of contribution between joint tortfeasors." Id. at 197 (setting
forth reasons for the creation of the Act); see also Commissioners' Comment, 12 U.L.A. 187-
89 (1996).
Under the Act, the right to contribution is based on a pro rata calculation. 12 U.L.A.
185. While the Act included an optional section that authorized consideration of the rela-
tive degrees of fault among joint tortfeasors in determining their shares of common liabil-
ity, Maryland rejected this section as did the majority of states that have adopted the 1939
Act. Id, See also Kemper, supra note 449, at 191-92 (explaining that only Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Hawaii and South Dakota have included the optional section 2(4) in their enact-
ments of the 1939 Act).
In 1955, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted a new Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act which recognizes that there is no need for a comparative
negligence or degree of fault rule in contribution cases. Commissioners' Comment, 12
U.L.A. 246. This recognition is in accordance with the approach taken by the majority of
jurisdictions that adopted the 1939 Act. Kemper, supra note 449, at 191.
459. 57 Md. 201 (1881).
460. Id. at 223.
461. Id. at 224; see supra note 453 and accompanying text (defining "in pari delicto").
462. Chesapeake, 57 Md. at 224.
463. Id. at 220.
464. Id. at 223.
465. Id.
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tion in the action giving rise to the liability, would be entitled to re-
cover from the party actually responsible for the injury.466
Maryland's notion of common-law tort indemnity was expanded
in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. County Commissioners.467 The facts
underlying the case involved an accident, in which a traveler was
killed, caused by an unsafe condition of a highway resulting from
changes made in the road by a railroad company when it relocated its
tracks.46 8 After the County was held liable for the injuries, the county
commissioners sought indemnification from the railroad that had cre-
ated the unsafe condition in the public road.469 Although the Court
of Appeals found that the county had been negligent in not repairing
the road after receiving notice of the defective condition,
the Court could not say as a matter of law upon the facts
before it that [the county] participated with the defendant
[railroad company] in the creation of this dangerous nui-
sance or that [the county] was equally guilty with [the rail-
road company] with respect to the consequences which
ensued.
4 70
Thus, after comparing the negligence of the two tortfeasors, the court
concluded that they were not "equally culpable '47 1 and permitted the
county commissioners to receive indemnity from the railroad
company.472
B&O Railroad further enlarged the concept of tort indemnity be-
cause the court allowed the county to recover even though it had no-
tice of the defective condition and negligently failed to repair it.
4 73
This expanded notion of tort indemnity included cases where the in-
demnitee, although negligent, was less culpable than the indemnitor.
In determining whether the indemnitee was less culpable than the
466. Id.
467. 113 Md. 404, 77 A. 930 (1910), overruled by Franklin, 350 Md. at 167, 711 A.2d at
189. In B&O Railroad, the Court of Appeals articulated the general rule that "wherever the
wrongful act of one person results in liability being imposed on another, the latter may
have indemnity from the person actually guilty of the wrong." Id. at 414, 77 A. at 933. In
addition to articulating the general rule, the court recognized an exception which prevents
indemnity between actual tortfeasors, that is, cases in which each tortfeasor participates
equally in the action giving rise to the lawsuit. Id. However, the court explained that it
does not favor the extension of this exception and stated that to render this exception
applicable, "[there must be joint participation in the tort and the parties must be in equal
degree guilty." Id.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 411, 77 A. at 932.
470. Id. at 416-17, 77 A. at 934.
471. Id. at 416, 77 A. at 934.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 416-17, 77 A. at 934.
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indemnitor, B&O Railroad introduced the concept of "relative
fault"4 7 4 among tortfeasors by comparing the negligence of the
county, in failing to repair the road, with that of the canal company,
which was solely responsible for action giving rise to the lawsuit.4 7 5
Maryland courts have articulated the concept that there is a right
to indemnity where, although both parties have breached a legal duty
and are, as such, negligent, the indemnitee is less culpable than the
indemnitor in various ways. Generally speaking, the test used to deter-
mine whether to grant indemnity has been labeled the active-passive
negligence distinction.4 7 6 Indemnity is proper when the participation
of the indemnitee, although negligent, is considered passive or secon-
dary, while that of the indemnitor constitutes active negligence.4 7 7
Although it was clear by the middle of this century that tort in-
demnity was available to a defendant who is only "passively" negligent
from a defendant who is "actively" negligent,4 78 Maryland courts
lacked concrete guidelines to determine whether a tortfeasor's negli-
gence was active or passive. As a result, the rules for indemnity among
joint tortfeasors have been established through judicial decisions
based on varying interpretations of what the active-passive negligence
distinction is.
One of the earliest applications of the active-passive negligence
distinction arose in the context of legal relationships, where a party
who had not participated in the action giving rise to the injury was
held constructively liable. In one such case, the Court of Appeals de-
termined that an employer should have a right for indemnity against
an employee for damages suffered as a result of the employer's "vicari-
ous, or imputed" liability under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior.4 79 Because the employer's liability was not predicated upon
active negligence, he was entitled to recover from his employee whose
474. Id.
475. See id. at 416, 77 A. at 934 ("We cannot hold upon the evidence in this record as a
matter of law that the parties, as between themselves, were equally culpable ....").
476. Board of Trustees of Baltimore County Community College v. RTKL Assocs., Inc.,
80 Md. App. 45, 56, 559 A.2d 805, 811 (1989) (citing Gardenvillage Realty Corp. v. Russo,
34 Md. App. 24, 40, 366 A.2d 101 (1976)).
477. Pyramid Condominium Ass'n v. Morgan, 606 F. Supp. 592, 595 (D. Md. 1985)
(mem.).
478. See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 109 Md.
App. 217, 277-78, 674 A.2d 106, 135 (1996) ("[1]n negligence cases, Maryland follows the
'active/passive negligence' rule, by which a defendant may be entitled to indemnity if his
negligence was only 'passive' while another defendant's negligence was 'active.'" (citing
RTKL, 80 Md. App. at 54-57, 559 A.2d at 810-11)), affd, 346 Md. 122, 695 A.2d 153 (1997).
479. See Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
233 Md. 205, 215, 196 A.2d 76, 81 (1963).
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negligence was active.48 ° As such, the passively negligent defendant-
employer, whose liability was based on a legal relationship, was enti-
tled to indemnity from the actively negligent defendant-employee.4 l
Another example of a legal relationship justifying a claim for in-
demnity exists when a party is held liable solely by reason of vicarious
liability resulting from the nondelegable nature of his duty to comply
with the building code. Council Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v.
Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.482 involved a claim by a condominium
owners association against the general contractor, developer, and ar-
chitects of the building, alleging that, as a result of the defendants'
negligence, the utility shafts and related electrical work were not in-
stalled or constructed in accordance with the plans and did not com-
ply with the requirements of the applicable building code.48 3 Because
the developer was liable solely by reason of vicarious liability resulting
from the nondelegable nature of his duty to comply with the building
code, he had a right to indemnity from the independent contractor
he employed whose negligence actually caused the breach of the de-
veloper's duty.4 84 The court reached this conclusion by employing
the active-passive negligence distinction, finding that the developer's




482. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986).
483. Id at 22-23, 517 A.2d at 338-39.
484. Id. at 40-41, 517 A.2d at 348.
485. Id. A similar situation arose in Gardenvillage Realty Corp. v. Russo, 34 Md. App. 25,
366 A.2d 101 (1976). In Russo, the owner and the builder of a dwelling were seeking
indemnity from the supplier of a concrete slab, used to form the base of the back porch,
after the porch gave way and injured a tenant and her invitee. Id. at 27, 366 A.2d at 103. It
was established that the concrete slab was in a defective condition because the metal rein-
forcing bars ran in the wrong direction. Id. at 29, 366 A.2d at 104. The improper place-
ment of the reinforcing bars not only caused the porch to collapse, but it also violated the
Baltimore City Building Code. Id. Under the Building Code, the owner and builder were
liable for the injuries because they were a direct result of the violation. See id. at 33, 366
A.2d at 108 (explaining that liability attaches to the owner and permit holder if the viola-
tion of the code was a cause of injury). However, the Court of Special Appeals determined
that the violation of the Building Code constituted merely passive negligence, while the
negligence of the supplier was active, and permitted indemnity. Id. at 40, 366 A.2d at 111.
Using the active-passive negligence distinction, the court concluded that the owner and
builder were only constructively liable by reason of vicarious liability and had not been
guilty of any independent negligence, while the supplier had been actively negligent in
supplying the defective slab. See id. at 40-41, 336 A.2d at 111 (citing Pennsylvania Thresher-
man & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 233 Md. 205, 196 A.2d 76 (1963);
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. County Comm'rs, 57 Md. 201 (1881)).
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Thus, in Maryland, indemnity is clearly proper when a party held
liable to a plaintiff in a tort action did not take a physical role in the
negligent act that caused the plaintiff's injury, but was merely passively
negligent and held liable because of a legal relationship. Such prece-
dent has resulted in a requirement, articulated by some Maryland
courts, that the joint tortfeasors have "some sort of relationship" prior
to the tort that justified the claim for indemnity. 48 6
Outside the realm of imputed and vicarious liabilities, the active-
passive negligence distinction becomes difficult to apply. In Pyramid
Condominium Ass'n v. Morgan,4 s7 the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland applied the active-passive negligence distinc-
tion to require indemnity despite the absence of a legal relationship
between the parties. In Pyramid, indemnity was sought from banking
lenders by an architect and engineer.4 8 The parties were among sev-
eral defendants in a suit resulting from injuries to the "common ele-
ments"48 and to the air-conditioning system of a condominium
building.49 ° Because the relationship between the parties did not
clearly indicate that one defendant was liable through imputed or
constructive liability, the district court examined the plaintiffs com-
plaint against the defendant seeking indemnity to determine whether
the defendant's negligence was active or passive.49 1 The court deter-
mined that indemnity was precluded because the defendant seeking
indemnity was "an indispensable party to and direct participant in, the
construction of the Pyramid complex [the condominium] during at
least some critical stages of the building project. "492 In denying in-
demnity, the Pyramid court weighed the participation of the joint
tortfeasors. This "weighing" resulted in a denial of indemnity because
486. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 109 Md.
App. 217, 275, 674 A.2d 106, 134 (1995) (citing Board of Trustees of Baltimore County
Community Colleges v. RTKL Assocs., Inc., 80 Md. App. 45, 55, 559 A.2d 805, 810 (1989)),
aff'd, 346 Md. 122, 695 A.2d 153 (1997).
487. 606 F. Supp. 592 (D. Md. 1985).
488. Id. at 594.
489. "Common elements" are those aspects of the condominium complex which are
shared by all of the units. The alleged defects in the instant case included "flaking con-
crete, corrosion of reinforcing rods, roof leaks, settlement cracks, corrosion of windows
and handrails, water damage due to excessive intrusion of water through exterior walls,
and an air-conditioning system that was improperly designed and installed." Id. at 595.
490. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the injuries were caused by the negligence and other
acts or omissions of the defendants and the defendants filed third-party complaints for
indemnification and contribution. Id.
491. See id. at 596 (citing Tesch v. United States, 546 F. Supp. 526, 529 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).
492. See id. The defendant seeking indemnity participated in both the design and con-




the role of the defendant was active rather than passive.4 9 3 Even
though indemnity was denied, the consideration of the relative fault
of the joint tortfeasors was significant because it signified a move away
from the use of legal relationships as the basis for indemnity and to-
ward an expanded concept of comparative fault by utilizing the active-
passive negligence distinction.
The Court of Special Appeals addressed the Pyramid case in Board
of Trustees of Baltimore County Community Colleges v. RTKL Associates,
Inc.,"' expanding the approach used to make the active-passive negli-
gence distinction when it is not evident from the relationship between
the parties. 49 5 After the Plaintiff filed the Complaint against the de-
fendant (an architectural firm), the defendant filed cross-claims for
indemnification against the general contractor and the subcontrac-
tor.4 96 In addition to examining the complaint, the court stated that
"if it is clear from circumstances revealed in the complaint that liabil-
ity would only arise from proof of active negligence, there is no basis
for an indemnity claim. '49 7 The complaint in the Pyramid case alleged
breaches of duty which included active and passive negligence on the
part of the defendant seeking indemnification. 498 The court consid-
ered the evidence relating to the defendant and found that such evi-
dence could result in a finding by the jury of passive negligence. 4 99
The court explained that the allegation of negligent supervising could
be viewed as passive negligence.5 0 0 This observation by the court indi-
cates that tort indemnity was no longer limited to a party who has
been held liable because of constructive liability stemming from a
legal relationship. Yet the court did not make a conclusive determina-
tion of whether the negligence was active or passive, stating that "in-
demnity was not precluded nor mandated . . . as a matter of law."
501
This case is an example of the difficulty courts face, outside the realm
of legal relationships, when determining the propriety of indemnity.
493. Id.
494. 80 Md. App. 45, 559 A.2d 805 (1989).
495. Id. at 56, 559 A.2d at 811.
496. Id. at 48, 559 A.2d at 806.
497. Id.
498. See id. The complaint alleged a breach of duty on the part of the defendant seek-
ing indemnification in "negligently designing, approving and supervising ... " and the
court explained that supervising was of a passive character. Id. at 56-57, 559 A.2d at 811.
499. Id. at 56-57, 559 A.2d at 811.
500. Id.
501. See id. at 57, 559 A.2d at 811. Such a determination should be left to the jury, but in
this case, the Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial
because the jury failed to follow the instructions. Id. at 60, 559 A.2d at 813.
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In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Associates,5 ° 2
the most recent Maryland case addressing tort indemnity among joint
tortfeasors, the Court of Special Appeals examined the conduct that
constituted the alleged wrong in the complaint, as well as the circum-
stances revealed in the complaint, to determine whether indemnity
was proper.5° The case involved a suit brought by the council of the
condominium unit owners against the developer and its present and
former general partners and third-party claims filed by the defendant
against two subcontractors.5 °4 In determining whether indemnity was
proper, the court considered whether the wrongs against the defend-
ant seeking indemnity were passive compared to the other defend-
ant's active misconduct.5 0 5 This inquiry was based on the "overriding
concept [in tort indemnity] ... that, when there is a great disparity in
the degree of fault among the wrongdoers, liability may be shifted to
the party primarily responsible for the loss. ' 506
The Hartford case is significant in that the Court of Special Ap-
peals's reliance on the active-passive distinction was based on an inter-
pretation of Maryland's tort indemnity law. Without having objective
guidelines to follow, the court made this comparison based purely on
the court's interpretation rather than principled guidelines. It dem-
onstrates the court's willingness to expand tort indemnity from the
original confines of vicarious or constructive liability.
The most recent test advanced by a Maryland court to determine
whether tort indemnity is proper before Franklin compared the negli-
gence of the joint tortfeasors to determine who is primarily at fault.50 7
Yet, two lines of cases had evolved with one following the common-law
rule of tort indemnity, limiting its application to situations in which
the indemnitee is only constructively or vicariously liable, and the
other line of cases indicating that tort indemnity could be permitted
based on a great disparity in the degrees of negligence. Thus, after
the Hartford decision, it became evident that the phrase "active-passive
negligence" had come to embody two concepts: (1) indemnity based
on vicarious or constructive liability; and (2) indemnity based on de-
grees of fault.
502. 109 Md. App. 217, 674 A.2d 106 (1995), affd, 346 Md. 122, 695 A.2d 153 (1996).
503. Id. at 278, 674 A.2d at 136 (citing RTKL as an example of a case where the court
compared the negligence of the two tortfeasors). For further discussion of the RTKL cases,
see supra notes 494-501 and accompanying text.
504. Id. at 229, 674 A.2d at 112.
505. Id. at 278-79, 674 A.2d at 136.




3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Franklin v. Morrison, the Court of
Appeals held that while indemnification based on degrees of negli-
gence is not permitted, indemnity may be based on the active-passive
negligence distinction, to the extent that indemnity based in the ac-
tive-passive distinction means indemnity based on vicarious/construc-
tive liability. °8 In reaching this conclusion, the Franklin court
presented a general overview of tort indemnity before rejecting the
three arguments advanced by Franklin to support his claim for indem-
nity from Jiffy Lube. °9 The court discredited Franklin's arguments
that: (1) indemnity was proper under Restatement section 886B(2) (e);
(2) he was entitled to indemnity under the active-passive negligence
distinction; and (3) indemnity should be granted because Jiffy Lube's
negligence was disproportionately greater than his own. 10 In support
of its rejection of Franklin's three arguments for indemnity, the court
construed Maryland precedent narrowly and limited the types of cases
in which indemnity is proper.511 In order to detail the court's reason-
ing, Franklin's arguments will be addressed in turn.
a. Franklin's Claim for Indemnity Under Restatement (Second)
of Torts Section 886B(2)(e).-The first argument addressed by the
court was Franklin's contention that indemnity was proper under sec-
tion 886B(2) (e) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides, in
pertinent part, that indemnity should be granted where "[t] he indem-
nitor created a dangerous condition of land or chattels as a result of
which [two persons] were liable to the third person, and the indemni-
tee innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect."5" 2 Frank-
lin claimed the Restatement rule entitled him to indemnity because Jiffy
Lube created a dangerous condition of chattels513 by failing to replace
508. Franklin, 350 Md. at 167-69, 711 A.2d at 189-90.
509. Id. at 153-56, 711 A.2d at 182-84. The court explained that the basis for indemnity
between tortfeasors "'is restitution, and the concept that one person is unjustly enriched at
the expense of another when the other discharges liability that it should be his responsibil-
ity to pay.'" Id. at 154, 711 A.2d at 182 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B,
cmt. c (1979)). It continued with a discussion of the expanded notion of tort indemnity
that arose "'to include cases in which the indemnitee, while to some degree personally at
fault, was much less culpable than the indemnitor.'" Id. at 154, 711 A.2d at 183 (quoting
Vertecs Corp. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 661 P.2d 619, 621 (Alaska 1983)).
510. Id. at 157-69, 711 A.2d at 184-90.
511. Id. at 156-60, 711 A.2d at 184-85; see infra notes 572-587 and accompanying text
(analyzing the reasoning employed by the Franklin court in rejecting Franklin's claim for
indemnity under a relative fault theory).
512. Franklin, 350 Md. at 158, 711 A.2d at 184 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(2)(e)).
513. Id Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886B(1) explains the general concept of the rule
and provides that "[i]f two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm
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or by improperly replacing the differential check plug.514 In support
of this argument, Franklin cited defective brake cases from other juris-
dictions in which the defendant had no knowledge or notice of the
defective brakes and indemnity was granted against the third-party de-
fendants responsible for the defects. 15 However, the Franklin court
explained that the defective brake cases were irrelevant to the facts in
Franklin because the plaintiffs theory of Franklin's liability was based
on Franklin's conduct after he learned of the defect in his Blazer. 516
Unlike the defective brake cases, where the defendants had no notice
or knowledge of the defects, Franklin became aware of the problems
with his Blazer 2100 feet in advance of the place where his car
stopped. 517 Because the theory of liability against Franklin was based
on Franklin's conduct after learning of the problem with his Blazer,
the court determined that the rule of Restatement section 886B(2) (e)
did not support his claim for indemnity. 518 By rejecting Franklin's
claim, the court limited the Restatement requirement that "the indem-
nitee innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect. ' 519 The
and one of them discharges the liability of both, he is entitled to indemnity from the other
if the other would be unjustly enriched at his expense by the discharge of the liability."
RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(1). Restatement section 886B(2) simply sets forth
the "established applications" of the general principle of unjust enrichment set forth in
subsection (1). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B cmt. c.
514. Franklin, 350 at 148-49, 711 A.2d at 180; see supra notes 416-419 and accompanying
text (explaining the defect in the Blazer's differential plug after its Jiffy Lube servicing).
515. See Franklin, 350 Md. at 158-59, 711 A.2d at 185 (discussing Corso v. Maroney, 293
N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1968) and Lipsman v. Warren, 188 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1959),
aff'd as modified, 199 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. 1960)). The Franklin court noted that in these
cases, the New York courts held that indemnity would be proper if the defendant had no
knowledge or notice of the defective brakes, "but that, if the operator did have notice or
knowledge of the defect, then both the operator and the mechanic would be actively negli-
gent and there could be no indemnification." Id. at 159, 711 A.2d at 185.
516. See id. at 159-60, 711 A.2d at 185. The plaintiff focused on Franklin's actions in the
2100 feet between his discovery of the defect and the time the Blazer stopped in the mid-
dle of the road, arguing that Franklin was negligent in what he had done or failed to do
while traveling that 2100 feet. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff highlighted Franklin's failure
to flash his lights to warn oncoming cars that he was having trouble, as well as his failure to
honk his horn or even use a turn signal to let somebody know that he wanted to get out of
the lane he was in. Id.
517. Id. There were measures that Franklin could have taken to try to prevent the acci-
dent. Morrison argued:
Did he [Franklin] ever flash his lights to let cars that were going beside him know
that he was having trouble with his car? No. Did he honk his horn to let cars
know that there was something wrong with his car? No. Did he so much as even
turn on a signal to let somebody somewhere know that he wants to get out of the
lane he is in? No. He did not do any of that.
Id. at 160, 711 A.2d at 185.
518. Id.
519. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(2) (e).
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holding suggests that Maryland will only permit indemnity when the
indemnitee innocently failed to discover the defect, but not in situa-
tions where the indemnitee negligently failed to discover the
defect. 520
b. Franklin's Claim for Indemnity Under the Active-Passive Negli-
gence Distinction.-After recognizing that the instances listed in Restate-
ment section 886(B) (2) are not the exclusive bases for tort
indemnity, 521 the court examined Franklin's second argument for in-
demnity, which was based on the active-passive negligence distinc-
522tion. The court noted the rule "that one whose negligence has
consisted of mere passive neglect may have indemnity from an active
wrongdoer."5 2 In support of its finding that Franklin's negligence
constituted active negligence, the court discussed cases involving mo-
tor vehicle accidents from other jurisdictions which held that negli-
gent driving of a motor vehicle constitutes active negligence.524 The
520. The court's rejection of Franklin's claim for indemnity under Restatement
§ 886B(2) (e) illustrates a practice point for attorneys. If a plaintiffs theory for indemnity
is based on what a defendant did or failed to do after learning of a defective condition in a
chattel or property, it is unlikely that the defendant will be entitled to indemnity from a
third party. Franklin, 350 Md. at 160, 711 A.2d at 185. The rationale underlying this princi-
ple is the recognition that the defendant's action or failure to perform particular actions
most likely is a proximate cause of the injury. This rationale is in accordance with past
statements by the Court of Appeals addressing proximate cause. For example, in Bloom v.
Good Humor Ice Cream Co., 179 Md. 384, 18 A.2d 592 (1941), the court explained that "[t]he
negligent acts must continue through every event and occurrence, and itself be the natural
and logical cause of the injury." Id. at 387, 18 A.2d at 593. Applying this language to the
Franklin case, it becomes evident that Franklin's failure to take preventive measures while
traveling 2100 feet to the site of the accident constituted a negligent act that was a natural
and logical cause of the injury. As such, the court determined that Franklin's knowledge,
although limited, was sufficient to preclude recovery under Restatement section 886B(2) (e)
because he could have taken measures to prevent the accident. Franklin, 350 Md. at 159-
60, 711 A.2d at 185. His failure to take such measures was a proximate cause of the injury
and precluded recovery under the Restatement rule.
521. Franklin, 350 Md. at 160, 711 A.2d at 185.
522. Id.; see supra notes 477-491 and accompanying text (discussing the active-passive
negligence distinction).
523. Franklin, 350 Md. at 160, 711 A.2d at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing KEETON ET AL., supra note 413, § 51, at 343).
524. See id. at 161-62, 711 A.2d at 186-87. The court discussed a Missouri Supreme Court
decision that barred indemnity because the court did "not believe that indemnity should
be required as between joint tort-feasors involved in a two-car automobile collision on a
highway because of supposedly different types or degrees of negligence." Id. at 161, 711
A.2d at 186 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d
799, 807 (Mo. 1961) (en banc) (quoting State exrel. Siegel v. McLaughlin, 315 S.W.2d 499,
507-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958))). Additionally, the Franklin court referenced a Mississippi
decision that rejected a claim for indemnification arising out of a motor vehicle accident
between two trucks that caused the death of a child. Id. at 162, 711 A.2d at 186-87 (discuss-
ing Hood v. Dealers Transp. Co., 472 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Miss. 1979)). The Mississippi
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facts of these cases were not compared to the facts in the case at hand,
but were set forth to justify the jury's finding that Franklin and Jiffy
Lube were concurrently negligent because Franklin's operation of his
Blazer constituted active negligence.525
After establishing that Franklin's negligence was active, the court
recited the general law in Maryland that "one who is guilty of active
negligence cannot obtain tort indemnification."526 This general rule
was applied to Franklin, causing the court to conclusively state that
use of the active-passive negligence distinction indicated that Frank-
lin's negligence was active, precluding tort indemnity.527
c. Franklin's Claim for Indemnity Under a Relative Fault The-
ory.-Finally, after determining that Franklin's negligence was active,
the court examined Franklin's argument that he was entitled to in-
demnity because Jiffy Lube's negligence was disproportionately
greater than that of Franklin. 52' This argument was based on lan-
guage contained in Maryland cases addressing the right to indemnity
where "there is a considerable difference in the degree of fault among
the wrongdoers. "529
The Franklin court addressed each decision cited by Franklin in
support of his argument that indemnity is proper when there is a
great disproportion between the negligence of the two joint
tortfeasors.5" ° However, the court dismissed the statements as noth-
ing more than an introductory overview of the law. 1
court stated that the facts of the case involved "'a classic joint tortfeasor situation'" and
indemnity was precluded. Id. (quoting Hood, 472 F. Supp. at 252).
525. Id. at 163, 711 A.2d at 187.
526. See id.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 164, 711 A.2d at 187-88. As the court pointed out, this argument was based
on language in Hanford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Associates Ltd. Partnership,
109 Md. App. 217, 674 A.2d 106 (1995), affd, 346 Md. 122, 695 A.2d 153 (1997), and
Pyramid Condominium Ass'n v. Morgan, 606 F. Supp. 592, 595 (D. Md. 1985). See supra notes
487-506 and accompanying text (discussing the Hartford and Pyramid cases). The Franklin
court highlighted the specific language in Hartford, relied upon by Franklin, which stated
that "'[a] right to indemnification may lie, notwithstanding the parties' joint and several
liability, when there is a considerable difference in the degree of fault among the wrongdo-
ers."' Franklin, 350 Md. at 164, 711 A.2d at 187 (quoting Hartford, 109 Md. App. at 277, 674
A.2d at 135). The court noted that Franklin also relied on the statement in Pyramid that
indemnity lies "'where the character of one tortfeasor's conduct is significantly different
from that of another who is also liable for the same damages.'" Id. (quoting Pyramid, 606 F.
Supp. at 595).
529. Franklin, 350 Md. at 164, 711 A.2d at 187 (quoting Hartford, 109 Md. App. at 277,
674 A.2d at 135).
530. See id. at 164-68, 711 A.2d at 187-89.
531. See id. at 164-65, 711 A.2d at 187-88.
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The court spent more time addressing the case of Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co. v. County Commissioners,32 which expanded the rule
of tort indemnity to include cases where the indemnitee, although to
some degree personally at fault, was less culpable than the indemni-
tor.53" A distinction was drawn between the facts of B&O Railroad,
where indemnity was permissible, and those of the Franklin case,
where indemnity was not proper.534 Specifically, B&O Railroad in-
volved a claim for indemnity by Howard County, which had been held
liable for an accident occurring on a public highway based on its spe-
cial duty and relationship as a municipality.5 35 The court contended
that negligence of a municipality, based on a legal duty, did not proxi-
mately cause the accident, while the negligence of Franklin proxi-
mately caused the accident.536
In addition, the Franklin court overruled its statement in B&O
Railroad that indemnity is proper unless there is "'joint participation
in the tort and the parties [are] in equal degree guilty in a case of
[that] nature.' 5 37 The court argued that not only would such a rule
go beyond Franklin's argument that indemnity could be based on "'a
great disparity in the degree of fault among the wrongdoers," 5 " but
that it would be inconsistent with Maryland law.5 39  As such, the Frank-
lin court implied that the expanded coverage in B&O Railroad was
intended to apply only to such special relationships and not to cases
where joint tortfeasors have different degrees of personal fault.54 °
The court also determined that a rule which permitted indemnity
unless there is joint participation in the tort and the parties are
equally guilty was inconsistent with a tort system that does not recog-
532. 113 Md. 404, 77 A. 930 (1910), overruled by Franklin, 350 Md. at 167, 711 A.2d at
189; see supra notes 467-478 and accompanying text (discussing the B&O Railroad case and
its role in the origins of tort indemnity in Maryland).
533. The court spent time on this case because it acknowledged that B&O Railroad is
either "in conflict with, or enlarges, the rule stated in Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. County
Commissioners, 57 Md. 201 (1881)" and faults the B&O Railroad court for not citing the
latter case. Franklin, 350 Md. at 165, 711 A.2d at 188.
534. Franklin, 350 Md. at 165-67, 711 A.2d at 188-89.
535. Id. at 166-67, 711 A.2d at 188-89 (citing B&O Railroad, 113 Md. 404, 77 A. 930
(1910)).
536. Id.
537. See id. at 167, 711 A.2d at 189 (alterations in original) (quoting B&O Railroad, 113
Md. at 417, 77 A.2d at 933).
538. Id. (quoting Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs. Ltd. Partner-
ship, 109 Md. App. 217, 277, 674 A.2d 106, 135, affd, 346 Md. 122, 595 A.2d 153 (1997)).
539. Id.
540. Id. (concluding that Franklin's liability to Morrison was not based on a special rela-
tionship or duty comparable to that of a municipality and a user of its streets).
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nize comparative fault.54' The Franklin court reasoned that there is
not any substantial difference between "a rule allowing indemnifica-
tion where there is non-equal negligence, and tort system of compara-
tive fault." '42 The similarity between these concepts lies in the fact
that they both require the jury to make a determination of the relative
fault of wrongdoers based on percentages.
4 3
Furthermore, the court argued that a system of tort indemnity
based on the relative fault of the tortfeasors would be inconsistent
with the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which has
been adopted by Maryland.544 While a system of comparative fault
concerns itself with relative degrees of fault between parties, the
UCATA simply apportions liability among joint tortfeasors on a pro
rata basis, regardless of their legal negligence and is not concerned
with degrees of fault.545
Final support for the court's rejection of a system of comparative
fault for indemnification came from the failure of the Maryland legis-
lature to adopt an optional section of the UCATA that addressed ap-
portionment based on degrees of fault.546 By not adopting this
provision, the Franklin court reasoned, the Maryland legislature did
not intend loss-shifting to be accomplished by comparative negli-
gence.547 As such, the court rejected Franklin's claim for indemnity
based on an argument that Jiffy Lube's negligence was disproportion-
ately greater than his own.548
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 167-68, 711 A.2d at 189. The court noted that some states, in recognizing
comparative fault, have held that total loss-shifting is inconsistent with the theory of com-
parative fault, and therefore no longer recognize tort indemnification. Id. (citing Vertecs
Corp. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 661 P.2d 619 (Alaska 1983); Taggart v. State, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 696 (Ct. App. 1975); Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 495 N.E.2d 496 (IlL. 1986); Amrep
Southwest, Inc. v. Shollenbarger Wood Treating, Inc., 893 P.2d 438 (N.M. 1995); Owens v.
Truckstops of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. 1996); Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transp. Corp., 202 N.W.2d 268 (Wis. 1972)).
544. Id. at 168, 711 A.2d at 189. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-1402 to -
1409 (Supp. 1997) for the full text of Maryland's UCATA.
545. Franklin, 350 Md. at 168, 711 A.2d at 189 (citing CTS. & JuD. PROC. §§ 3-1402 to -
1405).
546. See id. (citing UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACr § 2 (revised 1955), 9
U.L.A. 157-58 (1951)). The optional section provided that "'If the evidence indicates that
there is a disproportion of fault as among the tortfeasors, the court shall instruct the jury
that if it finds the tortfeasors to have been negligent, they shall also fix their relative de-
grees of fault."' Id. (quoting UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACr § 2).
547. Id.
548. Id. at 169, 711 A.2d at 190.
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4. Analysis.-In Franklin v. Morrison, the Court of Appeals main-
tained Maryland's law permitting indemnity based on an active-passive
negligence distinction, but held that there is no right to indemnity
based on degrees of negligence. 549 This holding is inherently confus-
ing, for application of the active-passive negligence distinction neces-
sarily relies upon a comparison of the negligence of the joint
tortfeasors to determine who is primarily at fault and therefore ac-
tively negligent. By prohibiting indemnity based on the relative fault
of joint tortfeasors, the Court of Appeals established confusing prece-
dent for lower courts because it is difficult to employ the active-passive
negligence distinction without comparing the negligence of the two
wrongdoers.
Concededly, the court's holding does clearly indicate that the cir-
cumstances in which indemnity is proper are very limited,5 50 and care-
ful examination of the court's opinion, authored by Judge Rodowsky,
suggests that Maryland's tort indemnity law cannot be employed
outside the realm of purely imputed and vicarious liabilities. 55 1 As
such, the Court of Appeals should have abandoned the active-passive
negligence distinction entirely, and articulated the possible relation-
ships in which indemnity is proper. Although a more concise state-
ment of Maryland's law of tort indemnity would have created better
policy, the Franklin court implied that in the absence of imputed or
constructive liability resulting from a special relationship, there is no
right to tort indemnity absent a contract.
a. General Principles Underlying Indemnity.-Indemnification
is designed to shift the entire cost of the tortious conduct to one de-
fendant who is primarily responsible. 5 52 A right to indemnity may
arise by express agreement or by implication.55 In the absence of an
express agreement, tort indemnity should be strictly applied because
the indemnitor becomes one hundred percent liable for the loss while
the indemnitee has no liability at all. The Franklin court brought an
end to the expansion of tort indemnity from which the active-passive
negligence distinction had evolved. The difficulty of applying the ac-
549. Id. at 168-69, 711 A.2d at 190.
550. See id. at 160-61, 711 A.2d at 185-86 (discussing the general limit on the concept of
passive negligence which restricts application of the label to situations where a party is
solely vicariously or constructively liable).
551. Id. For further discussion on situations in which indemnity may be proper, see
infra notes 591-616 and accompanying text.
552. Id. at 153, 711 A.2d at 182 (stating that "[bly seeking indemnity... Franklin seeks
to have 100% of the loss borne by Jiffy Lube").
553. Hanscome v. Perry, 75 Md. App. 605, 615, 542 A.2d 421, 426 (1988).
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tive-passive distinction has resulted in indemnity reaching beyond the
scope desired by the Court of Appeals and beyond the scope of what is
equitable. The Franklin court prevented further expansion of tort in-
demnity under Maryland law by limiting its application to constructive
or imputed liability.
554
b. Analysis of the Franklin Court's Reasoning.-
(1) Franklin's Claim for Indemnity Under the Active-Passive Dis-
tinction.-The rationale underlying the court's rejection of Franklin's
claim for indemnity under the active-passive distinction 555 is not as
convincing as that used to reject Franklin's claim under the Restate-
ment rule. The court relied on cases involving car accidents from
other jurisdictions556 to illustrate that Franklin's negligence arising
out of the operation of his automobile was "active" negligence as a
matter of law.557 By drawing this conclusion, the court implied that
negligence resulting from the act of operating a motor vehicle will
always constitute active negligence, without much inquiry into the spe-
cific facts of the case.
The facts of the Franklin case, however, differ from the facts of
the cases cited by the court. Specifically, in each of the automobile
collision cases cited by the Franklin court in its analysis of the active-
passive negligence distinction,"55 the tortfeasors did not have any legal
relation to one another and both the indemnitee and indemnitor
were involved in the accident in which the injury occurred.5 59 These
facts can be distinguished from those in the Franklin case where
Franklin and Jiffy Lube did not have a relationship prior to the acci-
dent, and Franklin was the only party involved in the accident. Specif-
ically, Franklin took his car to Jiffy Lube for a routine service and Jiffy
Lube's negligence, in failing to replace the differential plug, created
and initiated the sequence of events giving rise to the accident.
560
Franklin had to deal with the Blazer's mechanical failure, which was
foisted upon him by faulty repair work. Yet, in reaching its conclu-
554. Franklin, 350 Md. at 154-56, 711 A.2d at 183-84.
555. See supra notes 521-527 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning underly-
ing the Franklin court's decision to reject Franklin's claim for indemnity under the active/
passive negligence distinction).
556. See supra notes 524-525 and accompanying text.
557. Franklin, 350 Md. at 163, 711 A.2d at 187.
558. Id. at 161-63, 711 A.2d at 186-87 (citing Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799 (Mo.
1961) (en banc); Hood v. Dealers Transp. Co., 472 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Miss. 1979)).
559. Id.
560. Id. at 147, 711 A.2d at 179. For a discussion of Franklin's relationship with Jiffy
Lube prior to the accident, see supra notes 416-419 and accompanying text.
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sion, the court did not even inquire into the negligence of Jiffy Lube,
nor did the court compare Franklin's negligence to that of Jiffy
Lube. 561 Rather, it examined Franklin's actions independently, indi-
cating that in employing the active-passive distinction, the alleged neg-
ligence of each party is to be analyzed separately. 56 2
Additionally, the court explained that in all cases involving the
active-passive distinction, the distinction:
rests upon a fault that is imputed or constructive only, being
based on some legal relation between the parties, or arising
from some positive rule of common or statutory law, or be-
cause of a failure to discover or correct a defect or remedy a
dangerous condition caused by the act of the one primarily
responsible.563
However, the court relied on selective case law to draw this conclu-
sion, 64 and ignored past cases which had suggested that there is no
such limitation on tort indemnity.565 The cases relied upon by the
Franklin court were primarily those which had reinforced the common
law rule enforcing tort indemnity in cases in which the indemnitee is
only constructively or vicariously liable for the acts of the indemni-
tor.566 For example, the court briefly mentioned, but did not analyze,
the language in the Hartford case567 which stated "[A] right to indem-
nification may lie, notwithstanding the parties' joint and several liabil-
ity, when there is a considerable difference in the degree of fault
among the wrongdoers."568 The court's selective reading of prece-
dent created a new standard for tort indemnity in Maryland, which is
limited to the realm of implied or constructive liability, even though
the court failed to address cases involving the expanded notion of tort
indemnity.
Because the court found that the Franklin case did not present a
claim for indemnity based on a legal relationship, Franklin's negli-
561. Franklin, 350 Md. at 160-64, 711 A.2d at 185-87.
562. Id. at 163, 711 A.2d at 187. The court concluded that "[u]nder the active-passive
analysis, Franklin's negligence is active, and accordingly, tort indemnification is not avail-
able to him." Id. No reference was even made to jiffy Lube's negligence.
563. See id. at 161-62, 711 A.2d at 186 (quoting Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d at 805 (quoting
State ex rel. Siegel v. McLaughlin, 315 S.W.2d 499, 507-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958))).
564. See id. at 163-64, 711 A.2d at 187 (discussing the active-passive distinction under
Maryland law).
565. See supra notes 487-490.
566. See supra notes 481-487.
567. See supra notes 504-508.
568. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 109
Md. App. 217, 277, 674 A.2d 106, 135 (1996), affd, 346 Md. 122, 685 A.2d 153 (1997).
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gence was active and there was no right to indemnity.569 The court
found that Franklin's active negligence precluded indemnity, without
even inquiring into whether Jiffy Lube was more negligent than
Franklin.5 70  Such an inquiry indicates that when determining
whether tort indemnity is proper, a court should examine the relative
negligence of a party seeking indemnity individually, without regard
to the negligence of the other party.5 71 If a party's liability is based on
a special legal relationship, it will be entitled to indemnity from the
party whose personal fault stems from active participation in the ac-
tion giving rise to the injury.
(2) Franklin's Claim for Indemnity Under a Relative Fault The-
ory.-The Franklin court rejected Franklin's claim for indemnity based
on the great disparity between his negligence and that ofJiffy Lube by
explaining that Maryland no longer recognizes the right to indemnity
based on the relative negligence of the parties.5 72 Although Franklin
advanced this argument as part of the active-passive distinction argu-
ment, the court examined it separately.57 3 This separation ignored
the reality that employment of the active-passive distinction required a
comparison of the negligence of the joint tortfeasors57 In employ-
ing the active-passive analysis in the past, Maryland courts have ex-
amined the relative negligence of the parties to determine who is
primarily negligent. 575  While some Maryland cases have examined
the relative negligence of the parties, others looked only to whether
the indemnitee's liability was constructive or imputed to determine
whether his negligence was active-passive.577 Without inquiring into
the relative negligence of the parties, the Franklin court narrows Mary-
569. Franklin, 350 Md. at 163, 711 A.2d at 187.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id. at 167-68, 711 A.2d at 189; see supra notes 459-509 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the origins of tort indemnity in Maryland based on degrees of negligence).
573. Franklin, 350 Md. at 164-69, 711 A.2d at 187-90.
574. See Brief for Petitioner at 14-18, Franklin v. Morrison, 350 Md. 144, 711 A.2d 177
(1998) (No. 84) (explaining that the active-passive distinction necessarily relies on a com-
parison of the relative negligence of the tortfeasors).
575. See supra notes 476-506 (explaining how Maryland courts have employed the active-
passive analysis).
576. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. County Comm'rs, 113 Md. 404, 711 A. 930
(1910), overruled by Franklin, 350 Md. at 167, 711 A.2d at 189; Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v.
Scarlett Harbor Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 109 Md. App. 217, 674 A.2d 106 (1996), afffd, 346
Md. 122, 685 A.2d 153 (1997); Board of Trustees of Baltimore County Community Col-
leges v. RTKL Assocs., Inc., 80 Md. App. 45, 56, 559 A.2d 805, 811 (1989). For a detailed
discussion of these cases, see the Legal Background section of this Note.
577. See e.g. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 233 Md. 205, 196 A.2d 76, 81 (1963); Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium,
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land's tort indemnity law by limiting its application to cases where a
party's liability, when examined individually, is based on a construc-
tive or imputed liability.5 78
The court found ample support for rejecting indemnity based on
the relative degrees of fault between joint tortfeasors because of the
limited purpose the expanded notion of tort indemnity was originally
intended to serve, primarily to weaken the harshness of the Mer-
ryweather rule. 79 Yet, it never addressed Maryland precedent, includ-
ing this comparison, outside the realm of constructive or imputed
liability. An examination of the negligence of each tortfeasor inde-
pendently will usually result in a finding of active, rather than passive,
negligence in the absence of some special relationship between the
parties. This is the likely outcome in such situations because the cau-
sation element of negligence requires a finding that the liable party
did something to proximately cause the injury. Any joint tortfeasor
who participates in an action giving rise to an injury, no matter how
minor the role, will be barred from indemnity from the other
tortfeasor who is primarily responsible.
The Franklin decision returned Maryland's tort indemnity law to
common law principles by basically eliminating indemnity based on
degrees of fault. While the court did not provide substantial reason-
ing for this shift in the law, the decision was perhaps based on the
recognition that there is no longer a need for tort indemnity based on
degrees of negligence because of the relief available through the Uni-
form Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.58 0 Because both the Act
and the expanded notion of tort indemnity were designed to weaken
the harshness of the rule that there is no right of contribution be-
tween joint tortfeasors, it is not necessary to maintain both laws. The
guidelines set forth in the Act, which provide for contribution based
on a pro rata basis, are not difficult to apply in practice. The law of
tort indemnity based on degrees of negligence, on the other hand,
does not have any concrete guidelines to follow and lacks consistency.
The court did not raise this rationale in its opinion and, instead, pro-
vided an unconvincing argument to support its return to the common
law.
Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986); Gardenvillage
Realty Corp. v. Russo, 34 Md. App. 25, 366 A.2d 101 (1976).
578. Franklin, 350 Md. at 163, 711 A.2d at 187.
579. See supra notes 451-454 and accompanying text.
580. For a more detailed discussion of Maryland's Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, see supra note 458.
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One such example is the court's unconvincing reasoning that in-
demnity based on degrees of negligence should not be permitted be-
cause it is substantially similar to a tort system of comparative fault,
which is not recognized in Maryland.5"' A tort system of comparative
fault compares the contributory negligence of the plaintiff to the neg-
ligence of the defendant and apportions liability accordingly.
58 2
Under a comparative fault system, negligence is measured in terms of
percentages and any damages awarded against the defendant are di-
minished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person seeking recovery.583 Tort indemnity based on the degrees
of negligence, in contrast, examines the relative fault of the defen-
dants. 5 4 The Franklin court did not even recognize the difference
between a system of comparative fault and tort indemnity based on
degrees of negligence; their failure to do so weakened the argu-
ment.58 5 Apparently, the court did not deem the parties involved in
the comparison as controlling. Rather, the fact that both systems re-
quire the jury to make a determination of the relative fault of the
wrongdoers based on percentages was a sufficient similarity for the
court.
5 8 6
A stronger argument advanced by the court was that which
looked to the Maryland legislature's rejection of the optional provi-
sion of the 1939 UCATA, which addressed apportionment of liability
based on degrees. 87 This history demonstrates that the Franklin
court's holding is consistent with the intent of the legislature. The
court implies that the decision of the Maryland legislature to reject
the optional section expressly indicates its intention to denounce a
system of tort indemnity based on degrees of negligence. Yet, while
the legislature's rejection of a system of contribution based on degrees
of negligence indicates that the legislature disapproves of the notion
581. Franklin, 350 Md. at 167-68, 711 A.2d at 189.
582. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 452-53, 456 A.2d
894, 898-99 (1983) (discussing the principles underlying comparative negligence before
rejecting its adoption in Maryland).
583. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 446, at 282.
584. See supra 467-478 and accompanying text.
585. See Franklin, 350 Md. at 167, 711 A.2d at 189 ("We do not discern any substantial
difference between Franklin's position, or a rule allowing indemnification where there is
non-equal negligence, and a tort system of comparative fault.").
586. Id. at 168, 711 A.2d at 189; see supra notes 540-542 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the similarities between a system of comparative fault and tort indemnity based on
degrees of negligence).
587. Franklin, 350 Md. at 168, 711 A.2d at 189; see supra note 458 (examining Maryland's
rejection of the optional section of the UCATA which examined the relative degrees of
fault of joint tortfeasors when determining whether contribution is proper in determining
the amount of contribution required from each party).
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of loss shifting based on relative degrees of fault, it does not necessar-
ily constitute a direct attack on tort indemnity based on a great dispar-
ity in negligence. Nevertheless, the court argues that by rejecting
indemnity based on degrees of negligence, the Franklin court placed
Maryland law in accordance with the original intent of the legislature,
limiting the application of tort indemnity to the special circumstances
to which it was intended to apply, primarily to situations involving im-
puted or constructive liability.
c. Special Circumstances in Which Indemnity Is Clearly Proper
Under Maryland Law.-The circumstances under which an implied
right of indemnity is now recognized by Maryland law are rather lim-
ited. There are few situations in which the right to indemnity is likely
to be proper. The Franklin court provided some examples, based on
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 886B (1), when indemnity is proper
based on some relationship between the joint tortfeasors prior to the
wrongful act.588 Such examples were the clearest indication of the
court's policy that the right to indemnity is extremely limited. 589 All
of the relationships set forth by the court involve legal duties which
may result in the imposition of constructive liability without personal
fault or involvement in the action giving rise to the injury.590
The court, in accordance with Restatement (Second) of Torts section
886B(2), provided the instances in which indemnity should be
granted.591 Restatement (Second) of Torts section 886B(2) (a) provides
that indemnity should be granted when "It] he indemnitee was liable
only vicariously for the conduct of the indemnitor."5 2 As an example
of a situation that would fulfill the requirements of this subsection,
the Franklin court cited a Maryland case involving a claim against an
employer based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.595 Because an
employer may be held liable for the active negligence of his employ-
ees, an employer would have a right to indemnity against the em-
ployee for damages suffered by him.594 As such, the Franklin court
588. Franklin, 350 Md. at 156-59, 711 A.2d at 183-85 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886B(1) (1979)).
589. Id.; see infra notes 591-616 (explaining relationships involving imputed or construc-
tive liability which may entitle a party to tort indemnity).
590. Franklin, 350 Md. at 156-59, 711 A.2d at 183-85.
591. Id. at 156-58, 711 A.2d at 183-84 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 886B(2)).
592. Id. at 157, 711 A.2d at 184 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 886B(2) (a)).
593. Id. n.4 (citing Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 233 Md. 205, 196 A.2d 76 (1963)).
594. Id.
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makes it clear that indemnity may be proper in situations involving a
special relationship such as that of an employer and his employee.
595
Another special relationship in which indemnity may be granted
is where "[t] he indemnitee acted pursuant to directions of the indem-
nitor and reasonably believed the directions to be lawful." 59 6 A prime
example of such a relationship, as provided by the Franklin court, is
that of an agent acting pursuant to the authority of the person from
whom he seeks to recover, without any knowledge or intention on the
part of the agent to violate the law.597 Thus, the legal relationship
between an agent and principal may entitle an agent to indemnity if
he is held liable for damages caused by his actions which were in re-
sponse to the directions of his principal.
59 8
The relationship between an employer and employee, and that
between an agent and principal, are not the only relationships that
may entitle one to indemnity. Another example of such a relationship
arises when " [t]he indemnitee was induced to act by a misrepresenta-
tion on the part of the indemnitor, upon which he justifiably re-
lied."599 The Franklin court gives the example of a case involving a
shipper's preparation and request to a railroad to issue bills of lading
to separate consignees for the same shipment.60 0 The railroad was
entitled to indemnity from the shipper for loss incurred after it had
justifiably relied on the shipper's misrepresentation. 6 1 This example
suggests that parties engaging in business have a unique relationship
which may justify indemnity in certain circumstances.
Furthermore, if "[t] he indemnitor supplied a defective chattel or
performed defective work upon land or buildings as a result of which
595. For example, if an employer is held liable for damages resulting from a car acci-
dent caused by his employee's negligent driving, the employer is entitled to indemnity
from his employee. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Thresherman, 233 Md. 205, 196 A.2d 76.
596. Franklin, 350 Md. at 157, 711 A.2d at 184 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886B(2) (b)).
597. See id. n.5 (citing Percy v. Clary, 32 Md. 245, 250 (1870)). The court cites Percy, for
the doctrine that indemnity may be proper when two conditions have been met: "first, that
the wrong must not be malum in se; and second, that the party claiming contribution must
have acted without any design to violate the law, and as the agent or by the authority of
him from whom he seeks to recover." Id. (quoting Percy, 32 Md. at 250).
598. For example, if a principal provides false information to an agent and the agent,
believing the information to be true, acts on the information, the agent is entitled to in-
demnity from the principal if he is held liable for an injury resulting from the false
information.
599. Franklin, 350 Md. at 157, 711 A.2d at 184 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 886B(2) (c)).
600. Id. n.6 (citing Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R. Co. v. Roberts, 134 Md.
398, 106 A. 615 (1919)).
601. Id. at 157, 711 A.2d at 184 (citing Roberts, 134 Md. 398, 106 A. 615).
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both were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently
or negligently failed to discover the defect, '6 ° 2 indemnity may be
granted. The relationship between an independent contractor and a
real estate developer falls within this category, and indemnity will be
proper where the developer is held constructively liable for the actual
negligence of the independent contractor.6"' The Franklin court also
cites a case in which a landlord was entitled to indemnity from the
manufacturer of a concrete slab that collapsed and injured tenants
because it did not conform to the building code requirement.60 4 In-
demnity was proper in that case because the landlord was only con-
structively liable for the actual negligence of the manufacturer who
defectively built the concrete slab.60 5
These examples illustrate that indemnity is available to a party
who has not taken a physical role in the negligent act, but is legally
negligent because of some sort of relationship prior to the tort. This
rule seems to adequately address the injustice at which tort indemnity
was originally aimed. Specifically, it was aimed at weakening the
harshness of the common law rule that there is no right to contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors.60 6 It is equitable to permit tort indem-
nity in cases where a party, without personal fault, is held liable.
Because indemnity shifts the total cost of damages to one party, it is
only fair that it is applied sparingly, and limiting its application to
cases involving constructive or derivative liability is reasonable. Mary-
land law now properly limits the availability of tort indemnity to per-
sons whose liability is constructive or imputed.
Indemnity may also be granted where "[t]he indemnitor created
a dangerous condition of land or chattels as a result of which both
were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently and
negligently failed to discover the defect."60 7 This seems to be the
broadest category of legal relationship because it may include several
types of circumstances. The court cites the example provided by the
602. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(2) (d)).
603. Id. n.7 (citing Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Tur-
ner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 40-41, 517 A.2d 336, 348 (1986)). The court noted that
the nondelegable duty on the part of the real estate developer for violations of safety meas-
ures in a building code entities the developer to indemnity from the independent contrac-
tor whose negligence actually caused the breach.
604. Id. (citing Gardenvillage Realty Corp. v. Russo, 34 Md. App. 25, 366 A.2d 101
(1976)).
605. Id.
606. See supra notes 451-454 and accompanying text.
607. Franklin, 350 Md. at 158, 711 A.2d at 184 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886B(2) (e)).
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Restatement,6"' and discussed this particular situation 60 9 when it ad-
dressed Franklin's claim for indemnity under Restatement section
886B(2) (e). 61° Specific emphasis is placed on the lack of knowledge
of the indemnitee about the defective condition created by the in-
demnitor.'6f This discussion suggests that if the two parties have some
sort of relationship prior to the tort, and the indemnitor creates a
dangerous condition about which the indemnitee has no knowledge
or notice, the indemnitee can recover because he has not directly con-
tributed to the injury. 612
Finally, indemnity is proper where "[t] he indemnitor was under a
duty to the indemnitee to protect him against the liability to the third
person."61 The facts surrounding the first Maryland case to expand
tort indemnity to joint tortfeasors illustrate this situation. 614 The Ches-
apeake case involved a county's claim for indemnity from a canal com-
pany, which had created and should have repaired a defective
condition on the bridge that injured third parties.61 Indemnity
should be granted in such situations because municipal corporations
are held constructively liable to injuries incurred in their county be-
cause of the particular nondelegable duty owed by a county, and they
should receive indemnity from those who actually caused the defec-
tive condition that resulted in injury.616
608. Id. n.8 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B, cmt. i). The Restatement
gives the example of an indemnitor who wrongfully dug a ditch across the indemnitee's
road or had left a dangerous obstruction in front of the indemnitee's home. Id. (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B, cmt. i).
609. The Restatement situation quoted by the Franklin court involved a case where "The
indemnitor created a dangerous condition or land or chattels as a result of which both
were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to
discover the defect." Id.
610. 1& at 158, 711 A.2d at 184.
611. Id. at 159-60, 711 A.2d at 185. The court contrasts Franklin's failure to do anything
while the Blazer was traveling 2100 feet to the place where it stopped with the facts in the
defective brake cases cited by Franklin in support of his argument that he was entitled to
indemnity under Restatement section 886(B) (2) (e), where the operators had no knowledge
or notice of the defect. Id.; see also supra notes 515-516 and accompanying text (discussing
New York cases involving car accidents resulting from faulty mechanical repairs).
612. Franklin, 350 Md. at 159-60, 711 A.2d at 185. It is interesting to note that the Frank-
lin court cited no Maryland precedent applying this Restatement subsection in its opinion.
613. Id. at 158, 711 A.2d at 184 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(2)(f)).
614. See supra notes 467-473 and accompanying text for a discussion of the B&O Rail-
road case and the origins of tort indemnity in Maryland.
615. See Franklin, 350 Md. at 154, 711 A.2d at 182 (discussing Chesapeake & Ohio Canal




d. When the Active-Passive Distinction Applies.-After providing
these specific instances in which indemnity is proper, the Franklin
court acknowledged that they are not exclusive.61 7 Yet, this statement
may be misleading, for the Franklin court does not provide any addi-
tional circumstances where indemnity would be proper.61 8 Rather,
the court reiterated the relationships previously listed and merely im-
plied the actions of the permissible indemnitee as passive and those of
the proper indemnitor as active.619 Merely reiterating the relation-
ships provided in the Restatement, rather than explaining the role of
the active-passive negligence distinction in Maryland's tort indemnity
law, creates a confusing opinion.
Under the active-passive negligence distinction, only a passively
negligent tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity.62° The court indicated
that there is a "general limit on the concept of passive negligence, ' 621
because it is equitable only in rare circumstances that the entire loss
be shifted to one tortfeasor. According to the Franklin opinion, tort
indemnity is available to avoid unjust enrichment.622 As such, it is
only proper when a fault is "'imputed or constructive only, being
based on some legal relation between parties, or arising from some
positive rule of common or statutory law or because of a failure to
discover or correct a defect or remedy a dangerous condition caused
by the act of the one primarily responsible.' 6 23 Such imputed or con-
structive liability is what the court labels "passive negligence." 624
The Franklin court could have easily abandoned the active-passive
negligence distinction and labeled the additional circumstances in
which indemnity is proper as those in where a person without per-
sonal fault is held liable. The Court of Special Appeals has expressed
such a sentiment when it stated that the right to tort indemnity is "ar-
ticulated most succinctly in the Restatement of Restitution § 96. "1625 Sec-
tion 96 of the Restatement of Restitution provides, in pertinent part, that
"[a] person who, without personal fault, has become subject to tort
617. See id. at 160, 711 A.2d at 185 ("The instances listed in Restatement § 886B, in
which indemnification is generally recognized as available, are not exclusive.").
618. Id. at 156-59, 711 A.2d at 183-84.
619. Id.
620. Id. at 160, 711 A.2d at 185-86.
621. Id., 711 A.2d at 185.
622. Id.
623. Id. at 161-62, 711 A.2d at 186 (quoting Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799, 805
(Mo. 1961) (en banc) (quoting State ex rel. Siegel v. McLaughlin, 315 S.W.2d 499, 507-08
(Mo. Ct. App. 1958))).
624. See id. at 165-68, 711 A.2d at 188-90.
625. See Hanscome v. Perry, 75 Md. App. 605, 617, 542 A.2d 421, 427 (1988) (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1937)).
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liability for the unauthorized and wrongful conduct of another, is en-
titled to indemnity from the other for expenditures properly made in
the discharge of such liability." '626
The Franklin court should have adopted a phrase like "without
personal fault" to indicate the situations in which a person may be
entitled to indemnity. The circumstances in which indemnity is
proper, as highlighted by the court, indicate that indemnity is proper
when a defendant is held liable even though he did nothing to cause
the plaintiffs injuries.62 7 In such circumstances, the defendant enti-
tled to indemnity has not done anything to proximately cause the
injuries.628
Yet the active-passive negligence distinction connotes that some
negligent acts may be less of a proximate cause of the injuries and
therefore passively negligent, while other acts are a more direct proxi-
mate cause and hence actively negligent. Employment of the active-
passive negligence distinction requires a weighing of the relative fault
of tortfeasors, but the Franklin court has rejected indemnity based on
such a comparison.6 29 As such, the court's maintenance of the active-
passive negligence distinction is inconsistent with its rejection of in-
demnity based on degrees of negligence.
e. Maryland's Indemnity Law After Franklin.-By discarding
indemnity based on degrees of negligence, the Franklin court implies
that indemnity can only be applied where the liability of the indemni-
tee is solely constructive or derivative.630 Such constructive liability
must be what the court considers "passive negligence." 631 However,
rather than placing such a label on the specific situations, the court
would have provided better direction and stronger precedent if it had
abandoned the active-passive negligence distinction as well. Such ter-
minology is misleading because it denotes degrees of fault, and the
court has specifically rejected indemnity based on degrees of fault.63 2
The confusion caused by using such labels could have been avoided if
the court simply stated that the active-passive negligence distinction
626. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96.
627. Franklin, 350 Md. at 156-59, 711 A.2d at 183-85; see supra notes 588-616 (discussing
relationships that may entitle a party to indemnity).
628. Franklin, 350 Md. at 156-59, 711 A.2d at 183-85.
629. Id. at 167-68, 711 A.2d at 189-90.
630. See supra notes 591-611 (discussing relationships advanced by the Franklin court as
examples of cases when indemnity may be proper).
631. Franklin, 350 Md. at 163, 711 A.2d at 187.
632. Hanscome v. Perry, 75 Md. App. 605, 618 n.3, 542 A.2d 421, 427 (1988) (citing
Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 493 (Fla. 1979)).
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distinguishes one who is at fault from one who is free from fault. For
these reasons, the Franklin court should have suggested the situations
where indemnity is proper and emphasized the fact that each situa-
tion involves liability without personal fault. Furthermore, the court
should have expressly stated that tort indemnity is limited to the realm
of constructive and derivative liability.633
5. Conclusion.-In Franklin v. Morrison, the Court of Appeals lim-
ited the availability of tort indemnity by abandoning the rule permit-
ting indemnity or contribution based on degrees of negligence.634
Although the court maintained Maryland's rule permitting indemnity
based on the active-passive negligence distinction, it indicated that the
label "passive negligence" will sparingly be applied.63 Tort indemnity
will be proper primarily in cases where a person is constructively or
vicariously liable as the result of a legal relationship, but who is with-
out personal fault.6 36 The court was correct in limiting tort indemnity
to situations where liability is constructive or derivative because such
the entire loss should not be shifted to a "more" negligent party when
the parties are, in fact, joint tortfeasors. The Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act addresses the proper distribution of liability in
such cases. Yet, even though the Franklin court's abandonment of in-
demnity based on degrees of negligence is commendable, by main-
taining the active-passive distinction, confusion will result. Confusion
will result because the distinction has come to embody two meanings:
(1) situations where the indemnitee is only vicariously or imputedly
liable; and (2) situations where the indemnitee is much less negligent
than the indemnitor. The court could have clarified the confusion
surrounding the active-passive distinction by eliminating use of that
phrase entirely. The court should have simply stated that in the ab-
sence of a special relationship, there is no right to tort indemnity.
LAUREN N. SCHULTZ
633. Otherjurisdictions have expressly limited the application of indemnity to situations
when the indemnitee is not at fault or was owed a pre-existing duty by the indemnitor. See,
e.g., Stewart v. Roy Bros. 265 N.E.2d 357, 365 (Mass. 1970) (declining to permit indemnity
on grounds that the party seeking indemnity was not exposed to liability vicariously or
derivatively); Minster Mach. Co. v. Diamond Stamping Co., 248 N.W.2d 676, 678-79 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1976) (holding that indemnity does not extend to parties personally at fault for
the harm); Huck v. Gabriel Realty, 346 A.2d 628, 631 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (re-
fusing to grant indemnity because of misrepresentations by the party seeking indemnity).
634. Franklin, 350 Md. at 167-69, 711 A.2d at 189-90.
635. See supra notes 606-616 (describing relationships which may entitle a party to
indemnity).
636. Franklin, 350 Md. at 156-58, 711 A.2d at 183-85.
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D. An Examination of the Modern Employee's Dilemma and the
Legitimacy of the Assumption of Risk Defense
In ADM Partnership v. Martin,63 7 the Court of Appeals examined
"whether the 'voluntariness' element of the assumption of risk de-
fense is met when an employee encounters a known risk" during the
course of her employment but, on her subjective belief alone that her
or her employer would suffer "adverse economic consequences," the
employee confronts the risk and in the process is injured.63 The
court answered in the affirmative 639 and remanded the case to the
Court of Special Appeals, with an order to affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.6 4 ° In so doing, the court reversed the Court of Special
Appeals's use of the "modem employee's dilemma"64' to prevent the
"voluntariness" element of the assumption of risk defense from being
satisfied under the fact pattern in this case.6 42 The court concluded
that the Court of Special Appeals had improperly distinguished
Schroyer v. McNeala43 and Burke v. Williams6. from the case at hand to
apply the modern employee's dilemma.645 While the Court of Ap-
peals was accurate in its construction of Schroyer and Burke,64 6 the
court should, in future cases, abolish the use of the assumption of risk
defense in certain employment situations and adopt the modern em-
ployee's dilemma because the economic reasons for applying the as-
sumption of risk defense are no longer applicable.647 The facts in
637. 348 Md. 84, 702 A.2d 730 (1997).
638. Id. at 87, 702 A.2d at 732.
639. Id.
640. Id. at 104, 702 A.2d at 740.
641. Id. at 94-95 & n.3, 702 A.2d at 736 & n.3. The "modern employee's dilemma":
advances the view that an employee does not voluntarily or unreasonably assume
the risk of a danger during the course of employment because "the competitive-
ness and pragmatism" of the real world workplace compel employees to either
perform risky tasks or suffer various adverse employment consequences, ranging
from termination to more subtle sanctions.
Id, at 94 n.3, 702 A.2d at 736 n.3 (quoting Varilek v. Mitchell Eng'g Co., 558 N.E.2d 365,
376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)).
642. See id. at 90, 702 A.2d at 734. Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense; "the
defendant must show that the plaintiff: (1) had knowledge of the risk of the danger; (2)
appreciated that risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk of danger." Id. at 90-91, 702
A.2d at 734 (citing Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 630, 495 A.2d 838, 843
(1985)).
643. 323 Md. 275, 592 A.2d 1119 (1991).
644. 244 Md. 154, 223 A.2d 187 (1966).
645. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 95-99, 702 A.2d at 736-38.
646. See infra notes 771-780 and accompanying text.
647. See infra notes 784-795 and accompanying text.
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ADM Partnership, however, may be too far down that "slippery slope"
for the modern employee's dilemma to apply.6 41
1. The Case.-The respondent, Keen Tykenko Martin (Martin),
was a delivery person for Ideal Reprographics, Inc., a blueprint repro-
duction company.649 On the morning of March 8, 1989, Martin was
assigned to deliver blueprints to a business located in a building
owned by ADM Partnership (ADM) .650 Martin drove her pickup truck
"into the parking lot directly in front of the walkway leading up to the
building. '65 1 Ice and snow surrounded ADM's building, "particularly
the parking lot directly in front of the building and the entrance walk-
way," even though it had stopped precipitating nineteen hours
earlier.6 52
At trial, Martin testified that she had noticed the unplowed snow
and ice surrounding the building and that she had been curious why
the snow had not been removed from the walkways.6 53 Martin also
noted that other cars were parked in the lot, that there were foot-
prints in the snow and ice, and that there were people working inside
the building.5 4 From these facts, Martin deduced that there was a
"safe means of ingress and egress to and from the building" and there-
fore felt that she could safely enter the building.655
Martin testified that she thought she had to complete the delivery
if she wanted to keep her job, even though her employer had never
related this to her explicitly.65 6 She reasoned that if she failed to
make the delivery, Ideal Reprographics would lose the contract and
she would then be terminated.657 Under this belief, she exited her
pickup truck and "started around to the passenger side" to retrieve
the blueprints for delivery.658 As she proceeded, Martin slipped on
648. See infra notes 806-811 and accompanying text.
649. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 88, 702 A.2d at 733. The facts of this case were not in
dispute. Id.
650. Id.
651. Martin v. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. 652, 656, 666 A.2d 876, 878 (1995), rev'd,
348 Md. 84, 702 A.2d 730 (1997).
652. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 88, 702 A.2d at 733. Since the snow had stopped, the
temperature had not risen above twenty-eight degrees Fahrenheit. Brief of the Respon-
dents at 3, ADM Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 702 A.2d 730 (1997) (No. 5).
653. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 88, 702 A.2d at 733.
654. Id.
655. Id. at 88-89, 702 A.2d at 733; see also Brief of the Respondents at 3-4, ADM Partner-
ship (No. 5) (emphasizing that the building only had one means of egress and ingress).
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the ice in the parking lot.65 9 She was able to stop her fall by grabbing
on to her truck.66 ° Martin then continued her trek on the ice covered
walkway and delivered the blueprints.661 As she exited the building
and made her way back to her truck, she slipped and fell a second
time, seriously injuring her lower back.662
Martin filed suit against ADM in the Circuit Court for Montgom-
ery County for "negligence in failing to keep their property safe."66 3
The circuit court granted ADM's motion for judgment 664 after finding
that the evidence "conclusively established" that Martin knew of the
risk of walking on the ice and had voluntarily assumed the risk "of
falling on a walkway covered with ice and snow. "665
The respondents appealed,66 6 and the Court of Special Appeals
reversed the judgment after concluding that ADM did not meet the
burden of demonstrating that Martin had voluntarily assumed the risk
of injury.66 7 Specifically, the court found that Martin did not encoun-
ter the risk voluntarily "because she was not acting for her own con-
venience; rather, at the time of her injury, she was on a mission for
her employer." '668 Therefore, enough evidence existed to create a





663. Martin v. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. 652, 656, 666 A.2d 876, 879 (1995), rev'd,
348 Md. 84, 702 A.2d 730 (1997). Specifically, Martin contended that ADM was negligent
in failing to maintain a safe walkway, failing to remove the snow and ice from the walkway
and parking lot pursuant to local law, and failing to provide adequate warning of the dan-
gerous condition. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 89, 702 A.2d at 733.
664. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 88, 702 A.2d at 732. ADM moved for judgment at the
conclusion of Martin's case, arguing that Martin had assumed the risk of her injuries.
ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 655, 666 A.2d at 878.
665. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 88, 702 A.2d at 732. The trial judge applied an objec-
tive standard and found that Martin had assumed the risk for three reasons: (1)
"'[e]verybody knows that walking on ice is slippery;'" (2) Martin had admitted to seeing
the ice on the walkway; and (3) that she had previously slipped on the ice. Id. at 90, 702
A.2d at 733. Additionally, the court disregarded her argument that she did not act volunta-
rily due to her "fear of termination" because she had made a "calculated decision . . . to
take a chance and carefully walk across the walkway." Id., 702 A.2d at 733-34.
666. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 655-56, 666 A.2d at 878. Martin argued that the
circuit court erred in granting the motion for judgment because "the evidence demon-
strated that [ADM] failed to meet the burden of proof of their affirmative defense." Id. at
656, 666 A.2d at 878.
667. Id. at 656, 664-65, 666 A.2d at 878, 882-83.
668. Id. at 660, 666 A.2d at 880. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that Martin was
aware of and appreciated the danger of walking across an icy parking lot and walkway. Id.
at 658, 659, 666 A.2d at 879, 880. This finding was not challenged in the Court of Appeals.
ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 90 n.2, 702 A.2d at 734 n.2.
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suffered negative repercussions at her job had she not delivered the
blueprints."669 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider
whether:
the 'voluntariness' element of the assumption of risk defense
is met when an employee encounters a known risk while per-
forming a responsibility of her employment ... based solely
on her subjective belief that the failure to fulfill that respon-
sibility may result in adverse economic consequences to her
employer and ultimately to herself.670
2. Legal Background.-The assumption of risk defense is deeply
embedded in early English common law and is defined most accu-
rately by the maxim volenti non fit injuria which means, "l[t] o one who
is willing no harm is done."67' The Maryland courts have defined as-
sumption of risk as requiring the defendant to demonstrate that the
plaintiff "(1) had knowledge of the risk of the danger, (2) appreciated
that risk and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to it."'6 7 2 The doctrine of
assumption of risk has developed primarily in the employment con-
text as a method of "insulat[ing] employers from liability for work-
related injuries."67 Historically, the courts have either shunned the
doctrine as archaic or have received it as a "logical safeguard
grounded in economics and individualism."6 74
a. The Recent Development of the Assumption of Risk Doctrine in
Maryland.-In Burke v. Williams,6 75 the Court of Appeals applied the
assumption of risk defense to prohibit an employee from recovering
for injuries sustained in the course of his employment. In Burke, an
employee was injured when he fell into an excavation under a board
walkway while delivering kitchen sinks to a partially constructed
669. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 665, 666 A.2d at 883.
670. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 87, 702 A.2d at 732.
671. SeeJane P. North, Comment, Employees'Assumption of Risk: Real or Illusory Choice?, 52
TENN. L. REV. 35, 38 & n.19 (1984). This maxim first appeared in a 1305 English case, but
in 1887, "the English jurist, LordJustice Bowen, observed of the doctrine: 'This is not new
law: it is as old as the Roman Digest, and has been accepted by the Courts of this country.'"
Id. at 38 (quoting Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685, 696 (1887)); see also Ann D.
Bray, Comment, Does Old Wine Get Better with Age or Turn to Vinegar? Assumption of Risk in a
Comparative Fault Era-Andren v. White Rodgers, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1141, 1144
(1992) (discussing the English roots of the assumption of risk doctrine).
672. Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 630, 495 A.2d 838, 843 (1985) (cit-
ing Stancill v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 744 F.2d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
673. Bray, supra note 671, at 1144.
674. North, supra note 671, at 35 (citing Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406
A.2d 140, 165-66 (N.J. 1979) (Clifford, J., concurring)).
675. 244 Md. 154, 223 A.2d 187 (1966).
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house.6 7 6 The court held that the employee had voluntarily assumed
the risk of being injured even though no other entrance besides the
walkway existed.677 The employee was aware of the "previously cre-
ated risk" of using the walkway and still chose "to put up with the
situation" so that "his willingness to take a chance is implied and he
[is] barred from recovering for a risk he chose to assume."678 The
Court of Appeals refused to accept the employee's argument that the
"economic necessity of keeping his job and not being discharged for
failure to deliver the sink tops" should nullify the assumption of risk
defense.679 The employee argued that because the economic neces-
sity "forced him to involuntarily assume the risk of crossing the slip-
pery walkway,"68 ° the assumption of risk defense should have been
nullified. The court dismissed this contention, however, because no
evidence existed that anyone demanded that the employee use the
walkway, and there was no evidence that he would have lost his job if
he had left the sinks at the construction site without bringing them
into the house.681
Twenty-five years later, in Schroyer v. McNeal,682 the Court of Ap-
peals appeared to distinguish employment from nonemployment con-
texts with regard to the applicability of the assumption of risk
defense.6"' The court considered whether the plaintiff had assumed
the risk of injury by walking across an icy parking lot to enter the hotel
at which she was spending the night.684 The court first described the
differences and similarities between contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk.685 The court noted the significant difference be-
tween the two defenses: "Contributory negligence defeats recovery
because it is a proximate cause of the accident which happens, but
assumption of risk defeats recovery because it is a previous abandon-
676. Id. at 156, 223 A.2d at 188.
677. Id. at 158, 223 A.2d at 189. The employee provided evidence that the boards were
slippery "because of mud and slush from melting snow" and that "the boards had a ten-
dency to give and bob up and down when stepped on." Id. at 157, 223 A.2d at 188.
678. Id. at 157-58, 223 A.2d at 189.
679. Id. at 158, 223 A.2d at 189.
680. Id
681. Id
682. 323 Md. 275, 592 A.2d 1119 (1991).
683. See infra note 692 and accompanying text.
684. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 279, 592 A.2d at 1121. McNeal, after registering at the hotel,
parked her car "on packed ice and snow" and noticed that the sidewalk near the entrance
through which she was to enter had not been shoveled and was slippery. Id. at 278-79, 592
A.2d at 1121. She made the first trip successfully from her car to the entrance, but on the
return trip to her car slipped and fell. Id.
685. Id. at 280-83, 592 A.2d at 1121-23 (stating that the two are "closely related and often
overlap[ ]").
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ment of the right to complain if an accident occurs." '68 6 The court
declared that this distinction is clearly made by the rationale underly-
ing the doctrine of assumption of risk.68 7 With assumption of risk, the
plaintiff "consent[s] to relieve the defendant of an obligation of con-
duct toward him, and to take his chances of harm from a particular
risk." '688
The court in Schroyer further stated that an objective test should
be used to determine whether a "plaintiff knows of, and appreciates,
the risk involved in a particular situation. "689 The court mandated
that "when it is clear that a person of normal intelligence in the posi-
tion of the plaintiff must have understood the danger, the issue is for
the court. '690 In Schroyer, the court held that the obvious danger of
slipping on ice is a risk "which any one of adult age must be taken to
appreciate. '69 ' The court, in holding that the plaintiff had assumed
the risk, seemed to differentiate this case from employment cases by
pointing out that the plaintiff in Schroyer had crossed the icy parking
lot and sidewalk "for her own purposes, i.e. her convenience in un-
loading her belongings. ''66 2 The court concluded that the plaintiff's
voluntary action of parking her car on the ice and traversing it re-
lieved the defendant of any responsibility.693
686. Id. at 281, 592 A.2d at 1122 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Warner v.
Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 559-60, 189 A. 260, 264 (1937)). The court in Warner also stated that
"[c]ontributory negligence, of course, means negligence which contributes to cause a par-
ticular accident which occurs, while assumption of risk of accident means voluntary incur-
ring that of an accident which may not occur, and which the person assuming the risk may
be careful to avoid after starting." Warner, 171 Md. at 359-60, 189 A. at 264.
687. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 281-82, 592 A.2d at 1122.
688. Id. (quoting Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 421, 226 A.2d 273, 275 (1967) (quoting
WILLtIA L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 303 (2d ed. 1955))). The
court asserted that "[i]t is... the willingness of the plaintiff to take an informed chance
that distinguishes assumption of the risk from contributory negligence." Id. at 283, 592
A.2d at 1123; see Burke v. Williams, 244 Md. 154, 157, 223 A.2d 187, 189 (1966) (stating
that assumption of risk "implies an intentional exposure to a known danger which may or
may not be true of contributory negligence" (citing People's Drug Stores v. Windham, 178
Md. 172, 12 A.2d 532 (1940))).
689. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 283, 592 A.2d at 1123 (citing Gibson, 245 Md. at 421, 226 A.2d at
275).
690. Id. at 283-84, 592 A.2d at 1123; see Gibson, 245 Md. at 421, 226 A.2d at 275 (quoting
PROSSER, supra note 688, § 55, at 310)).
691. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 284, 592 A.2d at 1123 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting PROSSER, supra note 688, § 55, at 310).
692. Id. at 288, 592 A.2d at 1125. The court stated that McNeal was "[f]ully aware of the
danger posed by an ice and snow covered parking lot and sidewalk, [and] she voluntarily
chose to park and traverse it, albeit carefully, for her own purposes, i.e. her convenience in
unloading her belongings." Id.
693. Id.
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b. The Development of the Modern Employee's Dilemma as an Ex-
ception to the "Voluntariness" Element of the Assumption of Risk Defense. -
While Maryland courts continue to apply the assumption of risk doc-
trine in employment cases, other courts have long recognized the
weaknesses of this doctrine. The discussion of assumption of risk in
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.694 has been used by many juris-
dictions to describe the defense's history,695 to demonstrate its ero-
sion,696 and to support the jurisdiction's eradication of the defense.69 7
The Supreme Court in Tiller addressed the detriments and the archa-
ism of the assumption of risk doctrine in the employment context.698
In Tiller, the Court held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA) had abolished the assumption of risk defense in employment
situations where the employer was negligent and FELA applied.699
The Court stated that the original theory behind the assumption of
risk defense was no longer applicable as evidenced by Congress's pas-
sage of a 1939 amendment to FELA.7 °° The amendment required
"cases tried under the Federal Act to be handled as though no doc-
trine of assumption of risk had ever existed."70 1 Moreover, the Court
cautioned that no case should be withheld from the jury on the theory
of assumption of risk and "questions of negligence should under
694. 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
695. See Williamson v. Smith, 491 P.2d 1147, 1149 (N.M. 1971) (using Tiller to explain
why assumption of risk has been adopted); Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 373 P.2d 767, 770-71
(Wash. 1962) (en banc) (stating that the Tiller decision has "adroitly summarized" the
history and the development of assumption of risk).
696. See North, supra note 671, at 43 (maintaining that the Tiller decision is part of the
corrosion of the assumption of risk defense).
697. See Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 367, 380 (E.D. Ark. 1971)
(mem.) (using Tiller to support the court's statement that the assumption of risk defense
has been "inhumane, anachronistic, and unnecessary").
698. Tiller, 318 U.S. at 58-65.
699. Id. at 58.
700. Id. at 58-59, 62-64. The Court stated that the original doctrine of assumption of risk
was supported by the belief that "'an opposite doctrine would not only subject employers
to unreasonable and often ruinous responsibilities, thereby embarrassing all branches of
business,' but would also encourage carelessness on the part of the employee." Id. at 59
(quoting Tuttle v. Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Ry., 122 U.S. 189, 196 (1887)). The
sponsor of the amendment to the Act rejected this economic theory because "[i]n these
days when millions are unemployed and must find work in order to save themselves and
their families from distress, the situation is so desperate that men will sign any sort of
waiver or agreement in order to obtain employment." Id. at 61 n.12 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Amending the Federal Employers' Liability Act: Hearings on S. 1708
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1939) (state-
ment of Senator Neely)).
701. Id. at 64. The legislative history asserted that abrogation of the defense was neces-
sary because it was "out of harmony with the equitable principles which should govern
determinations of employer-employee responsibilities." Id. at 65 (citation omitted).
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proper charge from the court be submitted to the jury for their
determination. "702
Other jurisdictions have employed the Supreme Court's critique
of assumption of risk to aid in abolishing the use of the doctrine in
products liability cases in employment settings. In Varilek v. Mitchell
Engineering Co.,70 an Illinois appellate court held that a defendant in
a products liability case cannot argue that an injured worker assumed
the risk of injury "because he had a voluntary choice to make in that
he could have chosen not to do his job. ' 70 4 The main issue of the case
was whether there was enough evidence to show that the plaintiff had
met the voluntary prong of the assumption of risk defense. 70 5 The
plaintiff, an ironworker, slipped and fell while installing panels to
complete the roof of a building.706 The court noted that the only way
for the plaintiff to complete his task was to walk on the panels which
caused him to fall and that he "was compelled to accept the risk of
walking on the panels in order to exercise and protect his right and
privilege to his job. ' 70 7 The court held that the plaintiff was not re-
quired to provide evidence that he would lose his job if he had re-
fused to complete his task because such evidence is not requisite to
demonstrating that a plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of injury.70 8
The court reasoned that despite the "theoretical liberty of every per-
son to contract for his labor or services and his legal right to abandon
his employment if the conditions of service are not satisfactory," prac-
tically speaking, a laborer has no such choice because of the prospect
of poverty, scarcity of employment, and the dependence of his fam-
ily.7°9 Such circumstances mean that a laborer does not truly confront
702. Id. at 67. Courts still must determine negligence and "whether that negligence was
the proximate cause of the injury." Id.; see also North, supra note 671, at 42-44 (discussing
FELA and state worker compensation statutes).
703. 558 N.E.2d 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
704. Id. at 376; see also Rhoads, 329 F. Supp. at 381 (holding that the defense of assump-
tion of risk is inapplicable in products liability cases in which an employee is hurt by dan-
gerous machinery during the course of employment); Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 547
P.2d 132, 140 (Or. 1976) (stating that in a products liability case involving an employee
injured in the course of employment the jury should ascertain whether the plaintiff's ac-
tions were reasonable by considering "the conditions which motivated the decision, the
pressures which were operating on the plaintiff, and the amount of time which he had to
make the decision"); North, supra note 671, at 56-59 (discussing the abrogation of the
assumption of risk defense in employment situations in both Johnson and in Rhoads).
705. Varilek, 558 N.E.2d at 374.
706. Id. at 369-71.
707. Id. at 375.
708. Id. at 376.
709. Id. (quoting Streeter v. Western Wheeled Scraper Co., 98 N.E. 541, 546 (Ill. 1912)).
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the dangers associated with his employment voluntarily.7 1° The court
concluded that "public policy in work-related product liability injury
cases" compelled this decision because "virtually everyone in the work
force of our society uses some manufactured product" and injuries
from such products are usually "grave and often permanent." '711
Similarly, in 1991, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the as-
sumption of risk defense should be abolished in the employment con-
text and work-related injury claims. In Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson
Manufacturing Co.,712 the court reasoned that "an employee does not
voluntarily or unreasonably assume the risk of injury which occurs in
the course of his or her employment when he or she encounters that
risk in the normal performance of his or her required job duties.""7 3
Cremeans, an employee for Sohio Chemical Company, was injured
while operating a loader during his regular course of employment.714
The loader was manufactured by Willmar Henderson Manufacturing
Company, and Sohio purchased the loader without a protective cage,
which Willmar also manufacturers.71 5 Cremeans claimed that the
loader was defective and dangerous without the cage. 716 His job was
to drive the loader into fertilizer bins, scoop up some fertilizer, back
out, and bring it to another location.717 If the cage or any other struc-
tures had been attached to the loader, it would not have fit into the
bins.718 As Cremeans drove the loader into the bin, "an avalanche of
fertilizer occurred" and Cremeans "was injured when the rear wheels
710. See id. (noting that given the circumstances faced by laborers, the argument that a
laborer voluntarily assumed the risk of injury because he could have chosen not to do his
job is "specious"); see also Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 148
(N.J. 1979) (stating that an employee who is engaged in his assigned task "has no meaning-
ful choice" but to encounter the risk and thus cannot voluntarily assume the risk of injury);
Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 454 P.2d 205, 208 (Wash. 1969) (en banc) (asserting that "[i]t
could never be said as a matter of law that a workman whose job requires him to expose
himself to a danger, voluntarily and unreasonably encounters the same" (citing Miller v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 374 P.2d 675 (Wash. 1962) (en banc)); North, supra note 671, at 54-55
(discussing the holding in Suter and concluding that the case stands for "the principle that,
as a matter of public policy, workers injured while doing their assigned work cannot be
found to have assumed the risk").
711. Varilek, 558 N.E.2d at 376.
712. 566 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio 1991).
713. Id. at 1207.




718. Id. Apparently, Sohio and Cremeans had agreed that Sohio would assume any lia-
bility arising from the removal of the protective cage. Id.
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of the loader lifted off the ground" and Cremeans became wedged
into the loader.7 19
Cremeans was aware of the possibility of such an avalanche, but
he had never heard of any resulting injuries.7 21 Willmar, however,
claimed that Cremeans was barred from recovery because he had as-
sumed the risk.72 1 The court found that the assumption of risk de-
fense did not apply in this situation because Cremeans could not have
voluntarily assumed the risk due to the economic pressures of the
workplace.722
Additionally, the court held that the historical reasons for the
utilization of the assumption of risk defense were no longer valid in
the twentieth century. 723 The court stated that the trend has been to
move away from the assumption of risk defense in employment situa-
tions because the defense runs counter to "any current social pol-
icy, "724 such as the modem workmen's compensation legislation and
"our legal policy of requiring the employer to provide his employees
with a reasonably safe place to work. 725
719. Id. at 1205.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id. at 1208.
723. Id. at 1205-06, 1207. The court stated that the original rationale for application of
the assumption of risk defense was to give "maximum freedom to expanding industry" by
"insulat[ing] the employer as much as possible from bearing the 'human overhead' which
is an inevitable part of . the doing of industrialized business." Id. at 1205 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 59
(1943)). It was rooted in an economic theory that "there was complete mobility of labor,
... that the supply of work was unlimited," and that the worker was "an entirely free agent
not compelled to enter into a particular employment relationship." Id. at 1205-06 (citing
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 80, at 568-69 (W.
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)).
724. Id. at 1206-07. According to the court, workmen's compensation legislation reflects
public opinion and "has dictated a change in the underlying concepts of employers' re-
sponsibility." Id at 1206 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Siragusa v. Swedish
Hosp., 373 P.2d 767, 773 (Wash. 1962) (en banc)).
725. Id. at 1206-07; see also Williamson v. Smith, 491 P.2d 1147, 1150 (N.M. 1971) (abol-
ishing the assumption of risk defense in employment situations because it is "directly
counter to current social policy," particularly workmen's compensation legislation);
Siragusa, 373 P.2d at 773 (abolishing assumption of risk defense when an employer's negli-
gence causes an employee's injury because the policy reasons that once supported the
defense are no longer applicable); North, supra note 671, at 51-62 (outlining the policy
reasons supporting abrogation of the assumption of risk defense in the employment con-
text); cf Kitchens v. Winter Co. Builders, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 807, 809-10 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)
(stating that "[a]ny construction worker as a servant and employee has a certain amount of
his freedom of choice restricted by the circumstances under which he works and the coer-
cion of seeking to remain employed," but declining to permit the plaintiff construction
worker to collect for his injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant prime contrac-
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Therefore, the court decided to abrogate the assumption of risk
defense in the employment context because "the days of laissez-faire
economics are long gone. 7 2 6 Furthermore, the court stated that the
assumption of risk defense does not belong in today's employment
setting in which employees have to choose between the risk of employ-
ment and finding a new job in a shrinking job market.7 27
The court also pointed out that the assumption of risk defense
should be made unavailable to both the employer and the manufac-
turer for two reasons. 728 First, "the decision to encounter the risk was
equally involuntary regardless of who commissioned the employee to
perform his or her duty." 729 Additionally, many cases that have dealt
with the assumption of risk defense in similar contexts have not distin-
guished between employers and manufacturers. 73" This point is espe-
cially important because it demonstrates how assumption of risk works
in the case of third parties.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In ADM Partnership v. Martin, the
Court of Appeals held that an employee injured in the course of em-
ployment cannot assert that she did not voluntarily assume a known
risk because she held a subjective belief that failure to perform her
task would result in negative economic consequences for her and her
employer.7 3 Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Bell began by set-
ting out the criteria for satisfying the defense of assumption of risk in
Maryland;732 the defendant must show that the plaintiff: "(1) had
knowledge of the risk of the danger; (2) appreciated that risk: and (3)
voluntarily confronted the risk of danger."73 3 First, the court focused
on determining the standard for the "voluntariness" element of as-
tor because he had already received workers' compensation from the subcontractor that
employed him).
726. Cremeans, 566 N.E.2d at 1207; see infra note 786 and accompanying text (describing
laissez-faire economic policy).
727. Cremeans, 566 N.E.2d at 1207. The Ohio court felt it was time to follow the trend of
other jurisdictions. Id. (citing North, supra note 671).
728. Id. at 1208.
729. Id.
730. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 141-42 (N.J. 1979)
(allowing the manufacturer to use the assumption of risk defense where an employee was
injured by a piece of equipment owned by the employer who bought it from the manufac-
turer);Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 547 P.2d 132, 137 (Or. 1976); Brown v. Quick Mix Co.,
454 P.2d 205, 207-08 (Wash. 1969) (en banc) (same); see also Kitchens, 289 S.E.2d at 809-10
(permitting the prime contractor to use the defense against an employee of a
subcontractor).
731. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 87, 702 A.2d at 732.
732. Id. at 90-91, 702 A.2d at 734.




sumption of risk13 ' and stated that, for a plaintiff to be deemed to
have voluntarily exposed herself to a known danger, "there must be
some manifestation of consent to relieve the defendant of the obliga-
tion of reasonable conduct."735 The risk will not be assumed if, from
the plaintiffs words or from the facts of the case, it appears that the
plaintiff did not consent to discharge the defendant of the obligation
to protect the plaintiff.7 6 If the plaintiff enters voluntarily into a situ-
ation that involves risk, however, then this action indicates that she
consented even though she may have consented reluctantly.737 The
court cautioned that a plaintiff does not act voluntarily if she had no
reasonable alternative but to confront the danger due to circum-
stances created by the defendant or coercion by the defendant. 73
The plaintiff, however, does act voluntarily when she acts "under the
compulsion of circumstances, not created by the tortious conduct of
the defendant, which have left [her] no reasonable alternative. 739
The court then analyzed the Court of Special Appeals's conclu-
sion that the question whether Martin acted voluntarily, and thus as-
sumed the risk, was for the jury because the fact that Martin feared
she could lose her job if she failed to traverse the icy path to deliver
the blueprints may have "deprived [her] of a clear and reasonable
choice" to confront the risk.740 The court stated that it disagreed with
"the proposition that an employee, who, in the fulfillment of a job
requirement, encounters the risk of a known danger does not act vol-
untarily because he or she will not have been given 'a clear and rea-
734. Id. at 90 n.2, 702 A.2d at 734 n.2 (stating that the knowledge and appreciation
elements were not challenged on appeal).
735. Id. at 92, 702 A.2d at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting KEETON ET
AL., supra note 723, § 68, at 490).
736. Id., 702 A.2d at 734-35 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 723, § 68, at 490).
737. Id. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 723, § 68, at 490).
738. Id. at 92-93, 702 A.2d at 735 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 723, § 68, at 490-
91). The court noted that "[w]here the defendant puts [the plaintiff] to a choice of evils,
there is a species of duress, which destroys the idea of freedom of election." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 723, § 68, at 490-91). The
Restatement (Second) of Torts states that the "plaintiffs acceptance of the risk is not to be
regarded as voluntary where the defendant's tortious conduct has forced upon him a
choice of courses of conduct, which leaves him no reasonable alternative to taking his
chances." RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 496E cmt. c (1965).
739. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 93, 702 A.2d at 735 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 496E cmt. b). The Restatement provides the example of "a plaintiff who is
forced to rent a house which is in obvious dangerous condition because he cannot find
another dwelling, or cannot afford another," stating that such a plaintiff "assumes the risk
notwithstanding the compulsion under which he is acting." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E cmt. b).
740. Id. at 94, 702 A.2d at 735-36 (quoting Martin v. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App.
652, 661, 666 A.2d 876, 881 (1995), rev'd, 348 Md. 84, 702 A.2d 730 (1997)).
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sonable choice either to act or not act,""'74 and refuted the Court of
Special Appeals's reliance on Schroyer and Burke in reaching the oppo-
site conclusion.742
The Court of Special Appeals stated that the Court of Appeals in
Schroyer had held that the plaintiff's "actions were voluntary because
she was not acting for her employer, but rather, was acting for her
own benefit."74 The Court of Special Appeals used this conclusion to
distinguish Martin, who was acting in an employment context, from
the plaintiff in Schroyer, who was not.7 4 4 The court stated that Martin
had a "convincing argument" that unlike the plaintiff in Schroyer, Mar-
tin "did not voluntarily encounter the risk because she was not acting
for her own convenience; rather, at the time of her injury, she was on
a mission for her employer. 745
The Court of Appeals refuted the Court of Special Appeals's reli-
ance on Schroyer by stating that the Court of Appeals never touched
the issue of employment or its scope in Schroyer, not even "peripher-
ally."' 746 According to the court, the decision was very clear in Schroyer.
the plaintiff had "intentionally, knowingly and voluntarily assumed
the risk of the danger that caused her injuries" and "[t]here was sim-
ply no evidence . . . to suggest that the plaintiff's employment was
adversely affected and, therefore, we did not address that issue.
747
The Court of Appeals next addressed the Court of Special Ap-
peals's reliance on its decision in Burke.74 ' The Court of Special Ap-
peals had distinguished the instant case from Burke by inferring that
the plaintiff in Burke only had to deliver the sinks to the site "[i]n
order to complete the job assignment successfully," and "[b]y taking it
upon himself to move the sinks into the house through the carport,
the plaintiff chose to undertake a voluntary activity that subjected him
to an assumption of risk defense." 74 9 The Court of Appeals would not
741. Id. at 95, 702 A.2d at 736 (quoting ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 661, 666 A.2d
at 881).
742. Id.
743. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 659, 666 A.2d at 880.
744. Id.
745. Id. at 660, 666 A.2d at 880.
746. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 98, 702 A.2d at 737.
747. Id.
748. Id., 702 A.2d 737-38; see ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 660-61, 666 A.2d at 880-
81; see also supra notes 675-681 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Burke).
749. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 96, 702 A.2d 737 (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 661, 666 A.2d at
881). The Court of Special Appeals came to this conclusion by using the Court of Ap-
peals's assertion in Burke that there was no evidence that the owners of the house de-
manded that the plaintiff use "the walkway against his will" or that he would have lost his
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permit this inference because the Burke court did not hold "that the
plaintiff's job requirements established the point at which 'carrying
out an employment responsibility become[s] a voluntary act. '750
Rather, the Burke court held that there was no evidence that the
"plaintiff was not acting on his own volition or free will, or that his
employment would have been in jeopardy" if he had refused to deliver
the sinks inside the house.7 5 ' Furthermore, the court stated that
there was nothing in Burke to suggest "that only the plaintiffs subjec-
tive belief that an adverse impact on employment would occur would
have been taken as 'evidence"' that the plaintiff's acts were not volun-
tary752 and noted that the standard to be applied in determining
whether one voluntarily assumed the risk is an objective one.753
The court then asserted that Burke is a stronger assumption of
risk case than ADM Partnership because in Burke the plaintiff was "spe-
cifically asked by the defendant to do the very act that resulted in his
injuries."7 54 However, the court stated that an employer explicitly ask-
ing an employee to do an act that requires an employee to assume the
risk of injury is not enough by itself to support the assertion that an
employee did not voluntarily assume the risk of injury.755 The court
continued, stating that the plaintiffs in Burke and in the instant case
failed to offer evidence of their respective states of mind.756 The
court stated that "there is not a shred of evidence from which Martin's
concern for her job if the delivery were not made can be inferred. 757
Lastly, the court analyzed Martin's reliance on Gibson v. BeaverW5 1
to support her argument that even though ADM was not the source of
the coercion, it could still be held liable for the injuries Martin sus-
job if he had left the sinks "on the construction site instead of taking them into the house."
Id. (citing ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 661, 666 A.2d at 876 and quoting Burke v.
Williams, 244 Md. 154, 158, 223 A.2d 187, 189 (1966)).
750. Id. at 98, 702 A.2d at 737 (alteration in original) (quoting ADM Partnership, 106 Md.
App. at 661, 666 A.2d at 881).
751. Id., 702 A.2d at 737-38; see also Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 422, 226 A.2d 273,
276 (1967) (stating that the arguments in Burke were discarded "because there was no
showing that the act of the plaintiff which produced the harm was done by him against his
will").
752. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 98, 702 A.2d at 738.
753. Id. (citing Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 283, 592 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1991)).
754. Id.
755. Id. at 98-99, 702 A.2d at 738 (citing Velte v. Nichols, 211 Md. 353, 127 A.2d 544
(1956), in which the court held that a purchaser had assumed the risk of climbing a ladder
even though the merchant told him to).
756. Id. at 99-101, 702 A.2d at 738-39. There was no evidence that the plaintiffs actions
were not volitional in either Burke or the instant case. Id. at 99, 702 A.2d at 738.
757. Id. at 101, 702 A.2d at 739.
758. 245 Md. 418, 226 A.2d 273 (1967).
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tained.7 5 9 Martin attempted to use Gibson to infer that ADM breached
their tort-based duty "to make conditions of the relationship between
the plaintiff and defendant safer than they appear to be" and that
ADM "may also be responsible for the coercive element experienced
by the plaintiff no matter where it emanates from."76 Martin came to
this conclusion by employing the court's holding in Gibson that "[the]
defendant is under no duty to make the conditions of their associa-
tion any safer than they appear to be" and inferring that this meant
the court was acknowledging a contractual relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant in Gibson in which the defendant had no
"tort-like obligation" and owed no duty to the plaintiff.761 Martin then
used this inference to come to the conclusion that if the defendant
has a duty "to make conditions of the relationship between the plain-
tiff and defendant safer than they appear to be, the rule does not
apply and the coercion may emanate from sources other than the
defendant. 7
62
However, the court rejected Martin's argument and stated that
duty and defendant's negligence are not necessary to establish as-
sumption of risk, but "the assumption of risk defense exists indepen-
dently of the conduct of another person, whether the defendant or a
third party. ' 763 Thus, the court concluded that Martin, similar to the
plaintiffs in Gibson and Burke, exercised her "own volition in encoun-
759. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 101, 702 A.2d at 739. In Gibson, a 55-year-old man
suffered a heart attack while helping an oil and heating deliveryman pull a hose from the
truck to the back of his house. Gibson, 245 Md. at 420, 226 A.2d at 275. The deliveryman
told the plaintiff that if he did not help him, he would not receive any fuel to heat his
house. Id. The plaintiff argued that he was coerced into the situation in which he was
injured. Id. at 422, 226 A.2d at 276. The court held that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed
the risk, observing:
The plaintiff takes a risk voluntarily (within the meaning of the present rule)
where the defendant has a right to face him with the dilemma of "take it or leave
it"-in other words, where defendant is under no duty to make the conditions of
their association any safer than they appear to be. In such a case it does not
matter that [the] plaintiff is coerced to assume the risk by some force not emanat-
ing from defendant, such as poverty, dearth of living quarters, or a sense of moral
responsibility.
Id. at 422-23, 226 A.2d at 276 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 FOWLER V.
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.3, at 1174 (1956)).
760. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 102, 702 A.2d at 739-40.
761. Id. at 101-02, 702 A.2d at 739 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gibson,
245 Md. at 422-23, 226 A.2d at 276; 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS § 21.3, at 1174 (1956)).
762. Id.
763. Id. at 102-03, 702 A.2d at 740 (stating that "[u]nlike contributory negligence, the
assumption of risk defense exists independently of the conduct of another person, whether
the defendant or a third party"); see also Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 282-83, 592 A.2d
1119, 1122-23 (1990) (discussing the difference between contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk).
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tering a known danger, and thus voluntarily assum[ed] the risks it
entail [ed]."764
4. Analysis. -The Court of Appeals in ADM Partnership v. Martin
held that the "voluntariness" element of the assumption of risk de-
fense is met when an employee encounters a known risk during the
course of performing employment responsibilities, proceeds to con-
front the risk, and then is injured by the risk, even though the em-
ployee confronts the risk based on a subjective belief that she will
suffer "adverse economic consequences" if she does not perform the
task.7 65 The court came to this conclusion by following the precedent
of Schroyer and Burke and refusing to adopt the modern employee's
dilemma.766 While the Court of Appeals correctly utilized Schroyer and
Burke in its analysis, the court should abolish the assumption of risk
defense in certain employment situations because the economic basis
for the defense no longer exists.7 67 However, the facts in ADM Partner-
ship may not be strong enough to apply the modern employee's di-
lemma, and thus it would be unreasonable to abolish the defense of
assumption of risk under the circumstances of this case.7 68
a. The Application of Schroyer and Burke.-The Court of
Special Appeals incorrectly concluded that the Court of Appeals held
that the actions of the plaintiff in Schroyer "were voluntary because she
was not acting for her employer, but rather, was acting for her own
benefit. '"69 As the Court of Appeals in ADM Partnership aptly noted,
the court never mentioned the plaintiffs employment, employer, or
764. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 103, 702 A.2d at 740.
765. Id. at 87, 702 A.2d at 732.
766. Id. at 95, 96-99, 702 A.2d at 736, 737-38.
767. See North, supra note 671, at 50-51, 65 (stating that the abrogation of assumption of
risk in employment situations is consistent with today's economic and social policies which
are based on "wage-based employment" rather than an economy based on the Industrial
Revolution with mainly "industry workers" which were primarily "self-employed and enter-
prise employed"); see also supra notes 713-725 and accompanying text (describing the
Cremeans decision and its reliance on the change in economic reasons that form the basis
for the assumption of risk defense to abolish the defense in the context of work related
injury claims).
768. But see ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 104, 702 A.2d at 740 (Eldridge, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the majority for the reasons set forth in the Court of Special Appeals's
decision); Martin v. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. 652, 665, 666 A.2d 876, 883 (1995)
(contending that the facts of the case were strong enough to apply the modern employee's
dilemma and holding that the employee did not voluntarily assume the risk of injury),
rev'd, 348 Md. 84, 702 A.2d 730 (1997).
769. See ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 659, 666 A.2d at 880; see supra notes 743-747
and accompanying text (discussing the Court of Appeals's interpretation of its decision in
Schroyer).
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its scope in Schroyer, or even considered any of these factors "peripher-
ally.",770 What the court actually stated in Schroyerwas that McNeal, the
plaintiff, took an "informed chance" to "voluntarily... park and trav-
erse [the icy parking lot], albeit carefully, for her own purposes, i.e. her
convenience in unloading her belongings." 771 The Court of Special
Appeals correctly noted that Martin and McNeal were acting in differ-
ent contexts, i.e. Martin was in an employment situation and McNeal
was not.772 Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that the Court of Appeals
did not intend for Schroyer to draw such a distinction. 773 The eco-
nomic coercion argument is valid under certain circumstances in em-
ployment settings, but this argument is not supported by the facts in
this case nor by Maryland's precedent as the Court of Special Appeals
attempted to assert.7 7 ' Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in as-
serting that the Court of Special Appeals was. flawed in its understand-
ing of Schroyer.775
The Court of Special Appeals again tried to find the modem em-
ployee's dilemma in existing Maryland law by distinguishing Burke
from the case at hand.776 The Court of Special Appeals contended
770. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 97, 702 A.2d at 737. The court stated that in Schroyer
there was no evidence "to suggest that the plaintiff's employment was adversely affected
and, therefore, we did not address that issue." Id. at 98, 702 A.2d at 737; see supra notes
683-693 and accompanying text (discussing the Court of Appeals's reasoning in Schroyer);
see also Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 592 A.2d 1119 (1991).
771. Schroyer, 323 Md. at 288, 592 A.2d at 1125. The court stated that McNeal voluntarily
chose to park on the parking lot and to walk across it and the sidewalk, "thus indicating her
willingness to accept the risk and relieving the Schroyers of responsibility for her safety."
Id., 592 A.2d at 1126.
772. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 660, 666 A.2d at 880.
773. See ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 87, 702 A.2d at 732 (rejecting the contention that
the voluntariness element of the assumption of risk defense is not met when a plaintiff
confronts a risk in performing an employment responsibility under the subjective belief
"that the failure to fulfill that responsibility may result in adverse economic consequences
to her employer and ultimately to herself").
774. See supra notes 743-744 and accompanying text (discussing the validity of the eco-
nomic coercion argument).
775. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 98, 702 A.2d at 737.
776. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 661, 666 A.2d at 881; see supra notes 675-681 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts and the court's reasoning in Burke). The Court of
Special Appeals attempted to distinguish Burke from the instant case by stating that Martin
could not have left her blueprints outside the building and still have completed her task,
but the plaintiff in Burke could have left the sinks outside the house and still completed his
job. Id. However, it is possible that Martin could have completed her task at a later point
in the day when some of the ice had melted or could have called ADM Partnership, re-
questing them to come out and retrieve their blueprints, and she still would have com-
pleted her assignment. See ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 99, 702 A.2d at 738 (showing that
defense counsel made a similar argument). The Court of Appeals even stated that if the
court were to accept a subjective belief of adverse economic consequences, Burke would
have been a stronger case than the one at hand because in Burke, "unlike here, the plain-
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that the Court of Appeals in Burke was deciding "at what point does
carrying out an employment responsibility become a voluntary act. 777
The Court of Appeals correctly denied that this was the proper inter-
pretation of their holding in Burke. 7 78 Rather, the Court of Appeals
stated that its decision in Burke found that "there was no evidence to
show that [the] plaintiff was not acting on his own volition or free will,
or that his employment would have been in jeopardy. '77" Again, the
Court of Special Appeals's reasoning works under the modern em-
ployee's dilemma but it finds no basis in Maryland case law. Accord-
ing to Maryland precedent, Martin needed to have more than a
subjective belief that she would suffer adverse economic consequences
because "the standard to be applied is an objective one. 78 °
It appears that what the Court of Appeals was saying in ADM Part-
nership, Schroyer, and Burke was that for the plaintiff to succeed in dem-
onstrating that she did voluntarily assume the risk she needed to
provide objective rather than subjective evidence.7 ' Requiring objec-
tive evidence may then be considered a watered down version of the
modem employee's dilemma or it may just be the standard that as-
sumption of risk has always required.782
b. Adoption of the Modern Employee's Dilemma.-Many courts
have adopted the modern employee's dilemma and have abolished
the assumption of risk defense in certain employment situations, par-
tiff/delivery-person was specifically asked by the defendant to do the very act that resulted
in his injuries." Id. at 98, 702 A.2d at 738.
777. ADM Partnership, 106 Md. App. at 661, 666 A.2d at 881.
778. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 98, 702 A.2d at 737.
779. Id. The court did state that the Burke court drew distinctions between different
points of delivery, but it did not suggest "that only the plaintiffs subjective belief that an
adverse impact on employment would occur would have been taken as 'evidence"' that the
plaintiffs acts were not voluntary. Id. at 98, 702 A.2d at 738; see Burke v. Williams, 244 Md.
154, 158, 223 A.2d 187, 189 (1966) (asserting that there was no "evidence that his job
would have been in jeopardy had he left the sink tops on the construction site instead of
taking them into the house").
780. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 98, 702 A.2d at 738 (citing Schroyer v. McNeal, 323
Md. 275, 283, 592 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1991)).
781. See id. at 100-01, 702 A.2d at 739 (stating that more than subjective evidence is
required to show that the plaintiff did act voluntarily); Schroyer, 323 Md. at 283, 592 A.2d at
1123 (putting forth that the test is to be an objective one); Burke, 244 Md. at 158, 223 A.2d
at 189 (concluding that the plaintiff voluntarily confronted the risk because there was no
evidence that economic necessity abrogated his violation).
782. See Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 421, 226 A.2d 273, 275 (1967) ("In determining
whether a plaintiff had knowledge and appreciation of the risk, an objective standard must
be applied and a plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which
must have been obvious to him.").
1214
1999] MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS 1215
ticularly in products liability cases. 783 The Court of Appeals should
follow the lead of these jurisdictions because the economic basis on
which the defense of assumption of risk stands is archaic. 784 The as-
sumption of risk defense arose in an era in which the main goal of the
courts was to give maximum freedom to industry expansion and to
ensure complete mobility of labor.78 5 The courts used laissez-faire ec-
onomics reasoning and based their use of assumption of risk on the
understanding that "[s] ince employers in a rapidly industrializing so-
ciety had to be free to pursue their economic goals, inevitable work
783. See Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 367, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1971)
(mem.) (finding that particularly "in a products liability case brought by an injured em-
ployee," the voluntariness with which the employee accepts the risk of injury is "illusory");
Varilek v. Mitchell Eng'g Co., 558 N.E.2d 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding "that a product
liability defendant cannot be heard to argue that an injured worker assumed the risk of
injury because he had a voluntary choice to make in that he could have chosen not to do
his job"); Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co., 566 N.E.2d 1203, 1207 (Ohio 1991)
(holding that in a products liability case, an employee does not voluntarily assume the risk
of injury "which occurs in the course of his or her employment when he or she must
encounter that risk in the normal performance of his or her required job duties and re-
sponsibilities");Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 547 P.2d 132, 140-41 (Or. 1976) (maintaining
that in a products liability case involving an employee, it is necessary to take into account
the employee's subjective belief regarding whether he voluntarily faced the risk); Brown v.
Quick Mix Co., 454 P.2d 205, 208 (Wash. 1969) (en banc) (holding in a products liability
case that an employee whose job requires him to encounter a risk does not do so volunta-
rily) (citing Miller v. St. Regis Paper Co., 374 P.2d 675 (Wash. 1962) (en banc)).
784. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 71 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the "common law concept of liability for negligence is archaic
and unjust as a means of compensation for injuries sustained by employees under modern
industrial conditions"); Williamson v. Smith, 491 P.2d 1147, 1149-52 (N.M. 1971) (discuss-
ing the evolution of assumption of risk and stating that no longer is assumption of risk
necessary to "insulat[e] business from human overhead"); Cremeans, 566 N.E.2d at 1205-06
(discussing the historical basis of assumption of risk and stating that due to current eco-
nomic pressures in the workplace no assumption of risk is required to insulate employers)
(citing Tiller, 318 U.S. at 59); North, supra note 671, at 3944, 65 (outlining the history of
assumption of risk and contending that the defense is no longer applicable in the employ-
ment setting).
785. See Tiller, 318 U.S. at 59 (asserting that the defense of assumption of risk was meant
to insulate the employer as much as possible from bearing the 'human overhead' which is
an inevitable . . . cost ... of the doing of industrialized business"); Williamson, 491 P.2d at
1149 (stating that assumption of risk evolved to give freedom to expanding industry);
Cremeans, 566 N.E.2d at 1205 ("The defense of assumption of risk is a product of laissez-
faire economics and evolved in master and servant cases." (citing Williamson, 491 P.2d at
1149)); KEETON ET AL., supra note 723, § 80, at 568-69 (stating that the defense was based
on the economic theory "that there was complete mobility of labor, that the supply of work
was unlimited, and that the worker was an entirely free agent, under no compulsion to
enter into the employment"); North, supra note 671, at 38 (asserting that the judge made
defense was based on individualism and "the subsidization of a rapidly expanding indus-
trial sector").
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place injuries could not be allowed to impede the process."78 6 There-
fore, an employee accepted all the known risks of employment and
was able to leave her employment whenever she felt the need to aban-
don it.78 7 The defense of assumption of risk is no longer necessary to
protect expanding industry because the defense's original intentions
work against the social and legal policy of the employer providing the
employee with a reasonably safe place to work. 788 For example, in
Williamson v. Smith,789 the Supreme Court of New Mexico asserted
that:
insulating business from human overhead, however valid it
may have been during the moment of the industrial revolu-
tion, now runs directly counter to current social policy ...
[and] the concept of assumption of risk is one hundred
eighty degrees out of phase with our legal policy of requiring
the employer to provide his employees with a reasonably safe
place to work.79°
Additionally, the assumption of risk defense neglects the economic
compulsion that compels an employee to work.79 ' The Supreme
Court of Ohio, in Cremeans, stated that "the economic pressures associ-
ated with the reality of today's workplace inevitably came to bear on
[the employee's] decision to encounter the risk."79 2
The Court of Appeals appears reluctant to eradicate the defense
of assumption of risk, even though it has become an "anachro-
786. North, supra note 671, at 40. Laissez-faire economics is the belief that the economy
is at its optimum when the government does not interfere with the workings of the market.
Id. at 39.
787. See, e.g., Cremeans, 566 N.E.2d at 1206 (contending that "a worker was viewed as an
entirely free agent not compelled to enter into a particular employment relationship" (cit-
ing KEETON ET AL., supra note 723, § 80, at 568-69)); North, supra note 671, at 65 ("The
decision to abolish assumption of risk in the employment setting is grounded in economic
reality and a sense of humanity consistent with present social policy.").
788. See Creineans, 566 N.E.2d at 1206-07 (contending that assumption of risk defense in
employment situations is against public policy); Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 373 P.2d 767,
773 (Wash. 1962) (en banc) ("No longer can it be said that ajudicially-imposed doctrine of
assumption of risk is necessary or desirable to protect expanding industry from being crip-
pled by employers' responsibility for tortious conduct toward their employees."). The
Siragusa court also asserted that it was well established that an employer has the legal duty
"to furnish his employees a reasonably safe place to work, and the task of citing all the cases
which have announced this rule would be overbearing." Id. at 771.
789. 491 P.2d 1147 (N.M. 1971).
790. Id. at 1150.
791. See supra note 709 and accompanying text.
792. Cremeans, 566 N.E.2d at 1208; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 723, § 80, at 568(stating that relieving employer liability based upon the theory that an employee is free to
leave employment at any time disregards "[tjhe economic compulsion which left [the em-
ployee] no choice except starvation").
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nism, '' 79 3 because the modern employee's dilemma is based upon the
employee's subjective, 79  rather than objective, 79 5 belief that she will
suffer adverse economic consequences. However, a subjective belief is
substantive enough to demonstrate that an employee did not act vol-
untarily.7 9 6 In Varilek, an Illinois appellate court concluded that objec-
tive evidence is not necessary due to the "competitiveness and
pragmatism of the real world" which makes the fear of being fired
"not the only sanction or detriment that workers suffer if they refuse
to do theirjobs."79 7 The court continued by saying that "[t]here are
many other sanctions and detriments that are not expressed or imme-
diately imposed that workers suffer if they choose not to do their
jobs," but the court did not specify what they are.7 98
However, the Supreme Court of Oregon in Johnson v. Clark Equip-
ment Co. 79 9 noted that other sanctions may include an employee's
"fear that a slowdown in his individual production would slow down
the entire production team and thereby draw attention of his boss"
and this situation would be particularly detrimental to the employee if
he has a history of such slowdowns.80 0 Additionally, if the job market
is tight, the employee may fear he will be unable to find a job.8" 1
These sanctions and economic compulsion make an employee's sub-
jective belief sufficient and the voluntary element of assumption of
risk virtually unsatisfiable in employment settings.80 2
793. See North, supra note 671, at 65 (concluding that "in the face of increasing numbers
of work-related injuries, courts should eliminate the [assumption of risk defense] as an
anachronism").
794. SeeVarilek v. Mitchell Eng'g Co., 558 N.E.2d 365, 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (acknowl-
edging that the plaintiff did not provide objective evidence that he would have lost his job
if he had not encountered the risk because such evidence is not necessary to prove that the
decision was voluntary).
795. See ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 98, 702 A.2d at 738 (stating that the standard
should be objective) (citing Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 283, 592 A.2d 1119, 1123
(1991)).
796. See Varilek, 558 N.E.2d at 376("[A]n injured worker does not have to put in evi-
dence that he would have been fired if he had not done his job in order to show that his
decision to use the defendant's product was not voluntary under the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk."); North, supra note 671, at 49 ("It is questionable whether a purely voluntary
assumption of risk can ever occur when a worker is carrying out an assigned task.").
797. Varilek, 558 N.E.2d at 376.
798. Id.
799. 547 P.2d 132 (Or. 1976).
800. Id. at 140-41.
801. Id at 141.
802. See Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 367, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1971)
(mem.) ("The 'voluntariness' with which a worker assigned to a dangerous machine in a
factory 'assumes the risk of injury' from the machine is illusory.").
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c. Application of the Modern Employee's Dilemma in ADM Part-
nership.-Although the modem employee's dilemma should be
adopted by the Court of Appeals, the facts of ADM Partnership appear
too far down that feared "slippery slope" to apply the doctrine in this
case. In other words, for this doctrine to work effectively, a boundary
must be established, or employees could use the doctrine for any mi-
nor infliction sustained during the course of employment. This doc-
trine operates most effectively in strict products liability lawsuits and
not slip and fall cases such as the present one. °3 For example, it is
reasonable to argue that after falling once, Martin could have gotten
back into her truck, driven to the nearest phone, and asked ADM
Partnership to send an employee out to meet her at her truck and to
pick up the documents.80 4 Martin would have been able to complete
her task without injury and without fear of losing her job. The exist-
ence of a reasonable alternative to a rarely encountered risk, as was
the case here, demonstrates why the modern employee's dilemma
should not apply in most slip and fall cases. However, this case is dif-
ferent from products liability lawsuits where employees routinely en-
counter dangerous situations.8 0 5 For example, in Varilek, a products
liability case, the employee had to encounter oil-covered panels on a
daily basis; this was the only manner in which he could complete his
job.0 6 The employee in ADM Partnership did not have to confront the
803. North, supra note 671, at 37 (stating that "strict products liability lawsuits" require
"judicial re-examination of the use of assumption of risk in the employment context" be-
cause workers' compensation laws protect employers from "employees' tort actions" but
these payments are small so "injured workers often look to manufacturers for redress of
work-related injuries and diseases"). The article also notes that proponents of the use of
the assumption of risk defense in products liability cases could "argue that in the context of
the present products liability explosion, mass torts have the same potential for destroying
industry that industrial torts were perceived to have had in the late nineteenth century."
Id. at 64. However, the author also notes that the courts decide who is "better situated to
bear loss of injury" and how best to serve society, and in so doing, the "trend has been to
require manufacturers to bear the cost of injuries as part of their production costs." Id. at
65.
804. See ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 99-100, 702 A.2d at 738 (noting that the defense
counsel argued that Martin could have called her employer upon realizing the icy condi-
tions and Martin admitting that she could have).
805. In addition to products liability cases, another plausible employment setting in
which the doctrine may be employed is with regard to construction workers. See Kitchens
v. Winter Co. Builders, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 807, 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) ("It goes without
saying that all construction work is dangerous and if we applied the doctrine of assumption
of the risk.., there would be no construction work, as all employees would immediately be
required to walk off the job or assume the risk of injury. ... ").
806. Varilek, 558 N.E.2d at 375. The Illinois appellate court stated that under the cir-
cumstances this was the only method by which the panels could be installed and thus "it is
plain that the plaintiff was compelled to accept the risk of walking on the panels in order
to exercise and protect his right and privilege to do his job. His only alternative was not to
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ice to deliver the blueprints, nor did she routinely have to encounter
icy or dangerous conditions to complete her daily employment obliga-
tions."s 7 Therefore, the modern employee's dilemma doctrine should
be applied on a case-by-case basis and should be invoked in cases
where the circumstances dictate that the employee had to face the risk
consistently to complete his task and could not complete the job with-
out facing the risk.8°8
Additionally, the public policy reasons for abolishing assumption
of risk in products liability cases are much stronger than in slip and
fall cases. The Varilek court stated that this was so because "virtually
everyone in the work force of our society uses some manufactured
product in the regular course of their job" and "work-related product
liability injuries are ordinarily grave and often permanent and devas-
tating to the worker and his family." °9 The court's statement does
not stretch to include slip and fall cases such as Martin's because Mar-
tin did not fall on the ice because of a manufactured product with
which she had daily contact during the performance of herjob. Thus,
an employee should not be barred in a products liability suit from
recovering a just amount for his injuries because "of a specious argu-
ment that he had an election and voluntarily assumed the risk of be-
ing injured by doing his job."" ° In ADM Partnership, however, Martin
did not come into contact with a manufactured product that caused
her injury.8 1' Allowing the use of the modern employee's dilemma
doctrine in slip and fall cases such as ADM Partnership could open the
door to abuse of the doctrine. Notwithstanding this possibility, the
Court of Appeals should not dictate that an employee who slips and
do hisjob." Id.; seeJohnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 547 P.2d 132, 140 (Or. 1976) (abolishing
assumption of risk defense in products liability cases); Rhoads, 329 F. Supp. at 381 (abrogat-
ing assumption of risk defense in products liability cases).
807. See supra note 804.
808. The Supreme Court of Oregon in Johnson v. Clark Equipment Co. stated that when
considering whether it was reasonable for an employee to decide to encounter a known
risk, it is necessary to consider the employee's motivation, the pressures on the employee,
and the amount of time he had to make the decision. Johnson, 547 P.2d at 140. Addition-
ally, "working conditions and related circumstances are a particularly relevant considera-
tion" in determining the reasonableness of the employee's actions because such factors
have a strong influence on the employee's actions. Id.
809. Varilek, 558 N.E.2d at 376. The court asserted that the "socio-legal responsibilities
mandate that the law sees to it that these injured workers are not unjustly deprived of
recovering fully for their injuries." Id.
810. Id.
811. ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 88 n.1, 702 A.2d at 732 n.1; North, supra note 671, at
37 ("Employers are generally insulated from employees' tort actions by workers' compensa-
tion laws, and workers' compensation payments are generally conceded to be minimal at
best; hence, injured workers often look to manufacturers for redress of work-related inju-
ries and diseases." (footnotes omitted)).
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falls during the course of employment should never be able to use the
modern employee's dilemma to counteract the assumption of risk de-
fense. Rather, the court should offer a list of factors that the trial
courts should utilize on a case-by-case basis. Factors should include
whether it is a products liability case, the hazards of the employee's
job, the frequency the employee comes in contact with the danger,
the severity of the injury sustained, the ability of the employee to re-
cover a sufficient amount under workers' compensation statutes, and
under what circumstances the employee was working.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals correctly decided ADM
Partnership v. Martin because, following Maryland precedent, the mod-
ern employee's dilemma does not apply to the facts of this case. How-
ever, in future employment cases, particularly those where economic
coercion can be shown, the court should apply the modern em-
ployee's dilemma and abrogate the use of the assumption of risk de-
fense, because the economic basis for the defense is no longer
applicable in today's economy. The court will then be able to protect





The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Curricular Choice and the Constitution: Conflicting Views of Teacher
Free Speech Rights
In Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education,1 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a teacher's selection
and production of a school play was not protected speech under the
First Amendment.2 The court reasoned that the teacher's selection
and production of the play did not involve a matter of public concern,
and therefore was not subject to First Amendment protection.3 The
court further reasoned that because the play was part of the school
curriculum,4 even if the teacher's selection and production of the play
was "speech" protected by the First Amendment, the school authori-
ties had a "legitimate pedagogical interest" in restricting that
"speech."5 In so holding, the court confused the general issue of the
freedom of a public employee to speak on a matter of public concern
with the more specific issue of the freedom of a teacher to make cur-
ricular decisions in public schools. As a result, the court failed to
adopt a clear standard for analyzing teacher curricular speech in the
public schools. Furthermore, although the court's affirmance of the
school's right to control the curriculum6 followed Supreme Court pre-
cedent,7 the Fourth Circuit's limited inquiry into the basis of the
school's restrictions may be used by later courts to place further limi-
tations on the ability of teachers to make curricular decisions.
1. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 47 (1998).
2. Id. at 367. The First Amendment states in relevant part: "Congress shall make no
law .. .abridging the freedom of speech . U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Boring, 136 F.3d at 368.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 370. Pedagogical means "'of or relating to teaching or pedagogy. EDUCA-
TIONAL."' Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1663 (1971)).
6. See id. at 370-71.
7. See infra Part 2.b (discussing Supreme Court precedent regarding a school's right
to control the school curriculum).
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1. The Case.-During the fall of 1991, Margaret Boring, a
teacher at Charles D. Owen High School in Buncombe County, North
Carolina, selected the play Independence to be performed by her ad-
vanced acting class in an annual statewide competition.8 Boring de-
scribed the play as "'powerfully depict[ing] the dynamics within a
dysfunctional, single-parent family-a divorced mother and three
daughters; one a lesbian, another pregnant with an illegitimate
child."'9 Boring alleged that she provided the school principal with
the name of the play, but apparently did not give him any other infor-
mation about it.10
The play won several awards in a regional competition and was to
be performed in the state finals."1 Before performing the play at the
state finals, the four student-actors performed a scene from the play in
front of an English class at the school. 2 After the performance, a
parent of one of the students in the class complained to the school
principal. 3 The principal then read the script and initially decided
that the students could not perform the play at the state competi-
tion.' 4 He eventually agreed, however, to allow them to perform the
play at the state competition with certain parts excluded. 15
In June 1992, the principal requested that Margaret Boring be
transferred from Owen High School on the basis of "'personal con-
flicts resulting from actions she initiated during the course of th[e]
school year.""' 6 The transfer was approved by the superintendent on
the basis that Boring had not followed the school's "controversial
materials policy" in producing the play. 7 Boring alleged that school
dramatic productions were not included in the policy at the time of
the production at issue, but that they were added subsequently. 8 Bor-
8. Boring, 136 F.3d at 366.
9. Id. (quoting Plaintiff's Amended Complaint).
10. Id. Boring alleged that she notified the principal each year of her play selection.
Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Because the play contained "mature subject matter," Boring suggested that the
teacher obtain permission from parents of the students in the English class before they
watched the play. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The court assumed that the performance at the state competition followed the
principal's instructions. Id. The students won second place at the state competition. Id.
16. Id. at 366-67. In addition to the play, Boring and the school principal had a con-
frontation during the spring of 1992 regarding the stage floor in the auditorium and con-
struction of sets for a musical production.
17. Id. at 367.
18. Id.
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ing appealed her transfer to the Board of Education (Board), which
upheld the transfer.1 9
Boring filed suit,2° alleging, among other things, that her transfer
"was in retaliation for expression of unpopular views through the pro-
duction of the play and thus in violation of her right to freedom of
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. ' 21 The United
States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina dis-
missed all of Boring's claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.22 The district court held that Boring's transfer
as a result of the selection and production of the play did not violate
the First Amendment because she did not engage in protected
speech.2' The court reasoned that the speech was not protected be-
cause she was not disciplined for ideas she expressed, but rather for
ideas the play expressed. 24 In addition, the district court held that
even if the selection of the play was protected speech, the school offi-
cials had a "'legitimate [pedagogical] interest"' in restricting Boring's
speech.25
Boring appealed the dismissal of her federal First Amendment
claim to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
26
The Fourth Circuit, in a divided panel opinion, reversed and re-
manded the district court's dismissal of the First Amendment claim.
27
The court held that the district court erred in holding that the First
Amendment protects only original expression and does not protect
expression based on another person's ideas, such as the ideas ex-
pressed in a school play. 28 The court also held that although the
19. Id.
20. Boring filed suit in state court, but the defendants removed the case to federal
court. Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 1474, 1476-77 (4th Cir. 1996),
vacated and reh'g granted en banc, No. 95-2593 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 1996), reh'gen banc, 136 F.3d
364 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 47 (1998).
21. Boring, 136 F.3d at 367. Additionally, Boring claimed a violation of her right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment based on her allegation that school board
members used information not disclosed at the hearing in making their decision. Id. Bor-
ing also brought these claims, as well as a claim for violation of her liberty interest, under
the North Carolina Constitution. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Boring, 98 F.3d at 1477.
25. Id. The Supreme Court first held that a school could restrict student speech if the
restrictions were related to legitimate pedagogical concerns in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
26. Boring, 136 F.3d at 367.
27. Id.
28. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1478 (" [T] he First Amendment protects speech, regardless of
whether the speaker originally generates the communication or personally advocates the
ideas contained therein.").
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Board may have had legitimate pedagogical reasons for restricting the
play, none were stated on the record, and thus the district court was
premature in its dismissal.29 In so holding, the court agreed with the
district court's use of the "legitimate pedagogical concern" standard
adopted in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier0 for restricting
teacher classroom speech, but reasoned that the district court failed
to apply it properly.3 In addition, the court rejected the Board's ar-
gument that it was necessary for Boring to establish that the produc-
tion and selection of the play related to a matter of public concern in
order for the play to constitute protected speech.32
The panel decision was vacated by order of the en banc court,
which granted rehearing en banc to address whether Boring, a public
high school teacher, had a First Amendment right to participate in
the makeup of the school curriculum through the selection and pro-
duction of a school play.3
2. Legal Background.-The United States Supreme Court has
stated that "[t] he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is no-
where more vital than in the community of American schools."3 4 A
heightened recognition of First Amendment rights in the context of
the public schools began in the mid-twentieth century.3" During this
time, the constitutional foundation for freedom of speech in aca-
demic realms was grounded in the notion that the First Amendment
29. Id. at 1479.
30. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); see supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting the
district court's use of the Hazelwood standard).
31. Boring, 98 F.3d at 1483.
32. Id. at 1479.
33. Boring, 136 F.3d at 367. Orders for rehearing en banc are not common. DAVD G.
KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALs MANUAL § 31.11, at 597 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that in
the Fifth Circuit "less than I per cent of all cases decided . . . are reheard in banc"). The
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide: "Such a hearing or rehearing is not favored
and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court is neces-
sary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves
a question of exceptional importance." FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). A rehearing en banc does
not involve review of the panel's prior decision. KNIBB, supra, § 31.11, at 602. The panel
opinion is a nullity. Id. Rather, the en banc court reviews the district court's decision. Id.
34. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
35. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (holding that a state's right to
choose the curriculum for its schools does not include the right to restrict the teaching of a
"scientific theory or doctrine" when the reasons behind the restriction violate the First
Amendment); Shelton, 364 U.S. at 480-81, 490 (holding invalid a statute that required
teachers, as a condition of employment in a state school, to file a list of all organizations
they were members of during the previous five years); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that students could not be compelled to par-
ticipate in the Pledge of Allegiance).
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"does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the class-
room."36 However, recent Supreme Court decisions have demon-
strated that courts must balance the government's interest in
providing a quality education to its citizens against the individual First
Amendment rights of teachers and students.37 The Court has ad-
dressed both the rights of teachers, as public employees, to comment
on matters of public concern, as well as the First Amendment rights of
students and teachers within the context of the school curriculum.
The instances in which these two analyses have overlapped have been
explored by the lower courts.
a. Control of Public Employee Speech-Pickering and its Prog-
eny. -Beginning with the landmark case of Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion38  in 1968, the Supreme Court adopted a new test for
characterizing the speech of public employees on matters of public
concern. The Court in Pickering held that a teacher's First Amend-
ment rights had been violated when she was dismissed from her teach-
ing position for writing a letter to a newspaper in which she criticized
school funding issues.3 9 The Court adopted a balancing approach in
which "the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern" would be balanced against "the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
service it performs through its employees."4 In applying this ap-
proach, the Court found that the issue of school funding was a matter
36. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 609-10 (1967) (holding that
membership in an organization, such as the Communist party, without the specific intent
to further the unlawful aims of the organization, could not disqualify an individual from
public school employment).
37. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that
school officials may restrict student speech "so long as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns"); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)
(stating that "[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior"); Board of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion) (stating that "the discretion of the States
and local school boards .. . must be exercised in a manner that comports with the tran-
scendent imperatives of the First Amendment"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding that a student's speech is protected unless it
can be shown that the speech would cause a "material and substantial interference with
schoolwork or discipline").
38. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
39. Id. at 564-65.
40. Id. at 568. In adopting this balancing test, the Court acknowledged that although
public employees do enjoy First Amendment protection, the interests of the government in
controlling the speech of its employees differ from the interests the government has in the
regulation of the speech of the general public. Id.
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of public concern and that teachers are the "members of the commu-
nity" best able to provide opinions on the issue. 4 Furthermore, the
teacher's speech did not interfere with the school's operation or affect
her performance. 2 The Pickering Court thus recognized a public em-
ployee's right to freedom of speech on a matter of public concern, but
concluded that this right had to be balanced against the government's
interest in an efficient workplace.43
Fifteen years later, the balancing approach announced in Picker-
ingwas applied to a non-school setting in Connick v. Myers." In this 5-
4 opinion, the Court upheld the discharge of an assistant district attor-
ney who distributed a questionnaire to her coworkers concerning of-
fice operations and morale.45 The Court reaffirmed its holding in
Pickering, but held that public employee speech must involve a matter
of public concern, rather than a matter of private interest to the em-
ployee, in order to afford it First Amendment protection.46 Because
the questions on the office survey, with one exception, involved a
workplace dispute, the Court held that the questions did not involve a
41. Id. at 571-72.
42. Id. at 572-73.
43. See id at 568. Even if the speech is found to be constitutionally protected, it is still
possible for an adverse employment decision to be upheld. In Mount Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), the Court established a test for
determining whether an adverse employment decision violates a public employee's First
Amendment rights. First, the employee must show that his speech was constitutionally
protected based on the standard set forth in Pickering. Id. at 284, 287. After this determina-
tion the employer has the burden of showing that it "would have reached the same deci-
sion . . . even in the absence of the protected conduct." Id. at 287. Thus, the fact that
speech deserving constitutional protection under the Pickering balancing test speech may
have been involved in a discharge decision does not automatically indicate that the dis-
charge was improper. See id. at 284. The Mt. Healthy Court, after determining that an
employee's speech was protected under the Pickering balancing test, held that an employer
should not be "precluded, because it considered constitutionally protected conduct in de-
ciding not to rehire Doyle, from attempting to prove ... that quite apart from such con-
duct Doyle's record was such that he would not have been rehired in any event." Id. at 286.
The Mt. Healthy test has also been applied to more recent decisions that have adopted
standards other than Pickering to determine whether the speech is constitutionally pro-
tected. See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying Mt. Healthy to
determine whether a school committee's decision to deny reappointment to a teacher be-
cause of her classroom discussion of abortion of Down's Syndrome fetuses violated her
First Amendment rights); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1991)
(applying Mt. Healthy to establish whether a teacher's First Amendment rights were vio-
lated when he was placed on administrative leave and issued a letter of reprimand for
comments made to his class regarding a rumor about two students engaging in sexual
intercourse on the school tennis court).
44. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
45. Id. at 140, 154.
46. Id. at 146-47. The Court noted that this holding does not mean that private speech
"is totally beyond the protection of the First Amendment." Id. at 147.
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matter of public concern. Furthermore, the Court stated that if the
public employee's speech was not on a matter of public concern,
there would be no need to "scrutinize the reasons for her dis-
charge."48 Because one of the survey questions involved a limited mat-
ter of public concern, the Court did conduct a limited inquiry into the
reasons for the assistant district attorney's discharge, but concluded
that the government's interest in an efficient workplace defeated her
First Amendment claim.49 Thus, the Connick Court "narrowed the cir-
cumstances under which public employees can prevail in free expres-
sion cases"5° by making a clear distinction between speech on matters
of public concern, to which the Pickering standard would be applied,
and speech that is personal and private, to which the standard would
not be applied and to which First Amendment protection would not
be extended under these circumstances.
51
The Fourth Circuit applied the standards set forth in Pickering
and Connick in Piver v. Pender County Board of Education.52 In this 1987
case, a teacher claimed that he had been reassigned to another school
47. Id. at 148. The determination of whether an employee's speech involves a matter
of public concern is based on the "content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record." Id at 147-48. The Court found that one of the questions
on the questionnaire, asking coworkers whether they felt pressure to participate in political
campaigns, involved a limited matter of public concern. Id. at 149.
48. Id. at 146. The Court went on to hold:
when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern,
but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest ... a federal
court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's
behavior.
Id. at 147.
49. See id. at 154 (concluding that "[t]he limited First Amendment interest involved
here does not require that [an employer] tolerate action which he reasonably believed
would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working
relationships").
50. MARTHA M. MCCARTHY ET AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL LAw 274 (4th ed. 1998).
51. Id. McCarthy also notes that under Connick, a court may apply the Pickering balanc-
ing test's assessment of the speech's effect on government interests to its initial determina-
tion of whether the speech relates to a matter of public or private concern. Id. The
Connick Court, in its determination of whether the speech on the questionnaire involved a
matter of public concern, stated that "[t] he Pickering balance requires full consideration of
the government's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to
the public .... We agree ... that there is no demonstration here that the questionnaire
impeded Myers' ability to perform her responsibilities." Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51; see
supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing other factors the Court considered in its
determination of whether or not the speech was on a matter of public concern). It should
also be noted that the Connick Court does not suggest that speech not on a matter of public
concern is "totally beyond the protection of the First Amendment" if it occurs in a setting
that affords it protection, such as a public street. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
52. 835 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1987).
MARYLAND LAW REvIEW
in violation of his First Amendment rights for speaking out in support
of tenure for his principal.53 The court first determined that the
speech was on a matter of public concern and was thus constitution-
ally protected, because the teacher spoke about an issue that was of
interest to the community, particularly to the parents of students. 54
Second, the court found that the public's interest in the speech out-
weighed any threat of "turmoil" at the school.i The Fourth Circuit's
decision demonstrated the need for schools to provide more proof of
disruption to the classroom than the mere threat of "turmoil" at the
school. 56 More importantly, it emphasized that teachers are entitled
to some First Amendment protection when speaking on matters of
public concern. 7
b. Control of Speech in the Public Schools-Adding Curriculum to
the Equation.--The First Amendment rights of students in the context
of curricular, "school-sponsored" speech have also been addressed by
the Supreme Court in recent years. The Court's landmark decision in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District58 was consid-
ered a major step towards the recognition of First Amendment rights
in public schools.59 In this 1969 opinion, the Court held that students
had the right to wear armbands on school grounds as a form of peace-
ful, symbolic protest of the Vietnam War, as long as their acts did not
substantially interfere with the educational process or with the rights
of others.6 ° In extending students' First Amendment protections,
however, the Court acknowledged the authority of school officials to
53. Id. at 1077.
54. Id. at 1080.
55. Id. at 1081. The court found the threat of turmoil to be insufficient when weighed
against the public's interest in hearing from a teacher who had particular knowledge of the
principal's performance. See id. ("Although discipline and harmony in the workplace are
factors mentioned in Pickering and Connick, the threat to those values presented by [the
teacher] was clearly less worrisome than the interests trampled by the reprisal against [the
teacher].").
56. See id.
57. See id.; see also Jennifer Turner-Egner, Commentary, Teachers' Discretion in Selecting
Instructional Materials and Methods, 53 EDUC. L. REP. 365, 378 (1989) ("Deference to school
boards, however, does not mean elimination of teachers' rights to freedom of expression;
the recent decision[ ] in Piver ... show[s] that teachers are not without protection.").
58. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
59. See Derrick E. Cox, Commentary, A School Board's Power to Make Curriculum Decisions,
60 EDUC. L. REP. 1041, 1041 (1990) (asserting that "broad First Amendment rights" were
granted to students by the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Tinker); see also Hazel-
wood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (citing Tinker as establishing the
principle that students have rights regarding freedom of speech or expression on school
premises).
60. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14.
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control conduct in the public schools.6" Although the case involved
the protection of student speech, the Court also recognized the rights
of teachers, noting that " [i] t can hardly be argued that either students
or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."62
Similarly, in Board of Education v. Pico,63 the Court expanded the
First Amendment rights of students when it held that local school
boards could not remove books from school libraries solely because
the board members might disagree with the ideas expressed in the
books.64 The Court again noted, however, that school authorities
maintain broad discretion in managing the school curriculum.65
Six years after the Pico decision, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,6 6 the Supreme Court expanded the authority of school offi-
cials to exercise control over the school curriculum. In a 5-3 opinion,
the Court held that school officials did not violate the First Amend-
ment rights of students by deleting two articles from the school's
newspaper. 67 The first article discussed the pregnancy experiences of
three students at the school.68 The second article described the im-
pact of divorce on school students. 69 In so holding, the Court an-
nounced a new standard for analyzing student speech occurring in
the context of school-sponsored curricular activities such as student
newspapers and theatrical productions that "bear the imprimatur of
61. 1& at 507 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)). The Court in Epperson, although recognizing that First Amend-
ment rights exist in the public schools, nevertheless stressed the importance of exercising
judicial restraint in this area, stating that "[b]y and large, public education in our Nation is
committed to the control of state and local authorities." Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104; see also
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
62. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
63. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
64. Id at 872.
65. See id. at 869. The Court distinguished between the school library, which is used
voluntarily by the students and to which the school board should exercise limited discre-
tion, and the school curriculum, to which the school board may well have "absolute discre-
tion." Id. Following the Court's decision in Pico, the Court reiterated the discretion owed
to school boards in Bethel SchoolDistrict No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). The Court, in
holding that a student's "lewd and indecent speech" at a school assembly was beyond the
protection of the First Amendment, stated that "[t]he determination of what manner of
speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the
school board." Id. at 683, 685.
66. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
67. Id. at 276.




the school."7 Educators, the Court held, do not violate the First
Amendment by placing restrictions on student school-sponsored
speech if the restrictions are "reasonably related to legitimate peda-
gogical concerns."7 1 It is only when the restrictions have "no valid
educational purpose" that First Amendment rights are violated.7 2
Pedagogical concerns include the potential for the speech to "substan-
tially interfere" with the proper functioning of the school.7 3 Concerns
specifically noted by the Court include the speech's suitability for im-
mature audiences, the quality of the speech, its advocacy of inappro-
priate conduct, and its propensity to associate the school with some
prejudicial position. 74 The Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood
gave school officials heightened authority to regulate student curricu-
lar speech.
c. The Application of Connick and Hazelwood to Teacher Cur-
ricular Speech.-Several federal circuit courts have applied the Hazel-
wood analysis to curricular decisions in public schools that have not
involved adverse employment action. The analysis has been applied
to a decision by school administrators to prohibit a teacher from read-
ing from the Bible during class and keeping religious books in his
classroom library,7 5 to a decision to remove a humanities textbook
70. Id. at 271. The Court distinguished Tinker, stating that Tinker involved the school's
"tolerat[ion]" of student speech that occurred on school grounds while this case involved
the school's "promot[ion]" of student speech within school-sponsored activities. Id. at 270-
71. The Court stated three reasons for giving school officials heightened control over
school-sponsored student speech: (1) to ensure that students learn the appropriate les-
sons; (2) to ensure that the speech is appropriate for the maturity level of the audience;
and (3) to ensure that the views expressed are not wrongly attributed to the school. Id. at
271.
71. Id. at 273; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (defining "pedagogical").
72. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
73. Id. at 271 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 509 (1969)).
74. Id. at 271-72. The Court found that the principal's concerns over protecting the
privacy of the individuals mentioned in the article and the appropriateness of the article
for young audiences justified deleting the articles. Id. at 276.
75. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1056-57 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that because
the teacher's conduct was "prompted by a religious purpose" and may be perceived to bear
"'the imprimatur of the school,'" then the activity was properly prohibited (quoting Hazel-
wood, 484 U.S. at 271)).
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from a high school curriculum, 76 and to a decision to place restric-
tions on participation in a school's career day.77
A number of the circuits have also discussed the application of
Hazelwood and Connick to the analysis of teacher curricular speech in
the context of an adverse employment decision. In Kirkland v. North-
side Independent School District,7s the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that a teacher's use of an unapproved reading
list was not entitled to First Amendment protection, and further, that
the school board's decision not to renew his employment contract in-
volved "nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute.
71
Although the Fifth Circuit discussed both Hazelwood and Connick in its
decision, it chose to adopt the Connick standard for analyzing the
teacher's speech.8" In contrast, in Miles v. Denver Public Schools,81 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied Hazel-
wood to determine that a teacher's free speech rights were not violated
when he was placed on paid administrative leave and issued a repri-
mand letter for comments he made during class about two students
engaging in sexual intercourse on the school tennis court.82 In so
holding, the Tenth Circuit rejected the analysis articulated in Connick
relating to employee speech in "a more general public setting" in
favor of the Hazelwood standard for reviewing restrictions on "class-
room speech."83 Most recently, the Eighth Circuit, in Lacks v. Ferguson
Reorganized School District,84 applied the Hazelwood analysis to find that
a school board's decision to terminate a teacher's employment based
on her violation of school policy by using profanity in the classroom
did not violate the First Amendment.85 Applying Hazelwood, the court
76. Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1523 (1lth Cir. 1989) ("[A]fter careful consid-
eration, we cannot conclude that the school board's actions were not reasonably related to
its legitimate concerns regarding the appropriateness ... of the sexuality and vulgarity in
these works.").
77. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319-20 (1th Cir. 1989) (considering the Hazel-
wood "context" when reviewing the "reasonableness of the two sets of regulations" limiting
access to the school's Career Day).
78. 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989).
79. Id. at 802.
80. See id. at 797-801. The Fifth Circuit's primary reliance on the Connick standard
rather than the Hazelwood standard was presumably based on the fact that the teacher
clearly failed to follow established policy regarding obtaining approval of his reading list,
thus making the controversy merely an "ordinary employment dispute." Id, at 796, 802; see
infra notes 102-105 and 123-132 (discussing the Boring court's reliance on the Fifth Cir-
cuit's opinion in Kirkland).
81. 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 778-79.
83. Id. at 777.
84. 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998).
85. Id. at 724.
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found that "[a] flat prohibition on profanity in the classroom is rea-
sonably related to the legitimate pedagogical concern of promoting
generally acceptable social standards." 6 The Lacks court made no ref-
erence to Connick in its decision.8 7
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Boring v. Buncombe County Board of
Education, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that a teacher's selection and production of a school play was not
protected speech under the First Amendment.88 The en banc court
was sharply divided, with only seven of the court's thirteen judges join-
ing the majority opinion.89 The court first determined that school
plays are within the definition of school curriculum." ° The court then
applied the test established in Connick to find that the speech was not
protected because it did not involve a matter of public concern.9 ' Fi-
nally, the court found that, even if the speech was protected, a legiti-
mate pedagogical interest in the school curriculum justified
restrictions on that speech.92
The court began its analysis by determining that school plays, in-
cluding the one at issue in this case, are part of the school curricu-
lum.93 The court found support for this determination in the
Supreme Court's Hazelwood decision.94 In Hazelwood, the Court stated
that activities such as school plays can be considered part of the school
curriculum if they are directed by a member of the faculty and are
"designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student partici-
pants and audiences."95 Because the school play was supervised by Ms.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 723-24. In Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452-54 (1st Cir. 1993), the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied Hazelwood to determine whether a
teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when she was denied reappointment as a
result of her classroom discussion of abortion of fetuses with Down's Syndrome. In its
decision, the court, like the Eighth Circuit in Lacks, did not apply the Connick standard to
its analysis of the teacher's First Amendment rights. Id.
88. Boring, 136 F.3d at 367.
89. Id. at 366. Judge Widener wrote the majority opinion, id. as well as the dissenting
opinion in the vacated panel decision. Judge Motz wrote a dissenting opinion, Boring, 136
F.2d at 375 (Motz, J., dissenting), and the majority opinion in the vacated panel decision.
Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 1474 (4th Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g
granted en banc, No. 95-2593 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 1996), reh' en banc, 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 47 (1998).
90. Boring, 136 F.3d at 368.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 370.
93. Id. at 368.
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)).
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Boring and was part of the theater program at the school, the court
reasoned, the play Independence was part of the school curriculum.9 6
Next, the court applied the standard adopted in Connick to con-
clude that Ms. Boring's choice of the play, and the subsequent editing
of the play by the principal, did not present a matter of public con-
cern and thus did not deserve First Amendment protection. 97 To sup-
port its application of Connick in the context of teacher curricular
speech in the public schools, the court first relied on its decision in
Dimeglio v. Haines.98 In Dimeglio, the court held that a public em-
ployee's First Amendment rights were not violated when he was trans-
ferred for advising citizens on a zoning issue against his employer's
instructions.99 Applying Connick, the Fourth Circuit held that DiMeg-
lio was "speaking as an employee, rather than as a citizen."100 Further-
more, even if DiMeglio was speaking as a private citizen on a matter of
public concern, his speech was still undeserving of protection because
"the interests of the State in preventing disruption of the orderly man-
agement of its offices might well have outweighed DiMeglio's interests
in expressing himself."1 1 The Fourth Circuit in Boring found even
greater support for its application of the Connick standard in Kirkland,
which the court found to be "indistinguishable" from Boring. 2 In
Kirkland, the Fifth Circuit found that the selection of an unapproved
reading list by a public school teacher was not a matter of public con-
cern and was therefore not entitled to First Amendment protection. 03
The Fifth Circuit held that the nonrenewal of the teacher's contract
for his use of an unapproved reading list was "nothing more than an
ordinary employment dispute."10' 4 The Fourth Circuit adopted the
language of the Kirkland opinion in Boring and stated that Boring's
claim was likewise "nothing more than an ordinary employment dis-
96. Id.
97. Id. The court characterized Ms. Boring's dispute with the school board as "nothing
more than an ordinary employment dispute." Id.
98. 45 F.3d 790 (4th Cir. 1995).
99. Id. at 806. The court in DiMeglio reasoned that the government had the right to
dictate daily operations under its roof "without fear of reprisal in the form of lawsuits from
disgruntled subordinates who believe that they know better than their supervisors how to
manage office affairs." Id.
100. Id. at 805.
101. Id.
102. Boring, 136 F.3d at 369. But see id. at 376-77 (Motz, J., dissenting) (finding Kirkland
to be distinguishable and criticizing the majority's reliance on the case).
103. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800. In Kirkland, the teacher was informed by school officials
that he could use his own reading list as long as he received approval from the school. Id.
at 796. However, he never attempted to have his list approved. Id.
104. Id. at 802.
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pute" and that her "speech" was therefore not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection.
°5
Finally, after determining that the speech was not protected, the
court applied the "legitimate pedagogical interest" standard articu-
lated in Hazelwood." 6 The court found that even if the speech was
protected, the school had a "legitimate pedagogical interest" in pun-
ishing Ms. Boring for her speech.107 The court stated that "[t]he
makeup of the curriculum... is by definition a legitimate pedagogical
concern."'0 Because the play was part of the curriculum, the school
authorities had a legitimate pedagogical interest in controlling the
production of the play.'0 9 The court concluded its opinion by reem-
phasizing that school authorities, not teachers, should control the
makeup of the public school curriculum. 110
In separate dissenting opinions, both Judge Hamilton and Judge
Motz concluded that by failing to require the Board to provide "legiti-
mate pedagogical concerns" for restricting Boring's speech the major-
ity opinion did not follow the standard articulated in Hazelwood."'
Judge Motz criticized the majority for automatically defining "any and
every curriculum decision made by school administrators" as a legiti-
mate pedagogical concern without requiring any evidence of the "le-
gitimacy" of these concerns." 2  In addition, she rejected the
majority's use of the standard set forth in Connick for analyzing
teacher's in-class speech, reasoning that the proper standard in these
cases should be that which was set forth in Hazelwood."3
105. Boring, 136 F.3d at 369. The Boring court also noted its agreement with the Fifth
Circuit's conclusion that teachers do not have freedom to control the school curriculum.
See id. ("'[P]ublic school teachers are not free, under the first amendment, to arrogate
control of curricula."' (quoting Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 802)). The Fifth Circuit relied on
Hazelwood in coming to its conclusion. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800-01.




110. Id. at 370-71. The court noted that the "four essential freedoms" of a university
should also apply to public schools. Id. at 370. These freedoms are "who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Id. (citing
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263-64 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
111. See id. at 376 (Motz,J., dissenting) (stating that while the Board may have legitimate
pedagogical concerns, "nothing in the record.., allows us to draw such a conclusion"); id.
at 374 (Hamilton,J., dissenting) (stating that the case "presents one simple question: Can
the Board censor Boring's speech without proffering any legitimate pedagogical concern
justifying the restriction?").
112. Id. at 376 (Motz, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 377. In a separate concurring opinion,Judge Luttig distinguished a teacher's
in-class curricular speech, which did not warrant protection, from a teacher's in-class
noncurricular speech, which he stated would "assuredly enjoy[ ] some First Amendment
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4. Analysis.-In holding that a teacher's right to select and pro-
duce a school play was not protected speech under the First Amend-
ment, 14 the Fourth Circuit in Boring failed to adopt a clear standard
for analyzing teacher curricular speech in the public schools. The
Fourth Circuit confused the issue of protected employee speech with
the issue of academic freedom in the public schools.1 15 First, the
court did not take advantage of the opportunity to eliminate the Con-
nick analysis from cases involving curriculum matters and academic
freedom.'" 6 Second, the court should have embraced more fully the
Hazelwood analysis for determining the level of First Amendment pro-
tection afforded to a teacher's school-sponsored speech, as this analy-
sis more appropriately addresses restrictions on curricular activities
such as school productions." 7 Third, because the court failed to spe-
cifically define the limits of the Hazelwood "legitimate pedagogical con-
cern" standard or to conduct any inquiry into the Board's basis for its
decision, its approach is likely to be used by later courts to place fur-
ther limitations on the ability of teachers to make curricular decisions.
a. The Connick Standard and its Application to Curricular
Speech.-The court's application of the standard articulated in Connick
is misplaced for two reasons. First, the "speech" at issue in Pickering
and Connick involved statements by employees that were critical of the
workplace.11 8 In contrast, the speech at issue in Boring did not involve
any criticism of the workplace or the school's authority. Rather, it
involved a teacher's right to select a portion of the school curricu-
lum.'19 The Boring court applied the Connick standard because both
protection." Id. at 373 (Luttig,J., concurring). He noted that the latter category was not at
issue in this case. Id.
114. Boring, 136 F.3d at 367.
115. See generally MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 50, at 285 (defining academic freedom as
the principle that "faculty members should be free from governmental controls in con-
ducting research and imparting knowledge to students" and discussing the notion that
courts have not been willing to extend the rights associated with academic freedom in the
university setting to the public elementary and secondary schools). See also infra note 180
and accompanying text (discussing the reason why academic freedom is afforded height-
ened protection in the university setting).
116. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text (describing the public concern analy-
sis articulated in Connick).
117. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text (describing the standard applied to
student school-sponsored speech in Hazelwood).
118. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1983) (involving an assistant district
attorney who was dissatisfied with her proposed transfer and circulated a questionnaire on
office morale and policy); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968) (involving
the First Amendment rights of a teacher who sent a letter to a local newspaper criticizing
school funding proposals).
119. Boring, 136 F.3d at 367.
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cases involved speech by a public employee that resulted in an adverse
employment decision made based on that "speech. ' 12' However, the
speech at issue in Boring should not be treated similarly to the speech
involved in Connick. When Boring selected the school play, she was
speaking as an employee on a matter of interest to the school through
the selection of curriculum, a form of speech not covered in the Con-
nick balancing test. In her dissenting opinion, Judge Motz argued that
"[Boring's] speech is neither ordinary workplace speech nor common
public debate" and therefore cannot be subject to the categorical de-
termination used in Connick.1 2' Because teacher curricular speech has
a special purpose, namely to educate, the Connick standard seems to
be inapplicable to the public schools. 1 22
The Boring court relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Kirkland, which also applied the Connick standard to a teacher's curric-
ular speech. 12  In Kirkland, a teacher alleged that his First Amend-
ment rights were violated when his employment contract was not
renewed as a result of his use of an unapproved reading list.1 24 There
are two main concerns with the court's reliance on this case. First,
because of the curricular nature of the speech at issue in Kirkland, a
teacher's unapproved reading list, like the approval of the play in Bor-
ing, does not fit squarely into the categories articulated in Connick.125
Second, although both cases address teacher curricular speech, the
cases are factually distinguishable.
In Kirkland the teacher was aware of the school's guidelines for
obtaining approval for substitute reading lists, but he chose to ignore
them.126 Furthermore, he asserted that his control over the curricu-
lum was "unlimited.'' 127 The Kirkland court found that because Kirk-
land never gave school officials the chance to approve his list, his
120. See id. at 368.
121. Id. at 378 (Motz,J., dissenting).
122. Id. (arguing that placing curricular speech into these categories "ignores the es-
sence of teaching-to educate, to enlighten, to inspire-and the importance of free
speech to this most critical endeavor").
123. Boring, 136 F.3d at 369.
124. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 795.
125. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the inapplicability of the Con-
nick standard to teacher curricular speech); see also infra notes 133-134 and accompanying
text (discussing the unique aspects of the public school environment).
126. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 796.
127. Id. at 801. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, relying on the Supreme
Court's recognition in Hazelwood of the rights of school officials to place restrictions on
school-sponsored speech. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267
(1988)).
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speech did not rise to the level of public concern. 12s It was "an ordi-
nary employment dispute" because the issue of censorship was not
raised until the decision was made not to rehire him.129 Thus, even
though Kirkland's speech was curricular in nature and should nor-
mally not be subject to the Connick analysis, the speech came closer
than Boring's to being a direct violation of workplace policy, the type
of speech generally governed by Connick. In contrast, Boring followed
school guidelines by informing the principal about her choice of the
play Independence, and the issue of censorship of the school play was
discussed prior to the transfer decision.13 ° In addition, Boring did not
dispute the school's authority over the curriculum. Rather, she dis-
puted the Board's inability to show that their actions were "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."'' Although it remains
questionable whether the Connick standard should be applied to any
type of curricular speech, it is clearly misplaced in Boring. Boring fol-
lowed school rules and was not asserting unlimited authority over the
curriculum; her dismissal for the selection and production of the
school play was far more than an "ordinary employment dispute," 132
and the holding in Kirkland, and its reliance on Connick, should not
apply.
Second, by applying the standard in Connick, the court failed to
acknowledge the "special characteristics of the school environment"
which make it different from an ordinary public workplace and thus
not susceptible to the analysis required by Connick.'33 The school's
interest involves providing the best possible education for students.
School officials "should not be required to demonstrate that a restric-
tion on in-class speech is necessitated by workplace efficiency or har-
mony."' 34 In Miles v. Denver Public Schools,'3 5 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a teacher's in-class speech
128. See id. at 800 (stating that "while an employee need not publicly announce a matter
of general concern in protest, and may use private channels instead, he cannot remain
mute and thereafter self-servingly label his conduct to be a matter of public concern" (foot-
note omitted)).
129. Id. at 800, 802.
130. Boring, 136 F.3d at 366. There is some dispute, however, over whether Boring may
have violated the school's "controversial materials policy." Id. at 367.
131. Id. at 377 (Motz, J., dissenting) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
132. Boring, 136 F.3d at 368.
133. SeeTinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see
also supra Part 2.b (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker).
134. Boring, 136 F.3d at 378 (Motz, J., dissenting); see also supra note 70 (discussing the
reasons articulated in Hazelwood for giving school officials heightened control over the
school curriculum).
135. 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
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was not protected.' 3 6 The court rejected the Pickering and Connick
analysis in favor of the analysis of school-sponsored speech adopted by
the Supreme Court in Hazelwood, recognizing that there are special
responsibilities that the state maintains in providing education to its
citizens that are not applicable in other public settings. 13 7 In choos-
ing to apply the Hazelwood standard, the Miles court found that a
teacher's expression during a ninth-grade government class, like the
students' expression in a school newspaper at issue in Hazelwood, was
school-sponsored speech.13 In rejecting the applicability of Pickering
and Connick to the teacher's in-class expression, the court reasoned
that "[b]ecause of the special characteristics of a classroom environ-
ment, in applying Hazelwood instead of Pickering we distinguish be-
tween teachers' classroom expression and teachers' expression in
other situations that would not reasonably be perceived as school-
sponsored."1 3 '9 Furthermore, the Miles court reasoned that the test ar-
ticulated in Pickering and Connick relates to the "state's interests as an
employer" but not the "interests of the state as educator."1 4 Thus,
the balancing test adopted in Pickering, which emphasized workplace
efficiency, should be replaced by a balancing standard that more fairly
reflects the interests of the public schools, namely the "legitimate ped-
agogical concern" standard. The Fourth Circuit should have followed
the precedent set by the Tenth Circuit in Miles by eliminating the Con-
nick standard from the analysis of a teacher's in-class curricular
speech.
b. Applying Hazelwood to Teacher Curricular Speech.-The
Fourth Circuit properly followed the Supreme Court's decision in Ha-
136. Id. at 777, 779 (holding that the school acted reasonably in disciplining a teacher
who made comments during class about rumors that two students had engaged in sexual
intercourse on the school tennis court during lunch hour).
137. Id. at 777.
138. Id. at 776.
139. Id. at 777. In applying Hazelwood to the facts of the case, the Miles court first found
that the school's interests in "preventing Miles from using his position of authority to con-
firm an unsubstantiated rumor[,] ensuring that teacher employees exhibit professionalism
and soundjudgment[, and] providing an educational atmosphere where teachers do not
make statements about students that embarrass those students among their peers" were
legitimate pedagogical interests. Id. at 778. Second, the court found that the actions taken
by the school-namely placing Miles on paid administrative leave while the school was
investigating the incident and issuing a letter of reprimand which stated the school's inter-
est in punishing him-were reasonably related to the interests articulated by the school.
Id. at 778-79. Finally, the court found that Miles's speech was not protected by "a constitu-
tional right to academic freedom." Id. at 779. As a result of these findings, the court found
that Miles's speech was not constitutionally protected. Id.
140. Id.
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zelwood in holding that the play was part of the school curriculum, and
in so doing, recognized the curricular nature of Ms. Boring's
speech. 1' However, by turning its attention to whether the selection
and production of the school play was a matter of public concern, the
court abandoned its focus on the fact that this case involved decisions
about school curriculum and failed to fully embrace the Hazelwood
analysis. 14 2 Only after the court determined that the speech was not
protected based on the Connick standard did it return to the Hazelwood
analysis and attempt to define the "legitimate pedagogical concerns"
that justified the school's restrictions. By doing so, the court missed
the opportunity to fully adopt Hazelwood, and not Connick, as the
proper framework to be used when analyzing teacher curricular
speech in the public schools.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood most clearly demon-
strates the appropriate standard for analyzing restrictions on a
teacher's control over school-sponsored, curricular activities such as
the school play at issue in Boring. First, in Hazelwood, the Court clearly
included "theatrical productions" in its list of school-sponsored activi-
ties over which school boards may exercise their authority. 14 3 By artic-
ulating an expansive definition of "curriculum" and "school-
sponsored," the Supreme Court created a general standard that courts
can and should use when reviewing curricular decisions made by
school authorities.
1 44
Second, although Hazelwood involved restrictions on student ex-
pression through a school newspaper, the Court noted that "school
officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students,
teachers, and other members of the school community."145 The
Supreme Court has not directly held that the Hazelwood standard ap-
plies to teachers, but courts have nonetheless applied it to many forms
of teacher curricular expression, including classroom interaction and
141. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368 ("It is plain that the play was curricular from the fact that
it was supervised by a faculty member, Mrs. Boring; ... and the theater program at the
high school was obviously intended to impart particular skills... to student participants.").
142. See id. (stating that "[p]laintiff's selection of the play... does not present a matter
of public concern and is nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute").
143. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (stating that
"[e] ducators are entitled to exercise greater control" over expression such as "school-spon-
sored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities").
144. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368 (applying the Hazelwood definition of curriculum); see
also Cox, supra note 59, at 1041 (stating that courts are applying the Hazelwood standard to
the review of "all curriculum-related decisions by local school boards").
145. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
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selection of school materials.' 46 Thus, the standard has been broadly
applied both to curriculum choices and teacher speech through class-
room interaction with students. The Boring court should have fol-
lowed the other federal circuits that have rejected Connick as the
appropriate standard for addressing teacher curricular speech and ap-
plied only the Hazelwood analysis, as the Hazelwood analysis more ap-
propriately addresses restrictions on teacher speech within the school
curriculum. 147
c. Failure to Define Limits of the "Legitimate Pedagogical Concern"
Standard Indicates Strong Stand for School Board Discretion.-The Fourth
Circuit, after determining that Boring's speech was not protected,
nonetheless applied the Hazelwood "legitimate pedagogical concern"
standard to the facts of this case because the court recognized that the
selection and production of the school play was part of the school
curriculum. 14  However, because the court failed to specifically de-
fine the limits of the standard in its decision, the court's application of
the standard to school-sponsored activities is likely to be used by fu-
ture courts to place further limitations on the ability of teachers to
make curricular decisions. 1 49
Once the court established that the selection and production of
the school play was a part of the school curriculum, but was not a
matter of public concern, it returned to the Hazelwood analysis and
attempted to define the "legitimate pedagogical concerns" that justi-
146. See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452-54 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying Hazelwood to a
teacher's classroom speech regarding abortion of fetuses with Down's Syndrome); Miles v.
Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying Hazelwood to a teacher's in-
class comments about rumors that two students had engaged in sexual intercourse on the
school tennis court during lunch hour); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1056-57 (10th
Cir. 1990) (applying Hazelwood to a decision by school administrators to prohibit a teacher
from reading from the Bible during class and from keeping religious books in his class-
room library); Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1521-23 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying the
Hazelwood standard to a school board's decision to ban a humanities textbook).
147. The Boring court noted that this case involved employee speech and not student
speech as in Hazelwood. Boring, 136 F.3d at 371 n.2. Thus, the majority apparently did not
find the Hazelwood analysis directly applicable to teacher speech. But see id. at 378 (MotzJ.,
dissenting) (finding that the "Hazelwood analysis should apply to a teacher's in-class speech,
as well as a student's in-class speech").
148. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-70.
149. See E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., Commentary, Academic Freedom Advisory: Be Wary of the
Long Arm of Kuhlmeier, 89 EDuc. L. REP. 347, 354 (1994) (stating that by expanding the
definition of such terms as "school-sponsored speech" and "legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns," courts may "intrude upon the professional judgment of teachers"); see also infra
notes 178-179 and accompanying text (describing a subsequent decision that relied on
Boring to place absolute limitations on the ability of public university professors to make
curricular decisions).
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fled the school's restrictions."' Rather than inquiring into the rea-
sons why the Board's restrictions may have been justified, the court
concluded that "[t]he makeup of the [school] curriculum . . . is by
definition a legitimate pedagogical concern."' 5 ' Thus, the court justi-
fied the restrictions by relying solely on the fact that the school play
was part of the school curriculum and did not inquire into the Board's
reasons for its restrictions.
In Boring, the court broadened the definition of "legitimate peda-
gogical concerns" and retreated from requiring school officials to ar-
ticulate the types of concerns that would justify restrictions under the
Hazelwood standard, such as the speech's suitability for immature audi-
ences and the protection of students' privacy interests.1 52 Other
courts that have applied the Hazelwood standard have required school
officials to articulate such concerns. 153 Both the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit have conducted a two-step inquiry when
evaluating teacher speech under the Hazelwood standard. 54 The cir-
cuits first determined whether the school had legitimate pedagogical
concerns, and second, whether the school's actions were reasonably
related to these concerns. 155 In Miles, the school's interests included
"preventing Miles from using his position of authority to confirm an
unsubstantiated rumor[,] ensuring that teacher employees exhibit
professionalism and soundjudgment[, and] providing an educational
atmosphere where teachers do not make statements about students
that embarrass those students among their peers.' 56 After determin-
ing that these were "legitimate pedagogical interests," the Miles court
found that the school's action of placing Miles on paid administrative
leave "allowed the school . . . to disassociate itself from the speech,"
thus conforming with the first interest articulated by the court
150. Boring, 136 F.3d at 370; see id. at 376 (MotzJ., dissenting) (describing the majority's
failure to define "legitimate pedagogical concerns"). But see id. at 371 (Wilkinson, J., con-
curring) (criticizing the dissenters' attempts to define "legitimate pedagogical concern,"
calling it a "loose, slippery, litigious phrase" that the courts can not be expected to define).
151. Boring, 136 F.3d at 370.
152. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72, 276 (stating reasons
for justifying a school's restrictions on school-sponsored speech); see also supra text accom-
panying notes 73-74 (noting the legitimate pedagogical concerns that warrant reasonable
restrictions on school-sponsored speech).
153. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 376 (Motz, J., dissenting) (noting that since Hazelwood was
decided, courts have required school officials to at least offer some basis for showing that
their actions related to legitimate pedagogical concerns).
154. SeeMiles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 778-79 (10th Cir. 1991); Virgil v. School
Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1522-25 (11th Cir. 1989).
155. See Miles, 944 F.2d at 778-79; Virgil, 862 F.2d at 1522-25.
156. Miles, 944 F.2d at 778.
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above.1 57 Further, the court found that the letter of reprimand which
specifically requested that the teacher refrain from making comments
about students in class was reasonably related to the school's third
interest in protecting students against negative publicity.1 58 In Virgil v.
School Board,59 the school board stipulated its motivations for remov-
ing readings from a curriculum.16 ° The motivations for removing the
readings included beliefs that the readings were "excessively vulgar[,]
... immoral[,]... violative of the socially and philosophically con-
servative mores.., of the Columbia County populace[,] . . . offensive
to a substantial portion of the Columbia County populace [,] ... [and]
inappropriate to the age, maturity, and development of the stu-
dents." 61 The court determined that these were legitimate pedagogi-
cal concerns, and further, concluded that because of the youth of the
students, the excessively vulgar and sexually explicit nature of the
readings, and the fact that the materials had not been banned from
the school but had merely been removed from the curriculum of a
particular class, the school's actions were reasonable. 16 2
In Ward v. Hickey,"'63 the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit took a slightly different approach to its application of the
Hazelwood standard. The court adopted a set of factors, based on prior
precedent, to be considered when deciding whether a prohibition on
speech is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."164
These include "the age and the sophistication of students, the rela-
tionship between teaching method and valid educational objective,
and the context and manner of the presentation." '165 In addition, in
Searcey v. Harris,16 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit, in striking down part of a regulation that placed restric-
tions on participation in a school's Career Day, stated that it could not
"infer the reasonableness of a regulation from a vacant record. 1 67
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989).
160. Id. at 1522-23.
161. Id. at 1523 n.7.
162. Id. at 1523-25.
163. 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
164. Id. at 453.
165. Id. (citing Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam)); see
also Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding
that "[a] flat prohibition on profanity in the classroom is reasonably related to the legiti-
mate pedagogical concern of promoting generally acceptable social standards").
166. 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989).
167. Id. at 1322. The court found it problematic that the school board offered no evi-
dence to explain a requirement in the regulation requiring organizations to describe their
present affiliation." Id. The majority in Boring quoted this case when arguing that the
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The court in Boring failed to adopt a method or set of factors such
as those set forth above for evaluating restrictions on school-spon-
sored speech using the Hazelwood standard. In fact, the majority went
even further by not requiring the officials to assert any justification for
their restrictions. The school officials may have had legitimate con-
cerns, and if they had been articulated, it is likely that the Board could
have easily won this case at the district court level without providing
any grounds for appeal. 6 By failing to inquire into the reasons for
the board's restrictions, however, the court gave the Board unlimited
discretion in restricting teacher curricular speech and provided little
guidance for future courts on how to apply the Hazelwood standard.
Although the Court in Hazelwood upheld the rights of school offi-
cials to control the curriculum in the public schools, the Court did
provide for a "limited intrusion" into the rationale behind a school
board's decision.169 The Fourth Circuit's decision in Boring failed to
follow Hazelwood by failing to inquire into the rationale behind the
school's restrictions on the curriculum.17° By failing to do so, the
court failed to provide teachers with any guidance as to the types of
concerns that might justify school restrictions on teacher speech. Fur-
thermore, the court provided little reason for school boards to pro-
vide more notice as to what activities they plan to restrict.
171
Providing teachers with notice of school board concerns would pre-
"purpose of a curricular program is by definition 'pedagogical.'" Boring, 136 F.3d at 370
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1319). However, in her
dissent, Judge Motz criticized the majority's use of this statement to justify its failure to
inquire into the school board's restrictions given that the court in Searcey found this type of
failed inquiry to "'overstate[ ] the deference a court must pay to School Board decisions.'"
Id. at 377 (Motz, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1321).
168. See id. at 374 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (stating that if the Board had offered some
proof as to the reasons behind its restrictions that "[i]n all likelihood, if remanded, the
case would be resolved in favor of the Board at the summary judgment stage, as several
pedagogical concerns probably justified the Board's action").
169. Id. at 374-75 (stating that the standard articulated by Hazelwood, requiring school
officials to provide reasons for their restrictions, is "one to which we are bound to adhere
until the Supreme Court states otherwise"). The Hazelwood Court stated that it is only
when the school board's decision to place restrictions on school-sponsored speech "has no
valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is so 'directly and sharply impli-
cate[d] ,'as to require judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional rights." Ha-
zelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 (alteration in original) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104 (1968)).
170. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 369-70.
171. The courts are not the sole vehicle for determining the extent of the school's au-
thority over the curriculum. See MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 50, at 285 (noting that state
legislatures grant authority over the curriculum to local school boards by statute).
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vent teachers from becoming too "cautious and reserved" in the class-
room because they are not aware of the school's policy.
1 72
The Fourth Circuit recognized the importance of notice in a
1979 decision in which it found that a teacher's First Amendment
rights had not been violated when she was demoted for reading to her
class part of a note that she found. 173 The court held that a state
statute provided adequate notice to her of the grounds for dismissal of
a public school teacher. 174 More recently, the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit held that before a school board can discipline a
teacher's classroom expression, the teacher should be put on notice
as to the forms of expression that are prohibited.1 75 Although notice
in these examples was provided statutorily or through school board
policies, it nonetheless highlights the important role that the courts
play in determining the extent of school authority over curricular de-
cisions. By not requiring the school board to articulate the types of
concerns that would justify its restrictions, the court missed the oppor-
tunity to provide teachers with notice of the types of activities that are
likely to be restricted in the future.176
The court's failure to adequately define the "legitimate pedagogi-
cal concern" standard and its decision not to require school boards to
give reasons for placing restrictions on the school curriculum has the
effect of significantly expanding school board discretion. Further-
more, the court's strong statement that "the school, not the teacher,
has the right to fix the school curriculum" is likely to be used by
courts to place even more discretion in the hands of school boards at
the expense of a teacher's academic freedom. 177 A recent Third Cir-
cuit decision gives an indication of how far courts may extend the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Boring. In Edwards v. California Univer-
sity,1 78 the court cited language from Boring in holding that a "public
172. Turner-Egner, supra note 57, at 372-73 (arguing that this type of reservation on the
part of teachers would itself limit academic freedom in the classroom (quoting Parducci v.
Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 357 (M.D. Ala. 1970))).
173. Frison v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 596 F.2d 1192, 1193 (4th Cir. 1979).
174. Id. at 1194.
175. See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Indeed, this circuit has long
recognized a teacher's right to notice of what classroom conduct is prohibited."); see also
Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 723 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
teacher who allowed her students to use profanity in writing short plays had been given
sufficient notice that this conduct was restricted by the Student Discipline Code which
"clearly prohibits profanity").
176. It is possible that the "controversial materials policy" mentioned briefly by the court
in Boring could have provided sufficient notice to Ms. Boring, although this is not discussed
in the opinion. Boring, 136 F.3d at 367.
177. Id. at 370.
178. 156 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 1998).
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university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide
what will be taught in the classroom." ' 9 The Edwards decision failed
to acknowledge that university professors have generally been entitled
to broader academic freedom than teachers at the elementary or sec-
ondary school level. 8 ' Additionally, the court's decision runs con-
trary to past decisions that have recognized that university professors
should be afforded at least some degree of academic freedom.18 '
Teachers and teachers' associations are concerned about the im-
plications of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Boring. In a recent edito-
rial, the general counsel for the National Education Association
(NEA) cited the Boring decision as an example of how the courts have
placed severe limitations on a teacher's First Amendment rights in the
classroom and have "sen[t] teachers a frightening message: [t]hose
who stray beyond the narrow confines of the approved curriculum by
using controversial teaching methods or materials do so at their own
risk."'
8 2
5. Conclusion.-In Boring, the Fourth Circuit held that a
teacher's selection and production of a school play was not protected
179. Id. at 491. In noting that Edwards had a right to advocate the use of curriculum
materials outside of the classroom, but not inside the classroom, the Edwards court relied
on the language at the end of the Boring opinion which stated that " ' the school, not the
teacher, has the right to fix the curriculum.'" Id. (quoting Boring, 136 F.3d at 370).
180. See Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. REv. 831, 836 (1987)
(distinguishing the concept of broad academic freedom in the university setting which
affords "significant latitude" to professors to research and publish, from the more limited
concept of academic freedom in the elementary and secondary school setting, where
teachers are "rarely engaged in advanced research .... or in testing and sharing their hard-
won insights with their students"); supra note 115 (defining academic freedom).
181. See University of Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 199
(1990) ("Nothing we say today should be understood as a retreat from this principle of
respect for legitimate academic decisionmaking."); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing,
474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) ("When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely
academic decision .... they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judg-
ment."); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) ("Academic free-
dom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a
special concern of the First Amendment."); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967) ("Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned."); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("The essentiality of freedom in the community
of American universities is almost self-evident .... To impose any straitjacket upon the
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Na-
tion."). But see Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 (stating that academic freedom also includes
"autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself").
182. Michael D. Simpson, Academic Freedom Takes a Hit, NEA TODAY, Nov. 1998, at 27.
Simpson asserts: "Courts have sent the message: It's okay to fire teachers who use contro-
versial materials." Id. He cites Boring and Lacks in support of his assertion. Id.; see supra
notes 165, 175 and accompanying text (discussing Lacks).
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speech under the First Amendment."8 3 The court followed a number
of Supreme Court decisions that have recognized the broad authority
that school officials maintain over the curriculum. However, by con-
fusing the issue of employee speech in the workplace with the issue of
academic freedom, the court declined to announce a clear standard
for use by later courts in analyzing restrictions on a teacher's speech
within the context of the school curriculum. Furthermore, by limiting
its inquiry into the justifications behind restrictions on the school cur-
riculum, the Boring court has paved the way for school boards to exer-
cise unlimited authority over the curriculum while substantially
limiting the freedom of teachers in the classroom.
JOANNA B. GOGER
B. Erosion on the Slippery Slope of First Amendment Protection for Books
In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,"84 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the First Amend-
ment 8 5 provides an absolute defense to a wrongful death action
brought against the publisher of an instructional manual for profes-
sional killers that was used by a "hit man" in preparing to carry out a
contract murder, when the publisher intended and knew that the
manual would be used to commit murders, and the manual assisted
the hit man in killing the decedents."i 6 The Fourth Circuit answered
in the negative, holding that the estates and relatives of the victims
could maintain a civil cause of action against the publisher for aiding
and abetting the murders, and that this cause of action was not barred
by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and freedom of the
press."8 7 The court reasoned that the book's highly detailed instruc-
tions on how to be a professional killer, coupled with its persuasive
tone and glorification of the profession, permitted a finding that the
book was intended and likely to incite or produce imminent lawless
activity."88 Although the court only explicitly exempts from First
183. Boring, 136 F.3d at 367.
184. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998).
185. The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides, in perti-
nent part, that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
186. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241.
187. Id. at 265.
188. See id. at 253-55 (stating four bases upon which a reasonablejury could find that the
publisher possessed the requisite intent to support civil liability, including "the book's ex-
tensive, decided, and pointed promotion of murder" and the fact that "the declared pur-
pose of Hit Man itself is to facilitate murder").
1246 [VOL. 58:1221
1999] FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 1247
Amendment protection detailed instructional manuals that teach and
encourage activity that is criminal per se,1 s9 its holding could be ap-
plied in such a way as to endanger other forms of expression.
1. The Case.-In 1983, Paladin Enterprises, Inc., published Hit
Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractorst9 ° (Hit Man) and
How to Make a Disposable Silencer, Vol. II. (Silencers).191 Hit Man is a 130-
page manual that contains "detailed factual instructions on how to
murder and to become a professional killer." '192 It is remarkable for
two reasons. First, the book contains meticulous instructions, some
accompanied by photographs, on how to be a contract killer. 93 It
includes instructions on how to solicit clients; schedule and collect
fees; choose the proper weapons and other materials a contract killer
will need; construct a disposable silencer; and conceal every aspect of
the crime.194 It contains explicit instructions on how to kill a person
using a knife, ice pick, gun, or bomb; how to dispose of the corpse;
and how to torture a person when torture is part of the contract.
195
Second, Hit Man, "through powerful prose in the second person
and imperative voice, . . . encourages its readers in their specific acts
of murder" by reassuring them that they will not fail or be caught, and
by glamorizing the "profession" as a way to prove one's masculinity
and superiority over others.
19 6
189. Id. at 263 ("The Supreme Court has never protected as abstract advocacy speech so
explicit in its palpable entreaties to violent crime.").
190. REx FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
(1983) [hereinafter HIT MAN]. "Rex Feral" is almost certainly a pseudonym. "Rex," in
Latin, means "king." See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1945 (1993). "Feral" is an adjective that means, inter alia, "causing death,"
"deadly," "fatal," or "of or relating to the dead." Id. at 838.
191. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Md. 1996) (mem.), rev'd, 128
F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998). The parties stipulated that
approximately 13,000 copies of each book had been sold nationally since 1983. Id.
192. Rice, 128 F.3d at 239. The first several pages of the Fourth Circuit's opinion are
comprised wholly of excerpts from Hit Man. See id. at 235-39 (quoting portions of Hit
Man). The court attempted to set forth passages that were representative, in substance and
presentation, of the entire manual. Id. at 239 n.1. The court "even felt it necessary to omit
portions of the[ ] few illustrative passages in order to minimize the danger to the public
from their repetition." Id.
193. See id. at 238-41 (discussing several instructions contained in the book, as well as
how those instructions were followed by the killer of the decedents in the present case); see
also HIT MAN, supra note 190, at 42-45, 48-50 (exemplifying how some of the instructions in
the book are illustrated with photographs).
194. See HIT MAN, supra note 190, at vii-viii for a complete list of the contents of the
book.
195. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 236-38 (quoting particular portions of Hit Man).
196. Id. at 252. Hit Man's encouragement and glamorization of contract killing is illus-
trated by the following passages that describe events after the killing:
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In the early morning hours of March 3, 1993, James Perry mur-
dered Mildred Horn, her eight-year-old quadriplegic son, Trevor, and
Trevor's nurse, Janice Saunders.' 97 Perry committed the murders
pursuant to a contract with Lawrence Horn, Mildred's former hus-
band and Trevor's father, who stood to collect $2 million from a trust
for the benefit of his son, which was payable to Lawrence upon the
deaths of Trevor and Mildred.' 8 Perry was convicted of the murders
and received three death sentences and a life sentence for conspiracy
to commit murder.' 99 Lawrence Horn was convicted and sentenced
to life without the possibility of parole for hiring Perry to commit the
murders. 20
Perry ordered and received both Hit Man and Silencers in January
1992.201 Perry meticulously followed a number of instructions con-
tained in the manuals in planning, executing, and trying to get away
with the murders. 2  Relatives and representatives of the victims filed
After you have arrived home the events that took place take on a dreamlike
quality. You don't dwell on them. You don't worry. You don't have nightmares.
You don't fear ghosts....
By the time you collect the balance of your contract fee, the doubts and fears
of discovery have faded. Those feelings have been replaced by cockiness, a feel-
ing of superiority, a new independence and self-assurance.
[E]verything seems to have changed.
The people around you have suddenly become so aggravatingly ordinary. You
start to view them as an irritating herd of pathetic sheep, doing as they are
told ....
You too have become different. You recognize that you made some mistakes,
but you know what they were, and they will never plague you again. Next time
(and you know there will be a next time), there will be no hesitation, no fear.
Your experience in facing death head-on has taught you about life. You have
the power and ability to stand alone. You no longer need a reason to kill.
The things you have learned about life are important. You may wish to pass
on your observations to someone you care about.... Or you may want to overawe
some new woman in your life with your masculinity and you feel the urge to shock
her just a little by hinting at your true profession.
Start now in learning to control your ego. That means, above all, keeping your
mouth shut! You are a man. Without a doubt, you have proved it.
Id. at 238-39 (alteration in original) (quoting HIT MAN, supra note 190, at 108, 111-13).
197. Id. at 239; Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 208-09, 686 A.2d 274, 276 (1996).
198. Rice, 128 F.3d at 239.
199. Perry, 344 Md. at 208, 686 A.2d at 276.
200. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 838 n.1 (D. Md. 1996) (mem.), rev'd,
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998).
201. Rice, 128 F.3d at 242 n.2.
202. Id. at 239; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 839. For example, Hit Man recommends that a
contract killer use an AR-7 rifle and kill his victims by shooting them through the eyes from
a distance of three to six feet. Rice, 128 F.3d at 240 (citing HIT MAN, supra note 190, at 21,
24). Perry used an AR-7 rifle to shoot Mildred Horn andJanice Saunders through the eyes
from a distance of three feet. Id. (citing Perry, 344 Md. at 211, 215-16, 686 A.2d at 277, 279;
Joint Appendix at 24, Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 686 A.2d 274 (1996) (No. 119)). Hit
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survival and wrongful death actions under Maryland law against Pala-
din Enterprises, Inc., and its president (collectively Paladin), alleging
that Paladin aided and abetted Perry in the commission of the
murders by publishing Hit Man and Silencers.2°3
Paladin moved for summary judgment on the theory that the
First Amendment barred the imposition of civil liability for publishing
books like Hit Man and Silencers . 204 For the purposes of its motion,
Paladin stipulated that Perry followed instructions in Hit Man and Si-
lencers in planning, executing, and attempting to cover up the
murders. 20 5 The publisher also stipulated that it "'intended to attract
and assist criminals and would-be criminals who desire information
and instructions on how to commit crimes,'" and that it "'intended
and had knowledge'" that Hit Man "'would be used, upon receipt, by
criminals and would-be criminals to plan and execute the crime of
Man instructs the reader to establish a base at a motel near the "jobsite," to use a rental car
with stolen out-of-state license tags to reach the victim's location, and to use a false license
tag number when registering at the motel. Id. (citing HIT MAN, supra note 190, at 98, 101-
02). Perry got a room at a nearby Days Inn, gave the motel a false license tag number, and
affixed stolen out-of-state tags to his rental car before driving it to the Horns' residence on
the night of the murders. Id. (citing Perry, 344 Md. at 209, 686 A.2d at 276). Hit Man
informs its readers how to make a disposable silencer, and how to alter the AR-7 rifle
before and after the murders so that it cannot be traced. Id. at 240-41 (citing HIT MAN,
supra note 190, at 23, 25, 39-51). It also recommends breaking down the weapon after the
murders to make it easier to conceal, and disposing of the weapon by scattering the disas-
sembled pieces along the edge of the road as one leaves the crime scene. Id at 241 (citing
HIT MAN, supra note 190, at 105). Perry made and used a silencer, altered the rifle in
accordance with the instructions, broke down the weapon before leaving, and scattered the
pieces along the road as he left the area. Id. at 240-41 (citing Perry, 344 Md. at 215-16, 686
A.2d at 280; Joint Appendix at 24, Perry (No. 119)). These are only some of the instruc-
tions that Perry followed. See id. at 239-41 (listing other examples of instructions from the
book specifically followed by Perry).
203. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838. The district court's memorandum
opinion makes clear that the plaintiffs sought to hold the defendants liable for the publica-
tion of both manuals. Id. ("According to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants aided and abetted
the murders ...by publishing two books which James Perry consulted to commit the
murders.... ."). However, the Fourth Circuit focused primarily on the question of Defend-
ants' liability for publishing Hit Man, and largely ignored Silencers. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241
("[T] he relatives and representatives... allege that Paladin aided and abetted Perry in the
commission of his murders through its publication of Hit Man's killing instructions.").
The plaintiffs also sought damages based on theories of civil conspiracy, strict liability,
and negligence. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838. However, the Fourth Circuit opinion deals
primarily with Defendants' liability for aiding and abetting. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 248 n.4
(noting that the district court did not address the plaintiffs' negligence and strict liability
claims, and so neither would the Fourth Circuit).
204. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838.
205. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241. The court sets forth the full joint stipulation of facts. Id. at
241 n.2. It commented that these "extraordinary stipulations," id. at 242, were made "in
almost taunting defiance," id. at 265.
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murder for hire."' 206 Paladin further stipulated that it assisted Perry
in committing the murders by publishing and selling Hit Man.20 7
Despite Paladin's stipulations, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Paladin, holding that Hit Man did not fall within
the recognized exception to the "general First Amendment principles
of freedom of speech" for speech that incites imminent lawless activ-
ity, or any of the other recognized exceptions.20 8 In its initial opinion,
the district court found that Maryland does not recognize a cause of
action for civil aiding and abetting.2 9 In response to submissions
filed by both parties the very next day explaining that Maryland does
recognize civil aiding and abetting, the court revised its original mem-
orandum opinion by adding a single sentence: "Although Maryland
appears to recognize aider and abetter tort liability, it has never been
applied to support liability in this context. "210
The plaintiffs argued that the publisher should be held liable if
its publication of Hit Man manifested a "knowing or reckless disregard
for human life."'2 1' The district court declined to adopt this standard
on the ground that there was no authority for applying it in this case if
the First Amendment protected the act of publishing Hit Man.212
The court then turned to the question whether the act of publish-
ing and distributing Hit Man fell within the exception to the First
Amendment's general principles of free speech and free press for
speech that incites imminent lawless activity. 213 The court applied the
standard announced by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio,2 14
206. Id. at 241 (quotingJoint Appendix, Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th
Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2412)).
207. Id.
208. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 849 (finding that although Hit Man is "reprehensible and
devoid of any significant redeeming social value," it "does not fall within the parameters of
any of the [First Amendment's] recognized exceptions").
209. Rice, 128 F.3d at 250.
210. Id. at 250-51 (quoting Joint Appendix at 205 n.2, Rice (No. 96-2412)).
211. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844.
212. See id. (explaining that because the speech involved in the instant case was not
aimed at or intended to injure the reputation of a particular individual, the New York Times
v. Sullivan analysis did not apply).
213. Id. The district court noted that five classes of speech receive limited or no First
Amendment protection: (1) obscenity; (2) fighting words; (3) libel; (4) commercial
speech; and (5) words likely to incite imminent lawless action. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 841
(citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (per curiam)).
214. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment protects abstract advocacy of violent acts, but does not protect
speech that is likely to produce imminent lawless activity. Id. at 447.
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and found that Hit Man was protected speech because it "merely
teaches" how to implement a professional hit, but "does not purport
to order or command anyone to any concrete action at any specific
time, much less immediately."215 The court also found that the book
did not have a tendency to incite violence, reasoning that only one
person actually used the information in the book to commit murder
and that the book contained a disclaimer, "[f]or information pur-
poses only!"' 2 16 The family and representatives of the victims then ap-
pealed to the Fourth Circuit on the issue of whether the First
Amendment protected Paladin from civil liability for publishing the
manuals .217
2. Legal Background.--Courts have struggled for decades with
the question of what attributes bring speech that advocates unlawful
action outside of the protection of the First Amendment. The Court's
earlier cases on this issue dealt with the constitutionality of statutes
that criminalized certain written speech that allegedly incited unlaw-
ful action.211 In 1969, the Supreme Court attempted to distinguish
between protected and unprotected advocacy in Brandenburg v.
Ohio.2 19 In subsequent civil and criminal cases, federal appellate
courts have struggled to interpret and apply Brandenburg in a variety of
settings.
2
a. The Supreme Court Considers the Government's Power to
Criminalize Written Speech that Allegedly Incites Unlawful Conduct. -In two
early decisions, the Supreme Court considered whether the First
Amendment protected written speech that allegedly incited unlawful
action. In Fox v. Washington,221 the Court held that a statute that
criminalized the editing of printed matter advocating disrespect for
law was not unconstitutional. The statute at issue read:
215. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847 (citing Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536
N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193 (Ct. App.
1988)).
216. Id. at 848 (alteration in original) (quoting HIT MAN, supra note 190, at vi).
217. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241.
218. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273
(1915).
219. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
220. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (consider-
ing whether publishers of article that explained how to perform a dangerous activity could
be held civilly liable under Brandenburg when a reader attempted the activity and died);
United States v. Kelly, 769 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1985) (considering whether instructing peo-
ple on how to avoid paying taxes by filing false returns was protected under Brandenburg).
221. 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
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Every person who shall wilfully print, publish, edit, issue, or
knowingly circulate, sell, distribute or display any book, pa-
per, document, or written or printed matter, in any form,
advocating, encouraging or inciting, or having a tendency to
encourage or incite the commission of any crime, breach of
the peace, or act of violence, or which shall tend to en-
courage or advocate disrespect for law or for any court or
courts of justice, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.222
Defendant was convicted under this statute for editing an article enti-
tled "The Nude and the Prudes. '223 After citing several excerpts from
the article,224 the Court concluded that "by indirection, but unmistak-
ably, the article encourages and incites a persistence in what we must
assume would be a breach of the state laws against indecent expo-
sure."225 The Court understood the state court "to have read the stat-
ute as confined to encouraging an actual breach of law."'2 26 The
Court rejected the arguments that the law was an unjustifiable restric-
tion of liberty and unconstitutionally vague on the ground that "[i] t
[did] not appear and [was] not likely that the statute [would] be con-
strued to prevent publications merely because they tend[ed] to pro-
duce unfavorable opinions of a particular statute or of law in general."
According to the Court, the statute "lays hold of encouragements that,
apart from statute, if directed to a particular person's conduct, gener-
ally would make him who uttered them guilty of a misdemeanor if not
222. Id. at 275-76.
223. Id. at 276.
224. The Court's discussion of the article follows:
The printed matter in question is an article entitled, "The Nude and the Prudes,"
reciting in its earlier part that "Home is a community of free spirits, who came out
into the woods to escape the polluted atmosphere of priest-ridden, conventional
society;" that "one of the liberties enjoyed by the Homeites was the privilege to
bathe in evening dress, or with merely the clothes nature gave them, just as they
chose;" but that "eventually a few prudes got into the community and proceeded
in the brutal, unneighborly way of the outside world to suppress the people's
freedom," and that they had four persons arrested on the charge of indecent
exposure, followed in two cases, it seems, by sentences to imprisonment. "And
the perpetrators of this vile action wonder why they are being boycotted." It goes
on: "The well-merited indignation of the people has been aroused. Their liberty
has been attacked. The first step in the way of subjecting the community to all the
persecution of the outside has been taken. If this was let go without resistance the
progress of the prudes would be easy." It then predicts and encourages the boy-
cott of those who thus interfere with the freedom of Home, concluding: "The
boycott will be pushed until these invaders will come to see the brutal mistake of
their action and so inform the people."
Id. at 276-77.
225. Id. at 277.
226. Id.
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an accomplice or a principal in the crime encouraged, and deals with
the publication of them to a wider and less selected audience. 227
In Winters v. New York,22 8 the Court considered the constitutional-
ity of a statute that "forb[ade] the massing of stories of bloodshed and
lust in such a way as to incite to crime against the person. "229 A book
dealer was convicted of violating this statute after he was found to pos-
sess a large number of books that contained detailed stories and pho-
tographs of crimes that were supposedly obtained from police records
of actual cases. A New York appellate court described the magazines
as follows:
[T]he magazines are, without doubt, "devoted to the publi-
cation, and principally made up of criminal news, police re-
ports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of
deeds of bloodshed, lust and crime." They contain a collec-
tion of crime stories which portray in vivid fashion tales of
vice, murder and intrigue. The stories are embellished with
pictures of fiendish and gruesome crimes, and are besprin-
kled with lurid photographs of victims and perpetrators.
Featured articles bear such titles as "Bargains in Bodies,"
"Girl Slave to a Love Cult," and "Girls' Reformatory"; these
suggest the pattern of the literature.23 °
The book dealer argued that the statute violated the freedoms of
speech and press because it was vague and indefinite. The Court
agreed that "[s] o massed as to incite to crime" was unconstitutionally
vague, reasoning that "fair use of collections of pictures and stories
would be interdicted because of the utter impossibility of the actor or
the trier to know where this new standard of guilt would draw the line
227. Id. at 277-78.
228. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
229. Id. at 514. The statute provided that:
[a] person . . .who ... [p]rints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, distrib-
utes or shows, or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, give away, dis-
tribute or show, or otherwise offers for sale, loan, gift or distribution, any book,
pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted to the publica-
tion, and principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts of
criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or cime... [i]s
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. at 508 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1141(2) (Consol. 1941)). The New York Court of Ap-
peals interpreted this statute as applicable to publications that "so massed their collection
of pictures and stories of bloodshed and of lust 'as to become vehicles for inciting violent
and depraved crimes against the person.'" Id. at 514 (quoting New York v. Winters, 63
N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1945)). The Supreme Court considered the statute as construed by the
Court of Appeals. Id.
230. New York v. Winters, 48 N.Y.S.2d 230, 231 (App. Div. 1944), affd, 63 N.E.2d 98
(N.Y. 1945), rev'd, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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between the allowable and the forbidden publications. ' 231 This was so
because the statute did not require any intent or purpose, and be-
cause it was conceivable that stories of crimes or war, which were not
obscene or indecent, might become so "massed" as to incite a person
to commit a crime.232 Because the statute was so vague as to criminal-
ize innocent acts, the Court held it unconstitutional.23" However, the
Court did say that its holding that a State could not punish by such a
vague statute did not imply "that it may not punish circulation of ob-
jectionable printed matter, assuming that it is not protected by the
principles of the First Amendment, by the use of apt words to describe
the prohibited publications. '234 The Court also noted in dictum that
"[t]he standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is
higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanction for
enforcement."
23 5
b. The Supreme Court Attempts to Draw a Line in Brandenburg
v. Ohio.-The seminal case with regard to the First Amendment's pro-
tection of advocacy of unlawful action is Brandenburg v. Ohio.23 6 Bran-
denburg, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, had given a speech at a
rally in which he stated: "We're not a revengent organization, but if
our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to sup-
press the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to
be some revengeance taken."2 7 He was convicted under the Ohio
Criminal Syndicalism statute in part for "advocat[ing] . . . the duty,
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or other unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or polit-
ical reform."2 8 Brandenburg challenged his conviction, arguing that
the criminal syndicalism statute violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.2 9 The Supreme
Court agreed, holding that "the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
231. Winters, 333 U.S. at 519.
232. Id. at 519-20.
233. Id. at 520 (citing Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259 (1937)).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 515.
236. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); see also Rice, 128 F.3d at 243 (noting that Bran-
denburg is the seminal case).
237. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446.
238. Id. at 444-45 (alteration in original) (omission in original) (quoting OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2923.13).
239. Id. at 445.
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and is likely to incite or produce such action. "240 The court distin-
guished between "preparing a group for violent action and steeling it
to such action" and "the mere abstract teaching... of the moral pro-
priety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence."241
The Ohio statute was unconstitutional because it failed to draw this
distinction and thus swept "within its condemnation speech which our
Constitution has immunized from governmental control. 242
Four years later in Hess v. Indiana,243 the Supreme Court refined
the standard announced in Brandenburg.44 Gregory Hess was con-
victed for disorderly conduct during an antiwar demonstration on the
campus of Indiana University. 241 In the course of the demonstration,
the sheriff and his deputies began walking up a street to clear student-
demonstrators who had gathered there. 46 Hess was standing off the
street when the sheriff passed him and heard him say "fuck.'' 247 It was
later stipulated that Hess said either "We'll take the fucking street
later," or "We'll take the fucking street again."24s The uncontradicted
testimony of two witnesses established that Hess did not appear to be
exhorting the crowd to go back into the street and that his statement
did not appear to be addressed to any particular group or person.249
The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the conviction based on the trial
court's finding that Hess's statement "'was intended to incite further
lawless action on the part of the crowd in the vicinity of appellant and
was likely to produce such action.'
250
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the First Amendment
protected Hess's speech because, "at worst, it amounted to nothing
more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future
time. '251 The Court emphasized the imminence requirement of Bran-
denburg, reasoning that "since there was no evidence, or rational infer-
ence from the import of the language, that his words were intended to
240. Id. at 447.
241. Id. at 448 (omission in original) (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-
98 (1961)). Although the Fourth Circuit in Rice ultimately decided that the district court
had misread Brandenburg, it explained that it could not fault the lower court because "[t] he
short per curiam opinion in Brandenburgis, by any measure, elliptical." Rice, 128 F.3d at 264.
242. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
243. 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
244. See supra notes 236-241 and accompanying text.
245. Hess, 414 U.S. at 105-06.
246. Id. at 106.
247. Id. at 106-07.
248. Id. at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. Id.





produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those words could
not be punished by the State on the ground that they had 'a tendency
to lead to violence.' 25 2 The Court also noted that, because the un-
controverted evidence showed that Hess's statement was not directed
to anyone, it could not be said that he was advocating any action.253
The Ninth Circuit downplayed the importance of Brandenburgs
imminence requirement in United States v. Barnett,254 a case in which
the publisher of instruction materials about manufacturing illegal
drugs was charged with criminal aiding and abetting.2 5 After the dis-
trict court suppressed the instructional materials, the Government ap-
pealed. 256 The publisher argued that the First Amendment protected
his sale of written instructions for the manufacture of illegal drugs.257
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. 258 The court first rejected the pub-
lisher's contention that the First Amendment provides a defense sim-
ply because the defendant used words to commit a crime.25 9 It
asserted that publishing and selling an instructional manual on manu-
facturing drugs was similar to "[t]he use of a printed message to a
bank teller requesting money coupled with a threat of violence, the
placing of a false representation in a written contract, the forging of a
check, and the false statement to a government official, [all of which]
are all familiar acts which constitute crimes despite the use of speech
as an instrumentality for the commission thereof."26 0 Although the
court did not specifically cite Brandenburg, it did rely on the case of
United States v. Buttorff261 In Buttorff the Eighth Circuit, referring to
Brandenburg, held that the First Amendment did not bar the convic-
tion for aiding and abetting of individuals who gave speeches on how
to file false tax returns because "defendants [went] beyond mere ad-
vocacy of tax reform," even though "the speeches ... [did] not incite
the type of imminent lawless activity referred to in criminal syndical-
ism cases." '2 6 2 The Ninth Circuit stated that "[t]o the extent, however,
that Barnett appears to contend that he is immune from search or
prosecution because he uses the printed word in encouraging and
252. Id. at 109 (quoting Hess, 297 N.E.2d at 415).
253. Id. at 108-09.
254. 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
255. Id. at 842-43.
256. Id. at 837.
257. Id. at 842.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 842.
261. Id. at 842-43 (citing United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978)).
262. Id. at 842.
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counseling others in the commission of a crime, we hold expressly
that the first amendment does not provide a defense as a matter of law
to such conduct. '263 The court also noted that the defendants in But-
torff "had virtually no personal contact with the persons who filed false
income tax returns," and concluded that it was irrelevant that the pub-
lisher in the case subjudice had not met with the person who used the
manual to manufacture drugs.
264
In 1985, the Fourth Circuit applied the Brandenburg distinction in
United States v. Kelley,265 a case in which a defendant challenged, on
First Amendment grounds, his conviction for aiding and abetting in
the preparation of false W4 forms. 266 Kelley was the organizer and
leader of a group called the Constitutional Tax Association, which as-
serted that the federal income tax is unconstitutional as applied to
wages.2 67 In exchange for payment of dues, Kelley instructed mem-
bers of the group how to prevent taxes from being withheld from
wages and how to obtain refunds of previously withheld wages.268 He
gave the members detailed instructions on how to fill out W-4 and
refund claim forms. 269 He further instructed members to report zero
wages on their 1040A income tax return forms, and to destroy their
credit cards and use only cash in order to avoid leaving paper trails
that could be followed by the IRS.2 7° If an employer refused to honor
the claimed exemption without reporting it to the IRS, Kelley told the
members that they should claim twelve dependents. 27 1 Kelley ex-
plained that employers were required to report to the IRS if an em-
ployee claimed fourteen dependents, but probably would not do so if
an employee claimed only twelve.2 72
The Fourth Circuit rejected Kelley's argument that his instruc-
tions were protected by the First Amendment, describing this argu-
ment as "frivolous." 271 Citing Brandenburg, the court held that "[t] he
cloak of the First Amendment envelops critical, but abstract, discus-
sions of existing laws, but lends no protection to speech which urges
263. Id. at 843.
264. Id.
265. 769 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1985).
266. Id. at 217.






273. Id. at 217.
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the listeners to commit violations of current law."27 4 The court noted
that Kelley's speech was not "abstract criticism" of the law or a plea for
his listeners to seek legislative action to change the law;27 5 "[i] nstead,
[his listeners] were urged to file false returns, with every expectation
that the advice would be heeded."2 76 Other circuits have reached the
same conclusion.
2 77
Two years later in Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,2 78 the Fifth Cir-
cuit considered whether a magazine could be held liable for publish-
ing an article describing the technique and pleasure associated with a
sex act that ultimately resulted in the accidental death of a teen-
ager.2 79 As part of a series on unusual sexual practices, Hustler Maga-
zine printed Orgasm of Death, an article about autoerotic asphyxia. 28 0
This practice entails masturbating while "hanging" oneself in order to
momentarily cut off the blood supply to the brain at the moment of
climax. 281 The article detailed how the act is performed and the sex-
ual pleasure associated with it. 28 2 The heading of the article identi-
fied it as part of a series of discussions on "sexual pleasures [that] have
remained hidden for too long behind the doors of fear, ignorance,
inexperience and hypocrisy," presented "to increase [readers'] sexual
knowledge, to lessen [their] inhibitions and-ultimately-to make
[them] much better lover[s]." 28 3 The editor's note preceding the ar-
ticle stated: "Hustler emphasizes the often-fatal dangers of the prac-
tice of 'auto-erotic asphyxia,' and recommends that readers seeking
unique forms of sexual release DO NOT ATTEMPT this method. The
facts are presented here solely for an educational purpose. '28 4 More-
over, the two-page article contained at least ten warnings that the
practice is dangerous and deadly. 28 5
Tragically, a fourteen-year-old adolescent named Troy D. read
the article and attempted the technique.2 8 6 His nude body was discov-
274. Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); United States v.
Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978)).
275. Id.
276. Id
277. See, e.g., United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Moss, 604 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1979); Buttorff 572 F.2d 619.
278. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
279. Id. at 1018-19 (describing the facts giving rise to the issues presented in the case).
280. Id. at 1018.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
284. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
285. Id. at 1018-19.
286. Id. at 1019.
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ered the next morning, hanging by the neck in a closet. 287 A copy of
the magazine, opened to Orgasm of Death, was found near his feet.
288
Troy's mother and the friend who found his body sued Hustler, alleg-
ing that the article incited Troy to perform the act that resulted in his
death.289 Ajury found Hustler liable for $182,000 in actual and exem-
plary damages.2 90
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment entered on
the jury verdict.29' The court held that Orgasm of Death was entitled to
First Amendment protection under Brandenburg.29 2 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the article constituted "incitement" because it provided "un-
necessary detail" about how to accomplish autoerotic asphyxiation.
293
The court rejected this argument, noting that the technique "appar-
ently is not complicated" and that the detail contained in the article
was taken from an article published in the Journal of Child Psychia-
try. 29 4 However, the majority did observe that "it is conceivable that,
in some instances, the amount of detail contained in challenged
speech may be relevant in determining whether incitement exists."295
Finally, the majority questioned whether Brandenburg should ever be
applied to written material, or whether the incitement exception
should be limited to speech made to crowds.2196 Although the court
did not reach the question of whether written material might ever be
found to be incitement unprotected by the First Amendment, it did
note that "[i] ncitement cases usually concern a state effort to punish
the arousal of a crowd to commit a criminal action" and that "[t] he
root of incitement theory appears to have been grounded in concern
over crowd behavior."297
In a separate opinion, Judge Jones "vigorously" dissented from
the majority's conclusion that Orgasm of Death was protected speech. 298
Although she acknowledged that the article does not fit conveniently





291. Id. at 1025.
292. Id. at 1023. The majority reasoned that "no fair reading of [the article] can make







298. Id. at 1030 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
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ples of free speech, she asserted that "no federal court has held that
death is a legitimate price to pay for freedom of speech. '29 9 Judge
Jones argued that "Hustler is not a bona fide competitor in the 'mar-
ketplace of ideas,"' and should be entitled to less First Amendment
protection than the "public advocacy of controversial political ideas"
protected in Brandenburg.3 00
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland briefly addressed the
question whether the First Amendment applies to acts that constitute
criminal aiding and abetting in Handy v. State."° ' In Handy, the de-
fendants challenged their convictions for aiding and abetting viola-
tions of Maryland's bookmaking laws through telephone
conversations with gamblers." °2 The court rejected defendant's argu-
ment that their convictions infringed on the guarantees of free speech
found in the United States Constitution and Article 40 of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights, observing that it was "aware of no author-
ity holding that speech which aids or abets the commission of a crime
is within the protection of the constitutional guarantees. "' 03
By the time the Rice case reached the Fourth Circuit, the courts
had accepted the proposition that the First Amendment does not pre-
vent criminal aiding and abetting, but had only begun to apply this
exception to civil suits over written speech.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, the
Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment did not prevent a pub-
lisher of a book that encouraged and instructed readers on the com-
mission of murder for hire from being held liable for civil aiding and
abetting when a reader followed the instructions and killed three
people.3 °4
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Paladin, and remanded the case for trial.3 0 5 The court
began its opinion by reviewing First Amendment jurisprudence, start-
299. Id. at 1026.
300. Id. at 1029 (explaining that because Hustler borders on obscene and its pornogra-
phy is used for its effect rather than for the transmission of ideas, it should be entitled to
only limited First Amendment protection).
301. 23 Md. App. 239, 326 A.2d 189 (1974).
302. See id. at 240-41, 326 A.2d at 190 (describing the charges upon which appellants
were convicted and presently appeal).
303. Id. at 254, 326 A.2d at 198. Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights pro-
vides, in pertinent part, "that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write
and publish his sentiments on all subjects." MD. CODE ANN., CONST., DECL. OF RTs. art. 40
(1981).
304. Rice, 128 F.3d at 265.
305. Id. at 243.
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ing with Brandenburg, and then discussing the extent of the govern-
ment's power to regulate conduct that contains elements of speech.30 6
The court then observed that several circuits, including the Fourth
Circuit, have held that the First Amendment does not necessarily bar
the imposition of criminal liability for aiding and abetting the com-
mission of a crime, "even when such aiding and abetting takes the
form of the spoken or written word."3" 7
The court then set forth two possible qualifications to this gen-
eral rule, but decided that neither was important for the resolution of
the present issue.30 8 First, the court observed that the First Amend-
ment may impose a heightened intent requirement for liability in or-
der to avoid a chilling effect on protected speech. 0 9 Specifically, the
court suggested that "in order to prevent the punishment or even the
chilling of entirely innocent, lawfully useful speech, the First Amend-
ment may in some contexts stand as a bar to the imposition of liability
on the basis of mere foreseeability or knowledge that the information
one imparts could be misused for an impermissible purpose." 10
However the court also insisted that an intent requirement "would not
relieve from liability those who would, for profit or other motive, in-
tentionally assist and encourage crime and then shamelessly seek ref-
uge in the sanctuary of the First Amendment. ''31' The court observed
that the First Amendment does not protect speech where the speaker
306. See id. at 243-44 (discussing "speech-act doctrine"). The court cited the "speech-act
doctrine" several times to refer to the principle that certain unlawful acts can be punished
without violating the First Amendment even though the act was accomplished through
speech. See id. at 244, 247, 263 n.9.
307. See id. at 244-46 (surveying cases in which the federal circuit courts have held that
the First Amendment is not necessarily a defense to criminal liability for aiding and abet-
ting a crime through publication or instruction). The court cited United States v. Kelley, 769
F.2d 215, 217 (4th Cir. 1985), which held that the First Amendment does not bar prosecu-
tion for criminal aiding and abetting for orally instructing members of a group on how to
avoid paying taxes through filing falsified tax returns. The court also discussed United
States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 843 (9th Cir. 1982), in which the Ninth Circuit held that the
First Amendment does not bar prosecution for aiding and abetting a crime through the
publication and distribution of instructions on how to make illegal drugs.
308. Rice, 128 F.3d at 247.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 248. The court warned that if the First Amendment was construed to protect
people who intentionally assisted criminals,
one could publish, by traditional means or even on the internet, the necessary
plans and instructions for assassinating the President, for poisoning a city's water
supply, for blowing up a skyscraper or public building, or for similar acts of terror
and mass destruction, with the specific, indeed even the admitted, purpose of
assisting such crimes-all with impunity.
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has a specific intent to assist and encourage the commission of a
crime.312 It then concluded that it did not matter whether the First
Amendment required an "intent-based limitation" because the stipula-
tions and the facts of the case at hand were sufficient to show specific
intent and the court was "confident that the First Amendment
pose[d] no bar to the imposition of civil .. .liability for speech acts
which the plaintiff... can establish were undertaken with specific, if
not criminal, intent." 13 Second, the court suggested that Brandenburg
might (and probably would) bar the imposition of civil liability for
abstract advocacy that is not directed to inciting imminent unlawful
action, just as it bars criminal prosecution of such speech.314 The
court concluded that an exhausted analysis of this probable limitation
was not required because the facts permitted a jury to find that Hit
Man was the kind of advocacy that the Brandenburg Court decided was
not protected by the First Amendment.315
The Fourth Circuit next reviewed the district court's rationale in
granting summary judgment. It attributed the lower court's decision
to its initial failure to realize that Maryland recognizes a civil cause of
action for aiding and abetting, and the district court's apparent un-
willingness to revisit its decision after the parties pointed out its
mistake.3 1
6
The Fourth Circuit decided that Maryland's civil and criminal
laws regarding aiding and abetting differed with regard to the intent
requirement. 317 The court cited an opinion by Judge Learned Hand
312. Id.
313. Id. Paladin explained to the district court that when it said it intended that its
publications would be used by criminals to commit murder, it meant only that it "knew"
that the books would be used by some purchasers for that purpose. Id. at 253. The district
court accepted this clarification and found that this intent was not enough for liability.
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 846 (1996) (mem.), rev'd, 128 F.3d 233 (4th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998). The Fourth Circuit disagreed, observing
that Paladin had no power to unilaterally alter the parties'joint stipulation of facts, which
stated that Paladin "provided its assistance to Perry with both the knowledge and the intent
that the book would immediately be used by criminals" to commit the crime of murder for
hire). Rice, 128 F.3d at 248, 253.
314. Rice, 128 F.3d at 248-49.
315. See id. at 249-50 (noting that the speech contained in Hit Man is "a textbook exam-
ple of the type of speech that the Supreme Court has quite purposely left unprotected").
316. Id. at 250-51. Maryland does recognize aider and abettor tort liability. See Alleco,
Inc. v. Harry & Jeanette Weinberg Found., Inc., 340 Md. 176, 199, 665 A.2d 1038, 1049
(1995) (noting that "Maryland has expressly recognized aider and abettor tort liability");
Duke v. Feldman, 245 Md. 454, 457, 226 A.2d 345, 347 (1967), (holding that "[a] person
may be held liable as a principal for assault and battery if he, by any means (words, signs,
or motions) encouraged, incited, aided or abetted the act of the direct perpetrator of the
tort" (citations omitted)).
317. Id. at 251.
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in which the judge determined that civil liability for aiding and abet-
ting requires only that the criminal conduct be the "natural conse-
quence of [one's] original act," while criminal liability for aiding and
abetting required that the defendant have a "purposive attitude" to-
ward the commission of the crime." l ' Citing no Maryland law, the
Rice court "assume [d] that Maryland prescribes a higher intent stan-
dard for the imposition of criminal liability than it does for civil
liability. 3 1
9
The court suggested-but did not decide-that the First Amend-
ment might impose a heightened intent standard for civil aiding and
abetting beyond that required by Maryland law.3 2° The court then
held that Plaintiffs had established a genuine issue of material fact as
to Paladin's intent even under such a heightened standard, with or
without Paladin's stipulation.32 ' It then identified four bases, apart
from Paladin's stipulations, on which, "collectively, if perhaps not in-
dividually," ajury could find the intent required by a heightened First
Amendment standard. 22 First, the jury could find that the declared
purpose of Hit Man is to facilitate murder and thus conclude that the
publisher intended to assist in achieving that purpose. 23 Second, the
jury could find the requisite intent from the "unique text of Hit Man
alone, [which] boldly proselytiz[es] and glamoriz[es] the . . . 'profes-
sion' of murder as it dispassionately instructs on its commission. "324
Third, the jury could infer the requisite intent from Paladin's market-
ing strategy, based on the publisher's description of the book in its
own sales catalogue.3 25 Fourth, the jury could infer intent by finding
that Hit Man's only genuine use is to facilitate murders.326
318. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d
Cir. 1938)).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 252.
321. Id. at 252, 253 ("[E]ven if the stipulation only established knowledge, summary
judgment was yet inappropriate because a trier of fact could still conclude that Paladin
acted with the requisite intent to support civil liability.").
322. Id. at 253.
323. Id. The court found this purpose declared by the book's subtitle, "A Technical
Manual for Independent Contractors," and its description of itself as "an instruction book
on murder." Id. (quoting HIT MAN, supra note 190, at ix).
324. Id. at 253-54.
325. Id. at 254. The description read: "Learn how a pro gets assignments, creates a false
identity, makes a disposable silencer, leaves the scene without a trace, watches his mark
unobserved and more. Feral reveals how to get in, do the job and get out without getting
caught. For academic study only!" Id. (quoting 26 PALADIN PRESS CATALOGUE, No. 2, at 41).
The court decided that "a jury could readily find [the italicized disclaimer] to be transpar-
ent sarcasm designed to intrigue and entice." Id.
326. Id. at 255.
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The court next distinguished Hit Man from the abstract advocacy
typically protected by the First Amendment.3 27 Chapter by chapter,
the court pointed out the specific detail with which the book in-
structed the reader on how to solicit, plan, execute, and cover up a
contract killing.328 The court then cited examples of Hit Man's lan-
guage that "steels its readers to the particular violence it explicates,
instilling in them the resolve necessary to carry out the crimes it de-
tails, explains, and glorifies," and noted that such language, "uncanny
in its directness and power, pervades the entire work. '329 The court
held that "[t] he Supreme Court has never protected as abstract advo-
cacy speech so explicit in its palpable entreaties to violent crime. 3 30
The Fourth Circuit then found that the district court misread
Brandenburg as having distinguished between mere teaching or advo-
cacy of lawlessness and inciting or encouraging lawlessness, and ob-
served that the Supreme Court held that "mere abstract teaching" was
protected, not "mere teaching. '3 1 The court stated: "[I]t is not
teaching simpliciter, but only 'the mere abstract teaching . . . of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity' for resort to lawlessness or its
equivalent, that is protected under the commands of Brandenburg.332
The court noted that Brandenburg had also distinguished between
"mere abstract teaching" and the "prepar[ation] [of] a group for vio-
lent action and steeling it to such action."33 It concluded that the
Supreme Court probably meant to imply that one prepares and steels
others for violent action "only when he does so through speech that is
'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . .
[that is] likely to produce such action,"' and that therefore preparing
and steeling are not per se unprotected by the First Amendment.334
However, the Fourth Circuit then concluded that the Supreme Court
only meant for the First Amendment to protect preparation and steel-
327. See id. at 256 ("[I]t is evident from even a casual examination of the book that the
prose of Hit Man is at the other end of the continuum from the ideation at the core of the
advocacy protected by the First Amendment.").
328. See id. at 256-61.
329. Id. at 261-62.
330. Id. at 263.
331. Id. at 263-64 (emphasis added) ("In the final analysis, it appears the district court
simply failed to fully appreciate the import of the qualification to the kind of 'teaching'
that the Supreme Court held to be protected in Brandenburg.").
332. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98
(1961)).
333. Id. at 264 (alterations in original) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448
(1969)).
334. Id. (alteration in original) (omission in original) (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at
447).
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ing when the speech was advocacy, which the court defined as "speech
that was part and parcel of political and social discourse. '335 The
court observed that "to understand the [Supreme] Court as address-
ing itself to speech other than advocacy would be to ascribe to it an
intent to revolutionize the criminal law... by subjecting prosecutions
to the demands of Brandenburg's 'imminence' and 'likelihood' re-
quirements whenever the predicate conduct takes . . . the form of
speech-an intent that no lower court has discerned and that ... we
would hesitate to impute to the Supreme Court."3 6 One of the con-
fusing features of the court's opinion is that although it indicated that
Hit Man satisfied the "imminence" and "likelihood" requirements of
the Brandenburg exception to the First Amendment, 3 7 it here sug-
gests that Hit Man might not be subject to these requirements if it is
not "advocacy," i.e., if it is not "part and parcel of political and social
discourse. '3 8 The court then concluded that the plaintiffs stated a
cause of action for civil aiding and abetting sufficient to withstand
summary judgment and that this cause of action was not barred by the
First Amendment.133
Finally, the court addressed concerns raised by Paladin and nu-
merous amici340 that exempting Hit Man from First Amendment pro-
tection would have a far-reaching chilling effect on the exercise of
freedom of speech by other media entities.341 The court asserted that
335. Id.
336. Id. at 265.
337. See supra notes 314-315 and accompanying text (discussing court's conclusion that
Hit Man would meet requirements of Brandenburg exception).
338. See text accompanying supra notes 335-336.
339. Rice, 128 F.3d at 265.
340. Amici curiae urging affirmance included ABC, Inc.; America Online, Inc.; the Asso-
ciation of American Publishers; The Baltimore Sun Co.; the E.W. Scripps Co.; the Freedom
to Read Foundation; the Magazine Publishers of America, Inc.; McClatchy Newspapers,
Inc.; Media General, Inc.; Media Professional Insurance; the National Association of
Broadcasters; the Newspaper Association of America; the New York Times; The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press; the Society of Professional Journalists; and the Wash-
ington Post Co. [hereinafter collectively the Media Amic], as well as The Horror Writers
Association; The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression; the
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation; the American Civil Liberties Union of the
National Capitol Area; and the American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado. Id. at 233.
341. Id. at 265. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 22, Rice v.
Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2412) (warning that "[a] deci-
sion that allows this claim to survive-even for a brief time-will have a destabilizing effect
on First Amendment law" and that no form of expression will "be safe from civil liability");
Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance on Behalf of The Horror Writers Ass'n at 9,
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2412) (declaring that
deeming Hit Man unprotected speech "would be to sanction the chilling and silencing of
writers and publishers through tort litigation").
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its holding would not subject news reports, works of fiction, or even
instructional manuals that do not teach activity that is criminal per se
to civil aider and abetter liability.14
2
The Fourth Circuit observed that it had found no case that it re-
garded as factually analogous to Rice, and that a number of features of
that case made it "unique in the law."34 These features were:
Paladin's astonishing stipulations, coupled with the ex-
traordinary comprehensiveness, detail, and clarity of Hit
Man's instructions for criminal activity and murder in partic-
ular, the boldness of its palpable exhortation to murder, the
alarming power and effectiveness of its peculiar form of in-
struction, the notable absence from its text of the kind of
ideas for the protection of which the First Amendment ex-
ists, and the book's evident lack of any even arguably legiti-
mate purpose beyond the promotion and teaching of
murder . .. ."'
The Fourth Circuit attributed importance to the level of detail in
Hit Man. 45 It noted that Brandenburg protected "mere abstract teach-
ing," but not necessarily "mere teaching" as the district court had con-
cluded. 46 After quoting extensively from the book, the court
observed that:
342. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 265-67 (addressing the slippery slope argument presented by
Paladin and the Media amici).
343. Id. at 267.
344. Id.
345. Id.; cf. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1987) (find-
ing that the detail in the material at issue was insufficient to establish incitement, in part
because the article also contained at least ten warnings that autoerotic asphyxiation was
dangerous and often fatal). By contrast, the advertisement for Hit Man and the 130-page
book itself contain only three disclaimers, all of which do little more than state that the
publisher does not intend for the reader to actually use the instructions therein to kill. See
Rice, 128 F.3d at 263 n.10 (describing the disclaimers involving Hit Man as "insufficient in
themselves to alter the objective understanding of the hundreds of thousands of words that
follow"). The Fourth Circuit found that these disclaimers were used to titillate rather than
to dissuade readers. Id. However, as the dissenting judge in Herceg observed, the warnings
in Orgasm of Death could also titillate readers. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1026 (JonesJ, concur-
ring and dissenting) (explaining that the warnings may be seen "as invitations rather than
taboos").
The important difference between the Hit Man disclaimers and the warnings in the
Hustler article was that the latter actually gave readers a reason not to engage in the prac-
tice, i.e., the risk of death, and therefore constituted warnings. In contrast, the disclaimers
in Hit Man offered no reason why the readers should not engage in the activity, and in fact
did little more than supply Paladin with a basis for later arguing to a court that it could not
be held responsible for the crimes of its readers.
346. Rice, 128 F.3d at 263.
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Hit Man's detailed, concrete instructions and adjurations to
murder stand in stark contrast to the vague, rhetorical
threats of politically or socially motivated violence that have
historically been considered part and parcel of the impas-
sioned criticism of laws, policies, and government indispen-
sable in a free society and rightly protected under
Brandenburg.47
The court observed that Hit Man's "powerful prose" stemmed, in
part, from the style of the writing.3 48 Hit Man is written in the second
person;349 for example, "After you have tested your poisons for effec-
tiveness and established your favorites you are ready to go to work., 35 0
Many of the instructions are written in the imperative voice,351 such
as, "Hide, bury, burn, toss-but, in any event, do away with every tool
and article of clothing that was near the scene of the crime."35 ' The
court noted that these formal aspects were used to encourage readers
in their specific acts of murder.353
The court's determination was also influenced by the book's reas-
surance of the would-be murderer, and its glorification of the "profes-
sion. 354 The book reassures the reader that he or she will not feel
guilt after the killing or be plagued by lingering fears of discovery.3 55
It also reassures the reader that "we [as killers] can rest assured that
the law is on our side" and that a "true professional" "won't ever have
to face [various] legal predicaments."3 5 6 The book glorified the "pro-
fession" by tying it to the reader's manhood and by assuring him that
he will feel superior to other people after his first kill. 57 Further-
more, the court found that the book "is so effectively written that its
protagonist seems actually to be present at the planning, commission,
and cover-up of the murders the book inspires."358 The court noted
347. Id. at 262.
348. Id at 252.
349. Id.
350. HIT MAN, supra note 190, at 62 (emphasis added).
351. Rice, 128 F.3d at 252.
352. HIT MAN, supra note 190, at 105.
353. Rice, 128 F.3d at 252; see also supra note 196 and accompanying text (quoting exem-
plary passages from Hit Man).
354. Rice, 128 F.3d at 252.
355. Id. at 261-62 (citing HIT MAN, supra note 190, at 106-08).
356. Id. at 262 (alterations in original) (citing HIT MAN, supra note 190, at 125, 130).
357. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (quoting passages from Hit Man).
358. Rice, 128 F.3d at 252. The court quoted the following excerpt that takes place after
the murderer completes his first killing as illustrative of the "criminal partnership" be-
tween Hit Man and its readers:
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that these features distinguished Hit Man from a book that "merely
detail[s] how to commit murder and murder for hire. 35 9
The court also asserted that a "political, informational, educa-
tional, entertainment, or other wholly legitimate purpose" would be
apparent and demonstrable whenever a crime is described or de-
picted in "copycat" cases.3 6 ° The court recognized that the speech
that gives rise to "copycat" crimes often does so by incidentally glamor-
izing the criminal activity, but the court asserted that, with few if any
exceptions, such speech would not directly and affirmatively promote
the criminal activity in a way that would permit an inference of the
requisite intent.3 6'
The Fourth Circuit's determination that the absence of a legiti-
mate, lawful purpose for a book could support a finding that the pub-
lisher intended it to be used for an unlawful purpose imports a
standard that originated in the law of obscenity. 62 The court cited
Miller v. California,363 in which the Supreme Court distinguished pro-
tected non-obscene speech from unprotected obscene speech in part
on the basis of "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value."3 64 In other words, material
that appeals to the prurient interest would still be protected by the
First Amendment if it had some legitimate value. Similarly, the effect
of the Fourth Circuit's holding is that a book that is likely to produce
or incite imminent lawless activity may still be protected by the First
Amendment if there are other legitimate purposes because these pur-
poses could prevent ajury finding that the publisher had the requisite
heightened intent.
I'm sure your emotions have run full scale over the past few days or weeks.
There was a fleeting moment just before you pulled the trigger when you
wondered if lightning would strike you then and there. And afterwards, a short
burst of panic as you looked quickly around you to make sure that no witnesses
were lurking.
But other than that you felt absolutely nothing. And you are shocked by that
nothingness. You had expected this moment to be a spectacular point in your life
The first few seconds of nothingness give you an almost uncontrollable urge
to laugh out loud. You break into a wide grin. Everything you have been taught
about life and its value was a fallacy.
Id. (quoting HIT MAN, supra note 190, at 107).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 266.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 255.
363. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
364. Rice, 128 F.3d at 255 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
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4. Analysis.-This case pits society's strong interest in safeguard-
ing the guarantees of free speech and free press enshrined in our
Constitution against the State's interest in preventing its citizens from
killing one another, as well as the State's interest in compensating vic-
tims.3 65 In the course of its decision, the court uncovered some of the
difficulties in applying Brandenburg to books like Hit Man.36 6 It also
discussed a possible heightened intent requirement for imposing civil
liability for torts arising out of speech and what this requirement
might be for different kinds of speech.367 Unfortunately, however,
the lasting legacy of the Rice opinion may be its reduction of First
Amendment protection for recorded speech.368
a. Brandenburg has Little Precedential Value for Written Works
Like Hit Man.-The court held that Hit Man fit within the Brandenburg
exception to the general First Amendment principle of free speech
and free press even as it questioned whether Brandenburg should ap-
ply.3 69 The court was right to raise this issue, because Hit Man does
not fit well into the kind of advocacy that Brandenburg protects, or the
exception that it creates.370 Brandenburg and its progeny recognized
that advocacy of violence was protected in the context of efforts to
bring about social and political change so long as the speech did not
365. The district court observed that it had the "novel and awesome" task of
"balanc[ing] society's interest in compensating injured parties against the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment." Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp.
836, 840 (D. Md. 1996) (mem.), rev'd, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1515 (1998). Of course, the imposition of civil liability is also intended to deter the harm.
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25 (5th ed.
1984) (explaining that "one reason for imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of pro-
viding that incentive [of preventing the occurrence of the harm]").
366. See infra notes 369-380 and accompanying text (discussing problems with applying
Brandenburg to works like Hit Man).
367. See infra notes 381-390 and accompanying text (analyzing court's discussion of pos-
sible intent requirements).
368. See infra notes 390-424 and accompanying text (discussing the danger that other
forms of recorded speech will be endangered by Rice).
369. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 246-47, 262-65 (noting prior to its in-depth discussion of Bran-
denburg that the concrete advocation of lawlessness urged in Hit Man has never been pro-
tected by the Supreme Court as abstract advocacy speech); text accompanying supra notes
337-338 (noting that the court had indicated that Hit Man satisfied the imminence and
likelihood requirements of the Brandenburg exception, but then suggested that these re-
quirements might not apply because Hit Man might not be the kind of "advocacy" pro-
tected by Brandenburg).
370. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that "the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action").
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advocate imminent lawful activity or was unlikely to produce such im-
minent unlawful activity. 17 1 However, because speech can only be reg-
ulated under certain exceptions to the First Amendment, 72
Brandenburg should not be read as defining a limited category of advo-
cacy that is protected, but instead as defining a category of advocacy
that is not protected.3 73 Therefore, even if Brandenburg does not rec-
ognize Hit Man as abstract advocacy, the First Amendment may, none-
theless, protect the manual.
Even if Brandenburg applies to speech that does not encourage
societal change, it is uncertain, given its "imminence requirement,"
whether it would apply to written material. Speeches given to crowds
can produce an immediate riot.3 7 4 Written material, by its very na-
ture, cannot produce this kind of immediate reaction because reading
takes time. 75 Although the Supreme Court has not addressed Bran-
denburg's imminence requirement in the context of written speech, at
least one Justice has recognized that "[w]ritten words are less apt to
incite or provoke to mass action than spoken words, speech being the
primitive and direct communication with the emotions."376 The Fifth
Circuit in Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 7 7 opined that it was "inap-
propriate" to apply Brandenburg to incitement caused by written mate-
rial because "[t]he root of incitement theory appears to have been
371. See, e.g., id. at 444-46 (discussing defendant's arrest during a Ku Klux Klan rally for
saying that the Klan might need to take revenge if the government continued to suppress
the white race); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1973) (per curiam) (considering
the propriety of defendant's arrest for saying "We'll take the fucking street later" or "We'll
take the fucking street again" during an antiwar demonstration).
372. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994) (noting that
"the First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not
countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private indi-
viduals" (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992); Texas v.Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989))); supra note 213 (discussing the recognized categories of unpro-
tected speech).
373. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 263-64 (discussing the difficulties in deciphering the meaning
of the Brandenburg opinion).
374. See, e.g., People v. Feiner, 91 N.E.2d 316, 319-20 (N.Y. 1950) (observing that defend-
ant's speech to a crowd on a sidewalk threatened "[a]n imminent danger of a breach of
the peace, of a disturbance of public order, perhaps even of riot"), affd, 340 U.S. 315
(1951).
375. But see Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, How Imminent is Imminent?: The Imminent Danger
Test Applied to Murder Manuals, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 47, 67 (1997) (suggesting that the
one year time period between Perry's acquisition of the book and the murders could satisfy
the "imminence" requirement because although the act of murder does not occur immedi-
ately, the unlawful activity of planning the murder could begin immediately after one be-
gins reading the book).
376. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 307 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
377. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
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grounded in concern over crowd behavior. "378 The Herceg court
quoted John Stuart Mill's On Liberty: "An opinion that corn dealers
are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to
be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may
justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob as-
sembled before the house of a corn dealer."'3 79 Judge Jones, dissent-
ing, agreed, asserting that "advocacy of inciteful ideas would . .. be
differently regarded in a collection of speeches by Tom Paine than it
is among a crowd of armed vigilantes who proceed to riot.'"380
b. Rice Could Foreshadow the Development of Intent-Based Re-
quirements for Imposing Civil Liability on Recorded Speech.-If Paladin's
"astonishing stipulations," which the court found were made "in al-
most taunting defiance," were unusual before, s ' they will be unheard
of after this case. No rational publisher will invite another court to
follow Rice by making similar stipulations. However, these stipulations
were not essential to the court's holding.382 The court held that the
trier of fact could have found the requisite liability based on the con-
tent and tone of the book itself, as well as from Paladin's marketing
strategy.383
The court strongly suggested that knowledge is sufficient intent
for civil liability under Maryland's aiding and abetting law.38 4 In a
378. Id. at 1023.
379. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 67-
68 (Corrin V. Shields ed., Prentice Hall 1956 (1859)).
380. Id. at 1030 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
381. Rice, 128 F.3d at 265, 267.
382. See id. at 253 (finding that the trier of fact could conclude requisite intent without
reference to the intent stipulation); id. at 256 (finding that stipulations are unnecessary to
conclude that Hit Man is not the kind of advocacy protected by the First Amendment).
383. See supra notes 322-326 and accompanying text (discussing several bases upon
which the jury could find the requisite intent to establish Paladin's liability).
384. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 251 (quoting Judge Learned Hand as defining the standard for
civil aiding and abetting as knowledge of the consequences of one's actions). The concept
of intent has been treated in some depth by the criminal law. Radwan, supra note 375, at
68. The Model Penal Code has articulated four levels of intent: purposefully, knowingly,
recklessly, and negligently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). The Code ascribes different
intents to different crimes. Radwan, supra note 375, at 68-69. "Purposeful" is the most
specific level of intent. Id. An act that requires a result, e.g., aiding and abetting a crime, is
done "purposely" when "it is [the actor's] conscious object . . . to cause such a result."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (a) (i). However, if the actor is merely "aware that it is practi-
cally certain that his conduct will cause such a result," then the act is done "knowingly." Id.
§ 2.02(2) (b) (ii).
The Rice court's opinion also suggests that it will look to the publication rather than
the publisher to determine the latter's intent. It would be difficult to argue that Paladin's
corporate goal was to aid and abet the crime of murder. See Radwan, supra note 375, at 69
("[I]t is a stretch to believe Paladin's executives wanted more murders to take place." (cit-
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footnote, the court said that the Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting counts
"require that Paladin have acted knowingly or intentionally." ' 5 How-
ever, the Fourth Circuit suggested that a heightened First Amend-
ment standard might apply when speech is the conduit for the alleged
aiding and abetting. 8 6 The court did not explicitly decide the level of
intent required for liability for civil aiding and abetting with regard to
a how-to book for activity that is criminal per se because it concluded
that, based on Paladin's stipulations and the facts of the case, a jury
could find "that Paladin acted with a kind and degree of intent[ ]
that would satisfy any heightened standard that might be required by
the First Amendment prerequisite to the imposition of liability for aid-
ing and abetting through speech conduct."' 87 However, it distin-
guished books that instruct on activity that is sometimes criminal and
sometimes not, depending on the context, as well as other types of
books, by assuming that liability could not be imposed on a finding of
mere foreseeability or knowledge that the information therein might
be misused. 88 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit has opened the door
for a future and more explicit holding that knowledge that an instruc-
tion manual could be used to commit crimes is sufficient if the book
teaches the techniques of activities that are criminal per se, as does Hit
Man. s9
ing Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 847 (D. Md. 1996) (mem.), rev'd, 128
F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998))). Like most commercial
publishers, Paladin's purpose was almost certainly to generate profits by selling as many
books as possible, not to cause more murders to occur. Id.; see also Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 840
("All parties agree that Paladin's marketing strategy is intended to maximize sales to the
public.... ."). In light of this obvious corporate goal and the Fourth Circuit's holding that
the jury could infer intent in large part from the content of the book itself, it appears that
the court is more concerned with what might be called the "artistic purpose" of the book
than with its obvious "corporate purpose." See supra text accompanying note 383 (discuss-
ing the court's conclusion that the jury could infer the requisite intent from the content of
Hit Man). The court essentially imputed this "artistic purpose" to the corporation, disre-
garding Paladin's profit motive, and concluded that intent should be determined with ref-
erence to the book, not to the corporation itself.
385. Rice, 128 F.3d at 248 n.4.
386. Id. at 247 (noting that "the First Amendment may, at least in certain circumstances,
superimpose upon the speech-act doctrine a heightened intent requirement in order that
preeminent values underlying that constitutional provision not be imperiled" (citations
omitted)).
387. Id. at 248 (footnote omitted).
388. See id. at 265-66.
389. A holding that knowledge is sufficient would find support in United States v. Feather-
ston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1122 (5th Cir. 1972), in which the Fifth Circuit rejected a First Amend-
ment challenge to a statute that made it a crime to teach or demonstrate the making of an
explosive device after construing the statute to require "intent or knowledge that the infor-
mation disseminated would be used in the furtherance of a civil disorder." See also Rice, 128
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c. Rice Endangers Other Forms of Recorded Speech.-Despite the
court's protestations to the contrary,39 ° there is a danger that Rice will
one day be used as precedent to hold publishers of other forms of
literature liable for "copy-cat" crimes. The court's suggestion that
knowledge might be sufficient intent for books that instruct on activity
criminal per se,391 and its holding that this intent can be inferred
from the content of the book itself, are troubling because there is no
clear distinction between such an instructional manual and other
types of books. Various literary genres are similar to Hit Man.392
Whatever wisdom they bring to the fact-finding process, judges and
juries are not professors of literature.393 Hit Man may be relatively
easy to identify as a murder manual, rather than as another form of
literature, but there will be books that could fit into either category.
Permitting juries to decide whether a book is protected literature or
an unprotected murder manual will have a chilling effect on the pub-
lication of certain books.
One genre that could suffer is satire. One of the greatest exam-
ples of literary satire is Jonathan Swift's A Modest Proposal,394 in which
the writer proposes that the poor tenants of Ireland sell their children
to wealthy landlords as food. 95 Swift presents his proposal as a mutu-
ally beneficial solution to the overpopulation and poverty in Ireland:
A child will make two dishes at an entertainment for friends;
and when the family dines alone, the fore or hindquarter will
F.3d at 247 (citing Featherston when discussing the possible imposition of a heightened
intent requirement in certain situations).
390. See supra note 342 and accompanying text (noting the Rice court's assertions that
the holding in the present case will not necessarily have the far-reaching impact feared by
the media amic).
391. See supra notes 384-389 and accompanying text (asserting that the court's opinion
has opened the door for a future holding that a publisher's knowledge that an instruction
manual on criminal per se activity will be used by criminals satisfies any heightened intent
requirement imposed by the First Amendment).
392. See, e.g., infra notes 394-401, 403-405, 406-409 and accompanying text (discussing
satire, murder mysteries and horror fiction, and informational texts for writers,
respectively).
393. See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 427 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("We are
judges, not literary experts or historians or philosophers. We are not competent to render
an independentjudgment as to the worth of this or any other book, except in our capacity
as private citizens.").
394. JONATHAN SwiFr, A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR PREVENTING THE CHILDREN OF POOR PEO-
PLE IN IRELAND FROM BEING A BURDEN TO THEIR PARENTS OR COUNTRY, AND FOR MAKING
THEM BENEFICIAL TO THE PUBLIC (1729), reprinted in 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH
LITERATURE, at 2181 (M.H. Abrams ed., 6th ed. 1993).
395. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 4-5, Rice (No. 96-2412) (dis-
cussing Swift's A Modest Proposal).
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make a reasonable dish, and seasoned with a little pepper or
salt will be very good boiled on the fourth day, especially in
winter.
Those who are more thrifty (as I must confess the times
require) may flay the carcass; the skin of which artificially
dressed will make admirable gloves for ladies, and summer
boots for fine gentlemen.
As to our city of Dublin.... butchers we may be assured
will not be wanting; although I rather recommend buying
the children alive, and dressing them hot from the knife as
we do roasting pigs.3" 6
Nowhere in the pamphlet does Swift ever overtly say that he is not
serious about his proposal." 7 Yet commentators recognize this piece
as a superb example of satirical irony.398 The piece, according to one
commentator, "expresses in Swift's most controlled style his pity for
the oppressed, ignorant, populous, and hungry Catholic peasants of
Ireland and his anger at the rapacious English absentee landlords,
who were bleeding the country white with the silent approbation of
Parliament, ministers, and the crown.
399
This kind of political commentary is central to the purpose of the
First Amendment.400 However, the political purpose of satire is never
obvious if it is done well,40' and may be difficult for the most astute
readers to spot if it is done badly. Permitting judges and juries to
decide whether a work like Hit Man or A Modest Proposal is a subtle
criticism of the status quo or an effort to aid and abet criminal activity
threatens to silence the political criticism expressed through satire.
This threat is made worse by the fact that judges and juries often rep-
396. SwiFT, supra note 394, at 2183 (footnote omitted).
397. See id. at 2181 n.1 (observing that Swift's "rigorous logic deduces ghastly arguments
from a shocking premise so quietly assumed that readers assent before they are aware of
what that assent implies").
398. See, e.g., id, (asserting that "A Modest Proposal is an example of Swift's favorite satiric
devices used with superb effect").
399. Id.
400. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that
"the First Amendment reflects a 'profound national commitment' to the principle that
'debate on public issues should be unlimited, robust, and wide-open,'" and noting that the
Court has "consistently commented on the central importance of protecting speech on
public issues" (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
401. See SwiFr, supra note 394, at 2181 n.1 (describing A Modest Proposal as "rigorous ly]
logic[al]").
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resent the power structures and majoritarian views that are criticized
by good satire.4 °2
The line distinguishing "murder manuals" and other writing will
be even more difficult to draw after writers and publishers of these
manuals inevitably alter them to resemble narratives or instruction
books for writers in an effort to escape liability under the Rice stan-
dard. Such works already exist. One example, cited by the media
amici urging affirmance of the district court holding, is Thomas Har-
ris's bestselling suspense novel, Silence of the Lambs,4"' in which a char-
acter named Jame Gumb kills women and flays them to make a female
body suit out of their skin.40 4 The media amici quote the following
passage:
Watching Catherine, playing the infrared flashlight up
and down her, Mr. Gumb prepares himself for the very real
problems ahead.
The human skin is fiendishly difficult to deal with if
your standards are as high as Mr. Gumb's. There are funda-
mental structural decisions to make, and the first one is
where to put the zipper.
He moves the beam down Catherine's back. Normally
he would put the closure in the back, but then how could he
don it alone? It won't be the sort of thing he can ask some-
one to help him with, exciting as that prospect might be ....
To split the center front would be sacrilege-he puts that
right out of his mind.
Experience has taught him to wait from four days to a
week before harvesting the hide. Sudden weight loss makes
the hide looser and easier to remove. In addition, starvation
takes much of his subjects' strength and makes them more
manageable. More docile. A stuporous resignation comes
over some of them. At the same time, it's necessary to pro-
402. See infra note 413 (citing cases that raise concerns about the danger of majoritarian
influences and a jury's uncontrolled discretion); cf West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts.").
403. THOMAS HARRIS, SILENCE OF THE LAMBS (1988).
404. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 7-8, Rice (No. 96-2412 (dis-
cussing the premise and prose of Silence of the Lambs).
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vide a few rations to prevent despair and destructive tan-
trums that might damage the skin. 40 5
If someone actually wanted to accomplish this depraved task, this
book contains details about how to do it.
A second kind of book that will be difficult to distinguish from
Hit Man is the informational book for writers. Writers who write sto-
ries about crime are informed about the habits and methods of
criminals by books like Modus Operandi: A Writer's Guide to How
Criminals Work,4 0 6 Armed and Dangerous: A Writer's Guide to Weapons, 40 7
and Cause of Death: A Writer's Guide to Death, Murder & Forensic
Medicine.40 ' For instance, the authors of Modus Operandi advise the
readers about tricks employed by burglars:
[L]et's give you an inside tip on what burglars do to give
them more time to escape when you arrive home a little ear-
lier than planned. They place small pieces of broken tooth-
picks in the keyhole after they enter. The reason for this is
your key will not fit into the lock, so you cannot enter your
home. The noise that you make trying to open your door
will alert our burglar that you are home.4"9
This clearly would be very helpful to writers, who are not necessarily
familiar with the modus operandi of criminals. Unfortunately, it would
also be helpful to criminals.
One can imagine a day when the new hole that Rice made in the
fabric of the First Amendment is stretched to permit juries in tort
cases to scrutinize books to determine whether they are murder
manuals disguised as works of fiction or true crime nonfiction.41 ° The
405. Id. at 7-8 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting HAR-
Ris, supra note 403, at 205-06). This description ofJame Gumb's demented work occupies
only a few pages of the novel. However, it illustrates how difficult it could be for triers of
fact to distinguish between a narrative and a thinly disguised instructional manual.
406. MAURO V. CORVASCE &JOSEPH R. PAGLINO, MODUS OPERANDI: A WRITER'S GUIDE TO
How CRIMINALS WORK (1995), cited in Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 24,
Rice, (No. 96-2412).
407. MICHAEL NEWTON, ARMED AND DANGEROUS: A WRITER'S GUIDE TO WEAPONS (1990).
408. KEITH D. WILSON, CAUSE OF DEATH: A WRITER'S GUIDE TO DEATH, MURDER & Fo-
RENSIC MEDICINE (1992), cited in Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 24, Rice
(No. 96-2412).
409. CORVASCE & PAGLINO, supra note 406, at 165, quoted in Brief of Amici Curiae in
Support of Affirrnance at 24, Rice (No. 96-2412).
410. The media amici cite excerpts from works by well-known writers like Jonathan Swift,
Thomas Harris, and even the Bible and the Koran, which they contend would be vulnera-
ble under the Fourth Circuit's Rice decision. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Affirm-
ance at 4-5, 7-8, 8-9 n.10, Rice (No. 96-2412). Of course, these authors are viewed as
belonging to certain genres that have long been protected by the First Amendment, and
their works are today classified as part of those genres. A jury would be unlikely to find
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Fourth Circuit decided that the jury could disregard the Paladin's dis-
claimer, "For academic study only!" '' Unless the holding in Rice is
carefully restricted to cases involving similar stipulations or overruled,
a court may one day broaden the application of Rice and hold that a
jury can disregard the fact that a book identifies itself as an informa-
tional aid for crime fiction writers, or as a narrative.
This situation is worsened by the court's apparent willingness to
allowjuries to draw their own conclusions about the nature of a book
and the intent of its author from the contents of the book itself.
4 1 2
Juries may be unlikely to find a criminal nature or intent in well-
known works. However, in light of the absence of clear distinctions
between murder manuals and other kinds of writing, triers of fact may
quietly opt to impose liability to punish particularly offensive lesser-
known works.4 1 Importantly, it is this kind of fringe expression for
which First Amendment protection is most needed.414
The court's decision raises another troubling question: Should
the reading material available to the law-abiding public be limited by
the propensity of a criminal to use a book to commit a crime? In his
concurring opinion in A Book Named 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a Wo-
man of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts,4"5 Justice Douglas
considered whether the concern that pornography might lead to anti-
social sexual conduct would justify its censorship:
U]udges cannot gear the literary diet of an entire nation to
whatever tepid stuff is incapable of triggering the most de-
mented mind. The First Amendment demands more than a
that Stephen King's latest book was nothing more than a thinly veiled murder manual,
because his reputation for horror fiction is well known. The real danger is to lesser known
authors who write a book that is used in a "copy-cat" crime. Under Rice, courts might leave
to the jury the question whether a book is a "legitimate" work or a thinly disguised murder
manual like Hit Man.
411. Rice, 128 F.3d at 254 (quoting 26 PALADIN PRESS CATALOG, supra note 325, at 41).
412. See supra notes 322-326 and accompanying text (discussing the various bases upon
which the court found a jury could find intent sufficient to hold Paladin civilly liable).
413. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1987) (conclud-
ing that differentiating between different categories of speech "would not only be hope-
lessly complicated but would raise substantial concern that the worthiness of speech might
be judged by majoritarian notions of political and social propriety and morality"); cf Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (limiting certain defamation awards to
actual damages based on the recognition that "[t]he largely uncontrolled discretion of
juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of
any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First
Amendment freedoms").
414. Cf supra notes 402, 413 and accompanying text (noting that the First Amendment
exists to protect freedom of speech from being controlled by majoritarian notions of pro-
priety and morality).
415. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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horrible example or two of the perpetrator of a crime of sex-
ual violence, in whose pocket is found a pornographic book,
before it allows the Nation to be saddled with a regime of
censorship.4"6
Considering whether reasonable foreseeability of harm could support
a negligence action based on speech by the defendant, one commen-
tator argued:
Absurd things happen, but to hold a person responsible for
another person's absurdity is arguably the most absurd posi-
tion of all. It could easily make a mockery of First Amend-
417ment freedom of expression ....
The purveyor of a text written with the sole purpose of aiding and
abetting criminals is arguably more culpable than an entity that can
merely foresee that its speech might help criminals, but as previously
noted, it is difficult to distinguish between the two.4 18
Finally, the court's decision probably will not reduce the number
of people who become professional killers or significantly reduce
their educational options. Killers can learn about killing from mystery
novels and horror fiction,419 informational books for writers,42 ° true
crime stories and news accounts, 421 movies,4 22 and even judicial opin-
ions.423 Instead of committing crimes by following the instructions in
416. Id. at 432 (Douglas, J., concurring).
417. Sandra Davidson, Blood Money: When Media Expose Others to Risk of Bodily Harm, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 225, 237 (1997).
418. See text accompanying supra notes 392-409 (noting the difficulty in distinguishing
between various literary genres).
419. See text accompanying supra notes 403-405.
420. See text accompanying supra notes 406-409 (discussing informational books for
writers).
421. See, e.g., THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Aug. 24, 1967, at 1 (featuring on front
page a diagram showing how to make the homemade bomb known as a molotav cocktail),
cited in Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 26, Rice (No. 96-2412).
422. The Media Amici identified several movies that contain details about how to commit
crimes, including The Mechanic (United Artists) (1972) (depicting a hit man training a
prot6g6 on the planning and execution of contract kills); The Godfather (Paramount 1972)
(showing how to avoid leaving fingerprints and how to leave the scene of a public "hit");
On Deadly Ground (Warner Bros. 1990) (showing how to make a silencer out of household
objects); and The Exterminator (Interstar/AE 1980) (showing how to fill hollowpoint bullets
with poison). Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 26, Rice (No. 96-2412).
423. The Horror Writers Association's amicus brief cites United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d
314, 318-19 (8th Cir. 1978) (describing murders of FBI agents) as one example. Amicus
Brief of Horror Writers Ass'n at 8, Rice (No. 96-2412). An even better example is the
Fourth Circuit's Rice opinion itself, which includes several pages of excerpts from Hit Man.
Rice, 128 F.3d at 235-39, 257-62. For that matter, even this Note contains information that
could be dangerous if misused.
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an instructional manual, criminals can use information gleaned from
the foregoing sources.424
5. Conclusion.-The district court observed that "this is a novel
case with unprecedented future implications. '4 25 The Fourth Circuit
took pains to limit its holding strictly to books that teach activity that is
criminal per se in exacting detail in a way that relentlessly encourages
426 Nvrh h
the reader in the commission of the crime. Nevertheless, the
guidelines that the court provided for the finder of fact fail to distin-
guish clearly between "murder manuals" and books with noncriminal
purposes. Because this distinction is so difficult to make, courts would
better serve the values underlying this nation's commitment to free-
dom of speech by refusing to impose liability for civil aiding and abet-
ting against book publishers. At the very least, courts should respect
the Fourth Circuit's admonition that its holding in Rice should rarely
if ever be used to impose liability on publishers.427
BRIAN SACCENTI
424. In fact, the author of Hit Man realized this and recommended fictional mystery or
murder stories as places to discover "ingenious new methods of terrorizing, victimizing, or
exterminating." HIT MAN, supra note 190, at 10. The author explains:
[L] et's not forget reading for entertainment. With the right attitude and an open
mind, almost any good mystery or murder story can provide some ingenious new
methods of terrorizing, victimizing, or exterminating. Sometimes a new poison
will be introduced, or perhaps a new method for induction. Sometimes the
warped imagination of a fiction writer will point out an obvious but somehow
never before realized method of pacification or body disposal. So don't bypass
those fictional characters. Chuckle through the trench coats and warped person-
alities but test out any new theories you come across.
Id.
425. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 848 (D. Md. 1996) (mem.), rev'd, 128
F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998).
426. See supra notes 340-364 and accompanying text.
427. The Fourth Circuit will likely have the opportunity to revisit its holding. Three
books that instruct on how to make bombs are The Poor Man's James Bond, The Anarchist
Cookbook, and Fighting in the Streets. See United States v. Bullis, No. 96-4354, 1998 WL
171328, at *3 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 220 (1998). These books were
found at the home of a man who was arrested for mailing pipe bombs. Id. Rice may have
been the first case of its kind, but it probably will not be the last.
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II. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Inviting Employers to Retaliate Against Employees Who Assert Their
Rights Under Title VII
In Munday v. Waste Management of North America, Inc.,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an employer's
conduct of "instruct[ing] [other] employees to ignore and spy on"
their coworker after she filed an employment discrimination charge
did not, in itself, constitute actionable retaliation under section
704(a) of Tide VII.2 The court reasoned that because no tangible em-
ployment-related harm directly flowed from the employer's conduct,
it did not satisfy the element of "adverse employment action" required
for retaliation under Title VII. In addition, the Munday court held
that while a constructive discharge constitutes an adverse employment
action, the unpleasant working environment that resulted from the
employer's conduct did not rise to the level of intolerable work condi-
tions4 necessary for a constructive discharge claim under Title VII. 5 In
so ruling, the Fourth Circuit in Munday set limits on the scope of ac-
tionable employer conduct under 704(a) and restricted constructive
discharge claims under Title VII. The Munday decision reflects the
Fourth Circuit's view that section 7 04(a) was not intended to function
as Tide VII's broad retaliation proscription. Moreover, the Munday
ruling thus permits employers to engage in some "retaliation" against
employees who assert their rights under Tide VII, leaving such em-
ployees without recourse.
1. The Case.--On December 7, 1992, Dawn Munday resigned
from her job as a truck driver for Waste Management of Maryland,
Inc. (Waste Management).6 For Munday, this resignation was the cul-
mination of several years of difficulties with her employer, difficulties
which she believed were based on gender discrimination.7 Munday
1. 126 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1053 (1998).
2. Id. at 243.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc.,
770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985)).
5. Id. at 243-44.
6. Id. at 242 (citing Munday v. Waste Management of N. Am., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1364,
1371 (D. Md. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 126 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 1997)).
7. See id. at 244 (noting the district court's finding that "Miss Munday 'wrongly viewed
[the activity of which she complained] as based on sex discrimination and sexual harass-
ment'" (quoting Munday, 858 F. Supp. at 1375)).
1280 [VOL. 58:1221
1999] FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 1281
alleged that for approximately one year after she was hired in 1988,8
she was subjected to numerous instances of sexual harassment9 that
ultimately compelled her to "walk off the job" on May 30, 1989.1"
Waste Management fired Munday on that same day after concluding
that her actions constituted insubordination." Munday subsequently
filed a claim of sexual harassment and sex discrimination with the
Howard County (Maryland) Office of Human Rights, which, upon in-
vestigation, issued a reasonable-cause letter in June 1990.12 In April
1991, after the hearing had commenced, the parties entered into a
settlement agreement, which provided for, among other things,
Munday's reinstatement at Waste Management and a promise on the
part of Waste Management not to retaliate against Munday for filing
her discrimination complaint."
Notwithstanding the settlement agreement, Munday's difficulties
with Waste Management, particularly with the company's general
manager, Robert Bohager, persisted after her reinstatement. 4 Prior
8. This was actually the second time Munday was hired by Waste Management. She
was initially hired in December 1986 to work in the Maryland facility, but was transferred to
the Greater Washington facility in May 1987 where she worked for six months before leav-
ing to work briefly for a competitor of Waste Management. She was subsequently rehired
in August 1988 to work at the Maryland facility. See Munday, 858 F. Supp. at 1367.
9. See id. at 1367-68. Specifically, Munday alleged that the following acts of sexual
harassment occurred:
First .... a dispatcher ... who kept a key to the [only available] women's bath-
room[ ] regularly denied Munday access to the bathroom . .. [and] repeatedly
made comments to her such as, 'How bad do you have to go?', and 'Can't you
hold it in?'. Second, she received less pay than her male co-workers. Third, when
she asked to have extra work assigned to her .... her immediate supervisor[ I
remarked that she had 'one strike against her because she was a woman' and that
she should not be in her job 'taking food out of the mouths of men.' Fourth,
when she was assigned additional work, more often than not, her pay was not
adjusted to compensate her for the added undertaking until she complained of
the same. Fifth, her paperwork, including route and schedule, was constantly
placed in the 'driver's lounge,' which was in actuality the men's changing area
and bathroom. Sixth, drivers and dispatchers made comments and jokes over the
two-way radio installed in every truck, including comments that Munday was 'on
the rag' and 'under sexual pressure.'
Id.
10. Id. at 1368 (noting that Munday decided to "walk off the job" after arriving for work
and discovering that her assigned truck was not in "proper operating condition").
11. Id. (noting that at the time Munday was fired, Waste Management informed her
that as a matter of company policy, "termination was their only recourse for an employee
who walked off the job").
12. Id. at 1368-69.
13. Id. at 1369. The settlement agreement provided that "'there shall be no discrimi-
nation or retaliation of any kind' against any person for engaging in protected activity."
Munday, 126 F.3d at 245 (quoting paragraph 4 of the settlement agreement).
14. See Munday, 858 F. Supp. at 1369-71.
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to Munday's return to work, Bohager allegedly instructed Waste Man-
agement's employees "not to socialize with Munday and to avoid her
as much as possible,"15 and "to report back to Bohager anything she
said to other employees."1 6 In addition, Bohager allegedly refused to
address any of Munday's complaints about the work environment.' 7
On July 26, 1991, the tension between Munday and Bohager appeared
to be at its peak. 8 According to Munday, Bohager "exploded" at her
when they finally met to discuss her complaints.' 9 Following that inci-
dent, due to several periods of disability leave, Munday worked at
Waste Management only "intermittently."2° She began working for
another company in October 1992 and ultimately resigned from
Waste Management in early December.2'
Munday brought suit against Waste Management in the United
States District Court for Maryland, alleging that she was retaliated
against because she filed sex discrimination charges and because of
the resulting settlement agreement, thus violating her rights as pro-
tected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22 Munday con-
tended, specifically, that Waste Management constructively
discharged her as a result of their conduct.2 Munday further sued
Waste Management for breach of contract for retaliating against her
in violation of their settlement agreement.24 The district court held
that Bohager's conduct after Munday's reinstatement satisfied the re-
quirement of "adverse employment action" necessary to establish a
prima facie retaliation claim under Title VII.25 The court specifically
held that this retaliatory conduct rendered Munday's work atmos-
phere objectively intolerable and, thus, constituted a constructive dis-
15. Munday, 126 F.3d at 241 (citing Munday, 858 F. Supp. at 1369).
16. Id. (citing Munday, 858 F. Supp. at 1370).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Bohager shouted at Munday because "he had heard a rumor that she planned
to sue the company again." Munday, 858 F. Supp. at 1370. According to Munday, when
she denied this accusation and attempted to discuss her complaints, Bohager responded
that he "didn't give a shit" about her problems. Id.
20. Munday, 858 F. Supp. at 1370-71.
21. Id. at 1371.
22. Id. at 1374. Munday also brought suit against Waste Management for sex discrimi-
nation and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, claims that the district did not find
actionable. Id. at 1373-74. This note addresses only her retaliation and constructive dis-
charge claims under Title VII.
23. Id. at 1375-76.
24. Id. at 1376.
25. Id. at 1374-76.
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charge.26 Under the provisions of Title VII, Munday was awarded
back pay, compensatory damages for psychological harm, and puni-
tive damages. 27 Finally, the district court held that Waste Manage-
ment breached paragraph four of the settlement agreement, which
provided that it would not retaliate against Munday for filing a charge
of discrimination with the Howard County Office of Human Rights.28
However, because her contractual damages were identical to her dam-
ages under Title VII, Munday's recovery was limited to damages avail-
able under Title VII. 29 Waste Management appealed to the Fourth
26. Id. at 1375-76. The Munday court determined that the essence of the district
court's decision was that Munday's constructive discharge was an adverse employment ac-
tion in violation of section 704(a) of Title VII:
[Although] [t]he district court did not explicitly find any causal link between the
protected activity of Miss Munday and the constructive discharge.... because the
district court relied upon substantially the identical factual bases in determining
that [she] had been constructively discharged as it had relied upon in determin-
ing that [she] had been unlawfully retaliated against, the gist of the district
court's conclusion regarding the Title VII retaliation claim is that [she] was sub-
jected to retaliatory constructive discharge because of her pursuit of a complaint
before the Office of Human Rights.
Munday, 126 F.3d at 243.
27. Munday, 858 F. Supp. at 1377-79.
28. Id. at 1376.
29. Id. at 1381. The district court found that Munday would not be entitled to com-
pensatory or punitive damages for retaliatory conduct predating November 21, 1991,
which is the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Id. at 1376. Prior to the 1991
Act, damages for prevailing Title VII plaintiffs were traditionally limited to "make-whole
equitable relief," including reinstatement and back pay. Douglas E. Ray, Title VII Retaliation
Cases: Creating a New Protected Class, 58 U. Prrr. L. Rtv. 405, 429 (1997) ("[T]he traditional
Title VII remedies [were] make-whole equitable relief, including back pay and attorneys
fees.. ."); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994) (providing for reinstatement and back pay as
possible remedies for prevailing Title VII plaintiffs); Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Fried-
man, Retaliation Claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncer-
tain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 Mo. L. Rav. 115, 150 (1998) (noting that
"[traditionally, damages under Title VII . . . were limited to equitable relief").
Congress found that additional remedies and legislation were needed to deter and
protect against unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace and
added section 1981a in 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994) (Congressional Findings)
(concluding that "additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace... [and] legislation is neces-
sary to provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination in employment").
Section 1981a amended the Act so that prevailing Tide VII plaintiffs may now recover
compensatory damages and up to $300,000 in punitive damages, depending on the size of
the employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3). The 1991 Act provides compensatory damages
for future pecuniary losses; nonpecuniary losses, including "emotional pain, suffering, in-
convenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life," etc.; and punitive damages-sub-
ject to the following limitations as to amount: $50,000 for respondents employing "more
than 14 and fewer than 101 employees"; $100,000 for respondents employing "more than
100 and fewer than 201 employees"; $200,000 for respondents employing "more than 200
and fewer 501 employees"; and $300,000 for respondents employing "more than 500 em-
ployees." Id.
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Circuit and challenged the district court's findings of retaliation and
constructive discharge, breach of settlement agreement, and, further,
whether the district court's damages award was proper.3 °
2. Legal Background.-
a. Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision.--Congress enacted Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) in order to protect
employees from discrimination in employment. 31 Section 703(a) of
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating based on sex, race,
national origin, and religion, and defines discrimination with respect
to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 2
In order to further Title VII's purpose of preventing discrimina-
tion in employment, Congress included section 704(a), which prohib-
its employers from discriminating against employees who exercise
their right to protest against discriminatory workplace practices, file
charges against employers engaging in the discriminatory practices
prohibited by section 703 (a), or otherwise participate in activities pro-
tected by Title VII.33 In essence, section 704(a) is an anti-retaliation
provision that protects employees who attempt to assert their rights,
or aid others asserting their rights, under Title VII.3 4
30. Munday, 126 F.3d at 242-45.
31. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (stating that the purpose
of Title VII is to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past").
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 7 03(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). Section 704(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees .... because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by [Tide VII], or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under [Title VII].
Id.
34. See Essary & Friedman, supra note 29, at 118 (noting that "Congress included [sec-
tion 704(a)] ... in order to enable employees to engage in... activities [protected by Tide
VII] without fear of retaliation by their employers."); Ray, supra note 29, at 409-13 (describ-
ing how Title VII's anti-retaliation provision ensures the effectiveness of Title VII employ-
ment discrimination prohibitions).
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In the Fourth Circuit, as well as most other circuits, to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must satisfy
three elements:35 "(1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her em-
ployer took adverse employment action against her; and (3) a causal
connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse ac-
tion."3 6 Once a plaintiff has satisfied the three elements, the em-
ployer may rebut the prima facie case by "producing a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the [second element of] adverse em-
ployment action."37
Under Title VII, a retaliation plaintiff establishes the first element
of a prima facie case, which requires a protected activity, if she alleges
either that she participated in a protected activity or opposed an em-
ployment practice made unlawful by Title VII. 3s The third element,
which requires a causal connection between the retaliatory conduct
and the protected activity, is satisfied in the Fourth Circuit if the plain-
tiff alleges, or it can be inferred, that the retaliatory conduct was moti-
vated by the protected activity.39 Once an employer rebuts the prima
facie case, however, by presenting a legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the conduct, the employee must show that the retaliation
35. See Essary & Friedman, supra note 29, at 120 & n.12 (stating that the three-element
approach to retaliation is modified slightly in some circuits that include an additional ele-
ment "requiring ... an employer [to] have knowledge of the employee's protected activ-
ity[,] ... [while] [t]hose courts using only three elements subsume the fourth element of
knowledge into the third element of causation."); see also Harrison v. Metropolitan Gov't,
80 F.3d 1107, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996) (employing the four-element approach to retaliation);
Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1985) (utilizing
the three-element retaliation standard and noting that employer's knowledge of em-
ployee's protected activity "is not really a distinct element .... but is necessarily subsumed
in the requirement of a causal connection"); Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796
(9th Cir. 1982) (utilizing the three-element retaliation standard that addresses employer's
knowledge of employee's protected activity in the causation element).
36. Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir. 1994); see Gunnell v. Utah Valley State
College, 153 F.3d 1253, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1998) (articulating the three-element standard
for establishing a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327,
1333-34 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (same); Cohen, 686 F.2d at 796 (same); but see supra note 35 (describing a four-
element approach to retaliation under Title VII employed by some courts).
37. Ross, 759 F.2d at 365; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972)
(establishing the burden-shifting scheme applied in Title VII retaliation cases). One
scholar notes that the "overwhelming majority of courts rely on McDonnell Douglas in ana-
lyzing retaliation claims." Essary & Friedman, supra note 29, at 120.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994); see supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also
Essary & Friedman, supra note 29, at 121-32 (providing a detailed overview of the broad
range of scenarios in which courts find a protected activity).
39. See, e.g., Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989) (establish-
ing causality merely by showing that alleged retaliatory action followed protected activity).
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would not have occurred "but for" the protected activity.4" By and
large, the element of retaliation that generates the widest debate
among the courts, is what constitutes an "adverse employment
action.""
b. Adverse Employment Action: The Fourth Circuit View of Action-
able Retaliation.-Among the circuits, courts hold three views of ad-
verse employment action.4 2 Courts that take the narrowest view
attempt to articulate a predictable, bright-line rule requiring "ultimate
employment decisions, such as hiring and firing."43 Other courts have
taken a still narrow, but less stringent approach and hold that actiona-
ble employer conduct must impair the employee's current or future
employment opportunities. 4" Both of these views, however, require a
showing that the plaintiff experienced tangible employment-related
40. Ross, 759 F.2d at 365-66 (determining that the test for causation in the Fourth Cir-
cuit is the "but for" standard).
41. Essary & Friedman, supra note 29, at 117, 132-42 (asserting that "there is a clear
split [about adverse employment action] in the nation's circuits" and providing an over-
view of the various approaches taken by the courts).
42. See Essary & Friedman, supra note 29, at 133-34.
43. Id. at 134-37 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707-08 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 336 (1997) (holding that
threatening an employee with termination after she filed a sexual harassment claim and
failing to furnish her with necessary work tools did not constitute adverse employment
action); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing in a sexual harassment retaliation claim that unpleasant comments in the workplace
did not constitute adverse employment action when employee's evaluations remained con-
sistent after he complained of discriminatory sexual harassment and he was not dis-
charged); Hooper v. Maryland Dep't of Human Resources, No. 94-1067, 1995 WL 8043, at
*3 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 1995) (per curiam) (providing that an adverse employment action
occurs when an employee is "fired, demoted, passed up for promotion, or not hired").
The Fifth Circuit and numerous district courts that follow this narrow approach have
explicitly relied on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981), in determining what constitutes adverse em-
ployment action. Essary & Friedman, supra note 29, at 135-36 (citing Mattern, 104 F.3d 702.
In Page, a black postal worker alleged that he was denied a promotion because of his race
as a result of his employer's conduct of composing an all-white review committee to make
promotion recommendations. Page, 645 F.2d at 228-29. The Page court refused to uphold
the claim, defining actionable discrimination as "ultimate employment decisions" having
an "immediate effect upon employment conditions" such as "hiring, granting leave, dis-
charging, promoting, and compensating." Id. at 233. As scholars point out, reliance by
other courts on Page for this narrow view of what constitutes adverse employment action in
Title VII retaliation claims is misplaced because Page did not involve the anti-retaliation
clause. Essary & Friedman, supra note 29, at 136.
44. Essary & Friedman, supra note 29, at 137-38; see, e.g., Nelson v. Upsala College, 51
F.3d 383, 389 (3d Cir. 1995) (indicating that post-employment conduct such as refusal to
provide a job reference, providing a negative job reference, or discontinuing severance
benefits could constitute adverse employment action in Title VII retaliation claims).
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harm.4 5 In contrast, a flexible approach is taken by some courts that
analyze adverse employment action on a case-by-case basis.4 6 These
latter courts are willing to hold actionable a broad range of employer
conduct that adversely affects the employee, including "a campaign of
co-worker harassment.
4 7
The Fourth Circuit generally takes a narrow approach to deter-
mining what constitutes adverse employment action under Title VII.
Initially, however, the court refrained from articulating a clear stan-
dard for illegal employer conduct under Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision. Thus, in 1984, the term "adverse employment action" did
not explicitly appear in the Fourth Circuit's decision in Holsey v. Ar-
mour & Co.,4 in which the court affirmed a district court's finding of
a pattern and practice of racial discrimination and retaliation.4 9 The
Holsey court found that retaliation occurred when two senior employ-
ees, who had previously filed racial discrimination charges with the
EEOC, were prevented from exercising their seniority privilege to
"bump" junior employees in another department in order to avoid
layoffs in their own department. 50 The court held that the employer's
manipulation of its "bumping" system, which resulted in the denial of
a company privilege to an employee, constituted retaliation. 51 The
court did not attempt to characterize retaliation as other than dispa-
rate treatment in response to a protected activity, reaching its decision
by reasoning that the same employer conduct amounting to unlawful
racial discrimination also constituted retaliation because the conduct
occurred subsequent to the employee's attempt to exercise his or her
45. See generally Essary & Friedman, supra note 29, at 134-38.
46. Id. at 139-40; see, e.g., Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253, 1264
(10th Cir. 1998) ("[T]his court takes a case-by-case approach to determining whether a
given employment action is adverse.").
47. Essary & Friedman, supra note 29, at 139-40 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.2d 1327, 1335 (7th Cir. 1996)). The Seventh Circuit falls
into this third category, and has noted that "adverse actions can come in many shapes and
sizes." Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334 (holding that instances of "fellow worker harassment and
vicious gossip" following employee's complaint of sexual harassment was sufficient evi-
dence to support ajury verdict for retaliation under Title VII when employer knew of and
tolerated such conduct); see Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264 (holding that coworker hostility
could constitute adverse employment action and explicitly distinguishing its approach
from that expounded by the Fourth Circuit in Munday and other courts); Passer v. Ameri-
can Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that cancellation of a
public symposium in employee's honor constituted adverse employment action).
48. 743 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1984).
49. Id. at 206-08.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 207.
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rights by complaining about discriminatory practices or filing charges
with the EEOC.
5 2
The Holsey approach to retaliation under Title VII neither defines
actionable employer conduct as adverse employment action nor con-
fines it to specifically defined employer actionsY.5  In contrast, in Ev-
ans v. Davie Truckers, Inc.,54 decided just one year after Holsey, a black
truck driver questioned his employer about the fairness of its scheme
of compensating black employees. 5  The employer subsequently
called the employee at his home and, stating "if we need you, we'll call
you, ' ' 56 put the senior employee "on standby on the eve of a busy day"
while permitting junior employees to work.57 In a split panel decision,
the majority affirmed the district court's conclusion that the em-
ployer's conduct did not constitute "adverse employment action" be-
cause the employee had, subsequent to the employer's conduct,
signed a separation notice indicating that he voluntarily quit.5 ' The
Evans court adopted the district court's reasoning that the evidence of
the employee's voluntary resignation precluded him from showing
that he "suffered adverse employment action [-i.e., termination-]
at the hand of the defendants. 59
In his dissent, Judge Butzner described the district court's narrow
approach to adverse employment action, which was adopted by the
Fourth Circuit majority, as a "flaw in the . . .court's reasoning."6
Judge Butzner particularly criticized the majority's inability to per-
ceive the employer's conduct as adverse employment action when,
prior to the separation notice, Evans was placed on standby while 'jun-
ior employees . . . [were assigned] work that would otherwise have
been assigned to him."6 By adopting the district court's reasoning,
the majority in Evans effectively avoided answering an important ques-
tion: "[W]hat caused the company to place Evans .. .on standby on
the eve of a busy day?"62
The Evans court's view of adverse employment action reflects a
departure from the approach to retaliation in earlier cases such as
52. See id. at 207, 215.
53. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing courts that define adverse
employment action as specific employment-related decisions or detriments).
54. 769 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1985).
55. Id. at 1013.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1015 (Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Evans, 769 F.2d at 1014.
59. Id. at 1014 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 1015-16 (Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id. at 1015.
62. Id. at 1016.
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Holsey by issuing a standard that focuses largely on the effect of the
employer's conduct, rather than the employer's intent to treat an em-
ployee harshly because she participated in a protected activity. This
view requires the court to center on an ultimate employment conse-
quence, such as termination, and then determine if it was the immedi-
ate result of the employer's conduct. Thus stated, the Evans
interpretation of adverse employment action paved the way for the
Fourth Circuit's current view of this element, a view that limits adverse
employment action to substantial and tangible employment-related
harm that directly flows from the employer's conduct.
Despite Judge Butzner's dissent in Evans, in which he argued that
the relevant inquiry should be the employer's intent-that is, whether
the employee was treated differently than her coworkers, and, if so,
why? 63-as well as a trend calling for a more expansive view of adverse
employment action in other courts,' the Fourth Circuit has contin-
ued its narrow view of adverse employment action, confining actiona-
ble retaliation claims to employer conduct that has an immediate,
substantial and tangible effect on employment conditions.65
c. Intolerable Conditions: Constructive Discharge as Adverse Em-
ployment Action.-Simply put, the Fourth Circuit has narrow limits re-
garding what may constitute adverse employment action in Title VII
retaliation claims.66 It has, nonetheless, recognized that a construc-
tive discharge may constitute an adverse employment action because
it is an ultimate employment consequence.67 The Fourth Circuit's
standard for actionable employer conduct in constructive discharge
63. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (quoting from Judge Butzner's response
to the Fourth Circuit majority's decision in Evans).
64. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing the broader approach to
adverse employment action in Title VII retaliation claims).
65. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding in sexual harassment retaliation claim that unpleasant comments in the work-
place did not constitute adverse employment action when employee's evaluations re-
mained consistent after he complained of discriminatory sexual harassment and he was not
discharged); Hooper v. Maryland Dep't of Human Resources, No. 94-1067, 1995 WL 8043,
at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 1995) (per curiam) (providing that an adverse employment action
occurs when an employee is "fired, demoted, passed up for promotion, or not hired");
Boarman v. Sullivan, 769 F. Supp. 904, 911 (D. Md. 1991) (noting that the Fourth Circuit
has consistently concluded that an adverse employment decision requires a finding of "af-
firmative harm" to the plaintiffs employment position, which did not occur when plaintiff
received a promotion that was less favorable than she desired).
66. See supra notes 48-65 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the Fourth
Circuit's narrow approach to adverse employment action).
67. Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 1984) ("A constructive dis-
charge violates [Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions] when the record discloses that it was
in retaliation for the employee's exercise of rights protected by the Act.").
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claims under Title VII, however, is stricter than its view of adverse em-
ployment action in retaliation claims.6 8 As a consequence, it is un-
likely that employees who resign will prevail in retaliation claims,
particularly when the alleged adverse employment action is a con-
structive discharge.
The standard for constructive discharge in Title VII cases was
largely adopted from earlier labor cases in the Fourth Circuit. In Hol-
sey v. Armour & Co.,6 9 an employee claimed that constructive discharge
had occurred in the context of a retaliation claim.7 ° The Fourth Cir-
cuit articulated a two-part standard for constructive discharge: there
must be (1) a deliberate intent on the part of the employer to (2)
render the employee's working conditions so intolerable that he or
she would be compelled to quit.7 1 Applying this standard, the Holsey
court held that intolerable conditions existed for a Title VII plaintiff
because his employer denied him a promotion on numerous occa-
sions and only promoted him to a supervisory position after he had
filed an EEOC charge.72 The employer then denied the plaintiff
equal status by constantly adjusting shifts to accommodate white su-
pervisors, granting leave to his subordinates without advising him,
continually ignoring his complaints about his unequal treatment, and
rejecting his requests for transfer.7" The Holsey court looked at the
entire scope of the employer's conduct and determined that this em-
ployee was not "only denied equal status with white supervisors," but
was also "systematically harassed."7 4 Furthermore, the Holsey court
noted that the employer's lack of attention to the plaintiffs com-
plaints about his unequal treatment sufficed as evidence of the em-
ployer's intent to create intolerable working conditions.7 5
Lower court decisions involving constructive discharge in Title
VII claims held that the employment conditions necessary to satisfy
the element of intolerable conditions must be particularly severe-
68. See infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution in the Fourth
Circuit of the strict standard that must be satisfied to establish a constructive discharge
claim under Title VII).
69. 743 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1984).
70. Id. at 209.




75. Id. Significantly, the Holsey court noted that direct evidence of an employer's delib-
erate intent is not necessary. Id. Rather, "[c]ircumstantial proof suffices" to establish this
element of a constructive discharge claim. Id. (citing United States Postal Servs. v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983)).
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disparate treatment alone did not suffice.7 6 Thus, in Sparrow v. Pied-
mont Health Systems Agency, Inc.,77 a plaintiffs claim of constructive dis-
charge failed when she resigned due to her perception that she had
"suffered a gross professional insult" after she failed to receive a pro-
motion that was granted to an equally qualified male coworker.78 The
Sparrow court reasoned that "Title VII does not ... provide a remedy
for such disappointed expectations., 79  Moreover, the court con-
cluded that the employer's attempt to persuade the plaintiff not to
resign belied her claim that the employer's conduct was deliberately
intended to force a resignation.
80
The next year, in Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc.,81 the Fourth Circuit
heard an appeal from a finding by a district court that an employee
was constructively discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.82 The plaintiff in Bristow claimed that his employer
denied him promotions and assigned him to a work region with
"unique problems" in an effort to force him to resign because of his
age.83 The Bristow court articulated an objective standard for deter-
mining if the element of intolerable conditions is satisfied: "whether a
'reasonable person' in the employee's position would have felt com-
pelled to resign."84 Finding that the promotions were not denied be-
cause of age and that the assigned region did not involve problems
different from other regions, the court held that the employee had
not experienced intolerable conditions and, thus, was not construc-
tively discharged. The Bristow court emphasized that "[a] n employee
may not be unreasonably sensitive to his working environment" 5 and
that "the law does not permit an employee's subjective perceptions to
govern a claim of constructive discharge.""6 Furthermore, the Bristow
court stated that, although "[a] n employee is protected from a calcu-
lated effort to pressure him into resignation through the imposition
of unreasonably harsh conditions, in excess of those faced by his co-
76. See, e.g., Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that unequal pay, although relevant, does not alone form the basis for a finding of
constructive discharge).
77. 593 F. Supp. 1107 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (mem.).
78. Id. at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id. at 1117-18.
80. Id. at 1118.
81. 770 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1985).
82. Id. at 1252.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1255 (citations omitted).
85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646
F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981)).
86. Id.
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workers[,] [h]e is not.., guaranteed a working environment free of
stress."
'8 7
In reversing the trial court's finding of constructive discharge, the
Bristow court emphasized that the problems the plaintiff experienced
were no more severe than those of other employees in his position.88
Moreover, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs desire to
be reinstated contradicted his claim that conditions were so intolera-
ble that he felt compelled to resign.8 9 Therefore, the Bristow court
held that the plaintiffs situation encompassed no more than "univer-
sal workday frustrations" and a reasonable person in his position
would not have been forced to resign.9"
The Fourth Circuit has continued to apply the Bristow two-pro-
nged standard in Title VII constructive discharge claims, requiring ob-
jectively intolerable conditions that are particularly severe as well as a
deliberate intent on the part of the employer to force the employee to
resign. 9t
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Munday v. Waste Management of
North America, Inc., the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's find-
ings of retaliation, specifically concluding that Munday had not been
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1255-56.
89. Id. at 1256.
90. Id. at 1255-56.
91. See, e.g., Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1132 (4th Cir. 1995)
(finding that intolerable conditions sufficient to constitute constructive discharge could
exist when an employee was persistently ridiculed publicly and subjected to epithets about
his national origin by his supervisor and coworkers to the extent that the stress he exper-
ienced caused him to get an ulcer and eventually resign). Not all courts currently follow
the Fourth Circuit's two-part approach to constructive discharge in Title VII discrimination
claims. One scholar states that the Fourth Circuit view is the minority view, with the major-
ity view omitting the requirement for intent and instead focusing almost wholly on whether
"a reasonable person would have found the discriminatory conditions to be intolerable."
Comment, Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and the ADEA, 53 U. CuI. L. REv. 561, 562
(1986). However, even among courts that decline to follow the Fourth Circuit's view, there
is some variation. Some courts hold that employers are liable for the reasonably foresee-
able consequences of their conduct, because they were likely to have intended them. Id. at
564. Still other courts have held that evidence of the employer's specific intent and fore-
seeability of consequences are significant factors rather than a required element. See id. at
564-65. All courts, however, require objectively intolerable conditions, and the general
rule is that intolerable conditions require employer conduct more severe than an arrant
instance of disparate treatment. See id at 565. Furthermore, courts that require intent
normally do not demand direct evidence of specific intent, but rather permit indirect evi-
dence to satisfy the intent requirement. Id. at 568; see, e.g., supra note 75 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Fourth Circuit's reasoning regarding a finding of employer intent
in Holsey).
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constructively discharged.9 2 The Munday court affirmed, however, the
lower court's conclusion that Waste Management breached its settle-
ment agreement with Munday.
93
a. Adverse Employment Action.--The Fourth Circuit reviewed
Munday's retaliation claim and found that, as a matter of law, her em-
ployer's conduct did not constitute an adverse employment action.94
The Munday court first noted the district court's finding that Robert
Bohager, Waste Management's general manager, by virtue of his con-
duct of yelling at Munday during a meeting, instructing her coworkers
to ignore and spy on her, and ignoring her complaints, engaged in a
"pattern of retaliation."9 The Munday court further conceded the
lower court's finding that Bohager knew of Munday's employment-
related complaints and that his "fail [ure] to act appropriately" was de-
liberate in that he expected that his conduct would eventually cause
Munday to resign from her job.96
On the basis of these undisputed facts, the Fourth Circuit held, in
a split panel decision, that Waste Management's conduct did "not rise
to the level of an adverse employment action for Title VII purposes. 97
The Munday court limited the district court's findings regarding
Bohager's actions and refused to hold that his "pattern" of conduct
constituted illegal retaliation.98 Judge Widener, writing for the major-
ity, concluded that no case in the Fourth Circuit ever found "an ad-
verse employment action to encompass a situation where the
employer has [yelled at and] instructed employees to ignore and spy
on an employee who engaged in protected activity, without evidence
that the terms, conditions, or benefits of her employment were ad-
versely affected."99 The court conceded that Bohager ignored
Munday's complaints but, emphasizing that her employment-related
complaints were investigated and corrected where appropriate, the
court reasoned that this aspect of Bohager's conduct was not signifi-
92. See supra note 26 (discussing the Munday court's determination that the essence of
the district court's decision was that Munday's constructive discharge was an adverse em-
ployment action in violation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision).
93. Munday, 126 F.3d at 243-45.
94. Id. at 243.




99. Id. (citing Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir. 1996);
DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 804 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1995); Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770




cant to the court's conclusion regarding adverse employment
action. 100
b. Constructive Discharge as Adverse Employment Action.-Judge
Widener supported his interpretation of adverse employment action
by citing to three cases in which employees claimed, unsuccessfully,
that their employers' conduct constituted adverse employment ac-
tion.'0 1 Though not all of these cases involved Title VII retaliation
claims, the unifying element among them is that each employee ulti-
mately chose to terminate their employment and then later alleged
adverse employment action."0 2 Thus, the Munday court next turned
to review separately the precise issue raised by Waste Management:
whether the facts as stated by the district court supported its conclu-
sion that intolerable working conditions were present as a matter of
law. 103
To determine whether Munday's working conditions were intol-
erable, the Fourth Circuit applied "the objective standard of whether
a 'reasonable person' in [Munday's] position would have felt com-
pelled to resign. '  The court began its analysis by emphasizing that
an employer's conduct must be particularly severe to satisfy a claim of
constructive discharge.10 5 The court cited Bristow for the proposition
that although "' [a]n employee is protected from a calculated effort to
pressure him into resignation through the imposition of unreasonably
harsh conditions, in excess of those faced by his coworkers[,] [h]e is
100. Munday, 126 F.3d at 243.
101. See id.; see also supra note 99 (listing the cases cited by the Munday court in support
of its interpretation of adverse employment action).
102. See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 754 (holding in Title VII retaliation claim that adverse em-
ployment action had not been taken against an employee whose job was eliminated upon
the company's reduction in force and restructuring and who was also subject to innocuous
comments and inconsequential reprimands; the employee was offered a transfer but chose,
instead, to terminate his employment); Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1254 (holding in an ADEA
claim alleging constructive discharge that employer's conduct of assigning plaintiff to a
difficult work region did not amount to adverse employment action when the work re-
gion's difficulties were no different than in other work regions and the employee ulti-
mately chose to terminate his employment); Evans, 769 F.2d at 1014 (holding in a Title VII
claim of retaliation based on an alleged constructive discharge that employer's conduct of
putting a senior employee on standby while allowing junior employees to continue work-
ing did not constitute adverse employment action when the employee eventually signed a
voluntary separation agreement).
103. Munday, 126 F.3d at 243.
104. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255).
105. Id. (citing Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255).
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not, however, guaranteed a working environment free of stress."'106
Conceding the district court's findings that Munday "had to cope with
being ignored both by her co-workers and by the top supervisor[,]" 10 7
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that such conduct alone was not suffi-
cient to establish adverse employment action and, therefore, could
not be sufficient to establish that her conditions were intolerable.
The court emphasized that Munday's complaints had been addressed,
her employment status was not altered, and she did not receive any
reprimands or poor evaluations.1 08  Moreover, the court noted,
Munday "never complained [to Waste Management] about being ig-
nored," she did not provide any evidence that she had actually been
spied upon, and she did not resign until seventeen months after the
conduct occurred that formed the basis of her complaint.10 9 Thus,
the Munday court held that "notwithstanding either [her manager's]
intent to persuade her to resign or the fact that he successfully made
her working environment unpleasant," Munday's situation lacked the
degree of severity necessary to constitute intolerable working
conditions."10
c. Breach of Contact: The Settlement Agreement's Anti-Retaliation
Provision.-After reversing the district court's decision regarding retal-
iation, the Munday court upheld the lower court's ruling against
Waste Management for breach of contract."1 The court noted that
the settlement agreement between Waste Management and Munday
explicitly prohibited "retaliation of any kind.""' 2 The court reasoned
that the formulation "retaliation of any kind," while related to section
704(a) of Title VII, is not identical to the statutory prohibition against
discrimination against those who engage in protected activities and,
thus, requires a lesser standard of proof than adverse employment ac-
tion under Title VII. 3 Therefore, based on the undisputed findings
of fact, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court was correct
in concluding that Waste Management had breached the settlement
106. Id. (quoting Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255); see also supra notes 81-90 and accompanying
text (discussing the Bristow court's conclusion that employees cannot be unreasonably sen-
sitive about their working conditions).
107. Munday, 126 F.3d at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Munday, 858




111. Id. at 245.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 245 & n.6.
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agreement by "intentionally making [Munday's] working conditions
unpleasant" because of her protected activity.114
d. The Dissenting Opinion: Objecting to the Fourth Circuit View of
Constructive Discharge.-In his dissent, Judge Heaney disagreed with
the majority's conclusion that Munday's employment situation did not
constitute intolerable conditions necessary to support her claim of
constructive discharge and would have affirmed the district court's
finding of retaliation under Tide VII." 5 Following Fourth Circuit pre-
cedent, Judge Heaney characterized Waste Management's conduct of
ignoring Munday and directing her coworkers to follow suit with the
intent of forcing her to resign, as "unreasonably harsh conditions, in
excess of those faced by her co-workers," and, thus, sufficient to meet
the standard for constructive discharge under Bristow.' 6 Judge He-
aney opined that Waste Management's conduct alienated Munday to
the point that she could no longer perform herjob, stating: "I cannot
imagine anything worse for an employee than to work in an environ-
ment in which co-workers refuse to speak or associate with her any
more than is absolutely essential to carry out their respective jobs." '117
Moreover, Judge Heaney disagreed with the majority's view that
Munday's delay in resigning contradicted her claim of intolerable
working conditions because the environment of alienation persisted
throughout her tenure at Waste Management after her reinstate-
ment."1 8 He then noted that in the decision to uphold Munday's
breach of contract claim, the majority specifically concluded that
Waste Management deliberately made Munday's work environment
unpleasant because she had filed a claim with the Office of Human
Rights. Thus, Judge Heaney reasoned, because Waste Management
deliberately created an environment that constituted "unpleasant"
conditions, her claim of constructive discharge was satisfied, and,
therefore, the district court's decision regarding retaliation under Ti-
tie VII should have been affirmed.
4. Analysis.-
a. The Fourth Circuit View of Section 704(a): Does Narrowly Con-
struing Title VI Allow Employers to "Retaliate"?--Courts have determined
114. Id. at 245.
115. Id. at 245-46 (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770
F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985)).
117. Id. at 246.
118. Id.
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that actionable retaliation under section 704(a) of Title VII requires
discrimination on the part of the employer that materially or adversely
affects the terms or conditions of employment. 19 As the Munday de-
cision illustrates, the Fourth Circuit's view of actionable employer con-
duct under section 704(a) is limited by prior decisions regarding the
element of adverse employment action. In essence, the Fourth Circuit
has always required a retaliation plaintiff to show that she suffered
tangible employment-related harm as the result of her employer's
conduct by demanding an adverse employment action that consists of
either an ultimate employment decision or a substantial impairment
to the plaintiffs employment opportunities.12 ° Following Fourth Cir-
cuit precedent, the Munday court's conclusion that Waste Manage-
ment's conduct did not constitute an adverse employment action as a
matter of law is proper. In the Fourth Circuit, the harm that Munday
suffered-alienation and "emotional upset" '121 at the hands of her su-
perior and coworkers-simply did not amount to a violation of section
704(a). There was no ultimate employment decision or substantial
and tangible effect on Munday's employment conditions that directly
flowed from Waste Management's conduct. The view of adverse em-
ployment action in Munday is, thus, consistent with prior Fourth Cir-
cuit decisions involving alleged violations of 704(a), as well as with
decisions in other circuits employing a similarly narrow view of ad-
verse employment action.
122
The Munday decision further reflects the court's persistent re-
fusal to stray from a narrow interpretation of Title VII. Section 704(a)
is regarded as Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, and courts apply
the term "retaliation" in claims involving alleged violations of section
704(a). The language of Title VII, however, does not explicitly in-
clude the term "retaliation," rather it makes it unlawful for employers
to "discriminate" against those who assert rights protected by Title
VII's substantive anti-discrimination provisions. 23 The Fourth Circuit
view, as demonstrated by the Munday decision, is that section 704(a)
119. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the courts'
approaches to the requirement for an adverse employment action under section 704(a) of
Title VII).
120. See supra notes 48-65 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of the
Fourth Circuit's narrow approach to adverse employment action under section 704(a) of
Title VII).
121. Munday, 858 F. Supp. at 1379.
122. See supra notes 4345 and accompanying text (describing the narrow view of adverse
employment action taken by many courts).




prohibits employment "discrimination" but does not protect employ-
ees who engage in protected activity from any and all ensuing acts of
employer "retaliation" that may occur in the workplace. The Fourth
Circuit in Munday suggests the following: If section 704(a) were in-
tended to function as a broad anti-retaliation provision, the language
of Title VII would have expressly included the term "retaliation."
The Munday court's reasoning in upholding the district court's
finding for Munday on her breach of contract claim provides an apt
illustration of its view of section 704(a)'s reach. In Munday, the court
specifically pointed to the language of the settlement agreement and
distinguished its prohibition against "retaliation of any kind" from the
unlawful employment practice prohibited by 704(a).124 The court
noted that the two provisions are not identical and that the standard
for retaliation under the settlement agreement is lower than the stan-
dard for actionable employer conduct under section 704(a). 25
In determining whether the standard for retaliation under the
settlement agreement was satisfied, the Munday court explicitly recog-
nized that Waste Management's general manager Robert Bohager in-
tended to make Munday's work environment unpleasant because she
filed charges with the Office of Human Rights,12 6 which reflects the
court's acknowledgment that Waste Management engaged in inten-
tional "retaliation" against Munday for participating in a protected ac-
tivity. In juxtaposing the court's narrow approach to section 704(a)
against its approach to "retaliation" under the contract claim, the
Fourth Circuit asserts its position that section 704(a) is not meant to
function as Tide VII's broad retaliation proscription because some in-
tentional employer "retaliation" may be beyond the reach of Title VII.
The limited reach of section 704(a) as reflected in Munday clari-
fies the Fourth Circuit's view of both section 704(a) in particular and
Title VII in general-a view that is consistent with both the language
and purpose of Title VII as it was originally enacted for the prevention
and deterrence of discrimination in employment. Courts have explic-
itly stated that Title VII was not intended to address all offensive con-
duct in the workplace but, rather, only conduct that interferes with
equal opportunities for women and minorities in employment.' 12 7
124. See Munday, 126 F.3d at 245 & n.6.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 243, 245.
127. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (noting in a Title VII
hostile work environment claim that "'mere utterance of an ... epithet which engenders
offensive feelings in a [sic] employee' . . . does not sufficiently affect the conditions of
employment to implicate Title VII" (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
67 (1986))); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Title
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Narrowly defining actionable retaliation in an effort to serve Title
VII's original purpose and to prevent expansion of the statute's reach
may, however, thwart Congress's attempt to further the effectiveness
of Title VII by amending it in 1991.
The 1991 amendment to Title VII followed Congress's finding
that additional remedies and legislation were needed to deter and
protect against unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in
the workplace. 121 While the traditional remedy for Title VII plaintiffs
was usually limited to "make-whole" relief,1 21 under the 1991 Act em-
ployers may now be liable for compensatory and punitive damages for
such intentional discrimination or harassment.13 0 The institution of
these new remedies invites the question of whether Congress in-
tended to expand the scope of actionable employer conduct under
Title VII. Indeed, some courts recently have taken a more expansive
approach to what constitutes actionable conduct under section
704(a), looking at adverse employment action on a case-by-case basis
and allowing juries to make the ultimate decision regarding adverse
employment action. 31 The Fourth Circuit in Munday, however, de-
cided as a matter of law that the 1991 amendment necessitated a
change only in the remedies available to victims of discrimination in
employment, and not a change in what constitutes unlawful employer
conduct.
The Munday court allowed the lack of tangible effect of Waste
Management's conduct on Munday's employment conditions to over-
ride Waste Management's motivation for and success in making her
working conditions unpalatable. In this sense, the Munday decision is
disconcerting. By focusing on the effect of the employer's conduct,
and by limiting actionable retaliation only to tangible employment-
VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in
the workplace."); Crowley v. Prince George's County, 890 F.2d 683, 687 (4th Cir. 1989)
(noting in a retaliation claim that "Title VII is not a general 'bad acts' statute"); see also Ray,
supra note 29, at 407 (stating that the amendments to Tide VII have created a "new federal
employment tort").
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a note (1994) (Congressional Findings) (concluding that "ad-
ditional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and inten-
tional discrimination in the workplace"); see also supra note 29 (providing background for
the 1991 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
129. See supra note 29 (discussing the emphasis on "make-whole" relief prior to the 1991
amendments).
130. See supra note 29 (discussing additional remedies available under Title VII as
amended in 1991).
131. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (addressing the broad, case-by-case
approach to adverse employment action taken by some courts which have expanded ac-




related harm, the Munday ruling may result in foreclosing the possibil-
ity of recovery for future Title VII plaintiffs. These plaintiffs may be
denied recovery even though certain intangible factors, such as dam-
age to an employee's reputation and social status at her place of em-
ployment, may interfere with her ability to perform her job. Most
disturbing, however, is the Munday decision's message that under Ti-
tle VII employers may lawfully engage in a calculated plan of "retalia-
tion" as long they are careful-or clever enough-not to impose a
serious or tangible employment-related detriment upon their victims.
b. Constructive Discharge: Precluding Recovery under Title VII for
Employees who Voluntarily Resign.-The Fourth Circuit has always em-
ployed a high standard for claims of constructive discharge under Ti-
tle VII, requiring intolerable working conditions to be particularly
severe.13 2 For example, while an employee's subjective perception of
extensive stress normally will not be actionable,' discriminatory con-
duct causing stress that results in a physical condition such as an ulcer
may be actionable."3 The Munday decision is thus consistent with
Fourth Circuit case law addressing the requirement for intolerable
working conditions because the district court found that Munday's
perception of her working conditions resulted only in "emotional up-
set" rather than a more serious condition that would impair her ability
to perform her job or otherwise substantially affect her employment
conditions.135
Judge Heaney dissented vehemently to the majority's conclusion
in Munday, contending that the atmosphere of alienation should con-
stitute "unreasonably harsh" conditions under Bristow."3 6 Munday's
situation, as characterized by the district court, however, was similar to
Bristow's in that each perceived that the working conditions were un-
reasonably harsh, when in actuality the conditions were not as severe
132. See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit's view
of constructive discharge); see also infra notes 133-134.
133. See, e.g., Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) (conclud-
ing that "an employee's subjective perceptions [do not] govern a claim of constructive
discharge"); see also Sparrow v. Piedmont Health Sys. Agency, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1107, 1117-
18 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (mem.) (noting that "disappointed expectations" are not sufficient to
constitute a constructive discharge); see also notes 77-91 and accompanying text (discussing
the Bristow and Sparrow decisions in detail).
134. See Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1132 (4th Cir. 1995)
(finding that an employee suffered intolerable working conditions when he developed an
ulcer as a result of public humiliation caused by his coworkers and supervisor); see also
supra note 91 and accompanying text.
135. See Munday, 858 F. Supp. at 1379; see also supra notes 119 and accompanying text.
136. Munday, 126 F.3d at 245-46 (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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as their subjective impressions led them to believe. Therefore,
Munday's constructive discharge claim was not actionable because she
did not experience the level of severe harm required by the Fourth
Circuit to achieve intolerable working conditions."3 7
By setting forth a strict standard demanding objective evidence of
severe harm, the Fourth Circuit approach provides heightened pro-
tection to employers from liability to disgruntled employees who quit
and later decide that they were forced to resign by their employers. In
addition, the Munday approach prevents employees from playing the
part of judge and walking off the job for every workplace grievance.
Further, the Munday decision clarifies the Fourth Circuit's narrow ap-
proach to constructive discharge, and it appears to offer rough guide-
lines for what may constitute intolerable working conditions.
In assessing the existence of intolerable working conditions, the
Fourth Circuit favors concrete evidence indicating that the employee
has suffered due to her employer's conduct. For example, the court
will consider whether an employer fails to address an employee's em-
ployment-related complaints.1 3 Yet as the Munday decision indicates,
if such complaints are ignored by one manager but investigated and
corrected by other employees, the employee's claim may fail.1 39 The
court will also consider whether the plaintiff can show that her em-
ployment status was altered and whether she received a reprimand or
an unsatisfactory evaluation.1 4 ° Furthermore, the Munday court stipu-
lates that the length of time between the employer's alleged retalia-
tory conduct and the employee's resignation will be considered
strongly in retaliatory constructive discharge claims."'
Thus, the Munday decision suggests that employer conduct that
results in alienation of an employee will not render working condi-
tions intolerable unless it is manifested in concrete ways. Under
Munday, an employee alleging constructive discharge will certainly fail
unless she shows that she experienced specific instances of measura-
ble harm. Conduct resulting in subjective harm such as internal feel-
ings of alienation will most likely not be considered a constructive
discharge. Therefore, if an employee alleges that she resigned from
her job because her employee intentionally created an atmosphere
137. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text (discussing the Munday court's ap-
plication of standards provided by the Bristow court for determining whether an employee-
plaintiff experienced intolerable working conditions).
138. Munday, 126 F.3d at 244.
139. See id. at 243-44.
140. Id. at 244.
141. Id. (noting that Munday did not resign until seventeen months after the events
forming the basis of her claim occurred).
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where she was ostracized and spied upon, she must first voice her spe-
cific complaints to her employer. 14 2 In addition, an employee who
alleges that her employer convinced coworkers to participate in creat-
ing unreasonably harsh working conditions by, for example, spying on
her and reporting her actions to management, must present specific
evidence that such activities actually occurred. 4 '
The Fourth Circuit's strict approach to constructive discharge
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for an employee alleging a viola-
tion of section 704 (a) to recover if, ultimately, she voluntarily resigned
from her job. The relationship between the Fourth Circuit's high
standard for intolerable conditions for a constructive discharge under
Title VII and the court's narrow view of adverse employment action
under 704(a) is such that, in most cases, a plaintiff will not be able to
show that her employer's conduct amounted to a constructive dis-
charge, and, consequently, she will not be able to show that she suf-
fered from an adverse employment action. The Munday court thus
sends out a clear message to employees who believe that their employ-
ers have discriminated against them or retaliated against them for ex-
ercising their rights: Employees who voluntarily resign from theirjobs
risk being precluded from recovery under Title VII.
5. Conclusion.-The Fourth Circuit in Munday, by narrowly de-
fining the scope of protection available to employees under section
704(a) of Title VII and confining adverse employment action to tangi-
ble employment-related harm, set forth its view that 704(a) is not Title
VII's comprehensive retaliation proscription. In addition, the Munday
court narrowly construed the theory of constructive discharge, effect-
ing a difficult standard for intolerable conditions. The result is that
recovery under Title VII is now virtually impossible for plaintiffs alleg-
ing a violation of section 704(a) who voluntarily resigned as a result of
perceived employer retaliation. The Munday decision is consistent
with prior Fourth Circuit precedent as well as the language and origi-
nal purpose of Title VII. We may also benefit from Munday in terms
of guidance for future retaliation and constructive discharge claims.
The Munday ruling, nonetheless, is dangerous to future Title VII
plaintiffs because it narrowly prescribes the scope of conduct that may
142. See id. (noting that Munday never complained to her employer about being ig-
nored by her coworkers and supervisor).
143. See id. ("[T]here is no evidence that any co-worker actually spied on her or re-
ported her statements to Bohager or other management.").
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be actionable and invites employers to engage in-albeit with care-
intentional "retaliation."
RACHEL M. WOLF
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III. TRADEMARKS
A. Incontestability: Now You See It, and Now You Don't
In Petro Stopping Centers, L.P. v. James River Petroleum, Inc.,1 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
"PETRO CARD" trademark of James River Petroleum, Inc. (JRP) did
not cause a "likelihood of confusion" with Petro Stopping Centers'
(PSC) marks.2 The Fourth Circuit also held that the incontestability
of PSC's marks did not prevent the district court from finding the PSC
marks to be "descriptive and weak"; therefore, JRP's trademarks did
not infringe PSC's.4 With this holding, the Fourth Circuit has solidi-
fied the case law on the doctrine of incontestability by following the
guidance and intent of Congress, while adequately balancing the com-
peting interests of trademark law.
1. The Case.-In 1975, PSC began providing full-service rest stop
facilities adjacent to interstate highways for use both by the general
public and commercial truckers.5 PSC operates and franchises these
centers under the marks "PETRO STOPPING CENTER" and "PETRO
TRAVEL PLAZA."6 PSC has many facilities throughout the nation, in-
cluding two in Virginia. 7 The services provided at PSC range from
fuel and automotive services to movie theaters and barber shops.8
PSC advertises extensively, directed mainly at truckers, and claimed an
estimated revenue of over $2 billion in one five-year period.9
1. 130 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1561 (1998).
2. Id. at 90-91, affg41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853 (E.D. Va. 1997). See infta note 10 for
examples of PSC's registered trademarks.
3. Section 15 of the Lanham Act provides that "the right of [a] registrant to use [a]
registered mark in commerce for the goods or services on or in connection with which
such registered ... mark shall be incontestable" if (1) the mark has been in continuous use
for five years, (2) there has been no final decision adverse to the right of use of the mark,
(3) there is no pending proceeding concerning the right to use the mark, (4) the regis-
trant has filed an affidavit with the PTO attesting to the above requirements, and (5) the
mark has not become the "generic" name for goods or services. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1994).
4. Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 90, 92.
5. Id. at 90.
6. Id.
7. Id. PSC operates over forty facilities that are located in twenty-seven states. Id. The
two facilities in Virginia were located in Ruther Glen and Fort Chiswell. Id.
8. Id. The services provided by PSC include "separate fueling areas for cars and
trucks, truck maintenance, truck weighing scales, truck washes, restaurants, retail stores,
fax machines, ATM machines, showers, laundry, quiet rooms, game rooms, television
rooms, movie theaters, and barber shops." Id. The facilities were operated twenty-four
hours a day, and PSC accepted all forms of payment, including cash, checks, credit cards,
and a "PETRO" card. Id.
9. Id. PSC advertises in special publications for truckers, truck stop directories, on
billboards, on Virginia Department of Transportation exit signs, and on radio. Id. PSC
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PSC had registered fourteen federal trademarks that contained
the word "PETRO."' One of its trademarks covered the word
"PETRO" alone with background colors that were distinctive to PSC. 1t
Eight of PSC's trademarks, including the PETRO mark, had attained
"incontestable" status under the Lanham Act.1 2
In 1992 JRP, a petroleum distribution company, entered into the
business of directly selling fuel to commercial fleets through a "card
lock" system. 13 In the "card lock" business, a commercial fleet owner
purchases an "account" from JRP (or any other member of the Com-
mercial Fueling Network (CFN)), 4 which allows drivers of the com-
mercial fleet to purchase fuel from unmanned, self-service filling
stations via a payment card.15 JRP operated five such filling stations in
the Richmond, Virginia area; none of these stations were adjacent to
interstate highways or near any PSC facilities.16 JRP employed a lim-
ited advertising campaign directly aimed at obtaining commercial ac-
counts. 1 7 JRP used the trademark 'JAMES RIVER PETRO CARD" to
identify its facilities.1 "
OnJuly 1, 1996, PSC suedJRP in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia,1 9 alleging, inter alia, federal and
common law trademark infringement.2" The district court held for
estimated at trial that this advertising had cost $6.25 million over the five years prior to
litigation. Id.
10. Id. Examples of PSC's registered marks include: "PETRO PRIDE,"
"PETRO:LUBE," "PETRO:2," "PETRO:PLUS," and "PETRO:TREAD." Id. PSC registered
its first mark, "PETRO STOPPING CENTER," in August 1982. Id.
11. Id. PSC uses the colors green, white, and red-orange in its mark. Id. at 94.
12. Id. at 90; see supra note 3 (describing the prerequisites to obtaining incontestable
status under the Lanham Act).
13. Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 91.
14. Id. The CFN is a network of facilities that employ the "card lock" fueling system.
Id. A card from JRP will work at other CFN member stations and vice versa. Id.
15. Id. Although there were no other services available at JRP fueling stations, one
station was located near a convenience store and another near a restaurant. Id. However,
both the store and the restaurant were independently owned and had no affiliation with
JRP. Id.
16. Id at 91, 95.
17. Id at 91. JRP ran advertisements directed specifically towards commercial custom-
ers in local trade newsletters and CFN directories. Id JRP did not use radio advertise-
ments, billboards or Virginia Department of Transportation signs for advertising. Id. at 91,
95.
18. Id. at 91. JRP used either white or gray for its background and had "JR" in large red
letters. Id. Next to the "JR" is "James River" in blue letters and below that is "PETRO
CARD" in slanted red letters designed to create an impression of movement. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 90. PSC also alleged federal and common law unfair competition, federal
dilution, and Virginia false advertising claims. Id. All of these claims were resolved in favor
of JRP in the district court and were not addressed on appeal. Id.
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JRP on all counts, concluding that PSC's trademarks were "merely de-
scriptive" and "fairly weak" and that no "likelihood of confusion" ex-




a. Trademark Registration.-The law of trademarks "estab-
lishes exclusive rights to use marks that distinguish one manufacturer,
merchant or service provider's goods or services from those of
others. ' 23  Trademarks can consist of a single word or a group of
words or of "any device that serves to distinguish goods or services,"
such as "color patterns, scents, packaging, even a good's nonfunc-
tional design. "24 A trademark may be registered by its owner in the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO); this may be accomplished in a
few, relatively easy, steps.25 When an applicant attempts to register a
21. Id.; Petro Stopping Ctrs., L.P. v.James River Petroleum, Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1853, 1855-56 (E.D. Va.), affd, 130 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1561
(1998).
22. Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 91.
23. DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAw § 5A, at 7 (1997).
24. Id.; see Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 158, 159 (1995) (holding "that
there is no rule absolutely barring the use of color alone"); In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1238, 1239 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (stating that there is no "reason why a fragrance is not
capable of serving as a trademark to identify or distinguish a certain type of product"); In re
General Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (stating that in
certain instances when sounds are distinguishable and create an association with a specific
product they can be valid trademarks).
25. The applicant must fill out an application with the PTO listing (1) the name of the
applicant, (2) the first date that the trademark was used, (3) a description of the goods or
services that the trademark is used to represent, and (4) a claim of ownership of the trade-
mark being submitted by the applicant. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (a) (1994). Along with the appli-
cation, the applicant must submit a copy of the trademark being registered. Id. After the
application is filed, an examiner at the PTO reviews it. If the examiner feels that the
trademark does not adequately identify or distinguish the goods or services of the appli-
cant from other trademark holders, or if it violates any of the prohibitions of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052 (defining which marks can and cannot be registered on the principal register), she
will deny the application. 1 JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, TRADEMARK PROTEC-
TION AND PRACTICE § 3.04[1], at 82-82.1 (1998). If the application is approved, then the
trademark is published in the Official Gazette, a PTO publication. 15 U.S.C. § 1062. After
publication in the Official Gazette, members of the public have thirty days to file an "oppo-
sition" with the PTO if they feel that they will be "damaged" (i.e., the new trademark will
infringe on their existing mark) by the trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1063. If no one files an
opposition proceeding, then the trademark is registered, and the owner receives a certifi-
cate of registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1057. Each registered trademark must be renewed every
ten years after its issuance to maintain the protections of federal registration; renewal may
occur so long as the trademark is being used in the sale of goods in commerce. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1059.
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trademark with the PTO, it must essentially meet four criteria before a
registration will issue: (1) the mark must be a trademark,2 6 service
mark,2 7 collective mark,2 8 or a certification mark;29 (2) the mark must
be a "device" used to "distinguish goods and services"; (3) the mark
must be "distinctive"; and (4) the mark cannot be so similar to an-
other mark that has been previously used or registered as to cause
confusion. 0 Several statutory bars exist to block registration; the most
important, for the purposes of this note, is the mark being "merely
descriptive."'"
The ability of a mark to "distinguish" itself is often referred to as
its "strength" or its ability to "identify the goods sold under the mark
as emanating from a particular, although possibly anonymous,
source." 32 For purposes of determining registrability, trademarks are
generally classified into one of four categories: 3 (1) "generic" trade-
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof ... used by a person, or . . .which a person has a bona fide
intention to use in commerce ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods" from others
in commerce).
27. See id. (defining service mark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combi-
nation thereof.., used by a person, or... which a person has a bona fide intention to use
in commerce.., to identify and distinguish the services of one person" from the services of
others in commerce).
28. See id. (defining collective mark as "a trademark or service mark .. .used by the
members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization" or
intended to be used by the group or organization).
29. See id. (defining certification mark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof... used by a person other than its owner, or... which its owner has a
bona fide intention to permit a person other than its owner to use in commerce").
30. See CHIsUM & JACOBs, supra note 23, § 5C, at 12; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (setting
forth the statutory requirements and bars to trademark registration); 1 GILSON & LALONDE,
supra note 25, § 1.02[1] [c], at 11 (stating that a "trademark must meet three fundamental
requirements" for registrability: (1) "it must consist of a word, name, symbol, device, or
any combination thereof" which will qualify as a valid trademark, (2) "it must be adopted
and used by a manufacturer or merchant or qualify for intent to use treatment," and (3) "it
must identify [the mark holder's] goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or
sold by others").
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1). Other statutory bars include: when the mark is comprised
of "immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter"; when the mark is "deceptively misdescrip-
tive" of the goods to be sold; and when the mark is "primarily geographically descriptive"
or is "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" of the goods being sold, or is
primarily a surname." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (e).
32. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing
E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 512 (E.D.N.Y. 1975);
3 RUDOLPH CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
§ 82.1(1), at 755 (3d ed. 1969)).
33. SeeAbercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4,9-11 (2d Cir. 1976)
(identifying the four categories of terms with respect to trademark protection). The
strength or distinctiveness of a mark determines not only "the ease with which it may be
established as a valid trademark," but also "the degree of protection it will be accorded."
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marks, which receive no protection; 4 (2) "descriptive" trademarks, 35
which obtain no protection unless the registrant can show that the
trademark has "become distinctive of the applicant's goods in com-
merce," i.e., acquired a "secondary meaning";36 (3) "suggestive" trade-
marks, which are registerable but are only entitled to narrow or
"weak" protection;37 and (4) "arbitrary" or "fanciful" trademarks,
which receive broad or "strong" protection. Therefore, when a
party wants to oppose the registration of a trademark, or to declare it
invalid, it must show that the mark is either generic or descriptive
(with no secondary meaning).9
McGregor-Doniger, 599 F.2d at 1131; see infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing
the role of a mark's distinctiveness in the infringement analysis).
34. See Abercrombie &Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9 (defining a "generic" term as "one that refers,
or has come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular product is
a species"); e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938) (holding that
the term "Shredded Wheat" as a trademark could give no exclusive rights because it is the
generic term for the product).
35. See 1 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 25, § 2.03, at 59-60 (defining a "descriptive"
term as one that "informs the purchasing public of the characteristics, quality, functions,
uses, ingredients, components, or other properties of a product, or conveys comparable
information about a service," and citing an example of a merely descriptive term as
"Speedy" for a delivery service ).
36. See International Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079,
1085 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that even if a term's "'primary' meaning is merely descriptive,
if through use the public has come to identify the term with [a specific] product or service,
the words have acquired 'secondary meaning' and would become a protectable trade-
mark"); see also CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 23, § 5C, at 12 ("Descriptive .. .marks are
presumptively nondistinctive, but the mark user may overcome the presumption by a show-
ing that the mark has acquired secondary meaning, i.e., has through use become distinctive
of the goods of services."); F.T. Alexandra Mahaney, Incontestability: The Park 'N Fly Deci-
sion, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1149, 1160 (1986) ("The doctrine of secondary meaning recognizes
that a mark that is incapable of inherent distinctiveness because of its descriptiveness
might nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer in connec-
tion with one product that the mark has come to identify that product alone." (citing G. &
C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912))).
37. See Abercrombie &Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11 (noting that "[a] term is suggestive if it re-
quires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the
goods" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants
& Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968))); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready,
Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379-80 (7th Cir. 1976) (stating that "EVEREADY" is not descriptive, but
suggestive because it "suggests the quality of long life").
38. See CHISUM &JACOBS, supra note 23, § 5C[3], at 60 n.218 (stating that "[a] fanciful
term is one invented solely for use as a trademark, for example 'EXXON' for petroleum
services" and "[a]n arbitrary term is a common word used in an unfamiliar way, for exam-
ple 'APPLE' for computers"); I GI SON & LALONDE, supra note 25, § 1.02[1] [c], at 11-12
(defining arbitrary and fanciful marks as those "having no inherent meaning in relation to
the product or service").
39. A trademark can be challenged anytime after its registration (and before it be-
comes incontestable) on the basis that it is generic or merely descriptive because "the
Lanham Act gives the courts broad authority to review the PTO's registration decisions and
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An application to register a trademark may be opposed by "[a] ny
person who believes that he would be damaged by the registration of a
mark upon the principal register."4 ° An opposition may be brought
for any reason in which a mark may be denied by the PTO listed in 15
U.S.C. § 1052, such as the mark is "merely descriptive" or is likely to
cause confusion with an existing mark.4'
b. Trademark Infringement.-The common law of trademarks
and the rationale underlying the Lanham Act derive from a basic pol-
icy designed to "prevent others from using the same or similar marks
that create a likelihood of confusion... as to the origin or sponsor-
ship of goods or services."4 2 With the goal of preventing consumer
confusion, trademark law serves four vital functions in commercial
law. First, "it identifies one seller's product and distinguishes a prod-
uct from similar products sold by others."43 Second, "it signifies that
all goods bearing the same trademark come from a single source."4 4
Third, "it signifies that all goods bearing the same trademark are of
equal quality."45 Finally, "it is a prime instrument in the advertise-
ment and sale of goods."46
"Trademark law fosters these functions by balancing four inter-
ests" to equally serve the consuming public, the trademark owner, and
those who want to compete freely in an open market.47 The first in-
terest is to prevent consumers from being confused about the "origin
or sponsorship" of merchandise, goods, or services.48 The second in-
to allow or cancel registrations." Mahaney, supra note 36, at 1157 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1119
(1982)).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1994).
41. See CHISUM &JACOBS, supra note 23, § 5D, at 142 (stating that "[g] rounds for oppo7
sition are the same as those for registration denial under Lanham Act Section 2, including
descriptiveness and confusing similarity to marks previously used by others"); see also supra
notes 25-31 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for trademark registra-
tion and some of the statutory bars to registration listed in 15 U.S.C. § 1052).
42. CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 23, § 5A, at 8.
43. Mahaney, supra note 36, at 1151.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1151-52.
46. Id. at 1152; see also CHISUM &JACOBS, supra note 23, § 5A, at 8 (stating that the four
functions of trademarks are to: (1) "identify the goods or services to consumers"; (2)
"identify the source of the goods and services and serve as a badge of their quality"; (3)
provide "consumers [with] a frame of reference regarding quality by informing them of a
product manufacturer's identity"; and (4) serve as "advertising devices").
47. See CHISUM &JACOBS, supra note 23, § 5A, at 8.
48. Id. If marks are similar, they may confuse consumers, causing them to purchase
one merchant's goods when they were intending to purchase another merchant's goods.
Id. This would deprive the consumers of "free choice" in choosing the products that they
want to purchase, regardless of the products' quality. Id
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terest is in preserving and protecting the "goodwill" of the mark's
owner in the community among consumers.49 The third interest is
the common interest of free competition, which serves both the con-
sumers and new competitors who want to enter into a particular enter-
prise." The final competing interest is a general desire for a "fair and
efficient legal system" that will serve both the consumers and competi-
tors equally.
5 1
The balance between these competing interests is served by one's
opportunity to bring an infringement action. An injunction in an in-
fringement action is allowed when the litigant bringing the action can
show that the registered mark is "likely. . . to cause confusion."52 If a
mark is permitted to cause confusion as to the origin of the goods in
commerce, it will run afoul of the first two competing interests men-
tioned above, the prevention of confusion as to the origin of goods
and preserving the goodwill of a mark holder in commerce.5 ' There-
fore, courts protect these interests via infringement suits. Addition-
ally, the third and fourth interests are also preserved by courts
presiding over infringement actions.54 Courts ensure the fair and
consistent application of trademark law, allowing the continuance of
free trade and commerce among competitors in the market, which
prevents "[e]xcessive trademark protection [which] restricts market
entry, limiting customer choice and raising prices. '5 5 Therefore, in-
fringement actions promote the balancing of the competing interests
in trademark law.
The Lanham Act states that a person "infringes" a trademark
when that person uses "in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark" for the purpose of
selling, distributing or advertising "any goods or services on or in con-
nection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
49. Id. Any incentives that a trademark holder would have in establishing "goodwill"
with his customers, by providing consistent quality in his goods, would be lost if any com-
petitor could freely take advantage of that "goodwill" through use of similar marks. Id.
50. Id. By granting "excessive trademark protection" the choices that consumers have
would be reduced and the prices of those products that are available could be priced
higher. Id.
51. Id. If the doctrines of trademark law are "vague or subject to inconsistent applica-
tion," it will increase the burden on judicial resources, promote litigation, and increase the
costs of conducting business. Id.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994).
53. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (describing various interests weighed
by trademark law).
54. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing the interest of free compe-
tition, and the desire for fairness and efficiency in the legal system).
55. CHisuM & JACOBS, supra note 23, § 5A, at 8.
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mistake, or to deceive," without the registrant's consent.56 "In deter-
mining infringement, it is not necessary to prove actual confusion [,]"
rather "[t] he test is whether there is likelihood of confusion. 57
The judicially created two part test for infringement was ex-
plained in Quality Inns International, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.58 In that
case, Quality Inns International, Inc. sought a declaratory judgment
against McDonald's Corp., declaring that the trademark "McSleep
Inn" for an economy class hotel chain did not infringe any of McDon-
ald's federally registered marks. 59 In denying Quality Inn's declara-
tory judgment Judge Niemeyer stated that:
[t]here are but two inchoative elements that must be estab-
lished for entitlement [of a claim of infringement], from
which all permutations and guises of the cause of action are
derived: the senior owner of the mark must demonstrate (1)
the adoption and use of a mark and his entitlement to en-
force it, and (2) the adoption and use by a junior user of a
mark that is likely to cause confusion that goods or services
emanate from the senior owner.60
Using this two-step analysis, the Fourth Circuit stated its test for
infringement in the case of Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha
of Virginia, Inc.6" In that case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's ruling granting the plaintiff (Lone Star Steakhouse) a perma-
nent injunction against Alpha of Virginia on the basis of trademark
infringement.6 2 The plaintiff had federal registration for the trade-
marks "Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon" and "Lone Star Cafe," and
was seeking to enjoin the defendant's use of "Lone Star Grill."63 To
determine the test for infringement, the court looked to 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1) and stated that "a complainant must demonstrate that it has
a valid, protectible trademark and that the defendant's use of a color-
able imitation of the trademark is likely to cause confusion among
consumers."'" The court agreed with the lower court's analysis in
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
57. Dwight S. Williams Co. v. Lykens Hosiery Mills, Inc., 233 F.2d 398, 401 (4th Cir.
1956) (citing Noll v. Rinex Labs. Co., 25 F. Supp. 239, 240 (N.D. Ohio 1935); Mershon Co.
v. Pachmayr, 220 F.2d 879, 883-84 (9th Cir. 1955)).
58. 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988).
59. Id. at 201.
60. Id. at 209 (citing Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928)).
61. 43 F.3d 922 (4th Cir. 1995).
62. Id. at 925.
63. Id. at 925-26.
64. Id. at 930.
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finding infringement by the defendant and with its decision to grant
an injunction in favor of Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon. 65
In the Fourth Circuit, the modern test for determining whether a
likelihood of confusion exists began to develop in Pizzeria Uno Corp. v.
Temple.66 In this case, the plaintiff, Pizzeria Uno Corp., registered the
mark "Pizzeria Uno" in 1978 for a restaurant in Chicago, Illinois.67
The plaintiff began to sell franchises, and the chain of restaurants
grew to eleven. 68 The defendant operated restaurants in South Caro-
lina under the trademark "Taco Uno."69 The defendant attempted to
register the "Taco Uno" mark in 1982 and the PTO rejected the first
application. 7' The defendant petitioned the PTO for reconsideration
and the PTO then published the mark in the Official Gazette. 71 After
viewing the defendant's mark in the Official Gazette, the plaintiff filed
a complaint alleging, inter alia, federal trademark infringement.72
The district court held that there was no infringement, finding that
the term "UNO" was weak and "merely descriptive," the operations of
the two companies were not similar, the restaurant operations were
not located near each other, the advertising campaigns were different,
there was no intentional infringement, and there was no evidence of
actual confusion. 7
The district court relied on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Sun-Fun
Products, Inc. v. Suntan Research & Development, Inc.74 to define the fac-
tors to be employed when determining if a likelihood of confusion
exists. 75 The factors, which the Fourth Circuit adopted, were:
a) the strength or distinctiveness of the mark;
b) the similarity of the two marks;
65. Id. at 937, 941.
66. 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 1525.
68. Id.
69. Id. The court noted that the plaintiff, Pizzeria Uno, was not operating any
franchises in South Carolina, but was investigating the possibility of expansion into that
state. Id.
70. Id. The PTO rejected the mark "'on the basis of [the registration] for the mark
Pizzeria Uno.'" Id.
71. Id.; see supra note 25 (explaining the process by which a trademark is registered).
72. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1524-25. In addition to the federal infringement claim,Pizzeria Uno brought a state common law unfair competition action. Id. at 1524. Prior to
filing the action in federal court, Pizzeria Uno filed an opposition application with the
PTO. Id. at 1525-26. The PTO ordered a hearing on the opposition, but deferred the
hearing pending the outcome of the infringement action in federal court. Id.
73. Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 566 F. Supp. 385, 396-99 (D.S.C. 1983), affid, 747
F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984).
74. 656 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1981).
75. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527.
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c) the similarity of the goods/services the marks identify;
d) the similarity of the facilities the two parties use in their
businesses;
e) the similarity of the advertising used by the two parties;
f) the defendant's intent;
g) actual confusion.76
The Fourth Circuit cautioned that not all of the factors carry
equal weight or are relevant in every analysis. 77 However, the court
did emphasize that the "first and paramount factor under this set of
factors is the distinctiveness or strength of the two marks."' 78 Similarly,
the majority of the circuits consider the "strength" of the mark factor
when determining if a likelihood of confusion exists.
79
76. Id.
77. Id. (stating that "'[n]ot all these [factors] are always relevant or equally emphasized
in each case'" (alterations in original) (quoting Modular Cinemas of Am., Inc. v. Mini
Cinemas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1972))).
78. Id. In addition to developing the seven-factor test for the likelihood of confusion
analysis, the Fourth Circuit also defined the standard for appellate review to be applied in
reviewing the district court's findings in trademark cases. Id. at 1526. The court adopted
the "clearly erroneous rule" and stated:
[A] finding is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record support-
ive of it and also, when, even though there is some evidence to support the find-
ing, the reviewing court, on review of the record, is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made in the finding.
Id. (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); Friend v.
Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1978); Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 556
F.2d 702, 703 (4th Cir. 1977)). Note that although the Fourth Circuit adopted the test
announced by the district court and affirmed the denial of an injunction, it disagreed with
the district court's conclusion that the mark was descriptive, and instead held it to be
suggestive. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's finding that there
was no likelihood of confusion, and held instead that while there was a likelihood of confu-
sion between the two marks, injunctive relief was not appropriate because Pizzeria Uno has
not "penetrated" the area in which the defendant was operating. Id. at 1533, 1536.
79. See Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 222 (1st Cir. 1989)
(identifying one of the eight factors as "the strength of the plaintiffs mark"); Sno-Wizard
Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that one of the
seven factors to be considered is the "type (i.e., strength) of [the] trademark or trade
dress"); Frish's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982) (not-
ing that the "strength of the plaintiffs mark" is one of the eight factors to be considered);
Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that the
strength of a trademark is one of numerous factors examined to determine whether there
is a likelihood of confusion); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.
1979) (noting that the "strength of the mark" is one of eight factors to be considered);
Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating
that one of the ten factors to be considered is "the strength of [the] owner's mark"); He-
lene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977) (indi-
cating that "the strength of the complainant's mark" is one of the seven factors to be
considered); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (stat-
ing that one of the eight factors to be used is the "strength of [the plaintiffs] mark").
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c. The Doctrine of Incontestability.-The introduction of the
Lanham Act8" was important to trademark law in many respects; one
of the Act's most important new provisions was the doctrine of "incon-
testability."8 1 Incontestability status is obtained for a trademark by
meeting the following requirements: the trademark must have been
in use for five consecutive years; the trademark registered may not be
the "generic" 2 name for the goods and services the mark is being
used in connection with; and the owner of the mark must provide a
written affidavit to the PTO within one year after the five years contin-
uous use has elapsed."3 The owner's affidavit must state the goods
and services that the trademark has been used in connection with for
the continuous five year period, that there has been "no final decision
adverse to the registrant's claim of ownership" of the mark, and that
there is no current proceeding involving the rights of the trade-
mark. 4 Once the PTO determines that these requirements are met,
the trademark becomes incontestable, and its registration "shall be
conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the
registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark,
and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in
commerce." 5 This right of exclusive use is subject to a number of
defenses that may be proven by an alleged infringer to overcome the
incontestable status of a mark.8 6
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
81. See Mahaney, supra note 36, at 1154 ("One of the most important statutory advan-
tages of the Lanham Act is the doctrine of incontestability."); see also CHISUM & JACOBS,
supra note 23, § 5E[1] at 168 ("The Lanham Act's incontestability provision . . . was an
innovation.").
82. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (defining and providing an example of a
"generic" mark).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1065.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 1115(b).
86. Id. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b), the incontestable status of a mark is subject to the
following defenses: "the registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was ob-
tained fraudulently"; "the mark has been abandoned by the registrant"; the mark is being
used by or with the permission of the owner to misrepresent the source of goods or services
that the mark is used on or in connection with; the mark being charged as an infringement
is used "otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business.... or
of a [mark] which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
goods of such party, or their geographic origin"; "prior use" of the registered mark by the
alleged infringer, without the knowledge of the senior mark (note that this defense is only
applicable to the party who is charged with the specific infringement, and does not bar an
infringement action being brought against others who can not use this defense); the mark
was previously registered and used by the alleged infringer; "the mark has been or is being
used to violate the antitrust laws of the United States"; or "equitable principles, including
laches, estoppel, and acquiescence, are applicable." Id. Additionally, by reference, 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b) allows defenses from § 1065, which are: "no incontestable right shall be
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However, since the Lanham Act was passed in 1946, many courts
have had difficulty defining the scope of protection to be accorded to
incontestable marks.8 7 One of the main questions was whether a mark
that has attained incontestable status under 15 U.S.C. § 1065 could be
declared invalid in an infringement action brought by the owner of
the incontestable mark on the grounds that the mark was merely de-
scriptive with no secondary meaning."' This split in the interpretation
of the impact of incontestability is best evidenced in the cases of Park
'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,"° a Ninth Circuit case, and Union
Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc.,°° a Seventh Circuit decision. This split
in the case law related to whether the incontestable status of a "merely
descriptive" trademark could be used "offensively,"° ' in addition to its
"defensive"92 use.
In Union Carbide Corp., the Seventh Circuit determined that even
though a mark was "merely descriptive," with no secondary meaning,
acquired in a mark which is the generic name for the goods or services or a portion
thereof, for which it is registered," and that an incontestable mark will not be superior to a
"valid right acquired under the law of any State or Territory by use of a mark or trade name
continuing from a date prior to the date of [federal] registration" of the incontestable
mark. Id. § 1065.
87. See Mahaney, supra note 36, at 1149 ("Since the passage of the [Lanham] Act, fed-
eral courts have wrestled with the meaning of incontestability.").
88. See 1 GiLsoN & LALONDE, supra note 25, § 4.03[3] [C], at 52-53 (noting that a "con-
flict [existed] between the Ninth and Seventh Circuit on a fundamental question of Lan-
ham Act interpretation"). Compare Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327,
331 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that in the Ninth Circuit "a registrant can use the incontestable
status of its mark defensively, as a shield to protect its mark against cancellation and to
protect its right to continued use of the mark, but not offensively, as a sword to enjoin
another's use") with Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 377 (7th Cir.
1976) (holding that "a plaintiff in an infringement action establishes conclusively, under
§ 1115(b), his exclusive right to use a trademark to the extent he shows his trademark has
become incontestable under § 1065" and that there is no distinction between "defensive/
offensive" use of a mark's incontestable status).
89. 718 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1983).
90. 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976).
91. "Offensive" use of an incontestable trademark is analogous to using the incontest-
ability of the "merely descriptive" mark as a "sword to enjoin another's use." Park 'Nly, 718
F.2d at 331. This use would allow the holder of an incontestable, "merely descriptive"
mark to enjoin the use of an infringing mark. If the mark was not incontestable, it would
not be able to enjoin the use, because of its "merely descriptive" strength. Id.
92. "Defensive" use of an incontestable trademark allows a registrant of a mark which is
merely descriptive" (and normally not entitled to protection) to use its incontestable sta-
tus as a "shield to protect its mark against cancellation and to protect its right to continued
use of the mark." Id. "If an incontestable mark becomes generic, it may be canceled pur-
suant to 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c), but an incontestable mark cannot be challenged for being
'merely descriptive.'" Id. at 330 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,
537 F.2d 4, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1976); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Park & Fly, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 422, 424
(D. Mass. 1979)).
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"offensive" use of the mark's incontestable status was allowed.9" The
plaintiff, Union Carbide, had the mark "EVEREADY," which had long
gained incontestable status,9 4 and brought an infringement action
against the defendant, Ever-Ready Inc., which was in similar business
operations under the mark "Ever-Ready."95 The defendant argued
that "incontestability is a narrow defense device which cannot be used
offensively by a plaintiff in an infringement action."96 After careful
review of the statutory materials and the case law, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that "[tihere is no defensive/offensive distinction in the[Lanham Act], and .. .one should [not] be judicially engrafted on
it.,, 97
However, in Park 'NFly, the Ninth Circuit held exactly the oppo-
site, stating that a plaintiff with a "merely descriptive" but incontesta-
ble mark could not enjoin the use of an infringing mark.98 The
plaintiff, Park 'N Fly, Inc.,99 brought an infringement action against
Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.' °° While rejecting Dollar Park & Fly's argu-
ment that the mark "Park 'N Fly" was generic (and therefore entitled
to no protection), the Ninth Circuit did agree that since the "Park 'N
Fly" mark was "merely descriptive" with no secondary meaning, Park
'N Fly, Inc. was not allowed to use incontestability as an offensive
weapon and enjoin the defendant's use.' 0 1 This controversy was re-
solved by the Supreme Court in Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly,
Inc.102
In Park 'N Fly, the Supreme Court held that an infringement ac-
tion brought by the owner of an incontestable mark may not be de-
93. Union Carbide, 531 F.2d at 377.
94. The mark "EVEREADY" was registered and used for "electric batteries, flashlights,
and miniature [light] bulbs," and was in continuous use since 1901. Id. at 370.
95. Ever-Ready Inc. imported and distributed light bulbs and other electrical items
under the mark "Ever-Ready," but had only been in operation since 1946. Id. at 370-71.
96. Id. at 373.
97. Id. at 377.
98. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1983).
99. Park 'N Fly, Inc. had been in business since 1967, and has operated a number of
automobile parking lots near airports in various cities throughout the United States. The
company's mark, "Park 'N Fly" (with an airplane logo), received incontestable status from
the PTO in 1977. Id. at 329-30.
100. Id. at 329. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc. had entered into the same business as the plain-
tiff in 1973, and only operated one facility in Portland, Oregon, where the plaintiff had no
business. Id. at 329.
101. Id. at 330-31. The court reversed the district court's determination that Park 'N Fly,
Inc. was entitled to an injunction against the defendant and expressly disregarded theSeventh Circuit decision in Union Carbide by holding that incontestability of a "merely de-
scriptive" mark can only be used "defensively" and not "offensively." Id. at 331.
102. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
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fended on the ground that the mark is merely descriptive and
therefore invalid.1"' In so holding, the Court focused on the plain
language of the Lanham Act, stating that because a registrant has an
"'exclusive right' to use the mark [the] incontestable status may be
used to enjoin infringement by others."'0 4 The court further noted
that "Congress expressly provided in [section] 33(b) [15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(b)] and 15 [15 U.S.C. § 1065] that an incontestable mark
could be challenged on specified grounds, and the grounds identified
by Congress do not include mere descriptiveness.' 10 5 The Court did
note that any possibility of merely descriptive language being taken
from the "public domain" as a consequence of its holding is mitigated
by the existence of the PTO's examination procedure and the oppor-
tunity for third parties to contest the registration of any mark for the
five years prior to a mark becoming incontestable.
1 0 6
Confusion still exists, however, with regard to the effect of incon-
testability on the "likelihood of confusion" analysis, which is the sec-
ond element of a cause of action for infringement.10 7 Some courts
have held that a trademark's incontestable status dictates that the
mark be considered "strong" for purposes of the likelihood of confu-
sion analysis. Both Dieter v. B & H Industries, Inc.,l"' in the Eleventh
Circuit, and Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas,109 in the Sixth Circuit, inter-
preted the Supreme Court's holding in Park 'NEly to mean that incon-
testable trademarks are to be considered "strong" when determining
if a likelihood of confusion exists. 10
However, the majority of circuits have held that incontestability
goes only to a trademark's validity and gives no weight to incontest-
ability in assessing a mark's strength when determining if a likelihood
103. Id. at 205 (concluding "that the holder of a registered mark may rely on incontest-
ability to enjoin infringement and that such an action may not be defended on the
grounds that the mark is merely descriptive").
104. Id. at 196.
105. Id. at 201.
106. Id.
107. See CHISUM &JACOBS, supra note 23, § 5E[1][b], at 171.
108. 880 F.2d 322 (1th Cir. 1989).
109. 839 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1988).
110. See Dieter, 880 F.2d at 328-29 (reviewing the Park 'NRy decision and Eleventh Cir-
cuit case law and concluding that when a "mark is incontestable, then it is presumed to be
at least descriptive with secondary meaning, and therefore a relatively strong mark"); Wynn
Oil Co., 839 F.2d at 1187 (stating that "Park 'NRy[ ] require[s] that courts give full effect to
incontestable trademarks" and "[t]herefore, while the strength of the plaintiffs' mark will
still be at issue in cases involving contestable marks, once a mark has been registered for
five years, the mark must be considered strong and worthy of full protection").
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of confusion exists.' Therefore, in most circuits incontestability will
have no effect on a likelihood of confusion analysis; a defendant in an
infringement action will not be precluded from proving the plaintiffs
mark to be a weak mark and entitled to little or no protection." 2 This
majority view of the effect of incontestability can even be seen in the
opinions of district court judges in the Sixth Circuit, which has
adopted the minority view, as judges are "finding ways to de-empha-
size and diffuse [the] presumption" that incontestability will make a
weak mark strong. 1
The Fourth Circuit first considered this issue in Lone Star
Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Virginia, Inc." 4 In Lone Star, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision pertaining to
plaintiff Max Shayne," 5 a New York corporation operating the Lone
Star Cafe Roadhouse, on the basis that it "erroneously relied on incon-
testability as being dispositive" on the issue of the strength of an in-
contestable mark." 6 After reviewing decisions in other circuits and
111. See I GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 25, § 4.03[3] [D][ f], at 60 (noting that a "ma-
jority of courts are taking the . . . view . .. that a defendant is entitled to show that the
plaintiff's incontestably registered mark is weak" in a likelihood of confusion analysis).
112. See, e.g., Gruner &Jahr USA Publ'g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1077 (2d Cir.
1993) (noting that it was not error for the district court to find an incontestable mark
"weak" for the purposes of a likelihood of confusion analysis); Munters Corp. v. Matsui
Am., Inc., 909 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that "Park 'N y does not pre-
clude consideration of a[n incontestable] mark's strength for purposes of determining the
likelihood of confusion"); Miss World (UK) Ltd. v. Mrs. America Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d
1445, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that incontestability of a mark "does not establish,
however, that it is a particularly strong mark"); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803
F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that "[i]ncontestable status does not make a weak
mark strong").
113. 1 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 25, § 4.03[3] [D] [fl, at 61; see Aero-Motive Co. v.
U.S. Aeromotive, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 29, 37 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (determining, as a Sixth
Circuit district court, that the presumption of an incontestable mark being strong can "be
rebutted by demonstrating that the mark, while inherently distinctive, is nevertheless not
distinctive in the marketplace"); Daddy's Junky Music Stores v. Big Daddy's Family Music
Ctr., 913 F. Supp. 1065, 1071-72 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (suggesting the following additional
factors, besides incontestability, to examine when determining if an incontestable mark is
weak or strong: "determining the mark's type" (i.e. generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbi-
trary/fanciful); "consider[ing] the markets in which the mark has its greatest recognition
and allegiance"; and the existence of "numerous third-party registrations of the mark").
114. 43 F.3d 922 (4th Cir. 1995). In Lone Star, the defendant, Alpha of Virginia, Inc.
(Alpha), appealed a grant of summaryjudgment in the district court for the plaintiff, Lone
Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. (Lone Star). Id. at 925. Lone Star brought the action
claiming trademark infringement on its "Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon" mark, which was
used in connection with over thirty restaurants, claiming that Alpha's use of "Lone Star
Cafe Roadhouse" caused a likelihood of confusion. Id. at 925-27.
115. The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, enjoining
Alpha from using the mark "Lone Star Grill," and also granted a motion for summary
judgment for the plaintiff, Max Shayne. Id. at 925.
116. Id. at 933.
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the analysis of various commentators on the issue, the court stated
"that incontestability affects the validity of the trademark but does not
establish the likelihood of confusion necessary to warrant protection
from infringement. Likelihood of consumer confusion remains an in-
dependent requirement for trademark infringement." '117 Therefore,
the court held, it was free to determine whether the incontestable
mark was descriptive or suggestive in determining whether a likeli-
hood of confusion existed."' 8
This view of incontestability was reaffirmed in Shakespeare Co. v.
Silstar Corp. of America." 9 In this case, Shakespeare brought a trade-
mark infringement action against Silstar for infringing its registration
of a fishing rod with a "'whitish translucent' tip."120 In holding that
the defendant did not infringe on the plaintiff's mark, the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the decision of the lower court to inquire into the
strength of the plaintiffs mark, even though it was incontestable."'
The court followed Lone Star, stating "[i] n determining the likelihood
of confusion, the court may consider-indeed, should consider-the
mark's strength.
122
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Petro Stopping Centers, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its position
in Lone Star and held that the incontestability of a trademark only de-
termines the validity of a mark in an infringement action and has no
weight in defining the "strength" of a mark for the "likelihood of con-
fusion" analysis.12 Additionally, the court held that the district
court's finding that no likelihood of confusion existed between the
two parties' trademarks was not clearly erroneous, and therefore, PSC
117. Id. at 935 (citing 4A RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE-
MARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 25.08, at 59 (1992)).
118. Id.
119. 110 F.3d 234, 238-40 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 688 (1998) (holding
that an incontestable mark cannot be canceled because it is functional or descriptive, but
that its functionality or descriptiveness should be taken into account when performing a
likelihood of confusion analysis).
120. Id. at 236. The plaintiff, Shakespeare, owned a trademark for distinctive fishing
rods called "Ugly Stiks" and brought an action against the defendant, Silstar, which manu-
factured similar looking fishing rods called the "Power Tip Crystal rod." Id. at 236-37. In
this case, Silstar was not challenging Shakespeare's mark on the basis that it was "merely
descriptive," but rather because the mark was "functional" and therefore weak and entitled
to no federal protection. Id.
121. Id. at 239.
122. Id.
123. Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 92.
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was not entitled to an injunction to prevent JRP from using its
"PETRO CARD" mark.124
To determine whether infringement had occurred, the court
looked at the test defined in Lone Star "[ito prove trademark in-
fringement, a plaintiff must show both that it has a valid, protectable
trademark and that the defendant's use of a 'reproduction, counter-
feit, copy, or colorable imitation,' creates a likelihood of confu-
sion."' 25 Because many of PSC's marks had attained incontestable
status, the court conceded that no issue existed as to the validity of
PSC's trademarks and focused only on whether a likelihood of confu-
sion existed.' 26
To determine whether a likelihood of confusion existed, the
court employed the Pizzeria Uno seven-factor test.127 The court reiter-
ated that these factors do not carry "equal importance or equal rele-
vance in every case," and that "determinations regarding likelihood of
confusion" are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.' 21
The first element of the likelihood of confusion analysis ad-
dressed by the court was the strength of PSC's mark. 21 PSC proffered
three separate arguments in an attempt to show that the lower court
erred in finding that PSC's "PETRO" mark was "merely descriptive
and a fairly weak mark."' 30 PSC argued that the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Park 'N Fly precluded the district court from finding PSC's
mark descriptive and weak; that because the PTO found PSC's marks
to be at least suggestive, 1 ' the district court was precluded from find-
ing PSC's marks weak; and that the fact that third-party registrations
124. Id. at 95.
125. Id. at 91 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994); Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v.
Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 930 (4th Cir. 1995)).
126. Id. ("[O]nly the second requirement-likelihood of confusion-is at issue in this
appeal.").
127. Id. at 91-92; see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (explaining the seven
factor test adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Pizzeria Uno).
128. Petro Stoping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 91-92 (citing Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d
1522, 1526 (4th Cir. 1984)).
129. Id. at 92.
130. Id. at 91-93 (quoting Petro Stopping Ctrs., L.P. v. James River Petroleum, Inc., 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853, 1855 (E.D. Va. 1997)).
131. PSC contended that since the PTO did not require PSC to show that its mark had
acquired "secondary meaning" to be entitled to registration, the PTO found the mark to
be at least "suggestive." Id at 92. Specifically, PSC reasoned that when the PTO receives
an application for a mark that is descriptive, a "secondary meaning" showing is required.
Because PSC was not required to show secondary meaning, it claimed that its mark must be
at least suggestive. Id. (citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43
F.3d 922, 934 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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including the word "PETRO" exist was not sufficient to declare a mark
weak. 13 2 The court addressed and dismissed all of these arguments.
First, the court addressed PSC's claim that Park 'N Fly precluded
the conclusion that an incontestable mark is descriptive and weak.
133
The court dismissed this argument by showing that PSC misinter-
preted the holding in Park 'NFly.134 The court characterized the Park
'N Fly decision as holding only that "a defendant in an infringement
suit cannot claim that an incontestable mark is merely descriptive and
therefore invalid and undeserving of any protection."'1 35 The court
noted that the Park 'N Fly Court did not go as far as saying that the
incontestability of a mark is dispositive of its strength when being con-
sidered in the likelihood of confusion analysis. 136 The court stated
that the 1988 revisions of the Lanham Act confirmed its interpretation
of Park 'N F/y.137 The court also looked to its decisions in Lone Star,
where the court held that "incontestability affects the validity of the
trademark but does not establish the likelihood of confusion neces-
sary to warrant protection from infringement,1 38 and Shakespeare,
where it held that "although a district court cannot cancel an incon-
testable trademark on the grounds of functionality or descriptiveness,
it can and should consider these grounds when determining whether
likelihood of confusion has been established.
1 1
39
132. Id. at 92-93.
133. Id. at 92.
134. Id. (stating that PSC "confuses the issue of a trademark's validity with the separate
inquiry into a mark's strength for purposes of the likelihood of confusion determination").
135. Id.
136. Id. ("The [Supreme] Court did not hold.., that the descriptive nature of a mark
may not be considered in the separate likelihood of confusion inquiry.").
137. Id. The court quoted a change in the incontestability provisions of the Lanham
Act, which occurred in the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, which stated that "[s]uch
conclusive evidence of the right to use the registered mark shall be subject to proof of infringe-
ment." Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 128(b)(1), 102 Stat. 3935, 3945 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115(b))). The court felt that by making the use of an incontestable mark conditioned
on any "proof of infringement," Congress was making it clear that incontestability would
not affect the likelihood of confusion analysis, and therefore, not affect the determination
of the strength of the mark, when determining if likelihood of confusion exists. Id. If
Congress meant to make any incontestable mark strong as a matter of law, it would be
inconsistent to make its use conditioned on "proof of infringement," as Congress was likely
aware that almost every circuit uses "strength of the mark" when determining if a likeli-
hood of confusion exists. See supra note 79 (listing all of the circuits that use this factor in
their analysis).
138. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon,
Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 935 (4th Cir. 1995)).
139. Id. (citing Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 238-40 (4th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 688 (1998)).
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Secondly, PSC argued that since the PTO found the "PETRO"
mark to be at least suggestive, the lower court erred in finding that the
mark was descriptive and weak, because a district court should not be
"free to substitute its own finding for that of the PTO."' 4 ° The court
addressed this argument by again citing Pizzeria Uno and stating that
"courts should accord deference to the PTO's findings when assessing
the strength of a mark under the likelihood of confusion test," but
"the PTO's 'determination is not conclusive."' 1 4' The court, however,
also stated that other factors besides a mark's suggestive or descriptive
nature should be considered when determining the strength of a
mark.14 2 In the instant case, these additional factors included
whether the mark had acquired a secondary meaning and the extent
that third parties have used the term "PETRO" in other trademarks.1 4
The court agreed with the district court's findings that the term
"PETRO" does not have a secondary meaning in the card lock busi-
ness, in which JRP is involved, and that a large number of third-party
registrants have the term "PETRO" in their trademarks.' 4 4 PSC ar-
gued that "evidence of third-party registrations alone is insufficient to
conclude that a mark is weak." 45 The court disagreed, stating that
"[t]he frequency with which a term is used in other trademark regis-
trations is indeed relevant to the distinctiveness inquiry under the first
likelihood of confusion factor."' 4 6
The court also noted that PSC's representations to the PTO when
first trying to acquire registration for its trademarks, that the term
"PETRO" is "'entitled to a very narrow scope of protection,"' was in
conflict with the position PSC was taking before the Fourth Circuit
regarding the strength of its "PETRO" marks.' 4 7 On these grounds,
140. Id. at 93; see supra note 118 and accompanying text (noting the Fourth Circuit's
similar observation in Lone Star).
141. Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 93 (quoting Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d
1522, 1534 (4th Cir. 1984)).
142. See id. ("More significantly, the placement of a mark in either the suggestive or
descriptive category is merely the first step in assessing the strength of a mark for purposes
of the likelihood of confusion test." (citing Lang v. Retirement Living Publ'g Co., 949 F.2d
576, 581 (2d Cir. 1991); Western Publ'g Co. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 57, 61 (2d
Cir. 1990); Miss World (UK) Ltd. v. Mrs. Am. Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d 1445, 1449 (9th Cir.
1988))).
143. Id.
144. Id. The court noted that there are 117 third-party registrations or applications with
the word "PETRO" in it, and 63 of these are related to the sale of fuel or fuel related
services. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1530-31).
147. Id. at 94. When PSC first tried to obtain registration of its mark in 1981, the PTO
objected to the mark, claiming that it would cause a "likelihood of confusion with previ-
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the court upheld the district court's finding that PSC's "PETRO" mark
was descriptive and weak.
148
The second "likelihood of confusion" factor addressed by the
court was the similarity between PSC's and JRP's marks.1 49 PSC ar-
gued that the district court erred because it focused on the dissimilari-
ties between the marks and not the similarities.' 5 0 The court
dismissed this argument, stating that when considering the similarity
of the marks "courts generally focus on the dominant portions of par-
ties' marks." '15 1 The court further stated that if the scrutiny of two
marks was limited to only similarities, then the need to review this
factor would be eliminated altogether, " [b] ecause every triable case of
trademark infringement involves marks that are similar at some
level."' 5 2 The court then noted that the test for similarity is whether a
"'similarity of appearance and sound"' exists which would result in
consumer confusion.1 53 After reviewing the two marks, the court af-
firmed the lower court's finding that the marks were dissimilar.
1 54
The court then addressed the similarity of goods and services,
and similarity of facilities-the third and fourth Pizzeria Uno factors.1
55
The court again found that the lower court did not err in finding the
goods, services, and facilities to be so dissimilar as to create no likeli-
hood of confusion. 156 In so finding, the court compared the services
and facilities of both PSC and JRP and held that "[b] esides the sale of
fuel, the two parties' services and facilities differ in virtually every re-
spect."15 The court also noted that even if by chance a PSC customer
was confused and attempted to purchase fuel at a JRP card lock sta-
ously registered trademarks that included the term PETRO." Id. To obtain registration,
PSC countered that "the term 'Petro' is entitled to a very narrow scope of protection," and
"that the term is extremely dilute and entitled to a weak scope of protection." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). In contrast, in this litigation, PSC was asking the court for




151. Id (citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922,
936 (4th Cir. 1995); Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1534-35).
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1534).
154. Id. The court noted that PSC's marks use green, white and red-orange, whileJRP's
marks use red, white and blue (and sometimes gray). Id. Additionally, the court focused
on JRP's use of "James River" or "JR" in its marks along with lines that signify movement,
and that the use of "JR" was the "dominant portion" of the mark. Id.
155. See id. at 94-95.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 95; see also supra notes 7-11, 13-15 and accompanying text (describing the
facilities and services available at PSC and JRP).
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tion, he could not, because only CFN members can purchase fuel at
JRP's facilities.1 5 8
The court next addressed the similarity of the advertising used by
both parties.159 PSC argued that JRP "promotes its services in the
CFN directories, in a manner similar to [PSC's] own promotion of its
services in truck stop directories." 60 The court dismissed this by not-
ing that CFN directories are available only to CFN customers (not to
the public) and that drivers of a CFN company would only wish to visit
those stations in which their CFN card would work. 61 The court also
noted the many differences between the types of advertising that each
company uses, 1 6 2 and held that the lower court did not clearly err in
finding no likelihood of confusion under this factor. 6 '
The final factor addressed by the court was whether there were
any instances of actual confusion between the two parties' marks. PSC
argued that even one instance of actual confusion should be signifi-
cant in determining the likelihood of confusion, and that the lower
court erred by not giving proper weight to its showing of actual confu-
sion. 1 64 The court, however, stated that PSC's "meager evidence of
actual confusion is at best de minimis.' 6 5 The court further stated
that the evidence of so few cases of actual confusion creates a "pre-
sumption against likelihood of confusion in the future."' 6 6
In holding that the Park 'NFly decision does not preclude an in-
contestable mark from being deemed merely descriptive, and there-
fore weak, for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis, and
that the lower court did not clearly err when applying the likelihood
of confusion factors, the court affirmed the district court's decision
that JRP did not infringe upon PSG's trademarks. 167
158. Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 95; see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text
(discussing the Commercial Fueling Network and the "card lock" fueling system).
159. Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 95.
160. Id.
161. Id. (reasoning that the exclusivity of the CFN makes any confusion unlikely).
162. Id.; see supra notes 9, 17 and accompanying text (comparing the advertising used by
PSC and JRP).
163. Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 95. The likelihood of confusion factor concerning
the defendant's intent was not raised on appeal and was therefore not addressed by the
court. Id.
164. Id. ("[PSC] maintains that courts normally accord significance to even one instance
of actual confusion.").
165. Id. (citing Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 F.3d 1527,
1535 (10th Cir. 1994)).
166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza,
Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980)).
167. Id.
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4. Analysis.-In Petro Stopping Centers, the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed its earlier holding in Lone Star that the incontestability of a
trademark does not make a "weak" mark "strong" for purposes of the
"likelihood of confusion" analysis in an infringement action, but is
only to be used to determine the validity of the mark.'6 ' Additionally,
the court held that the district court's finding that no likelihood of
confusion existed between the two parties' trademarks was not clearly
erroneous."' The Petro Stopping Centers holding, that incontestability
is only to be taken into account when determining the validity of a
trademark in an infringement action, is directly in line with Fourth
Circuit precedent. This holding strengthens the Fourth Circuit's posi-
tion that incontestability has no weight in a likelihood of confusion
analysis, and is consistent with both the guidance and the intent of
Congress, while balancing the competing interests that exist in trade-
mark law. 1
70
The decision in Petro Stopping Centers finds its roots in the
Supreme Court's Park 'N Fly decision. In that case, the Supreme
Court held that a trademark owner can bring an action for infringe-
ment of an incontestable mark, and that the defendant cannot defend
the action on the basis that the mark is merely descriptive, and there-
fore not valid.' However, the Supreme Court did not hold, as PSC
asserted, that a mark's incontestable status "forecloses any argument
that [the mark] is descriptive."1 72 In fact, the Park 'N Fly Court re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether a likeli-
hood of confusion actually existed. v17  Therefore, the Court did not
address the question of whether or not incontestability has any bear-
ing on the strength of the mark in a likelihood of confusion
analysis.' 74
168. Id. at 92 ("[I] ncontestability affects the validity of the trademark but does not estab-
lish the likelihood of confusion necessary to warrant protection from infringement." (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of
Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 935 (4th Cir. 1995))).
169. Id. at 95.
170. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing the competing interests of
trademark law).
171. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985). See supra
notes 102-106 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion on the Park 'N Fly
decision.
172. Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 92.
173. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 205.
174. See Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 92 (stating that Park 'NFly "did not hold[ ] that
the descriptive nature of a mark may not be considered in the separate likelihood of confu-
sion inquiry"); Munters Corp. v. Matsui Am., Inc., 909 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The
Supreme Court's holding in Park 'N Fly does not address likelihood of confusion. In fact
the Court specifically directed the district court to consider the likelihood of confusion
13251999]
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The Supreme Court's failure in Park 'NFly to address the impact
of incontestability on the strength of the mark, in a likelihood of con-
fusion analysis, left the courts with no guidance on the subject. 175 In
1988, Congress amended the text of 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) to clarify the
incontestability provisions by providing that although incontestable
status is conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark
"[s]uch conclusive evidence of the right to use the registered mark
shall be subject to proof of infringement as defined in section 32."176
The Lanham Act states that infringement occurs when an individual
uses the valid trademark of another in a manner which "is likely to
cause confusion."' 77 This shows that even if incontestability grants an
"exclusive right" to use a mark, that use is subject to a likelihood of
confusion analysis. If Congress intended incontestability to be disposi-
tive in a likelihood of confusion analysis, there would be no need to
condition the "exclusive right" to use an incontestable mark by requir-
ing a confusion analysis. In support of this position, a commentator
has stated that the Senate Committee made it "clear that incontestabil-
ity does not relieve the owner of an incontestable registration from
the burden of proving likelihood of confusion." 17 ' Therefore, with
this revision, Congress attempted to eliminate any confusion stem-
ming from the Park 'N Fly decision and to ensure that the incontest-
ability of a mark was to affect only the validity of the mark and not its
strength. 1
79
In his dissent in Park 'N Fly, Justice Stevens expressed concerns
over the Court's holding because of the nonadversarial nature of the
registration process."8 ' He felt that even though trademark applica-
tions are reviewed by competent personnel, the possibility for errors
argument on remand." (citing Park 'NFly, 469 U.S. at 205)); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys.,
Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that the Park 'N Fy holding does not ad-
dress whether incontestability is to be a factor in determining likelihood of confusion).
175. See 1 GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 25, § 4.03[3] [D] [f], at 60 (stating that "[i]n
the aftermath of Park "NFly, the courts were faced with the question of whether incontesta-
ble marks must be considered strong for likelihood of confusion analysis" and that the
courts still have not come to a unanimous agreement on the issue).
176. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 128(b)(1), 102 Stat.
3935, 3945 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1994)).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a).
178. CHISUM & JACOBs, supra note 23, § 5E[1] [b], at 171.
179. See id. (stating that "[t]he better view, confirmed by the 1988 amendment, is that
incontestability pertains only to validity").
180. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 212 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "the possibility of error [during the registration process that a
'merely descriptive mark' obtains registration] is always present, especially in nonadversary
proceedings" (footnote omitted)).
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did exist.181 Justice Stevens's concern was that merely descriptive
trademarks with no secondary meaning may be registered in error,
and if left unchallenged for the required five years, would become
incontestable. 182 This, in his mind, would lead to marks which are not
entitled to protection under the Lanham Act (because they are
"merely descriptive") becoming valid as a matter of law.'18
These concerns are well founded and valid. However, by holding
that incontestability does not affect the strength of the mark for pur-
poses of the likelihood of confusion analysis, the potential for harm to
society and free market competition is greatly reduced, if not elimi-
nated. This is because the "governing standard in trademark infringe-
ment actions is 'likelihood of confusion,"'184 and as long as
incontestability does not affect this portion of the infringement test,
the infringement test will remain equally balanced because only one
half of the infringement test will be affected by incontestability.'85 Be-
cause incontestability affects only validity in the infringement analysis
in the Fourth Circuit, it will not create strong marks as a matter of
law.186 This will make it more difficult for a holder of an incontesta-
ble weak mark than a holder of an incontestable strong mark to show
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 211-12 (stating that "Congress could not have intended that incontestabil-
ity should preserve a merely descriptive trademark from challenge when the statutory pro-
cedure for establishing secondary meaning was not followed and when the record still
contains no evidence that the mark has ever acquired secondary meaning," for this result
would mean that the mere "passage of time [can] transform[ ] an inherently defective
mark into an incontestable mark").
184. Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir.
1981) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and citing Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d
500, 504 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44,
47 (2d Cir. 1978) ("It is well settled that the crucial issue in an action for trademark in-
fringement or unfair competition is whether there is any likelihood that an appreciable
number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply con-
fused, as to the source of the goods in question." (citing Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your
Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1956))).
185. Balance in the infringement test will be maintained because incontestability will
only sway one half of the infringement test (validity of the mark) in favor of the holder of
the incontestable mark. By having the remaining half of the test (likelihood of confusion)
unaffected by incontestability, the holder of an incontestable mark which is "merely de-
scriptive" will not receive very broad protection. If a mark was to be considered strong as a
matter of law because it is incontestable, than the holder of a registered but "merely de-
scriptive" mark would receive broader protection than if the mark was only considered
"merely descriptive" (and therefore weak). This result would seem to grant an effective
monopoly in merely descriptive language to the holder of the mark, which is in conflict
with the goals of trademark law.
186. See Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 935 (4th
Cir. 1995) (stating that "incontestability affects the validity of the trademark but does not
establish the likelihood of confusion necessary to warrant protection from infringement"
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infringement because incontestability will not create the presumption
of a strong mark."8 7 If a party has a weak mark, it will need to make a
stronger showing with respect to the remaining six Pizzeria Uno factors
to show infringement.1 8  Therefore, unless an intentional act of in-
fringement took place, it will be much more difficult for a plaintiff to
show a likelihood of confusion.1 8 9
The concern over the potential for the trademark holder to ob-
tain a "monopoly" of merely descriptive language is practically elimi-
nated by the Fourth Circuit's decision in Petro Stopping Centers. By
holding that incontestability does not affect the strength of the mark
in a likelihood of confusion analysis, the court places the burden on
the holder of an incontestable mark to prove infringement.1"' Be-
cause the strength of a mark is the "first and paramount factor"'9 1 in
determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists, a district court
must consider the amount of protection the holder of the incontesta-
ble mark is to receive.' 92 The weaker the mark, the less likely that
confusion between the marks will be found.'93 Therefore, by holding
for the "[1]ikelihood of consumer confusion remains an independent requirement for
trademark infringement").
187. The strength of the mark is the most important factor in the likelihood of confu-
sion analysis. See Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (stat-
ing that the "first and paramount factor [in a likelihood of confusion analysis] is the
distinctiveness or strength of the two marks").
188. Because the Pizzeria Uno court described the strength of the mark as the "first and
paramount factor" when determining if a likelihood of confusion exists, it must follow that
if the mark of the person bringing the action is "weak," they will have to rely predomi-
nandy on the remaining six Pizzeria Uno factors to bring a successful infringement action.
189. See Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir.
1981) (stating that "[e]vidence of intentional deception carries special weight in the
calculus of determining likelihood of confusion" and "proof that a defendant chose a mark
with the intent of copying the plaintiffs mark, standing alone, may justify an inference of
confusing similarity" (citing Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 506 (5th Cir.
1980); Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980))).
190. To show infringement, the Petro Stopping Centers court stated that the plaintiff must
show it has "a valid, protectable trademark and that the defendant's use of a 'reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation,' . . . creates a likelihood of confusion." Petro
Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.2d at 91 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); Lone Star, 43 F.3d at 930).
191. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527.
192. Basically, the district court will determine if the mark is weak or strong. See Petro
Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.2d at 92 (stating that the Fourth Circuit "recognize[s] that likelihood
of confusion is an inherently factual issue" to be determined by the trier of fact in the
district court and reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard).
193. This is inherent in the impact of the strength of the mark in a likelihood of confu-
sion analysis. In the Fourth Circuit, as the strength of the mark is the "first and paramount
factor" in determining if a likelihood of confusion exists, it follows that if the mark is weak,
the trademark holder will have to make a much stronger showing in the remaining factors
to show infringement. Id.; see also supra notes 187-188 and accompanying text (emphasiz-
ing reliance on other factors when a mark is weak).
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that incontestability does not affect the likelihood of confusion analy-
sis, the Fourth Circuit has placed a check on the exclusive use of
merely descriptive marks. This will prevent "monopolies" on merely
descriptive language by allowing the original holder to keep using his
mark while permitting others to use similar language.
Additionally, the application of the incontestability doctrine in
the manner set forth in Petro Stopping Centers equally balances the com-
peting interests in trademark law.194 One such interest is that of the
trademark owner in maintaining customer "goodwill. ' 19 5 As inter-
preted by the Fourth Circuit in Petro Stopping Centers, two aspects of the
doctrine of incontestability allow the holder of a mark to maintain
"goodwill" with his customer base. First, the mark remains valid and
the holder may continue to use it. Therefore, the advertising and cus-
tomer base that the holder has developed over the five years leading
up to the incontestable status of the mark, and beyond, is not wasted.
Even though a court may still consider the mark merely descriptive
and therefore weak, incontestability will ensure the continued validity
of the mark for both "offensive" and "defensive" use, even though a
court may find it "merely descriptive" with no secondary meaning.
19 6
Second, the strength of a mark is not the only factor to be considered
in a likelihood of confusion analysis.19 7 Thus, although a competitor
may be able to use similar language because the incontestable mark is
descriptive and weak, she would not be permitted to use a near dupli-
cate of the mark.19 Many courts have held that the weight and use of
the factors to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists var-
194. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (explaining the competing interests
that must be balanced in trademark law).
195. See supra note 49 (explaining the interest in protecting the "goodwill" of a mark's
owner in the community).
196. This is because 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) specifically states that incontestability "shall be
conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the
mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use
the registered mark in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Of
course, this exclusive right is subject to the enumerated defenses of § 1115(b). See supra
note 86 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (discussing the factors considered by
the Fourth Circuit in determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists).
198. By using a "near duplicate" of a weak, but incontestable mark, a defendant in an
infringement suit would run afoul of at least one of the Pizzeria Uno factors, the "similarity
of the two marks." See supra note 76 and accompanying text (listing the seven Pizzeria Uno
factors which are used in the Fourth Circuit for the likelihood of confusion test). As
"'[n]ot all of the[ ] [factors] are always relevant or equally emphasized in each case,"' a
court would certainly give great weight to the similarity of the marks when the allegedly
infringing mark is a near duplicate. Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527
(4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Modular Cinemas of Am., Inc. v. Mini Cinemas Corp., 348 F.
Supp. 578, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
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ies in each case.' For example, if a plaintiff has a mark that is deter-
mined to be weak, but can show that the defendant intentionally
copied his mark, that evidence would carry "special weight. 20 0
"[P]roof that a defendant chose a mark with the intent of copying
[the] plaintiffs mark, standing alone, may justify an inference of con-
fusing similarity. '' 2 1' Therefore, if a court finds a plaintiff's mark is
weak, the court is not precluded from finding that a likelihood of con-
fusion exists and ruling in the plaintiffs favor. Even though incontest-
ability will "not make a weak mark strong, '20 2 a trademark holder will
be able to keep his mark, and he will be protected from infringement
by the remaining factors of the likelihood of confusion analysis.20 3
However, because the strength of a mark is the "first and para-
mount factor"2 0 4 in a likelihood of confusion analysis, another com-
peting interest of trademark law, the public and potential
competitors' interest in a free market, is protected by the holding in
Petro Stopping Centers.215 If a plaintiff's mark is determined to be weak,
he will have to make a strong showing with regard to the remaining
factors to show that a likelihood of confusion exists. This extra weight
given to the strength of a mark will provide an extra burden on the
holder of a descriptive, and therefore weak, mark to show infringe-
ment. This prevents the holder of a weak mark from having a "mo-
nopoly" on descriptive language, which would foreclose anyone else
199. See Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 91 (stating that likelihood of confusion factors
"are not of equal importance or equal relevance in every case" (citing Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d
at 1527)).
200. Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir.
1981).
201. Id. (citing Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 1980);
Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980)).
202. Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1986).
203. Because no lone factor is dispositive in a likelihood of confusion analysis, a trade-
mark holder can have a weak mark and yet still show that the remaining factors create a
likelihood of confusion. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text (discussing the
varying weight that may be given to different factors of the Pizzeria Uno "likelihood of con-
fusion" test, depending on the circumstances of the case).
204. Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527.
205. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing the competing interests of
trademark law). By holding that incontestability does not affect the strength of the mark
for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis, the Fourth Circuit protected the pub-
lic's and competitors' interest in a free market; because the holding prevents holders of
weak, but incontestable, marks from having a monopoly on a "merely descriptive" mark. If
incontestability operated as a matter of law to make a weak mark strong, then the holder of
that weak mark could easily use that "strength" as a weapon to prevent others from using
similar "descriptive" language in the marketing of their products. This would fly in the
face of the interest to allow others to compete freely in an open market and grant wide
protection to a mark, that would only receive very narrow protection (if any at all) were it
not for its incontestability.
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from using that language in describing their own product. The very
nature of a free market requires that multiple competitors try to sell
the same or similar product, and the Fourth Circuit's application of
the incontestability doctrine aids in that end.
Another competing interest is the need for a "fair and efficient
legal system."2 6 This interest is also achieved by the limitation on the
effect of incontestability in a likelihood of confusion analysis. If in-
contestability could turn a weak descriptive mark into a strong mark as
a matter of law, then a "monopoly" on that descriptive language would
be created. This would be unfair both to innocent competitors and to
the consuming public. One should not be denied the opportunity to
fairly compete in a free market. Additionally, if the court had not
followed its precedent, it would have placed the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sional law in disarray, leaving the door open for more litigation on the
impact of incontestability and taking away from the "efficiency" of the
judicial system in the Fourth Circuit.2"7
The final competing interest of trademark law is to protect con-
sumers from being confused about the origin of products.2"8 The po-
tential for consumer confusion is held in check in a way similar to the
way a trademark holder's "goodwill" interest is protected.20 9 This is
because the test for likelihood of confusion has seven independent
factors, which are weighed differently in each fact situation, thereby
ensuring that the similarity of descriptive language in competing
marks will not be dispositive in an infringement action by favoring
either the plaintiff or the defendant.2 10 The holder of a descriptive,
but incontestable, mark is protected from having his customers be-
come confused because he can rely on the other six Pizzeria Uno fac-
tors to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion.21 Therefore, although
this application of incontestability may allow a competitor to use simi-
206. CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 23, § 5A, at 8.
207. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the interest of trademark law
in a "fair and efficient legal system").
208. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (stating that confusion impedes customers
from making free and informed purchasing decisions).
209. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis of the hold-
ing in Petro Stopping Centers and how it protects the interest of the trademark holders'
"goodwill").
210. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (describing the case-by-case treatment of
the relevant factors).
211. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (setting forth the seven factors to be taken
into account in the likelihood of confusion analysis). A determination that a mark is weak
does not preclude a trademark owner from successfully prosecuting an infringement ac-
tion. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that not all of the factors will carry
equal weight in each analysis, therefore allowing the plaintiff to make a strong showing in
the other six factors to be successful in an infringement action).
1999] 1331
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
lar descriptive language, the public will be protected from confusion
by proper application of the remaining factors, which ensure fair
competition.
The holding in Petro Stopping Centers clearly advances the views of
incontestability illustrated by the Supreme Court in Park 'NFly, and by
Congress in the creation and subsequent revisions of the Lanham Act,
while balancing the competing interests which exist in trademark law.
The prevention of confusion among consumers regarding the origin
of goods is protected by the many factors which carry flexible weight,
allowing an analysis to be customized to the facts of any situation. 212
The interest of a trademark owner in maintaining his "goodwill" is
protected by the incontestable validity of his mark, along with the ad-
ditional factors he can use to show a likelihood of confusion. The
common interest in free competition is protected by the additional
importance given to the "strength" of the mark when determining if a
likelihood of confusion exists, causing the holder of a merely descrip-
tive mark to make a stronger showing in the other factors to show
infringement.
213
5. Conclusion.-In holding that incontestability does not affect
the "strength" of a trademark when determining if a likelihood of con-
fusion exists, the Fourth Circuit has followed its precedent and solidi-
fied its case law on the doctrine of incontestability. 214 The Fourth
Circuit has properly applied the intent of the Congress 2 5 by ensuring
that incontestability is used only to define the validity of a mark and
not to affect a likelihood of confusion analysis. This holding also
maintains a balance between the competing interests of trademark
law, and ensures that no "monopolies" will be granted for merely de-
scriptive language. With its holding in Petro Stopping Centers, the
Fourth Circuit has made it clear that "[i] ncontestable status does not
make a weak mark strong. '2 16
TERRANCE J. WIKBERG
212. See supra notes 207-211 and accompanying text (analyzing the impact of the Petro
Stopping Centers holding on the interest of trademark law in the prevention of confusion
among consumers).
213. See supra notes 204-205 and accompanying text (explaining how the common inter-
est of the public and potential competitors in a free market is protected by the holding in
Petro Stopping Centers).
214. Petro Stopping Ctrs., 130 F.3d at 95.
215. See supra notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
216. Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1986).
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